We discuss the emergence of cooperation in repeated Trust Mini-Games played by finite automata. Contrary to a previous result obtained by Piccione and Rubinstein (1993), we first prove that this repeated game admits two Nash equilibria, a cooperative and a non-cooperative one. Second, we show that the cooperative equilibrium is the only (cyclically) stable set under the so-called best response dynamics. © 2013 Elsevier Inc.
Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata
Andreozzi, Luciano
2013-01-01
Abstract
We discuss the emergence of cooperation in repeated Trust Mini-Games played by finite automata. Contrary to a previous result obtained by Piccione and Rubinstein (1993), we first prove that this repeated game admits two Nash equilibria, a cooperative and a non-cooperative one. Second, we show that the cooperative equilibrium is the only (cyclically) stable set under the so-called best response dynamics. © 2013 Elsevier Inc.File in questo prodotto:
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