The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is nowadays the most widespread block cipher in commercial applications. It represents the state-of-art in block cipher design and provides an unparalleled level of assurance against all known cryptanalytic techniques, except for its reduced versions. Moreover, there is no known efficient way to distinguish it from a set of random permutations. The AES (and other modern block ciphers) presents a highly algebraic structure, which led researchers to exploit it for novel algebraic attacks. These tries have been unsuccessful, except for academic reduced versions. Starting from an intuition by I. Toli, we have developed a mixed algebraic-statistical attack. Using the internal algebraic structure of any AES-like cipher, we build an algebraic setting where a related-key (statistical) distinguishing attack can be mounted. Our data reveals a significant deviation of the full AES-128 from a set of random permutations. Although there are recent successful related-key attacks on the full AES-192 and the full AES-256 (with non-practical complexity), our attack would be the first-ever practical distinguishing attack on the full AES-128 (to the best of our knowledge).

On algebraic and statistical properties of AES-like ciphers / Rimoldi, Anna. - (2009), pp. 1-130.

On algebraic and statistical properties of AES-like ciphers

Rimoldi, Anna
2009-01-01

Abstract

The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is nowadays the most widespread block cipher in commercial applications. It represents the state-of-art in block cipher design and provides an unparalleled level of assurance against all known cryptanalytic techniques, except for its reduced versions. Moreover, there is no known efficient way to distinguish it from a set of random permutations. The AES (and other modern block ciphers) presents a highly algebraic structure, which led researchers to exploit it for novel algebraic attacks. These tries have been unsuccessful, except for academic reduced versions. Starting from an intuition by I. Toli, we have developed a mixed algebraic-statistical attack. Using the internal algebraic structure of any AES-like cipher, we build an algebraic setting where a related-key (statistical) distinguishing attack can be mounted. Our data reveals a significant deviation of the full AES-128 from a set of random permutations. Although there are recent successful related-key attacks on the full AES-192 and the full AES-256 (with non-practical complexity), our attack would be the first-ever practical distinguishing attack on the full AES-128 (to the best of our knowledge).
2009
XXI
2009-2010
Matematica (cess.4/11/12)
Mathematics
Sala, Massimiliano
no
Inglese
Settore MAT/02 - Algebra
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Provatemplate.pdf

accesso aperto

Tipologia: Tesi di dottorato (Doctoral Thesis)
Licenza: Tutti i diritti riservati (All rights reserved)
Dimensione 1.09 MB
Formato Adobe PDF
1.09 MB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11572/367817
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
  • OpenAlex ND
social impact