L’abuso di potere nel mercato del lavoro statunitense: uno studio di law and empirical labor economics

Both labor and product markets have traditionally induced scholars to investigate several fundamental questions. The debate over their adherence to models of perfect competition is one of these. Recent research, especially in the United States, suggest that labor markets have monopsonistic traits and are not competitive. In particular, information asymmetries, frictions and other anticompetitive behaviors are ubiquitous. Often business practices and regulation limit their competitiveness, as witnessed by the Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the U.S. Economy signed by President Biden in July 2021. Adopting a law & empirical labor economics approach, I analyze the problem of market power in U.S. labor markets, and in particular its abuse and potential remedies. First of all, my aim is to highlight the role that the economic analysis of law can play in the study of labor markets: when based on empirical evidence, this approach can help us understanding their dynamics and poriving policy recommendations. More in detail, I begin my analysis deepening the conflict between labor and antitrust. The historical perspective suggests focusing on the rise and decline of American trade unions, which traditionally – and precisely because of their exemption from antimonopoly legislation - have deployed a collective countervailing power to obtain the improvement of working conditions in (not only) economic terms. I describe how trade unions reached the control of labor supply, its regulation, and case law in this field; then I turn my attention to the regulatory crisis of U.S. labor law and collective bargaining mechanisms. Then I revert my perspective - from seller power to buyer power of labor services – focusing thus on employer power in the labor market, specifically analyzing economic models and empirical evidence. Starting from the economic literature on buyer power (in particular, on monopsony power exploited by firms in labor markets), I define the scope and limits of antitrust authorities’ intervention and remedies in labor markets. Case law, evidence and empirical research indicate that, in the absence or ineffectiveness of other regulatory interventions in labor markets, antitrust authorities play a residual (regulatory) role in order to promote greater competition and curb anti-competitive conduct by employers in labor markets. In the final chapter I argue the relevance of these issues for the European context. Many factors and evidence suggest that the same approach is to be adopted to address certain European and Italian labor market issues, at least to fight excessive downward competition.