The analysis of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina with their complex institutional structures are at the center of this article. Although they created the conditions for stabilization of post-war Bosnia, they are certainly no blueprints for a functional and equitable state. Their fundamental contradiction is the attempt to accommodate the highest level of individual rights and, at the same time, the demands of nationalists to “preserve collective rights in ‘cleansed’ enclaves. The Constitutional Court’s “constituent peoples” decision of 2000 is important, because it attempts to square this particular circle and to use Dayton to improve Dayton”. The implementation of this landmark judgment, imposed by international decree, clearly illustrates the limits and problems of the situation. However, a system of consociational democracy associated with federal and confederal structures for the time being seems to be the most viable institutional option for Bosnia and Herzegovina short of formal partition, redrawing of boundaries and exchange of populations.
|Titolo:||Federalism and consociationalism as tools for state-(re)-construction? Experiences from Bosnia and Herzegovina|
|Titolo del volume contenente il saggio:||Federalism, subnational Constitutions and the protection of minorities|
|Luogo di edizione:||Westport CT ; New York, N.Y.|
|Anno di pubblicazione:||2004|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||02.1 Saggio su volume miscellaneo o Capitolo di libro (Essay or Book Chapter)|