Il concetto di "convenienza" in Montesquieu. Giustizia e arte politica

The notion of “convenance” has only recently attracted the attention of Montesquieu scholars, who have repeatedly stated its centrality to the author's thought, as well as a certain inherent ambiguity. This thesis firstly explores the history of the concept, starting from some existing studies that have laid the foundations for a research in this direction. In its Latin version (“convenientia”), the concept’s first philosophical appearance is due to Cicero, as a translation of certain notions from Stoic philosophy. The notion acquires then a non-secondary place in scholastic thought, finding application in different fields, from logic to theology and morality. In the Modern Age, the concept of “convenientia” becomes of great relevance in the moral and legal spheres: among others, Grotius, Pufendorf, Malebranche or Leibniz develop or rework differently the scholastic and stoic traditions where it was employed. Through these channels the notion of “convenientia” can reach the young author of the Persian Letters, who employs it in his ambiguous definition of justice as a “rapport de convenance” (letter 81). The study of the sources and the analysis of the major issues linked to this definition of justice singularly benefit from this retrospective look at the possible philosophical traditions where this notion of “convenance” is employed. On the basis of this examination of the texts, the thesis advanced is that the expression “rapport de convenance” denotes only the a priori or formal aspect of justice, which elsewhere the author designates as “rapport d’équité”. If “convenance” designates the universal and invariable aspect of justice, a study of its content, which is variable and relative, must lead to the various orders of law: natural, civil, political. The investigation thus crosses a second axis of relevance of the concept of “convenance” in Montesquieu’s work, namely the question of the relativity or “convenance” of laws to the people for whom they are established, on which the entire structure of the Spirit of Laws rests. This second (and very much Aristotelian) axis is the subject of a classification in the thesis. Human laws and institutions can be understood according to different planes of “convenance”: general, structural, local. Pivotal concepts in Montesquieu’s work, such as political freedom, moderation, “esprit général”, nature and principle of government, can then be understood in this articulation between “convenance à la société” in general and “convenance à chaque société” in particular, according to a structural or typological logic or according to a singular and local one. The scholastic usages inherited and reworked by the moderns include one that some french scholars have recently designated as the “argument de convenance”, i.e. the idea that God works in the simplest ways and always chooses the best. The thesis investigates the presence of this argument in Montesquieu, suggesting that the author conceives it above all as a principle of the “economy of nature”. Moreover, it is argued that this principle, while secularizing the traditional “argument de convenance”, acquires a fundamentally political significance: the art of legislation exiges to govern men by economising on violent means, that is, without doing violence to the natural inclinations of citizens and their freedom. In general, the study of Montesquieu’s thought through the lens of the notion of “convenance” allows one to better grasp the connection between the method of the art of legislation and the political and ideological objectives of his work, first and foremost the opposition to a despotic exercise of power.