The Behavioral Agency Model (BAM) offers a behavioral account of executive incentives, according to which the perceived threats to CEO wealth, i.e., CEO risk bearing, influence a CEO’s propensity to undertake innovation investments. While examining stock options extensively, the extant BAM research devotes relatively scant attention to other forms of incentives, such as stock ownership, that are conducive to one source of risk bearing, i.e., employment risk. Furthermore, with an emphasis placed on the CEO, much BAM research neglects the interactive risk preferences of the CEO and the board. This study refines the BAM and empirically explores the countervailing forces exerted by the CEO and board ownership. It elucidates that while CEO ownership exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with innovation investment, board ownership weakens that relationship. An exploratory test on a sample of 108 Italian manufacturing firms provides support for the hypothesized effects. The refined BAM sheds further light on executive incentives through a behavioral lens, by elucidating the role of stock ownership and the interactive risk preferences of the CEO and the board.

The Behavioral Agency Model and Innovation Investment: Examining the Combined Effects of CEO and Board Ownership / Zona, Fabio; Zamarian, Marco. - In: GROUP & ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT. - ISSN 1059-6011. - STAMPA. - 0(0) in press:(2021), pp. 1-32. [10.1177/10596011211058276]

The Behavioral Agency Model and Innovation Investment: Examining the Combined Effects of CEO and Board Ownership.

Zona, Fabio;Zamarian, Marco
2021-01-01

Abstract

The Behavioral Agency Model (BAM) offers a behavioral account of executive incentives, according to which the perceived threats to CEO wealth, i.e., CEO risk bearing, influence a CEO’s propensity to undertake innovation investments. While examining stock options extensively, the extant BAM research devotes relatively scant attention to other forms of incentives, such as stock ownership, that are conducive to one source of risk bearing, i.e., employment risk. Furthermore, with an emphasis placed on the CEO, much BAM research neglects the interactive risk preferences of the CEO and the board. This study refines the BAM and empirically explores the countervailing forces exerted by the CEO and board ownership. It elucidates that while CEO ownership exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with innovation investment, board ownership weakens that relationship. An exploratory test on a sample of 108 Italian manufacturing firms provides support for the hypothesized effects. The refined BAM sheds further light on executive incentives through a behavioral lens, by elucidating the role of stock ownership and the interactive risk preferences of the CEO and the board.
2021
Zona, Fabio; Zamarian, Marco
The Behavioral Agency Model and Innovation Investment: Examining the Combined Effects of CEO and Board Ownership / Zona, Fabio; Zamarian, Marco. - In: GROUP & ORGANIZATION MANAGEMENT. - ISSN 1059-6011. - STAMPA. - 0(0) in press:(2021), pp. 1-32. [10.1177/10596011211058276]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11572/328088
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