Whether they are financed by forced labour, taxation, debt, or monetary inflation, wars traditionally imply some form of resource extraction: the costs of the war are borne by the population through a loss of income, wealth or purchasing power. Now, this notion of war finance is overthrown by the peculiar financial regime that has supported the rise of US global hegemony over the past decades. Since the end of World War II, the military and consensus mobilization that has allowed the United States to impose its primacy has been financed by a form of debt that does not entail any cost, since it is not intended to be repaid, but indefinitely floated on international financial markets. Thanks to the liberalization of capital movements worldwide, the United States has managed to finance persistent balance of payments deficits. This chapter analyses and interprets the rise of mobile capital as the ultimate form of war finance: the establishment of a cours forcé on a global scale. The argument is twofold: on one hand, free capital markets emerge as a response to the financial requirements of the cold war; on the other hand, they contribute to the perpetuation of a condition of constant belligerence
Mobile capital as the ultimate form of war finance / Fantacci, Luca; Gobbi, Lucio. - STAMPA. - (2018), pp. 93-112. [10.1017/9781316995327.005]
Mobile capital as the ultimate form of war finance
Gobbi Lucio
2018-01-01
Abstract
Whether they are financed by forced labour, taxation, debt, or monetary inflation, wars traditionally imply some form of resource extraction: the costs of the war are borne by the population through a loss of income, wealth or purchasing power. Now, this notion of war finance is overthrown by the peculiar financial regime that has supported the rise of US global hegemony over the past decades. Since the end of World War II, the military and consensus mobilization that has allowed the United States to impose its primacy has been financed by a form of debt that does not entail any cost, since it is not intended to be repaid, but indefinitely floated on international financial markets. Thanks to the liberalization of capital movements worldwide, the United States has managed to finance persistent balance of payments deficits. This chapter analyses and interprets the rise of mobile capital as the ultimate form of war finance: the establishment of a cours forcé on a global scale. The argument is twofold: on one hand, free capital markets emerge as a response to the financial requirements of the cold war; on the other hand, they contribute to the perpetuation of a condition of constant belligerenceI documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione



