Bayesian orthodoxy posits a tight relationship between conditional probability and updating. Namely, the probability of an event A after learning B should equal the conditional probability of A given B prior to learning B. We examine whether ordinary judgment conforms to the orthodox view. In three experiments we found substantial differences between the conditional probability of an event A supposing an event B compared to the probability of A after having learned B. Specifically, supposing B appears to have less impact on the credibility of A than learning that B is true.
Titolo: | Updating: learning versus supposing | |
Autori: | J., Zhao; V., Crupi; Tentori, Katya; B., Fitelson; D., Osherson | |
Autori Unitn: | ||
Titolo del periodico: | COGNITION | |
Anno di pubblicazione: | 2012 | |
Numero e parte del fascicolo: | 3 | |
Codice identificativo Scopus: | 2-s2.0-84864042423 | |
Codice identificativo WOS: | WOS:000312359200013 | |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11572/91484 | |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 03.1 Articolo su rivista (Journal article) |
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