Three Legal Tools to Address the US ‘Proposal’ of Acquisition of Greenland: Cession, the Svalbard Treaty Model, and the Case for a Sui Generis Treaty

This article addresses the United States’ ‘proposal’ of acquisition of Greenland as well as the threats of coercion made by the US towards Denmark and Greenland. The article finds that international reactions have been mostly limited to some Western States. The focus then shifts on three treaty-based models that could reconcile the competing strategic and economic interests. A hypothetical treaty of cession, the application of the Svalbard model and a sui generis multilateral framework are analysed in turn. The article argues that cession would be scarcely compatible with self-determination and politically untenable, and that although the Svalbard model is an interesting example, it could not accommodate Greenland’s autonomy. The article proposes a sui generis treaty to reconcile Greenland’s self-determination and Denmark’s residual sovereignty with US strategic interests. This treaty would have a limited subjective scope and would embed social and environmental safeguards as well as security arrangements to reduce the risk of coercive escalation.