



UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI TRENTO
Dipartimento di Sociologia
e Ricerca Sociale



LESS DIVIDED AFTER ETA?

Green networks in the Basque Country between 2007 and 2017

PhD THESIS

October 2020

Alejandro CIORDIA MORANDEIRA

PhD in Sociology and Social Research, 32nd cycle
University of Trento, Italy
(a.ciordiamorandeira@unitn.it)

A thesis submitted to the Doctoral School of Social Sciences
of the University of Trento with a view to obtaining the degree of
PhD in Sociology and Social Research (*Doctor Europaeus* label).

Supervisor: Prof. Mario Diani, *Università degli Studi di Trento*

Examining board: Prof. Robert M. Fishman, *Universidad Carlos III de Madrid*
Dr. Katia Pilati, *Università degli Studi di Trento*
Prof. Clare Saunders, *University of Exeter*



Alejandro Ciordia Morandeira

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
Noncommercial-Sharealike 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)

“After leaving Kars, Ka apparently read a number of books about snow. One of his discoveries was that once a six-pronged snowflake crystallises it takes between eight and ten minutes for it to fall through the sky, lose its original shape and vanish. When, with further enquiry, he discovered that the form of each snowflake is determined also by the temperature, the direction and the strength of the wind, the altitude of the cloud, and any number of other mysterious forces, Ka decided that snowflakes have much in common with people. (...)

And by the time he was recording these thoughts in the notebooks, Ka was convinced that every life is like a snowflake: individual existences might look identical from afar, but to understand one’s own eternally mysterious uniqueness one had only to plot the mysteries of one’s own snowflake”

Orhan Pamuk, *Snow*

“Sólo que ambas habían ido a parar a distintos mares, y que su vida había sido dominada por distintas olas y corrientes. Por lo demás, eran dos personas semejantes, dos hermanas.”

Bernardo Atxaga, *El hombre solo*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	vii
LIST OF TABLES	viii
LIST OF FIGURES.....	x
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYTICAL MODEL	7
3. THE BASQUE POLITICAL CONTEXT AND ITS IMPACT ON COLLECTIVE ACTION.....	40
4. EMPIRICAL DESIGN AND DATA	70
5. FROM CONCENTRIC TO INTERSECTING CIRCLES? IDEOLOGICAL CLEAVAGES OVER TIME.....	103
6. FROM ALLEGIANCES TO ALLIANCES? THE ROLE OF PRAGMATIC INTERESTS AND SOCIAL TIES	129
7. MODES OF COORDINATION OVER TIME: THE REINFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT LOGICS.....	151
8. CONCLUSION.....	201
BIBLIOGRAPHY	212
APPENDICES.....	239

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates how everyday patterns of interactions among civil society organizations are transformed in a relatively short period of time when major changes in the broader political context occur. More precisely, it focuses on civic organizations engaged in environmental activism and advocacy in the Basque Country, examining whether ETA's decision to abandon the armed struggle on October 20th, 2011 has affected their dynamics of collaboration. Combining diverse theoretical elements from the literature on social movements, together with insights from studies of civil society and peacebuilding, and relying upon the conceptual and methodological toolbox of social network analysis (SNA), I analyze the evolution of interorganizational networks of collective action before and after the end of violence, specifically, between the years 2007 and 2017.

The empirical core of the dissertation comprises chapters 5, 6 and 7. Chapter 5 examines the varying impact of two main external ideological cleavages (national identity and position towards ETA's violence) on interorganizational collaboration. The findings confirm that allegiances and conflicts related to these two dimensions used to condition collaborative ties between organizations up to 2011, while during the more recent post-conflict period collaborative patterns seem to be less segmented along ideological lines. Chapter 6 complements the preceding one by adding into the analysis several other non-ideological predictors of interorganizational collaboration. Results show that, with the end of ETA's armed struggle, pragmatic-instrumental factors and interpersonal bonds seem to play a larger role as drivers of public collaboration. Next, chapter 7 engages in a quite different and more exploratory kind of analysis. Applying Diani's modes of coordination (MoC) analytical framework, I explore whether the underlying relational logics through which civic actors engage with one another have significantly changed before and after the end of violence. The structural network analyses conducted reveal that social movement patterns of relations have expanded after 2011, becoming dominant vis-à-vis other modes of coordination. At the same time, actors embedded in a social movement mode of coordination are slightly more heterogeneous after the definitive demise of the violent conflict in comparison with the previous phase. Taken as a whole, these findings can be interpreted as positive signs of post-conflict normalization of socio-political life in the Basque Country. The fact that environmental civic networks are now

denser and more cross-cutting does not only mirror the lower saliency of the cleavages that used to severely condition Basque politics, but it can also serve as a powerful mechanism through which a more tolerant and vibrant democratic community can progressively be built.

Overall, this dissertation provides a more nuanced and complex view of the role played by organized civil society and social movements in deeply divided communities, underlining the need to focus on their relational structure in order to correctly assess their potential impact on social integration and the functioning of democracy. Moreover, by analyzing networks among civic organizations in a longitudinal perspective, this dissertation makes several original contributions to social movement scholarship, especially to the stream of literature focusing on coalition making. Methodologically, the replication or adaptation of the empirical design employed in this research could be instrumental in fostering more longitudinal examinations of collective action fields, which until now remain scarce. From a theoretical standpoint, this investigation underlines the context-dependent nature of even well-established patterns of political interactions, underscoring the need to pay more attention to the complex interplay between historical conjunctures and underlying everyday patterns of sociopolitical behavior.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Early on this four-year research process –and incomparable personal journey– I started to grow a quite strong pleasure from an odd literary ‘genre’: the acknowledgements section of academic books. Reading many of those few paragraphs that preceded long, sophisticated –and sometimes dull– sociopolitical analyses that were in some way relevant for my research I have been comforted in knowing that many other academics before me –many of whom I deeply admire– had also struggled in ways that felt similar to mine, falling prey to the uncertainties of becoming fully aware of the many shortcomings of one’s own intellectual ‘masterpiece’. More so, I have often been moved by authors’ affectionate references towards friends, colleagues, and families, references that served as rare small windows allowing a glimpse of the human being behind the academic. On several occasions, when my dissertation project seemed like it had irremediably gotten stuck, I even went back to some prefaces I particularly enjoyed in search of inspiration and motivation to climb out of the pit. Now it feels strange and somewhat intimidating to be writing a section of acknowledgments myself. While I doubt these pages will serve as inspiration to anyone but –perhaps– my future self, I would be satisfied if they can at least be a modest but sincere tribute to the many people to which I have become indebted over these years, quite often without them being aware of their crucial help. I will try that as many of them as possible read these lines.

First, it all started with what is probably one of the best bold decisions I have ever made: moving to the small and quiet city of Trento –which was at the time completely unknown to me– to pursue a doctorate. In this marvelous corner of the Alps that now feels like home, I did not only find a doctoral program that provided excellent training and pushed me beyond my intellectual comfort zones, but –most importantly– I was incredibly lucky to be surrounded by an heterogenous and exceptional mix of people, both within and outside of the university’s walls. Thanks to the camaraderie of my fellow colleagues, it was always a great pleasure to work in *ufficio*, often long hours that became way more enjoyable whenever a collective *pausa caffè* –or, even better, *gelato!*– was called. But life outside of the university would have never been the same without my dear housemates at *via Chini* and the countless dinners, hiking tours, and *feste* that we organized. What an amazing *terrazzo* we had and what a great family we formed! Then there was basketball and the group of brave young African men who taught me many

indelible life lessons. You guys deserve the best! Cristiano, Moussa, Sara, and all the people related with Aquila Basket involved in this wonderful project also have a special place in my memory.

Moving properly within the contours of academic work, I would like to thank the faculty members of the Doctoral School of Social Sciences at the University of Trento who provided very useful –even if at times harsh– feedback at early stages of the project. I am particularly grateful to my supervisor, Prof. Mario Diani, for his gentle guidance throughout the research process. His initial willingness to supervise my then extremely vague and shaky project was certainly the most decisive factor for me in moving into Trento. Thereafter, our meetings were always a source of stimulating new insights and ideas without which this dissertation would have probably never taken the shape it has. I am also grateful to Prof. Benjamín Tejerina, who hosted me for eleven months as a visiting researcher at the Center for the Study of Collective Identities (CEIC/IKI) at the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU).

My long stay in Bilbao was certainly intense in terms of work, for obvious reasons, as I had to conduct my fieldwork, but fortunately I also got to enjoy the many daily perks and wonders of living in the Basque Country. Again, as in Trento, I was incredibly lucky to find myself in such an enjoyable environment off work that I could call ‘home’. It was a great pleasure, and so much fun, to be a member of the *Jamel-house*!

During the different phases of my fieldwork, dozens of academics, politicians, journalists, and activists throughout the Basque Country generously responded to the unexpected emails and calls of a young researcher they had never before heard of. I am indebted to all those who contributed to this research by sharing their time, factual knowledge, and personal perspectives with me. Without their illuminating responses to questionnaires, face-to-face interviews, and other various requests this research project would have simply never been completed. *Eskerrik asko guztioi!* Furthermore, in such settings I got to meet two great Basque colleagues –Arkaitz Letamendia and Ion Andoni del Amo– who were invaluable sources of information, contacts, theoretical reflection, and always stimulating debates.

Despite writing is, for the most part, an individual and lonely activity, this final product would have not been possible without the support of those who helped me out with various tasks that too often remain uncredited. Specifically, I would like to express my gratitude to several individuals: to Emilio for helping me verify the robustness of the coding of news articles for the event database; to Juan, Alba, and Alejandro for

transcribing many long interviews; and to Patrick for his careful proofreading, which was essential in polishing a bit my too often convoluted English prose. Additionally, early partial versions of this manuscript were presented at several academic conferences and seminars in which I received useful feedback from several participants. More importantly, I have been extremely lucky to count with three bright colleagues such as Matthias Hoffmann, Aurora Perego and Dorte Fischer, whose research fortunately overlaps with mine in many respects and were always willing to read drafts, exchange bibliography, and discuss methodological and theoretical issues. Their advice and comments were always sound and constructive, as much as kind and encouraging.

For the very last step, I was greatly honored that professors Robert Fishman, Katia Pilati, and Clare Saunders agreed to evaluate my dissertation. I am immensely grateful to all of them for their thorough and illuminating reviews. Their generous words of encouragement and their fair criticisms to my work will certainly influence my future research endeavors.

Finally, I will hardly forget the particularly challenging conditions under which this dissertation was finished. The bulk of the writing and revisions took place during the first few months of 2020, under global and personal circumstances that were simply beyond my imagination in New Year's Eve. It is therefore compulsory for me to sincerely thank the many friends and relatives who checked up on me and made sure lockdown remained only physical but did not turn social nor emotional. They are simply –and fortunately– too numerous to name them all, but I am quite sure they know who they are. However, special mention goes to my mother Isabel and my dearest friends Mario and Alex. I do not think I will ever be able to return all their patient support, empathy, and affection, which felt closer than ever. *De corazón, muchas gracias.*

Alejandro Ciordia Morandeira

Madrid, Spain

October 2020

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

*This list contains all abbreviations employed throughout the text, with the exception of acronyms of civic organizations, political parties and trade unions that are included in the analyses as members of the field, which are listed in Appendix 3.

- BAC: Basque Autonomous Community
- BEM: Basque Environmental Movement
- BVE: *Batallón Vasco Español* ('Spanish-Basque Battalion')
- CCVNN: *Comisión por una Costa Vasca No Nuclear* ('Commission for a Non-nuclear Basque Coast')
- CC.AA.: *Comités Antinucleares* ('Anti-nuclear Committees')
- CSO: Civil Society Organization
- ECAF: Environmental Collective Action Field
- EE: *Euskadiko Ezkerra* ('Basque Left')
- EGI: *Euzko Gaztedi Indarra* ('Basque Youth Force')
- ESMO: Environmental Social Movement Organization
- ETA: *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* ('Basque Country and Freedom')
- FCN: Foral Community of Navarre
- GAL: *Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación* ('Antiterrorist Liberation Groups')
- HB: *Herri Batasuna* ('Popular Unity')
- HST: High Speed Train
- IU: *Izquierda Unida* ('United Left')
- MLNV: *Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Vasco* ('Basque National Liberation Movement')
- MoC: Modes of Coordination of Collective Action
- MSV: *Mayoría Sindical Vasca* ('Basque Trade Union Majority')
- NIMBY: "Not in my Backyard"
- QAP: Quadratic Assignment Procedure
- PEA: Protest Event Analysis
- POS: Political Opportunity Structures
- SNA: Social Network Analysis

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1. Characteristics of the local newspapers selected as sources for PEA	81
Table 4.2. List of core organizations and keywords used for querying newspapers' repositories	86
Table 4.3. Number of articles reviewed and selected for codification by year	87
Table 4.4. Summary of events' characteristics	88
Table 4.5. Descriptive statistics of the collaborative networks	96
Table 5.1. Summary of organizations' characteristics and ideological identities	114
Table 5.2. QAP regression of collaborative ties on ideology-based latent linkages (models A and B)	121
Table 5.3. Densities of interorganizational collaboration within and across Basque nationalists and non-nationalists	123
Table 5.4. QAP regression of collaborative ties on ideology-based latent linkages, collaboration observed at different periods during 2011	127
Table 6.1. Non-ideological predictors of collaboration included in the analysis	131
Table 6.2. Organizations' issues of preferential mobilization, yearly distributions	134
Table 6.3. Organizations' territorial presence, yearly distributions	136
Table 6.4. Number of political parties and trade unions active in the ECAF by year	137
Table 6.5. Ideal-type organizational models	139
Table 6.6. Organizational models and tactical profiles, yearly distributions	142
Table 6.7. QAP regression of collaborative ties on different types of latent linkages (model C)	145
Table 7.1. List of enduring coalitions included in the analysis	163
Table 7.2. Structural properties of networks associated with resource allocation	164
Table 7.3. Value assignment for the construction of individual proximity matrices of ideological congruence for the four dimensions considered	167
Table 7.4. Strength of boundary interpenetrations and assigned values	167
Table 7.5. Structural properties of networks associated with boundary definition	168

Table 7.6. Densities between structural positions, according to the three-cluster partition of the conflict-affected network produced by CONCOR, ignoring diagonal values	180
Table 7.7. Image matrices resulting from the application of a mean value criterion to the density matrices presented in table 7.6	181
Table 7.8. Goodness-of-fit statistics (R2) of alternative blockmodels	182
Table 7.9. Density tables of the two-relational conflict-affected network, resulting from the 7-cluster solution obtained through complete-link hierarchical clustering	185
Table 7.10. Final classification of actors according to their prevailing mode of coordination	188
Table 7.11. Mean tie values within and between modes of coordination, both phases	191
Table 7.12. Distribution of modes of coordination in each phase	192
Table 7.13. Properties of actors in a social movement mode of coordination	195

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1. Analytical framework for the study of interorganizational collaborative networks	37
Figure 3.1. Map of Euskal Herria	41
Figure 3.2. Bi-dimensional representation of the BAC's political party system at the early 2000s	47
Figure 3.3. Evolution of the number of violent deaths related to the Basque conflict (1968-2010)	49
Figure 3.4. Evolution of the attitude towards ETA in the radical nationalist electorate (1981-2015)	51
Figure 4.1. Evolution of the perception of the existence of fear	83
Figure 4.2. Distribution of organizations by type and geographic scope of action	91
Figure 4.3. Distribution of organizations according to the number of years they are identified as members of the environmental field	92
Figure 4.4. Example of conversion of a two-mode event-by-organization matrix into a one-mode co-occurrence matrix of organizations tied by events co-attended	95
Figure 5.1. Evolution of freedom to speak about politics in the BAC (1987-2015)	108
Figure 6.1. Organizations' issues of preferential mobilization: overall frequencies and sources of assessment (N=70)	134
Figure 6.4. Comparison of the explanatory power of pragmatic-instrumental dyadic variables and the full regression model over time (adjusted R ² values)	148
Figure 7.1. Modes of coordination of collective action (source: Diani 2015a: 16)	154
Figure 7.2. Combined image matrix of the conflict-affected network, resulting from the 7-cluster solution obtained through complete-link hierarchical clustering	185
Figure 7.3. Combined image matrices for the 6 best-performing blockmodels of the conflict-affected network	186
Figure 7.4. Two-relational network during the conflict-affected and the post-conflict phases	190
Figure 7.5. Combined image matrices with modes of coordination as partitions	191

Figure 7.6. Correlations between individual indicators of resource exchange and boundary interpenetrations over time	193
Figure 7.7. Flows among modes of coordination at both phases	194
Figure 7.8. A typology of collective action fields and the evolution of the Basque ECAF	199
Figure 8.1. Simplified explanatory model of the evolution of the Basque ECAF in the aftermath of violent conflict	204

1. INTRODUCTION

October 20th, 2011 marks a landmark date for the history of the Basque Country, the day when the Basque separatist organization ETA (*Euskadi ta Askatasuna*, “Basque Country and Freedom”) announced its unilateral and definitive abandonment of armed struggle. The violent campaign of ETA against the Spanish state in pursuance of ‘national liberation’ extended for 43 years (1968-2011) and caused more than 800 deaths, being the most prominent perpetrator of political violence –though not the only one– in what has been the last major violent ethnonationalist conflict remaining active in Western Europe. Despite contrasting views regarding the conflict shaped the immediate political reactions to ETA’s declaration and, to a great extent, continue to mold Basque politics, there seemed to be a clear element of consensus from the very beginning: that this event represented a decisive turning point. Two statements of that day from two opposing political actors illustrate this point: “*In Euskal Herria, a new political time is opening*”; “*A new time has begun in Euskadi*”. The first quotation is part of ETA’s official statement, while the second one was pronounced a few hours later by the then *Lehendakari* (prime minister of the Basque Autonomous Government) Patxi Lopez.¹ The view expressed in these two statements, repeated by many others throughout the following years, is quite straightforward: the disappearance of political violence presents the opportunity to ‘normalize’ Basque society, politics, and public sphere at all levels, overcoming the entrenched sociopolitical divisions that the conflict used to exacerbate.

Let me clarify from the outset that this is nonetheless not a dissertation about the Basque violent conflict itself. I am not interested in studying the origins, evolution, and final –and rather unusual– settlement of the conflict, as there already exists an abundant literature on these matters. Rather, the present dissertation looks at one of the multiple consequences of this conflict, one that, in my view, has not received enough attention to this day: its impact on the everyday functioning of organized civil society. According to

¹ A member of the PSE, Mr. López was the first lehendakari not from the PNV, being in power between 2009 and 2012. The two statements referred can be found in these two sources: El País (2011, October 20). “Texto íntegro del comunicado”. Retrieved from: https://elpais.com/politica/2011/10/20/actualidad/1319131779_738058.html; and El Mundo (2011, October 20). “Patxi López: ETA confirma su derrota sin conseguir sus objetivos”. Retrieved from: <https://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2011/10/20/paisvasco/1319134390.html> (last accessed: 29/04/2020)

several accounts, in the Basque context, collective action of almost every kind has traditionally been permeated by two ubiquitous fault lines: one created by positions on the center-periphery debate, and the other produced by stances towards ETA's armed struggle and other sources of political violence. The 'permeative propensities' (Horowitz 2000: 7-8) generated by the salient ethno-nationalist and violence-related cleavages, added to the high levels of participation in unconventional politics and protests observed in the region, have created a very particular ecosystem for collective action and sociopolitical activism. Indeed, most previous social movement literature agrees on depicting the Basque Country as a hyper-mobilized and strongly polarized political community.

The extent to which the first of these cleavages, the ethno-national one, has traditionally permeated all spheres of Basque political life is nicely illustrated by the considerations of some young Basques who had been living in Madrid for some time and actively took part in the well-known 15-M wave of protests that originated in the Spanish capital in May 2011 and quickly spread to the rest of the country. Two years later, in 2013, the interviewed activists contrasted their personal perceptions of the initial cross-cutting character of the *indignados* mobilizations with their previous experiences in their natal region. According to them, "*in the Basque Country, [national] identity pervaded everything*" and "*social activism was dependent on the process of nation building*".² Such descriptions of collective action mobilizations are quite extended among both activists and external observers alike. It is nonetheless remarkable that the aforementioned assertions were formulated, already by 2013, in past tense. They described the conditions of an undefined past, and it was implicitly stated that they did not apply anymore, that a significant shift in collective action dynamics might have occurred. Is this really the case? Is this shift related to the end of ETA's armed struggle? How does the present post-conflict situation look like? These were the kind of questions that prompted my initial interest on this topic and, seeing that no serious attempt of answering them had been undertaken yet, I started to think about how to empirically confirm or disprove the relative widespread belief that social life in general, and collective action dynamics in particular, had been significantly transformed in the Basque Country with the demise of a decades-long violent conflict.

² Source: El Diario Vasco (2013, April 1). "Los vascos de Sol". Retrieved from: <https://www.diariovasco.com/v/20130401/politica/vascos-20130401.html> (last accessed: 29/04/2020).

Thus, considering ETA's definitive abandonment of violence in 2011 as a potentially transformative historical event and focusing on organized civil society as the object of analysis, this dissertation examines *whether the influence of traditional divisions that had long characterized unconventional politics and civic action in Spain's Basque Country has been reduced, consequently making cross-cutting collective action more frequent*. For this purpose, this research focuses on one illustrative and crucial sector of Basque civil society as a case study: the environmental collective action field. Adopting a relational perspective and relying on network-analytic techniques, the central empirical chapters of this thesis will analyze the evolution of interorganizational relationships among Basque civic organizations mobilized around environmental issues before and after the end of violence, more precisely between the years 2007 and 2017. The evidence presented throughout this dissertation mostly confirms initial expectations of post-conflict deactivation of traditional cleavages. In practical terms, this could be considered as a positive indicator –even if partial– of post-conflict civic reconstruction in the Basque Country, which puts into question whether previous assumptions about the fragmented and polarized nature of Basque institutional and non-institutional politics still hold today in the current more peaceful scenario.

1.1. THE BROADER INTEREST OF THE CASE STUDY

Having briefly introduced what this thesis specifically *does*, it is time to point out what this research is more broadly *about*. In other words, why should readers without a significant previous interest in Basque sociopolitical phenomena devote their time to reading this work? I would like to argue that, beyond the intrinsic interest of the case at hand, several aspects of this research might appeal to a relatively wide readership, as this investigation engages with some topics of general sociopolitical relevance.

By conducting an in-depth diachronic examination of relational patterns in a specific sector of Basque civil society, the present dissertation aims to shed some light on the role played by organized civil society and social movements in deeply divided communities, where the public sphere is often strongly influenced by salient and long-lasting cleavages, often of an ethno-national nature. A nascent body of literature has recently started to pay attention to the particularities of collective action promoting demands that are in principle universalistic and non-sectarian (e.g. environmentalism, feminism, LGBT, labor rights, the fight against social exclusion, etc.) in divided political contexts as diverse as Northern Ireland, Lebanon or Bosnia-Herzegovina (e.g. Acheson & Milofsky 2008; Cinalli 2002,

2003; Cochrane 2005; Cockburn 2013; Milan 2020; Murtagh 2016; Nagle 2008, 2016). The study of organized civil society and collective action in divided post-conflict settings such as the Basque Country can provide a more nuanced and complex view of civil society's potential impact on social integration and the functioning of democracy. Contrary to the expectations derived from some popular neo-Tocquevillian arguments, voluntary collective action developed within organized civil society is not unambiguously positive, but it can either contribute to the strengthening of the social fabric as well as to the reinforcement or amplification of existing social divisions. In fact, the kind of impact civil society has on wider social integration depends to a large extent on the system of relations in which civic actors are embedded. In order to have a beneficial effect, civic organizations should be engaged in cross-cutting relations with other collective actors, putting in contact individuals with diverse backgrounds and viewpoints. However, the existence of cross-cutting ties that bridge social divides cannot be taken for granted but should be empirically assessed, especially in societies that have recently experienced a violent political conflict, where cross-cutting interactions tend to be scarcer. Because these are precisely the contexts in which the potential bridging capacity of associational life are needed the most, obtaining a comprehensive and reliable picture of the patterns of relations in which civic actors are embedded becomes of paramount importance for assessing advances in terms of reconciliation and civil reconstruction.

At the same time, the system of interorganizational relations is also deeply conditioned by contingent external circumstances, which makes diachronic analyses particularly pertinent. The centrality that time dynamics have in this investigation provides a major source of interest to readers that are not necessarily interested in deeply divided contexts similar to the Basque Country's. This in-depth examination of how relational patterns of collective action have evolved over a period marked by major contextual shifts can also contribute to broader theoretical discussions on the complex interplay between specific historical conjunctures and the evolution of certain patterns of everyday political behavior (such as the patterns of relationships among civil society actors) that are too often taken as given and regarded as immutable. In this sense, the original longitudinal analytical scheme devised in this research can also be regarded as important contribution in its own right, as its replication or adaptation could be helpful in advancing more time-sensitive empirical research on collective action and social movements (Gillan & G. Edwards 2020).

1.2. PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION

After this very short introduction to the main objectives of this dissertation, the next chapter contains a comprehensive presentation of the theoretical framework on which this research is based. First, the aforementioned main research question is placed within broader academic discussions, moving then to introducing the main theoretical and analytical building blocks that will guide empirical examination. Chapter 3 provides, on the one hand, a minimal historical contextualization of the setting of this study: the Basque Country. On the other hand, I briefly review the recent history of non-institutional collective action in the region during the previous decades, with a particular emphasis on the specific field under study: environmentalism. The empirical design and data collection procedures are thoroughly described in chapter 4, with special attention to the mapping and boundary specification of the Basque ‘environmental collective action field’ and to the strategies devised for the retrospective observation of interorganizational collaboration.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 constitute the empirical core of this dissertation. Chapter 5 examines the varying impact of two main external ideological cleavages (national identity and position towards ETA’s violence) on environmental collaborative networks. The findings confirm that allegiances and conflicts related to these two dimensions used to condition collaborative ties between organizations up to 2011, while during the more recent post-conflict period collaborative patterns seem to be less segmented along ideological lines. Chapter 6 complements the preceding one by adding into the analysis several other non-ideological predictors of interorganizational collaboration. Results show that, with the end of ETA’s armed struggle, pragmatic-instrumental factors and interpersonal bonds seem to play a larger role as drivers of public collaboration within the Basque environmental field. Next, chapter 7 engages in a quite different and more exploratory kind of analysis. Applying Diani’s (2013b, 2015a) modes of coordination (MoC) analytical framework, I explore whether the underlying relational logics through which civic actors engage with one another have significantly changed before and after the end of violence. The structural network analyses conducted reveal that social movement patterns of relations have expanded after 2011, becoming dominant vis-à-vis other modes of coordination. At the same time, actors embedded in a social movement mode of coordination are slightly more heterogeneous after the definitive demise of the violent conflict in comparison with the previous phase.

In the concluding chapter 8, I recapitulate the main findings of the thesis, discussing its implications for Basque civil society and, more broadly, for the study of collective action in strongly divided political communities. Afterwards, I present a theoretical explanatory model that connects the observed changes in network patterns to the primary contextual shifts occurred during the considered timeframe. Finally, I discuss the main limitations of this research enterprise and then outline its academic contributions.

2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYTICAL MODEL

Having briefly introduced the goals and structure of this dissertation, it is necessary in the first place to situate my research questions within broader academic discussions, and, secondly, to present the main theoretical and analytical building blocks that will guide empirical examination. With these goals in mind, this theoretical chapter is structured as follows. First, I place the concept of civic organizations –the main unit of data– within the literature on civil society, specifying their relationship with other cognate concepts and discussing their alleged contribution to democracy and the public good. Second, I draw upon the literature on deeply divided societies and socio-political cleavages to sketch the main characteristics of civil society and civic organizations in such settings. Third, I present the relational and structural perspective on which the empirical analyses of subsequent chapters are built. Finally, the last section puts together the different elements previously presented and combines them into a synthetic analytical model through which the main research question of this research can be better framed.

2.1. THE OBJECT OF STUDY: CIVIL SOCIETY AND CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS

2.1.1. Civil society as associational life

The concept of civil society has received an enormous amount of attention since the 1980s, mostly due to the extended assumption that a vibrant civil society is a crucial element for a functioning and healthy democracy. As it is often the case, the popularization of the concept within and outside academia has nonetheless hindered conceptual clarity and empirical ‘operationability’. Civil society is a highly contested and elusive concept, defined in multiple ways by different authors. Actually, one of the few elements of consensus is the acknowledgment of its multidimensional nature (Anheier 2004). Broadly speaking, three differentiated –though not completely independent nor incompatible– understandings of civil society can be distinguished: civil society as the good society, civil society as the public sphere, and civil society as associational life (M. Edwards 2014). These three main understandings stress, respectively, its normative, communicative or deliberative, and organizational dimensions. That said, while the afore-

mentioned trichotomy greatly oversimplifies the matter, as the theoretical discussion around the concept of civil society is much more complex and nuanced,³ this broad brush approach is sufficient at this point in order to introduce the specific definition of civil society that underpins this research, which clearly falls closer to the third broad understanding: associational life.

For the purpose of this thesis, civil society is understood as the set of all associations and groups in between the state, the market, and the private sphere in which membership and activities are voluntary (*Ibid.*: 20). Typical examples of civil society actors are: NGOs of different kinds, labor unions, political parties, churches and other religious groups, professional and business associations, community and self-help groups, social movements, or the independent media. The first thing that such a heterogeneous collection of groups has in common is their involvement in *collective action*, which can be broadly defined as encompassing all “social phenomena in which social actors engage in common activities for demanding and/or providing collective goods” (Baldassarri 2009: 391). Besides this common orientation towards the promotion and provision of collective goods through collective action, three other traits characterize associational civil society: being organized, voluntary, and distinctive from both the state and the market. Each of these defining traits require some additional qualifications in order to not excessively restrict the concept of civil society.

First, regarding the organizational character of civil society, this should not mean the restriction of the concept of civil society actors to formally organized associations.⁴ If a more flexible notion of organization is adopted that focuses on the gradual presence or absence of basic organizational elements,⁵ then there is no problem in including informal or ‘*partial*’ organizations (Ahrne & Brunnsen 2011) within the realm of associational civil society, as long as groups present some degree of ‘*organizationality*’.

Second, as Michael Edwards (2014: 20) carefully specifies, the term “voluntary” does not mean that all organizations which are part of civil society rely exclusively on voluntary (unpaid) work for its functioning. Even if most civil society organizations rely, at least partially, on voluntary contributions to function, the two key criteria for being

³ See, for instance, the voluminous handbook edited by Michael Edwards (2011).

⁴ Which can be defined as “*formally organized named group, most of whose members -whether persons or organizations- are not financially recompensed for participation*” (Knoke 1986:2).

⁵ Membership, hierarchy, rules, monitoring and sanctions. See Ahrne & Brunnsen (2011) and den Hond *et al.* (2015).

regarded as voluntary are: that membership is consensual –in opposition to prescribed or required– and therefore it can be abandoned without losing personal rights, and that the groups’ objectives are pursued through voluntaristic mechanisms such as dialogue and negotiation, in opposition to functioning based on coercion –like the state– or on the use of material incentives –like market actors.

Last, declaring the distinctiveness of civil society from the state and the market does not imply the denial that “in practice the boundaries between these sectors are often complex and blurred” (Spurk 2010: 8-9). Despite the increasing fluidity of boundaries between the three sectors, a conceptual distinction can still be made (M. Edwards 2014: 23-28). The key gradual criteria for the identification of civil society organizations is that these are neither purely driven by private or economic interests and are –at least to a large extent– autonomous from state institutions. Of course, this does not preclude the appearance of disputes when trying to delimit who is in and out of civil society. These decisions will need to be taken in many cases on an individual basis.

2.1.2. Civic organizations

As mentioned above, the concept of civil society as associational life encompasses an immense array of very different civil society organizations (CSOs), ranging from sports clubs, choirs, to charity organizations or activist groups. In order to understand such a heterogeneous group of collectivities, a first distinction can be made between two broad types of civil society organizations (Boix & Posner 1996; Morales & Mota 2006). On the one hand, there are a large number of voluntary groups mainly oriented towards the *provision of private collective goods* for their members (e.g. sports clubs, choirs, self-help groups for alcoholics, etc). The collective goods produced in such associations are private in the sense that their enjoyment is restricted to those that participated in their creation, that is, members themselves.⁶ On the other hand, there are organizations primarily involved in the *generation of public collective goods* that are designed to be enjoyed by other members of the community, not just members. Within this second group, some organizations primarily focus on the provision of collective goods and services to

⁶ Even if they might also generate ‘positive collective externalities’, and argument famously posed by Putnam (1993, 2000) and criticized by many others. Putnam initially argued that any kind of association, even recreational ones, favored the production of social capital and contributed to a deepening democracy. Weak empirical evidence on the connection between privately-focused associations and their supposed positive effects on social cohesion and democracy have recently moved the attention towards civil society organizations that are more oriented towards public collective goods.

others (nonprofit charities being the most typical example), while a majority of them participate in the public sphere (either exclusively or in addition to service delivery) by advancing claims and demands promoting or resisting social change (McCarthy & Zald 1977) on behalf of collective interests and programs (Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 216). The latter, which have been labelled as ‘*advocacy organizations*’ (Andrews & B. Edwards, 2004) or ‘*civic organizations*’ (Baldassarri & Diani 2007), constitute the subset of civil society on which this research focuses.⁷

The advantage of using the synthetic category of civic organizations lies in the fact that it encompasses several related types of organizations that have been studied as separate phenomena even though all of them share a solid common ground: “*a core focus on the pursuit of a collective good framed in the public interest*” (Andrews & B. Edwards 2004: 485). For instance, partially overlapping categories such as interest groups, social movement organizations, nonprofits, or grassroots organizations have been treated separately by different academic traditions, often using certain qualities (e.g. degree of institutionalization, organizational structure, type of claims, or geographic scope) to set dichotomic definitions instead of assessing those qualities as continuous variables to study internal heterogeneity within civic organizations (*Ibid.*). Thus, instead of considering the different varieties of civic organizations as separate categories, they can be seen as different varieties within the organizational repertoire (Clemens 1993) of participatory and public-oriented civil society. This synthetic perspective can be beneficial in connecting two academic traditions that have rarely interacted despite studying similar phenomena: studies on social movements and studies on voluntarism and the third sector (della Porta 2020b).

In sum, civic organizations can be defined as a subset of civil society organizations which pursue public interests through frequent participation in the public sphere. Thus, as used here, civic organizations present a much broader scope in comparison with some popular interpretations of associational civil society that focus only on NGOs. At the same

⁷ While I consider advocacy organizations and civic organizations as synonyms, I will generally favor the latter term. Therefore, I will refer to the main dependent variable of this study, the network of collaboration among advocacy/civic organizations (see chapter 4 below), as ‘civic networks.’ This choice avoids potential confusion with the concept of ‘advocacy networks’ (Bozzini 2013), which is more closely related to the analysis of public policy processes and the advocacy coalition framework (see, for instance: Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier 1994; Sabatier 1998). More importantly, the scope of ‘advocacy networks’ extends beyond civil society as defined in this project, since it “may include policymakers, governmental agencies, and state actors, alongside nongovernmental organizations, local social movements, foundations and charities, and the media.” (Bozzini 2013: 11).

time, it should be noted that civic organizations are not the only category of actors engaged in public collective action, as non-participatory private groups and state-related institutional actors can sometimes engage in collective action as well.

2.1.3. The neo-Tocquevillian ideal and the bridging impact of civic organizations

One of the main reasons that explains the increased attention to civil society in general and civic organizations in particular is their alleged key contribution to an integrated society and a vibrant democracy. This perspective has been revitalized over the past few decades by modern analysts inspired by Alexis de Tocqueville's (1954 [1835-40]; 2011 [1856]) classic comparison of the quality of democracy in the United States and France in the early 19th century, among which Robert Putnam (1993, 2000) stands out as its most famous representative.

According to the standard neo-Tocquevillian argument, high levels of active engagement in voluntary civic organizations benefit democracy in several crucial ways (see, among others: Fung 2003; Spurk 2010; Van der Meer & Van Ingen 2009; Warren 2001). In the first place, associations function as 'schools of democracy' in which individuals are socialized into attitudes and dispositions of trust and reciprocity that orient them towards the search of the common good. Additionally, through active participation, individuals also develop a set of civic skills (e.g. in managing logistic aspects, in public speaking, in arguing against opposing views, etc.) that are also necessary when engaging in political action. Associations can also act as instruments for citizens to influence state institutions by directly representing their interests and by controlling and limiting state power. More generally, associational life also provides a space for voicing alternative views that contest tyrannical majorities and dominant perspectives within society.⁸ On a partially related point, civic organizations can operate "as a public arena for discussion, mediation, and deliberation" (Baldassarri & Diani 2007: 735). By allowing the free exchange of ideas and contrasting positions among citizens, civil society facilitates a genuine public deliberation, which according to classic theories of civic republicanism, is the cornerstone of a truly democratic polity. Precisely, the enhancement of the public

⁸ Nonetheless, attention to this 'contestatory' function of civil society is not quite central in most neo-Tocquevillian accounts, at least certainly less than for those who take inspiration from the work of Antonio Gramsci (1971). Neo-Gramscian perspectives on civil society conceive civil society as the realm of counter-hegemonic contestation and resistance towards the authoritarian tendencies of the state. For a succinct recent contrast of the two schools, see: Bernhard *et al.* (2017).

sphere relies to a large extent on another alleged salutary effect of civil society: the emergence of “a social infrastructure of dense networks of face-to-face relationships that cross-cut existing social cleavages” (B. Edwards *et al.* 2001). Ultimately, because participation in such organizations entails getting to know other citizens coming from different social backgrounds and holding different views, a strong civil society is conducive to high levels of social integration, understanding an integrated society “not as a society in which conflict is absent”, but “as one in which conflict expresses itself through nonencompassing interests and identities” (Baldassarri 2011: 651). All in all, from a neo-Tocquevillian perspective, voluntary organizations play a crucial role in constructing a ‘good’ society and a plural and vibrant public sphere, the other two main conceptions of civil society mentioned above.

Neo-Tocquevillian ‘social capital’-based theories have however been criticized for being overly optimistic and biased in their assumptions, since in reality “associational life may either foster political integration or amplify division” (*Ibid.*). In fact, the potential democratic and deliberative contributions of civic organizations rest on the assumption that a series of conditions are met (O’Flynn & Russel 2011): (1) that organizations present inclusive membership, (2) that they are oriented towards civic and democratic goals, and (3) that they engage in cross-cutting relations with other organizations that may pursue different goals and have a diverse constituency. Nonetheless, these ideal favorable conditions, particularly the existence of cross-cutting ties that bridge social divides, cannot be taken for granted. As we will see in the next pages, these conditions are not always found in empirical reality and, therefore, need to be inductively evaluated through empirical assessment.

2.2. CIVIC ORGANIZATIONS IN POST-CONFLICT DIVIDED COMMUNITIES

While the potential virtues of associational life to more integrated and democratic societies is a relevant topic in any given context, it acquires particular importance in cases like the Basque Country. It is precisely in societies that have recently experienced a violent political conflict where the aforementioned conditions of an ideal civil society are less likely to be found. This is so, because societies that have suffered a recent conflict tend to show high levels of socio-political division, which makes the label of deeply divided societies applicable to most of them. As noted by Spurk, “during conflict and immediately after, civil society tends to be organized along conflict lines, fostering

clientelism, reinforcing societal cleavages and hindering democratization” (2010: 19). The next subsection briefly reviews the concept of divided societies and defends its applicability to the present case study. The second subsection elaborates on the characteristics of civil society in divided communities, which generally do not favor the bridging and integrative function attributed to civic organizations but create vicious circles of segmentation and sectarianism. After that, the last epigraph presents two different arguments regarding the relevance of looking at temporal changes in the level of integration among civic organizations in post-conflict settings.

2.2.1. Deeply divided societies: definition and applicability to the Basque Country

What exactly are deeply divided societies? What characteristics do they show? As Guelke puts it, deeply divided societies⁹ might be seen as a special category of ‘*plural societies*’ (Lijphart, 1977), “in which a fault line that runs through society causes political polarization and establishes a force field” (Guelke, 2012: vi). While it is true that every society is divided up to some extent, since every community contains multiple socio-political divisions,¹⁰ deeply divided societies present two clear defining traits that set them apart:

- a) That cleavages are not pacified, in the sense that they display ‘*permeative propensities*’ (Horowitz 2000: 7-8), as “practically all political and social issues are ultimately infiltrated by sectarian conflicts” (Nagle 2016: 20). Such cleavages should display high political salience and be sustained over a substantial period (Lustick 1979: 325).
- b) That the legitimacy of the state in the deeply divided communities is ultimately questioned (Bosi & De Fazio 2017: 11) and therefore “*the polity is deficient in legitimacy*” (Guelke 2012: 31).

The fault line generating deep divisions is in many cases an ethnic one, and that is why the concept of deeply divided societies has been often equated with ethnically divided ones (*Ibid.*: 27).¹¹ This equivalence is based on Lustick’s (1979: 325) early definition, which sets as an essential criterium that divisions need to be based on

⁹ From now on, I will use ‘divided societies’ and ‘deeply divided societies’ interchangeably.

¹⁰ “*Whether based on ethnicity, religion, race, class or any combination of these and other factors*” (Bosi & De Fazio, 2017: 11).

¹¹ For instance, Horowitz focuses on ‘ethnic seepage’ as the only type of ‘permeate propensity’ in which he is interested in (2000: 7-8).

‘*ascriptive ties*’, meaning those personal identities involuntarily acquired –that is, externally imposed– at birth or early family socialization, such as race, ethnicity and, in many cases, religion. However, more recent conceptualizations of deeply divided societies do not include ascriptive group identities as a necessary requisite, but rather as a possible –even if quite frequent– characteristic (e.g. Guelke 2012).

A broader understanding of deeply divided societies that does not require the existence of ascriptive, permanent, and unchangeable group identities might allow characterizing the Basque Country as deeply divided. Except for a few exceptions (e.g. Jeram & Conversi 2014), this label has not been of customary use for the Basque case, since none of the opposing identities that characterize the Basque political sphere are strictly ‘ascriptive’. For instance, the traditional long-standing cleavage conditioning Basque society can be regarded as an *ethnonationalist* one. However, ethnonationalist identities in modern Basque Country are more influenced by *nationalism* than by *ethnicity*. Ethnicity can be defined as self-perception of cultural difference, normally associated with a common ancestry (Wimmer 2008: 973; Muro 2015: 186), and therefore it is more susceptible to create ascriptive identities based on family origins and boundaries that are hardly changeable. In contrast, nationalism is better conceptualized as an ideology (Conversi 2011) “*that aims to have a perfect one-to-one correspondence between nation and state*” (Muro 2015: 187) and therefore, a nationalist identity is not externally ascribed but voluntarily adopted,¹² as any ideological identity. The same principle of individual voluntary adoption applies to the political identities determined by positions on the legitimacy of ETA’s armed struggle. The journalist Paddy Woodworth neatly summarizes this point when he notes that “*the fracture which distorts Basque civil society today is not ethnic –it is primarily an ideological fault line*” (2007: xx).

Despite the fact that Basque polarizing identities are not ascribed but rather voluntarily adopted, the other classic traits of deeply divided societies can be clearly found. On the one hand, it is clear that the legitimacy of the Spanish state has been questioned by large segments of the Basque population since the second half of 19th century (e.g. Muro 2008; Lecours 2007). This questioning is evident in the emergence of violent campaigns against the state –such as the Third Carlist War (1872-76) or ETA’s insurgent activity (1958-2011)-, the poor turnout rates in the 1978 Constitutional

¹² Even if relying on ethnic claims to support its nationalist objectives, as often done by some Basque and Spanish nationalists. This common hybridization is commonly labelled as ethno-nationalism.

Referendum, or the significant levels of electoral support that secessionism has maintained ever since (see section 3.2.1 for more details). On the other hand, the salience and pervasiveness of ethnonationalist and ETA-related divisions in Basque political life have been widely acknowledged, making the public political sphere strongly sectarian and polarized. Beyond electoral politics, strong divisions have also affected non-institutional collective action in several ways; for instance, creating imbalances in terms of informal political participation, with nationalist sectors being extremely mobilized (Casquete 2006), while non-nationalist Basque citizens tend to be under-represented – though not completely absent– in associational life (García Albacete 2010). Some other authors have also shown how collective action in fields without any *a priori* connection to the national center-periphery debate, such as feminism or environmentalism, have also been permeated by them (e.g. Barcena *et al.* 2003, Barcena & Ibarra 2001; Epelde *et al.* 2016: 317; Fernández Sobrado & Aierdi 1997; Fernández Sobrado & Antolín 2000; López Romo 2008; Tejerina *et al.* 1995; Tejerina 2001, 2010, 2015).

In conclusion, I contend that the Basque Country presents the theoretical characteristics to be considered a deeply divided society. Even though the national cleavage in the Basque Country has not had an effect of ‘pillarization’ comparable to that described in the Netherlands or Belgium (Kriesi *et al.* 2007: 252). in the very first formulations of cleavage theory (Lipset & Rokkan 1967), nor to the high levels of spatial segregation and frequent serious episodes of intercommunal violence observed in places like Northern Ireland (López Romo & Van der Leeuw 2013), this might be considered a matter of degree rather than categorical difference. While the Basque Country is certainly ‘not as deeply divided’ as other deeply divided societies, it still exhibits the minimum criteria to fit into this theoretical category, at least when examining the public sphere. Thus, I consider the literature examining civil society in deeply divided contexts to be relevant for the analysis of Basque civil society.

2.2.2. The structure of civil society in divided communities: cleavages, social boundaries and political subcultures

Although it might sound somewhat tautological, the main characteristic of associational civil society in deeply divided communities is precisely that it is likely to be neatly divided along the main politicized cleavages, that is, divisive issues that acquire high political salience. Even if the concept of cleavages, originally formulated by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) as axes of conflict that structure political opinions and behavior

(S.Aguilar 2011), has been mainly applied to study voting patterns and political party systems, nothing prevents us from using it to study other types of political behavior, like non-institutional collective action (Damen 2013).

It should be noted however, that the manifestation of a cleavage within civil society does not imply an absolute and dichotomic separation. Rather, there will always be a few actors that connect across cleavages, though it will be “the exception rather than the norm” (Nagle 2016: 13). Therefore, it seems more helpful to assess the impact of cleavages at the meso-level in relative and relational terms as a social boundary. Tilly provides a minimum broad definition of a social boundary as “any contiguous zone of contrasting density, rapid transition, or separation between internally connected clusters of population and/or activity” (2004: 214). When a social boundary exists, actors on either side interact more frequently and densely among each other than with actors situated on the other side, with actors in each zone producing shared stories regarding the boundary and the distinct relations that are established within and across groups. That is, where a social boundary exists, we would expect most civic organizations to establish relationships based upon *Simmelian* ‘concentric circles’ (Diani 2000), ultimately giving birth to strong and potentially antagonistic political subcultures.

Political subcultures can be succinctly defined as “a subset of a larger population that organizes its interactions around a set of understandings that are known and shared between the subcultural group and that differ, at least in some meaningful way, to those found externally” (Fishman 2004: 26). In the Basque context, radical Basque nationalism, and its organizational expression through the so-called Basque National Liberation Movement (see section 3.2.2) has traditionally been depicted as a closed and cohesive political subculture (e.g. Mata 1993; Casquete 2006, 2009).¹³ It is nonetheless important to note that political subcultures do not need to be constituted by *uncivil* violent organizations in order to have pernicious divisive effects but, on the contrary, they are usually composed of a wide spectrum of legal civic organizations that may unintentionally reinforce sectarianism due to their composition, scope of action and

¹³ Casquete even considers that radical Basque nationalism has established a kind of “parallel society” (2006: 51), with a broad social infrastructure consisting not only of political organizations, but also of spaces of socialization, information, recreation, and cultural consumption that “duplicate the organizational framework of the broader society.” His argument resonates with many ethnographic observations that have emphasized the strong political segmentation of many informal spaces of public life, such as bars or music events (e.g. Elzo & Arrieta 2005; Kasmir 2002; Lahusen 1993; Mansvelt Beck 2006: ch. 6). While similar subcultural tendencies are found in almost every society, these seem particularly strong in the Basque context.

networks of relationships (Belloni 2008: 190-4). Political subcultures, as the purest expressions of concentric circles, impose important obstacles for collective action and for the development of a virtuous civil society. As reasoned by Diani (2000: 396):

Concentric patterns of social relations delimit the practical opportunities of social exchange, to the extent that people involved are predominantly connected to others within the same milieu. Also, and most important, they shape people's identities and social representations. Identities are embedded in 'circles of recognition' which consist of both concrete social relationships and virtual circles of ideas (Pizzorno, 1991; see also Somers, 1994; Emirbayer, 1997: 296-7). The interdependence between ideas and concrete relationships shapes dramatically possible courses of action: some appear as obvious and accessible, while others seem to be unfeasible if not unconceivable.

Moreover, apart from delimiting collective action for those actors within a given political subculture, salient and pervasive cleavages also “*narrow the ground available for nonsectarian voices to be heard by the political leadership and the public alike*” (Nagle 2016: 25), effectively sidelining actors that intend to overcome the existing divisive logics.

Lastly, from a dynamic perspective, concentric circles reproduce and reinforce the salience of existing cleavages, setting in motion a vicious circle that is hard to break (Cochrane, 2005). Once a community is deeply divided and its civil society structured in concentric circles, is it possible to break the vicious circle of lack of intergroup contact and distrust that salient cleavages generate? Theorists like Tilly (2004, 2005) or Wimmer (2008, 2013) –the latter concentrating exclusively on ethnic boundaries– have recently engaged with this issue. Both emphasize that even though many relevant social boundaries tend to last in time, we should not reify these boundaries as natural and unchangeable, but we should rather examine temporal variations in terms of their location and strength. The same that some social boundaries appeared at specific points in history, creating opposing identities that had not existed before, social boundaries can also be deconstructed and lose their relevance, even ethnic ones (Wimmer 2008: 984-5). Tilly (2004: 222-4) identifies two ways in which this second option can happen: general boundary *erasure* and boundary *de-activation* in specific social settings.¹⁴ These two processes can result from the combination of several of the five different causal

¹⁴ Tilly describes *inscription* and *activation* (mirroring concepts of erasure and de-activation), as well as two other mechanisms constitutive of boundary change: *site transfer* and *relocation* (2004: 224-6). However, I do not consider pertinent to include the latter two in the discussion, as these two mechanisms refer to the making or the changing position of a social boundary, but not to its debilitation or disappearance, which is the focus of this research.

mechanisms of boundary change that he identifies, namely: *encounter, imposition, borrowing, conversation, and incentive shift* (*Ibid.*, 216-21). Wimmer (2008: 1004-7; 2013: 105-8) –although arguably more focused on the ‘making’ rather than on the ‘unmaking’ of ethnic boundaries– can also provide some guidance on the search for causes of boundary weakening with his identification of three main types of sources of boundary change: *exogenous shifts* (sudden changes due to external factors, such as major political events), *endogenous shifts* (cumulative consequence of the strategic actions of individual actors), and *exogenous drifts* (cumulative change in actors behavior due to external influences). These theorizations about the dynamics of social boundaries can be particularly useful in formulating specific causal explanations (see section 8.2).

2.2.3. The temporal evolution of social boundaries in divided civil societies: reasons for analysis

Once the structural characteristics of civil society in divided communities have been described, and it has been shown that despite typically being quite resilient, social boundaries between civic groups can fade away throughout time, it seems pertinent to discuss what is the relevance of observing such changes. Two opposing arguments can be differentiated here: civil society as a catalyst for broader societal change, and civil society as an indicator of such change.

2.2.3.a) Civil society as a catalyst

While it is true that the existence of a divided society is in many cases a contributing factor leading to violent conflict, it is certain that deeply divided societies are an outcome of violence as well, since “*war itself further polarizes civil society and more broadly the views of all those involved, leaving a bitter legacy of resentment and mistrust that complicates the process of post-war democratization and peacebuilding*” (Belloni 2008: 188). The literature on post-conflict peacebuilding has always had among its objectives the mitigation of socio-political divisions, but there is a relatively recent growing attention to the role of civil society (e.g. Cox 2009; Paffenholz & Spurk 2006; Paffenholz 2010). For instance, in the case of ethnically divided societies, constructivist perspectives on post-conflict reconstruction particularly emphasize the need of reducing ethnic divisions’ political salience as a key strategy for successful peacebuilding (Heupel 2011: 214-6). Under the banner of ‘civil society reconstruction’, peacebuilding scholars and practitioners are increasingly focused on reducing the fragmentation of civil society and

therefore favoring the integrative or community-building function of civil society, which is one of the seven functions through which civil society can contribute to peace and democracy (Spurk 2010).¹⁵

This focus on civil society reconstruction as a way to foster peacebuilding has been mainly promoted by theories of conflict transformation that follow Lederach's (1997) emphasis on grassroots bottom-up initiatives. Conflict transformationists advocate strategies of 'sustainable peacebuilding' that, using Galtung's (1969) terms, go beyond 'negative peace' (the mere absence of direct violence) and set the basis for 'positive peace' (a peaceful society at all levels), which necessarily includes high levels of social cohesion. The basic premise of this transformationist approach is elegantly captured by Diamond, when he states that "a rich and pluralistic civil society tends to generate a wide range of interests that may cross-cut, and so mitigate, the principal polarities of political conflict" (1999: 245) and, therefore, ultimately contribute to the strengthening of peace and democracy.

These transformationist approaches focused on the grassroots have also been applied in some concrete peacebuilding initiatives promoted in the Basque Country. For instance, from the institutional side we could mention the organization of restorative initiatives involving victims of different types such as the *Glencree* program, or the forums organized in the municipality of Renteria (see Zernova 2017). The creation of an official 'Secretariat of Human Rights, Coexistence and Cooperation' within the Government of the Basque Autonomous Community (Euskadi), which tries to involve civil society actors in many of its projects, is also a clear exponent of the institutional attention given to issues of social reconstruction. From the civil society sector, some pacifist organizations such as *Lokarri*, *Bakeaz*, *Argituz* or *Gernika Gogoratu* have also promoted a number of smaller occasional initiatives targeting social reconstruction at the small scale, trying to involve other civil society actors from outside of the pacifist sector in order to foster a more deliberative democratic culture.

Most peacebuilding approaches focusing on civil society are somewhat based on the same type of neo-Tocquevillian assumptions reviewed above. Since civil society is supposed to ultimately promote peace and democracy once it presents the right conditions to develop, fixing those conditions (integrative membership, democratic goals, and cross-cutting relationships) should be conducive to a more peaceful and democratic society. In

¹⁵ The others being: *protection, monitoring, advocacy, in-group socialization, intermediation* with the state, and *service delivery* (Spurk, 2010).

other words, civic organizations are seen as catalysts for positive change, as a more integrated civil society can set in motion positive dynamics that will lead to higher levels of integration in all levels of society.

2.2.3.b) Civil society as an indicator

In contrast with the previous view, given the weak empirical evidence and causal ambiguity supporting claims about the transformative effects of civil society (Chapman 2009), some other authors see associational civil society not so much a catalyst of social change –be it peaceful coexistence or other positive social outcomes– but more as an indicator of underlying societal characteristics. This position is built upon the premise that civil society is decisively shaped by the political and cultural context in which it develops (e.g. Booth & Richard 2001; Roßteutscher 2002; Paxton 2002; Cochrane 2005; Kriesi *et al.* 2007). Therefore, if “*civil society reflects and incorporates the divisions within society*” (Belloni 2008: 193), the observation of substantial changes within the former would indicate that the society in which it is immersed has undergone important transformations. Roßteutscher provides a clear formulation of this idea:

Associations are a microcosm of society at large; in a sufficiently democratic environment their impact generally will be democratic, in an undemocratic society their impact might well be very undemocratic. This is the case because associations do not advocate a certain type of culture but reflect and amplify the dominant cultural traits of their environment: they are not democracy's avant-garde but political culture's mirror. (Roßteutscher, 2002: 515)

This latter position is closer to the one adopted in this research, as it aims to examine whether and how a crucial change in the Basque political context –the end of ETA's violence– has affected the relational structure of civil society. However, my position differs slightly from Roßteutscher's claim of civil society dynamics being merely a reflection, a dependent variable. Such a vision implies a complete reversal of the traditional neo-Tocquevillian causal link going from civil society to the production of aggregate public goods (e.g. democracy, civic culture, peace, ...).

Instead, one could more modestly affirm that this relationship seems to be reciprocal rather than unidirectional (Chapman 2009). Strong democracies facilitate that civic organizations can act as bridges between unconnected sectors of society and open arenas for discussion, which sets in motion a virtuous civic circle that reinforces democracy itself. On the contrary, as we have seen when discussing deeply divided communities, the presence of strong cleavages stimulates the appearance of social boundaries within the

associational universe, which itself reinforces those same divisions, making the reciprocal relationship between political culture and civic organizations vicious rather than virtuous. Assuming this reciprocity, I contend that shifts in structural patterns of relations between civic organizations can be interpreted, first and foremost, as a consequence of broader societal changes, reflecting particularly well the strength or saliency of socio-political cleavages (Damen 2013: 946). At the same time, the configuration of this web of relations at a certain point in time can either accelerate or curb processes of polarization or integration.

Finally, it could be argued that, particularly for the Basque case, looking at relations among civic organizations might be the one of the most appropriate way of studying the varying salience of socio-political cleavages and assess, allowing for a partial assessment of whether or not Basque society is actually *less divided after ETA*. In the politically-oriented civil society, socio-political identities are at play without the strategic deformation and exaggeration that these suffer in the arena of institutional and electoral politics, while still being externally observable, in contrast to many other everyday settings of social interactions at the individual level, where political identities tend to be routinely suspended and, even when it is not the case, they are extremely hard to study diachronically.

2.3. A RELATIONAL AND STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF CIVIL SOCIETY

In line with the argument formulated by Baldassarri and Diani (2007), I contend that while examining the traits of advocacy organizations with respect to its membership and orientation is important, it is far from sufficient. If one does not take for granted the integrative and democratic effects of associational civil society, nor its reconstructive power in conflict-ridden societies, “*one also needs to look at the properties of the networks that connect organizations to each other and thus facilitate or constrain their cross-cutting and bridging functions, as well as their overall contribution to social integration*” (*Ibid.* 736). This requires looking at civil society not as a mere sum of its composing organizations, but rather as an ‘*ecosystem*’ (M. Edwards 2014), that is, as a complex structure formed by the multiple relations through which civil society organizations are engaged with each other. Precisely, the rest of this section provides the theoretical and analytical building blocks needed to undertake such an analysis.

2.3.1. Civil society as an ecosystem: field theory

In order to study the ecosystem of civil society –or, at least, an important subset of it, as in this case– a relational approach is required. Sociological relational approaches view social relations as the constituent elements of social structure (Fuhse 2013: 181), a tradition that can be traced back to classic theorists like Georg Simmel and Jacob Moreno (see, for instance: Wellman 1988: 22-23). Studying civic organizations from a relational and structural standpoint implies paying attention to the complex systems of relations in which these are embedded with other organizations. These complex meso-level structures were conceptualized first as ‘environments’ and later as ‘organizational fields’ (Curtis & Zurcher 1973; DiMaggio & Powell 1983; DiMaggio 1986; for more recent reviews see: Clemens & Minkoff 2004; Minkoff & McCarthy 2005). Thus, field theory can be defined as “a more or less coherent approach in the social sciences whose essence is the explanation of regularities in individual action by recourse to position vis-à-vis others” (Martin 2003: 1), and is coherent with the most important tenets of ‘constructivist-structuralist’ theorists such as Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) or Giddens (1984). Both authors, despite presenting some important divergences, agree in a conception of structure both as medium and outcome of everyday social practices, that is, both as structure and process (see, for instance, Crossley 2010: 128-130). Since the concept of field was first formulated within neo-institutional organizational theory (DiMaggio & Powell 1983) it has become quite popular, as it “represents a particularly promising vantage point from which to view organization change. If treated longitudinally, the field level is particularly hospitable to the study of dynamic systems” (McAdam & Scott 2005: 12). As a consequence of its popularization, the field concept has been both theoretically and empirically stretched, leaving a confusing and at times contradictory body of literature (Zietsma *et al.* 2017).

In this research, I follow the most widespread understanding of organizational fields as “a set of interacting groups, organizations and agencies oriented around a common substantive interest” (Aldrich 1999: 49-50), which in a recent literature review Zietsma and colleagues (2017) labelled as ‘*exchange fields*’. Interorganizational exchange fields, like the one we are interested in, are composed of a community of organizations that regularly interact amongst themselves and that “in the aggregate, represent a *recognized area of institutional life*” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 148). In particular, this dissertation will empirically focus on what I call the ‘environmental collective action

field’ (hereafter I will interchangeably employ the acronym ECAF or the shorter version of ‘environmental field’). The environmental field under examination here should be seen as a specific example of ‘*collective action fields*’ (Diani & Mische 2015), also referred as ‘*social movement exchange fields*’ (Zietsma *et al.* 2017). Even though I consider the definitions of ‘collective action fields’ and ‘social movement exchange fields’ to be identical concepts, I will favor the use of the former label, due to the narrower conceptualization of the term ‘social movement’ that is employed in this research. Social movements are here conceived not as a synonym of collective action promoted by civic actors, but as a specific subtype of such phenomena, distinguished by a particular mode of coordination of collective action (Diani 2015; see section 7.1 for more details).

Collective action fields can be defined as “localized relational arenas characterized by mutual orientation, positioning, and (at times) joint action among multiple kinds of actors engaged in diverse forms of collective intervention and challenge” (Diani & Mische 2015: 307). In our case, the mutual orientation shared by members of this field is their common interest in furthering environmental agendas and demands. While a more detailed justification of the case selection and a description of field constituents will be provided in the following two chapters (see sections 3.4.1 and 4.2.2), we should briefly make a distinction here between our object of study, the ECAF, and related concepts like the ‘environmental movement’ (Rootes 1999, 2004) or the ‘environmental social movement industry’ (Rucht 1989). The fundamental difference is that the concepts of ‘movement’ and ‘social movement industry’ (SMI) (McCarthy & Zald 1977) have mostly been operationalized from an aggregative perspective as populations rather than as fields. In this way, traditional studies of ‘movements’ and SMIs have focused on “a collection or aggregate of organizations that are ‘alike in some respect’” (Hannan & Freeman 1977: 934). For instance, if we were to focus on the environmental movement or SMI, we would only include the population of organizations that are primarily focused on environmentalism, environmental social movement organizations (ESMOs). Instead, a focus on the environmental field will not only encompass environmental actors –the ‘focal population’ of this exchange field (Zietsma *et al.* 2017)– but also members of allied movements and other types of collective actors that share a significant interest in pursuing a more harmonious relationship between society and nature.

2.3.2. Collective action fields as civic networks

Despite the expansion of the field concept, the supposed relationality attached to it – at least metaphorically – is still rarely reflected in empirical practice, where an aggregative view of censuses of organizational populations still dominates (e.g. Andrews & B. Edwards 2005; Andrews *et al.* 2016; Brulle *et al.* 2007; Kriesi 1996; Rucht 1996). This aggregative operationalization of fields should be changed for a more relational one, focused on systems of relations between organizations (Diani 2013b: 146-149; 2015a: 13). In other words, a strictly relational examination of fields should bring to the forefront in which way the relations that a given organization establishes with other collective actors condition its actions, and vice versa. The use of network-analytic approaches allows precisely that.

Network approaches “are a way of thinking about social systems that focus our attention on the relationships among the entities that make up the system” (Borgatti *et al.* 2013: 1). From a social network perspective, a certain social system can be expressed as a network, its true unit of analysis, which consists of a set of entities and the linkages among them (Wasserman & Faust 1994: 3-10). The entities or actors in a network are referred as nodes, and “have characteristics – typically referred as ‘attributes’ – that distinguish among them” (Borgatti *et al.* 2013: 2). Relationships are instead referred as ties or edges. Mutual collaboration, social ties, and flows of information, resources or trust are just a few examples among ties of potential interest to analysts of civil society and collective action. That said, the specific content of ties can vary greatly, as this “is limited only by a researcher’s imagination” (Brass *et al.* 2004: 795). In the same line, further reflection and nuance is offered by Nick Crossley:

What counts as a ‘relation’ will vary. In social network analysis we select the relations we examine in accordance with the issue and indeed the ‘world’ we are investigating, always allowing for the fact that multiple types of relations might be salient in the same world and that the same pair of actors might enjoy multiple types of (or ‘multiplex’) relations (Crossley 2010: 145).

In this project I follow authors such as Crossley (2010; see also Bottero & Crossley 2011, and Crossley and Diani 2019), who contend that social network analysis (SNA)¹⁶

¹⁶ SNA is broadly defined here as “a methodological and conceptual toolbox for the measurement, systematic description, and analysis of relational structures” (Caiani 2014: 368). Among the variety of “methods that specifically allow the investigation of the relational aspects of these [social] structures” (Scott 2013: 41) analysts can resort to the visual representation of network graphs and various forms of statistical analyses of the adjacency matrices through which relationships are recorded.

is an appropriate way of studying fields, despite the criticisms made by some field theorists such as Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) or, more recently, Fligstein and McAdam (2012). These criticisms normally argue that network approaches do not capture the real essence of social relations but anecdotal frequencies of occurrences and therefore do not bear theoretical significance. In response, Crossley argues that networks, if constructed through theoretically meaningful types of ties (DiMaggio 1986), are actually “structures in and of the social world which create both opportunities and constraints for those involved in them” (Crossley 2010: 159). Thus, following this reasoning, “SNA allows us to derive a sense of social space and positions which, though different to Bourdieu’s, nevertheless, as noted above, does the same job and no less effectively” (Bottero & Crossley 2011: 104), and therefore, provides tools for reflecting upon the dynamic evolution of fields (*Ibid.*: 114).

Thus, by adopting a network-analytic strategy, this research operationalizes collective action fields as ‘civic networks’ (Baldassarri & Diani, 2007), examining the structures that emerge from recurring patterns of interaction through network-analytic techniques. Now, it is time to extract some lessons from previous network-analytic studies of civil society actors in order to get some guidance on which type of relationships should be studied in civic networks and how these multiple levels of connection can overlap.

2.3.3. Moving beyond visible networks: visible and latent linkages

Studies of organizational fields composed of civic organizations –or of any of its subtypes– have a long tradition, though there is still a paucity of knowledge about organizational links and networks, especially if compared to empirical work on individuals’ participation in voluntary groups (Zmerli & Newton 2007: 153-6). The distant antecedents of this research strategy can be traced back to the classic community studies of the 1960s. Among these, for instance, Laumann and colleagues’ community studies tried to uncover local power structures by looking at ‘networks of collective action’ (Laumann & Pappi 1976), crystalized as interorganizational linkages between focal ‘corporate actors’ (Laumann *et al.* 1978). But what type of interorganizational linkages have been analyzed as meaningful ties?

Despite the fact that the original formulation of field theory by neo-institutionalist scholars of organizations emphasized the interplay between material relationships and meaning exchange (e.g. Meyer & Rowan 1977; DiMaggio & Powell 1983), network analyses of fields have remained until recently largely behavior-oriented, only taking into

consideration ‘objective’ and directly observable interactions between actors, forgetting the multiple types of relations that might connect a single set of organizations,¹⁷ particularly the meanings attached to them. As Mische (2011: 81) recounts, until the mid-1990s, “a sizeable gap remained between formal network analysis and more interpretively oriented cultural research”, with the former paying “little attention to the expectations, symbols, schemata, and cultural practices embodied in interpersonal structures: the meaning structure of social networks” (Fuhse 2009: 51). This concern on bridging material and cultural interactions, as well as structure and agency can be particularly observed in the work of Harrison White (1992). Following his path, attention to the cultural aspects of social relations has increased significantly among network scholars since the mid-1990s, in part driven by what Mische (2011) refers to as the ‘New York School’ of relational sociology, and others have termed ‘a relational sociology of meaning’ (Kirchner & Mohr 2010).¹⁸ However, although works encouraging quantitative-oriented analysts to construct networks that also reflect sociocultural structures instead of exclusively behavioral ones (e.g. Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Erikson, 1988; Mohr, 1998) have been widely cited, some lament that to this day the “cognitive and meaning-related dimension of collective action still remains largely unexplored vis-à-vis more instrumental coordination processes that ground collective dynamics” (Eggert & Pavan 2014: 364; in a similar line: Pachucki & Breiger 2010: 206; Ferguson *et al.* 2017: 9).

In a first step, we can distinguish in very broad terms between two main types of interorganizational linkages: direct or ‘*visible*’ ties and indirect or ‘*latent*’ ones. While this terminology originally borrows from Diani’s (1995) labels, my conception of ‘latent’ ties and resulting networks is significantly more expansive, referring to the many different kinds of implicit linkages created by overlaps in key organizational elements. For instance, even if the implicit connections created through overlapping membership between organizations are of paramount importance, we should also consider other significant similarities in aspects such as collective identities, policy goals, internal organizational models, or forms of protest. Visible networks (e.g. coordinating with other actors) are generally outcomes of purposeful collective action decisions carried out by the

¹⁷ The fact that “there may be many networks that connect, in different ways, the same nodes” is technically known in SNA terms as multiplexity (see, for instance: Kadushin, 2012: 28, 35-37).

¹⁸ A school which was certainly influenced by the previous emergence of social constructivist and symbolic interactionist approaches (e.g. Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Blumer, 1969; Goffman, 1959).

different actors that constitute the network (*Ibid.*: 99). Latent networks are instead the result of social bonds and crucial similarities between actors, often even unintended and unknown to the actors themselves. The second type of latent connections, the ones generated by sharing certain theoretically relevant traits, are particularly important since they act as indicators of potential *homophily*-driven cooperation between organizations.¹⁹

By contrast, some previous studies of collective action fields had worked with a dual classification that in practice restricted non-visible ties with interpersonal connections such as friendships or overlapping memberships (Laumann *et al.* 1978: 463-6; Diani 1995: 98-101). As stated in the previous paragraph, in my view, these interpersonal bonds are just a single –though very important– subcategory of latent linkages. Their relevance lies in the fact that these interpersonal connections, along with ideological bonds resulting from overlapping ideological identities, correspond to the types of ties that reflect mechanisms of *boundary definition*.²⁰ However, it should be clear that not all latent networks are associated with such mechanisms. For instance, some latent linkages such as sharing similar issue-agendas, geographical scope, tactical repertoires, or models of internal functioning, while being potentially important predictors of visible connections, derive from organizational elements that are not as central to organizations' distinctiveness as their membership and the moral or ideological values to which a group is committed. Hence, it is the interpersonal and ideological latent linkages generated by sharing the latter key traits that can be read as “*interpenetrations of organizational boundaries*” (Laumann *et al.*, 1978: 463).

Adopting a multiplex analytical strategy that goes beyond analyzing the more obvious direct interactions between actors (e.g. who coordinates collective action with who) present many advantages. For instance, focusing on the aims of this research, we can obtain a good relational picture of social boundaries and political subcultures (see section 2.2.2) by looking at how visible ties, on the one side, and ideological and/or social bonds, on the other side, combine. In our case, we may identify a relevant ‘political

¹⁹ The basic idea behind the mechanism of homophily, which is fairly ubiquitous in social life, can be succinctly summarized with the idea that “*similarity breeds connection*” (McPherson *et al.* 2001).

²⁰ *Boundary definition* and *resource allocation* are the two crucial analytic dimensions on which Diani's “modes of coordination” (MoC) framework is built (2013b, 2015a). This typology draws upon Laumann and colleagues' distinction between “linkages based on the interpenetration of organizational boundaries” and “linkages based on the exchange of resources” (1978: 463). See section 7.1 for a more detailed treatment of the MoC framework.

subculture’ when we see clusters of organizations densely connected through both transactions (e.g. joint involvement in the same events) and bonds of ideological (e.g. sharing the same ethno-national identity) or interpersonal nature (e.g. overlapping memberships).

In addition, when focusing on transaction networks as a visible outcome of collective action, it will be relevant to assess which latent linkages have been more influential for actors’ choices to get involved in certain transactions with other actors. In our case, we are interested in understanding which factors explain organizations’ decisions to collaborate with other organizations. Precisely, the next section reviews the role played by different types of latent ties in influencing interorganizational collaboration.

2.3.4. The latent ties that structure transactions: lessons from the literature on coalition building in social movements

The last couple of decades have witnessed the emergence of a new body of research focusing on coalition formation within the broader literature on collective action and social movements. Understanding coalitions in a broad sense, as instances when “*distinct activist groups mutually agree to cooperate and work together toward a common goal*” (McCammon & Moon 2015: 326), this emerging subfield²¹ has identified a number of factors that facilitate or inhibit collaboration between social movement organizations. Before entering into more details about these factors, I would like to make two brief clarifications. First, in terms of terminology, throughout this dissertation I consider interorganizational ‘coalition’ (in accordance with the broad definition provided above) and ‘collaboration’ to be conceptually equivalent, and therefore these will be used interchangeably. That said, I will most often favor the use of the latter term due to the fact that the popular understanding of the term ‘coalition’ is associated with stronger and more sustained forms of collaboration through often formal structures, confusingly labelled as ‘coalition organizations’ (Murphy 2005) or ‘enduring coalitions’ (Levi & Murphy 2006). This extended usage of coalitions is significantly more demanding than McCammon and Moon’s definition and, most importantly, the specific type of collaborative interactions on which the empirical data of this research focuses: co-participation in public events and in umbrella structures (for more details, see sections 4.2 and 7.3.1). The second warning

²¹ The current body of research on ‘movement coalitions’ has been carried out since the late 1990s and early 2000s (e.g. Diani 1995; Lichterman 1995; Diaz-Veizades & Chang 1996; McCammon & Campbell 2002; Van Dyke 2003; Van Dyke & McCammon 2010), even if building upon previous pioneering treatments of the topic (Zald & Ash, 1966; Staggenborg, 1986).

refers to the slight mismatch between the empirical focus of most of the works referenced in this section and the slightly broader scope of this research. Even though most of the cited works reviewed in this section come from studies of social movement organizations (SMOs), I consider that both the findings and the theoretical framework originated within this literature can be extended to the broader scope of civic organizations. In short, there is no theoretical reason to believe that SMOs belong to a different category than interest groups or NGOs with respect to their role within civil society (see section 2.1.1 above), nor with respect to the basic factors explaining their collaborative behavior.

In the remainder of this section, I will briefly review the main interorganizational latent linkages that, according to the literature, can be relevant in facilitating or hindering mutual agreement for cooperation.²² Considering that civic networks of collaborative ties are an outcome of the discrete –though not mutually independent– choices of the actors –civic organizations– that compose them (Diani 1995: 7) we should direct our attention to the factors that influence organizations’ decisions to collaborate (or not) with each other. Drawing upon previous literature (for recent reviews, see: Brooker & Meyer 2019; McCammon & Moon 2015; Van Dyke & Amos 2017; Van Dyke & McCammon 2010), I differentiate between three broad categories corresponding to three main ‘logics’ that influence actors’ decisions to collaborate (or not) with one another: (a) identity-based solidarities, (b) pragmatic-instrumental logics, and (c) interpersonal connections. Within each of these logics, different types of interorganizational latent linkages become relevant incentives for the formation of specific collaborative ties. Even though these three relational logics are presented separately for purposes of greater clarity, they also influence one another, as it will be discussed at the end of the section. should be noted that to three relational logics are closely interrelated, as they all influence one another.

Identity-based solidarities emphasize linkages that reflect similarities in organizational socio-political identities. When these are congruent and a logic of solidarity weighs heavily in organizations’ decisions, collaboration is facilitated, and coalitions are more likely. On the contrary, dissimilarity between identities can act as a barrier for coordinated collective action, generating aversion instead of solidarity. A wide range of organizational identities can be relevant as solidarity-generating bonds influencing coalition formation. For instance, they can derive from the social category or group identity (Tajfel 1978) of organizations’ members and/or constituencies (Diani

²² External contextual factors, which are also identified by the literature as having a relevant explanatory power for the analysis of coalitions, are not treated here but in the next section.

1995: 11), such as those determined by socio-economic class or ethnic origin (on the latter, see: Diaz-Veizades & Chang 1996; Fennema & Tillie 1999; Pilati 2016). Solidarity can also be the result not so much of who is part of the organizations, but of how organizations think of themselves, that is, of sharing similar organizational collective identities. These can be understood as “*broader representations of actors’ position in relation to other actors and to broader representations of social life than those associated with issue agendas*” (Diani and Pilati 2011: 266) that normally “*relate more or less explicitly to broader societal cleavages and systems of meaning*” (Diani 1995: 9) (for further elaboration on this concept, see section 5.2.2). Illustrating this point with a hypothetical example in the context of the case study at hand, the logic of identity-based solidarity would provide incentives to organizations that, for instance, show a strong Basque nationalist ideology to engage in coalitions with fellow Basque nationalist organizations. At the same time, nationalist identity could also act as a barrier preventing potential coalitions with non-nationalist or Spanish-nationalist groups.

Even if the power of identity-based solidarity is undisputed as a ‘double-edge sword’ (Saunders 2008), it is also clear that civic organizations “*do not necessarily need specific identity bonds to become involved in dense collaborative exchanges with groups with similar concerns*” (Diani *et al.* 2010: 220). Instead, coordination “*may simply be driven by an instrumental logic*” (*Ibid.*)²³ that emphasizes latent ties constituted by common objectives and other shared attributes that facilitate collaboration in practice. On the one hand, it is obvious that actors that pursue the same objective have a strong incentive to work together, and that this common objective may be in some occasions sufficient to overcome identity-based differences, even if only temporarily. On the other hand, coordinating action with other groups can be costly in many respects (time, money, motivation, ...) and sharing some organizational traits may reduce these transactional costs from a pragmatic point of view. For instance, organizations with high levels of formalization and resources will not find many problems in working together, as they function in similar ways and may have specific personnel assigned to coordination tasks. On the contrary, coordination between a large, hierarchical and resourceful association with another small, horizontal and entirely voluntary organization may run into problems of timing and coordination due to their very asymmetric internal functioning. A similar reasoning applies to the geographic location of organizations, as coalitions are generally

²³ Thus, constituting ‘coalitions’ in its purest sense (see Gamson 1961: 374), marked by instrumentality, temporality, informality and low levels of consensus beyond explicit and often short-term objectives.

easier to coordinate when organizations are present in the same municipality or at least are not very distant from each other.

The third logic behind coalitional decisions is that of interpersonal bonds or connections. Prior social ties between groups and their members can facilitate coalitions at least in two main ways. Firstly, positive social relationships –such as close friendships– between members belonging to different organizations provides chances for interorganizational informal communication and may even facilitate congruence in terms of issues, objectives and/or ideology. In contrast, although not so much acknowledged as personal affinities, negative social ties such as personal antagonism and rivalry, especially among leaders (e.g. Tejerina *et al.* 1995: 134), can also play an important role in shaping civic networks, acting as a barrier for interorganizational cooperation. Secondly, some people participate in more than one organization and, given the famous duality of persons and groups (Breiger 1974), these multiple memberships provide meaningful connections between organizations due to the crucial brokerage or bridging role of activists with multiple affiliations (e.g. Obach 2004; Reese *et al.* 2010; Rose 2000).

As mentioned above, in spite of being presented separately for purposes of greater clarity, the three relational logics discussed are closely interrelated and mutually influence one another. For example, solidarity and instrumentality typically overlap in many cases, as many political identities go hand in hand with specific short-term agendas and even with organizational forms (Clemens 1997: 50) or tactical repertoires (Taylor & van Dyke 2004: 270). In the opposite direction, sharing the same objectives can foster the adoption of similar frames that instead provide ground for the later development of a common identity (Gerhards & Rucht 1992). Regarding interests and personal ties, militants with multiple affiliations to organizations working on different issues can give birth to inter-sectoral agendas of collective action. An example of this process would be the increased mobilization on issues regarding women's rights by actors outside the traditional boundaries of the feminist sector (e.g. labor unions, environmentalist groups, social exclusion groups, etc) in the Basque Country, which can be partially explained by the crucial role of many women active in both feminism and other sectors (Martínez Portugal 2017: 81-82). Last, ideology-based identities and interpersonal relationships are tightly tied together as well, as the latter provide fertile ground for the generation of the former (Beamish & Luebbers 2009). Multiple affiliations in several civic organizations have been found to be driven by the adoption of specific master frames by individual bridging activists (Carroll & Ratner 1996). Moreover, these social ties generated by shared

members indicates, at the very minimum, a certain degree of compatibility between the collective identities of those organizations to which the same individual belongs (Diani 1995: 83, 100-1).

2.3.5. Context, time and agency in the study of collaboration within collective action fields

The different latent factors of coalition formation among civic organizations presented in the previous section are helpful in guiding empirical examinations focusing on structural predictors of visible transactions (e.g. interorganizational collaboration in public events). Nonetheless, they cannot provide deterministic accounts of civic networks' configurations, as network systems are always "*consecrations of contingency*" (Martin & Gregg 2015: 52), modelled both by stable factors as well as by more volatile conjunctural forces. When studying collaborative ties, all three groups of latent ties reviewed above influence simultaneously actors' coalitional decisions, although their relative weight can vary greatly depending on the specific conjuncture. Taking this premise as a starting point, this section adopts a more time-sensitive position, reflecting on how established relational dynamics within a given collective action field can be dramatically transformed in relatively short periods of time. More specifically, I will distinguish between two different –though not mutually exclusive– types of explanations that have been previously formulated regarding the origins of such transformations. On the one side, there are those theories that emphasize the impact of exogenous macro-level shifts, thus focusing on the time-varying aspects of the broader environment. On the other side, there are other explanations that underline endogenous micro-level change, paying attention to the agency and intermediation skills of individual activists. While the former perspective is the one underpinning the central research question and the empirical design of this investigation (and therefore receives the lion's share of attention), it was still deemed necessary to briefly acknowledge some potential paths of internally-driven relational change stemming from activists' agency and intermediation skills. As it will be argued in the closing section of this chapter, both types of conjunctural factors should be part of any complete analytical model that aims to account for the evolution of relational dynamics within civic networks.

2.3.5.a) The external context and the impact of abrupt transformations

There is a clear consensus within the literature dealing with social movements coalitions on the fact that “the broader political context can have an important influence on whether activist groups form coalitions” (McCammon & Moon 2015: 329). However, it is not always that clear what exactly the ‘external context’ encompasses, that is, which contextual elements should be taken into account. In this dissertation, I depart from the most extended perspective that focuses exclusively on features of the institutional political system, usually studied under the popular concept of political opportunity structures (POS). Instead of equating external circumstances with POS, I draw upon Rucht’s (1996) broader concept of *context structure*, defining the external (political) context as the set of conditions beyond actors’ immediate control that shape different aspects of collective action, within which POS are a very important one, though not the only relevant group of factors.²⁴ Among the features that facilitate or constrain certain collaborative decisions, three distinct dimensions can be distinguished: cultural, social, and political-institutional (*Ibid.*:188-91) The latter dimension, typically studied under the POS label, focuses on several institutional characteristics and on the reactions of state authorities.²⁵ Despite the fact that no clear consensus exists regarding which variables of the political system should be taken into account, the most typical ones are: the openness of the formal political process to inputs from external challengers, the stability of political alignments underpinning the polity, the presence or absence of potential allies and/or enemies among the elite, and the authorities’ capacity and propensity for repression²⁶ (McAdam 1996: 27). The cultural context refers to the dominant attitudes, values and

²⁴ It is fair to say that Rucht’s definition of ‘context structure’ is quite similar to some broad definitions of POS, such as the one provided by Tarrow: “consistent -but not necessarily formal or permanent- dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics” (1998: 19-20). However, I found the former concept more appropriate, given that its clearer formulation avoids potential confusion between different uses of the POS (avoiding risks of conceptual stretching) while allowing to incorporate non-institutional and non-state-centered contextual aspects.

²⁵ It should be noted that political opportunity theorists have mostly left coalition behavior largely unexamined (Obach 2010: 197). As observed in comprehensive reviews (e.g. Kriesi 2004; Meyer & Minkoff 2004), coalitional behavior is not mentioned as a studied outcome of different configurations of political opportunities; at best, it is given attention as a component of the POS (Kriesi, 2004). As an exception, recently some attention has been paid to the cross-sectional analysis of the influence of POS in different European cities to the configuration of civic networks of migrant organizations (see Morales & Giugni 2011; Eggert 2014; Eggert & Pilati 2014).

²⁶ Repression is broadly understood here as any “action by authorities that increases the cost -actual or potential- of an actor’s claim making” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 215).

behaviors that define the political culture of a given society at a specific time, among which the relative salience of specific axes of conflict is of paramount importance (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi *et al.* 1995; Tarrow 1998). Finally, the social context refers to the structural characteristics of the social environment that can affect mobilization, such as economic stratification, ethnic integration, the geographic, demographic or occupational distribution of the population, etc.

Despite the fact that the context structure is necessarily “a relatively stable configuration of elements” (Rucht 1996: 189), none of its constituting elements is permanent, that is, completely immune to change. This change can take place slowly, even imperceptibly for activists and observers at the time, as a result of long-term incremental historical processes, or it can abruptly unfold in much shorter time spans, precipitated by particular *events*. It is precisely these latter “relatively rare subclass of happenings that significantly transform structures” (Sewell 2005: 100) that are of chief interest in this investigation. As aptly observed by McAdam and Sewell, “the analytical fascination of the event is that in events very brief, spatially concentrated, and relatively chaotic sequences of action can have durable, spatially extended, and profoundly structural effects” (2001: 102). Theoretical and empirical attention to such dramatic processes of short-term transformations has been growing over the last couple of decades by drawing upon among diverse cognate concepts such as *critical junctures* (Collier & Collier 1991), *turning points* (Abbott 2001), or *transformative events* (McAdam & Sewell 2001; Sewell 1996). Although with slightly different arguments and points of emphasis, all these notions point to the unusual capacity of some events to drastically alter the underlying social and cultural structures that social relations. The uncertainty that characterizes these “structural dislocations” (Sewell 1996: 845) provide a more open context for human agency and cultural creativity, thus making deep reconfigurations of old patterns of behavior and social interaction more likely (Abbott 2001; McAdam 2001; Sewell 1996; H. White *et al.* 2013).

Large-scale socio-economic and political “critical events” beyond activists’ control often present this transformative capacity²⁷ and can affect collective action in multiple ways, including coalitional behavior (Staggenborg 1993: 322-5). Indeed, the literature on

²⁷ That said, transformative or critical events affecting a given collective action field do not need to be exogenous (Staggenborg 1993). Indeed, several researchers have been paying attention to the transformative power of movement-initiated actions, particularly “eventful protests” (e.g. della Porta 2020a; Wood *et al.* 2017), both within and outside the confines of a certain collective action field.

social movements' coalitional behavior have long paid attention to the explanatory role of abrupt changes in contextual factors. However, in my view, extant examinations of the role of contextual changes on collaborative dynamics within collective action fields are excessively restrictive with regards to both the *explanans* and the *explanandum*. On the one hand, the contextual factors considered for the explanation tend to be circumscribed to the political-institutional dimension of the context structure, typically looking at the impact of emerging institutional opportunities or threats for movement-specific interests. On the other hand, analyses have been largely limited to assess whether the actors of a field collaborate, on average, to a larger or lesser extent with each other. Rather than looking at whether opportunities or threats matter more to the general amount of coalitions, I contend that it is more relevant to ask what a given change in the external context, broadly conceived, might mean for the relative weight of each type of 'logic' of interorganizational collaboration. That is, how sudden changes in the broader political context may mediate the impact of other predictive factors on the coalitional structure of organizational fields (Diani & Pilati 2011: 267). The following paragraph reviews different empirical findings of this literature from this perspective.

For example, sudden threats, generalized repression, or diminishing financial resources can foster *ad-hoc* transversal coalitions by momentarily increasing the value of shared interests and objectives while simultaneously backgrounding ideological disagreements (e.g. McCammon & Campbell 2002; Mayer & Corrigan-Brown 2005; Van Dyke 2003) or identity-related differences (e.g. Okamoto 2010). On the other hand, even if political openings are generally less likely than threats to foster broad-based coalitions (McCammon & Van Dyke 2010), other favorable circumstances, such as unusual openings of the institutional system to the movement's demands (Staggenborg 1986: 382) or experiencing a growing phase within a cycle of contention (Diani 1995: 15; Saunders 2007a), are also able to spur cross-cutting collaboration within a movement. That said, external factors do not only facilitate issue-based coalitions, but can also foreground solidarity bonds, promoting identity-homogeneous coalitions over transversal ones. This can be the case when the saliency of certain cleavages is high (Cinalli 2003; Diani 1995; Diani *et al.* 2010) or when formal access to the polity is limited (Diani 1995; Eggert 2014). Last, the interpersonal logic can acquire more prominence in periods of latency characterized by declining levels of mobilization (Melucci 1989), as well as in authoritarian contexts (Osa 2003). In both cases, submerged interpersonal networks might be able to keep actors within a certain organizational field connected when organizations

cannot openly mobilize with each other, either because of lack of capability or because they are prevented from doing so

2.3.5.b) Activists' agency and intermediation skills

The external context, even if very important, is not the only set of conjunctural factors that should be taken into account when trying to explain changing patterns of coalitional behavior. Under the same external constraints, collaboration between actors may or may not crystallize. What can explain this variance? Ann Mische (2003, 2008) argued that on-the-ground conversational dynamics between organizations' members may play a key role. Even if external constraints and existing bonds are important factors, networks are also constituted by "*culturally constituted processes of communicative interaction*" (2003: 258). From this perspective, interorganizational networks should be seen as multiple, cross-cutting set of relations sustained by conversational dynamics within particular social settings. Individual activists from these organizations can use a variety of discursive practices in order to emphasize similarities or differences. For instance, Mische (2003) identifies four specific conversational mechanisms that are used by activists in order to bridge oppositional organizational identities and facilitate collaboration: *identity qualifying*, *temporal cuing*, *generality shifting*, and *multiple targeting*.

With a somewhat different focus, Nagle (2016) identifies four ideal types of non-sectarian social movement organizations in divided societies based on the different bridging discursive strategies that they emphasize. According to him, non-sectarian actors in divided societies could rely on four main types of discourse: *transformationism* (aiming at transforming the existing antagonistic identities), *pluralism* (promoting the identities and interests of marginalized groups, such as women or immigrants), *cosmopolitanism* (emphasizing the relevance of global concerns, like climate change), and *commonism* (fostering cross-cleavage unity on issues that affect all sectors of society, such as corruption or public services).

These two typologies of bridging discursive strategies provided by Mische and Nagle could be considered part of what Wimmer (2008: 989) terms *boundary blurring* strategies. Unfortunately, the deployment of distinct discursive intermediation strategies by single actors could not be empirically assessed in this case, as the kind of ethnographic fieldwork required was severely limited by the retrospective nature of this study, the relatively large sample of organizations considered, and the inconsistent and incomplete

records of organizations’ textual production. As it is further discussed in section 8.3, hopefully this limitation will be overcome in future research.

2.4. SUMMARY: A SYNTHETIC FRAMEWORK TO STUDY THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIC NETWORKS

This concluding section aims at putting together the different elements that have been previously presented into a coherent analytical framework that will theoretically guide subsequent empirical examinations. Figure 2.1 visually summarizes this framework.




Figure 2.1. Analytical framework for the study of interorganizational collaborative networks [Source: own elaboration]²⁸

The diagram shows on the right-hand side what the main *explanandum* is: the visible civic network made up of interorganizational collaborative ties between members of the field. The specific configuration of this network is considered to be the result of the discrete decisions –yet not completely independent from one another– of each of the organizations that form part of the network. These decisions are influenced by two types of factors. On the one hand, shared organizational elements between organizations form latent linkages between them and create stable potential for cooperation. Based on

²⁸ Except for the simple network graph used on the right-hand side, which was retrieved from Wikimedia Commons (<https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Social-network.svg>). Last accessed: 25/04/2020.

previous literature, I classify the multiple latent ties that can act as potential for coalitions into three main groups, each being activated under a different logic of coalition-formation: identity-based solidarity, pragmatic-instrumental logics, and interpersonal relationships. On the other hand, the precise configurations of civic networks are highly contextual, in the sense that coalitional decisions taken by the organizations are strongly influenced by the specific conjuncture. The external context can affect actors' decisions either directly, by increasing the importance of some latent ties as facilitators of collaboration, while diminishing the weight of other similarities, or more indirectly, by influencing the conversational dynamics that take place between members of different organizations (Mische, 2003: 277-78). For instance, under a given context, certain bridging discursive frames promoting collaboration might be more likely to be formulated and/or be well-received because the external discursive opportunity structure (Koopmans & Olzak 2004; Koopmans & Statham 1999a) is more favorable to their content, thus increasing the resonance (Snow & Benford 1988) of particular arguments over others.

Regarding temporal stability, latent networks tend to be more stable, varying in the middle- to long-term, in contrast with conjunctural factors, which can vary significantly in the short-term. That is why I label latent linkages as stable factors, as they are unlikely to vary substantially during the relatively short time period analyzed in this case: the decade between 2007 and 2017. Nonetheless, for longer historical analyses, the varying nature of latent ties should also be taken into account, as expressed by the dashed line at the bottom of the diagram. The crystallization of cooperation into frequent collaborative action (in our case, recurrently co-participating in collective action events with the same other organizations) is likely to generate (or at least consolidate, in case they did exist before) shared views, new strategies, and interpersonal relations, which will in turn certainly weigh on coalitional decisions during future periods.

Having presented the conceptual tools and the analytical framework, it is possible to restate now the main guiding hypothesis in a more conceptually precise and theoretically informed way. The empirical chapters of this thesis will test if a particular critical historical event (Staggenborg 1993) –in our case, ETA's definitive abandonment of violence, which put an end to six decades of an armed political conflict in the Basque Country– might have weakened previous socio-political boundaries that used to condition civic networks. If this is the case, we should find collaboration to be more intense among actors with a similar national identification and to be weaker among actors holding opposing views regarding the armed struggle up to 2011, with the effects of these

ideological factors losing their previous strength in the conflict's aftermath (chapter 5). The declining role of identity-based solidarities would probably give place to a stronger overlap of interorganizational collaboration with latent ties reflecting similarities in pragmatic-instrumental aspects (chapter 6). Ultimately, such changes could have led to deeper changes in the underlying logics guiding relations within the Basque ECAF, eventually to the point of generating a different mix of prevailing modes of coordination of collective action (chapter 7).

3. THE BASQUE POLITICAL CONTEXT AND ITS IMPACT ON COLLECTIVE ACTION

It has long been noted that Spain's Basque Country presents a very particular ecosystem for collective action and social movement activity. On the one hand, Basque society is well-known for its high levels of political and social mobilization, with rates of protest activity and non-institutional political participation that are well above those of other areas of Spain (Torcal, Montero & Teorell 2006) and the Western world (Casquete 2006). On the other hand, the relevance of the center-periphery debate and the shadow of political violence have conditioned almost every aspect of Basque society, including civil society and social movements. Indeed, the long violent conflict (1968-2011) between the Spanish state and the armed organization ETA (*Euskadi ta Askatasuna*, 'Basque Country and Freedom') seems to have contributed to the formation of what many have described as an "overpoliticized" (Tejerina, Fernández Sobrado & Aierdi 1995: 147) and strongly polarized political community, with ethno-nationalist and violence-related cleavages permeating many aspects of public life. In terms of social movement activity, previous literature suggests that differences in organizations' national identities have often represented a burden for engaging in common collective action, fragmenting collective action fields. As it has already been stated in the preceding two chapters, the main aim of this study is to test whether this is still the case after ETA's announcement of its unilateral abandonment of violence on October 20th, 2011. But before we move to the methodological and empirical chapters of this dissertation, it is necessary, on the one hand, to provide a minimal geographical and historical contextualization of the setting of this study –the Basque Country– and, on the other hand, to briefly review the recent history of non-institutional collective action in the region during the previous decades, with particular attention to our case study: environmentalism.

3.1. WHAT DO WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT THE BASQUE COUNTRY? GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE AND TERMINOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

First of all, what is the Basque Country? Although such a question might seem trivial, it requires some elaboration in this case, as the term 'Basque Country' is geographically

ambiguous and, depending on who you ask, can be used differently, that is, encompassing diverse territories. The map shown in figure 3.1 will facilitate the explanation. In its most extensive definition, ‘Basque Country’ is used as a literal translation of the Basque term *Euskal Herria*, which can be roughly translated as “the land of Basque speakers”. *Euskal Herria* encompasses the entire westernmost regions of the Pyrenees and the adjacent Atlantic coast with a distinct historical and linguistic heritage regarded as “Basque”. Rather than a unified political-institutional entity, it is a cultural area composed of seven historical territories, three in the Southwestern corner of France (Northern Basque Country or *Iparralde*), and four in Northern Spain (Southern Basque Country or *Hegoalde*). This project will focus only on the latter group, Spain’s Basque Country, which is administratively organized in two autonomous communities, Euskadi²⁹ (BAC, Basque Autonomous Community) and Navarre (FCN, Foral Community of Navarre). However, for the sake of simplicity, and given the residual use and knowledge of the term *Hegoalde* –especially in the international literature– I will use the term ‘Basque Country’ referring to the four Basque territories within the Spanish borders (Araba, Biscay, Gipuzkoa, and Navarre), a strategy followed before by previous studies published in English (e.g. Barcena & Ibarra 2001).



Figure 3.1. Map of *Euskal Herria*
(Source: Mansvelt Beck, 2005: 3)

²⁹ *Euskadi* is the official denomination of the BAC in Basque, while the official denomination in Spanish (Castilian) is *País Vasco*, which is therefore often confusingly translated in English also as the Basque Country. It is composed of three provinces: Vizcaya/Bizkaia, Guipúzcoa/Gipuzkoa, and Álava/Araba. Despite its origin in late 19th century, the word *Euskadi* was invented by Sabino Arana as a neologism referring to all seven Basque territories, this use has been replaced by *Euskal Herria*, while nowadays *Euskadi* (today spelled with ‘s’) is mainly used as a synonym of the BAC.

While the decision to exclude France's Basque Country could at first sight be critically regarded as an example of methodological nationalism (Beck & Sznaider 2006; for an example of this critique applied to the Basque case, see A. Letamendia 2015: 16), I would like to contend this is not the case in this study, as there are several empirical reasons that support this geographical delimitation. First, as outlined above, this research focuses on the post-conflict consequences of political violence in terms of social divisions. Given that the conflict was mainly waged against the Spanish state, and violent events and ETA's social support bases were disproportionately concentrated in *Hegoalde* in comparison with *Iparralde* (Mansvelt Beck, 2005: 176-204), this geographic delimitation cannot be regarded as the result of a state-centered imposition by the researcher, but it is actually the result of the very divergent experiences of the ethno-nationalist conflict and its connection with collective action on each side of the border. This points to the social significance over time of what might be originally regarded as more or less artificial institutional arrangements (see, for instance, Lecours, 2007). Moreover, despite some initiatives of cross-border collaborative collective action have been developed (F. Letamendia 2006), their relevance is quite limited, restricted mostly to the symbolic realm (Mansvelt Beck 2008). In fact, this is also true for the case study of concern in this research, environmental collective action, as "generally speaking, environmentalist organizations and movements in *Iparralde* have had little contact with their counterparts in *Hegoalde*" (Barcena & Ajangiz 2011: 230-1).

Hence, this geographical delimitation is based upon the observation that the four provinces considered, despite belonging to two separate politico-institutional systems (Ibarra & Ahedo 2004), make up a common –even if highly heterogeneous– socio-political space. Even with the deep-rooted local idiosyncrasies of each territory, the four Spanish-Basque provinces share very often the same socio-political dynamics, campaigns and actors (see, for instance, Casquete 2001: 23-8), something that can be rarely said when comparing the two sides of the border.

Lastly, regarding the contentious issue of which languages should be used when naming cities and territories in a territory where most place names can be found in at least two of the three spoken languages (Basque/*Euskara*, Spanish, and French), I follow Diego Muro's multilingual criteria, both for reasons of political neutrality and in order for the text to be as easily accessible as possible for an international readership:

Choosing one of the names and not the other is widely understood as taking a political stance and I have chosen the English names where possible. Hence, I talk about Biscay, Navarre, the Basque Country, Spain, and so on. Where this has not been possible, I have chosen the Basque name (Araba, Gipuzkoa, Gernika, etc.) and in a few cases I have chosen the more familiar or commonly used terms in Spanish. For example, I have preferred to talk about Pamplona (rather than Iruñea), Bilbao (rather than Bilbo) and San Sebastián (instead of Donostia). Although this might be interpreted as lack of consistency it shows yet another aspect of the complexity and fragmentation of the Basque Provinces. (Muro, 2008: 12).

A similar eclectic language criterion will be followed with respect to the names of the organizations studied, which are often multi-lingual as well. Hence, for organizations that use only one denomination I will leave the names as they are, irrespective of the language. For organizations with dual names or acronyms, I will use the most widely used versions, independently of whether it is Basque, Castilian or bilingual. When no linguistic version is clearly predominant over the other, I will favor the Spanish version. In any case, English translations of organizations' names are provided in Appendix 3.

3.2. RECENT BASQUE HISTORY: A SUCCINCT ACCOUNT

This section aims to provide the reader with a minimal account of some of the most important historical facts regarding Spain's Basque Country, without which current socio-political dynamics might be hard to understand. This account will first concentrate on the development of Basque nationalism from the 19th century onwards, which went in parallel with the process of economic modernization and industrialization in the region. The second subsection will focus on the violent conflict between ETA and the Spanish state that lasted from 1968 to 2011.³⁰

3.2.1. The Basque Country during the 19th and 20th century: industrialization and the emergence of the national question

Even though most of the territories considered had been part of the Kingdom of Castile since the late Middle Ages –except for Navarre, that maintained its own Kingdom until the early 16th century– Basque areas retained substantial levels of legal and economic autonomy for centuries, together with a deep sense of cultural distinctiveness

³⁰ For much more detailed socio-political accounts and analyses of general Basque history, Basque nationalism, and/or the violent conflict, interested readers can choose among a wide offer of monographies. I will only reference those available in English, as the list in Spanish is immense. For instance: Clark 1979; Conversi 2000; Díez Medrano 1995; Douglass 1985; Heiberg 1987; Lecours 2007; Leonisio *et al.* 2017; F. Letamendia 2011; Mansvelt Beck 2005; Mees 2003; Muro 2008; Murua 2016; Payne 1975; Pérez Agote 2006; Sullivan 1988; Watson 2003; Whitfield 2014; Zirakzadeh 1991.

from surrounding populations. This ethnocentric awareness was explained to a large extent by the preservation of the ancient and non-Indo-European Basque language, or *Euskara*. The territory's political and economic autonomy was legally protected through special charters or statutes known as *fueros*, which were also granted to Navarre after being conquered by Castile. In short, the *fueros* “exempted the local population from both military service and taxation, while allowing the provincial assemblies the right to veto royal edicts, although this rarely occurred” (Conversi 2000: 45). Despite these special local jurisdictions might seem quite exotic from a nation-state perspective, it should be reminded that, even though Spain existed as a political entity since the late 15th century the country was far from being internally unified and cohesive, remaining “a patchwork of legal and jurisdictional constitutions” (Díez Medrano 1995: 25) for several centuries.

It was not until the 19th century that the Basque *fueros* began to be severely eroded by the central authorities. Opposition towards ongoing processes of state centralization led to the outbreak of three violent confrontations during the 19th century, the Carlist Wars, of which two of them were fought almost exclusively on Basque territory. After the Third Carlist War (1872-76) the *fueros* were finally abolished, although Basque territories continued to have some special agreements with the central government, albeit with more reduced implications in terms of economic and political autonomy from the rest of Spain. As Conversi summarizes, just two years after the end of the war:

in 1878 the first concierto económico [‘Economic Agreement’] was signed, allowing the Basque diputaciones [provincial governments] to collect taxes and remit their receipts to Madrid. However, the only beneficiaries of this arrangement were the big industrialists who bore a very low share of the tax burden. The rural areas and small towns were penalized, as local merchants, professional sectors and the peasants suffered most of the hardships brought about by new industries and taxes. As a reaction against the abolition of the fueros, Basques lent their support to any movement which opposed centralism. Hence the particular popularity of Carlism in Euskadi.” (Conversi 2000: 47).

After the *fueros*' abolition, the ideology that promoted their restoration –known as ‘foralism’, a local offshoot of Carlism (Conversi 2000: 46-8)– continued to receive broad support in the region during the following decades. Indeed, it is important to note that Basque nationalism as such did not emerge as a political movement until the last decade of the 19th century, surpassing foralist demands for the preservation of old local prerogatives with proposals advocating secession from Spain and an eventual unification with the territories in *Iparralde* given the alleged marked cultural and even ‘racial’ distinctiveness of the Basque people. Basque nationalism emerged in a very particular

socio-economic conjuncture, as an ideology reacting to the shock caused by the rapid industrialization taking place from the 1880s onwards, especially in Biscay. Economic modernization and industrialization altered traditional rural social structures and fostered a huge inflow of immigrant workers –mostly Castilian– that endangered the survival of Basque language and culture. A key figure in the first formulations and development of Basque nationalism was Sabino Arana (1865-1903), who produced the first Basque nationalist program, founded the first nationalist political organization (which a few years later became today's hegemonic Basque Nationalist Party, *PNV-EAJ*), and gave the nation a new name (the neologism *Euzkadi*) and a flag (the *ikurriña*, now official in the BAC). The PNV experienced continuous growth in electoral support during the first two decades of the 20th century, maintaining the strong influence of Arana's thought, its ideology being firmly based on racialism and Catholic traditionalism. Programmatically, the party periodically oscillated between advocating for full independence and demands for more autonomy within Spain, a pendular pattern that has maintained throughout its history (de Pablo *et al.* 1999).

After becoming a clandestine political organization during Primo de Rivera's dictatorship (1923-30), the PNV re-emerged stronger during the Second Republic (1931-36), becoming the dominant electoral force in the region while clearing its discourse of early racialist arguments. During the republican period the PNV promoted the approval of an Statute of Autonomy for the Basque Country, in parallel to similar initiatives coming from other regions in which nationalist feelings were strong, such as Catalonia and Galicia.³¹ Nonetheless, the Basque Statute of Autonomy was not officially approved until October 1936, a few months after the military coup was perpetrated in July of that same year, which kick-started the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). Therefore, the first Basque autonomous government, led by the *lehendakari* (president) Jose Antonio Aguirre, could only govern those areas that were not already in the rebels' control³² for about 7 months,

³¹ While the Catalan Statute of Autonomy was approved as early as 1932, the formal approval of Galician autonomy did not occur until late 1936, similarly to the Basque one, when the Civil War had already started. In the case of Galicia, the success of the military rebellion in the region prevented the formation of an autonomous government.

³² The territory under the effective administration of the first Basque autonomous government corresponded roughly to the provinces of Biscay and Gipuzkoa, as the more conservative and rural province of Araba joined the fascist military rebellion from the start of the Civil War. The military rebellion also triumphed in Navarre from the beginning (as it presented much of the same socio-demographic characteristics of Araba). However, it should be noted that Navarre had not been included in the approved Statute of Autonomy (in contrast with two previously failed drafts that initially included

during which it concerned itself with the organization of Basque militias and their coordination with the Republican troops. When Bilbao finally fell in Franco's hands the Basque government was forced into exile. During the remainder of the Civil War and the long Francoist Dictatorship (1939-75) that ensued, the fascist and staunchly Spanish nationalist regime implemented a brutal repression in the region that apart from targeting leftist and Basque nationalist 'traitors' also proscribed almost every public expression of Basque culture and language. While similar or even more intense levels of repression were suffered in other Spanish regions (P. Aguilar 1998), feelings of national and cultural annihilation fostered the mobilization of a particularly strong anti-Franco opposition movement. Such a context also provided fertile ground for the emergence and early popularity of ETA, as it will be explained in the next section dedicated to the violent conflict.

After Franco's death in 1975 and the Transition period that ended with the approval of the 1978 Constitution, the Spanish state initiated a process of territorial decentralization that led to the establishment of a semi-federal system known as 'State of Autonomies'. The three provinces that were included in the short-lived 1936 Statute (Biscay, Gipuzkoa and Araba) recovered regional self-government through the so-called Statute of Gernika approved in 1979, conforming today's BAC. As for Navarre, it acquired its current status as a 'foral community' in 1982, the previously mentioned FCN. Both the BAC and the FCN represent the asymmetric exceptions within the State of Autonomies in Spain, as they enjoy more legal and administrative powers in comparison with the other 15 autonomous communities. For instance, provincial institutions have kept the capacity to collect taxes (derived from the aforementioned 19th century 'Economic Agreements') and both regions have their own well-developed police corps (along with Catalonia). Beyond administrative singularities, both autonomies also present distinctive socio-economic and political characteristics in comparison with other Spanish regions. Regarding the former, most indicators of living standards, economic activity, personal income, employment and education are typically well above the Spanish average, including a developed regional welfare system. With respect to the latter, the fragmented and polarized traits of their political party systems (Ibarra & Ahedo 2004; Llera 1984, 1993) can be clearly differentiated from the imperfect bipartisan scenario generally observed –at least until 2015– in most other regions of Spain as well as at the

all of the four provinces), due to the strength of Carlism in the region, a political movement openly hostile to the Basque nationalism represented by PNV.

state level. In both the BAC and the FCN, the political-electoral competition is structured by the intersection of the ideological (left-right) and the identitarian (center-periphery) dimensions or axes. As an illustration, Ibarra and Ahedo (2004: 359) provided the following graphical representation of this two-dimensional space of ‘polarized pluralism’, with the approximate positions of the six most important parties in the BAC in the early 2000s, which is reproduced in figure 3.2.




Figure 3.2. Bi-dimensional representation of the BAC's political party system at the early 2000s
(Source: Ibarra & Ahedo 2004: 359)

Today, the debate over the political-institutional status of the Basque Country is far from settled, and the current *status quo* remains quite fragile. For instance, a large minority of Basques (ranging between one quarter and one third of the population in the BAC) are in favor of secession and, additionally, a wider share of the population consider the current institutional arrangements like the Statute of Gernika insufficient. In this line, the failed ‘Ibarretxe Plan’ for a new confederate relationship with Spain and a referendum of self-determination during the 2000s, along with the current nationalist-led attempts to approve a new statute of autonomy, testify to the weak legitimacy of the existing institutional framework. Even today, many activists and political observers agree that:

“both the Basque and the Spanish institutional systems are affected by a continuous struggle, which makes their degree of legitimacy still not as high as in other contexts” (Interviewed academic and activist).

3.2.2. The shadow of political violence

The most influential and distorting element in recent Basque history has been without any doubt the extensive experience of political violence affecting the region over the past few decades. In fact, the Basque Country has suffered the last major violent ethnonationalist conflict that remained active in Western Europe. This fact places the region, along with Northern Ireland, as an outlier in the postwar Western European context (de la Calle 2015). The most notorious source of violence has come from ETA's (including its various splinter groups and factions)³³ violent actions in its campaign against the Spanish state for the creation of an independent and unified Basque Country, killing 845 people.³⁴ It is significant that more than two thirds of those deaths took place in Basque territory (de la Calle & Sánchez-Cuenca 2013: 99). Nonetheless, ETA was not the only actor resorting to severe political violence. Extreme right Spanish nationalist groups –which acted with relative impunity or were even linked with the Spanish government, such as the infamous GAL– assassinated about 60-70 people,³⁵ mostly during the late 1970s and the 1980s. Lastly, police brutality has also been a major source of violence, causing more than 90 deaths, hundreds of injuries and uncountable accusations of torture and mistreatment of detainees (Krakenberger 2013). Figure 3.3 below shows the evolution of deaths over time, which peaked precisely during Spain's transition to democracy.

After the short contextualization provided in the previous paragraph, it seems appropriate to concentrate now on the most important of this violent clandestine organizations: ETA (*Euskadi ta Askatasuna*; 'Basque Country and Freedom'). The origins of the organization date back to 1952, when a group of young nationalist students

³³ In 1974 ETA suffered its first internal split, leading to a duplication of two ETAs up to 1986. These came to be known as ETA-m (military) and ETA-pm (politico-military). The latter was linked to the political party EE (*Euskadiko Ezkerra*, Basque Left) and partially disbanded in 1982 to pursue politics through non-violent means. The former, significantly stronger in terms of organizational resources, continued its armed struggle, inheriting the name of ETA. Apart from these, there were some other smaller splinter groups that were ideologically and socially close to ETA: CAA (Autonomous Anticapitalist Commandos), Iraultza, Mendeku, Berezis, etc.

³⁴ Exact numbers are disputed, ranging from 829 (Krakenberger 2013) up to 857 (Alonso et al. 2010) victims, due to occasional doubts about the authorship of specific killings and different criteria regarding the inclusion of deaths attributed to ETA's splinters and related groups. I rely on the count recently established by Raúl López Romo (2015), who systematically compared diverse sources, setting the number of fatalities at 845 mortal victims.

³⁵ Again, precise numbers are also disputed, ranging this time between the 62 recognized by López Romo (2015) to the 72 counted by Krakenberger (2013).

began to meet regularly, dissatisfied with the passivity of the PNV and the exiled Basque government against Francoist oppression. The group *Ekin* –meaning ‘to do’– became integrated a few years later within the PNV’s youth organization *EGI*, but soon afterwards it split from it due to internal divisions about the convenience of the armed struggle. Those who defended the use of violence as necessary means for the liberation of the Basque people formed ETA in 1959. Despite its original commitment to violence, the organization remained quite passive in terms of external direct actions during the 1960s, committing its first assassination in 1968. Nonetheless, this first decade allowed ETA to articulate its ideology and build a solid base of supporters. ETA viewed itself as an organization of national liberation, ideologically combining “*Basque nationalism, revolutionary socialism, and anticolonialism*” (Muro, 2013; see also Tejerina, 2001: 41-42), and adopting an strategy directed towards the generation of an “action-repression-action” spiral (see Ibarra 1987; Sullivan 1988).




Figure 3.3. Evolution of the number of violent deaths related to the Basque conflict (1968-2010) (Legend: fatalities caused by ETA and related organizations in red, by extreme-right groups in blue; significant historical events added; source: López Romo 2015: 42)

The armed organization acquired increasing status and popular sympathy during the final years of the Franco dictatorship, mainly thanks to two landmark events: the ‘Burgos trial’ in 1970 against 16 ETA militants and the assassination of Admiral Carrero Blanco (the appointed successor of Franco) with a spectacular bomb attack in 1973. Despite the death of the dictator in 1975 and the kickstart of the democratic transition (1975-78) ETA decided to maintain and even increase its violent strategy. As a consequence, the conflict escalated significantly during the late 1970s and the 1980s, particularly between 1976 and 1981, the so-called ‘years of lead’. This escalation was also the consequence of increasing state repression and the attacks of extreme-right clandestine counter-insurgent groups against Basque nationalist targets, such as BVE (*Batallón Vasco Español*, ‘Spanish-

Basque Battalion’) or GAL (*Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación*, ‘Antiterrorist Liberation Groups’), the latter linked with the Spanish government within a strategy of ‘dirty war’ against ETA that resorted to state-sponsored terrorism.

Between 1975 and 1995 ETA pursued a war of attrition against Spain’s new democratic institutions, trying to force the central government to negotiate the independence of the Basque Country. The insurgent organization was able to sustain this challenge throughout time due to the moral and logistic support provided by a segment of the Basque population that has come to be known as ‘radical Basque nationalism’³⁶ (see Mata, 1993; Muro 2008), which can be defined as:

the political ideology and social movement, led by ETA, which argued that Basque homeland (under Spanish and French sovereignty) deserved an independent socialist state and that the use of political violence or terrorism to achieve that strategic goal was justified (Muro 2017: 37)

The ‘radical community’ (Malthaner & Waldmann, 2014: 987-8) represented by radical Basque nationalism had its organizational expression in the Basque National Liberation Movement (*Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Vasco* – hereafter MLNV).³⁷ As summarized by Diego Muro, the MLNV was:

a self-named network of organizations founded in 1974 and made up of a number of interconnected political groups, social agents and NGOs with interests in the fields of environmentalism, internationalism, Basque culture, youth, students and prisoners’ rights. Some of the most important members of this web were the trade union LAB, the electoral coalition Herri Batasuna (and successors) and the terrorist group ETA. (Muro 2017: 37)

In the mid-1990s ETA shifted its previous military strategy directed mainly against Spanish security forces with the so-called strategy of the ‘socialization of suffering’. This was based on the encouragement of violent incidents of street vandalism or *kale borroka* (see de la Calle 2007) and the expansion of the range of legitimate targets to non-nationalist politicians, journalists, professors, and businessmen, among others. This turn towards constant small-scale intimidation tactics and selected assassinations was also

³⁶ Even though ‘radical Basque nationalism’ is often confusingly equated to the ‘*abertzale* (patriotic) left’, throughout this dissertation I employ the former label to designate those sectors within Basque left-wing nationalism that maintained supportive positions towards the armed struggle. Therefore, it is important to note that while all radical Basque nationalists belonged to the *abertzale* left not all members of this broader political family could be regarded as radical Basque nationalists, since many Basque leftist actors publicly adopted condemnatory positions towards ETA.

³⁷ For more detailed examinations of the MLNV see, among others: Llera, Mata & Irvin 1993; Mata 1993: 95-133; Ibarra 1987: 139-47.

partially conditioned by ETA’s decline in terms of military and logistic capability after the detention of the organization leadership at the French Basque locality of Bidart in 1992. However, the main unintended consequence of the ‘socialization of suffering’ strategy was the growth of popular rejection against the organization, even among the radical community (see figure 3.4). In particular, two landmark events accelerated ETA’s loss of legitimacy: the kidnapping and murder of Miguel Angel Blanco –a Popular Party’s 29-year-old councilor from the town of Ermua– in July 1997, and the unexpected breakdown of the 1998-99 truce.




Figure 3.4. Evolution of the attitude towards ETA in the radical nationalist electorate (1981-2015)
 (Source: Leonisio & López Romo 2017: 147)

Despite the fact that several ceasefires and peace negotiations had previously occurred at several points in time since the late 1970s (see Muro 2017: 46-7) the conflict did not significantly de-escalate until the mid-2000s. ETA’s weaknesses in terms of logistic capacity and popular support were aggravated even more in the new post-9/11 scenario, and especially after al-Qaeda’s March 11th 2004 bomb attacks in Madrid. In the midst of this international atmosphere dominated by the global war against terrorism, ETA remained an international anomaly, especially after the IRA had laid down its arms back in 1998. In that period, the Spanish state initiated a judicial and legal offensive against actors belonging to ‘ETA’s environment’ –that is, against the MLNV– which reached its peak with the legal proscription of the main radical Basque nationalist parties,

accused of being organically tied to ETA (see Bourne 2015). Early in 2006, ETA declared a unilateral ceasefire in the context of the ongoing negotiations with the government, which failed after a major bomb attack at Madrid airport on December 30th, 2006. From that date onwards, the separatist organization resumed violence for three more years. In parallel, between the years 2009 and 2010, a process of internal reflection and debate took place within radical Basque nationalist organizations and their social bases, culminating in the approval of a document that implicitly asked ETA to lay down its arms (see Murua 2016). This definitive loss of internal support led the armed group to declare a provisional ceasefire in September 2010, which was confirmed as permanent four months later, in January 2011. Finally, this process culminated towards the end of that year with a unilateral declaration of permanent abandonment of violence on October 20th, 2011. After that landmark, ETA completed its disarmament by disclosing to the French police the location of its remaining arsenal on April 8th, 2017, and finally announced its dissolution as an organization on May 3rd, 2018. This succession of decisions taken by ETA constitute a *de facto* settlement of the conflict, although a *sui generis* and non-negotiated one.³⁸

3.3. TRADITIONAL BASQUE PATTERNS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: HYPERMOBILIZATION AND SECTARIANISM

Having explained the geographic and terminological choices made in this study and reviewed the most salient features of recent Basque history, it is time to focus on a second group of questions: why should we care about the Basque Country? What makes this territory interesting from the perspective of political sociology and the study of collective action? These are the two questions that I will attempt to answer in this section.

Previous studies tend to characterize Basque public sphere as strongly sectarian and polarized (de la Calle 2007; Gillespie 2000; Llera 1999; Mansvelt Beck 2005; Moreno 2004). Regardless of whether this sectarianism has its roots in social structures previous to ETA (Johnston 1995), it is clear that political violence has at least widened social divisions, if not created new ones (Funes 1998; Ibarra & Grau 2007; Tejerina 2015). Therefore, social sectarianism and polarization can be regarded as one obvious correlative of the violent conflict. In fact, as argued in section 2.2.1., the Basque Country could be considered a *deeply divided society* in many respects, where the ‘permeate propensities’

³⁸ For an overview of nonnegotiated paths to conflict settlement, see: Kriesberg & Dayton (2017: 256-8). For recent historical examinations of the end of the Basque conflict, see: Conversi & Espiau (2019) Murua (2016, 2017), Whitfield (2014), Zabalo & Saratxo (2015).

(Horowitz 2000: 7-8) that characterize divided societies –related in the Basque Country to the national cleavage and the attitudes towards violence– condition not only Basque electoral politics but also civil society characteristics and dynamics (Tejerina 2010: 25, 216-9). These high levels of social division and polarization combined with the particular historical trajectory of the Basque region –marked by earlier and more intense industrialization in comparison with the rest of Spain-, resulted in a very unique socio-political landscape.

For instance, at the individual level, patterns of associationism and informal political participation significantly diverged in many aspects from Spain’s standards, marked to a large extent by the violent conflict. Two main traits can be highlighted in this regard. First, the ‘hypermobilization’ of Basque public sphere is certainly the most salient trait. With a combined population of less than 3 million people, about 6% of Spain’s total, official police data from the Spanish government shows that a disproportionately high proportion of registered protests occurs in the Basque regions (see also Casquete 2005). For instance, between 2006-07 more than 40% of protests happened in the BAC and FCN, and afterwards, despite the economic crisis and the unprecedented cycle of protest it propelled in Spain (Portos 2016; Romanos 2018), the proportion of protests, though decreasing, remained disproportionately high in the Basque territories (between 24-30% for the period 2008-11, and 17-19% for the years 2012 and 2013).³⁹ The spectacular ratio of “protest per capita” is even disproportionately high in comparison with available data from other contexts within the Western world (Casquete 2006: 49-52). Moreover, survey data from the early 2000s shows that involvement in protest activity is significantly more frequent in the BAC in comparison with the rest of the state (Torcal *et al.* 2006), even though the share of the Basques interested in politics does not differ significantly from Spanish averages (Bonet *et al.* 2006: 118-20). Two clear drivers of this hypermobilization have traditionally been the radical Basque nationalist movement, which have consistently remained as the most active SMI throughout time (see A. Letamendia 2015, 2019) and the violent conflict, as more than one third of the protest in the Basque regions in 2012 was still directly linked with political violence and its consequences.⁴⁰

³⁹ Data from the Spanish Interior Ministry: *Anuarios Estadísticos del Ministerio del Interior* (<http://www.interior.gob.es/web/archivos-y-documentacion/documentacion-y-publicaciones/anuarios-y-estadisticas>; last accessed: 4/10/2020). Data for the BAC -nor for Catalonia- is not available since 2013.

⁴⁰ Data from the 2012 Annuals is used, since it is the most recent year when the data covering both the BAC and the FCN was broken down by issues.

Second, levels of associationism and social capital in the BAC and Navarre have also been traditionally higher than the Spanish average,⁴¹ though this difference had decreased over time (Morales & Mota 2006: 104) and by the early 2000s were not that different – and occasionally even lower– from other wealthy, urban and industrialized regions such as Catalonia and Madrid (Morales & Mota 2006). Indeed, survey data from 2002 even showed that the percentage of Basques who are members of associations was relatively low, though among those formally affiliated their degree of commitment was higher (Morales and Mota 2006: 91-3).⁴²

This paradoxical situation in which very high levels of overall collective action and protest co-exist with modest levels of individual associationism and interest in politics could be partially explained by the discouraging effect of the high levels of polarization over the national question and the impact of the violent conflict for many citizens. For example, about half of Basques used to perceive an atmosphere of fear of participating in politics up to 2004 and more than 20% of the population used to declare that they preferred not to talk about politics with anyone (Leonisio & López Romo 2017: 148-51). Moreover, as many as 56% of those who were not involved in any kind of association in their early 2000s justified their non-participation on the grounds of “avoiding trouble”, a figure significantly higher than any other Spanish region (Morales & Mota 2006: 90-91). However, it should be noted that the discouraging effect of violence was not equally felt across all segments of society. Indeed, Gema García-Albacete (2010: 696-8) found that Basque citizens who do not identify with Basque nationalism showed lower levels of associational membership. This might be partially explained by the coercive effect that terrorist violence and ideological polarization had for the freedom of expression of non-nationalist sectors of the population (Leonisio & López Romo, 2017: 148; López Romo 2014: 111-2; Spencer & Croucher 2008).

Focusing now on the meso-level of civil society, the two Basque regions considered also stand out within the Spanish context as the ones with the highest ratio of formal associations per capita (Mota & Subirats 2000: 140-1). However, from a relational

⁴¹ Taking into consideration that Spanish levels of social capital and associationism are generally regarded as poor in European comparative terms (Torcal & Montero 1999; Torcal *et al.* 2006).

⁴² However, it is fair to acknowledge, that this does not take into account the high rates of involvement in informal networks such as *cuadrillas*, which are extremely prevalent in the Basque Country (García-Albacete 2010) and do also contribute to the generation of social capital, though mostly with bonding rather than bridging effects.

perspective, the two most salient cleavages have also permeated several collective action fields, which have traditionally suffered from high levels of fragmentation and internal divisions caused by the external political context (Barcena *et al.* 1998: 43; Epelde, Aranguren & Retolaza 2016: 317; Fernández Sobrado & Aierdi 1997: 197-9; Fernández Sobrado & Antolín 2000: 158-62; López Romo 2008: 7-12; Tejerina 2015: 7; Tejerina *et al.* 1995: 152-7). Examples of such ‘permeative propensities’ can be found in both ‘new’ social movements like feminism, antimilitarism or environmentalism, as well as in the ‘old’ workers’ movement. Moreover, what Fernández Sobrado and Aierdi refer as the “strategy of accumulation of sectoral struggles”⁴³ (2000: 159) devised by radical Basque nationalism since the 1980s resulted in the predominance and centrality of organizations from the MLNV in many fields. This ubiquity of MLNV organizations in almost every collective action field entailed at least two main consequences. First, it gave institutional powerholders and the mainstream media an easy target, leading to the dismissal of many legitimate social movement demands on the grounds of being formulated by ‘ETA’s accomplices.’ This discourse of criminalization of dissidence (Alonso *et al.* 2014; Barcena *et al.* 1998: 60-1; Casado da Rocha 1996; Fernández Sobrado 2000: 163) was even more intense in those fields where ETA followed a strategy of “involvement in conflicts that might have important repercussions within Basque society in terms of social support for the organization” (Tejerina 2001: 51). For instance, “ETA’s intervention in labour conflicts, or in the fight against the Lemoniz nuclear power station or the construction of the Leizarán motorway, were examples of this strategy” (*Ibid.*: 51-2).

Secondly, the attempt by MLNV organizations to become the focal organizations of certain movements increased internal tensions within many collective action fields (Vilaregut 2007), even fostering the duplication of some types of organizations (Fernández Sobrado & Antolín 2000: 160; Kriesi *et al.* 2007: 252). In many fields (e.g. feminism, environmentalism, social exclusion, international solidarity, promotion of the Basque language, student unions, etc) it is possible to observe a competition between at least two main organizations: one firmly situated within the MLNV and another being clearly autonomous from it. The latter groups have been forced to invest a great deal of their efforts in differentiating themselves from more radical groups, and even then, have

⁴³ “This strategy consists, basically, in situating of all protest potential and the diverse extant conflicts under in the same direction, subordinating it under the same master protest frame: the struggle for the liberation of the Basque people” (Fernández Sobrado & Aierdi 2000: 159).

found difficulties in making their demands heard in a very polarized public sphere (Fernández Sobrado & Antolin 2000: 160). Thus, the competition between distinct groups working on the same issues have been traditionally marked by distrust and even sectarianism, which have oftentimes obstructed the creation of common and broad platforms for unitary action. Even at the very end of the violent conflict, in early 2010, and generalizing upon the experience of the anti-HST (High Speed Train) movement, Iñaki Barcena and Josu Larrinaga would still note that:

sectarianism is a quite well extended disease within the Basque socio-political universe, and vaccines against it are scarce in Euskal Herria, which makes the generation of common spaces for unity of action that go beyond local nodes a difficult task (2010: 4)

All in all, we can summarize the peculiarities of the Basque Country from the perspective of collective action and political participation into three outstanding traits: (a) moderate rates of political and associational participation at the individual level, being particularly low among non-nationalist sectors, (b) high levels of activity of those politically involved, and (c) high levels of sectarianism and polarization among activists. In other words, traditionally, militants in political and social organizations in the Basque Country were few but extremely mobilized and active, and coordinated action mainly with similar alters in terms of national identity and positions towards ETA. As it has been shown before, all of these characteristics were strongly influenced by a very specific political context marked by the existence of long-standing political violence, which *“in its many manifestations, has deeply conditioned social practices and the Basque social imaginary in recent decades”* (Tejerina 2015: 1).

3.4. THE BASQUE ENVIRONMENTAL FIELD

3.4.1. Justification of the case selection

Among all possible sectors of Basque civil society and collective action fields, why environmentalism? Why is it relevant for the purposes of this research? What can it tell us about broader dynamics of Basque collective action? In fact, this research project was initially aimed at obtaining a multi-issue overview of collective action relational dynamics in the region, similarly to previous studies focused on specific urban areas (e.g. Baldassarri & Diani 2007; Diani 2015a; Diani *et al.* 2018). For this purpose, I originally targeted three other social movement exchange fields (labor, feminism, and social

exclusion) and a particularly prominent and contentious ‘issue field’ (Hoffman 1999; Zietsma *et al.* 2017): the one formed around contestation against different manifestations of political violence and their consequences. However, it was not until the data collection on collective action events began (see next chapter for more details) that the inclusion of more than one field was revealed as excessively time-consuming and complex, becoming unfeasible for a single researcher with the limited time and resources available. Thus, I decided to follow a case-study design, examining in more detail the evolution of a single collective action field. Among the five fields initially selected, environmentalism is certainly the most well-studied, having attracted significant academic attention due to two main factors.⁴⁴ On the one hand, the high levels of per capita socio-environmental conflicts in the region are unparalleled in international comparative terms (Martínez-Palacios & Barcena 2013: 16-9). On the other hand, it is arguably the field most deeply affected by the national question and the violent conflict. In a recent overview of the defining traits of Basque environmentalism, Carlos Alonso and colleagues (2014: 16-9) stressed how:

the identity question (the different Basque identities) and different ways of understanding political sovereignty in Basque society have also marked the evolution of Basque ecologism, both at the organizational level and in everyday practice.

Furthermore, as we have seen, the question of armed violence, which has traversed our society and has marked the Basque conflict in recent decades, has had a significant presence in the ecologist conflicts since their start in the struggles against Lemoiz. (Alonso, Barcena & Gorostidi 2014: 19)

Some environmental activists themselves also readily acknowledge from inside the particularities of Basque environmental collective action:

I believe that the entire environmental movement in Euskal Herria has not been a typical European environmental movement, but has been social and political, because a lot of elements have come into play. (...) The national, the political issues enter directly [into environmental conflicts] (Former politician and environmental activist)

One of the most salient singularities of Basque environmental activism refers to the strong alliances, social bonds and discursive alignments that the core of the environmental

⁴⁴ Indeed, environmental collective action in the Basque Country has received considerable academic attention since the 1990s. See, among others: Alonso *et al.* 2014; Barcena 1994; Barcena & Ajangiz 2011; Barcena & Ibarra 2001; Barcena *et al.* 2003; Barcena, Ibarra & Zubiaga 1995, 1997, 1998; Beorlegui 2009; Fernández-Sobrado & Antolin 2000; López Romo 2008, 2012; López Romo & Lanero 2011; Martínez-Palacios & Barcena 2012, 2013; Tejerina 2010; Tejerina *et al.* 1995.

movement has had with the *abertzale* left in general and, especially with radical Basque nationalism. This relationship was in some periods, especially at the early stages of the movement (1970s-80s), almost symbiotic (see Barcena 1994; Barcena *et al.* 1997, 1998). After a relative distancing of environmentalists from radical Basque nationalism since the early 1990s, environmental and political organizations associated with the MLNV still continued to play a central role (Barcena & Ibarra 2001: 191). This position of radical Basque nationalism –and, more generally, the *abertzale* leftist milieu– as a ‘privileged ally’ for environmental organizations, despite being beneficial for the latter in terms of mobilization (Barcena *et al.* 1998: 57), has often been uneasy or directly conflictive, generating internal tensions among environmentalists (Barcena & Ibarra 2001; López Romo 2008; Tejerina *et al.* 1995). The reflection expressed by one interviewed activist illustrates well this point:

A good part of our membership has come from the milieu of the abertzale left, that is undeniable. The abertzale left, not just with our organization, but with the environmental movement in general, has always been in tune. Sometimes it has ignored the environmental movement, but there has been good agreement overall. But it is true that even among the mass media there was this generalized perception that the environmental or even the conservationist movements belonged, in general, to the milieu of the abertzale left. (Environmental activist)

A chief source of tension related with this ambivalent relationship between environmentalism and Basque nationalism has been the violent conflict itself. Certainly, as pointed out earlier, the ECAF is by no means the only collective action field that is significantly influenced by the ethno-national violent conflict in spite of not being evidently connected to it from a thematic point of view. Added to the general polarizing impact of political violence in all realms of Basque society (see sections 2.2.1 and 3.3), ETA militants were often involved in sociopolitical activism, and environmentalism was no exception:

I am not going to deny that there have been ETA militants in the environmental movement, as well as in the labor movement, and the feminist movement, and in all social movements. If there are hundreds of ETA prisoners in jail it is because there were many people, who were in many places. I have met environmental activists who have also been part of ETA. (Academic and activist)

But besides these generalized influence, one element made this external contamination of violence particularly intense and divisive in the case of environmentalism, differentiating it from other social movement fields: the recurring direct involvement of ETA in environmental struggles and campaigns. Throughout the

decades, ETA repeatedly meddled in a number of environmental campaigns, perpetrating violent actions first against the Lemoiz nuclear station in the 1970s and early 1980s, later against the Leizaran motorway in the 1990s, and finally against the construction of the high-speed train (HST) infrastructure in the late 2000s. Even though the use of violence in environmental conflicts has overall been extremely infrequent quantitatively speaking,⁴⁵ ETA's 'pro-environmental' attacks had nonetheless a significant symbolic and practical impact for the environmental field, hindering common issue-based action and deeply conditioning the system of alliances to a larger extent than for other areas of social movement activity. Two main reasons account for this. On the one hand, ETA's intervention heightened police repression and fostered attempts to criminalize all kinds of environmental protest (Alonso *et al.* 2014; Barcena *et al.* 1995, 1998; Casado da Rocha & Pérez 1996). On the other hand, this situation prompted many environmental actors to make important discursive efforts directed at separating themselves from radical Basque nationalism and make their voices heard in a very polarized public sphere (Fernández Sobrado & Antolín 2000: 160).

Therefore, taking all those aspects into account, the environmental field can be regarded as a 'crucial' case (Gerring 2008) within the universe of Basque collective action fields. Given that the salience of the two dominant external cleavages have been found to be particularly strong in the case of the ECAF in comparison with other sectors of Basque civil society, it can be interpreted to be the least likely scenario where a significant change in post-conflict collaboration patterns might be observed. The main argument behind this crucial-case approach for case selection is that if signals of post-conflict boundary deactivation were observed within the ECAF, where these boundaries used to be the most entrenched, it is likely that similar dynamics would be occurring in other sectors of Basque civil society as well. Thus, examining up to what extent the coalitional structure of the environmental collective action field was in fact influenced by external cleavages associated with the national question, and whether this continues to be the case after the

⁴⁵ In fact, it is not possible to characterize the Basque environmentalism's repertoire of action as violent, not even as especially confrontative in comparative terms. Basque researchers involved in the Transformation of Environmental Activism (TEA) comparative research project reported only 67 events (less than 8% of all 887 events collected) in which violent of some intensity was used employed during the period 1988-97 (Barcena *et al.* 2003). This reduced presence of violent tactics is even smaller in my own self-collated database of environmental collective action events during six alternate years of the period 2007-17 (see section 4.2.1), as I only found 5 events (1% of all 419 collected) in which physical violence was reported, in all cases corresponding to violent clashes between protestors and police forces. A more detailed and comprehensive comparison of these two databases of environmental collective action events in the Basque context can be found in Ciordia (2020).

end of terrorism is not only interesting *per se*, but it can also be regarded as a partial indicator of lower levels polarization and political sectarianism within Basque society at large.⁴⁶

Additionally, moving beyond the Basque context, this case study can also be seen as an example of a broader phenomenon common to many deeply divided communities: the strong influence of salient ethno-national cleavages on civil society and social movements (e.g. Cinalli 2002, 2003; Milan 2020; Murtagh 2016; Nagle 2008, 2016). As mentioned above (section 2.2.2), such divisions hamper the integrative and cohesive function theoretically attributed to associational civil society, as they inhibit cross-cutting relationships among organizations identified with different political communities. The predominance of politically ‘concentric’ patterns of relationships in collective action over ‘intersecting’ ones (Diani 2000) is not only the consequence of underlying social divisions but can also reinforce polarization and mistrust, setting in motion a vicious circle that may ultimately hinder plural political participation and the functioning of democracy. On the contrary, observing civic organizations engaged in transversal relations with each other will likely be the reflection of a more integrated society, understanding this ‘not as a society in which conflict is absent’, but ‘as one in which conflict expresses itself through nonencompassing interests and identities’ (Baldassarri 2011: 651).

3.4.2. A tour through the history of Basque environmental mobilization

The rest of this chapter aims to provide a succinct historical contextualization of our context of study, summarizing the historical evolution of Basque environmental collective action since its emergence in the 1970s. Building upon the periodization made in previous studies by Barcena and collaborators (Barcena 2004; Barcena, Ibarra & Zubiaga 1995; Barcena, Ibarra, Guarrotxena & Torre 2000, 2003) and my own reading of available summaries and data, I distinguish seven different phases from 1976 to the present day, each characterized by distinct levels of mobilization, internal dynamics and issues of concern. Of course, specific dates demarcating the periods should be considered in approximate terms, as boundaries between different phases are typically disputable and blurry.

⁴⁶ That said, this assumption remains nonetheless open to future investigations.

3.4.2.a) The origins of Basque environmentalism and the anti-nuclear fight against Lemoiz (1976-82)

In the Spanish state, the exceptionality of the long Francoist dictatorship (1939-75) delayed the impact that the wave of mobilizations associated with May '68 had caused in other European countries, with the emergence of the so-called new social movements (most famously represented by environmentalism, feminism and anti-militarism). The Basque provinces were no exception in this regard to the Spanish trend, witnessing a late emergence of such movements, including environmentalism. Despite the anecdotal birth of the first officially-recognized conservationist group ANAN in Navarre in 1971, and some early mobilizations developed in the early 1970s against industrial pollution and environmental degradation led by neighborhood associations in working-class districts of Bilbao's metropolitan area, the beginning of the Basque environmental movement (BEM) is normally situated in 1976, with the foundation of the Commission for a Non-nuclear Basque Coast (*Comisión por una Costa Vasca No Nuclear, CCVNN*) (Barcena *et al.* 1995: 24-5). The CCVNN was the first organized expression of a rising anti-nuclear movement born in the heat of the local opposition to the plans of the Francoist government to build as many as seven nuclear reactors in Basque territory. One year later, in 1977, another crucial anti-nuclear organization came into being: the Anti-nuclear Committees (Comités Antinucleares, CC.AA.). The very different structure and functioning of these two organizations and the complementary role both played for the success of the movement is nicely summarized by Barcena and colleagues:

*Its self-organisational, assembly-based and anti-bureaucratic forms, their internationalist vocation or their defence of ideological pluralism made the Anti-nuclear Committees an organisation that, because of its public positions and its socio-political alternatives, framed its activity beyond mere opposition to nuclear energy, adopting other socio-political commitments. Alongside the Anti-nuclear Committees, the Commission for a Non-nuclear Basque Coast, a group of Basque professors, intellectuals and scientists dedicated to countering pro-nuclear positions with reports, public talks and debates, was a suitable symbiotic complement for winning over the majority of Basque society. (Barcena *et al.* 2000: 2-3).*

The discourse of the movement was not only anti-nuclear but also strongly anti-capitalist, questioning the socio-economic model imposed and even the newly created constitutional structures, including the nascent Autonomy Statute (1979) that restored Basque self-government within Spain, since it did not contemplate national self-determination. In this context, the most important campaign revolved around the

construction of the first of the seven nuclear plants in the small coastal town of Lemoiz, just 20 km away from Bilbao. This project was considered by radical Basque nationalism as a threat to the very existence of the Basque people. Even though its construction started in 1976, the Lemoiz power plant was never completed, and the project was finally abandoned in 1982. This outcome became possible due to the strength of two distinct sources of pressure: on the one hand, a very intense protest campaign that included mass demonstrations, civil disobedience and actions of sabotage, and, on the other hand, the armed actions of ETA targeting the firm responsible for the construction (*Iberduero*), which killed seven people, including two chief engineers of the plant. As a result, the young Basque environmental movement soon enjoyed a first categorical success, as not only Lemoiz, but all the projects to build nuclear plants in the Basque Country were abandoned by the Spanish state.

3.4.2.b) Relative demobilization and the anti-NATO campaign (1982-86)

The sound victory obtained in the Lemoiz campaign was followed by a relative demobilization of the environmentalist movement, particularly of the now renamed Anti-nuclear and Ecologist Committees, with many of its members moving to other sectors of socio-political activism (Barcena *et al.* 2000: 3). Along with the loss of resources, an identity crisis also appeared, with efforts now concentrating on the opposition against Spain's integration in NATO. The saliency of the anti-NATO campaign, in which anti-nuclear and environmentalist activists were very active, led to pure environmental concerns being displaced by immediate anti-militarist claims. Moreover, given the weakening of the Committees, new organizations started to emerge, fragmenting the movement not only in organizational terms, but also dialectically "*between those who rejected violence as a form of struggle on moral and political grounds, and those who continued to consider valid 'all forms of struggle against the state and the capitalist system'*" (*Ibid.*: 4). Indeed, many of these new environmental organizations clearly differentiated themselves from the Committees, due to the latter's tolerance of ETA's armed struggle (Barcena *et al.* 1995: 34-5). Even though anti-NATO positions clearly triumphed within the Basque provinces in the 1986 referendum about Spain's integration in the Alliance (with 63% of Basques voting against it), overall results for the entirety of the Spanish state went in the opposite direction (with 57% of voters backing Spain's membership into NATO). In spite of this relative success, at least in electoral terms at the Basque level, the truth is that in the end:

Basque ecologism did not emerge strengthened from the long anti-NATO campaign (1982-1986). On the contrary, a series of previous problems and disagreements continued to go unresolved (organisational dispersion and weakness, lack of a common program of action...), and in this period there had been a sharpening of organisational divisions, both for ideological reasons and over differences in style of work. (Barcena et al. 2000: 4)

3.4.2.c) *The birth of Eguzki, internal schism and the Leitzaran conflict (1987-92)*

The experience of the long anti-NATO campaign prompted reflections within the environmentalist movement about the desirability for more coordination among environmentalists at the Basque national level, in order to foster unity of action. Indeed, in 1986, some local conservationist groups had already launched a Basque coordinating committee (*Coordinadora de Euskadi*). Yet, the most important initiative came from the larger and more prestigious Anti-nuclear and Ecologists Committees, which promoted the creation of a common umbrella organization that was finally constituted in June 1987 under the name of *Eguzki* (meaning, “the sun” in Euskara). However, despite its pretensions of functioning as a unitary body, *Eguzki* would be situated from the start “within the anti-capitalist tradition and hold a nationalist vision and interpretation of politico-social [*sic.*] reality, integrating itself into the national and social liberation movement of Euskal Herria [the MLNV]” (Barcena et al. 2000: 5; see as well: Barcena et al. 1995: 39-47; Beorlegui 2009: 179). This, of course, limited its potential to act as a plural point of confluence, leading to an internal split only after one year and a half, which resulted in the foundation of a second national coordinator, *Eki* (which also means “the sun”) in 1989. The latter group would share with *Eguzki* almost the same analysis of the ecological situation in the Basque Country, but would differ in a crucial external point: the question of whether to remain autonomous to the struggle for national liberation or to be firmly linked with the structures of the MLNV and the family of SMOs of radical Basque nationalism.

Despite this intergroup rivalry at the national level and the existence of an atomized organizational landscape at the local level, a new campaign attracted most attention and fostered unitary action: the opposition against the Leitzaran highway, which peaked especially between 1990 and 1992. This campaign opposed the construction of a new highway connecting Navarre with Gipuzkoa because of the severe environmental impacts it would cause to the isolated valley of Leitzaran. All environmental organizations and local groups converged around the Anti-motorway Coordinator (*Coordinadora Anti-autovía*), created in 1985, which was four years later converted into the *Lurralde*

Coordinator. The creation of Lurralde responded to the evolution of the main demands of the opposition campaign, which initially bluntly rejected any type of new connection projected in the area and later opted for a technical counter-proposal, elaborating an alternative itinerary for the motorway that was considered less damaging to the environment (see Aierdi & Gaviria 1992). The anti-motorway campaign received the support of the MLNV, particularly of its political party *Herri Batasuna* (HB) as a ‘privileged ally’ (Barcena *et al.* 2000: 7; 2003: 211-2). ETA also intervened with several violent actions, “planting bombs against the works and construction companies and threatening the latter’s technicians, resulting in 4 mortal victims.” (Alonso *et al.* 2014: 17). However, at Leitzarán, in contrast with the case of Lemoiz nuclear plant, “ETA’s actions were marginal, hardly influenced the [construction] process and, nevertheless, created dissension within the alliance between nationalists and ecologists” (Barcena *et al.* 2003: 215). Moreover, the emergence of violence also led to the criminalization of the campaign as violent and pro-ETA, representing a serious obstacle for the establishment of negotiations with the concerned institutions.

Nonetheless, after a long period of institutional closure towards popular opposition, Lurralde managed to establish a dialogue with the provincial institutions of Gipuzkoa governed by the hegemonic PNV. In 1992, the provincial authorities agreed to a slight modification of the initial route of the motorway, which nonetheless ignored the bulk of Lurralde’s counter-proposal. This partial victory showed the strength of Basque environmentalism and the capacity of environmental actors to influence public policy – even showing some traits of professionalization– though it also created internal tensions between the previously dominant anti-institutional approaches and more possibilist strategies open to cooperating with institutions. Additionally, the Leitzarán conflict once again showed the contamination of environmental conflicts by the turbulent external context, being generally interpreted “*as a confrontation between moderate nationalism and the defenders of the autonomous order established by the Spanish Constitution on [the] one side, and the defenders of self-determination and a surpassing of that political framework on the other.*” (Barcena *et al.* 2000: 7).

3.4.2.d) Diversity, competition, and localism (1992-1999)

After Leitzarán, the Basque environmental movement distanced itself from radical Basque nationalism, which continued to be an important partner, but no more the ‘privileged ally’ of previous phases (Barcena *et al.* 2003: 212; Barcena & Ibarra 2001:

187). Against this background, in 1992, a new initiative for unitary action encompassing as many environmental actors as possible was launched: the *Erreka* ('river') platform (Barcena et al. 1995: 56-9). This initiative originated with a manifesto calling for broad and global environmental action in connection with the Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro taking place that year. After setting in motion a number of initiatives and meetings, mostly in Biscay, old calls for the creation of a common supra-structure for the movement were reactivated, and the majority of activists considered that the newly created *Erreka* could fulfill that purpose. Nonetheless, Eguzki soon withdrew itself from the platform, and *Erreka* did not manage to acquire a national scope and organizational presence, consolidating itself only in Biscay (Barcena et al. 2000: 8).

With this new sign of the weakness of Basque national organizations and the distancing from nationalist frames, the 1990s witnessed a marked tendency towards localism and '*nimbysm*'. This was reflected in the type of conflicts that received most attention (local environmental aggressions) and in the burgeoning growth of very local '*ad-hoc*' NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) organizations, which promoted campaigns with traits halfway between environmental and 'neighborhood' activism (Barcena et al. 2003: 213) that mostly wanted "the environmental aggression to disappear from their area" (Barcena & Ibarra 2001: 193). The most salient conflict during these years –the opposition against the construction of a new reservoir that would flood the Navarrese town of Itoitz and its surrounding areas– exemplifies this localist turn, with the campaign being led by one local coordinator ('Itoitz Coordinator') and small *ad-hoc* group ('*Solidarios con Itoiz*') that advocated for civil disobedience and direct action (Barcena et al. 2000: 11-3).

3.4.2.e) *New century, new organizations and new issues: the High-Speed Train (HST) and the fight against Garoña (1999-2006)*

Right before the turn of the century, the tendency towards localism and fragmentation was reversed, with the two main sectors of the BEM promoting new national structures for coordinated action. On the one hand, the plural sector of Basque environmentalism aiming to maintain its autonomy from the MLNV reorganized itself around a new organization: *Ekologistak Martxan* ("Ecologists in Motion"). The creation of this new umbrella organization in the Basque Country followed to the debate on the restructuring of environmental organizations in the entire Spanish state that led to the formation of the new confederation: *Ecologistas en Acción* ("Ecologists in Action") (Barcena et al. 2000:

10; Galante 1999; Jiménez 2007). Even though *Ekologistak Martxan* is federated at the state-level with *Ecologistas en Acción*, the new organization maintained an eminently Basque national scope of action, replacing the two previous coordinators of *Eki* in Euskadi and *ANAT-LANE* in Navarre, and developing organizational capacity in all four provinces. On the other hand, almost contemporaneously, *Eguzki* launched a new proposal to build a new plural network open, beyond environmentalists, to youths, feminists, farmers, or trade unionists that would coordinate all of the struggles 'in defense of the land' and against urbanization and globalization. This would crystalize in the constitution of the *Lurra* ("Earth") Call in 2000, a new organization that would nonetheless fail to acquire much relevance in the following years.

In parallel to this organizational restructuring at the Basque national level, two issue-specific umbrella organizations were formed, focusing on the two conflicts that would attract the largest mobilizations during the first two decades of the 21st century. The first of these umbrella groups was *AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana* ("Stop HST! Collaboration/Union"), founded in 2001 against the projected construction of a high-speed train railway infrastructure, which aimed to connect the Basque capitals with Madrid to the south and Bordeaux to the north. The opposition to the project was mainly based upon the high environmental impacts of the construction (especially notable in such a mountainous region, as the railway would require a continuous succession of tunnels and viaducts), its billionaire budget, the uneven social costs that residents of rural areas would have to bear, and the anti-democratic and top-down character of the decision making process (for an expansion, see Alonso *et al.* 2014: 19-21). *AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana* "was formed as a social coordinator with the participation of social and ecologist movements, local groups of those affected, trade unions, political organizations, etc. and some municipal councils" (*Ibid.*: 22). Although a pioneering anti-HST already existed since 1993 (the *Assembly against the HST*, which also partook in *Elkarlana*), the creation of this broad platform marked "a qualitative leap and the germ of a true social movement" (*Ibid.*)

The second of these umbrella groups was *Araba sin Garoña* ("Araba without Garoña"), founded in 2002 as a platform fighting for the closure of the old Garoña nuclear station inaugurated back in 1973. Despite being situated administratively in the Castilian province of Burgos, the closure of Garoña had long formed part of the Basque environmental and political agenda, as the nuclear plant is only 6 kilometers away from the border with Euskadi, and just 50 and 70 km away from the cities of Vitoria-Gasteiz

and Bilbao, respectively. Therefore, despite the previous existence of the Burgos-based *Coordinator against Garoña*, to which most relevant Spanish environmental groups belonged, the organization Eguzki promoted the creation of this Araba-based umbrella group participated mainly by local neighborhood associations and Basque trade unions.

3.4.2.f) *The peak of the anti-HST campaign and its aftermath: mobilization, violence and repression (2006-2012)*

Despite the fact that the HST project had first been announced by the state regional administrations back in 1989, construction works did not begin until the fall of 2006 in Urbina (Araba), expanding two years later to the provinces of Gipuzkoa and Biscay. The beginning of construction increased the number and the confrontative character of protests, kickstarting a huge wave of mobilization, which reached its peak in 2008 and that made the debate over the HST railway one of the major issues within Basque socio-political agenda during those years. In this context, in early 2008, ETA publicly indicated the opposition to the HST as one of its main objectives, attacking the properties of involved construction companies throughout that year and assassinating Inaxio Uria (a businessman of one of the targeted enterprises) on December 3rd, 2008. Besides the social commotion that it provoked, the assassination also caused strong internal tensions within the anti-HST movement, increased state repression, and ultimately produced a relative demobilization of the anti-HST movement (Barcena & Larrinaga 2010). Recalling this episode, an informant activist concluded the following:

There were a lot of people who went home. In the sense that a lot of people thought to themselves 'I do not want vanguards to direct my work.' That is something that we are very clear about. We are anti-vanguards. We believe that social changes occur among many people, combining efforts without leadership, without saviors. We don't believe in those kinds of strategies. There were a lot of people who went home. It was the anti-HST movement, a movement that has been going on for many years. So the fact that in 2008 ETA went against a businessman related with the HST and assassinated him, that is a moment in which you think, 'What has this got to do with us? Not in my name!' In fact, the anti-HST movement is still recovering itself from that blow... it will take years. (Academic and activist)

Nonetheless, despite the progressive decline of anti-HST mobilizations from 2009 onwards, the construction of the HST railway infrastructure continued to be the most prominent environmental issue in Basque territory at least up to 2011.

3.4.2.g) Overall demobilization and the diversification of issues and actors
(2012-present)

By 2012 the conflict over the construction of the HST, though ongoing, was situated in a much lower position in the Basque political agenda, partially due to the abovementioned demobilization of the opposition campaign, but also due to the standstill of the project itself within a global context of anti-austerity policies and severe cuts of public spending. While Basque environmentalism has been facing low levels of mobilization over the last few years, in part due to the parallel surge of other sectors of socio-political activism (e.g. anti-austerity, feminism, housing, etc), this last period is characterized by an increasingly diversified environmental agenda and by the appearance of new actors. Old environmental issues that were overshadowed by the anti-HST peak of the late 2000s such (waste incineration and management, climate change, renewable energy production, or the closure of Garoña nuclear plant) have re-emerged, and a powerful new conflict over the use of *fracking*⁴⁷ for shale gas extraction occupied many front pages between 2012 and 2015. Along with this issue diversification, new smaller environmental organizations have come on stage (e.g. *Sustrai Erakuntza*, *PxINME-Gure Energia*, *Desazkundera*, *Goienar Elkarte*) and more non-environmental actors (political parties, trade unions, and civic organizations focused on other issues) attend more frequently environmental events. Thus, as we will see in the next chapter, even though there has been an overall demobilization in terms of public collective action, nowadays a larger and more heterogeneous share of organized civil society seems interested and actively engaged in environmental issues.

7.1. SUMMARY

This chapter was born from the need to provide the reader enough background about the case study under consideration: the environmental collective action field in the Basque Country. In this sense, the contextualization contained in chapter 3 plays a crucial role in the dissertation by laying the groundwork for a richer appraisal of the data collected (presented in chapter 4) and a better interpretation of the empirical results (chapters 5, 6

⁴⁷ *Fracking* is the short popular term referring to hydraulic fracturing, a drilling technique employed for the extraction of underground gas, consisting of the fracturing of rocks by a pressurized liquid. The technique is very controversial, due to its environmental impacts (causing noise, water contamination and air pollution) and its potential to trigger earthquakes. Several plans for conducting fracking drills were discussed and projected in Spain, mostly in the north of the peninsula, propelling a strong social movement of opposition, which was particularly notable in the Basque provinces of Araba and Biscay.

and 7). In the first place, I began by defending my choice of geographically restricting this research to the Basque territories within Spanish borders and explicitly stated the criteria guiding the terminology adopted throughout the dissertation. In the following section, a succinct general account of the region's recent political history was provided, with special attention to the emergence and development of Basque nationalism from the 19th century onwards and to the long violent conflict between ETA and the Spanish state that severely conditioned social and political life over more than half a century. In the third section, drawing upon previous literature, I underlined the distinctiveness of contentious politics and civic participation in the Basque Country, which are marked by extraordinary levels of mobilization and ideological sectarianism. Finally, the long fourth section delved deeper into the particular case study, the environmental collective action field, providing a brief historical account of the development of Basque environmental activism from its onset in the 1970s until the present day. Now that sufficient background has been provided, we are ready to review the ins and outs of this investigation, starting in the next chapter with a detailed account of the empirical strategies that were followed for data collection.

4. EMPIRICAL DESIGN AND DATA

As it was explained in the theoretical chapter (see sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2), this study adopts a network-analytic empirical strategy for the study of the environmental collective action field in the Basque Country over time. This particular field is studied through the examination of civic networks, which should reflect the intricate system of multiplex relations between civic organizations involved in environmental collective action. The present chapter details how the data that informs subsequent empirical analyses was collected, with special attention to the strategies devised for the retrospective observation of interorganizational collaborative networks, which function as dependent variables in chapters 5 and 6, and are also part of the more exploratory analysis of chapter 7.

4.1. THE TEMPORAL DIMENSION AS THE ACHILLES' HEEL OF NETWORK RESEARCH ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Network-analytic perspectives have long been applied to conduct research on collective action and social movements. For instance, some studies have focused on the facilitative role of interpersonal networks for social movement activism, thus looking at networks as preconditions for collective action, while other analysts have looked at the emerging network structure constituted by the links that actors engaged in collective action form among themselves (for a recent review, see Crossley & Diani 2019). The latter perspective has been gaining ground, along with the increasing popularity of Diani's (1992) conceptualization of social movements as particular types of networks characterized by high levels of mutual interaction among members and a shared collective identity. These social movement networks are often themselves immersed within broader collective action fields that can also be studied as multiorganizational networks.

While explicitly relational approaches empirically based on network tools provide a useful vantage point for the study of several collective active phenomena –such as coalition formation– these have had a harder time introducing time into the picture (Crossley & Diani 2019: 159), to a large extent due to the difficulties embedded in the longitudinal data collection of network data. Data collection has until now mostly relied on surveys, for instance, interviewing a certain sample or population of 'civic' and/or social movement organizations (SMOs) and including several questions enquiring about

different types of ties with other actors. However, their extremely time-consuming nature, coupled with the well-known high mortality of voluntary organizations (B. Edwards & Marullo 1995), make prospective longitudinal designs based on panel interview data practically unfeasible. On the other hand, the retrospective reconstruction of ties through interviews is undesirable as well, given the well-known inaccuracy of recall data for the reconstruction of past behaviour at specific points in time (Bernard, Killworth & Sailer 1982; Bernard, Killworth, Kronenfeld & Sailer 1984). For instance, it would not make much sense to ask our informants in 2018 with whom they collaborated in 2010 and if these collaborations were different from the ones they established in 2012. The most we could obtain by following this procedure –besides the frustration of our informants– would be a collection of very unreliable network data.

In conclusion, the temporal limitations of organizational surveys as instruments of data collection explain why static approaches are prevalent in previous studies of social movement networks and why the inclusion of the temporal dimension into the analysis of these networks continues to be the Achilles' heel of this type of empirical studies.

4.2. A RELATIONAL APPROACH TO PROTEST EVENT ANALYSIS (PEA)

As an alternative to interviews, content analysis of archival records can also be used for data collection (Burt 1983). In fact, resorting to text archives to create rich longitudinal network datasets is a strategy that, even if still marginal, has been increasingly used in socio-historical research over the last decades (Gould 2003). In particular, newspaper reports offer a viable alternative for the study of past networks of interactions among actors over long time spans (Diani 2013a). Paradoxically, newspaper articles are one of the main data sources employed in the quantitative study of collective action and protest behaviour, having generated a well-established methodology known as 'protest event analysis' (PEA) (Earl *et al.* 2004; Franzosi 1987; Hutter 2014; Koopmans & Rucht 2002; Rucht & Ohlemacher 1992). Nonetheless, such data have been mainly examined from an aggregative perspective, tracking the change over time of the total amount of events and some of their characteristics (e.g. number of participants, form of protest, claims, etc.).

In contrast with the traditional use of PEA data, a relational examination of collective actions events allows tracing an important visible expression of interorganizational collaboration: co-participation in the same event (Diani & Mische 2015: 311). This is based on the quite straightforward assumption that "events also create connections

between organizations”, as “one could expect organizations that are involved in many events to be more strongly linked to each other than organizations that only collaborate sparingly, or hardly at all” (Diani 2015a: 141). Thus, while this research makes use of the PEA methodology it differs from most classic studies within this tradition because of its eminently relational perspective, as I am not interested in the events *per se*, but in the events as instances of coordination between collective actors. The relational approach to PEA places this research together with a reduced number of existing studies in which network-analytic techniques on protest event data have been applied (Bearman & Everett 1993; Diani & Kousis 2014; Franzosi 1999; Pirro *et al.* 2019; Rootes 2003;⁴⁸ Wada 2014; Wang & Soule 2012). This empirical strategy for retrospective network generation has not been fully explored yet, inhibiting the development of longitudinal analyses of collective action networks.

Notwithstanding the advantages and promises of looking at networks of event co-attendance, some limitations of using this information as an indicator of interorganizational collaboration should be discussed.⁴⁹ Proponents of a more exigent definition of coalitions such as Levi and Murphy point out that these should be seen as “*distinct from marching together on the streets, lobbying, being mutual signatories to a petition or other kinds of joint activities that movement organizations are likely to undertake*”, since these joint activities “*may not always involve pooling resources, and not all cooperative activity requires rules for managing dissent or defining membership*” (2006: 654). Thus, both the pooling of resources and the existence of rules are necessary requirements of more demanding definitions of interorganizational coalitions. Even though this research follows a looser version of the concept of coalitions that is interchangeable with interorganizational collaboration (see section 2.3.4 above), the acknowledgement of the particularities of event co-attendance with respect to stronger forms of coalitional behavior force us to recognize two main types of errors that co-participation in public events can potentially introduce in our data. In the first place, event co-attendance might just reflect a partial dimension of coalition work –though arguably a very relevant one– as it might conceal some other behind-the-scenes forms of

⁴⁸ In Rootes’ (2003) collection, see in particular the chapters on France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain for examples of network-analytic uses of PEA data.

⁴⁹ The limitations discussed in this paragraph refer exclusively to the phenomenon of event co-attendance in itself and its capacity to say something meaningful about interorganizational collaboration. Limitations derived from the sources of data (in this case, local newspaper articles) are instead discussed below in section 4.2.1.b).

collaboration that could be as meaningful, if not more, as joining several events together. From the opposite point of view, it could be argued that this measure could lead in some cases, particularly in very large events, to count casual co-presences in which some pair of actors might not even be aware of one another as instances of meaningful collaboration. These two observations point to the potential introduction of edge attribution errors, by omission in the first case and by commission in the latter (Borgatti *et al.* 2013: 37-8), derived from assuming interorganizational collaboration based on event co-attendance. While the possibility of incurring such errors exists and event co-attendance is far from being a perfect measure of interorganizational collaboration, I contend that this indicator should not only be considered the ‘least bad’ option available –if not the only one– for the diachronic study of collaborative ties, but that it does reveal substantive aspects of interorganizational dynamics, especially when counting upon a large number of events that occurred over a relatively long period of time, as in this case. For instance, as pointed out by Diani, it must be kept in mind that direct visible interorganizational linkages (to which participation in joint activities belong):

*require decisions to be taken by some level of the concerned SMOs to direct resources towards a given goal, to the detriment of others. **They also entail public recognition of compatibility** –a total congruence is very rarely achieved– between the goals and styles of action of each SMO and its prospective partners in any specific protest event. Choices on these matters are subjected to contestation by members of SMOs involved, though in different forms, depending on the degree of internal bureaucratisation. In any case, however, at least active members are likely to exert some control and to pose some constraints over their leaders’ behavior and options” (Diani 1995: 99; emphasis added)*

This observation of the significance of event co-attendance seems to resonate with collective action dynamics in the Basque Country. As noted by several activists in the interviews conducted, organizational decisions to attend externally organized events are rarely taken lightly, usually involving long and sometimes contentious internal debates. In the Basque region, apart from the content or purposes of the event, special attention is given to the list of other actors that are also joining the event, the so-called ‘alphabet soup’ of convening and/or signatory groups that support a specific event. Even when organizations shared the demands brought up by the organizers of a specific planned event, many of them used to refrain from joining if other organizations perceived as incompatible to themselves –for instance, in the most extreme cases, because of being regarded as ‘supporters of terrorism’ or as ‘accomplices of Spanish oppression’– were

also participating. Therefore, in the case that empirical analyses found a tendency towards more heterogeneous event co-attendance over time, we would have solid reasons to interpret these findings, at the very minimum, as reflecting increasing levels of tolerance in Basque civil society. While it is certain that co-presence in the same public spaces falls short of revealing strong interorganizational coalitions by itself, its significance cannot be regarded as negligible, less so in our context of study, given the political sectarianism that has traditionally characterized Basque public sphere in general and the environmental field in particular (see sections 3.3 and 3.4 above).

In what follows, I briefly reconstruct the data collection process followed for the generation of the collaborative networks based on event co-attendance. These networks play a crucial role as dependent variables and in the following two chapters, while a second more durable indicator of collaboration based upon common membership in campaign-specific umbrella groups is also employed in chapter 7 (see section 7.3.1 for more details). In the remainder of this section, I proceed as follows. First, I reconstruct the process through which a dataset of environmental collective action events was built. Secondly, decisions on the networks' boundary specification (that is, deciding who is a member of the Basque environmental collective action field and who is not) are explained and incumbent organizations are succinctly presented. Finally, this section closes with the specification of the operationalization procedures followed for the measurement of the varying strength of collaborative ties among those included as members.

4.2.1. Building a dataset of environmental collective action events

The self-collated event dataset that allowed for the subsequent construction of the co-attendance networks that function as dependent variables in the following two chapters resulted from a large process of data collection carried over several months in 2018. Five main steps could be differentiated in this process: the definition of the unit of analysis, the selection of sources, the delimitation of the time span, the retrieval of relevant newspaper articles, and, finally, the identification of events and codification of their characteristics.

4.2.1.a) The unit of analysis: environmental collective action events

The first decision that needs to be made for the construction of any event dataset is the definition of the type of events that the researcher aims to uncover, that is, his/her unit

of analysis. Following the theorization proposed by Sampson's and colleagues in the context of a large research project on civic participation in Chicago (McAdam, Sampson, Weffer & MacIndoe 2005; Sampson, McAdam, MacIndoe & Weffer 2005), I focus on *collective action events* dealing with environmental issues as the units of analysis. Collective action events are defined as nonroutine public and collective⁵⁰ gatherings which take place outside of institutional politics and advance causes and/or demands on behalf of public interests (Sampson *et al.* 2005: 682-3). Thus, the events under consideration can be of any type (such as demonstrations, press conferences, boycotts, cultural events, organized petitions, etc), as long as they are: (i) expressions of collective action taking place physically in at least one of the four provinces considered,⁵¹ (ii) present a public-sphere projection,⁵² and, (iii) given the focus of our case study, advance environmental causes and/or demands as one of the primary aims of the event, even if the events also address other non-environmental topics.

Therefore, it must be noted how the concept of environmental collective action events does not only encompass protest events *stricto sensu*, but also less confrontational 'civic' forms of action, which have been traditionally overlooked by the social movement literature in general and empirical studies relying on event data in particular (*Ibid.*, 2005; 675). Noncontentious events also attract considerable collective action efforts by civic organizations (Diani 2015a: 107), being equally able to generate social capital and contribute to social cohesion.

⁵⁰ The *collective* nature of an event, besides the promotion of what is perceived to be the interest of a broader set of individuals besides individual participants, requires the involvement of at least two or more people, though often the number of participants is much higher. As collective action events are by definition physical gatherings, I did not include online-only forms of collective action (e.g. diffusion of a statement directly through social or traditional media outlets without a physical press conference or public event) or other forms of public claim-making that do not require the existence of a physical event. This specification differentiates traditional PEA approaches from claim making analyses (e.g. Koopmans & Statham 1999b).

⁵¹ These provinces or '*historical territories*' are Araba, Biscay, Gipuzkoa, and Navarre (for an explanation on the territorial scope of this research, see section 3.1 above). The only exception to this territorial criterion is the inclusion of three events celebrated in Santa María de Garoña, where the contentious nuclear plant of Garoña is located. While the municipality administratively belong to Burgos, it is only 6 kilometers away from the border with Euskadi, just 50km away from the capital Vitoria-Gasteiz, and 70 from Bilbao. Therefore, this led many Basque environmental activists and groups to occasionally organized on-site protest events at the nuclear power plant. Such events were arguably directed more towards the Basque public sphere rather than towards audiences in Burgos or the rest of Spain.

⁵² A public-sphere projection requires that the organizers aim to reach non-members, therefore excluding events that, even if covered by the media, are part of the internal life of an organization (e.g. a general assembly of a trade union or other organization).

Following Sampson and colleagues (2005: 684-6), I differentiate three types of collective action events: protest, civic and hybrid events. *Protest events* formulate explicit claims or express grievances, using a wide variety of forms that can include disruption and even violence, though most often events take place in orderly and conventional forms (rallies, marches, petitions, etc). In contrast, *civic events* do not formulate explicit claims to bring about or resist policy or social change, but have implicit or latent purposes, for example, “to celebrate the community (e.g., festivals), to procure resources (e.g., fundraisers), or to accomplish collective goals (e.g., cleanups, preservation)” (*Ibid.*, 685); their specific forms of action are multiple, but they are based on generating a sense of community togetherness (*Ibid.*, 680). Lastly, *hybrid events* represent a form of “blended social action” that combines articulated claims for specific change with civic or community-based forms of action.

The inclusion of civic and hybrid events in the database is justified under the theoretical assumption that co-attendance at these events is equally revealing as an indicator of interorganizational collaboration as instances of protest, therefore being equally pertinent for the construction of collaborative networks. Furthermore, expanding the analysis beyond protest events is particularly important in the case of environmental collective action, since “the great majority of environmental organizations are either engaged in practical conservation work or focus upon parliamentary and educational strategies; only a small minority rely on protest, and these are distinguished by the discourses they articulate” (Rootes & Brulle 2013). Hence, our more inclusive unit of analysis allows obtaining a more complete and representative view of collaboration within the ECAF in comparison with analyses restricted to protest events only, which would bias our assessment of collaboration networks in the environmental collective action field, underrepresenting organizations holding conservationist or reformist discourses (see section 5.2.2.d).

4.2.1.b) Selection of sources: Basque local newspapers

In order to build a database of environmental collective action events in the Basque Country, I relied on newspapers as data sources (Franzosi, 1987; Earl *et al.*, 2004), which, despite its biases and limitations, remain as the preferred source for protest event analysis (PEA) (Hutter, 2014; Koopmans & Rucht, 2002; Rucht & Ohlemacher 1992). Newspapers, while far from perfect, are superior to other potential sources such as police

records, organizations' documents, or other types of mass media like radio and TV (Kriesi *et al.* 1995: 253-4; McCarthy *et al.* 1999). As it was summarized by Swen Hutter:

The major advantages of newspapers are access, selectivity, reliability, continuity over time, and ease of coding. Newspapers report on a regular basis, they are kept in public archives, and—at least in case of quality newspapers—they try to maintain their credibility by covering events accurately. (Hutter 2014: 349)

Additionally, data collection from newspapers is nowadays greatly facilitated by the availability of past news articles online. On the one hand, this paves the way for implementing more efficient half-automated electronic selection strategies in which potentially relevant news articles are quickly retrieved through keyword searches (Ibid.: 352-3). On the other hand, at a later stage, the coding of selected news articles becomes much easier when these are in digital format, as it can be conducted with the help of specialized software for content analysis, which significantly increases the reliability and transparency of the coding process.

That said, it is necessary at this point to caution the reader about some of the most important inherent biases that newspapers can introduce in event catalogs, discussing how these may have affected our data in this case. It is well established among scholars that rely on newspapers as sources of data that there are two chief types of biases: *description* and *selection* biases. Description bias may result from the fact that reporters do not always describe accurately or thoroughly what actually happened at a given event, therefore potentially misrepresenting or omitting certain actors and/or actions. While newspapers can differ greatly in their interpretation of the actions and the motives of participants, the factual aspects or “hard news” (Tuchman 1973)⁵³ of events are generally considered to be relatively reliable (Danzger 1975; Earl *et al.* 2004; McPhail & Schweingruber 1999). In spite of this, researchers have also warned that on some occasions newspapers misreport factual information about the total number of participants (Biggs 2018; Kriesi *et al.* 1995: 255; Mann 1974), the demands of protestors (Smith *et al.* 2001), the occurrence, authorship or intensity of violence (Danzger 1975; Kriesi *et al.* 1995: 255), or the specific organizations that sponsor or partake in the event (Andrews & Caren 2010; Bearman & Everet 1993: 179). This last point, the selective identification of participants can be particularly problematic for our purposes, the construction of event co-attendance networks. Given that high-profile resourceful organizations are more likely to be

⁵³ The content of ‘hard news’ roughly correspond to the famous ‘five Ws’ of journalism: the *who*, *what*, *when*, *where*, and *why* of the event.

mentioned in comparison with smaller and informal groups, some organizations attracting little media attention could eventually fail to appear as active actors in the field, or when included, show lower levels of collaborative connections with other nodes.

Regarding selection bias, this is generally considered to pose a bigger challenge to the validity of event data. Because newspapers do not cover all events that actually take place, reporters tend to select events based on their newsworthiness. Therefore, events covered by newspapers are unlikely to be representative samples of all events celebrated, as some types of gatherings might be overrepresented while others remain underrepresented. Several factors strongly condition newspaper coverage: size of the event, the disruptiveness and novelty of the tactics employed, the geographic proximity of the event to the headquarters of the newspaper, whether the event is sponsored by influential actors, and whether the promoted cause figures prominently in the current “media issue attention cycle” (McCarthy *et al.* 1996) or is ideologically or thematically aligned with the editorial line of the source. Previous examinations of sources of newspapers selection bias have shown that events are more likely to be reported especially when they are large, disruptive (especially if violent), happen in the local area of the source, are promoted by high-profile civic organizations and political actors, and relate to issues or claims that resonate with general concerns and the interests of the newspaper’s specific audience.⁵⁴ Given that “with event data, there is no known universe of ‘real world’ events that we can sample or against which we can compare” (Jenkins & Maher 2016: 53), it is not possible to accurately assess how bad selection bias is.⁵⁵ For this reason, following a large portion of PEA studies, in this investigation I follow a “representational” approach (Mueller 1997). This approach accepts that, given that sources select events in a nonrandom fashion, producing an exact count of events or a perfectly representative sample is virtually impossible. Therefore, the most modest goal is to hold potential biases constant through the application of a “*systematic sampling strategy* across context and

⁵⁴ This list of factors is incomplete and only reflect those on which a broader consensus exists. It is not possible to review here in any more detail the findings from the vast number of studies that have empirically assessed different sources of selection bias in PEA. However, encompassing literature reviews on this topic can be found, among others, in: Davenport (2009: ch. 2), Earl *et al.* (2004: 68-72), Hutter (2014: 350-2), Jenkins & Maher (2016: 43-9), and Ortiz *et al.* (2005: 398-404).

⁵⁵ That said, partial assessments of the selection bias of a given source can be made by contrasting results to an independent source of evidence that reports on the same population of events. This is precisely the main focus of researchers that adopt a “media theory” approach to PEA (Mueller 1997).

over time” (Hutter 2014: 349). This way, a credible sample of events is obtained, and meaningful cross-sectional and temporal comparisons can be conducted.

Having briefly presented the most important shortcomings of newspapers as sources of collective action events, in the following paragraphs I justify the *ad hoc* selection criteria that guided the selection of newspapers.⁵⁶ Furthermore, I discuss the advantages of this particular selection of sources for the minimization of the potential damaging impact of description and selection biases for this case study.

First of all, the efficiency provided by keyword searches, added to the rich and varied scene of local newspapers in the region, allow to select multiple newspapers as sources. This data collection strategy has generally been, until recently, extremely costly and time-consuming, thus traditionally leading researchers to select one or, at most, two newspapers for each of the polities studied (e.g. Kriesi *et al.*, 1995), despite the fact that multisource data collection strategies are generally considered superior to event datasets generated from only one source (Jenkins & Maher 2016; Koopmans & Rucht 2002: 238). Moreover, in spite of the increasing workload of data collection, in this case the multisource approach presents several key advantages for the minimization of selection and description biases. Regarding the former, multiple independent sources will provide coverage for a larger share of events than samples derived from a single source, therefore reducing right away the numerical selectivity of the sample. Moreover, as it will be discussed below, when these multiple sources have contrasting and complementary characteristics the skewness of the sample in favor of certain types of events will also be reduced. Regarding the selective identification of participating collective actors in the events, increasing the number of sources significantly raises the likelihood of obtaining a more complete identification of participants, as many events are reported in several articles and more than one newspaper. This reduces the chances of participating organizations not being mentioned by at least one of the articles covering a given event.

Once it was decided to select multiple news sources, the second important decision was to discard Spanish newspapers with a statewide coverage, such as *El País* or *El Mundo*,⁵⁷ in favor of Basque local newspapers. Based on the analyses of media biases conducted by Barranco and Wisler (1999: 307-8), Fillieule and Jiménez (2003: 265-8),

⁵⁶ As Hutter notes, “the selection of sources depends significantly on the geographical level, time period, political sources and issue area covered by a study” (2014: 349).

⁵⁷ *El País* and *El Mundo* (the latter to a lesser extent) are the typical ‘quality newspapers’ sources used for PEA on Spanish territory.

or Hocke (1999), local news sources filter out a much lower fraction of nearby events. This lower selectivity is particularly advantageous when studying sub-state regions, especially when these are geographically distant from the national capital or the city of edition of state-wide newspapers, as in this case. In comparison with state-wide sources, local newspapers can be expected to report a much higher share of all events actually occurring, often including many of a small size, staged by small and informal groups, and that are focused on low-profile issues. While some events would still be lost, it can be argued that in cases such as this, when several local newspapers are used and these present contrasting editorial lines and territories of preferential coverage (see below), we can interpret the remaining selection bias as “substantive”, in the sense that events captured can be regarded as “all protest events that mattered” (Bearman & Everett 1993: 178). In other words, we can be quite confident that the chances of missing important events are minimal and that those events that failed to be reported by any of the selected local newspapers were practically insignificant in terms of their impact on the public sphere.

Finally, focusing exclusively on the local press, it was still necessary to specify which specific newspapers would be used. As mentioned above, the region examined presents a very rich scene of printed newspapers, with as many as nine dailies with a notable circulation: *Berria*, *El Correo*, *El Diario Vasco*, *Gara*, *Diario de Navarra*, *Deia*, *Noticias de Álava*, *Noticias de Gipuzkoa*, *Diario de Noticias (Navarra)*. The first of these newspapers, *Berria*, publishes exclusively in Euskara and therefore had to be discarded due to the language limitations of this author.⁵⁸ Among the remaining eight newspapers, the last four, which belong to the same media holding group (*Grupo Noticias*), were discarded as well due to their limited availability of past records online, as they lack a proper built-in digital archive within their respective websites and no records prior to 2015 are even retrievable through *Google Advanced Search*. Hence, finally, the following newspapers were selected as sources: *El Correo*, *El Diario Vasco*, *Diario de Navarra*, and *Gara*. Table 4.1 below summarizes their main characteristics.

⁵⁸ The exclusion of the daily *Berria* (which, according to several interviewed informants, is particularly attentive towards social movements grassroots activities, especially feminism) due to linguistic reasons is certainly a minor flaw of this research. Future PEA endeavors with a focus on the Basque Country should ideally count with coders fully proficient in *Euskara*. To see how other difficulties derived from my lack of proficiency in Euskara were handled, please see footnotes 68 and 69.

Table 4.1. Characteristics of the local newspapers selected as sources for PEA

Newspaper	Ideological profile	Territorial focus	Linguistic profile
<i>El Correo</i>	Spanish center-right	Biscay & Araba	Mostly Spanish
<i>El Diario Vasco</i>	Spanish center-right	Gipuzkoa	Mostly Spanish
<i>Gara</i>	Basque nationalist (<i>abertzale</i>) left	All <i>Euskal Herria</i>	Bilingual (Spanish & Euskara)
<i>Diario de Navarra</i>	Foralist center-right	Navarre	Only Spanish

These four local dailies did not only fulfill the minimum requirements that could grant a feasible data collection process (being published predominantly in Spanish and allowing easy access to their past records in digital format over the entire period of time under examination) but also coincide with the top four newspapers in the region in terms of readership, with the three provincial newspapers leading the sales in their respective territories of coverage (de Pablo 2009: 397-8).⁵⁹ Additionally, their combination presents two further advantages. First, their combined territorial reach allows having at least two sources that could, in principle, cover any given event celebrated in any of the four Basque territories under consideration. Secondly, their ideological leanings even each other out, therefore theoretically counteracting each newspapers' potential over- and/or under-representation of certain issues, actors and/or forms of actions. This should result in a more representative sample in comparison with alternative strategies relying just on one source (e.g. Barcena *et al.* 2003) or on multiple but ideologically homogeneous newspapers.

4.2.1.c) Temporal scope and sampling

Given the longitudinal design of this research project, with its central questions inquiring about the evolution of social phenomena over time, it is necessary to devote a few words to explain the choices made regarding the delimitation of the period of analysis. The time span covered goes from January 1st, 2007 up to December 31st, 2017, thus encompassing eleven years. Why start from 2007 and not any other year? The reasons supporting this choice are derived both from the historical development of the conflict as well as from practical constraints. As mentioned above in section 3.2.2, ETA's

⁵⁹ For more recent data on press readership in Euskadi and Navarre see: <http://www.ciessl.com/audienciamedios.htm> (last accessed: 12/09/2020).

bomb attack at Madrid airport on December 30th, 2006, effectively put an end to the then ongoing peace conversations between the insurgent organization and the Spanish government, kick-starting the very last lethal campaign by ETA (2007-2010). Therefore, 2007 is a suitable starting point, while in 2017, six years after ETA's abandonment of violence, peace was largely regarded as consolidated and irreversible. However, one might argue that, considering the relatively low intensity of the 2007-2010 period in terms of direct violence conducted by ETA, with 11 assassinations (see figure 3.4 in the previous chapter), would it not be better to go further back in time and start the period of analysis from an earlier date, covering previous more violent phases of the conflict? Indeed, this would have been the best option. However, practical constraints made this option unfeasible, mainly because of the difficulty of using available sources of data as one moves back in time before 2007. Three of our four sources (*El Correo*, *El Diario Vasco*, and *Gara*) do not provide access to electronic newspaper records published before 2006.⁶⁰ Given the use of keyword queries on the full text of news articles for article retrieval and the complexity involved in the codification of several participants for a single event, the use of printed undigitalized records for previous periods was simply unfeasible from the start.

In spite of some obvious limitations, the decision to start the analysis in 2007 still represents a satisfactory compromise between an ideal design and the practical constraints that every research project faces. The main objective of the research design (comparing pre- and post-settlement periods) is granted with the analysis of the 2007-2017 period, and while the last years of the conflict analyzed are substantially less violent and present much lower levels of support for ETA's armed struggle in comparison with previous decades, this last violent phase still shares important similarities with previous ones. For instance, regarding public perceptions of fear of participating in politics, the failure of the 2005-06 peace process reversed the previous trend towards increasing feelings of freedom, and perceptions of fear sharply rose again to levels slightly below those observed during the early 2000s –the period of 'socialization of the suffering'– as observed in figure 4.1. Moreover, it could be argued that in case that empirical analyses show a significant change in relational patterns before and after ETA's 2011

⁶⁰ In the case of *Diario de Navarra* the newspaper keeps digital archives of records published before spring 2011 available all the way to its foundation in 1903, though only upon paid requests and in PDF format, which made the text management for coding during 2007, 2009 and early 2011 much less efficient in the case of this daily, though still manageable due to the relatively low number of articles found.

announcement despite the low levels of violence during the 2007-10 period, these results would be even more revealing of the critical nature of this historical event.




Figure 4.1. Evolution of the perception of the existence of fear of participation in politics in the BAC (1995-2015)
(Source: Leonisio & López Romo 2017: 150)

Lastly, in order to make the amount of data to be collected more manageable and ensure the feasibility of the project, it was decided to introduce a temporal sample of the newspaper articles examined,⁶¹ looking only at events reported every other year during the period (2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017). By looking at six discrete and alternate year-long temporal windows instead of looking at the entire period, the potential number of articles to be examined was reduced by 45%, while keeping intact the capacity to observe temporal patterns. Moreover, I believe that sampling on years instead of on smaller temporal periods such as months or days of the week (e.g. Kriesi *et al.* 1995: 259-63) is the most sensible option given the purpose of the present PEA (obtaining a credible picture, even if not exhaustive, of collaborations among actors at different points in time) and the importance of commemorative calendars for the organization of some collective action events, especially within the radical Basque nationalism (Casquete 2009, 2013).

4.2.1.d) Identification of relevant articles

In order to collect articles containing information on environmental collective events that occurred in the Basque country during the six years examined, a three-stage process was followed. First, a list of prominent environmental social movement organizations

⁶¹ A particular challenge of PEA is that despite the fact that the coding units are events, newspaper articles represent the sampling units (Hutter 2014: 348).

(ESMOs) active in the Basque Country during the 2007-17 decade was compiled, including both discrete organizations (composed only of individuals) and “umbrella organizations” or platforms (which combine both people and organizations as “units of membership”) (see Lofland 1996: 141). Based on previous literature, internet searches, and informal consultations with eight expert informants,⁶² eleven environmental collective entities active during at least part of the period of analysis and mobilized at the supra-municipal level were identified.⁶³

On a second stage, this preliminary nominalist list of relevant ESMOs was used as a starting point to uncover environmental collective action events, employing the most common version of these eleven core environmental actors’ names as keywords for querying the online repositories of the four local newspapers selected. Table 4.2 provides a list of these core organizations along with the exact combination of words that were used as keywords. These keyword queries returned a large body of newspaper reports (more than 2,800 articles altogether) in which at least one of the eleven core environmental actors was mentioned in any part of the text. The logic behind this actor-centered keyword sampling strategy is that it was considered the most cost-effective way of obtaining a large pool of newspaper articles likely to report a large share of all environmental collective action events that occurred during the period.

⁶² These preliminary face-to-face consultations were conducted with a mix of academics, politicians and activists and took place at the end of 2017. The scope of these meetings was limited to a mapping of the main actors in the environmental collective action field and a discussion of overall impressions about its recent evolution, which was also useful for the generation of some hypotheses. Apart from the eight consultations with informants with substantive expertise on the Basque environmental field, another seven similar interviews were conducted as well for the four fields that at the time were still within the scope of the research project (labour, feminism, social exclusion, and political violence; see section 3.4.1). The full list of expert informants consulted for this preliminary phase can be found in Appendix 4.

⁶³ It should be noted that the umbrella organization *TTIP/CETA Ez* was not a pure environmental actor but a single-issue platform opposing issues related to neoliberal economic globalization, in particular the two proposed comprehensive trade agreements between the European Union and, respectively, the United States and Canada. In fact, *TTIP/CETA Ez* was also mapped by expert informants regarding the field of social exclusion, which shows how the platform was a relevant actor simultaneously in more than one collective action field, which is not surprising if one considers the multi-dimensional implications of the contested trade agreements (e.g. labour conditions, erosion of state sovereignty, food safety, environmental impacts, etc). Given this particular situation, *TTIP/CETA Ez* was also included as a core organization and taken into account for the queries of newspaper articles. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that not all anti-*TTIP/CETA* events in which this umbrella organization participated were included in the dataset, but only those in which environmental demands were explicitly mentioned and played a relevant role. In other words, anti-*TTIP/CETA* events focused purely on the economic or labor impacts of the trade agreements were discarded.

That said, it is fair to acknowledge that this strategy makes it highly unlikely (though not completely impossible)⁶⁴ to identify environmental events promoted by smaller purely local ESMOs and other civic groups that have not been included within the group of eleven core organizations. However, based on some qualitative explorations of the query results obtained following an issue-centered keyword strategy at randomly selected time periods,⁶⁵ most of the relatively small number of missed events were single-organization events generally staged by very small informal groups. Thus, the inclusion of such *single* events –those in which a single collective actor participates solo without collaborating with other organizations (Lee 2011: 304)– would not have altered the resulting networks. Furthermore, most of the rare cases of missed *collaborative* events – those involving two or more civic organizations (*Ibid.*)– were likely participated by civic actors with a passing interest on environmental demands and/or very limited resources, being involved in that one event only in one year. Therefore, the bulk of these peripheral organizations would not have been included as nodes in the networks anyway, since participation in two or more events is a key inclusion criterion for being considered part of the ECAF (see section 4.2.2). Nonetheless, it is true that by potentially missing a few instances of event co-attendance between peripheral ECAF members, this choice of keywords for retrieving articles might have slightly magnified the centralized nature of collaborative networks (see table 4.5). Still, this potential bias in the network structure does not jeopardize the validity of the results of the dyadic analyses conducted in chapters 5 and 6, given that important differences are observed across six temporal networks that were constructed following the same procedure, thus being equally exposed to the same potential biases (see section 4.2.1.b). Additionally, it should be noted that the analytic technique employed (QAP regressions, see section 5.2.1) produces net coefficients that already implicitly control for the structural properties (density, centralization, closure, etc) of the dependent variable network.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ In fact, the list of environmental events identified was not only composed of events in which at least one of the pre-selected organizations took part, but sometimes core-organizations would be mentioned tangentially as part of the background information of the article (e.g. “Greenpeace had already warned about this problem in 2010...”) while the convener was in fact another local organization.

⁶⁵ Using the Spanish translations of search strings such as: (*ecologist* OR environment*) AND (*protest* OR event**).

⁶⁶ In contrast with other stochastic statistical models for entire networks, such as Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGMs), that can also control for such structural features but requires the analyst to explicitly include them in the model.

Table 4.2. List of core organizations and keywords used for querying newspapers' repositories

ORGANIZATION	YEARS ACTIVE ⁶⁷	KEYWORDS
AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana	2001-present	<i>“aht gelditu”</i>
Araba sin Garoña	2002-2017	<i>“araba sin garoña”</i>
Desazkundera	2010-present	<i>desazkundera</i>
Eguzki	1987-present	<i>eguzki ekologista</i>
Ekologistak Martxan	1999-present	<i>“ekologistak martxan”</i>
Foro Contra Garoña / Garoñaren Kontrako Foroa	2014-2017	<i>“foro contra garoña”</i>
Fracking Ez	2012-2016	<i>“fracking ez”</i>
Greenpeace	1997-present	<i>greenpeace</i>
Plataforma por un Nuevo Modelo Energético (Px1NME) – Gure Energía	2014-present	<i>“plataforma por un nuevo modelo energético”</i>
Sustrai Erakuntza Fundazioa	2010-present	<i>“sustrai erakuntza”</i>
Plataforma TTIP/CETA Ez	2014-present	<i>ttip ez</i>

For the third step, I proceeded to screen each search hit, discarding articles that did not contain any information on environmental collective action events –false positives– and downloaded the full text of articles with relevant information in plain text format (.txt), using a browser plugin available for free on Firefox (“Save text to file”; Byrne 2019). A more detailed explanation of the selection criteria employed to decide on dubious cases, based mainly on Sampson and colleagues’ (2005: 682-3) criteria for event inclusion, can be found in Appendix 9.⁶⁸ It suffices to say here that about two thirds of all articles retrieved through keyword queries happened to be false positives in which there

⁶⁷ Starting years for Greenpeace and Px1NME-Gure Energia reflect the year when local Basque groups of these larger organizations were formed. In the case of Greenpeace, even though it has had a formal presence in Spain since 1984 and had sporadically conducted a few actions in Basque territory since the early 1990s (Barcena et al. 2003), it was not until 1997 that the first local nodes of the organization were formed in the Basque Country. In the case of Px1NME, it was constituted at the state level in 2012, but the umbrella group was not constituted at the Basque regional level until early 2014.

⁶⁸ For the screening of the small percentage of query results written in Euskara (which due to the linguistic profile of the selected newspapers and the choice of keywords were just about 10% of all query hits) I made use of automatic text translators and online dictionaries, which were enough at that stage to discern whether or not an article included information on a candidate event. In a second step, dubious cases were revised with the help of several acquaintances who were fully proficient in Euskara.

was no information on environmental collective action events (or at least these events did not fulfill all the inclusion criteria) even if the text of the article contained the search terms queried. In total, 812 relevant articles were identified and prepared for codification. Table 4.3 presents the yearly distribution of query results, that is, total articles reviewed, as well as the total amount of articles containing relevant information about our unit of analysis, from which we can calculate the percentage of false positive hits. The high percentage of false positive hits that needed to be reviewed is certainly one of the drawbacks of keyword-based approaches (Hutter 2014: 352-3), though in this case it was still significantly less time-consuming than the alternative option of manually reviewing the daily printed issues of the four newspapers used as sources.

Table 4.3. Number of articles reviewed and selected for codification by year

	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015	2017	Total
<i>Active ‘core’ organizations</i>	5	5	7	8	11	10	11
<i>Total query hits</i>	594	588	521	398	379	379	2,859
<i>Relevant articles</i>	218	173	99	108	111	103	812
<i>False positives</i>	63%	71%	81%	73%	71%	73%	72%
<i>Identified events</i>	116	80	60	54	58	51	419
<i>Ratio of events per article</i>	0.53	0.46	0.61	0.50	0.52	0.50	0.52

4.2.1.e) Event identification and coding procedures

After filtering out false positive search hits, the downloaded articles were subsequently analyzed using the *Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA)* (Leifeld, 2017b), an open-source program that combines qualitative content analysis with network export facilities. In total, 419 environmental collective action events were identified for the six years examined. For each event, a unique ID label was assigned, manually coding some basic information (13 different variables reflecting six broad types of information: date, location, issue, size, type of activity, and target), as well as the names of every participating organization mentioned by the newspapers.⁶⁹ Table 4.4 below summarizes

⁶⁹ 9% of all events (38 out of 419) were exclusively reported through news reports written in Euskara. In order to confirm the correctness of the results derived from my rather precarious coding of automatically translated news reports written in Euskara, these 45 “source articles” were reviewed by Arkaitz Letamendia, a native speaker researcher at the University of the Basque Country with extensive

the distribution of selected events' traits for each year. A full description of the codebook employed is provided in Appendix 10, while the digital file containing the entire dataset can be provided upon request.

Table 4.4. Summary of events' characteristics

	2007		2009		2011		2013		2015		2017	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Event type												
Civic	22	(19)	17	(21)	20	(33)	15	(28)	26	(45)	22	(43)
Hybrid	34	(29)	18	(23)	7	(12)	10	(19)	9	(16)	8	(16)
Protest	60	(52)	45	(56)	33	(55)	29	(54)	23	(40)	21	(41)
Main issue												
High Speed Train	67	(58)	39	(49)	21	(35)	8	(15)	8	(14)	7	(14)
Climate change and renewable energy	12	(10)	5	(6)	3	(5)	5	(9)	11	(19)	5	(10)
Garoña nuclear plant	3	(3)	5	(6)	8	(13)	4	(7)	5	(9)	8	(16)
Incineration and waste management	7	(6)	4	(5)	9	(15)	8	(15)	6	(10)	4	(8)
Fracking	-	-	-	-	1	(2)	14	(26)	8	(14)	-	-
Natural protection	10	(9)	8	(10)	5	(8)	10	(19)	3	(5)	10	(20)
Other issues	17	(15)	19	(24)	14	(23)	5	(9)	17	(29)	17	(33)
Location*												
Bilbao	16	(14)	12	(15)	9	(15)	7	(13)	12	(21)	13	(25)
San Sebastián	13	(11)	19	(25)	11	(18)	11	(20)	15	(29)	8	(16)
Vitoria-Gasteiz	17	(15)	8	(10)	5	(8)	13	(24)	7	(12)	7	(14)
Pamplona	4	(3)	4	(5)	14	(23)	7	(13)	13	(22)	13	(25)
Outside capitals	76	(66)	45	(56)	27	(45)	25	(46)	20	(34)	14	(27)
No. participant orgs												
1 (single events)	69	(59)	38	(48)	27	(45)	22	(41)	17	(29)	17	(33)
2 < x < 10	38	(33)	38	(48)	27	(45)	30	(56)	33	(57)	25	(49)
10 or more	9	(8)	4	(5)	6	(10)	2	(4)	8	(14)	9	(18)
Average	2.69		3.09		3.2		2.83		4.97		4.9	
Covered by...**												
<i>El Correo</i>	48	(41)	30	(38)	13	(22)	16	(30)	7	(12)	14	(27)
<i>El Diario Vasco</i>	45	(39)	44	(55)	17	(28)	21	(39)	20	(35)	13	(25)
<i>Gara</i>	54	(47)	27	(34)	26	(43)	23	(43)	33	(57)	29	(57)
<i>Diario de Navarra</i>	3	(3)	6	(8)	13	(22)	5	(9)	14	(24)	9	(18)
TOTAL	116	(100)	80	(100)	60	(100)	54	(100)	58	(100)	51	(100)

*Cumulative percentage exceeds 100 due to the existence of multi-location events.

**Cumulative percentage exceeds 100 due to the fact that a single event could be covered by multiple newspapers.

experience in PEA. His coding results coincided with mine for all variables related with events' attributes, finding only two minor errors in the coding of participating organizations that I had initially omitted and were consequently corrected. This extraordinarily high rate of agreement increases the confidence in the coding of the other 47 articles that contained at least some paragraphs in Euskara.

The recent availability of the DNA software proved to be crucial, as its use enormously increases the efficiency and transparency of data collection and management in cases when network generation builds upon the manual content analysis of textual data. Despite being initially designed for other purposes –networks of public policy debates (Leifeld 2017a)– its flexibility and the possibility to customize the coding scheme according to the researchers’ needs make of it a useful tool for the construction of events databases that code all events’ participants. In fact, until now, the coding of participant organizations was severely constrained by the traditional rectangular structure through which most PEA projects stored their data, which imposed the need to create as many variables –and therefore columns– as number of participants, which for practical purposes had led many researchers to just code 3-5 participant organizations (e.g. Rootes 2003; Jiménez 2005; Portos 2019; Wang, Rao & Soule 2019). Its design also allows for a quick retrieval of the original text excerpts from which information was coded, thus enormously improving the reliability and transparency of the content analysis.

4.2.2. Who is part of the environmental collective action field?

Having this event database, the first major challenge was related to the boundary specification (that is, deciding who is a member of it and who is not) of the environmental civic network through which field relationships are operationalized. But before presenting the inclusion criteria used for the operationalization and bounding of the field, it is necessary to go back to the theoretical concept of environmental collective action field (ECAAF) already presented in the second chapter (see section 2.3.1). As explained above, our object of study, the Basque ECAAF, can be conceptualized as a ‘social movement exchange field’ (Zietsma *et al.* 2017) formed by all organizations, of any type, that show a common substantive interest in environmental issues and engage themselves in a minimum degree of collective action directed towards the advancement of demands that promote, broadly speaking, nature protection. Thus, the analytical concept of ECAAF should be differentiated from related concepts such as the ‘environmental social movement industry’ (SMI) (Rucht 1989) or the ‘environmental movement’ (Rootes 1999). In particular, two main aspects distinguish the concept of environmental collective action fields. First, in terms of extension, while both environmental SMIs or movements normally consist only of ESMOs, environmental fields, are constituted by any actor consistently engaged in collective action oriented towards environmental issues, even if

not exclusively nor primarily. Therefore, this research presents a more comprehensive and realistic object of study in comparison with previous studies of the ‘Basque environmental movement’ (BEM), which focused almost exclusively on the focal population of ESMOs (e.g. Barcena & Ibarra 2001; Barcena, Ibarra, Guarrotxena & Torre 2003; Barcena, Ibarra & Zubiaga 1995, 1998), despite acknowledging the increasingly blurred boundaries of the BEM (Barcena *et al.*, 1995: 53-4). Secondly, it should be emphasized once again that the concept of fields is inherently relational, in contrast with the aggregative and census-like operationalization of many SMIs studies (e.g. Andrews & B. Edwards 2005; B. Edwards & Foley 2003; Brulle *et al.* 2007). That is, rather than conducting a population count of ESMOs and analyzing their traits, the concept of fields directs our attention to the complex set of relations that exists among these and other civic organizations oriented towards environmental protection, being closer to the classic notion of ‘multi-organizational fields’ (Curtis & Zurcher 1973).

Given the theoretical traits that define our environmental field, it follows that membership cannot be deductively attributed by the researcher according to some organizational traits (self-stated mission, discourses, organizational models, etc) but needs to be empirically observed in an inductive fashion through the actual behavior of actors. In our case we focused on a specific and easily observable behavior of organizations: engaging in public collective action in defense of the environment. This is precisely where our dataset of environmental collective action events comes to play a crucial role. While hundreds of collective actors participated in at least one event addressing environmental issues each year, it was decided to restrict the number of organizations using a combination of a main *realist* and a secondary *nominalist* criterion of inclusion or ‘definitional foci’ (Laumann, Marsden & Prensky 1983). Nominalist approaches to boundary specification impose a network boundary based on those actors’ characteristics of interest to the researcher’s analytic framework (‘*etic*’ criteria), while in realist strategies network membership is the result of actors’ perceptions and/or actual behavior (‘*emic*’ criteria).⁷⁰

First and foremost, only those organizations that repeatedly engaged in environmental collective action, being mentioned in at least two events during a given year, were considered. Additionally, apart from civic organizations –either ESMOs or

⁷⁰ For a more recent succinct discussion of these two logics of delimiting the set of actors to be included in networks, please see Borgatti *et al.* (2013: 32-5).

from other SMI populations— two other types of political actors were included as nodes in environmental civic networks: political parties and trade unions. In consonance with similar protest data from other European contexts (Kousis 1999; Rootes 2003), political parties and trade unions were found to participate in a non-negligible proportion of events. This is coherent with previous empirical observations which pointed out that multi-issue groups, particularly trade unions, tend to engage themselves more often in cross-movement coalitions and campaigns (Obach 2004; Rose 2000; Van Dyke 2003). This fact, together with their political and social relevance outside of environmentalism, and their display of strongly politicized organizational identities were strong reasons for their inclusion. In contrast, the few cases where public institutions were mentioned in two or more events were dropped, given that the focus of this research is concentrated on civil society actors. Additionally, their participation was mostly anecdotal in most cases (in many cases limited to the sponsorship of civic or hybrid events) and, more importantly, they lack clear ideological organizational identities that are the focus of this research.

After applying these two criteria, a total of 70 organizations were identified as part of the civic networks in at least one time point, with each yearly civic network being composed of a range of 21 to 32 nodes. Figure 4.2 provides an overview of the types of organizations and their territorial scope of action.




Figure 4.2. Distribution of organizations by type and geographic scope of action
(Source: own elaboration)

While it is not possible to provide here a detailed description of each of the 70 organizations that are included in the study, the remainder of this section will provide a short overview of the different organizations that were included in the analysis as

members of the environmental collective action field, with a focus on the most prominent actors. This overview will be particularly useful for a better contextualization of the subsequent empirical chapters that form the core of this dissertation, particularly for those readers who are less familiar with Basque politics in general and Basque environmentalism in particular. Considering the number of years in which organizations are identified as active network members by being mentioned at least two environmental events in a given year, we can distinguish among three groups of constituents: established members of the field (five or six years), regular participants (three or four years), and occasional participants (one or two years). Figure 4.3 below shows the distribution of organizations according to their temporal presence in the networks, showing that the majority of the 70 organizations identified are occasional participants, that is actors with only a passing interest in environmental issues, with limited mobilization resources, an/or with a short organizational lifetime. The next few paragraphs will quickly present some of the most important constituents, giving more attention to established and regular members of the field.




Figure 4.3. Distribution of organizations according to the number of years they are identified as members of the environmental field (participating in 2 or more events in the same year)
(Source: own elaboration)

Among the most established constituents showing a constant involvement with environmental concerns, we can make a first distinction between the members of the focal population of the field, that is environmental groups on one side and other prominent non-environmental political actors on the other side. Among the first group of ‘usual suspects’, we find three prominent multi-issue ESMOs in the region (*Ekologistak Martxan, Eguzki*

and *Greenpeace*) as well as three single-issue umbrella organizations (*AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana*, *Coordinadora de Plataformas Anti-incineración de Gipuzkoa*, and *Araba sin Garoña*). The other four actors with a constant presence in the field are trade unions, three of them of multi-sectoral nature (CC.OO., ELA, and LAB), plus the most relevant Basque agricultural trade union (EHNE).

Besides these 10 groups that showed both a very active engagement with environmental issues and organizational continuity during the period, it is important to note the presence throughout all six years examined of at least one political party representing each of the two main leftist families that exist in the intricate and unstable Basque political party system: the Basque nationalist or *abertzale* (patriotic) left and the non-nationalist or state-wide left.

The former family is currently represented by the electoral coalition *EH Bildu*, active since 2012 and constituted by four parties (*Alternatiba*, *Aralar*, *Eusko Alkartasuna*, and *Sortu*). The latter party and most important member of the coalition (Fernández Ortíz de Zárate 2015: 6), *Sortu*, is widely regarded as the successor *Batasuna*, which was the referent of this political family in the first two years under examination. In fact, by that time *Batasuna* had already been judicially proscribed due to its alleged links with ETA in 2003 after the enactment of a new law regulating political parties in 2002 that permitted the courts to dissolve parties that ‘violated democratic principles in a repeated and grave form, or aimed to undermine or destroy the regime of liberties, or injure or eliminate the democratic system’ (Organic Law 6/2002, article 9.2) (see Bourne 2015). Nonetheless, despite being barred from participating in elections, the party was still active in the Basque public sphere during the years 2007 and 2009, promoting events and demonstrations and circulating public statements covered by the press. Party representatives were often identified as ‘members of former *Batasuna*’, the ‘*abertzale* left’ or under the acronyms of two political organizations through which the radical Basque nationalism attempted to compete in electoral processes, *Basque Nationalist Action (ANV)* and *Communist Party of the Basque Homelands (EHAK)*, which were banned in 2008 for being considered successors of the illegal *Batasuna*.

On the other hand, the non-nationalist leftist family was in turn represented by *Ezker Batua (EB)*, ‘United Left’, the Basque section of the state-wide post-communist party *Izquierda Unida (IU)*, which was active until 2014. After the dissolution of EB, the leading position in that political space was taken by *Ezker Anitza* (‘Plural Left’), an organization that resulted from an internal split within EB-B in 2012, becoming from its

foundation the official Basque section of IU. After the emergence of a new breed of parties in the Spanish post-crisis political landscape (with Podemos as its most important exponent), Ezker Anitza shares with *Podemos-Ahal Dugu* and the ecologist *Equo* a permanent electoral coalition circumscribed to the Basque Country called *Elkarrekin Podemos*.

Among the regular participants, we can similarly observe a mix of environmental groups, trade unions and political parties. With regard to environmental groups, there are five younger organizations (*Desazkundera*, *Goiener Elkarte*, *Sustrai Erakuntza*, *PxINME-Gure Energia* and *Zero Zabor*; all founded between 2009 and 2012) which present a more restricted agenda and/or geographical scope in comparison with the aforementioned ‘big three’ conformed by *Ekologistak Martxan*, *Eguzki* and *Greenpeace*. Apart from those five ESMOs, we can also observe, on the one hand, some smaller representatives of the labor sector, such as the unions *ESK* and *CGT*, or the occasional *ad-hoc* coalition self-named as ‘Basque Trade Union Majority’ (*Mayoría Sindical Vasca*, hereafter *MSV*) (see section 5.2.2.e), and, on the other, two traditional political parties such as the Basque Nationalist Party (*Partido Nacionalista Vasco*, *PNV-EAJ*) and the Basque branch of the Spanish socialist party (*Partido Socialista de Euskadi*, *PSE*).

Last, among the 47 occasional participants, several subsets of organizations should be mentioned. First, we find three very prominent single-issue environmentalist organizations that nonetheless remained active for a short period of time, either due to organizational decline (*Asamblea contra el TAV*) or to the success of their campaigns (*Foro contra Garoña* and *Fracking Ez!*). Second, we observe another large group of environmentalist organizations –mostly conservationists– with either a very local scope of action (e.g. *CADE*, *Dale Vuelta-Bira Beste Aldera*, *Gurelur*, *Haritzalde*, *Izate*, *Jaizkibel Bizirik*, *Landare*, *Lurra*, *Txingudi Bizirik*) or weak organizational structures in Basque territories (e.g. *SEO-Birdlife*, *WWF-Adena*). Finally, apart from the presence of most of the remaining political parties and trade unions active in the period, the presence of some civic organizations belonging to other social sectors or SMIs is also notable. Examples of these non-environmental civic organizations engaged in the ECAF can be found among sectors as diverse as the fight against social exclusion (*Carta de Derechos Sociales de EH*, *Elkartzen*, *PAH – Stop Desahucios*), international solidarity (*Askapena*, *Mugarik Gabe*), or anti-militarism (*Kakitzat*).

4.2.3. Building networks of past collaboration from event data

Once the event database was built it was possible to merge the two types of content coded (events’ characteristics and events’ participants) and obtain nodelists of events and their respective participants. From these nodelists it was possible to generate two-mode event-by-organization matrices. These two-mode matrices were multiplied by their transposed versions, in order to obtain square co-occurrence matrices of the sampled organizations connected to each other by the number of events co-attended. Figure 4.4 below shows a schematic illustration of this conversion process.




Figure 4.4. Example of conversion of a two-mode event-by-organization matrix into a one-mode co-occurrence matrix of organizations tied by events co-attended
(Source: own elaboration)

In a second step, the tie values of these raw event co-participation matrices were normalized. As one of the main aims of the analysis is to uncover homophilic patterns, it is advisable not to use the raw co-participation matrices in these cases, but to use normalized projections that control for the fact that some organizations participate in many more events than others (Borgatti & Halgin 2011). Among the different metrics available, Jaccard coefficients were used. This normalization procedure gives the number of events attended in common by a given pair of organizations as a proportion of all potential occasions in which they could have collaborated, that is, all *collaborative* events (see section 4.2.1.d) in which at least one of the two organizations participated (Borgatti & Halgin 2011: 421).

Table 4.5 presents some basic descriptive statistics of both the raw co-participation networks and their normalized versions. The latter will be used as dependent variables for the analyses conducted in the next two chapters. Networks graphs are available in Appendix 1.

Table 4.5. Descriptive statistics of the collaborative networks

	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015	2017
Overall PEA charact						
Total events	116	80	60	54	58	51
Collaborative events	47	42	33	32	41	34
No. nodes	28	23	21	23	32	30
Density measures						
Average degree	11.214	13.391	10.286	8.261	15.313	17.333
Average distance	1.598	1.395	1.51	1.684	1.542	1.43
Diameter	3	3	3	3	3	3
Isolated nodes	0	0	0	1	0	0
Density	0.415	0.609	0.514	0.375	0.494	0.598
Centralization	0.55	0.379	0.426	0.385	0.402	0.357
Closure	0.661	0.819	0.781	0.681	0.707	0.803
Raw projection						
<i>(tie values = shared events)</i>						
Tie value range	0 to 7	0 to 6	0 to 5	0 to 5	0 to 6	0 to 7
Avg tie strength	0.825	1.115	1.048	0.565	0.79	1.087
S.D.	1.289	1.179	1.275	0.966	1.03	1.238
Normalized projection						
<i>(tie values = Jaccard coefficient)</i>						
Tie value range	0 to 1	0 to 1	0 to 0.75	0 to 1	0 to 1	0 to 1
Avg tie strength	0.096	0.162	0.127	0.102	0.111	0.162
S.D.	0.171	0.205	0.167	0.178	0.156	0.182

Before closing this section, it is necessary to provide more details about why it was important in this case not to treat *collaborative* events (those involving two or more civic organizations) and *single* events (those in which a single collective actor participates solo) in the same way for building the collaborative networks. While whether or not single events are included is completely inconsequential for the obtention of raw co-participation matrices, this decision does influence the tie strength values of the normalized matrices, whose values are expressed in Jaccard coefficients. For the obtention of the normalized matrices, it was important to exclude single events, using only collaborative events in the denominator for the calculation of Jaccard coefficients. Two key arguments support this decision. First, from a theoretical standpoint, it is reasonable to assume that in vast majority of single events the convener organizes the event on its own from the beginning, without even inviting other collective actors to join. Therefore, most single events do not even represent potential occasions for interorganizational collaboration at all. Second, from a pragmatic point of view, even if the previous premise is not upheld all single events were regarded as failed instances of collaboration (which is not very realistic though), the actor-centered keyword strategy employed for searching events (explained above in section 4.2.1.d) made it very unlikely

to uncover single events organized by field members who were not part of the ‘core’ group of 11 organizations used for querying news articles. Because these core ESMOs had a much higher chance than other nodes of being identified in single events, normalized Jaccard matrices needed to be generated from affiliation matrices that only included collaborative events⁷¹ in order not to systematically and artificially underestimate the intensity of the 11 ‘core’ organizations’ collaborative ties.

4.3. CHARACTERIZING THE MEMBERS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL COLLECTIVE ACTION FIELD

While the preceding section has presented in detail how the data on interorganizational collaboration has been obtained, this concluding epigraph is concerned with another type of data necessary for the intended analyses: organizational characteristics. As it will be shown in the following chapters, attribute data is fundamental for the operationalization of most of our independent variables, as many –though not all– latent relations that have been identified as potential predictors of collaborative behavior are the result of similarities or differences with respect to specific organizational characteristics (e.g. ideological orientation, internal organization, preferred tactics, etc.). Once information on theoretically relevant organizational attributes has been gathered, the creation of matrices of latent ties consisting on sharing (or not) certain traits is relatively straightforward (Borgatti et al. 2013: 86-7; Hanneman & Riddle 2005: 83-6). Furthermore, besides these more standard attribute data, I also collected information on social ties between organizations (see section 6.1.2), as well as on a more stable and less visible form of collaboration: common participation in umbrella organizations (sections 6.1.1.f) and 7.3.1).

Basically, once that the 70 field members had been identified, each of them was characterized with respect to a number of aspects of theoretical interest linked with the three groups of latent factors of coalition formation that were distinguished in our analytical framework: factors associated with identity-based solidarities, variables associated with pragmatic-instrumental logics, and interpersonal relations (see section

⁷¹ It should nonetheless be noted that not every single collaborative event necessarily generated a tie between nodes. For instance, an event co-attended by an active field member and one or more organizations not included as part of the network (that event being their only public participation in environmental collective action that year) would count as a collaborative event, though it would not generate any tie between any pair of nodes. In other words, it represented an instance of interorganizational collaboration which other network members could have joined, even if they did not.

2.3.4). Due the large number and heterogeneous nature of the variables employed, these are not presented here yet but will be appropriately introduced throughout the following chapters (see in particular sections 5.2.2, 6.1, and 7.3) when presenting the specific hypotheses that guide the analysis. Instead, the remainder of this section will focus on providing a comprehensive view of the different types of information that were gathered to characterize the members of the Basque ECAF. This characterization was possible thanks to the collection of different types of information obtained from three main types of sources: (i) organizations' activists themselves, (ii) primary documentary evidence produced by the organizations as part of their activities, and (iii) the external assessments of knowledgeable observers, conveyed either through interviews or extant secondary sources. This broad typology of sources will serve to organize the rest of the section.

But before going into more details about the sources of organizations' attribute data it is important to make an important qualification. In contrast to most previous investigations of civic networks elsewhere, organizations' attributes were not exclusively built upon information obtained through an organizational survey (discussed in the next section). While this source of information was very relevant, the fact that responses to the questionnaire were only available for 28 out of the 70 organizations, added to problem that responses to necessarily narrow survey questions cannot serve as sole evidence for the appraisal of important variables of interest such as 'ideological organizational identities' (see section 5.2.2),⁷² made it compulsory to draw heavily on documentary research and the assessments of expert observers. Since self-declared information is often missing, the specific values of organizational attributes were ultimately assigned based on my best-informed judgement. Even though these classification decisions draw comprehensively upon a wide range of primary documentary evidence, secondary sources, and the assessments of knowledgeable informants, these judgments are, of course, not free of a certain subjective component and, might consequently be called into question. Rather than neglecting the disputable nature of some attribute values, I have

⁷² The inappropriateness of survey instruments to adequately explore some ideological factors is most clearly illustrated when dealing with the variable "position towards ETA's violence" (see section 5.2.2.b). In contrast to the other three ideological dimensions considered (Basque nationalism, left-right orientation, and environmental-specific orientation), I did not even dare to include the extremely sensitive issue of ETA's violence in the questionnaire. I believe its inclusion would have unlikely provided any meaningful and genuine responses (after all, expressing support for terrorist acts is a criminal offense in Spain) and, most importantly, would have alienated organizations regardless of their actual position, as they would have probably judged such questions as intrusive and insensitive.

attempted to provide as much transparency as possible. For instance, in Appendix 3, I provide the exact classification of every single actor for the six attribute variables that are probably the most debatable. Moreover, because not all organizational data could be as easily summarized as this, it goes without saying that any other raw data files can also be provided upon request. While the evidence supporting the decisions taken for every single organization and variable could not be systematically coded, the accessibility to every assigned value at least allow other analysts to potentially inspect and replicate the analyses modifying those values they believe to be erroneous.

4.3.1. Insider information directly provided by activists

The main tool for obtaining information directly from activists of the included organizations was the circulation of an organizational survey. Drawing upon previous examples of network research that conducted surveys of civic organizations,⁷³ I devised a questionnaire written in Castilian (Spanish) consisting of 30 questions, divided in four thematic blocks: (a) organizational characteristics and internal functioning, (b) issues of concern and organizational identities, (c) forms of action and contacts with institutions, and (d) relations with other organizations and political actors. The full questionnaire can be consulted in Appendix 7, along with the consent form that was attached to it.

This questionnaire was sent to 51 of the 70 members of the environmental field during the first months of 2019. Among the 19 groups that were not even contacted, 16 of them were political parties. I decided not ask political parties to complete the questionnaire due to the fact that, in their case, most of the information targeted by the

⁷³ The design and wording of the questionnaire was based on three previous organizational surveys that also targeted, either exclusively or partially, civic organizations involved in environmental collective action. These three questionnaires were generated in the following contexts:

- Clare Saunders' doctoral research on the networks of the environmental movement in the London area. Data from this research formed the backbone of a more recent book in which the author included the original questionnaire as an appendix (Saunders 2013: 209-17).
- The research project 'Networks of Citizens' Organizations in Britain', conducted between 2000-03 and led by Mario Diani. See Diani (2015) for a comprehensive overview of data originated in that project.
- The research project 'CT-CIVNET: Cape Town Civic Network Study', conducted between 2012-17 and led by Henrik Ernstson. For an examination of the survey data see: Diani, Ernstson & Jasny (2018).

These questionnaires functioned as a very useful pool of potential questions and a source of inspiration. As the interested reader might observe, many questions are quite similar to the model questionnaires, though adapted to the Basque context and translated into Spanish. I am grateful to Prof. Mario Diani for calling my attention to the utility of the second and third questionnaires as potential models for my survey and for making them available to me.

survey was already available and easily accessible. On the one hand, political parties produce and publicly distribute a breadth of texts and documentation in which they explicitly express their stances on a wide variety of issues. On the other hand, parties are also subject to high levels of scrutiny from the media and social researchers, generating many secondary documents in which various organizational traits are examined. Therefore, the effort of personally reaching out to the parties that still existed at the time of data collection (several of those active in the first years of the period of analysis had either disappeared, merged with other parties, or been ‘refounded’) was not considered worth the hassle, especially taking into account the low chances of obtaining a response by such large and professionalized organizations. The other three organizations that were not contacted are two small organizations that were just identified as network members in 2007 and had long disappeared,⁷⁴ and the *sui generis* Basque Trade Union Majority.⁷⁵

Going back to the 51 organizations that were contacted 28 replied to the questionnaire, a 55% response rate (for the full list of respondents, see Appendix 6). This response rate is quite satisfactory in comparison with most other studies in which written questionnaires are circulated among civic organizations. For instance, Klandermans and Smith (2002: 17) stated long ago that “mailed questionnaires seldom generate response rates higher than (...) 50 percent for organizational ones [surveys].”⁷⁶ Three of every four completed questionnaires were autonomously self-administered by respondents and returned by email once filled, with responses often being followed up by emails and phone calls in order to expand and enrich some of their responses. In contrast, on seven occasions surveys were personally conducted face-to-face or over the phone by myself, taking this opportunity to also arrange in-depth semi-structured interviews with organizational representatives (see Appendix 5). These typically lasted between 60 and 90 and, besides expanding on some of their responses to the questionnaires, were also directed at discussing other issues that were not only related with their own organization but also with other actors, significant past episodes of environmental activism, and

⁷⁴ These were the *Plataforma contra la Central Termica de Pasaia* and *Txingudi Bizirik* (row numbers 56 and 67, respectively, in Appendix 3).

⁷⁵ See section 5.2.2.e for an extended description and discussion on the origins of this informal umbrella platform of Basque nationalist unions and its peculiarities as a second-order node in the network.

⁷⁶ Indeed, when this information is explicitly reported, studies known to me present response rates that range from 30 to 50% (see Ansell 2003: 128; Eggert & Pilati 2014: 863; Saunders 2013: 19), with the exception of Pilati’s (2016) examination of migrant organizations in Milan, which reached 70%.

broader dynamics within the environmental field. In addition to information provided in the questionnaire or during in-depth interviews, some informal channels of communication were established with a number of activists. Insights and details provided through personal communications were also a tremendously useful complement to information obtained through surveys, interviews, and documentary analysis.

4.3.2. Primary documentary evidence produced by organizations

As mentioned above, documentary research was crucial in this research. The most obvious way to obtain missing information about the 42 organizations that were not reached through the questionnaire and to complement and expand information about the 28 respondents was the examination of documents produced by organizations themselves as part of their activities. Because of the high heterogeneity of organizational sizes, resources, and levels of internal structuration within the field, practices of public communication and archival of produced materials varied greatly. As a result, the set of primary documentary evidence reviewed in search of both factual information and actors' positionings was extremely heterogeneous as well.

The vast majority of actors counted with their own well-structured websites and/or profiles in social media platforms such as Facebook or Twitter, and in lesser known open platforms of electronic publishing such as Issuu. Thus, it was possible to have ready online access to a large pool of public self-descriptions, press releases, reports, internal publications, commentary on current affairs, calls for action, and other announcements. These documents appeared mostly in text format, but relevant images and videos were also reviewed.⁷⁷ Additionally, when publicly available materials were scarce, I was sometimes able to gain access to relevant unpublished electronic or printed documents by either asking organizations directly or, more rarely, by checking a couple of local archives

⁷⁷ None of the 70 organizations conducted its public communication exclusively in *Euskara*. On the contrary, most tended to make all their communications bilingually, or even predominantly in Castilian. Similarly to what has already been commented when discussing the data collection scheme applied for the collection of collective action events (see footnotes 58, 68, and 69), my lack of proficiency in *Euskara* imposed some limitations on the documentary research conducted. However, my final assessments on organizational traits are unlikely to have been severely biased by the Castilian-only nature of my documentary research, given the overall predominance of Castilian or bilingual practices of communication in this collective action field and the availability of other sources of information. Indeed, the few organizations that give *Euskara* a prevailing status in their public communication are either very salient political actors on which a breadth of secondary sources exists or happen to be among the 28 survey respondents.

that keep multiple primary materials and documentation related with Basque contemporary history.⁷⁸

4.3.3. External assessments: secondary sources and interviews

Apart from information originating from field members themselves, I also took into consideration descriptive assessments about any of the selected organizations made by knowledgeable external observers. This encompasses profiles published in mass media, extant analyses within the specialized academic literature, and assessments made by a group of interviewed expert informants (see Appendix 5).

This latter type of information was obtained through in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted between June 2018 and August 2019 with a wide range of privileged observers and experts in the Basque political life and civil society. These were mostly academics with relevant research experience, though there were also experienced activists, politicians and journalists among the interviewees. In these interviews, after discussing some general characteristics of the environmental collective action field, a large portion of the time was focused on the qualitative characterization of external organizational identities (see section 5.2.2) with respect to three potential ideological cleavages (the left-right continuum, the national question, and the violent conflict). Since a large share of in-depth interviews conducted took place before definitely narrowing down the scope of the research to the environmental field as a single case study (see section 3.4.1), it was also possible to obtain detailed external assessments of trade unions and some non-environmental civic organizations. Although much information from those interviews could not be used for this dissertation, these ideological profiles turned out to be crucial for several non-environmental organizations that were nonetheless identified as field members.

⁷⁸ These two archives were the *Lazkaoko Beneditarren Fundazioa* [“The Benedictine Foundation of Lazkao”], in Gipuzkoa’s Goierri region, and the *Fundación Sancho el Sabio* [“King Sancho The Wise Foundation”], in Vitoria-Gasteiz. Although the vast majority of their materials precede by many years the period of analysis of this research, a handful of their archived posters and leaflets provided valuable information about some long-lived members of the field. I would like to thank the staff members of these two centers for their help with my various requests.

5. FROM CONCENTRIC TO INTERSECTING CIRCLES? IDEOLOGICAL CLEAVAGES OVER TIME

As already explained when presenting the analytical framework, one of the main logics guiding coalitional decisions of organizations are identity-based solidarities, which give prevalence to linkages that reflect similarities with respect to organizations' socio-political identities. Ideological affinities between organizations are evaluated here at the level of organizational identities, which can be understood as "broader representations of actors' position in relation to other actors and to broader representations of social life than those associated with issue agendas" (Diani and Pilati 2011: 266). When organizations present similar identities, collaboration is often facilitated, and coalitions are more likely, due to the generation of identity-based solidarities. On the contrary, dissimilarity between identities can sometimes act as an obstacle for coordinated collective action, generating antagonism instead of solidarity, even when actors have compatible short-term objectives. Even though a wide range of organizational identities can generate the sort of solidarity bonds that influence coalition formation, most organizational identities "relate more or less explicitly to broader societal cleavages and systems of meaning" (Diani 1995: 9).

Focusing on our case study, according to previous literature and activists' narratives, Basque environmentalism has been traditionally fragmented by the main ideological cleavages of Basque society, with disagreements over extra-environmental issues such as the national status of Euskal Herria or the legitimacy of ETA's armed struggle often representing a burden for interorganizational collaboration. In this chapter, we aim to test whether this picture still holds true after ETA's announcement of its unilateral abandonment of violence on October 20th, 2011. Has this historical event really changed anything? Was Basque civil society so strongly divided by conflict-related cleavages before 2011 in the first place? Have these divisions between civic organizations disappeared or at least waned during the first post-conflict years? Ultimately, is the Basque environmental collective action field more integrated now?

Thus, framing the previous questions in broader theoretical terms, the analytical scope of this chapter is directed to test how ideology-based affinities (and discrepancies) shape collaborative ties, and whether this impact varied over time influenced by the changing external political context. This chapter will compare the strength of ideological

homophily for the configuration of the network structure of interorganizational collaboration at different points in time between the years 2007 and 2017. In particular, the analysis will focus on the overlap between our retrospective indicator of public collaboration (joint involvement in environmental collective action events) and ideology-based similarities and differences. By looking at how this overlap evolved throughout time we can obtain a good relational picture of the evolution of ideological boundaries and their salience within the Basque ECAF, which might be indicative of broader trends in Basque organized civil society.

In our case, we focus on the structuring power of two organizational identities that, according to previous literature, have been historically relevant in the Basque context: national identity and public position towards ETA's violence. Additionally, we also include in the analysis two other potential sources of identity-based solidarity that are not specific to the Basque Country but could in principle be influential in environmental collective action fields elsewhere: ideological positions with respect to the general left-right continuum, and environmental-specific divides given by actors' leanings towards political ecologist or conservationist orientations (Dalton 1994: 45-50; Diani 1995: 22-6; Saunders 2013: 31-5).

Basically, we expect collaborative ties before 2011 to be strongly influenced by affinities and dissimilarities in terms of nationalist identities and perceived position towards ETA's armed struggle. Secondly, if the aforementioned premise suggested by previous literature is true, the influence of these two ideological factors on collaborative behavior is expected to decrease over time, with cross-cutting collaborative ties becoming more common in the more peaceful and less polarized post-ETA context, which would indicate a lower saliency of traditional cleavages.

Before engaging with the specificities of our empirical analysis, the next section examines which concrete aspects of the Basque political context have significantly changed during the relatively short time period considered, discussing how contextual transformations are expected to lead to lower levels of ideological segmentation in the environmental field.

5.1. THE POST-CONFLICT BASQUE CONTEXT AND ITS EXPECTED IMPACT ON COLLABORATIVE NETWORKS

Drawing upon the theorization of Dieter Rucht (1996), in section 2.3.5.a we distinguished between three broad sets of contextual factors: social, political-institutional,

and cultural. Despite of the short time period analyzed, some important differences can be noted between the late 2000s scenario and the post-2011 one.

Regarding the social context, the long Great Recession that ensued after the 2008 financial crash and the austerity policies adopted in its wake –which have been particularly strong in Southern Europe, especially from 2010 onwards– have not spared the Basque Country either. Although to a lesser degree than in the rest of Spain, unemployment has risen, working conditions have worsened and several pre-existing social problems –such as housing and poverty– have been exacerbated, widening overall levels of socio-economic inequality. Worldwide, the increasing precariousness affecting wide segments of society has brought the ‘old’ class cleavage and economic grievances back to a central position in protest politics (della Porta 2015). In the Basque context this has produced new waves of mobilizations explicitly related with the fight against poverty and social exclusion (A. Letamendia 2019). Within this group, special mention should be made to mobilizations against evictions –also prominent in the rest of Spain (e.g. Flesher Fominaya 2015; Romanos 2014; Santos 2019)– and the sustained large protests demanding higher retirement pensions –which have been particularly prominent in the Basque Country (e.g. Alejos 2018; Jiménez Sánchez *et al.* 2020).

This rise in socio-economic grievances and mobilizations has affected environmental mobilization in several ways. First, as Letamendia (2019: 15-6) points out, the noticeable decline in the total number of environmental collective action events after 2010, can be regarded as the flip side of the rising tide of anti-austerity and social exclusion issues, which, along with feminism, have come to dominate the Basque public sphere in the 2010s. At the same time, during this period of latency in terms of public mobilization, environmental demands appeared much more often explicitly connected to socio-economic grievances, opening the way to the participation of more non-environmental civic organizations with a clear social orientation, which increased their presence in the field, especially in the years 2015 and 2017 (see table 5.1). As socio-economic grievances and anti-capitalist frames became more central in the public sphere, it seems plausible that solidarities generated by sharing strong left-wing stances might have overridden, at least partially, traditional allegiances as drivers of interorganizational collaboration. Thus, this could favor the temporary coming together of actors with divergent views on the national cleavage and the question of the armed struggle, especially at events and campaigns formed around mixed environmental-economic claims, which have become more common over time.

Looking at the political-institutional sphere, two important changes occurred during the period that might have diminished the impact of ideological homophily for collaboration within Basque green networks: (a) the increasing availability of potential allies within institutions, and (b) the lower risk of repression faced by social activism in general during the 2010s in comparison with previous decades. The first change relates to the recovery of significant share of institutional representation by the *abertzale* left in general, and the electoral expression of radical Basque nationalism in particular. After *Batasuna* was judicially proscribed in 2003 (see 4.2.2) the institutional representation of radical Basque nationalism in regional, provincial and municipal institutions was severely lessened during the 2000s despite the fact that two small surrogate parties (EHAK and ANV) attempted to fill this gap, since they too faced legal prosecution for alleged links with ETA. For environmental actors, this anomalous institutional context significantly reduced the availability of institutional allies, as *Batasuna* and its predecessors had traditionally been the most important and reliable supporter of environmental demands within the political-institutional realm (Barcena *et al.* 1998). Through the creation of the new party *Sortu* in 2011⁷⁹ and its strategy of forming electoral coalitions with other left-wing non-radical Basque nationalist parties –which ended up resulting in a permanent electoral coalition: EH Bildu (see Fernández Ortíz de Zarate 2015)– the *abertzale* left at large, and especially the political representatives of radical Basque nationalism, regained significant institutional power in the local and regional elections of 2011 and 2012. Moreover, the comeback of the Basque nationalist left to institutional politics coincided with the reinvigoration of the state-wide post-communist left in the region. The latter has also been traditionally sympathetic to the BEM and reinforced its green profile with the appearance of a new green party, Equo, in 2011. Nonetheless, it was not until the 2015-16 electoral cycle onwards that coalitions led by the newly formed *Podemos* and the smaller *Ezker Anitza* became a notable force in Basque electoral politics (Kerr 2019). All in all, the combination of these two electoral developments has significantly strengthened the alliance structure of Basque environmental actors, who count now with some more chances of making their voice heard within the formal political process.

The second significant change in terms of POS was given by the lower propensity for direct repression of protest (environmental and not only) during the post-conflict period in contrast with previous decades. Signs of decreasing levels of repression came

⁷⁹ After a harsh political and judicial controversy, *Sortu* was finally allowed to partake in the municipal elections of May 2011 by the Constitutional Court, granting its legality as a political party.

from both protest event data and from the perceptions of interviewed activists. Regarding the former, out of the 14 protest events in which incidents related to police interventions were registered, most of them (11) occurred during 2007 and 2009, concentrating as well the harshest police charges, such as the ones occurred in the outskirts of Vitoria-Gasteiz on January 2009 during a large anti-HST demonstration.⁸⁰ The less repressive approach of authorities was also noted and underlined by several activists and observers interviewed.

The increasing availability of allied political parties within institutions and the fact that authorities became less prone to resort to police intervention in dealing with environmental protests derived in a quite more open POS after 2011. As previous research on the impact of POS on civic interorganizational networks has shown (e.g. Diani 1995; Eggert 2014), open POS are conducive to more inclusive networks in which collaborative ties cut more often across ideological or identity divisions. The reasoning that supports such expectations is the following:

In open POSs, on the other hand, emphasis will be put on affecting policy making, or on spreading the message to the larger public through more accepted means. Opportunities for issue-specific action will require a more limited recourse to ideology as a mobilisation means, nor will be major differences between activists emphasised. It may also be expected that, in principle at least, the criteria whereby movement actors select their allies will be more relaxed and inclusive than in the previous closed situation. (Diani 1995: 15)

Finally, it is in the third contextual dimension, the cultural one, where changes have probably been most dramatic and influential in terms of relational dynamics among civic actors. ETA's 2011 announcement of its definitive abandonment of violence has produced two main shifts in terms of political culture: (a) an increasing sense of freedom to talk about politics and to engage in political activities, and (b) the decreasing salience of the ethno-national and violence-related cleavages. As it was mentioned in section 3.3, the existence of political violence had produced notable discouraging effects in terms of freedom of expression and participation in socio-political activities, especially among Basque citizens not identified with Basque nationalism. However, this picture has

⁸⁰ The 5 instances of violence reported in footnote 45 are comprised within these 14 events in which incidents with the police occurred, in the remaining 9 events police repressed the protests by arresting protestors or identifying participants for the initiation of sanction proceedings, but without reportedly resorting to violence nor responding to previous violence initiated by protestors.

substantially changed in the aftermath of the violent conflict. Survey data restricted to the BAC reflect an increasing sense of freedom to both speak about politics (figure 5.1 below) and to participate in political activities (figure 4.1 in the previous chapter). In accordance with these perceptions, the share of Basques involved in political actions and voluntary associations has steadily grown since 2018 (68. Euskal Soziometroa / Sociómetro Vasco 2018: 23-29), being well above Spanish average levels (58. Euskal Soziometroa / Sociómetro Vasco 2015: 38, 44). This more favorable environment for the exchange of divergent political opinions, added to the fact that organizations' base of potential supporters is certainly wider yet probably less militant and homogeneous, may have encourage civic actors to overcome ideological differences that previously seemed unbridgeable.




Figure 5.1. Evolution of freedom to speak about politics in the BAC (1987-2015)
(source: Leonisio & López Romo 2017: 149)

Furthermore, the end of ETA's armed struggle and the disappearance of actions of *kale borroka* (street vandalism) in Basque cities has led to a relative relaxation of the ethno-national and the violence-related cleavage. While the latter, now focused on the consequences and responsibilities of past violence, continues to be a divisive issue, it now lacks the immediacy and extreme potential for fragmentation of previous periods (Kerr 2019: 597-8), making actors associated with radical Basque nationalism much less problematic political partners. Regarding the national cleavage, instances of popular mobilization focusing on demands of self-determination have decreased in number and size (A. Letamendia 2019; Martínez Riera & Zubiaga 2015) and political parties seem to give less importance to the center-periphery axis in favor of economic issues, in

comparison with previous phases, even in the case of EH Bildu (Leonisio & Scantamburlo 2019: 267-9). Moreover, support for independence in the BAC reached an all-time low in 2016, falling below the 30% threshold (Alkorta & Leonisio 2019: 31-3). This does not mean that the question of national self-determination has disappeared from Basque politics or become unimportant, not at all, but it does not pervade every sphere of social and political life to the extent it used to do. Apart from the aforementioned competition with the rising profile of new salient issues, many related to the economic crisis, there seems to be a certain sense of fatigue after decades of over-mobilization and polarization that many observers interpret to be behind a growing depoliticization.⁸¹ However, this period of relative relaxation of the ethno-national cleavage might be coming to an end in the next few years, as the center-periphery debate could regain its centrality due to the innovative work of new civic actors that have been working over the past few years in favor of a referendum of self-determination –mainly *Gure Esku Dago* (Geller *et al.* 2015; Ibarra 2018)– and the exogeneous influence of the ongoing Catalan process.

5.2. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY: METHODS AND VARIABLES

5.2.1. Analytic technique: QAP regressions

In order to test up to what extent affinities in nationalist identities and/or different positions towards ETA's violence shaped the collaboration structure of the Basque environmental field throughout the period examined, QAP (quadratic assignment procedure) linear regression models were employed for each of the six discrete networks observed. This network-analytic technique follows the same logic as normal regression but modelling the values of a dependent variable network using other relations between the same actors as independent variables. Two distinctive features of this technique should be noted. In the first place, the unit of observation corresponds to the dyad, that is, every single cell of the network matrix, which can either indicate the absence or the presence of a tie and its strength. Secondly, and more importantly, QAP regression uses a nonparametric technique to estimate the statistical significance of these coefficients.

⁸¹ According to Pedro Ibarra “Wide sectors of the Basque population, because of many reasons but probably especially because of the end of the violent conflict, have assumed -even embraced- a culture of detachment from all political activities that involve contentiousness, that entail confrontation. There is a culture of depoliticization not very favorable for the participation in initiatives involving demands of radical democracy and related to deeply nationalist stances. There exists among some social sectors an interpretative frame identifying democratic and national insufficiencies, but it is a very difficult frame to mobilize for action. It is a frame that is critical and conformist at the same time” (2018: 258).

Basically, in order to take into account the mutual dependence among observations inherent to network data, thousands of random permutations (5,000 in this case) of the rows and columns of the dependent variable network are conducted, recalculating the regression coefficients each time. These permutations allow obtaining a simulation-based significance statistic, which corresponds to the proportion of times in which coefficient values as large as the observed ones are randomly obtained (see, for instance Borgatti *et al.* 2013: 129-33).

In this case, as it was detailed in the previous chapter, the dependent variable is the network of event co-attendance, with tie values normalized using the Jaccard coefficient. In order to model the patterns of collaboration in our six discrete temporal observations, we include as potential predictors four independent variable networks based on linkages derived from the ideological profiles of organizations, plus two additional controls for structural non-collaboration (see section 5.2.2.e below).

5.2.2. Explanatory variables: using external organizational identities to build latent networks of ideological affinities and conflicts

With the so-called “cultural turn” experienced by social sciences since the 1980s, cultural and symbolic processes have received an increasing degree of attention, also within social movement studies (Melucci 1985; Johnston & Klandermans 1995; Stryker *et al.* 2000; Goodwin *et al.* 2001; Goodwin & Jasper 2004; Jasper 2014; Baumgarten *et al.* 2014). Culture can be broadly understood as encompassing all the domains of social reality related to shared meanings (Johnson & Klandermans 1995; Williams 2004; Goodwin & Jasper 2004; Jasper 2014; Ullrich *et al.* 2014). In other words, culture refers to how people in society make sense of the world, “including how we understand our own action and motives, how we signal them to others, how we understand the actions of other, and figure out who we are and who we wish to be” (Jasper 2014: x). Thus, the concept of culture encompasses a loosely connected group of topics and multidisciplinary perspectives on social reality rather than a systematic field of knowledge itself (Ullrich *et al.* 2014: 2-3).

Within the literature on social movements and collective action, one of the most prominent and studied phenomena has been collective identities (Taylor & Whittier, 1992; Melucci 1995; Stryker *et al.* 2000). Given the notoriously slippery and ambiguous character of the concept (Flesher Fominaya 2010: 394; Snow 2001) and the fact that this research is concerned with civic organizations and their system of relations, it must be

first specified that, following authors such as Melucci (1989, 1996) or, more recently, Saunders (2008) or Taylor (2013), I conceive the concept of collective identity as a *meso*– or group-level phenomenon, rather than a *macro*– or movement-level one.⁸² These authors argue that collective identities typically emerge within relatively small groups where members interact with and get to know each other. When studying group-level collective identities, many authors have studied its processual nature through ethnographic methods, focusing on how it emerges and changes through the daily interactions of group members, favoring a conception of collective identity as a *process* (see Melucci 1995 for a synthetic presentation of this theoretical standpoint).⁸³ An alternative vision of collective identity, has been more interested in the result of this process, thus favoring a definition of collective identity as a *product* (Snow 2001; Taylor & Whittier 1992). Although both conceptualizations have traditionally been portrayed as opposed and incompatible, recent reviews of the literature tend to underline their complementarity, as each of them designate two slightly different objects of study that, although closely interrelated, are analytically diverse and focus on distinct dimensions of the same phenomena (Flesher Fominaya 2010: 397; Saunders 2015: 89-90). In the words of Flesher Fominaya:

The ‘product’ definition refers more to a perception of shared attributes, goals and interests (something that can be felt by movement insiders but also by those outside the movement), whereas the ‘process’ definition is more concerned with shared meanings, experiences and reciprocal emotional ties as experienced by movement actors themselves through their interaction with each other. (2010: 397)

The present research, engaging in diachronic comparative analyses that deal with dozens of organizations, adopts the conception of collective identity as a product, thus, defining an organizational identity as “*the shared definition of a group that derives from*

⁸² Therefore, group-level collective identities should be distinguished from individuals’ social identities (Tajfel 1978), which refer to the definition of individual people in terms of social category memberships (van Stekelenburg 2013) and are often closely intertwined with the former.

⁸³ “Collective identity is an interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals (or groups at a more complex level) and concerned with the orientations of action and the field of opportunities and constraints in which the action takes place. By “interactive and shared” I mean a definition that must be conceived as a process because it is constructed and negotiated through a repeated activation of the relationships that link individuals (or groups).” (Melucci 1995: 44)

members' common interests, experiences, and solidarities" (Taylor & Whittier 1992).⁸⁴ In more operational terms, these organizational identities of civic organizations can be better understood as "*broader representations of actors' position in relation to other actors and to broader representations of social life than those associated with issue agendas*" (Diani & Pilati, 2011: 266) that normally "*relate more or less explicitly to broader societal cleavages and systems of meaning*" (Diani, 1995: 9).

As pointed out in the previous quote of Flesher Fominaya, these 'product' organizational identities present two distinct dimensions that match in some occasions but not in others. We are referring here to the difference between the internal and the external dimensions of organizational identities, that is, between self-definitions of 'insiders' and definitions provided by other actors. While the 'public' collective identity is always rooted in internal processes of collective identity formation and in the shared internal understandings resulting from it, the overlap between these two dimensions does not need to be perfect (Coy & Woerhle 1996: 289). Even though a complete view of organizational identities would ideally require paying attention to both dimensions, as "identity is generated through interactive mechanisms involving actors and their social environment" (Diani & Pilati, 2011: 267), this research focuses exclusively on external – or '*hetero-directed*' (Melucci 1989)– organizational identities. This choice responds to both theoretical and practical considerations.

On theoretical grounds, external organizational identities are defined, following Diani and Pilati (2011: 267), as the perceptions that third actors share about a given organization's identity. These, when assessed through consultations with knowledgeable experts, should ideally reflect to a certain extent the public perceptions that other field actors and the broader public share about civic organizations and political actors that are members of the environmental field. The relevance of assessing these public identities or 'images' (Tejerina 2010: 202-5) is that this dimension can be extremely influential in terms of interorganizational collaboration, arguably more than the internal identities.

On practical grounds, the choice to concentrate the analysis of organizational identities on its external dimension was conditioned to a great extent by constraints related with data availability and access. Information on the self-reported positioning with regard

⁸⁴ Another similar and well-known definition of collective identity as a product is provided by Snow, when he proposes understanding collective identity as "*a shared sense of 'one-ness' or 'we-ness' anchored in real or imagined shared attributes and experiences among those who comprise the collectivity and in relation or contrast to one or more actual or imagined sets of 'others'*" (2001: 2)

to the ideological cleavages of interest for the analysis was unavailable for a large share of incumbent organizations, due to three factors: the retrospective nature of the study (with several organizations being already dissolved), the often inconsistent practices of organizations' text production and archival, and the modest response rates of many actors when contacted with requests to fill organizational surveys and/or conduct in-depth interviews. Hence, reliance on the external characterization of organizations by external observers was the only viable option to construct comparable measures of organizations' ideological identities.

As a result, the characterization of each organization's position with respect to the four ideological dimensions considered as potential explanatory factors of the coalitional structure relied on three main sources of information: an extensive review of primary documents (mostly available online), previous references in relevant secondary literature, and in-depth interviews with expert informants (see Appendix 5). That said, for the 26 organizations for which ideological self-definitions were available,⁸⁵ these coincide to a large extent with the external characterizations of expert observers and the assessments of this author. Thus, this convergence can be read as a reinforcing sign of the accuracy of the categorization process. The remainder of this section will present the different typologies of external organizational identities that resulted from these assessments, specifying how these were used to construct networks of latent linkages that test for different ideology-driven logics of interorganizational collaboration. That said, it is important to keep in mind that the ideological organizational identities do not necessarily coincide with the individual identities of every single member, as many civic organizations present a great deal of internal heterogeneity and plural membership. For instance, we could imagine a situation in which an organization that portrays itself (and is perceived by others) as strongly Marxist has among its ranks some members that would not define themselves as such, but maybe as social-democrats or anarchists. On the contrary, individuals with strong political leanings, for instance outspoken supporters of Basque independence, might get involved in non-nationalist or even completely apolitical civic organizations that because of its cultural, sportive, or conservationist aims prefer not to display strong univocal stances as a collective. That said, in most cases where external organizational identities are unambiguous, these are likely to match –or, at least, not to be incompatible– with the individual views of most core activists.

⁸⁵ Having replied to questions B5, B7, B8 and B9 in the survey (see Appendix 7), which 2 of the 28 respondents failed to do (see Appendix 6).

The aggregated ideological characteristics of civic networks' members in each of the six years examined are displayed in table 5.1, while the full classification of every single organization can be found in Appendix 3. Appendix 2 reports instead the basic statistical characteristics of the latent networks used as independent variables in the QAP regression analyses.

