This paper analyses the effects played by rules within a coordination game. The starting point is constituted by the wide field of Public Choice theories. More precisely the focus of the research is on the stability of the voting process. The experiment is built on a game played through computers and the experimental subjects must perform some choices that can lead to different individual and collective solutions. The game that they play is based on a set of rules that must be voted by the players themselves before a new session of the experiment will be run. The idea is to verify the degree of stability of the collective choices (logrolling phenomena).
The Condorcet paradox: an experimental approach to a voting process / Mittone, Luigi. - ELETTRONICO. - (2003), pp. 1-23.
The Condorcet paradox: an experimental approach to a voting process
Mittone, Luigi
2003-01-01
Abstract
This paper analyses the effects played by rules within a coordination game. The starting point is constituted by the wide field of Public Choice theories. More precisely the focus of the research is on the stability of the voting process. The experiment is built on a game played through computers and the experimental subjects must perform some choices that can lead to different individual and collective solutions. The game that they play is based on a set of rules that must be voted by the players themselves before a new session of the experiment will be run. The idea is to verify the degree of stability of the collective choices (logrolling phenomena).File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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