The existing literature on the EU’s participation in the agricultural negotiations of the Doha Round assumes that EU policy-makers develop autonomous preferences in favour of liberalising agricultural trade, thus going against the preferences of the agricultural sector. This article challenges this view and argues that WTO judicialization – the strenghtened enforcement of rules introduced with the creation of the WTO – affects the domestic politics of trade in WTO members. My key contention is that WTO judicialization confronts societal interests and public authorities with legal vulnerability, and that this elicits a willingness to cooperate with other WTO members and thus pre-empt foreign challenges to domestic policies. Empirically, the article shows that negotiations centered on offsetting the potentially disruptive effects of foreign legal challenges to EU farm policies.
Drowning protection in the multilateral bath: WTO judicialisation and European agriculture in the Doha round
Poletti, Arlo
2010-01-01
Abstract
The existing literature on the EU’s participation in the agricultural negotiations of the Doha Round assumes that EU policy-makers develop autonomous preferences in favour of liberalising agricultural trade, thus going against the preferences of the agricultural sector. This article challenges this view and argues that WTO judicialization – the strenghtened enforcement of rules introduced with the creation of the WTO – affects the domestic politics of trade in WTO members. My key contention is that WTO judicialization confronts societal interests and public authorities with legal vulnerability, and that this elicits a willingness to cooperate with other WTO members and thus pre-empt foreign challenges to domestic policies. Empirically, the article shows that negotiations centered on offsetting the potentially disruptive effects of foreign legal challenges to EU farm policies.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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