We design and implement PG, a Byzantine fault-tolerant and privacy-preserving multi-sensor fusion system. PG is flexible and extensible, supporting a variety of fusion algorithms and application scenarios. On the theoretical side, PG develops and unifies techniques from dependable distributed systems and modern cryptography. PG can provably protect the privacy of individual sensor inputs and fusion results. In contrast to prior works, PG can provably defend against pollution attacks and guarantee output delivery, even in the presence of malicious sensors that may lie about their inputs, contribute ill-formed inputs, and provide no inputs at all to sway the final result, and in the presence of malicious servers serving as aggregators. On the practical side, we implement PG in the client-server-sensor setting. Moreover, we deploy PG in a cloud-based system with 261 sensors and a cyber-physical system with 19 resource-constrained sensors. In both settings, we show that PG is efficient and scalable in both failure-free and failure scenarios.

PG: Byzantine Fault-Tolerant and Privacy-Preserving Sensor Fusion With Guaranteed Output Delivery / Chenglu Jin, Authors:; Yin, Chao; Van Dijk, Marten; Duan, Sisi; Massacci, Fabio; Reiter, Michael K.; Zhang, Haibin. - (2024), pp. 3272-3286. ( 31st ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2024 usa 2024) [10.1145/3658644.3670343].

PG: Byzantine Fault-Tolerant and Privacy-Preserving Sensor Fusion With Guaranteed Output Delivery

Fabio Massacci
;
2024-01-01

Abstract

We design and implement PG, a Byzantine fault-tolerant and privacy-preserving multi-sensor fusion system. PG is flexible and extensible, supporting a variety of fusion algorithms and application scenarios. On the theoretical side, PG develops and unifies techniques from dependable distributed systems and modern cryptography. PG can provably protect the privacy of individual sensor inputs and fusion results. In contrast to prior works, PG can provably defend against pollution attacks and guarantee output delivery, even in the presence of malicious sensors that may lie about their inputs, contribute ill-formed inputs, and provide no inputs at all to sway the final result, and in the presence of malicious servers serving as aggregators. On the practical side, we implement PG in the client-server-sensor setting. Moreover, we deploy PG in a cloud-based system with 261 sensors and a cyber-physical system with 19 resource-constrained sensors. In both settings, we show that PG is efficient and scalable in both failure-free and failure scenarios.
2024
CCS '24: Proceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
1601 Broadway, 10th Floor, NEW YORK, NY, UNITED STATES
Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
9798400706363
Chenglu Jin, Authors:; Yin, Chao; Van Dijk, Marten; Duan, Sisi; Massacci, Fabio; Reiter, Michael K.; Zhang, Haibin
PG: Byzantine Fault-Tolerant and Privacy-Preserving Sensor Fusion With Guaranteed Output Delivery / Chenglu Jin, Authors:; Yin, Chao; Van Dijk, Marten; Duan, Sisi; Massacci, Fabio; Reiter, Michael K.; Zhang, Haibin. - (2024), pp. 3272-3286. ( 31st ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2024 usa 2024) [10.1145/3658644.3670343].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11572/455772
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