A Variation-Selection-Adaptation Framework for the Digital Markets Act

This paper examines the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA) through the lens of an evolutionary economics framework structured around the concepts of variation, selection, and adaptation (VSA). It argues that the DMA represents a bold, systemic regulatory shift, motivated by the inadequacy of traditional antitrust enforcement to address entrenched digital dominance. By introducing the VSA framework, the paper offers a novel tool for evaluating how effectively the DMA promotes contestability— with innovation as the form of competition most at risk in digital markets. The framework is applied to the case of online search, with a focus on Alphabet, the only search engine designated as a gatekeeper to date. The analysis highlights the extent to which current DMA obligations promote variation (diversity), counter biased selection mechanisms, and enable effective adaptation among gatekeepers, challengers, other market participants, and regulators. It also identifies persistent gaps in regulatory design and implementation, suggesting that additional measures may be needed to fulfil the DMA’s stated ambitions. In doing so, the paper contributes both a structured analytical approach and critical insights to the ongoing evaluation and future development of the DMA.