The Architecture of EU Law Enforcement: The Complementarity of Remedies and Sanctions in Light of Effectiveness, Proportionality, and Dissuasiveness

The architecture of EU law enforcement has been significantly modified, leading to a reconfiguration of both administrative and judicial enforcement as well as a shifting balance between administrative sanctions and remedies. Beginning from these new perspectives, this article examines the constitutional foundations of a triadic set of principles for the enforcement of EU law: the principles of effectiveness, proportionality, and dissuasiveness. The above apply to both remedies and sanctions according to the overarching duty of loyal cooperation between enforcers. In the absence of a formal hierarchy, these principles must be applied jointly; however, as CJEU case law suggests, there may be conflicts and trade-offs, especially between dissuasiveness and proportionality. By examining the main evolutionary patterns in both EU legislation and case law in the last decade or so, this analysis seeks to discuss (1) the relevance of the direct application of these triadic principles by the national courts; (2) the different criteria applicable to each depending on whether remedies or sanctions are at stake; (3) the need for a combined application of effectiveness and dissuasiveness together with proportionality; and (4) the extent to which complementarities between sanctions and remedies are likely to lead national enforcers to use an integrated, or a distinct but coordinated, assessment of sanctions and remedies, depending on their homogeneous or heterogeneous functions.