We extend Fischbacher et al.’s (2001) work on conditional cooperation, comparing the results obtained by means of the Strategy Method with behaviour in a classic linear public goods environment. We find that the Strategy Method is roughly adequate as a classification device, but underestimates the contribution of conditional cooperators in the public goods game.
Conditional cooperation: new evidence from a public goods experiment / Burlando, Roberto M.; Guala, Francesco. - ELETTRONICO. - (2002), pp. 1-14.
Conditional cooperation: new evidence from a public goods experiment
Guala, Francesco
2002-01-01
Abstract
We extend Fischbacher et al.’s (2001) work on conditional cooperation, comparing the results obtained by means of the Strategy Method with behaviour in a classic linear public goods environment. We find that the Strategy Method is roughly adequate as a classification device, but underestimates the contribution of conditional cooperators in the public goods game.File in questo prodotto:
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