Eppur non si muove? Prospects for constitutional reforms in Italy after the 2009 European and 2010 regional elections

The results of the 2008 Italian general election aroused expectations for the undertaking of a much awaited reform of the political system. This article discusses the prospects for constitutional reforms in Italy after the 2009 and 2010 ‘mid-term’ elections in order to provide informed speculation of the foreseeable outcomes. It analyses the interplay between the preferences of parties and the change of power relations amongst and within them in the context of the extant institutional veto points. The article concludes that: (1) a consensual ‘grand reform’ negotiated between government and opposition is the least likely outcome; (2) a partisan reform carried out by the governmental forces is also unlikely because of deep divisions within the governmental majority; (3) the most likely outcome is no, or very limited, reform. From a normative (liberal-democratic) perspective, given the populist constitutional preferences of the most prominent political actor (Silvio Berlusconi), it also concludes that ‘no reform’ is not the worst outcome.