Traditional corporate governance research has long emphasized formal structures, such as board independence and committee design, as the primary means of constraining managerial discretion. However, the persistent heterogeneity in organizational behavior among structurally similar firms suggests that formal design alone cannot explain how governance authority operates in practice. This dissertation argues that when formal guidance is weak and decision-making environments are characterized by ambiguity and high evaluative scrutiny, governance authority must be enacted through individual discretion. Drawing on upper echelons theory and personality psychology, I propose that subclinical personality traits—specifically narcissism—serve as a critical mechanism linking ambiguous authority to behavioral variance. I focus on the role of the board chair, a position defined by procedural authority and high symbolic visibility, yet lacking unilateral hierarchical command. I posit that the enactment of authority by board chairs is not inherently "bright" or "dark," but is instead contingent upon reputational risks and the specific evaluative context. The research progresses through three analytical stages. First, I establish a behavioral foundation through a systematic review of dark personality traits and corporate social responsibility, introducing the concept of moral elasticity to explain prior heterogeneous findings. Second, I examine the board chair in contexts of clear attribution and heightened reputational risk, analyzing how narcissism shapes oversight effectiveness when governance failures, such as misconduct or financial restatements, become publicly visible. Finally, I investigate routine boardroom governance by distinguishing between narcissistic admiration and rivalry, incorporating contextual constraints like top management team power and ideological distance to explain how personality structures the interpretation of discretion. By shifting the focus from structural assignment to the psychological foundations of enacted authority, this dissertation specifies when and why personality shapes governance outcomes in senior organizational roles.
Dark Personality Traits and Board Leadership: Three Essays on the Enactment of Governance Authority / Giardino, Pier Luigi. - (2026 May 05), pp. 1-146.
Dark Personality Traits and Board Leadership: Three Essays on the Enactment of Governance Authority
Giardino, Pier Luigi
2026-05-05
Abstract
Traditional corporate governance research has long emphasized formal structures, such as board independence and committee design, as the primary means of constraining managerial discretion. However, the persistent heterogeneity in organizational behavior among structurally similar firms suggests that formal design alone cannot explain how governance authority operates in practice. This dissertation argues that when formal guidance is weak and decision-making environments are characterized by ambiguity and high evaluative scrutiny, governance authority must be enacted through individual discretion. Drawing on upper echelons theory and personality psychology, I propose that subclinical personality traits—specifically narcissism—serve as a critical mechanism linking ambiguous authority to behavioral variance. I focus on the role of the board chair, a position defined by procedural authority and high symbolic visibility, yet lacking unilateral hierarchical command. I posit that the enactment of authority by board chairs is not inherently "bright" or "dark," but is instead contingent upon reputational risks and the specific evaluative context. The research progresses through three analytical stages. First, I establish a behavioral foundation through a systematic review of dark personality traits and corporate social responsibility, introducing the concept of moral elasticity to explain prior heterogeneous findings. Second, I examine the board chair in contexts of clear attribution and heightened reputational risk, analyzing how narcissism shapes oversight effectiveness when governance failures, such as misconduct or financial restatements, become publicly visible. Finally, I investigate routine boardroom governance by distinguishing between narcissistic admiration and rivalry, incorporating contextual constraints like top management team power and ideological distance to explain how personality structures the interpretation of discretion. By shifting the focus from structural assignment to the psychological foundations of enacted authority, this dissertation specifies when and why personality shapes governance outcomes in senior organizational roles.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione



