

Mainstream parties and the politics of immigration in Italy:

A structural advantage for the right or a missed opportunity for the left?

By Emanuele Massetti

Published in *Acta Politica*, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 486-505 (2015) - doi:10.1057/ap.2014.29

Abstract

The structure of the Italian party system pushes the mainstream right and left to adopt different strategies on immigration in spite of a certain ideological and definite policy convergence. First, in a context of bipolar competition, the mainstream right prefers to cooperate, rather than compete, with the anti-immigrant radical right. Second, while the mainstream left dominates the centre-left coalition, the mainstream right has found itself subject to and torn by the populist tendencies of the centre-right coalition leader Silvio Berlusconi. The analysis shows that the mainstream left has endorsed concerns over security and border control, while remaining open to the social, cultural and (to a lesser extent) political integration of immigrants. In contrast, the mainstream right has appeared increasingly split between a component 'contaminated' by Berlusconi, which makes some concessions to the radical right; and a moderate component, which is more sensitive to liberal ideas and/or to the solidaristic remarks of the Catholic Church. The reality of the Italian welfare system and labour market would appear to create more favourable conditions for the ideological approach of the mainstream left. However, the mainstream right has benefited from its alliance with the radical right as it has constantly owned the immigration issue.

Key words: immigration politics; mainstream parties; party strategy; left and right; Italian politics

Accepted version

(Refereed author's manuscript)

Introduction

Immigration has been a central issue in Italian party politics since at least the mid- 1990s. As in other Western European countries, the radical right parties have largely capitalized on the issue by emphasizing it, taking a tough anti-immigration stance and influencing other parties (Betz, 1994; Bale, 2008; Bale et al, 2010). The new cultural cleavage that has emerged in European party systems and which has immigration as a core theme (van Spanje, 2010) appears to locate the Italian left, both radical and mainstream, on the losing side (Scappini, 2002). Although the thesis that presents immigration as a source of voter defection from the left to the radical right has been empirically contested in the case of Italy (Marcotti and Vanelli, 2008), coalition politics seems to have made immigration a structural advantage for the right. Since 1994 it has turned the electoral advantage of the radical right vis-a-vis other parties (especially those on the centre-right) into an office advantage of the centre-right coalition vis-a-vis its centre-left rival.

Following the special issue's analytical framework, this article investigates the strategies (positioning, salience and framing) adopted by the mainstream right and left parties. In particular it will focus on the three hypotheses concerning salience – the role of party unity (Hypothesis 1), party valence or 'issue ownership' (Hypothesis 2) and the handling of possible ideological contradictions between different dimensions of the immigration issue (Hypothesis 3) (Odmalm and Bale, 2014). In the case of Italy, the latter hypothesis highlights an important puzzle. The interplay between the ideological approaches of the two blocs and their links with pressure groups, on the one hand, and the reality of the sociocultural and socio-economic issues related to immigration, on the other, would appear to favour the mainstream left. The virtual absence of competition for jobs between nationals and immigrants, coupled with the fact that the latter appear to be net contributors to the Italian welfare system (Calavita, 2004), has allowed the mainstream left to adopt an open stance regarding the inclusion of immigrants in the labour market without needing to worry about negative impacts on its unionized constituencies, thus removing possible tensions with its equally open ideological stance on civic/cultural (and political) integration. In contrast, the mainstream right is embroiled in a contradiction. The alliance with radical right parties and the populist leadership of Berlusconi led them to tolerate and even adopt an anti-immigration discourse, especially as far as cultural integration is concerned. However, the mainstream – as well as the populist – right is not willing, or able, to resist pro-immigration demands from influential pressure groups such as the Catholic Church and business organizations. Yet, voters consider the centre-right bloc more competent than its counterpart in handling the immigration issue. To be sure, this puzzle could be explained by simply pointing out how winning or losing policy debates can often depend more on voters' perceptions (no matter if these are erroneous) than on the 'objective' facts. However, it remains interesting to analyse how the right has managed to turn an objectively difficult situation into a structural strength and, vice versa, the left has failed to take advantage of what looked like an advantageous position.

The existing literature has addressed this puzzle implicitly, highlighting both the failures of the centre-left coalition (Andall, 2007) – including some naïve ideological/ policy stances on the part of its radical component (Zinccone, 2006; Sciortino, 2011) – and the ability of the centre-right coalition to perform a sophisticated 'role play' during the various phases of the policy process, which allowed them to project an image of overall 'uncompromising toughness' while in reality adopting policies largely in line with those of the centre-left (Colombo and Sciortino, 2004; Geddes, 2008). This article draws on these studies for the period 1996–2006, which saw the creation of a comprehensive legislative framework on immigration in Italy, but also extends the analysis to the period 2006–2012, during which important changes both in the party system and in the immigration phenomenon itself have influenced party strategy. More specifically, the analysis will focus on the effects of a restructuring of the political offer (for example, coalition politics and government formation), the evolution of immigration-related issues (for example, the growth of a 'second generation') and the unfolding economic crisis. The time span of the analysis is divided according to changes in government: 2006–2008 (centre-left), 2008–2011 (populist right) and 2011–2012 (technocratic government supported by a 'grand coalition').

Before presenting the empirical investigation, two sections discuss the political and social context of the politics of immigration in Italy. The first outlines the main dynamics of the Italian party system and provides a map tracking the numerous nominal and substantial party changes, including splits and mergers. It also discusses the difficulties of a straightforward application of the concept 'mainstream party' to the Italian case. In light of the ideological orientations of political forces, the second section analyses the opportunities and challenges posed by the phenomenon of immigration in Italy, distinguishing between the sociocultural and socio-economic dimensions.

The Second Republic Party System: Identifying Mainstream Parties

The party system of the Second Republic has been characterized by competition, not only between parties, but also between two main blocs, commonly referred to as the centre-right and centre-left (Bartolini et al, 2004; Diamanti, 2007). These have hosted various parties, some of which can be easily identified as 'mainstream', since their ideological outlook fits with at least one of the three mainstream European party families: socialist, liberal and Christian democratic/conservative. In contrast, other parties of the two blocs have displayed an ideological profile largely in line with the radical left or radical right party families (Mair and Mudde, 1998). However, the presence of personal and/or populist parties, as well as parties that have undergone significant ideological transitions, makes any distinction between 'mainstream' and 'radical' political forces particularly fuzzy (Masseti, 2009). In fact, the very analysis of party positioning on immigration sheds some light on the ideological moderation or radicalism of these political forces.

The centre-left coalition has been dominated by the mainstream political forces – mainly left democrats (PDS-DS) and Catholic and Liberal centrist (PPI-MA) – that in 1996 came together under the 'Olive Tree' label and in 2007 merged to form the Democratic Party (PD). In this mainstream area/party a variety of ideological positions are represented – from classic social democracy to Giddens' 'third way', from Christian democracy to social liberals – entailing connections with all the three mainstream European party families. The radical left (Communist Re-foundation – RC) has been in and out of the centre-left coalition, with no or marginal ministerial roles when in office and with a much lower electoral weight, up to point of disappearing from the national Parliament in 2008. This traumatic experience triggered a split between a moderating component (Left, Ecology and Freedom – SEL), which eventually re-joined the PD into the centre-left bloc, and a more radical one that has, so far, remained electorally insignificant. Between 2006 and 2012, the centre-left bloc also hosted a highly personalized party called Italy of Values (IdV), led by former prosecutor Antonio Di Pietro and strongly focused on corruption and 'white collar crimes'.

In contrast, the centre-right bloc has been dominated by the populist or radical forces, represented by Berlusconi's personal parties (FI-PDL), the Lega Nord (LN) and most of the post-fascists within and outside Alleanza Nazionale (AN) until 2009 and within and outside the PDL since (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2005; Ignazi, 2005; McDonnell, 2013). The only full mainstream party, the Union of Christian Democrats and Centrists (UDC), was left out of the centre-right coalition in the run up to the 2008 election, while Fini, the former leader of AN, was expelled from the PDL in 2010 because of his opposition to Berlusconi's populist leadership and to the party's condescendence towards the radical demands of the LN. Fini created Future and Freedom for Italy (FLI) in a view to catalyse, together with the UDC, a 'European' mainstream right area. With the 2013 general election, the Italian party system has entered another transitional phase. After a year of technocratic government led by former EU commissioner Mario Monti and supported by a 'strange coalition' – PDL, PD, UDC and FLI – Italian voters split their preferences primarily between four political forces: a centre-left coalition formed by the PD and SEL; a new 'anti-cartel party' called the Five Stars Movement (M5S); a mainstream right coalition including the UDC and FLI, led by outgoing Prime Minister Monti; and a populist right coalition led by Berlusconi, including the LN and minor post-fascist parties. The resulting hung Parliament led to the resumption of the 'grand coalition' (PD, PDL, UDC-Monti), leaving SEL and the LN as, respectively, the radical left and radical right opposition, and the M5S as the new 'hardline' anti-establishment opposition.

The Socio-cultural and Socio-economic Dimensions of the Politics of Immigration in Italy

Evaluating how mainstream parties handle the socio-economic and sociocultural issues linked to immigration requires a brief analysis of how immigration flows have impacted, with the mediation of relative public discourses and public policies, on Italian society and economy. As shown in Table 1, the number of immigrants regularly residing in Italy has increased more than tenfold, both in absolute and relative terms, in the last two decades. In addition, as Italy is particularly exposed, because of its geographical location, to irregular immigration, the number of immigrants in the country can be considered higher than official data say.¹

Arguably, this has had an important psychological impact on the native population, particularly in those areas (for example, Northern regions and big cities) in which immigrants tend to concentrate. It is, therefore, unsurprising that a considerable share of Italian voters consider immigration a highly salient issue. As election studies since 1996 show, some 5 per cent of the electorate sees it as the most important problem, and well over 10 per cent see it as one of the two most important problems (ITANES, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008).

The socio-cultural dimension

The sociocultural dimension refers to the attitudes of the population and the positions/discourses of intermediary groups and political parties on issues concerning the cohabitation of nationals and immigrants, such as law and order, traditions and lifestyles. It taps into questions of inclusion/exclusion, recognition of minority rights, and issues of identity formation and change.

The radical-right's stigmatization of immigrants as 'permanent aliens' has been favored by the Italian institutional/legislative legacy. The tradition of *ius sanguinis* in the citizenship law was fit for the preservation of a link between the country and its emigrants up until the 1970s, but it has proved dysfunctional for the integration of the growing number of immigrants since (Pastore, 2004). The 1992 reform reinforced the bias in favour of *ius sanguinis* and filled the path of foreigners applying for Italian citizenship with bureaucratic obstacles (Colombo et al, 2009).² A further institutional barrier is the restrictive interpretation of the constitution that attributes political rights only to Italian citizens.

Table 1: Total number of residents and foreigners residing in Italy (1991–2011)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of total residents (thousands)</i>	<i>Difference from previous census (in percentage)</i>	<i>Number of non-national residents (thousands)</i>	<i>Difference from previous census (thousands)</i>	<i>Difference from previous census (in percentage)</i>	<i>Non-nationals/ Total population (in percentage)</i>
1991	56 778	+0.4	356	+145	+69	0.6
2001	56 996	+0.4	1335	+979	+275	2.3
2011	59 433	+4.3	4027	+2692	+202	6.8

Source: Author's elaboration on the bases of official census data provided by ISTAT (www.istat.it/en/).

Arguably, a virtually mono-religious and mono-confessional (Catholic) tradition has not helped in accepting the ongoing transformation of Italy into a multi-ethnic/multi-religious society. Even before 9/11, the question of cultural and civic integration of Muslim migrants gained considerable political attention. In this context, anti-immigrant parties have contributed to magnify the feeling that many (Muslim) immigrants are unwilling to integrate. During the last decade between 46 and 60 per cent of Italian voters agreed strongly or fairly strongly with the proposition that immigrants represent a threat to the national culture and identity (ITANES, 2001, 2006, 2008).

¹ Official data on estimated undocumented immigrants are not available. Figures provided by organizations working in the immigration sector diverge considerably (IDOS, 2005, p. 11), and estimations become quickly outdated as new regularizations are implemented.

² By 2011, the number of 'foreigners' who were born and living in Italy was estimated at 736000 (citing data from Caritas and Migrantes, 2012, p. 117).

Xenophobic attitudes are also fomented by the perceived causal link between immigration and criminality. In 2001, 59.8 per cent of voters thought (strongly or fairly strongly) that immigrants represent a threat to public order and security (ITANES, 2001).³ This perception is not only based on the objective over-representation of immigrants in particularly visible or disturbing criminal activities (Barbagli, 2008), but also on a negative aura of illegality that the Italian immigration policy has conferred in general on all immigrants. Italy has used ex-post and would-be-exceptional (but periodically reiterated) regularizations of undocumented migrants. Summing up roughly the number of immigrants that were regularized since 1990, it is plausible to state that at least 1.5 million immigrants have passed through a condition of being a 'clandestine' before becoming legal residents. If we add the general media emphasis on the deviance of immigrants (Sciortino and Colombo, 2004), and the legitimization of a radical right discourse provided by Berlusconi's media power, the success of anti-immigration forces in proposing a semantic shift between the terms immigrant-clandestine-criminal becomes understandable.

The socio-economic dimension

The socio-economic dimension refers to widespread attitudes, public discourses and political positions on the material costs and benefits of immigration. It involves issues such as immigrants' positions in the labour market, their contribution to national revenues and the social security system, and their relationship to public welfare. As a typical example of the 'Southern/Mediterranean' model, the Italian welfare state is neither universal nor particularly generous (Ferrera, 1996). While the ever-increasing scarcity of resources devoted to particular social services, such as public housing or kindergartens, may foster local 'wars' between nationals and immigrants, as a national issue, immigration's burden on the welfare state is simply non-existent. The relative paucity of state expenditure in certain social policy areas or the exclusion of non-EU citizens from these policies, for example, child benefits, does not favour immigrants. In addition, employment rates have generally been higher among migrants compared with the national population.⁴ Finally, irregular immigrants have no access to most social services since many of them are employed in the black economy. In fact, the high employability of immigrants, both in the regular and irregular labour market, is largely due to the persistence of a welfare system that is proving unfit for an ageing population and the growing propensity of women to enter the labour market (Sciortino, 2004). By the late 2000s, more than 2.5 million Italian families employed domestic and/or care workers (colf and badanti), most of whom were foreigners (Catanzaro and Colombo, 2009).

Several studies have pointed out how immigrants' access to the Italian labour market has in fact had an overall positive effect on average wage levels (Gavosto et al, 1999), even for unskilled native workers (Staffolani and Valentini, 2010). Analyses of migrants in the labour market point not to a situation of competition with Italian nationals but to one of complementarity and gradual substitution (Calavita, 2004; Reyneri, 2004). The fear of 'social dumping' caused by immigration appears to be largely unjustified. The objective position of immigrants in the labour market and in the welfare system, however, may not prevent some voters from negatively perceiving the economic impact of immigration.

Relative importance of the two dimensions and issue ownership

The Italian case represents a typical example of the paradox in which immigrants are (economically) needed but (culturally) unwanted. Theoretically, the mainstream left should be best positioned to cope with this paradox. It has been ideologically open to multiculturalism without, so far, having to deal with particularly negative economic effects on its constituencies. Yet, in practice, it is the position of the right that corresponds

³ The question was not included in previous election studies, nor repeated in following ones.

⁴ According to a Report on Income of Families with Foreigners by the national statistical institution ISTAT, two-thirds of foreign residents in Italy immigrated for work purposes; immigrants are more active than Italians in the job market in all age classes; and 90.6 per cent of net income of foreign families comes from work, compared to 63.8 per cent for Italian families (ISTAT, 2011).

best to voters' preferences (independently of the logical consistency and feasibility of these preferences).⁵ In addition, due both to the media power of Berlusconi and the relative inaccessibility of economic information, it has managed to almost blank out the 'economically needed' side of the picture, thus hiding the contradictions of its stance and imposing its discourse of identity and security threat. In this respect, the centre-right bloc has benefited, at least from an office-seeking perspective, from including radical right parties and partially absorbing their discourse. As Table 2 shows, voters trust the centre-right coalition on immigration much more than the centre-left, although the gap appears dependent on which coalition has governed in the previous term.

Table 2: Which coalition is most capable of addressing the problem of immigration (%)

	<i>Centre-right</i>	<i>Centre-left</i>	<i>No difference</i>	<i>Unsolvable</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
2001	44.1	18.1	21.9	6.0	9.2
2006	31.8	25.8	24.5	8.0	9.1
2008	46.8	18.7	8.9	4.9	19.4

Source: ITANES, 2001, 2006, 2008.

The Politics of Immigration and Immigration Policies 1996-2006

The politics of immigration in the first part of the Second Republic set the stage for the years 2006–2012, not only in terms of strategic positioning by political parties but also in terms of the legislative framework developed in 1998 by the centre-left (Turco-Napolitano Law) and partially reformed by the centre-right in 2002 (Bossi-Fini Law).

Several works on Italian party positioning on immigration have pointed to harsh confrontation between the two main coalitions and to the emergence of a single dimension (liberal versus restrictive). For instance, Zucchini (1999) considered different levels of radicalism or moderation of parties within each coalition. The political forces are reported to hold different stances within a single all-encompassing dimension: from uncompromising (LN) to compromising opposition to immigration (AN and FI); and from regulated (UDC and 'Olive Tree') to unconditional openness (RC).

Other analyses have pointed to a considerable gap between party rhetoric and actual policies (Colombo and Sciortino, 2004; Zincone, 2006; Geddes, 2008). In particular, these contributions highlight two main points: actual policies tend to converge externally with those of other liberal democracies and internally with the positions of the most moderate components within the two blocs; as a consequence, in spite of turnovers in office, policy continuity trumps policy change. Explanations given for this include the transversal pressure coming from advocacy groups (the Catholic Church, various business associations and the voluntary sector), the constraints posed by internal (constitutional) and international or supranational (EU) legislative frameworks, the hard reality and partial insolubility of the problems, and the crucial role played by the most moderate forces in finalizing the laws (as opposed to the higher visibility of radical forces in public debates). Concerning the latter point, which is particularly true for the centre-right coalition (Geddes, 2008), it is important to note that, although this 'role play' magnifies the gap between rhetoric and policy, it does not necessarily translate into a loss of credibility and, therefore, votes. On the contrary, this 'simulative politics' is performed because it is supposed to entail electoral gains (Cento-Bull, 2009). Indeed, the functioning of media in general – prioritizing blunt statements over policy detail – and the use of Berlusconi's media power

⁵ Cohrane (2011) has shown how the lack of coherence in right parties' ideological positioning, vis-à-vis leftist parties, is a general trend and does not necessarily represent a major electoral disadvantage, as it reflects an equally fragmented positioning of rightist voters.

in particular can significantly reduce voters' perception of inconsistencies between rhetoric and policy. In addition, the kneejerk reactions of the centre-left to all unconstitutional proposals by the radical right (most of which have no chance of becoming law) also contribute decisively to the misrepresentation of the centre-right as 'tough on immigration' (Sciortino, 2011).

The centre-left immigration law (1998)

The Turco-Napolitano law was proposed, discussed and enacted just after the 'second wave' of mass immigration from Albania (Andall, 2007, p. 141), which had a strong media impact in Italy and across Europe. The mainstream left had to manage contrasting pressures from the radical-left and the pro-immigration advocacy groups, which pushed for regularization of undocumented immigrants, expansion of legal migration flows, and concession of civic, social and political rights, and from the European (especially Schengen) partners and the radical right, which pushed for tighter border control and securitization of immigration. The government sympathized with most of the proposals of the pro-immigration front but at the same time was keen to reassure those calling for control and regulation, rejecting only the most extreme proposals of the radical-right, such as the criminalization of undocumented immigrants. In turn, the mainstream right (UDC and most of FI) accepted the structure and balance of the proposed bill but not its most radical aspects, such as the concession of local political rights (Zincone, 2006, pp. 355–358). One of the new law's most characteristic provisions was the establishment of Temporary Detention Centres (CDTs) intended to tackle the issue of border control by identification of all undocumented immigrants intercepted by police authorities. This measure found more support within the opposition (UDC, FI and AN) than within the ruling majority. Parts of the mainstream and radical left were very reluctant to accept it. In compensation, the new law allowed the equalization of documented immigrants and nationals in terms of social rights, recognition and widening of the right of family reunion, unrestricted access to compulsory education and medical treatment for all (whether documented or not), the creation of a 'job-seeking permit' under the guarantee of a documented immigrant or national resident, and the introduction of new posts and funds for the promotion of multiculturalism.

In addition, following the law's approval, the pro-immigration front obtained another regularization of undocumented foreign workers (a measure particularly wanted by the trade unions and the business organizations) and protection provisions for particularly vulnerable categories, such as immigrant minors and prostitutes (measures desired by the religious and laic organization of the voluntary sector). These and the propositions for political integration unleashed an anti-immigration campaign by the centre-right, especially AN and the LN, which considerably reduced the government's room for maneuver (Andall, 2007, pp. 144–145). The issue of Italians residing abroad was used to oppose both a reform of the citizenship law in a *ius soli* direction and the enfranchisement of long-term resident foreigners in local elections.⁶ In addition, according to a restrictive reading of the constitution, the enfranchising of immigrants would also require lengthy constitutional reform. Eventually, both of these latter proposals were abandoned. Faced with uncompromising opposition by the centre-right, the centre-left lacked the political unity and determination to fight a crucial battle on political integration, which might have structurally changed the battle ground for the future politics of immigration.⁷ According to Andall, this was not only due to intra-coalition divisions but also to the presence of different sensitivities within the mainstream left party, DS. Members responsible for the party's immigration policy saw the marginalization of the issue within the party agenda, a general defensive attitude and the unwillingness to fight a cultural struggle as strategic mistakes made by the party leadership (Andall, 2007, p. 140).

The end of the term saw the LN rejoining the centre-right coalition and the start of a more coordinated anti-immigration offensive that found some support in the Islamophobic positions of prominent Catholic

⁶ In particular, the possible concession of voting rights for immigrants.

⁷ The fact that in the same period the centre-left was able to push through a different constitutional reform (the so called 'federalist reform'), against outright centre-right opposition, appears to suggest that the hesitation of the government forces was mainly due to calculations concerning short-term electoral costs, rather than to the institutional hurdles.

establishment figures, as they broke with the traditionally pro-immigration stance of the Church (Guolo, 2011, p. 10). Two new bills were presented, aiming to reduce family reunification rights (sponsored by the LN and FI) and a penalty for illegal entry (sponsored by AN), involving arrest, quick trial and expulsion (Zincone, 2006, p. 361). By the time of the 2001 election campaign, the centre-right coalition was promising radical change in the approach to immigration: no undocumented immigration, reduction of documented inflows and outright rejection of civic integration (CdL, 2001).

The centre-right reform of the immigration law (2002)

After winning the 2001 election, however, the centre-right's passage from ideological statements to policies was rather difficult. It remained sensitive to pressures from religious and business organizations. In the first months of the new government, the deportation of 800 undocumented immigrants from an LN-dominated area triggered protests by 50 medium/small companies (Zincone, 2006, p. 362). Such pressures helped the UDC to strengthen its critical position within the government coalition and gain strength in internal negotiations (Geddes, 2008, p. 361). As a result, the promised 'revolution' on immigration policy simply did not happen. All attempts to significantly restrict the right of family reunion were defeated. Most importantly, the government conceded the largest amnesty ever declared in Europe, regularizing around 650 000 immigrants.

In order to add a repressive veneer, the centre-right used some symbolic LN proposals like the use of naval forces to combat undocumented immigration, and the biometric identification of immigrants. They partially succeeded in presenting these proposals as tough reforms, helped by the strong protests from centre-left parties and organizations. However, the only substantive change introduced by the new legislation was an increased bureaucratic workload via the introduction of the *contratto di soggiorno*, a unified contract of employment and residence and a reduction of duration of permits.

In the last years of the centre-right's term in office the LN finally replaced AN in the radical right niche and established itself as the most anti-immigrant party (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2005, pp. 967–969). After the Bossi-Fini law was approved and the subsequent amnesty was completed, Fini moved to explicitly reposition his party by declaring his stance in favour of civic/political integration (Corriere della Sera, 2003). Yet, this was more a personal than a party shift. Most of his 'colonels' did not share the new 'leftist' stance of their leader.

The precarious and brief government of the centre-left (2006-2008)

The 2006 general election saw a close victory by a very wide and heterogeneous centre-left coalition (Unione), including parties from the radical and mainstream left as well as some minor centrist and liberal-conservative parties. Because of the peculiar electoral system approved by the centre-right shortly before the election (Masseti, 2006), the centre-left obtained a safe majority in the Lower House but a majority of only two MPs in the equally important Senate. The government was short-lived and unable to carry out most of its programme, including a pledged radical departure from the centre-right approach on immigration and integration policy. Party manifestos, though representing a compromise between the mainstream and radical components of the centre-right and centre-left blocs, clearly highlight the ideological differences on immigration issues between the two. They are similar in terms of the (low) prominence of the general issue, but significantly different in terms of the relative salience between the socio-economic and sociocultural aspects of immigration, as well as in terms of the positions adopted. The centre-left paid attention to both dimensions in its 2006 manifesto, emphasizing migrants' positive economic contribution, adopting a position in favour of multiculturalism, and professing the need for cultural, civic and political integration (Unione, 2006). In contrast, the centre-right tended to ignore the economic dimension and focus on the problems of integration, adopting an anti-multicultural position and framing the whole issue in terms of 'security' (CDL, 2006).

Although immigration remained a highly salient issue, especially as a consequence of the 'Romanian wave' that followed the 2007 EU enlargement and the enduring debate on the extent to which Muslim immigrants could be integrated, the government was totally unable to enact its promised reforms. The most important government initiative was the drafting of a 'Charter of Values, Citizenship and Integration': a synthesis of principles drawing on constitutional guarantees and existing laws (immigration, asylum and citizenship) in light of the changes that mass immigration had produced in Italian society. The Charter's main goal was to explore the limits of multiculturalism in the context of national traditions and, more explicitly, the legal and constitutional framework. It went into some detail concerning religious-related practices, such as the prohibition of mutilation practices, polygamy, gender segregation and full-face covering dresses (Ministero dell'Interno, 2007). In spite of its nugatory impact on actual policies, the debate about it highlighted divisions between mainstream and radical forces in the centre-right. In particular, the UDC strongly differentiated itself from the Islamophobic positions of the LN. Inspired by the Pope's visit to Turkey in late November 2006, it called for the adoption of a 'culture of dialogue' and for 'concrete policies aimed at effective integration in the respect of human beings, and based on reciprocal respect' (UDC, 2006). However, the UDC was the only party within the centre-right that publicly advocated a different approach to that of the LN at this time.

The (centre-)right government (2008-2011)

Four main coalitions competed in the 2008 general election: one on the radical-left, called Sinistra Arcobaleno (SA) (communists and greens); one on the centre-left (PD and IdV); one on the mainstream right (UdC); and one straddling the mainstream and radical right (PDL and LN), which won a clear victory. While the electoral pledges of the radical-left coalition were largely in continuity with those advanced in the previous parliamentary term, they also went further by calling for a permanent system of regularization (SA, 2008). In contrast, the manifestos of the centre-left PD and IdV showed a move towards implicit acceptance of the radical right discourse associating immigration with criminality. The IdV's manifesto referred to immigration under the heading of 'security', and proposed to repatriate illegal and convicted migrants (IdV, 2008). The PD's manifesto referred to immigration under the general heading of 'welfare' but, after criticizing the Bossi-Fini law and proposing the enfranchisement of immigrants in local elections, it slipped into the same securitization discourse. It stated that the PD would be 'committed to regular immigration, watchful against clandestine immigration, and tough on criminality' (PD, 2008). The UDC's manifesto clearly balanced attention to immigrants' economic function and the welcoming attitude of part of the Catholic Church, on the one hand, and security concerns and the preservation of Catholicism as a prominent feature of Italian culture on the other. Under the heading of 'security and justice', it proposed moulding immigration inflows according to employers' needs and housing availability; adjusting working permits to the flexibility introduced in the labour market; promoting work training for immigrants; conceding the right to vote in local elections; but also promptly expelling criminal immigrants and favoring integration respecting 'our' culture and tradition (UDC, 2008). Freed from the alliance with the radical right, the position of the UDC clearly converged with the stances of the PD and IdV, while the themes and proposals of the radical right found a comfortable home in the PDL's manifesto. Omitting any references to the economic advantages of immigration or to any platform for sociopolitical integration, the PDL pledged to prevent any new 'indiscriminate' regularization of undocumented migrants; to contrast illegal immigration via agreements with transit states; to create new CDTs for identification and expulsion of asylum seekers; and to dismantle illegal gipsy settlements (PDL, 2008).

It immediately became clear that having expelled its most moderate component and with government survival reliant on the LN, the mainstream right (what was left of it) had lost most of its capacity to counterbalance the repressive approach of its radical right partner, at both the rhetorical and policymaking level. Further, the new course in the Catholic Church inaugurated by Pope Benedict XVI and the new Secretary of State, Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone, was characterized by the centrality of bioethical themes (such as abortion, euthanasia, artificial insemination and so on) and the marginalization of concerns for disadvantaged social

groups. This resulted into a marked decrease in official Catholic criticism of the government's anti-immigrant policies.

The LN controlled the Ministry of Home Affairs in the new cabinet, with the initiative to deal with immigration from a security perspective (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2010). In May 2008 new restrictive legislative proposals were submitted to parliament with the approval of the whole government. The most characteristic measure, strongly backed by the LN, was the introduction of penalties of up to four years imprisonment for illegal entry (Alessandri and Garavaglia, 2008). In 2009, the LN secured other restrictive or 'security-oriented' measures, such as the rejection of boats carrying undocumented immigrants (*respingimenti*) and the legalization of vigilante groups (*ronde*), besides launching some openly racist initiatives, such as the fingerprinting of Roma communities (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2010, p. 1326). What is of interest here is the reaction of the other parties. While the UDC joined the centre-left opposition in attacking these controversial initiatives, the PDL fully defended the LN's line. Moreover, Berlusconi demonstrated that he intended to compete with the LN for anti-immigrant voters openly declaring his opposition to multiculturalism (Corriere della Sera, 2009). During the last days of campaigning for the European elections he went even further, stating that 'Milan looks like Africa. In some cities, walking around downtown and seeing the number of foreigners, it really looks like being in an African city' (La Repubblica, 2009).

However, at a policy level, the PDL, under strong pressure from business associations, imposed a compromise on the LN's proposal to stop legal entries: the inflows would continue but would diminish by 20 000 (Ambrosini, 2008). More importantly, because it directly conflicted with the coalition's election pledges, the PDL (and opposition forces) managed to impose a new regularization of undocumented foreign workers on the reluctant LN. In order to save face, the government restricted regularization to *colf* and *badanti*, the two jobs that were most familiar to Italian families and furthest away from the image of the 'dangerous clandestine' (Ambrosini, 2009). This episode can be read in two ways. One is that even in the case of a particularly populist-oriented coalition such as that of the PDL-LN, actual policies do not diverge dramatically. Once the parties had guaranteed a tough image by hitting the headlines with some restrictive policies (or proposals), they eventually came to terms with labour market necessities and made partial concessions to important advocacy groups. The second is that, without a sufficiently strong mainstream right component within the governmental coalition, a real policy break became possible. Indeed, for the first time the LN managed to obtain a discriminatory restriction on the regularization criteria. Partial support for this interpretation is provided by the other measures (*respingimenti* and penalties for illegal entry), as well as the repeated ignoring of calls from business organizations (even those in the LN's stronghold regions) for the simplification of the immigrant entry and employability procedures (Assolombarda, 2010).

The technocratic government (2011-2012)

From November 2011 to December 2012 a 'technocratic' government, led by former EU Commissioner Mario Monti, was in office. It was supported by a Grand (Strange) Coalition comprising centre-right parties (PDL, UDC and FLI) and the centre-left PD, opposed by the IdV on its left and the LN on its right. Immigration and integration policy was not a priority for the new government and little legislation was enacted in this area. The issue was marginalized not only because of a prominent focus on the economic/financial crisis but also due to strong disagreement between the PDL and all of the other government-supporting parties.

In two cases, legislation was enacted following specific EU directives (Briguglio, 2012a). The first was an attempt to favour inflows of highly skilled workers by reserving a number of places on top of the usual yearly inflow provision. The second was meant to tackle illegal employment and/or exploitation of foreign workers by raising the penalties for employers. It also allowed for a temporary residence permit for immigrants who denounced their employers. In addition, it provided for another amnesty. However, the restrictive conditions and the costs of the application posed by the decree considerably reduced the number of applications. The

remaining provisions adopted by the Monti government concerned the simplification of the employment of seasonal workers and the extension of humanitarian residence permits for refugees from North Africa.

A number of issues have remained unaddressed, mainly because of strong disagreement between the parties supporting the government (Briguglio, 2012b). First of all, the fundamental principle of the Bossi-Fini law – the absolute link between legal entry into the country and having a job offer – has not been properly addressed. This means that the system of ex-post regularizations will continue, since employers prefer to ‘regularize’ undocumented immigrants already in Italy and who are known to them, rather than bringing in someone they have never seen before from abroad. Second, in spite of a growing and mobilizing ‘second generation’ of immigrants, no serious attempt to change the citizenship law in the direction of *ius soli* was made. In his speech before the confidence vote for the new government in November 2011, the PD leader (Pierluigi Bersani) proposed conceding Italian citizenship to all Italian-born children. Besides the encouragement of the President of the Republic, this received the approval of UDC and FLI (La Repubblica, 2011). However, the LN immediately announced its outright opposition. Most crucially, the PDL threatened to bring down the government should any such initiative be taken. A second call came in June 2012 when Fini, as speaker of the Lower House, asked for a debate on the citizenship law, but the government folded in the face of the PDL’s threat (Il Fatto Quotidiano, 2012). Finally, the possibility of recognizing the right of immigrants to compete for public sector jobs on an equal basis with nationals – an issue that has found some jurisprudential support but no explicit legislative reform was not even discussed. The possible consequences of such reform in terms of increased competition for jobs between immigrants and nationals (in time of deep economic crisis and rising unemployment) might well explain why even leftist parties preferred not to raise the issue.

Concluding discussion

The analysis presented above provides a clear substantiation for the first and second hypothesis proposed in the introduction to the special issue (unity and valence), both at the level of parties and coalitions. Given the heterogeneous positions in each coalition (with the partial exception of the 2008 PDL-LN coalition), immigration is consistently not prioritized in the coalition manifestos, nor in those of most individual parties, with the clear exception of the radical right LN. At the same time, it is possible to note that the centre-right coalition, which thanks to the presence of the LN and some absorption of its stances appears to own the issue vis-a-vis the centre-left, emphasizes immigration slightly more than its counterpart.

As for the third hypothesis (ideological tensions), its explanatory power appears to be trumped by the second hypothesis (valence). More precisely, the article highlights the theoretically advantageous position of the Italian mainstream left in managing contradictions and tensions linked to the various dimensions of the immigration issue. While the centre-right finds itself torn between a predominantly repressive/ exclusionist ideological approach and pro-immigration pressures from important advocacy groups, the centre-left has not experienced major tensions between its open ideological stances in both dimensions of the immigration issue. The main reasons for this favourable situation are the virtual absence, thus far, of job competition between nationals and immigrants, the positive impact of immigrants on Italian workers’ average wages, the net-payer position of immigrants in the national welfare system and their contribution to filling its shortcomings. As a result, policies adopted by the centre-left are more welcomed by all major stake holders (business organizations, trade unions, voluntary sector, Church) than those of the centre-right.

The latter appear either contradictory/heavy going (when they are the result of difficult compromises between the mainstream and the radical components) or utterly restrictive and repressive (when the populist/radical component gets the upper hand). Yet the centre-right has been perceived by voters as the most reliable coalition for dealing with immigration at least since 2001. The findings of this article confirm

that this paradox can be explained by its ability to conceal the socio-economic dimension of immigration from the debate (and, therefore, its own contradictions) and to respond to some voters' anxieties via repressive rhetoric and (more recently) policies. The manifesto analysis shows that references to socio-economic aspects of immigration appear only in the programmes of the centre-left coalition or the UDC – the most moderate, but also the smallest, component of the centre-right right bloc – while FI- PDL does not refer to the economic dimension and increasingly follows the identitarian and xenophobic discourse of the LN. On the one hand, the centre-right reproduces more closely than the centre-left the contradictions of many Italian voters' attitudes towards immigration. On the other, by imposing its discourse and resisting political integration, it hinders any genuine engagement with these contradictions in public debate.

