What future for cognitive science(s)?

This thematic issue on the future of cognitive science(s) examines how challenges and uncertainties surrounding the past and present of this discipline make it difficult to chart its future. We focus on two main questions. The first is whether cognitive science is a single unified field or inherently pluralistic. This question can be asked at various levels: First, with respect to the disciplines that should be included in the cognitive hexagon and their reciprocal relationships: should we speak of cognitive science or of the cognitive sciences? Second, with regard to the conceptual and methodological changes (turns or revolutions) that have taken place within the cognitive project from its inception to the present day. Third, it pertains to cognitive psychology as a discipline. Before the emergence of cognitive science psychology was a fragmented discipline characterized by different traditions and approaches: has cognitive science been able to stem this fragmentation? Finally, we can question the unity of the cognitive architecture itself: is cognition produced by homogeneous or heterogeneous mechanisms for infor-mation processing? We show that the issue of unity is addressed by several of the papers included in this thematic issue. In addition, the various contributions explore the role of individual disciplines within the cognitive project and the type of architecture that appears most promising for explaining cognition. "The Future of Cognitive Science is Pluralistic: But What Does That Mean?" by Lisa M. Osbeck and Saulo de Freitas Araujo distinguishes three forms of pluralism: ontological, epistemic, and ethical. The authors explore the implications of each form for the future trajectory of cognitive science. "What philosophy, if any, is needed for cognitive science?" by Philip V. Kargopoulos argues that cognitive science will influence both the theory and practice of philosophy and that the futures of cognitive science and philosophy are tied together. "Psychology is – and should be – central to cognitive science" by Max Coltheart claims that psychology has a special status in this project: it is central to cognitive science in a way that none of the other five disciplines is. "Two open questions in the reformist agenda of the philosophy of cognitive science" by Aurora Alegiani, Massimo Marraffa, Tiziana Vistarini suggests a reformist agenda within the debate on the foundations of cognitive science, incorporating some important ideas from the 4E cognition literature into the computational-representational framework. "From unified to specific theories of cognition" by Frank van der Velde suggests that, instead of unified theories of cognition, specific mechanisms for cognitive behavior in specific cognitive domains could be needed, with architectures that are tailor-made for specific forms of implementation. A sketch of such an architecture for language is presented, based on modifiable connection paths in small-world like network structures. "Rethinking cognitive architecture: A heterarchical network of different types of information processors" by William Bechtel argues that - rather than seeking a common architecture for cognitive processing - we should recognize that the brain employs multiple information processing structures. Rather than employing one mode of information processing, the brain employs multiple modes integrated in a heterarchical network. Cognitive science can better understand human information processing by attending to the plurality of information-processing architectures employed in the brain. "Distributed loci of control: Overcoming stale dichotomies in biology and cognitive science" by Daniel C. Burnston and Antonella Tramacere advocate that theoretical debates in biology and cognitive science often are based around differences in the posited locus of control for biological and cognitive phenomena. They suggest that embracing a distributed locus of control provides a basis for a revisionary, but substantive account of mental representation. "The mind-body problem between philosophy and the cognitive sciences" by Sandro Nannini offers a physicalist-eliminative solution to the mind-body problem (here called “soft physicalistic eliminativism”) that allows for more continuity between philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences and that it can outline the path to follow for addressing the mind-body problem within the future cognitive research. "Cognition" - Let's forget it? by Alan Costall argues that the very concept of cognition is fundamentally misleading. He likens it to modern physicists attempting to develop new theories of phlogiston—a concept long discredited. Costall contends that cognition is an outdated notion we should abandon.