Table 5.1. Summary of organizations' characteristics and ideological identities

	2007		2009		2011		2013		2015		2017		Total	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Type of organization														
Environmental civic orgs	13	(46)	9	(39)	11	(52)	13	(57)	13	(41)	11	(37)	28	(40)
Political parties	6	(21)	7	(30)	3	(14)	5	(22)	6	(19)	3	(10)	16	(23)
Trade unions	7	(25)	4	(17)	6	(29)	5	(22)	9	(28)	10	(33)	12	(17)
Other civic orgs	2	(7)	3	(13)	1	(5)	0	(0)	4	(12)	6	(20)	14	(20)
Geographic scope														
Local / Regional	7	(25)	5	(22)	5	(24)	4	(17)	5	(16)	6	(20)	20	(29)
National (B.C.)	15	(54)	13	(57)	12	(57)	13	(57)	17	(53)	15	(50)	32	(46)
State-wide / International	6	(21)	5	(22)	4	(19)	6	(26)	10	(31)	9	(30)	18	(26)
National identity														
Basque nationalist	12	(43)	11	(48)	9	(43)	9	(39)	11	(34)	12	(40)	23	(33)
Non-nationalist	16	(57)	12	(52)	12	(57)	14	(61)	21	(66)	18	(60)	47	(67)
Position towards ETA														
Critical	12	(43)	11	(48)	7	(33)	10	(43)	13	(41)	9	(30)	25	(36)
Lenient	6	(21)	6	(26)	5	(24)	4	(17)	6	(19)	7	(23)	11	(16)
Ambiguous, n/a	10	(36)	6	(26)	9	(43)	9	(39)	13	(41)	14	(47)	34	(49)
LR ideological identity														
Far left-wing	16	(57)	16	(70)	16	(76)	15	(65)	22	(69)	22	(73)	45	(64)
Other	12	(43)	7	(30)	5	(24)	8	(35)	10	(31)	8	(27)	25	(36)
Environmental orientation														
Political ecologist	9	(32)	9	(39)	10	(48)	13	(57)	13	(41)	10	(33)	21	(30)
Reformist	3	(11)	2	(9)	4	(19)	3	(13)	3	(9)	4	(13)	8	(11)
Conservationist	5	(18)	3	(13)	0	(0)	1	(4)	1	(3)	0	(0)	10	(14)
Not applicable	11	(39)	9	(39)	7	(33)	6	(26)	15	(47)	16	(53)	31	(44)
TOTAL	28	(100)	23	(100)	21	(100)	23	(100)	32	(100)	30	(100)	70	(100)

5.2.2.a) *Basque nationalist homophily*

With respect to the nationalist dimension, organizations were classified as either Basque nationalist or non-nationalist. The former category was attributed to organizations that were perceived to support as a collective *Euskal Herria*'s self-determination, while the latter label was assigned to groups that were regarded as ambiguous, that purposely

remained on the sidelines of the national cleavage as an organization, or that could even be perceived by some actors as supportive of the *statu quo* of Basque integration within Spain.⁸⁶ Based on this division it was possible to build a network of Basque nationalist affinities, broadly understood, a binary network where a tie of value one indicates that both actors share a Basque nationalist orientation and no ties are assumed between them and Basque nationalists nor among non-nationalists, as the latter cannot be considered a coherent ideological subgroup, but is just a residual collection of diverse positions that are generally ambiguous or indifferent to the national cleavage. Hence, this network functioned as a test of Basque nationalist homophily, which would be confirmed if a significant positive relationship is found between this latent network and the network of interorganizational cooperation. This hypothesis is based on the noted centrality of Basque nationalist actors and discourses within Basque environmentalism (see Barcena *et al.* 1995, 1997, 1998), which traditionally increased cohesion within Basque nationalist sectors of the field, at the expense of generating some tensions with those that did not share the nationalist frames (see section 3.4.2 above).

5.2.2.b) *Ideological conflicts over ETA's armed struggle*

Just as a shared Basque nationalist frame is expected to facilitate cooperation, we can presume the effect of political violence to be quite the opposite, generating a situation of confrontation even among Basque nationalist actors. While it is not clear how the same position regarding the legitimacy of ETA's use of violence could foster cohesion for environmental collective action, disagreements on this fundamental moral issue have more often acted as an obstacle hindering cooperation with some 'uncomfortable' partners. As expressed by Benjamín Tejerina:

Relations among social movement organizations in the Basque Country are sectioned by their respective stances with respect to ETA's violence. The attitude that the different groups keep in the face of this violence is a differentiation factor that hinders the establishment of collaboration ties. (Tejerina 2010: 197)

When assessing organizational attitudes towards ETA there was an initial difficulty in the fact that for many organizations –especially the smallest ones– it was not possible to observe public declarations about the issue, nor would expert informants know how to

⁸⁶ In fact, while there were no examples of openly and unquestionably Spanish nationalist organizations being members of the Basque environmental field, a handful of organizations (PSE, UGT, or LSB-USO in particular) are sometimes considered as Spanish nationalists (*españolistas*) by Basque nationalist sectors.

precisely characterize their collective public position in relation to the violent conflict. On the other hand, for those organizations that could be characterized, it was possible to distinguish between critical and lenient towards ETA's violence. Organizations considered as lenient towards ETA's violence mostly correspond to organizations historically associated with the MLNV (such as the ecologist *Eguzki*, the trade unions *LAB* and *EHNE*, the internationalist organization *Askapena*, the anti-social exclusion *Elkartzen*,⁸⁷ or the political party *Batasuna*), with a couple of additions in which lenient attitudes towards ETA's violence were also assessed despite not strictly belonging to the MLNV. The first refers to the platform against the construction of the high-speed train *AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana*, which notably failed to clearly condemn ETA's assassination of Inaxio Uria (a manager of a constructor company linked to the construction works) in December 2008 (Alonso *et al.* 2014: 23-4) and was still generally perceived by most of the consulted informants as lenient towards the use of violence. Other cases of lenient attitudes can be found in some post-2011 political actors linked with former *Batasuna* (e.g. *Bildu*, *EH Bildu*, *Ernai*) which defend a relatively indulgent view of ETA's history, being reticent to explicitly condemn its violent actions. A quite different case is represented by *Kakitzat*, which despite not belonging to radical Basque nationalism but being instead part of a libertarian and anarchist tradition, have always been perceived as reticent to incorporate an unambiguous discourse of non-violence despite its anti-militarist focus, which used to complicate its relations with other anti-militarist groups (Beorlegui 2009: 172; Casquete 1996: 205; Tejerina 2010: 194-7).

With respect to organizations regarded as publicly critical towards ETA's armed struggle, it is important to note the presence of a considerable number of Basque nationalist organizations (e.g. *ELA*, *PNV*, *Aralar*, *ESK*, etc). This observation, which might come as excessively obvious for many readers familiar with the Basque context, is nonetheless useful in order to underscore once again the fact that both cleavages (the one derived from the center-periphery debate and the one over the legitimacy of the use of violence) are of course not symmetrical (Barcena *et al.* 1998: 44), and interact in complex ways. In fact, it could be argued that the only sector in which both dimensions are neatly tied together has been within the universe of radical Basque nationalism (Casquete 2009;

⁸⁷ *Elkartzen*, being founded in 2001, does not belong to the first generation of MLNV organizations created in the 1980s and organized around the KAS coordinator, but was still consistently characterized by expert informants as belonging to the current MLNV milieu, both in terms of nationalist orientation and leniency towards ETA's actions.

Mata 1993; Muro 2008), which could be regarded as a sort of ‘radical community’ (Malthaner & Waldmann 2014); see section 3.2.2.

Therefore, in order to test the hypothesis that public divergences about ETA’s armed struggle used to hinder interorganizational collaboration, a different logic was followed for the construction of this independent variable network. Instead of building a similarity matrix, as in the case of Basque nationalist homophily, a distance matrix was created this time, with ties in this network indicating disagreement regarding the legitimacy of the armed struggle, with one organization of the pair being publicly critical of it and the other being generally perceived as lenient (if not supportive). Thus, we expect this latter network to have a net negative effect on collaborative ties.

5.2.2.c) *Leftist homophily*

On the classic left-right dimension, I distinguished between a majority of far left-wing organizations and more moderate actors. The far left is understood here –in a non-pejorative but merely descriptive way– as the ideological space to the left of social democracy (March 2008, 2011). Although the far left is also internally heterogeneous and can be subdivided into two main currents (radical leftists and extreme leftists),⁸⁸ far leftists share among them a perception of social democracy being “insufficiently left-wing or even as not left-wing at all” (March 2008: 3) as well as strong anti-capitalist stances. These common elements shared among far leftists and the blurry nature of internal distinctions justify the use of this broad ideological category. Regarding moderate actors we can also distinguish several different positions among the field constituents, ranging from traditional social democracy (PSE, EA, UGT) to the center-right (PNV). Nonetheless, many organizations consciously avoided clear ideological stances. Such non-ideological stands were not only common among small conservationist groups but also among other actors such as Greenpeace, which deliberately sought to avoid ideological labels as well, as explicitly admitted by consulted members of the organization.

The high prevalence of left-wing actors within the examined field should not come as a surprise given the fact that average ideological self-identification in the region is notably skewed left. In fact, comparative survey data shows the BAC as the most leftist

⁸⁸ While radical leftists accept liberal democracy and aim to change the system from within, the more revolutionary extreme leftists remain openly hostile to the bourgeois democratic system (March 2008).

society in Europe in terms of ideological self-placement (Dinas 2012: 469-71). Moreover, within the focal population of the field examined, the BEM, “a clearly anti-capitalist, anti-developmental and left-wing political ideology” has been commonplace (Alonso *et al.* 2014: 19). This particularity of the Basque conflict reinforces the typical self-selection effects over-representing leftist participants that can also be found in other European environmental fields (Dalton 1994: 122-6; Milbrath 1984: 88-9). All these factors justify the placement of a categorical divide between the far left and other actors rather than between left and right, as the latter would not be very informative. Indeed, in a field dominated by anti-capitalist views and actors, social democrats are more likely to be regarded as ‘others’ –or, at best, with indifference– rather than to develop substantial latent solidarity linkages based on very thin ideological affinities.

Based on the previous categorization, we followed the same logic applied to nationalist identities, constructing a network of far left-wing affinities in which far leftist groups are linked to one another, while the residual category of moderates remains unconnected, both externally and internally. Therefore, this network functioned as a test of far left-wing homophily, which would be confirmed in case a significant positive relationship is found between this hypothetical network and the network built from event co-attendance.

5.2.2.d) *Inbreeding within streams of environmentalism*

Finally, ESMOs and the most clearly environment-oriented parties and unions were characterized according to their environmental-specific ideology as conservationists, reformists, or political ecologists. These categories are based on Saunders’ (2013: 31-5) fourfold typology of environmental ideologies (which also included radical ecologism, though no such position was identified within the organizations in the sample). *Conservationists* are mainly concerned with natural protection and specific environmental aggressions at the local –and often rural– level, seeking the preservation of wildlife through legal protection and/or limits to urban expansion. In contrast, *political ecologists* apply a holistic perspective, framing environmental degradation in relation with broader social and economic processes, and seeking to bring about a much more radical transformation of the relationship between humanity and nature. *Reformists* stand in the middle between these two ideal positions, focusing on tangible, small-scale issues, often at the local urban level, and promote a managerial approach to environmental problems, with problem attribution and solution proposals focusing on technocratic

deficiencies and potential improvements. The numerical hegemony of political ecologists is coherent with previous observations of the Basque environmental field (Alonso *et al.* 2014: 18; Barcena & Ibarra 2001: 189).

Previous studies of environmental fields have consistently found that incumbents of these different environmental families do not only behave differently in many respects (Dalton 1994) but also display distinct patterns of collaborative ties. Two consolidated patterns can be pointed out: that the most central and well-connected organizations tend to be established political ecologist groups, and that, once we take this imbalance into account, there seems to be an underlying inbreeding tendency, with actors being more likely to connect to others with a similar environmental orientations than to outsiders (Diani 1995; Di Gregorio 2012; Saunders 2007c).

Given these insights from previous literature, we constructed another network of latent ideological affinities in which incumbents of the three environmental-specific orientations were tied to each other internally but not externally. Again, internal cohesion within environmental subcultures would be confirmed in case of a positive net relationship between these matrices and the collaboration networks.

5.2.2.e) Controls of structural non-collaboration

Apart from the four types of latent networks already presented, two other types of networks were included in the QAP analyses. However, in this case their inclusion did not respond to theoretically driven expectations but to technical considerations. Both of these two networks, which I refer to as ‘controls of structural non-collaboration’, account for some null dyads that are actually the result of ‘constraints’ for collaboration imposed by the empirical strategy followed rather than genuine expressions of non-collaboration between actors.

The first of the two controls of structural non-collaboration accounts for the heterogeneous territorial reach of many local organizations, forming a network of ‘*geographic unconnectedness*’ that establishes a tie between those local organizations active in different and non-overlapping sub-territories of the Basque Country. For instance, a tie would be established between a local organization active only in Bilbao and another one active only in Pamplona. Since it is extremely unlikely that such pairs of organizations might get the chance to participate in the same event, we expect this network of geographic unconnectedness to have a negative net effect roughly equal to the size of the intercept.

The second control is present only in four of the years considered (2007, 2009, 2013, and 2015) and accounts for the impossibility that specific *second-order nodes* –that is, collective nodes resulting from the combined presence of several organizations that are also members of the field– establish ties with the same organizations that constitute them. The reason for this impossibility is that the codification of the former as participants in a certain event excludes by definition the co-presence of the latter. The first and most prominent of these two cases of second-order nodes is the ‘Basque Trade Union Majority’ (*Mayoría Sindical Vasca*, MSV), an informal coalition of trade unions conformed by the nationalist-leaning unions ELA, LAB, ESK, EHNE, Steilas, and Hiru (see Elorrieta 2012: 251-3, 304-5). When there were explicit references to the participation of at least 5 of these 6 unions, necessarily including the two most important actors ELA and LAB, the MSV was coded as a single collective actor. The second of these nodes is *Irabazi*, a short-term electoral coalition of leftist parties and independent candidates that was formed for the 2015 municipal elections, being *Ezker Anitza-IU* and *Equo* the two most important political parties. In this case, we found occasional direct references to the participations of *Irabazi* representatives in environmental events (normally town councilors or candidates). In those cases, additional references to the participation of *Ezker Anitza* and *Equo* were omitted, since the presence of *Irabazi* logically entailed the participation of the members of the coalition.

5.3. ANALYSIS: THE DECREASING SALIENCE OF TRADITIONAL IDEOLOGICAL CLEAVAGES

Table 5.2 below reports the results of the multiple QAP regression analyses conducted, which were implemented on the *UCINET 6* network analysis software (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman, 2002) using the Double-Dekker Semi-Partialing procedure (Dekker *et al.*, 2007) with 5,000 random permutations.

Table 5.2. QAP regression of collaborative ties on ideology-based latent linkages (models A and B)

	2007		2009		2009 bis [^]		2011		2013		2015		2017	
	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES														
Shared Basque nationalist orientation	.071**	.056*	.087*	.054	.167**	.147**	.096**	.101**	.039	.045	.008	-.004	.063	.053
Different position towards ETA	-.026	-.035*	-.07**	-.098***	-.090**	-.108***	.084**	.093**	.036	.044	.004	-.000	.028	.029
Shared far left-wing orientation		.043*		.096*		.066		-.020		-.023		.033*		.017
Shared environmental-specific orientation		-.002		.010		.012		-.032		-.020		.005		-.021
STRUCTURAL CONTROLS														
Geographic unconnectedness	-.093**	-.083**	-.168***	-.137**	-.161**	-.140*	-.109***	-.104***	-.094**	-.099**	-.108***	-.105***	-.152***	-.140***
Ties bt. second-order nodes and members	-.164***	-.183***	-.256***	-.285**			-.206***	-.207***			-.124**	-.132**		
<i>Intercept</i>	.093	.084	.168	.135	.161	.137	.109	.126	.094	.108	.116	.101	.152	.147
<i>Adjusted R²</i>	.032	.040	.059	.101	.109	.125	.158	.165	.021	.026	.024	.033	.036	.037
<i>N (dyads)</i>	378		253		190		210		253		496		435	

Notes: Values of collaborative ties normalized using Jaccard similarity measures. Unstandardized regression coefficients. Significance levels: * $<.1$; ** $<.05$; *** $<.01$ (one-tailed tests).

[^] The dependent variable network *2009bis* results from co-participation in 79 of the 80 events identified, excluding from the analysis an outlier event (a massive demonstration against Garoña nuclear station in Bilbao on June 9th, 2009) that counted with the participation of more than 30 organizations, being an isolated instance of wide multi-organizational coordination in that period.

The results of the statistical network analyses presented in table 5.2 seem to corroborate the previously stated hypothesis. The analysis shows that both Basque nationalism and stances towards ETA's violence used to influence collaborative ties between organizations active around environmental issues even up to 2011, as suggested by previous literature. On the other hand, the influence of these two traditional cleavages of Basque civil society appear to have progressively faded away during the more recent post-conflict period. In contrast, the relational impact of the linkages showing ideological alignment around far left-wing positions and environmental-specific orientations is almost negligible. While the results show a modest inbreeding effect among radical leftist organizations in 2007 and in 2009 (though partially inflated by that year's multitudinous anti-nuclear demonstration in Bilbao, as it loses statistical significance when removing that event from the analysis), linkages among organizations sharing a similar environmental orientation does not seem to play any role in collaboration patterns throughout the decade.

Regarding the relational impact of Basque nationalism, collaboration ties in the Basque environmental collective action field were found to be positively influenced by affinities in nationalist identities during the very last phase of the violent conflict, with co-participation in events being significantly more likely among Basque nationalist organizations up to 2011. However, while congruence on the national question functioned as a clear driver for collaboration, we can ask a further question: did it also act as a barrier for collaboration between Basque nationalists and non-nationalist actors? In order to address this question, I conducted a closer inspection of in-group and inter-group densities through ANOVA density analyses. The results of this bivariate analysis, which are reported in table 5.3, offer a negative answer to this question: the national cleavage, while fostering collaboration among Basque nationalists, did not seem to especially deter them from collaborating with alters, nor vice versa.⁸⁹ The table indicates that collaboration between Basque nationalists and non-nationalists was far from unusual (being significantly lower levels than expected only in 2009 and 2011) and, most importantly, that non-nationalist groups were sparsely connected among them. These two facts reveal that, despite nationalist orientations used to structure collaborative relations up to the final years of the violent conflict, it is not possible to assert that a strong ethno-

⁸⁹ Nonetheless, it should be remarked, once again, that organizations characterized as 'non-nationalist' could hardly be considered as staunch Spanish nationalists (see footnote 86). Therefore, the potential for polarization around the national question was already quite mitigated within ECAF members.

national social boundary was still in place then, as we cannot observe “*a contiguous zone of contrasting density, rapid transition, or separation between internally connected clusters of population and/or activity*” (Tilly 2004: 214). In fact, table 5.3 shows instead a core-periphery structure in which Basque nationalist actors seemed to occupy most core positions at the beginning of the period, while non-nationalist ones were weakly connected in the periphery. It is plausible to think, nonetheless, that in earlier and more intense phases of the violent conflict (1970s-90s), the influence of the ethno-nationalist cleavage on this collective action field might have been higher, possibly to the point of having generated in previous decades a thicker social boundary between environmentally-concerned groups with differing national orientations.

Table 5.3. Densities of interorganizational collaboration within and across Basque nationalists and non-nationalists

	Significance reported (following Tilly's definition of 'social boundary')	2007	2009	2009_bis	2011	2013	2015	2017
Basque nationalists, in-group ties	<i>Upper tail</i> (<i>p</i> of permutations as large)	.145* (.055)	.216* (.090)	.278** (.023)	.218** (.028)	.149 (.121)	.119 (.265)	.223* (.093)
Non-nationalists, in-group ties	<i>Upper tail</i> (<i>p</i> of permutations as large)	.068 (.876)	.139 (.521)	.125 (.553)	.100 (.550)	.081 (.753)	.116 (.281)	.123 (.933)
Inter-group ties	<i>Lower tail</i> (<i>p</i> of permutations as small)	.096 (.464)	.151 (.118)	.144** (.031)	.113* (.087)	.103 (.496)	.105 (.209)	.171 (.840)
Average density		.096	.162	.171	.127	.102	.111	.162

Notes: Values of collaborative ties normalized using Jaccard similarity measures. Significance levels, based upon 5,000 random permutations: *<.1; **<.05 (one-tailed tests).

With respect to the violent conflict, collaboration ties between those organizations publicly critical of ETA and those perceived as lenient towards it were, as expected, significantly less likely in 2007 and 2009, the two observations within ETA’s last violent campaign. It is especially notable how the burden effect of this disagreement became much stronger during 2009, after the armed organization had definitely immersed itself in the campaign against the construction of the high speed train –the most salient issue at the time– with a number of attacks on property and the aforementioned assassination of a construction manager related to the project in late 2008 (see section 3.4.2.f). While those radical Basque nationalist organizations perceived to be lenient –when not sympathetic– towards ETA’s armed struggle were poorly connected with mainstream environmental and political actors in 2007 and more clearly in 2009, this effect reversed itself in 2011, with critical and lenient actors collaborating among them more often than randomly

expected. But before zooming in on the historical particularities that made 2011 such a special year in terms of collective action dynamics (see section 5.3.1 below), it is necessary to first conclude the overall analysis and general interpretation of the results.

How can this dynamic evolution of relational patterns be interpreted? Why and how did the ideological positions around the national question and the armed struggle lose their structuring influence in shaping interorganizational collaboration? First, the decreasing relevance of these two traditional cleavages of the environmental field and of Basque civil society in general can be interpreted as a clear example of what Charles Tilly referred to as ‘boundary deactivation’, that is, a decline in the salience of a certain social boundary as an organizer of social relations (2004: 222-6). In this case, as already mentioned above, the degree of activation of the ethno-nationalist boundary was already modest in 2007, 2009 and 2011, having a greater impact in fostering in-group ties among Basque nationalists than in discouraging outside collaboration. Anyway, this ‘national boundary’ has gotten significantly weaker in the post-conflict period. A similar process of boundary deactivation occurred with the disagreeing positions over ETA’s use of violence. While these disagreements used to strongly disincentivize collaboration when the terrorist organization was still active and interfering in environmental issues, it later became a non-issue for engaging in collaborative action –at least in the environmental field– following an interesting and momentaneous reversal of the effect of this social boundary in 2011, what Tilly would refer as ‘site transfer’ (*Ibid.*).

But how is this boundary deactivation within Basque environmentalism linked with the end of the violent conflict in the Basque Country? I argue that ETA’s announcement of its definitive abandonment of violence in October 20th, 2011 can be interpreted as a large scale ‘critical event’ (Staggenborg 1993: 322-5) that weakened traditional incentives (Basque nationalism) and disincentives (disagreement over ETA’s armed struggle) for coalition work. In other words, the end of the violent conflict introduced an ‘incentive shift’ –a transformation of the rewards and penalties actors receive in their pursuit of within-boundary and cross-boundary relations (Tilly 2004: 220)– that acted as a crucial causal mechanism. This claim, however, should be taken as a hypothesis for investigation, requiring the collection of more qualitative data on activists’ own accounts of their everyday experiences and perceptions of the changing context and incentives at the time.

Having observed a post-conflict boundary deactivation of traditional cleavages in the Basque environmental field, it is rather surprising to not observe the other two ideological

factors tested in the model acquiring increasing relevance. Instead of observing a replacement of some ideology-based linkages by others as predictors of collaboration, the statistical analyses conducted show two alternative trends that point in a rather different direction. First, as observable in table 4.5, overall values of network density and average tie strength are particularly high in 2015 and 2017. Despite declining levels of mobilization, the fewer events organized are participated on average by a larger and more heterogeneous set of organizations, resulting in wider and stronger interorganizational collaboration. Secondly, looking at the adjusted R-square values in table 5.2, the fact that the aggregated explanatory power of the four ideological variables included as explanatory factors decreased notoriously during the first post-conflict years seems to suggest that collaborative behavior is now less ideologically structured. The combination of these two trends points towards an environmental field that, despite showing lower overall levels of activity, now displays higher degrees of integration and ideological pluralism.

5.3.1. The turn of the tide: a closer look at the year 2011

There are several Basque-specific contextual elements that make the year 2011 special in comparison with the others and for which it is worth paying closer attention to them. Additionally, further within-year analyses of the data will also be conducted. The first obvious particularity is that the historical announcement of ETA's definitive abandonment of violence occurred precisely at the end of that year. This alone would be enough to characterize that year as a crucial turning point. However, while this turning point was materialized with October 20th announcement, this *transformative event* did not only last two minutes –the duration of ETA's video statement– but, at the very minimum, could be regarded as encompassing the previous thirteen months. Indeed, this is perfectly congruent with Sewell's (1996) theoretical insight about the fact that transformative events are themselves sequences of several occurrences. Therefore, it is fair to say that, in many respects, the context of the first ten months of 2011, though still conditioned by the conflict, was already quite different from the two previously analyzed years 2007 and 2009. Indeed, with the halt in major violent attacks, the 2011 pre-October context was already much less violent after the provisional truce declared by ETA on September 2010, which was confirmed as permanent four months later, in January 2011. Furthermore, even though the announcement of the definitive abandonment of violence did not arrive until the fall of 2011, at the beginning of that year it was already widely known that ETA had

lost its traditional internal social and political support for persisting in its armed strategy (Murua 2016, 2017; Zabalo & Saratxo 2015). Apart from the evolution of the de-escalating conflict, the first few months of 2011 witnessed a deep reconfiguration of the Basque political party system. A new party widely regarded to be the successor of *Batasuna* (see sections 3.2.2 and 4.2.2), named *Sortu*, was allowed to run in the municipal elections by the Spanish Constitutional Court, a landmark decision that partially overturned the judicial doctrine that had served to impede *Batasuna*'s surrogate parties to run for the elections over the past years. Shortly afterwards, *Sortu* joined forces with other smaller parties of the *abertzale* left but which had been publicly critical of ETA's violence, creating what would become the prominent and stable electoral coalition *EH Bildu* (Fernández Ortíz de Zárate 2015; Kerr 2019). For a detailed chronology of that year's most salient events see the report of Arkaitz Letamendia (2012).

Therefore, even though the finding that civic organizations holding conflicting views about ETA's armed struggle were particularly prone to mutually collaborate that year seemed extremely puzzling at first, an explanation for how a traditional obstacle for collaboration turned that year into an incentive might be provided precisely by the much more relaxed and promising political scenario. The fact that radical nationalist organizations appeared to be increasingly integrated with Basque mainstream organizations also when looking at non-institutional collective action was probably a result of the goodwill of most political and civic actors in their attempts to facilitate the definitive incorporation of the radical milieu into non-violent institutional and protest politics. In fact, this cyclical pattern of isolation of radical nationalist organizations during periods of intensified violence and integration during phases of de-escalation had already been observed during both the 1998-99 and the 2004-06 failed peace processes (see, respectively, Fernández Sobrado and Antolín 2000: 162; and Letamendia 2011: 165-7; in similar but more general terms: Vilaregut 2007: 73-74).

Finally, because the notion of *transformative* event requires not only that enduring changes are observed long after the event but that these changes are already perceptible shortly afterwards (McAdam & Sewell 2001; Sewell 1996), it is necessary to examine in more detail what happened between October 20th, 2011 and the end of the year. Following this reasoning, I broke down the 2011 collaborative network and repeated the QAP regressions conducted in table 5.2., analyzing this time collaboration patterns observed during shorter periods of time with the exact same independent variables. In particular, by isolating the 12 events that were held after October 20th (8 of them being *collaborative*;

see section 4.2.1.d), a post-announcement network was generated. This network is made up of the same 21 actors that were active in the field during that year, with the difference that only collaborative events celebrated in the aftermath of the announcement are considered for the computation of tie values. Table 5.4 below shows the QAP regression results for the post-announcement network, contrasting them with the results for the entire year (already reported in table 5.2) and two alternative pre-announcement networks: one that considers the 48 environmental events (25 collaborative) held between January and the announcement, and another that considers the last 12 events (8 collaborative) registered right before October 20th.⁹⁰

Table 5.4. QAP regression of collaborative ties on ideology-based latent linkages, collaboration observed at different periods during 2011

	Entire year		Pre-announcement (Jan-Oct)		Pre-announcement (Jun-Oct)		Post-announcement (Nov-Dec)	
	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES								
Ideological factors								
Shared Basque nationalist orientation	.096**	.101**	.126**	.117**	.238***	.245***	.040	.097
Different position towards ETA	.084**	.093**	.076**	.080**	.172***	.191***	.112*	.143**
Shared far left-wing orientation		-.020		.014		-.033		-.140**
Shared environmental-specific orientation		-.032		-.034		-.069		-.025
STRUCTURAL CONTROLS								
Geographic unconnectedness	-.109***	-.104***	-.098***	-.084**	-.079**	.112**	-.098*	-.074
Ties bt. second-order nodes and members	-.206***	-.207***	-.225***	-.229***	-.310***	-.350***	-.354***	-.482***
Intercept	.109	.126	.098	.099	.112	.142	.168	.241
Adj R-square	.158	.165	.183	.186	.233	.246	.053	.096

Notes: Values of collaborative ties normalized using Jaccard similarity measures. Unstandardized regression coefficients. Significance levels: *<.1; **<.05; ***<.01 (one-tailed tests). Network size is the same for all periods: 21 nodes, 210 symmetric dyads.

Even if this within-year comparison does not yield dramatically divergent results, the post-announcement network is notably different in at least two aspects. The first one refers to the decreasing strength of Basque nationalist homophily, which ceased being a

⁹⁰ Descriptive statistics of these networks can be found in Appendix 11, along with the QAP results of the more encompassing Model C that is tested in chapter 6.

significant predictor of interorganizational collaboration for the last two months of 2011. Besides this decline in nationalist homophily, it is also noticeable how the overall explanatory capacity of ideological predictors also waned after ETA's abandonment of violence. Although special caution should be applied in this case, given the very small sample of events from which the post-announcement network is built, it is interesting to note that collaboration patterns at the very end of 2011 already started showing signs of what was later consolidated during the post-conflict years: the lower relevance of ideological factors for determining collective action partners. At the same time, this is also a reinforcing sign about the transformative nature of ETA's announcement of its definitive abandonment of violence. While this was not the only nor the first moment of rupture, it signaled the definite demise of a socio-political context deeply conditioned by a violent ethnonational conflict and, with it, the expiration of certain underlying logics that used to structure sociopolitical relations.

5.4. SUMMARY

The diachronic network analysis of collaboration within the Basque environmental field conducted in this chapter has shown that both Basque nationalism and position towards ETA's violence used to influence collaborative ties between organizations up to 2011, while during the more recent post-conflict period collaboration seems to occur in a more pluralistic and less ideology-driven fashion. Therefore, the evidence examined so far mostly confirms the initial expectations of a post-conflict boundary deactivation, showing that with the end of the violent conflict in the Basque Country the salience of long-established divisions ceased playing a significant structuring role for interorganizational relations, at least in the context of public environmental mobilization. In practical terms, albeit the empirical evidence examined here only refers to a small part of Basque civil society, this could be considered as a positive indicator of post-conflict civic reconstruction in the Basque Country. Furthermore, this puts into question whether long-held assumptions about the fragmented and polarized nature of Basque institutional and non-institutional politics still hold today in the current more peaceful scenario.

Lastly, these findings lead to a further question regarding our case study. If ideology seems to be playing a minor structuring role, then, what is driving collaboration nowadays in the Basque environmental field? Have more pragmatic logics of interorganizational cooperation acquired more importance in the new scenario? These are precisely the questions that will be tackled in the next chapter.

6. FROM ALLEGIANCES TO ALLIANCES? THE ROLE OF PRAGMATIC INTERESTS AND SOCIAL TIES

While the previous chapter has shown that ideological factors have ceased to be significant predictors of interorganizational collaboration in the post-conflict phase, the analyses performed so far provide only a partial picture of the potential factors influencing interorganizational event-based collaboration. What happens when we include explanatory variables related with pragmatic interests and with interpersonal ties? Have these become more relevant over time? Have the logics of collaboration within the Basque environmental field evolved from ideological allegiances to more flexible logics based on short-term *ad-hoc* alliances that facilitate collaboration among ideologically heterogeneous partners? In order to test this hypothesis, this chapter will complement the previous one by adding into the analyses two additional groups of stable relational factors included in the analytical model presented in chapter 2: those related with pragmatic-instrumental logics and with interpersonal bonds.

As we have already explained the logic of QAP regressions in the preceding chapter, we will move directly to the presentation of the non-ideological latent networks that will be added into the analysis.

6.1. NON-IDEOLOGICAL DYADIC PREDICTORS OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the influence of ideological linkages on collaborative patterns have significantly diminished after 2011. This opens the question of whether non-ideological factors might have acquired more relevance in explaining interorganizational collaboration during the post-conflict period. While it is clear that ideology-based affinities and differences can play a major role in facilitating or hindering interorganizational collaboration in virtually any context –but especially in divided social settings such as the Basque Country– it is also true that civic organizations “*do not necessarily need specific identity bonds to become involved in dense collaborative exchanges with groups with similar concerns*” (Diani *et al.*, 2010: 220). In fact, quite often coordination between distinct groups are crucially fostered by instrumental or pragmatic considerations, or by preexisting social ties between individual members.

While a vast variety of non-ideological factors can potentially act as facilitators or burdens for collaboration, a restricted set of seven dyadic predictors of collaboration were added to the analysis in this chapter. Among these, six reflect a pragmatic-instrumental logic of collaboration and one an interpersonal or social one (see section 2.3.4 and figure 2.1). Final decisions over the inclusion of specific non-ideological latent networks as independent variables and the formulation of respective hypotheses about their impact on collaborative patterns resulted from a combination of three types of considerations: (a) previous consolidated findings from the academic literature on social movement coalitions; (b) activists' reflections about what allows or prevents them from working together; and, to a lesser extent, (c) evidence obtained during fieldwork through the examination of thousands of news reports and organizational documents.

At this point, it is deemed necessary to briefly provide a few more details about this second type of considerations. Interviewed activists conveyed their own perceptions about the most relevant facilitators and burdens for interorganizational collaboration through their responses to two especially devised questions in the organizational survey as well as through open-ended responses during in-depth interviews or informal conversations (typically when recounting specific past experiences of successful or failed collaboration with other groups). In questions D3 and D4 of the survey (see Appendix 7), organizational representatives were asked to select the most relevant factors (up to 4) that in their experience facilitated or hindered, respectively, interorganizational cooperation.⁹¹ The responses obtained show that multiple elements beyond ideology were perceived by actors themselves to be especially influential in collaborative decisions, with four non-ideological items standing out from the rest (see the absolute frequencies of responses in Appendix 8).⁹² These were: issue-agendas, social ties, protest tactics, and models of internal organizational functioning. That said, not all four factors were considered to act

⁹¹ Although a long list of potential factors was offered, respondents were explicitly invited to add other responses in the blank brackets available for that purpose, in case no option properly represented their experience.

⁹² Whereas sharing the "same principles and values" was considered the most important facilitator of interorganizational collaboration, agreements or disagreements over more concrete ideological dimensions (the national status of *Euskal Herria* and the violent conflict) were mostly regarded by actor themselves as unimportant. This contrasts sharply with traditional accounts of Basque collective action and the ECAF in particular, as well as with the results of the previous chapter. However, taking into account that surveys were conducted during the first few months of 2019, this surprisingly low significance that respondents gave to these two ideological factors may just be precisely a reflection of their lower salience in the post-conflict phase boundary deactivation processes, reinforcing to some extent the results of chapter 5.

in the same way. On the one hand, issue-agendas and social ties were mostly considered to affect collaboration positively. That is, focusing on the same issues and having positive social ties between members were viewed as important incentives for collaboration but their reverses (non-overlapping issue-agendas and previous animosities between some members) were not regarded as particularly menacing for maintaining existing collaborations nor establishing new ones. On the other hand, protest tactics and internal functioning were mostly considered to have a negative impact, potentially impeding cooperation when there are important divergences but without radically enhancing chances for collaboration when important similarities do exist.

Besides these four general factors pointed out by activists, which have also received quite a lot of attention from coalition researchers, three other more specific factors were also included, two facilitators and one obstacle. These seven variables are listed below in table 6.1 and will be discussed in depth throughout the rest of this section. Following the analytical model presented in chapter 2 (see figure 2.1.), the presentation is divided according to the logic of interorganizational collaboration to which they belong: pragmatic-instrumental logics and interpersonal relations.

Table 6.1. Non-ideological predictors of collaboration included in the analysis

TYPE OF FACTOR	EXPECTED IMPACT ON COLLABORATIVE TIES	
	<u>Positive: incentive</u>	<u>Negative: obstacle</u>
Pragmatic-instrumental	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Similar issue-agendas • Geographic proximity • Centripetal attraction due to external competition 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Divergent organizational models • Disagreements over tactics • Participation in umbrella organizations
Interpersonal (social)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overlapping memberships 	

6.1.1. Pragmatic-instrumental factors: incentives and obstacles

When coordination arises simply from instrumental or pragmatic incentives we can talk about coalitions in the purest and most original sense of the concept (see Gamson 1961: 374), in which collaboration between distinct groups are driven by an instrumental logic, requiring low levels of consensus beyond explicit and often short-term objectives. The main disadvantage of such low requirements of internal consensus is that while instrumental coalitions are easier to form, they are also easier to dissolve, which explains their often informal and ephemeral nature. Nonetheless, it should be reminded that

pragmatic-instrumental factors do not only foster coalitions, but they can also hinder them. Indeed, collaboration is sometimes impeded precisely by pragmatic constraints or obstacles that increase the ‘transaction costs’ associated with any kind of interorganizational collaboration, even when there is perfect ideological and strategic congruence. For instance, actors with very different forms of internal decision-making or that are present in distant territories often fail to sustain cooperation, even if their members are willing to do so. With this in mind, this section provides an overview of the six explanatory variables related to pragmatic-instrumental logics of coalition that were considered the most relevant and on which information could be gathered. Within each of these six subsections, I cover the expectations associated with each network variable in terms of interorganizational collaboration, its operationalization, and the yearly distribution of the different categories across ECAF members, while the full descriptive statistics of the resulting networks are reported in Appendix 2. For the sake of clarity, I will first review the three variables expected to act as incentives for collaboration, and then discuss the three potential obstacles.

6.1.1.a) Similarities in issue-agendas and objectives

One fairly obvious pragmatic-instrumental incentive for collaboration is the existence of overlapping issue agendas between organizations. Actors concerned about the same topics and working on the same issues have a strong incentive to work together. In principle, the pooling of resources and the merging of supporters and activists would increase the chances of achieving the shared goals of those organizations. Indeed, shared concerns and short-term objectives may be on some occasions sufficient to overcome identity-based differences, even if only temporarily. In order to test the actual strength of this incentive, information was gathered regarding the specific environmental issues in which each actor showed a strong interest. For this purpose, two main sources of information were used: organizations’ responses to a specially devised question in the survey and a range of secondary documents (mostly available through organizations’ websites and social media pages).

Regarding the former, question B2 in the survey (see Appendix 7) asked respondents to mark all issues or topics for which their organizations had mobilized during the period of study, indicating in each case the degree of importance for the organization on a three-point scale: (1) preferential issues, (2) issues of secondary importance, and (3) topics that the organization had only occasionally touched upon. The list of 22 issues was generated

based on previous similar questionnaires used as models (see footnote 73), as well as on the deep knowledge of environmental controversies relevant in the Basque Country during the period examined that was acquired while reviewing thousands of newspaper articles (see section 4.2.1.d). Furthermore, apart from these 22 items, 19 prominent non-environmental issues (e.g. budget cuts, gender inequality, economic inequality) were also listed, in order to reflect as accurately as possible the issue priorities of non-environmental civic organizations and trade unions and discourage potential overstatements regarding the role of environmental issues within their organizational priorities. While the list of environmental issues was disaggregated as much as possible when designing the questionnaire in order to give respondents many options to which they could relate their trajectories of mobilization, the opposite logic was followed for data analysis, aggregating items that were thematically close to each other. As a result, the number of environmental issues was later reduced to 12 broad themes (see figure 6.2 below).

The analysis concentrates only on issues of preferential mobilization (that is, responses of value one), since almost all organizations could declare to have a minimal interest in almost every issue. This relatively high threshold was set in order to ensure a more restrictive and meaningful network of overlapping agendas, leaving aside overlaps of mere interest or concern about a topic that do not imply a consistent and preferential mobilization of organizational efforts. Since only 26 organizational responses to this question could be gathered through the survey, the assessment of issues of preferential attention for the remaining non-respondent organizations were externally assessed by this researcher, primarily relying on organizational documents⁹³ and on the event dataset, and, occasionally, on secondary references present in the literature. To maintain the same ‘strong’ criteria used for the survey responses, only reiterative references to an issue in documents and/or sustained participation in related events were considered. Additionally, for dubious cases, final decisions were also influenced by the observed patterns of replies given by similar organizations that completed the survey. Figure 6.1 and table 6.2 provides further details about the most popular issues of preferential mobilization and their variance over time.

⁹³ For political parties, documents available from the Regional Manifestos Project (RMP) were particularly useful. I would like to thank Laura Cabeza and the rest of the project’s team, for generously sharing the original coded electoral manifestos, through which it was possible to quickly retrieve all clauses related to the environment that were contained in the electoral manifestos of the Basque political parties included in the analysis.




Figure 6.1. Organizations' issues of preferential mobilization: overall frequencies and sources of assessment (N=70)

Table 6.2. Organizations' issues of preferential mobilization, yearly distributions

	2017		2009		2011		2013		2015		2017		All years	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Nuclear energy & Garoña	11	(39)	11	(48)	10	(48)	14	(61)	15	(47)	16	(53)	26	(37)
Waste management	10	(36)	10	(43)	12	(57)	11	(48)	12	(37)	10	(33)	25	(36)
Fracking	-	-	-	-	9	(43)	13	(57)	15	(47)	-	-	22	(31)
Nature preservation	10	(36)	7	(30)	5	(24)	7	(30)	8	(25)	4	(13)	21	(30)
High speed train (HST)	11	(39)	10	(43)	8	(38)	7	(30)	10	(31)	9	(30)	18	(26)
TTIP-CETA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	(41)	9	(30)	17	(24)
Climate change & energy	6	(21)	4	(17)	5	(24)	7	(30)	6	(19)	5	(17)	14	(20)
Sustainable consumption	5	(18)	5	(22)	7	(33)	7	(30)	8	(25)	5	(17)	13	(19)
Urban mobility/transport	3	(11)	3	(13)	3	(14)	6	(25)	5	(16)	5	(17)	10	(14)
Other large infrastructures	3	(11)	2	(9)	3	(14)	4	(17)	4	(12)	3	(10)	9	(13)
Degrowth	1	(4)	1	(4)	3	(14)	3	(13)	3	(9)	1	(3)	8	(11)
Animal wellbeing	2	(7)	3	(13)	0	(0)	2	(9)	0	(0)	0	(0)	7	(10)
No. orgs	28	(100)	23	(100)	21	(100)	23	(100)	32	(100)	30	(100)	70	(100)

*Cumulative percentages exceed 100 due to the fact that many organizations are simultaneously focused on more than one type of issues.

