We experimentally investigate whether individuals are more likely to engage in dishonest behavior after having experienced unfairness perpetrated by an individual with a salient group identity. Two individuals generate an endowment together, but only one can decide how to share it. They either share the same group identity or have distinct group identities. Then, they approach a task in which they can opportunistically engage in dishonest behavior. Our results show that when individuals share the same group identity, unfair distributive decisions do not trigger a dishonest reaction. In contrast, when different group identities coexist, dishonest behavior is observed as a reaction to unfairness.

Reacting to unfairness: Group identity and dishonest behavior / Dellavalle, Nives; Ploner, Matteo. - In: GAMES. - ISSN 2073-4336. - 8:3(2017), pp. 1-18. [10.3390/g8030028]

Reacting to unfairness: Group identity and dishonest behavior

Ploner, Matteo
2017-01-01

Abstract

We experimentally investigate whether individuals are more likely to engage in dishonest behavior after having experienced unfairness perpetrated by an individual with a salient group identity. Two individuals generate an endowment together, but only one can decide how to share it. They either share the same group identity or have distinct group identities. Then, they approach a task in which they can opportunistically engage in dishonest behavior. Our results show that when individuals share the same group identity, unfair distributive decisions do not trigger a dishonest reaction. In contrast, when different group identities coexist, dishonest behavior is observed as a reaction to unfairness.
2017
3
Dellavalle, Nives; Ploner, Matteo
Reacting to unfairness: Group identity and dishonest behavior / Dellavalle, Nives; Ploner, Matteo. - In: GAMES. - ISSN 2073-4336. - 8:3(2017), pp. 1-18. [10.3390/g8030028]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11572/186515
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