Blushing with Shame: Toward a Hegelian Contribution on the Issue of the Positive Role of Negative Emotions

This essay examines the notion of shame in Hegel’s writings as a case study to show that an emotion that is generally considered ‘negative’ may nonetheless fulfil important functions in the life of the subject. In none of Hegel’s works the concept of shame is analysed systematically and thoroughly. Therefore, I will start by analysing the encyclopaedic Anthropology to show how feelings always presume, for Hegel, states of physiological arousal and include bodily manifestations. Subsequently, on the basis of the encyclopaedic Psychology, I will show not only that the philosopher attributes considerable importance to sensations and feelings in general but also considers the emotional dimension of the subject in continuity with rational thinking. Eventually, I will examine some relevant passages of the Encyclopaedia Logic and the Aesthetic and I will show how, for Hegel, shame plays a relevant role in the process of development of the human being. Indeed, shame is considered by the philosopher as the constitutive place of self-consciousness. Contextually, I will try to retrieve the relations, by way of comparison and contrast, between the Hegelian understanding of shame and the most recent psychological and neuroscientific findings.