Might laws of nature ground phenomena?

The present paper focuses on the connection between grounding and laws of nature or, better, on the meaning that the grounding relation might assume if considered by a nomological point of view. In particular, the working hypothesis is that the grounding relation might used to implement the relation between a law of nature and its possible instances. The grounding relation can be distinguished from other modally-loaded relations and thus it might avoid the criticisms of those who are suspicious about the intuition according to which a law somehow ‘necessitates’ the phenomena falling within its scope. Moreover, if we adopt the above mentioned working hypothesis according to which a law ultimately ‘grounds’ its instances, then we are more likely to provide the idea of a governing law with a more definite meaning: that is, a law of nature would be a ‘governing’ process with respect a class of given phenomena whenever we are entitled to say that the latter are grounded in the former.