Conversely, the centre-left has tried to strike a balance between the sometimes naïve positions of the radical-left and the hegemonic discourse of the right. In the 1990s it tried to project an image of the competent border patroller, while remaining open in terms of social integration and multiculturalism. However, during the 2000s it has been increasingly dragged into a securitization discourse, showing a willingness to address the growing anxieties of many Italians on identity and security. Crucially, it has undergone two strategic defeats. First, at the communication level, it has failed to highlight the socio-economic dimension of immigration in order to exploit its theoretical advantage vis-a-vis the contradictions of the centre-right. While in opposition, it has over-reacted to manifestly symbolic, unfeasible or anti-constitutional proposals which were not likely to become law, thus reinforcing the centre-right's 'tough' image. Second, when it was in office, it lacked the political will and/or unity to reform the citizenship law and gave up on local political rights for immigrants. Enfranchising several hundreds of thousands of long-term immigrants or 'new Italians', at local and/or national level, might have had (and in future may still have) some counterbalancing effects on the current trend of immigration discourse.

In short, competition between the two coalitions and the origins of the centre-right's advantage do not primarily concern real policies, which remained remarkably similar until 2008, but discourse, rhetoric and largely un-realized policy proposals. The cultural/civic dimension remains the more polarized and, therefore, the more salient. The experience of the 2011–2012 'grand coalition', which also went on after the 2013 election, confirms that the divisions on political integration remain strong.

While the PD, Monti, the UDC and FLI (backed by the President of the Republic) proposed reforming the citizenship law in a *ius soli* direction, the PDL sided with the LN and threatened to bring the government down. Even the appointment of a foreign-born Minister of Equal Opportunities (Mrs Cecile Kyenge), within the current government, appears insufficient to break the PDL's opposition against any form of political integration.

Whether the politics of immigration in Italy – particularly those of mainstream parties – will follow the same patterns in future is difficult to guess. Several processes are underway, from the emergence of new anti-establishment parties (M5S) to possible reshuffles in coalition politics. The unfolding economic crisis might change the relationship between nationals and immigrants in the labour market, creating some tensions for the mainstream left, but it might also lower the relative salience of the immigration issue. A generation of 'immigrants' is coming of age that appears determined to fight for its civic/political rights. Finally, the Catholic Church, a very important actor in the politics of immigration in Italy, is repositioning itself on a more traditional (pro-immigration) stance. The new Pope Francis I appears determined to bring social issues back onto the agenda. He made his first trip to Lampedusa island, delivering a speech that clearly condemned the 'anti-humane' character of the *respingimenti* policy in the Mediterranean Sea. This repositioning might have a crucial impact on the mainstream right, especially that part that has, so far, passively accepted Berlusconi's populist political style.

References

- Albertazzi, D. and McDonnell, D. (2005) The Lega Nord in the second Berlusconi government: In a league of its own. *West European Politics* 28(5): 952–972.
- Albertazzi, D. and McDonnell, D. (2010) The Lega Nord back in government. *West European Politics* 33(6): 1318–1340.
- Alessandri, A. and Garavaglia, E. (2008) Non passa lo straniero, <http://archivio.lavoce.info/articoli/-immigrazione/pagina1000461.html>, accessed 18 November 2011.
- Ambrosini, M. (2008) Immigrato, capro espiatorio della crisi, <http://www.lavoce.info> <http://archivio.lavoce.info/articoli/pagina1000839.html>, accessed 18 November 2011.
- Ambrosini, M. (2009) L'ennesima ultima sanatoria, <http://www.lavoce.info> and <http://archivio.lavoce.info/articoli/pagina1001254.html>, accessed 18 November 2011.
- Andall, J. (2007) Immigration and the Italian left democrats in government (1996–2001). *Patterns of Prejudice* 41(2): 131–153.
- Assolombarda (2010) La Giunta di Assolombarda ha incontrato il Ministro Roberto Maroni, <http://www.assolombarda.it/press-room/36347>, accessed 9 March 2012.
- Bale, T. (2008) Turning around the telescope: Centre-right parties and immigration and integration policy in Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy* 15(3): 315–331.
- Bale, T., Green-Pedersen, C., Krouwel, A., Sitter, N. and Luther, R. (2010) If you can't beat them, join them? Explaining social democratic responses to the challenge from the populist radical right in Western Europe. *Political Studies* 58(3): 410–426.
- Barbagli, M. (2008) *Immigrazione e Sicurezza in Italia*. Bologna, Italy: Il Mulino.
- Bartolini, S., Chiaramonte, A. and D'Alimonte, R. (2004) The Italian party system between parties and coalitions. *West European Politics* 27(1): 1–19.
- Betz, H.-G. (1994) *Radical Right-wing Populism in Western Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Briguglio, S. (2012a) Immigrazione, <http://www.lavoce.info> and <http://www.lavoce.info/immigrazione/>, accessed 17 November 2011.
- Briguglio, S. (2012b) Immigrazione: ecco le cose da fare, in <http://www.lavoce.info> <http://www.lavoce.info/immigrazione-ecco-le-cose-da-fare/>, accessed 17 November 2011.
- Calavita, K. (2004) Italy: Economic realities, political fictions and policy failures. In: W. Cornelius, T. Tsuda, P. Martin and J. Hollifield (eds.) *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, 2nd edn. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Caritas e Migrantes (2012) *Dossier Statistico Immigrazione 2012*. Pomezia, Italy: Arti Grafiche. Catanzaro, R. and Colombo, A. (eds.) (2009) *Badanti & Co: il lavoro domestico straniero in Italia*. Bologna, Italy: Il Mulino.

