This paper proposes the establishment of a European Debt Agency (EDA) as a tool for the efficient management of Eurozone public debt, to address two primary risks: roll-over and sustainability risk. The proposed EDA would price its loans using a transparent formula that would anchor the price to fundamental economic factors. This approach would encourage fiscal discipline among Member States and avoid inefficient costs resulting from market price deviations from fundamentals, without resorting to debt mutualization. In addition, the paper suggests that adopting flexible fiscal rules alongside the EDA could result in a smoother path towards debt stabilization, by mitigating the macroeconomic effects of excessive fluctuations in risk premia. The simulations indicate that this combination could offer a comprehensive strategy for managing sovereign debt in the Eurozone that would promote fiscal responsibility and stability.

European Sovereign Debt Risk Management: the Role of a European Debt Agency / Amato, Massimo; Belloni, Everardo; Favero, Carlo; Gobbi, Lucio; Priviero, Ludovica. - In: JOURNAL OF GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMICS. - ISSN 2667-3193. - 2024, 15:(2024), p. 100118. [10.1016/j.jge.2024.100118]

European Sovereign Debt Risk Management: the Role of a European Debt Agency

Gobbi, Lucio
Penultimo
;
2024-01-01

Abstract

This paper proposes the establishment of a European Debt Agency (EDA) as a tool for the efficient management of Eurozone public debt, to address two primary risks: roll-over and sustainability risk. The proposed EDA would price its loans using a transparent formula that would anchor the price to fundamental economic factors. This approach would encourage fiscal discipline among Member States and avoid inefficient costs resulting from market price deviations from fundamentals, without resorting to debt mutualization. In addition, the paper suggests that adopting flexible fiscal rules alongside the EDA could result in a smoother path towards debt stabilization, by mitigating the macroeconomic effects of excessive fluctuations in risk premia. The simulations indicate that this combination could offer a comprehensive strategy for managing sovereign debt in the Eurozone that would promote fiscal responsibility and stability.
2024
Amato, Massimo; Belloni, Everardo; Favero, Carlo; Gobbi, Lucio; Priviero, Ludovica
European Sovereign Debt Risk Management: the Role of a European Debt Agency / Amato, Massimo; Belloni, Everardo; Favero, Carlo; Gobbi, Lucio; Priviero, Ludovica. - In: JOURNAL OF GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMICS. - ISSN 2667-3193. - 2024, 15:(2024), p. 100118. [10.1016/j.jge.2024.100118]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11572/425311
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