Rhetoric and epistemology in the legal context

Rhetoric is usually identified with the discipline concerned with the study of the style and persuasive techniques inherent in discourse, and has therefore always been somewhat discredited because of its alleged lack of reference to facts and truth. Often talk about rhetoric becomes a talk about the psychological aspects of persuasion rather than those inherent in forms of rationality. This chapter argues for the need for a complete philosophical re-evaluation of rhetoric, in line with the Aristotelian interpretation and the anthropological model of the zoon politikon. In this perspective, rhetoric is much more than a mere technique for persuading a particular audience; rather, it expresses the particular way of being of the political and linguistic animal engaged in making practical decisions in deliberative and judicial contexts. It is in such contexts that knowledge is situated and concerns questions whose solution depends on us and which, for this very reason, become the subject of discussion. Consequently, persuasion, to which the elements of logos, ethos and pathos contribute, seems indispensable. After a section dedicated to the illustration of these aspects, the chapter first focuses on the particular epistemic status of techne/rhetorical art in relation to episteme, with particular consideration of the fundamental function of phronesis. Subsequently, the relevance of pathos and the cognitive value played by emotions will be highlighted, finally considering the fruitfulness of rhetoric in favouring reasonableness, understood as the principle and criterion of judgement.