Se il "Tu" è la prima persona. Grammatica e diritto in Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy (1888-1973) e Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914)

At the beginning of the 21st century, in the fields of philosophy of language and moral philosophy, there has been a growing interest in studies dedicated to the “second person” perspective. This attention seems to reveal a crisis in the model of identity thinking, codified by Neo-Platonism, and its multiple conceptualizations, including man, logic and law, as highlighted by Maurizio Manzin. The aim of this thesis is to investigate the researches of Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy and Charles S. Peirce, who devoted their studies to the analysis of the crisis of identity thinking and to the formulation of theoretical proposals suitable for overcoming it, verifying their congruence and degree of adaptability to the theories on legal reasoning of an argumentative-rhetorical nature. Despite their partially different fields of research, the two authors began with the same starting point, that of pronouns, emphasizing the problematic arrangement handed down from scholastic grammar. In particular, Rosenstock-Huessy advocated a model of original social communication according to the Thou-I-We-It arrangement. The German speech thinker composes these pronouns in the “cross of reality”, a socio-linguistic model constituted by the integration between two phases (which are equivalent to two types of rationality corresponding to them) and four fronts: the event that occurs in the arc of nominal reality in the prejective front-subjective front-trajective front (by means of “fractal rationality”), is archived in the dimension of pronominal existence in the objective front (using “linear rationality”). Identitarian thinking assumes that it can study reality only from the perspective of the objective front, that is, of the individual and of deduction, of linear time and of the causality produced by the efficient cause. Peirce and Rosenstock-Huessy have expanded this monological status, placing at the center of their investigations the event as the confluence of two temporal currents, one oriented from the past towards the future (anteceptive) and the other from the future towards the past (ponecective), also contributing to proposing an original model of causality, the result of the joint effect of efficient cause and final cause. Once we have shown the form of the accomplishment of communication as a biographical and social fact based on the transformative status of linguistic propositions, we will try to apply it to the theory of law and legal argumentation, showing how a convergence is possible that corroborates the validity of the CALS (Cooperated Argumentative Legal Syllogism) model proposed by Manzin, in which rhetoric assumes a methodological and constitutive role of the internal premise, and thus of the judicial enthymeme.