Ha ancora senso discutere oggi di scienza giuridica?

DOES IT STILL MAKE SENSE TO DISCUSS LEGAL SCIENCE TODAY? The present contribution aims to understand if dealing with legal science from a philosophical point of view can still have a meaning today, and this with particular regard to its procedures and purposes, analyzed and understood first from an epistemological perspective, and then from a methodological one. The problem thus posed is not secondary for those who intend to deal with legal science and who neither want to adhere to the analysis of language of the positivistic Schools (while recognizing their important merits) nor reduce legal science to the theory of interpretation (while understanding the undeniable results obtained by the schools of hermeneutics and legal realism). In fact, as it seems by looking at the literature on the subject, the epistemological debates have now lost their interest for the Schools of analytic training, so much that all the most important discussions date back to the last century. Yet jurists (the “doctrine”) continue to propose legal theories and to affirm the need for new paradigms, capable of accounting for the continuous changing of legal experience. Therefore, this contribution intends to examine an exemplary dispute between philosophers of the last century, as well as an equally emblematic discussion between jurists belonging to the present century, in order to draw some indications and, in other words, to understand whether it can still have any significance to deal with epistemology and legal methodology.