One of Montesquieu's most striking ambiguities is his definition of justice as a ‘rapport de convenance' (Persian Letters, LXXXI), which has been variously interpreted. In order to help clarify its meaning, this paper examines the role that the notion of ‘convenance' plays in this definition, as well as the possible sources that it evokes. It will be suggested that, alongside the possible philosophical sources, such as Malebranche, Leibniz or Clarke, an important precedent for this definition is to be found in the common medieval legal practice of defining ‘equity' as "convenientia rerum"
La justice "rapport de convenance" et ses sources chez Montesquieu / Pulvirenti, Gabriele. - In: STUDI FILOSOFICI. - ISSN 1124-1047. - 48, 2025:(2025), pp. 77-94.
La justice "rapport de convenance" et ses sources chez Montesquieu
Gabriele Pulvirenti
2025-01-01
Abstract
One of Montesquieu's most striking ambiguities is his definition of justice as a ‘rapport de convenance' (Persian Letters, LXXXI), which has been variously interpreted. In order to help clarify its meaning, this paper examines the role that the notion of ‘convenance' plays in this definition, as well as the possible sources that it evokes. It will be suggested that, alongside the possible philosophical sources, such as Malebranche, Leibniz or Clarke, an important precedent for this definition is to be found in the common medieval legal practice of defining ‘equity' as "convenientia rerum"I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione
