Remote attestation protocols are widely used to detect device configuration (e.g., software and/or data) compromise in Internet of Things (IoT) scenarios. Unfortunately, the performances of such protocols are unsatisfactory when dealing with thousands of smart devices. Recently, researchers are focusing on addressing this limitation. The approach is to run attestation in a collective way, with the goal of reducing computation and communication. Despite these advances, current solutions for attestation are still unsatisfactory because of their complex management and strict assumptions concerning the topology (e.g., being time invariant or maintaining a fixed topology). In this paper, we propose PADS, a secure, efficient, and practical protocol for attesting potentially large networks of smart devices with unstructured or dynamic topologies. PADS builds upon the recent concept of non-interactive attestation, by reducing the collective attestation problem into a minimum consensus one. We compare PADS with a state-of-the art collective attestation protocol and validate it by using realistic simulations that show practicality and efficiency. The results confirm the suitability of PADS for low-end devices, and highly unstructured networks.

PADS: Practical Attestation for Highly Dynamic Swarm Topologies / Ambrosin, M.; Conti, M.; Lazzeretti, R.; Rabbani, M. M.; Ranise, S.. - (2018), pp. 18-27. (Intervento presentato al convegno 2018 International Workshop on Secure Internet of Things, SIoT 2018 tenutosi a Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya - BarcelonaTech, esp nel 2018) [10.1109/SIoT.2018.00009].

PADS: Practical Attestation for Highly Dynamic Swarm Topologies

Ranise S.
2018-01-01

Abstract

Remote attestation protocols are widely used to detect device configuration (e.g., software and/or data) compromise in Internet of Things (IoT) scenarios. Unfortunately, the performances of such protocols are unsatisfactory when dealing with thousands of smart devices. Recently, researchers are focusing on addressing this limitation. The approach is to run attestation in a collective way, with the goal of reducing computation and communication. Despite these advances, current solutions for attestation are still unsatisfactory because of their complex management and strict assumptions concerning the topology (e.g., being time invariant or maintaining a fixed topology). In this paper, we propose PADS, a secure, efficient, and practical protocol for attesting potentially large networks of smart devices with unstructured or dynamic topologies. PADS builds upon the recent concept of non-interactive attestation, by reducing the collective attestation problem into a minimum consensus one. We compare PADS with a state-of-the art collective attestation protocol and validate it by using realistic simulations that show practicality and efficiency. The results confirm the suitability of PADS for low-end devices, and highly unstructured networks.
2018
Proceedings - 2018 International Workshop on Secure Internet of Things, SIoT 2018
10662 LOS VAQUEROS CIRCLE, PO BOX 3014, LOS ALAMITOS, CA 90720-1264 USA
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
978-1-7281-1568-9
Ambrosin, M.; Conti, M.; Lazzeretti, R.; Rabbani, M. M.; Ranise, S.
PADS: Practical Attestation for Highly Dynamic Swarm Topologies / Ambrosin, M.; Conti, M.; Lazzeretti, R.; Rabbani, M. M.; Ranise, S.. - (2018), pp. 18-27. (Intervento presentato al convegno 2018 International Workshop on Secure Internet of Things, SIoT 2018 tenutosi a Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya - BarcelonaTech, esp nel 2018) [10.1109/SIoT.2018.00009].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11572/333324
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