Judicial Councils’ Accountability in Europe: Theoretical, Normative and Practical Perspectives

This dissertation examines the accountability of judicial councils in Europe and its role in addressing challenges associated with this model of judicial self-governance. While judicial councils have become the predominant institutional mechanism for safeguarding judicial independence and managing the judiciary across Europe (and beyond), concerns have increasingly been raised regarding politicization, corporatism, insufficient transparency, relatively low public trust, and related challenges. This dissertation investigates whether and which accountability mechanisms can contribute to addressing these challenges while preserving the independence of judicial councils from undue political and other external influences. It analyses the extent to which such mechanisms have become incorporated into European standards and implemented in practice across European countries. The analysis of European standards reveals a general normative trend towards greater emphasis on accountability. While earlier instruments did not expressly deal with this principle, more recent standards increasingly address transparency, legitimacy, integrity, and other accountability-related issues, concerning both judicial councils and their members. Building on the framework developed by the Consultative Council of European Judges in Opinion No. 24 (2021), the dissertation examines judicial, punitive, and explanatory accountability as distinct but interconnected dimensions of judicial council accountability. It identifies their substance and limits and uses this framework to structure the empirical analysis. In its empirical part, the dissertation analyses the accountability mechanisms of 22 European judicial councils. The data were collected through an original questionnaire distributed in 2025 to European judicial councils. In addition, three case studies provide more comprehensive insights: the Slovenian Sodni svet, the Italian Consiglio superiore della magistratura, and the Visoko sudsko i tužilačko vijeće of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The empirical findings confirm that accountability mechanisms are gaining more importance across Europe. Judicial accountability mechanisms, such as reasoned decision-making and availability of judicial review, are well established in almost all jurisdictions. Some exceptions warrant further attention. Punitive accountability mechanisms, particularly codes of conduct and disciplinary frameworks applicable to council members, remain less developed despite recent efforts to adopt comprehensive ethical standards. The greatest diversity and potential can be found in explanatory accountability. While almost all analysed councils publish annual reports and basic information concerning their activities, differences remain regarding transparency of decision-making processes, including the publication of meeting agendas, meeting minutes, decision reasoning, dissenting opinions, holding public sessions, broadcasting them, making recordings available, and conducting deliberations publicly. The research also identifies distinct geographical patterns. Judicial councils in Southern, Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe generally adopt more extensive transparency measures compared to Western Europe. This distinction reflects different historical experiences. In countries that experienced authoritarian or communist regimes without the separation of powers and checks and balances principles, judicial councils were introduced as part of democratization processes. Today, it appears they are more prone to introduce accountability measures aimed at strengthening their legitimacy and public trust, not ensured in the past. The dissertation concludes that accountability has become an essential component of contemporary judicial governance and a necessary complement to its independence. At the same time, accountability itself must not be conceived without limits. Poorly designed accountability mechanisms may themselves threaten the effective functioning of judicial councils. Judicial review must respect the discretionary powers of judicial councils. Punitive accountability mechanisms must provide adequate guarantees and protection against abuse. Explanatory accountability must be balanced with confidentiality requirements, data protection rules, and the need to protect decision-making processes from improper pressures. There is no universal formula for achieving such balance because the selection and design of accountability mechanisms should be adapted to the specific context in which a judicial council operates. Nevertheless, research on European standards and cross-border learning offer significant potential. It is in this respect that the present dissertation seeks to contribute. By developing a comprehensive analytical framework and providing original comparative empirical data, the dissertation contributes to the scholarship on judicial governance and offers practical insights for the future development of judicial council accountability across Europe.