- CdL (2001) 'Documento Patto Polo-Lega', manifesto 2001. CdL (2006) 'Programma Elettorale', manifesto 2006.
- Cento-Bull, A. (2009) Lega Nord: A case of simulative politics? *South European Society and Politics* 14(2): 129–146.
- Cohrane, C. (2011) The asymmetrical structure of the left/right disagreement: Left-wing coherence and right-wing fragmentation in comparative party policy. *Party Politics* 19(1):104–121.
- Colombo, A. and Sciortino, G. (2004) The Bossi-Fini: Explicit fanaticism, implicit moderatism and poisoned fruits. In: J. Blondel and P. Segatti (eds.) *Italian Politics: The Second Berlusconi Government*, Vol. 18. New York: Berghahan Books.
- Colombo, E., Domaneschi, L. and Marchetti, C. (2009) Prigionieri della burocrazia? Significati e pratiche della cittadinanza tra i giovani figli di immigrati in Italia. *Polis* 23(1): 31–56.
- Corriere della Sera* (2003) Fini: diamo il diritto di voto agli immigrati. 7 October, http://www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Politica/2003/10_Ottobre/07/fini.shtml, accessed 23 November 2011.
- Corriere della Sera* (2009) Berlusconi: Sì ai rimpatri, non apriremo le porte a tutti. 9 September, http://www.corriere.it/politica/09_maggio_09/maroni_immigrati_respinti_da84e542-3ca2-11de-a760-0144f02aabc.shtml, accessed 25 November 2011.
- Diamanti, I. (2007) The Italian centre-right and centre-left: Between the parties and the 'party'. *West European Politics* 30(4): 733–762.
- Fatto Quotidiano* (2012) Cittadinanza agli stranieri. Fini: 'Ineludibile la modifica della legge'. 6 June, <http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2012/06/06/cittadinanza-agli-stranieri-fini-ineludibile-la-modifica-della-legge/253921/>, accessed 7 June 2012.
- Ferrera, M. (1996) The 'Southern model' of welfare state. *Journal of European Social Policy* 6(1): 17–37.
- Gavosto, A., Venturini, A. and Villosio, C. (1999) Do immigrants compete with natives? *Labour* 13(3): 603–622.
- Geddes, A. (2008) *Il rombo dei cannoni?* Immigration and the centre-right in Italy. *Journal of European Public Policy* 15(3): 349–366.
- Guolo, R. (2011) *Chi impugna la croce: Lega e Chiesa*. Bari: Laterza.
- IDOS (contact point of the European Migration Network) (2005) *Immigrazione Irregolare in Italia*. Pomezia, Italy: Arti Grafiche.
- IdV (2008) '11 points to Change Italy', manifesto 2008.
- Ignazi, P. (2005) Legitimation and evolution on the Italian right wing: Social and ideological repositioning of Alleanza Nazionale and the Lega Nord. *South European Society and Politics* 10(2): 333–349.
- ISTAT (2011) Report: I redditi delle famiglie con stranieri (anni 2008-2009), 22 December.
- ISTAT, Censuses (1991, 2001, 2011) <http://www.istat.it/en/products/databases>.
- Italian National Election Studies* (ITANES). SPSS files relative to the 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2008 general elections. Data can be obtained upon request from ITANES' website <http://www.itanes.org/en/data/>.
- Mair, P. and Mudde, C. (1998) The party family and its study. *Annual Review of Political Science* 1: 211–229.

- Marcotti, P. and Vanelli, V. (2008) Dalla Sinistra arcobaleno alla Lega? I flussi elettorali raccontano un'altra storia, *Il Mulino*, rubrica 'Database' No. 3.
- Massetti, E. (2006) Electoral reform in Italy: From PR to mixed system and (almost) back again. *Representation* 42(3): 261–269.
- Massetti, E. (2009) The sunrise of the third republic? The evolution of the Italian party system after the 2008 general election and the prospects for constitutional reforms. *Modern Italy* 14(4): 485–498.
- McDonnell, D. (2013) Silvio Berlusconi's personal parties: From Forza Italia to the Popolo della Liberta. *Political Studies* 61(S1): 217–233.
- Ministero dell'Interno (2007) Carta dei Valori, della Cittadinanza e dell'Integrazione, http://www.interno.gov.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/notizie/immigrazione/2007_04_23_app_Carta_dei_Valori.html, accessed 16 March 2011.
- Odmalm, P. and Bale, T. (2014) Immigration into the mainstream: Conflicting ideological streams, strategic reasoning and party competition. *Acta Politica* XXX.
- Pastore, F. (2004) A community out of balance: Nationality law and migration politics in the history of post-unification Italy. *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 9(1): 27–48.
- PD (2008) 'Adesso una nuova Italia: si puo' fare', manifesto 2008.
- PDL (2008) '7 missioni per il future dell'Italia', manifesto 2008.
- Repubblica* (2009) Berlusconi: Milano sembra l'Africa. Bossi lo sfida. 4 June, <http://www.repubblica.it/2009/04/sezioni/politica/verso-le-elezioni-europee/bossi-patto/bossi-patto.html>, accessed 25 November 2011.
- Repubblica* (2011) Immigrati, Napolitano: 'Cittadinanza ai bambini'. La Lega: 'Cosi si stravolge la costituzione'. 22 November, http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2011/11/22/news/napolitano_follia_no_cittadinanza_a_bimbi-25399147/, accessed 23 November 2011.
- Reyneri, E. (2004) Immigrants in a segmented and often undeclared labour market. *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 9(1): 71–93.
- SA (2008) 'Programma della Sinistra Arcobaleno', manifesto 2008.
- Scappini, E. (2002) Ideologia, pregiudizio e comportamento elettorale: la vulnerabilità della sinistra. *Polis* 16(3): 397–416.
- Sciortino, G. (2004) Immigration in a Mediterranean welfare state: The Italian experience in comparative perspective. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis* 6(2): 111–129.
- Sciortino, G. (2011) La sinistra e l'immigrazione: intervista a Giuseppe Sciortino, by Claudio Giunta, *Tantam Democratico*, No. 3. <http://www.tamtamdemocratico.it/doc/225998/la-sinistra-e-limmigrazione-intervista-a-giuseppe-sciortino.htm>, accessed 14 March 2012.
- Sciortino, G. and Colombo, A. (2004) The flows and flood: The public discourse on immigration in Italy, 1969–2001. *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 9(1): 94–113.
- Staffolani, F. and Valentini, E. (2010) Does immigration raise blue and white collar wages of natives? The case of Italy. *Labour* 24(3): 295–310.
- UDC (2006) Dipartimento Nazionale Pari Opportunita, Appello alle Istituzioni.

UDC (2008) 'Programma', manifesto 2008.

Unione (2006) 'Per il bene dell'Italia', manifesto 2006.

van Spanje, J. (2010) Contagious parties: Anti-immigration parties and their impact on other parties' immigration stances in contemporary Western Europe. *Party Politics* 16(5): 563–586.

Zincone, G. (2006) The making of policies: Immigration and immigrants in Italy. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 32(3): 347–375.

Zucchini, F. (1999) La genesi in parlamento della legge sull'immigrazione. In: Cariplo-Ismu, Fondazione (ed.) *Quarto Rapporto sulle Migrazioni 1998*. Milan, Italy: Franco Angeli, pp. 61–72.