This paper develops a model to assess the potential for unfairness in freeze-out bond covenant ex-change offers by highlighting the role played by coordination among bondholders. We show that (i) shareholders have an incentive to always structure an exchange offer unfairly and (ii) the coor-dination costs are positively related to the unfairness of the exchange offer. By improving coordi-nation, bondholders can obtain better contractual conditions not only with regard to exchange of-fers but also in bond issues.
Titolo: | The role of bondholder coordination in freeze-out exchange offers |
Autori: | Bazzana, Flavio; Broccardo, Eleonora |
Autori Unitn: | |
Titolo del periodico: | JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS |
Anno di pubblicazione: | 2013 |
Numero e parte del fascicolo: | 1 |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.12831/73633 |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11572/96966 |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 03.1 Articolo su rivista (Journal article) |
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