Within an OLG framework we study a perfectly balanced Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pension scheme: in spite of its depressive impact on national saving, PAYG is implemented for operating intergenerational transfers. With international capital mobility, the national adoption of PAYG determines a spill-over effect through the world capital stock. This creates a situation of interdependence among national pension policies, that we model as a n-countries dynamic game. In contrast with previous literature, it is shown that in general the international coordination of pension policies does not boost world savings and capital accumulation.

Does international coordination of pension policies boost capital accumulation? / L., Beltrametti; Bonatti, Luigi. - In: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS. - ISSN 0047-2727. - STAMPA. - 88:(2004), pp. 113-129.

Does international coordination of pension policies boost capital accumulation?

Bonatti, Luigi
2004-01-01

Abstract

Within an OLG framework we study a perfectly balanced Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pension scheme: in spite of its depressive impact on national saving, PAYG is implemented for operating intergenerational transfers. With international capital mobility, the national adoption of PAYG determines a spill-over effect through the world capital stock. This creates a situation of interdependence among national pension policies, that we model as a n-countries dynamic game. In contrast with previous literature, it is shown that in general the international coordination of pension policies does not boost world savings and capital accumulation.
2004
L., Beltrametti; Bonatti, Luigi
Does international coordination of pension policies boost capital accumulation? / L., Beltrametti; Bonatti, Luigi. - In: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS. - ISSN 0047-2727. - STAMPA. - 88:(2004), pp. 113-129.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11572/70325
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