This information was arranged for each year considered as bimodal matrices of active organizations (rows) by issues on which they preferentially mobilized (columns). From this two-mode matrices it was possible to generate for each year one-mode matrices of overlapping agendas, with pairs of participating organizations connected to each other by the proportion of issues on which they were both interested. Following the same reasoning

applied to the generation of collaborative networks (see section 4.2.1.e), the raw tie values of these networks of overlapping agendas were normalized using the Jaccard coefficient, with final values ranging from zero to one (for more details see Appendix 2). Theoretical expectations point towards a positive relationship between this dyadic variable and our dependent variable of collaboration: the higher the degree of overlap in issue agendas, the more public collaboration at the same events is expected.

6.1.1.b) *Geographic proximity*

Another crucial pragmatic facilitator of interorganizational collaboration is geographic proximity, as coalitions are generally easier to coordinate when organizations are not very distant from each other and have a similar sphere of action. This is related to a basic relational mechanism known as ‘propinquity’, that is, the tendency to establish ties with those that share the same physical and social space (see Kadushin 2012: 18). Although geographic barriers can be overcome, even leading to transnational coalitions (e.g. Bandy & Smith 2005), the importance of face-to-face interaction is still far from negligible despite the fact that the fast development of communication technologies has lessened the influence of geographic proximity in comparison with previous decades. Actually, we can expect the impact of geographic overlaps in the case of the Basque environmental field to be quite strong, given a marked tendency towards localism since the 1990s (Barcena & Ibarra 2001; see section 3.4.2.d) and the different historical trajectories of environmental mobilization between the four historical territories considered (Tejerina 2010: 196-7).

Against this background, information on the territorial reach of each organization was gathered, based mainly on a close examination of mission statements and the organizations’ websites, which often contain relevant information on their territorial structure.⁹⁴ Hence, for each organization I indicated which provinces fell within its sphere of action and whether its geographic scope eventually extended beyond Basque territory as well. Table 6.3 below reports the number of organizations active in each of the five territorial categories over the six years examined, showing no major changes within the field in terms of geographic composition.

⁹⁴ Additionally, for survey respondents, this information could be crosschecked with answers to question A3 (see Appendix 7)

Table 6.3. Organizations' territorial presence, yearly distributions

	2007		2009		2011		2013		2015		2017		All years	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Araba	20	(71)	20	(87)	17	(81)	20	(87)	28	(87)	26	(87)	52	(74)
Biscay	22	(79)	19	(83)	16	(76)	19	(83)	27	(84)	25	(83)	53	(76)
Gipuzkoa	26	(93)	20	(87)	17	(81)	21	(91)	28	(87)	27	(90)	59	(84)
Navarre	18	(64)	14	(61)	16	(76)	16	(70)	25	(78)	25	(83)	46	(66)
Outside BC	7	(25)	5	(22)	4	(19)	6	(26)	10	(31)	9	(30)	19	(27)
No. Orgs	28	(100)	23	(100)	21	(100)	23	(100)	32	(100)	30	(100)	70	(100)

*Cumulative percentages exceed 100 due to the fact that most organizations are simultaneously active in more than one of the territories considered.

Based on these event-by-territory matrices, it was possible to build one-mode networks of geographic overlap, with tie values normalized once again through Jaccard coefficients. Thus, values indicate in this case the degree of territorial overlap of a given pair of organizations, with value one indicating that a pair of organizations present exactly the same sphere of action. As in the previous variable, we expect values of geographic overlap to be positively related with event co-attendance.

6.1.1.c) Centripetal attraction due to external competition: parties and unions

The third relational facilitator of interorganizational collaboration does not owe its existence to *a priori* theories or previous findings but results instead from an empirical observation obtained while constructing the event dataset from which event co-attendance networks were generated. During the coding of events it was observed that trade unions and political parties rarely appeared alone when attending large events, and whenever one of them confirmed its attendance often several of its kind would also join. One reason to explain such behavior is that trade unions and political parties belong to two distinct and prominent areas of politico-institutional life, that is, to two highly institutionalized fields (DiMaggio & Powell 1983): labor representation and institutional politics, respectively. As members of highly institutionalized fields, they share a common set of institutionalized rules and resources and, at the same time, are engaged among them in fierce competition. While political parties compete with themselves in parliamentary and municipal elections, trade unions do the same to increase their number of members and increase their share of representatives in thousands of small-scale elections for workers' councils. Thus, it seems plausible that this competition might generate a centripetal attraction force by which trade unions and political parties are more likely to join a given

event when one of their competitors is going to attend, as they do not want to be seen as oblivious or indifferent to a cause that might attract substantial popular support. This strategic behavior driven by competition is likely to be responsible for the relatively high levels of participation in sectoral external issue fields (like the environmental field) shown by these actors (see section 4.2.2) and for their tendency to be more tolerant towards the participation of ideologically diverse actors at the same event.

In order to test this inductively generated hypothesis of centripetal attraction among trade unions and political parties, I constructed yearly similarity matrices in which each political party is connected to all other political party active within the network and trade unions are also perfectly connected to their institutional equals. Our expectations is that within-parties and within-unions collaboration should be stronger than other relationship in the network, everything else considered. Table 6.4 below displays the number of political parties and trade unions that were active in the Basque ECAF each year (frequencies of environmental and non-environmental civic organizations are not repeated here but can be consulted in table 5.1).

Table 6.4. Number of political parties and trade unions active in the ECAF by year

	2007		2009		2011		2013		2015		2017		All years	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Political parties	6	(21)	7	(30)	3	(14)	5	(22)	6	(19)	3	(10)	16	(23)
Trade unions	7	(25)	4	(17)	6	(29)	5	(22)	9	(28)	10	(33)	12	(17)
No. Orgs	28	(100)	23	(100)	21	(100)	23	(100)	32	(100)	30	(100)	70	(100)

6.1.1.d) *Divergent organizational models*

Moving now to potential obstacles of collaboration, I first concentrate on interorganizational differences in terms of their internal organization, which was identified by half of the surveyed organizations as a major obstacle hindering collaboration (see Appendix 8). Indeed, several interviewed activists recalled previous experiences in which they tried to collaborate with one organization that followed a very different logic of internal functioning. For instance, coordination between a large, hierarchical and resourceful association on the one hand and a small, horizontal and entirely voluntary informal group may run into problems of timing and coordination due to their very asymmetric internal functioning or ‘*organizational structures*’.

The concept of organizational structures refers to the overall pattern of relationships between members of an organization, which establishes disparities in how power and other resources are distributed (Lofland 1996: 48-9). While every organization might present a unique pattern of relations, sets of similar structures can be analytically aggregated into a reduced typology of *organizational models*, ideal types of organizational structures that “comprise both templates for arranging relationships within an organization and sets of scripts for action culturally associated” (Clemens 1993: 758).

When examining our organizational population, it was possible to identify three broad organizational models, which were labelled as follows: communitarian-egalitarian, structured-voluntary, and professionalized. These three categories result from the combination of two crucial organizational dimensions: the degree of formalization of rules and the incentive structure on which everyday internal work relies. Formalization refers to the degree to which an organization “has an explicit (e.g. written) scheme of organization –division of labor– that it strives to enact in its routine activities” (Lofland 1996: 142-3). The last point (“that it strives to enact”) is particularly important, since the criteria for the classification of organization as ‘formalized’ does not rely, in this case, exclusively on whether organizations have elaborated written rules and are included in a public registry of associations. Even though the former are nonetheless useful indicators of formalization, this assessment also considered whether members attempt to implement such rules to govern the organization’s everyday activities. The other dimension, ‘incentive structures’, focuses instead on whether the tasks and activities are carried out primarily through paid work, thus relying on material incentives, or through the voluntary involvement of active members, which relies instead on normative and solidarity incentives (Rothschild-Whitt 1979: 514-6). Again, this should not be seen as a black-or-white issue but requires instead a more comprehensive qualitative evaluation that goes beyond looking at the presence or absence of paid members. For instance, it is not uncommon to see voluntary associations with a handful of part-time positions while the bulk of the work is still carried out by voluntary members. On the contrary, professionalized organizations such as large political parties or trade unions can sometimes count on volunteers for some tasks or campaigns while their core activities continue to be run by professionals.

As mentioned above, our three categories result from the interplay of the dimensions of formal-vs-informal rules and professional-vs-voluntary work. Organizations that follow a *communitarian-egalitarian* model rely exclusively on non-material incentives

and function on an informal basis, without specified procedures of decision-making or even membership rules, making decisions in an ‘*assamblearian*’ fashion that favors consensus over majority rule, and providing itself with a minimal and flexible functional differentiation of labor. From the perspective of organizational theory, collective entities following this model can be seen as examples of ‘partial organizations’ (Ahrne & Brunsson 2011). It is also widely acknowledged that organizations like the ones described present an “extremely high rate of failure” (Lofland 1996: 149), rarely being able to span beyond a small group of activists and a short period of time.⁹⁵ By contrast, organizations following a *structured-voluntary* model, though relying as well primarily on voluntary work, provide themselves with formal written rules that at least try to establish criteria for membership, hierarchies of power, and rules of decision-making. Often, as a correlate of formalization, these organizations tend to develop bureaucratic structures (e.g. presidency, governing board, secretariat, commissions, working groups, etc) aiming at establishing a clear and efficient division of labor, though with varying degrees of complexity and success. Finally, *professionalized* organizations are also highly formalized and structured, though they diverge from the former model in their reliance on paid staff for their internal functioning. Interest groups, large trade unions and political parties are paradigmatic examples of this model. Table 6.5 below summarizes the aforementioned conceptual distinction between these three ideal-type organizational models, while the yearly distribution of these three types of organizational models among field incumbents can be observed below in Figure 6.6.

Table 6.5. *Ideal-type organizational models (own elaboration, based on Lofland 1996: 139-76)*

		<i>Predominant incentive structures for the fulfillment of organizational tasks</i>	
		Voluntary	Material
<i>Degree of formalization of internal rules</i>	Medium / high	Structured-voluntary	Professionalized
	Low / null	Communitarian-egalitarian	-

For the construction of the dyadic variables operationalizing divergences in organizational models I proceeded in three steps. First, the three ideal structures were

⁹⁵ Though it must be said that ‘organizational success’ is rarely a concern for activists involved in communitarian-egalitarian organizations, which are usually more interested in the symbolic and prefigurative potential of such forms (see, for instance: Simsa & Totter 2017).

coded as ordinal categories, assigning a value of zero to communitarian-egalitarian organizations, one to structured-voluntary ones, and two to the organizations characterized as professionals. Secondly, once these ordinal attributes of the nodes had been created, it was possible to build distance matrices using the ‘absolute difference’ method, which returns “positively valued measures of the distance between the attribute scores of each pair of actors” (Hanneman & Riddle 2005: 84). Thirdly, the entire matrix was divided by two in order to keep the value range between zero and one. As a result, pairs composed of communitarian-egalitarian and professional organizations present a maximum distance of value 1, pairs involving structured-voluntary organizations and other types of organization present half the distance (0.5), while the equality of couples showing the same organizational mode is represented with a value of zero. Therefore, in order to conclude that divergences in organizational modes are an obstacle to cooperation, we should find a net negative relationship: the more different the internal functioning of two organizations is, the less they would collaborate among them.

6.1.1.e) Disagreements over tactics

Another factor that was selected by many of the surveyed organizations as an important burden for collaboration was disagreement over specific tactics of collective action. Choices regarding the adoption of specific forms of action by civic organizations respond not only to strategic cost-benefit calculations, but also have important ethical and cultural implications regarding what is considered legitimate means of conducting political action and what is not, or what type of tactic is more congruent with organizations’ collective identities. Hence, deep tactical disagreements often represent important obstacles for interorganizational collaboration between organizations. As in any collective action field, actors engaged in environmental issues use a wide range of tactics to promote their objectives. While some actors use available institutional or media channels to promote or oppose political change (e.g. lawsuits, petition signatures, citizens’ legal initiatives, press conferences), others resort to expressive forms of pressure on the streets. Within the latter, it is possible to distinguish between, on the one hand, relatively conventional and tolerated forms of protest (e.g. marches, rallies, demonstrations, symbolic performances, strikes) and, on the other hand, more disruptive or even violent forms (e.g. blockades, sit-ins, disruption of events, sabotage, attacks on buildings or people). Combining elements from two well-known typologies of protest forms deployed at protest events (Rucht 2010; Tarrow 1998) we can distinguish between

three broad types of actions as: *appellative-procedural*, *demonstrative*, and *disruptive* (the latter encompassing in our case both non-violent confrontational forms as well as light violence against property).

Organizations' tactical profiles were evaluated through the combination of information from existing secondary sources, the self-collated event dataset and, when available, survey responses to question C1 (see Appendix 7). While there are very few differences regarding the use of appellative-procedural forms and demonstrative protests, since almost every organization resorts to them (which is coherent with previous descriptions of Basque environmental actors' tactical repertoires; Barcena *et al.* 2000: 25-6; Tejerina *et al.* 1995: 114-5, 126-7), there seems to be more variation when looking at the use of disruptive protest forms. On the one hand, the majority of the organizations' repertoires of action are limited to appellative-procedural and conventional demonstrative protest, especially in the case of 'insider' or mainstream actors like political parties and trade unions. On the other hand, we have a minority of actors that do not rule out the use of more disruptive forms of protest. While only in three cases a decisively confrontational and exclusively extra-institutional profile was observed,⁹⁶ in up to eleven cases we can observe the deployment of an *omnivorous* repertoire characterized by an employment of a wide range of tactics in which, even though most organizations usually resort to institutional and conventional action, they do not rule out the occasional employment of disruptive and more confrontational forms of protest.

With such a skewed distribution in the adoption of the three broad types of tactics, it was decided to merge under the same category the few purely 'confrontational organizations' in terms of tactics with those organizations that presented omnivorous repertoires open to the occasional use of disruptive tactics. On the other hand, the vast majority of organizations were categorized as exclusively moderate. Following the same logic of distance matrices built upon attributes that was followed to account for differences in organizational models, matrices of divergent tactical profiles were constructed, with the difference being that tactical profiles were assessed in a dichotomous scale. In these binary networks a tie reflects tactical disagreements between organizations that occasionally resort to disruptive and more contentious forms of action and those who do not. The expectation is that disagreements over the employment of confrontational tactics are likely to act as a barrier for event-based collaboration.

⁹⁶ Specifically, these three were: the *Assembly against the HST*, *Ernai* and *Kakitzat*.

Table 6.6 summarizes the distribution of nodes’ organizational models and tactical profiles for each of the six years examined, while the full classification of every single organization can be found in Appendix 3.

Table 6.6. Organizational models and tactical profiles, yearly distributions

	2007		2009		2011		2013		2015		2017		TOTAL	
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)
Organizational model														
<i>Communitarian-egalitarian</i>	2	(7)	2	(9)	1	(5)	3	(13)	4	(12)	7	(23)	12	(17)
<i>Structured-voluntary</i>	14	(50)	10	(43)	9	(43)	9	(39)	13	(41)	11	(37)	28	(40)
<i>Professionalized</i>	12	(43)	11	(48)	11	(52)	11	(48)	15	(47)	12	(40)	30	(43)
Tactical profile														
<i>Exclusively moderate</i>	20	(71)	17	(74)	17	(81)	18	(78)	24	(75)	21	(70)	56	(80)
<i>Open to disruption</i>	8	(29)	6	(26)	4	(19)	5	(22)	8	(25)	9	(30)	14	(20)
TOTAL	28	(100)	23	(100)	21	(100)	23	(100)	32	(100)	30	(100)	70	(100)

6.1.1.f) Participation in umbrella organizations

The sixth and final pragmatic-instrumental factor included in the analysis did not result from theoretical expectations antecedent to the fieldwork and the design of the questionnaires, but from a hypothesis derived from some comments made by interviewed activists. When discussing the participation of informants’ organizations in certain past events and/or campaigns, some activists emphasized that they had helped in organizing through their work within an umbrella organization they belonged to, but without explicitly participating in the event “as an organization.” These observations point to a further element of complexity that needs to be taken into account: the fact that in the Basque environmental field –as well as in many others– there are organizations composed only of individuals and others that might combine both people and organizations as “units of membership” (Lofland 1996: 141). We can refer to the latter as ‘umbrella organizations’, that is, organizations composed of other organizations. When both umbrella groups and their member organizations are part of the same field, a complex question arises: do such ties foster or hinder event co-attendance? Based on the impressions obtained when coding newspaper articles reporting on environmental events and the aforementioned comments made by informants, it seems reasonable to think that these membership ties between umbrella organizations and their members might reduce event co-attendance for such pairs of actors, even when behind-the-scenes collaboration

might exist. This paradox can be explained by the fact that individual organizations belonging to another umbrella structure might refrain from publicly joining an event convened by the latter in order to ensure the public visibility of the unitary platform, especially when these umbrella groups are recently formed and are concerned with a single local issue.

In order to test this hypothesis and control for this potential bias introduced by our imperfect indicator of event co-attendance (see the discussion presented in section 4.2), I recorded all known membership ties linking single organizations to the umbrella groups to which they belonged (if any), merging information from available documents, in-depth interviews and surveys (specifically, the fourth column of question D1). The basic statistical properties of these networks can be found in Appendix 2. For the previously formulated hypothesis to be true, we should observe a negative relationship between membership ties and event co-attendance.

6.1.2. Interpersonal relations: overlapping memberships

As it was already mentioned when presenting our analytical framework in chapter 2, the third group of latent linkages that can help us predict interorganizational collaboration are those related to interpersonal bonds or connections. In particular, the literature has mainly examined two types of interpersonal bonds: strong social relationships (e.g. close friendship) among members of distinct organizations, and the connections generated by activists with multiple memberships in more than one organization.

Information on interpersonal relations was collected mainly through the combination of responses to a specifically devised question included in the questionnaire, complemented occasionally with external information about prominent activists that were known to participate in more than one organization, often obtained from newspaper reports but also through in-depth interviews. However, due to limitations of data gathering, it was not possible to collect reliable information on friendship ties between core members of organizations,⁹⁷ and therefore data on overlapping memberships was the

⁹⁷ Although the questionnaire initially also aimed at collecting information on existing personal friendships among members of different organizations, this information could not be used because the ambiguous way in which the question was formulated (see the fifth column of question D1 in Appendix 7) led some of the respondents to provide information on mere acquaintances and weaker personal relations. This misunderstanding artificially inflated the number of interpersonal connections of some organizations and, more worryingly, these responses became incomparable with responses from organizations that understood the question in a restrictive way and responded more narrowly on friendships among core members.

only available indicator of interpersonal bonds between organizations. Basically, in the organizational surveys, organizational representatives were presented with the full list of organizations considered to be members of the collective action field in at least one year, and were asked to mark the cell corresponding to the organizations with which any active member of their organizations was known to be affiliated.

Nonetheless, this limitation should not be regarded as particularly worrisome, as overlapping memberships can be considered the most reliable and theoretically meaningful of the two indicators of interpersonal bonds. Regarding its theoretical significance, building upon the famous notion of the duality of persons and groups (Breiger 1974), it should be noted how those activists that become active in more than one organization create meaningful latent connections between the collectives to which they belong. The significance of these latent connections created by shared members is twofold: symbolic and practical. First, overlapping memberships between organizations provide a rough indicator of their mutual compatibility –at least from the point of view of those joint members– and a high density of them often reveal the existence of informal communities or subcultures in which the same set of people share very similar interests, concerns and experiences (Diani 1995: 83, 100-1; 2015a: 82-3). Regarding the more practical dimension, individuals with multiple memberships often generate important channels for the transfer of information and expertise between different associations (Knoke, Diani, Christopoulos & Hollway, in preparation: ch.5), and can therefore play a crucial bridging role. For instance, previous investigations (e.g. Obach 2004; Reese et al. 2010; Rose 2000) have noted how the presence of these shared members “facilitate communication, trust, and coordinated efforts between organizations, both within and across movements” and can even “help divergent groups negotiate differences” (McCammon & Moon 2015: 329). Moreover, regarding its reliability as an indicator, overlapping membership presents several advantages. First, in contrast with strong personal relationships, the definition of overlapping memberships is significantly less ambiguous. Secondly, given the less sensitive nature of this information, members in key positions of the organization who are acquainted with most –if not all– fellow members are much more likely aware of such joint involvements of some of their colleagues with third organizations. Finally, in contrast with the directed nature of friendship (one can consider another actor as a friend, but we cannot take for granted that these feelings are reciprocated), joint memberships are inherently symmetric relationships. This aspect is particularly important for the intended analyses, since all the other relations considered,

including event co-participation, are also symmetric relationships. More information on the structural characteristics of these networks of overlapping memberships can be found in Appendix 2.

6.2. TOWARDS A MORE PRAGMATIC COOPERATION

Following the same structure of the previous chapter, after having presented in detail the explanatory variables included in the analyses, we will now move to the examination of QAP regression results, which are presented in table 6.7.

Table 6.7. QAP regression of collaborative ties on different types of latent linkages (model C)

	2007	2009	2009 bis [^]	2011	2013	2015	2017
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES							
Ideological factors							
Shared Basque nationalist orientation	.019	.026	.088*	.087*	.052*	.001	.046
Different public position towards ETA	-.032*	-.114**	-.121***	.067**	.008	-.022	.009
Shared far left-wing orientation	.009	.055	-.004	-.041	-.051**	.011	-.002
Shared environmental-specific orientation	-.011	.003	-.011	-.046*	-.021	.015	-.046
Interpersonal factors							
Shared active members	.067**	-.050	-.065	-.014	.063**	.033*	.030
Pragmat-Instr factors							
Overlapping issue-agenda	.084**	.093*	.236**	.227***	.157***	.063*	.193***
Overlapping territorial scope of action	.034	.100	.057	.028	-.020	.036	.018
Centripetal attraction among parties and unions	.184***	.103**	.171***	.121**	.288***	.288***	.169***
Different internal organizational models	-.077**	.037	-.076*	-.019	-.080**	.010	-.002
Different tactical profiles	.004	-.005	-.039	-.009	.001	.009	-.006
Membership of single orgs within umbrella platforms	-.061*	-.064	.068	-.095**	.032	-.022	-.081**
STRUCTURAL CONTROLS							
Geogr unconnectedness	-.074*	-.080	-.114*	-.094***	-.100**	-.055**	-.108**
Specific second-order nodes and members	-.389***	-.308**		-.282***		-.365***	
Intercept	.075	.073	.117	.099	.106	.046	.118
Adj R-square	.185	.152	.285	.313	.290	.231	.192
N (dyads)	378	253	190	210	253	496	435

Notes: Values of collaborative ties normalized using Jaccard similarity measures. Unstandardized regression coefficients. Significance levels: * $<.1$; ** $<.05$; *** $<.01$ (one-tailed tests).

Results reported in table 6.7 show a rather static picture regarding the newly introduced variables, and it is not possible to observe a clear temporal pattern as in the previous chapter. Nonetheless, several interesting findings can be pointed out.

The first conclusion regards the stability of the impact of ideology-based linkages, with coefficients being quite similar to those observed in the previous chapter, even after controlling for all the non-ideological factors introduced in this chapter. This is clearly a reinforcing sign of the robustness of the findings of the previous chapter, particularly regarding the influence that different attitudes towards ETA's armed struggle had on event co-attendance up to 2011, –even with the reversal of its traditional burden effect in that same year– while it seems to have become a non-issue in more recent times. On the contrary, the strength of nationalist homophily is softened a bit after controlling for non-ideological factors, which points to the fact that inbreeding among Basque nationalists was driven not only by solidarity logics but to a large extent by overlaps in the issue addressed, as well as by the competitive incentives of the electoral and the labor fields, where Basque nationalism is numerically predominant. Finally, shared far left-wing and environmental-specific (i.e. political ecologist, reformist, or conservationist) ideological orientations remain for the most part irrelevant as predictors of event collaboration, though each of the two dyadic variables behave contrary to expectations in one temporal snapshot (2013 and 2011, respectively). The puzzling isolated behavior of these variables remains hard to explain, though it could just be the result of an occasional surge in interorganizational competition among leading environmental organizations and leftist actors, which might have diminished cooperation.

Regarding interpersonal ties, the existence of overlapping memberships between organizations was a significant positive predictor of interorganizational collaboration only in three years. However, it should be noted that, with the exception of the first observation of 2007, the bridging function expected from interpersonal ties seems to operate mostly during the post-conflict period, even if this positive effect does not reach statistical significance in 2017. On the contrary, during 2009 and 2011, the presence of joint members remained a neutral factor. This inconsistent behavior is coherent to a certain extent with the observation made by McCammon and Van Dyke (2010) in their meta-analysis of the literature on social movement coalitions, where they found “social ties” between organizations to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for coalition formation, but, at most, a contingent facilitator. In other words, activists engaged in several organizations are not constantly acting as brokers between groups, but these

latent social ties are instead occasionally activated in particular periods but not in others. Still, the co-occurrence of event collaborations and joint members is more constant after 2011, which suggests that these latent social ties have been activated more frequently during the post-conflict years.

With regard to pragmatic-instrumental latent linkages the situation is quite mixed, though it should be remarked how, whenever they reach statistical significance, variables behave in the predicted direction. The first broad observation is that overlapping memberships and the centripetal attraction among political and labor actors are the two strongest and most constant predictors of interorganizational collaboration. Although not particularly surprising, it is interesting to note how even the extremely polarized Basque polity, instrumental interests associated with shared goals and with electoral competition are systematically at work, providing a strong incentive for actors holding different political identities to “suspend” them, even if temporarily (Mische 2008), in order to permit collaboration.

On the other side of the spectrum we have other two variables that, contrary to expectations, have a negligible impact on the rates of event co-attendance. We are referring here to tactical differences and overlapping territorial spheres of action. The fact that differences with respect to the occasional use of disruptive tactics are not a deterrent for collaboration is probably due to the high degree of homogeneity in the forms of protest in the region during the period of study. As the overall Basque repertoire of collective action has shrunk over the last decades, with a notable decrease in the use of violence and civil disobedience (A. Letamendia 2019), actors present increasingly similar tactical repertoires, thus reducing the potential ground for discrepancies. Regarding the neutral role played by overlapping spheres of action, this suggests that Basque environmentalism might have left behind previous localist tendencies (Barcena & Ibarra 2001) and collaborations tend to be nowadays multi-level in territorial terms, with local actors, Basque national ones, and even state-wide players joining together more often at the same events. The frequent nature of relationships between actors operating at different geographic scales in the Basque Country suggests that, as Saunders (2007b) found in the case of London, collaboration between exclusively local and regional or national organizations happen more frequently than commonly thought.

In between these two contrasting pairs of variables, we find that divergent organizational models and membership in umbrella organizations already attending an

event discourage collaboration only in certain years but not in others, without being possible to identify any clear temporal pattern.

Finally, moving beyond the examination of individual variables, it is interesting to look at the evolution of the overall explained variance (expressed through adjusted R-square values) throughout time. As it was noted in the previous chapter, ideological linkages explained a minimal share of the total variance in the three post-conflict observations, pointing to an overall de-ideologization of the network. In contrast, when adding non-ideological variables, the more complete model C seems to perform, on average, slightly better in the last three observations in comparison with the first three. In fact, when the explanatory power of the six pragmatic-instrumental factors considered is analyzed on its own (keeping the ‘structural controls’), we can observe in figure 6.4 a notable increase of their explanatory power over time, to the point that the addition of interpersonal ties and the four ideological variables barely improves the fit of the regression model during the post-conflict years, especially in 2015 and 2017.




Figure 6.2. Comparison of the explanatory power of pragmatic-instrumental dyadic variables and the full regression model over time (adjusted R2 values)

6.3. SUMMARY

In this chapter we have expanded the work developed in chapter 5, broadening the range of potential predictors of interorganizational collaboration. In particular, seven new variables have been added to the QAP multiple regression models, six pragmatic-instrumental factors and the interpersonal bonds created by the presence of shared members. The first main aspect to underline is that the conclusions that were reached in the antecedent chapter regarding the impact of ideological factors remain barely altered after controlling for seven other dyadic variables. Results from the more complete regression model C show a very similar picture to the one previously described: during the last years of the violent conflict, Basque nationalism used to be a facilitator of collaboration while disagreements over ETA's armed struggle functioned as a deterrent, and both factors seem to have become unimportant during the post-conflict phase.

Secondly, regarding the newly introduced variables, I would like to highlight the role played by three specific factors. On the one hand, overlapping issue agendas and what I call 'centripetal attraction' among political parties and trade unions are, without a doubt, the two most constant and influential predictors of event co-attendance throughout the entire period, without having observed any noteworthy temporal variation before and after the end of violence. In contrast, we can observe that interpersonal bonds seem to have been activated more often for the development of event-based collaboration after 2011, even if this variable falls slightly short of reaching conventional levels of statistical significance for the last year observed, 2017.

Finally, the examination of the explanatory power of QAP models throughout time and the breakdown of the specific contribution of pragmatic-instrumental factors summarized by figure 6.4 provides strong evidence in support of the guiding hypothesis of this chapter. In short, event collaboration patterns in the Basque environmental field appear to be more driven by pragmatic-instrumental factors after the end of ETA's armed struggle. Therefore, the empirical evidence examined in this chapter indicates an interesting shift at the organizational level from a previously dominant model of 'militant confrontation' towards one of 'pragmatic cooperation' (Ibarra & de la Peña 2004) in which common interests –but also pragmatic and strategic burdens– seem to be gaining ground versus ideological congruence as predictors of interorganizational collaboration. Whether this shift is limited to only weak forms of collaboration reflected in event co-attendance or reveal as well a more profound and encompassing transformation of the

underlying logics of interaction among field members remains to be tested. The introduction of newer relational data and the adoption of a different empirical strategy and analytical framework will allow us to address this question in the next chapter.

7. MODES OF COORDINATION OVER TIME: THE REINFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT LOGICS

The previous two chapters have focused on the evolution of one specific type of tie: interorganizational collaboration observed through event co-attendance. In particular, QAP multiple regression analyses have been used to explain the evolution of these visible patterns of collaboration throughout the six yearly snapshots at our disposal, looking at the association of collaborative ties with a wide number of latent linkages that could function as possible predictors. In a nutshell, results have shown a decrease in the strength of ideological homophily and a parallel increase in the relevance of pragmatic-instrumental factors. As hypothesized, these shifting patterns coincide to a large extent with ETA's abandonment of violence in late 2011, which has been confirmed to be a watershed event in terms of relational dynamics within the Basque environmental field, at least with regards to decisions to publicly join other actors in collective action events.

In contrast, the rationale behind the analyses presented in this chapter significantly differs from its predecessors. Instead of studying the determinants of a single form of interorganizational collaboration at six alternate years, this chapter aims to obtain a more holistic view of the intricate system of multiplex relations between the considered organizations that conform the Basque environmental civic network. For this task, I build upon the analytical framework of 'modes of coordination of collective action' (hereafter MoC framework) developed by Mario Diani (2013b, 2015a), conducting a simultaneous examination of two broad types of ties: those based on mechanisms of resource allocation (resource exchanges) and those reflecting mechanisms of boundary definition (boundary interpenetrations). The empirical examination conducted in this chapter aims, in the first place, to distinguish subsets of actors with differentiated patterns of relations with other field members. After distinguishing actors according to their different logics of interaction with other field members, the analysis will test whether the mix of modes of coordination and/or the profile of their incumbents have been significantly altered by the changing political context.

Having briefly introduced the broad aims of the present chapter, the following section presents the basic conceptual elements of the MoC framework. Afterwards, I specify how the former analytical framework is applied to our case study, setting out some research

questions and expectations that can guide empirical exploration. In the third section, I describe the network datasets examined in this chapter, whereas the fourth section describes in detail the methodological procedures followed for the empirical assessment of modes of coordination. Finally, section five interprets the obtained results in light of the MoC framework, addressing the guiding questions set out in section two.

7.1. THE MODES OF COORDINATION FRAMEWORK

Earlier in chapter 2, I defended a relational approach to the study of civil society, which in concrete terms led this research to focus on collective action fields operationalized as civic networks (see section 2.3). The complex configuration of the multiple types of relations that connect field members in a specific spatial and temporal context can be seen as a product of how collective action is conducted in a given field, that is, as an emerging social order that reflects underlying logics of interactions or organizing principles among actors. Departing from this premise, Mario Diani (2013b, 2015a) has developed an analytical framework that distinguishes four ideal-types of “modes of coordination of collective action” associated with distinctive network patterns. Modes of coordination can be defined as “the relational processes through which resources are allocated within a certain collectivity, decisions are taken, collective representations elaborated, and feelings of solidarity and mutual obligation forged” (Diani 2015a: 13-4). More specifically, he distinguishes between two key analytical dimensions that should be considered when studying any collective action effort from a relational perspective: *resource allocation* and *boundary definition*. The former refers to “the whole sets of procedures through which decisions are taken regarding the use of organizational resources” (*Ibid.*: 15). By contrast, mechanisms of boundary definition can be seen as “the processes through which statements are (implicitly) made about what binds together certain actors rather than others” (*Ibid.*: 201). In other words, boundary definition influences how collective identities and social boundaries are created and reproduced, understanding social boundaries as “criteria that classify elements of social life in different groups and categories, while shaping the relations between those elements both within and between those groups” (*Ibid.*: 16; in a similar way, see as well Tilly 2004: 214).

While both types of mechanisms are at work in any collective action effort, they can take place at different relational levels or settings. As Diani puts it:

Both mechanisms can develop in different relational settings, sometimes involving sustained exchanges between different actors, at others taking place primarily within the confines of specific actors. Some organizations may be inclined to exchange resources with other groups or associations, other organizations may work primarily on their own. Likewise, some organizations may rely primarily on their own identity when it comes to defining the “us and them” involved in collective action processes; other organizations, however, may use broader symbolic referents, identify with broader collectivities than those represented by their own constituencies, and develop sustained feelings of solidarity with other groups operating in the same field. (Diani 2015b: 934-5).

Therefore, when applying the MoC framework to the study of interorganizational collective action fields, a dual classification of the multiple types of relations that might connect a given set of organizations can be derived, distinguishing between ‘resource exchanges’ and latent ties indicating ‘boundary work’. This classification echoes the one proposed by Laumann and colleagues, who differentiated between “two general types of interorganizational relationship, linkages based on resource transfers and those based on interpenetration of organizational boundaries” (1978: 463). While the first type of ties fulfills instrumental aims, the other is associated with solidarity building and/or maintenance (Eggert 2014: 372). As a brief terminological aside, hereafter I will maintain Diani’s term of ‘*resource exchanges*’ to refer to observed ties associated with mechanisms of resource allocation. Nonetheless, when naming the specific ties associated with boundary definition mechanisms, I preferred to use an expression closer to Laumann and colleagues’ original formulation, opting for the term ‘*boundary interpenetrations*’ in order to refer to the concrete empirical manifestations of boundary definition ties between discrete organizations. The reasons supporting the choice of ‘interpenetrations’ over ‘work’ are twofold: theoretical and stylistic. Theoretically, the term ‘interpenetrations’ leaves no doubt to the fact that when these are observed, they refer to boundary work across different organizations, and not just within, as it may occur in coalitional or organizational modes. Stylistically, the countable nature of the former noun matches better with the valued characteristics of the empirical networks reflecting ties associated with boundary definition mechanisms (see section 7.3.2). In contrast with Diani’s, in my operationalization it is not only important to see whether a pair of organizations engage in symbolic or solidarity-building work among themselves or not, but also, if so, to take into account the intensity of such latent connection.

Depending on how resource exchanges and boundary interpenetrations combine, four ideal-types modes of coordination can be distinguished. A *social movement* mode combines high levels of both resource exchanges and boundary interpenetrations, that is,

intense collaboration and a broad sense of solidarity between actors. When organizations are involved in high levels of resource exchanges but with little or no boundary interpenetrations reflecting boundary work, we observe a *coalitional* mode. In contrast, a *subcultural* or *communitarian* mode of coordination emerges when actors hardly exchange any kind of organizational resources for instrumental purposes despite sharing “strong collective identities that go beyond single organizations” (Eggert 2014: 373). Finally, when actors promote collective action mostly on their own and boundary work takes place within organizational boundaries, we can talk of an *organizational* mode. A visual summary of the MoC framework is presented in figure 7.1.




Figure 7.1. Modes of coordination of collective action (source: Diani 2015a: 16)

Obviously, quite often empirical reality does not fully fit this ideal Weberian typology, since “unsurprisingly, any specific episode of collective action will likely consist of different modes” (Diani 2015a: 17). Moreover, when assessing the mode of coordination that specific collective actors follow in a certain episode, their relational behavior may fall somewhere in between two or more ideal-type modes, being hard to establish clear-cut boundaries. Still, the application of the MoC framework to the study of a single relational setting is particularly useful for distinguishing among different logics or ‘organizing principles’ that specific actors follow when promoting collective action in different contexts (Diani 2015a: 201; Eggert 2014: 372). As Pavan convincingly argues:

Distinguishing between different modes based on the investigation of actual relational patterns is more than a network exercise. It is a prerequisite to attach different expectations to different courses of action. A social movement is structurally different, and hence politically different, from a campaign as much as it is from a subculture or from a collective effort handled within the boundaries of one organization. Because they are grounded in different relational patterns, movements, campaigns, subcultures and organizational modes of action will last differently over time, are expected to engage with certain challenges rather than with others and, also, to be more or less keen on the adoption of different action repertoires. The key element here is not so much in “labeling” a course of action in a suitable way but, rather, to understand the potentialities and constraints to action that come with a specific relational pattern (Pavan 2015: 915)

Having emphasized the utility of adopting the MoC framework, it is important to underline that it does not aim to provide a theory of how every relational setting in which collective action takes place operates but, more modestly, provides a conceptual toolbox that can be helpful to inform empirical examination of a wide range of phenomena from a truly relational perspective, particularly within the context of organized civil society. At the same time, the employment of the MoC perspective for the interpretation of instances of collective action may contribute to a better (re)formulation of a range of theories about collective action and social movements. In other words, the MoC framework should not be regarded as a specific relational theory to be tested, as it does not presuppose that all four modes of coordination will be observable and/or distinguishable in every collective action field observed, nor that actors in each mode share prespecified characteristics or will always adopt the same type of strategies. How different modes of coordination combine and to what extent these are associated with actors' attributes and behaviors remain open empirical questions. It is therefore the analyst's task to identify distinct relational patterns, relate them to a mode of coordination and subsequently, if possible, establish a theoretical linkage to contextual and contingent circumstances that surround the specific episode of collective action under study.

7.2. MODES OF COORDINATION OVER TIME IN THE BASQUE ENVIRONMENTAL FIELD

Once the key conceptual building blocks of the MoC framework have been briefly presented, it is time to specify how our case study can be interpreted from the perspective of MoC, and what empirical questions will guide the analyses. Nonetheless, before addressing these issues, a few considerations should be made about the basic traits of the research design, particularly in terms of periodization.

7.2.1. Research design: periodization and network composition

The longitudinal comparison required to explore changes over time in Basque environmental collective action will now be conducted in a more parsimonious fashion in contrast to the two previous chapters, comparing two multi-year temporal observations that correspond to the first and the second half of our period of analysis. The first half combines observations from the years 2007 to 2011 and will be referred as the ‘conflict-affected phase’. The second half corresponds to the ‘post-conflict phase’ and aggregates data from the years 2013 to 2017. Apart from the significance of ETA’s definitive abandonment of violence in late 2011 as a critical event –which the two previous chapters have confirmed, at least with regards to the more visible patterns of collaboration, event co-attendance– another observation supports this periodization: organizational replacement within the ECAF. Coinciding with the commented shift in the broad Basque political context, several actors abandoned an active engagement in environmental collective action or even disappeared between the years 2010-12, at the same time as several new actors appeared and/or became involved in the field (see section 3.4.2.g).

Regarding the composition of the networks at both phases, among the 70 organizations identified in section 4.2.2 as members of the environmental field during at least one year, the great majority (51) were actively and publicly engaged in environmental collective action during just one of the two phases (specifically, 24 during the first one and 27 during the second one), with only 19 actors being active in both periods. Consequently, the civic networks observed at these two phases were quite similar in terms of size –with 43 and 46 nodes– but diverged considerably with respect to the identity of their respective members, with only 19 actors being active in both periods.

In summary, the analyses conducted in this chapter will consist of a careful exploration of structural patterns of interactions observed between organizations at two multi-year phases, considering both the patterns of resource exchanges and of boundary interpenetrations.

7.2.2. Guiding questions and some expectations

Moving now to the specific content of empirical examination in this case, the basic premise that underlies the analysis is that contextual factors are expected to affect the logics of interaction among field members, therefore producing a different configuration in terms of modes of coordination. This basic theoretical assumption has already been

tested in previous cross-sectional comparison of modes of coordination in different urban contexts (Diani 2015a; Eggert 2014), but this time the comparison will consist of a diachronic examination of the same object, the Basque ECAF, at two points in time.

In this case, two different overarching questions about the structural evolution of the Basque environmental field will be addressed:

- RQ1 – Has the relative strength of each mode of coordination changed over time?
- RQ2 – In case a social movement mode is observed in both periods, does the profile of actors engaged in it significantly differ before and after the demise of the violent conflict?

Even though the nature of these research questions and the MoC perspective in general is eminently exploratory and inductive, some relatively specific expectations can be developed, based on previous literature, empirical observations derived from qualitative fieldwork, and from the findings resulting from the the analysis of event co-participation patterns over time conducted in the previous two chapters.

First, regarding variations in the relative strength of different MoC we can formulate two tentative hypotheses, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. On the one hand, the fact that ties of event co-attendance have become denser, more intense and are less influenced by ideological factors points towards the potential enhancement of coalitional logics, probably at the expense of organizational modes. Therefore, in case other types of less visible resource exchanges also behave in the same way, we would expect a significantly higher share of organizations engaged in a coalitional mode in the post-conflict phase in comparison with the conflict-affected phase (H1a). On the other hand, the disappearance of the divisive issue of the armed struggle and the decreasing salience of the national cleavage might have increased ideological congruence among actors. In addition to this, similarly to what happened with event co-attendance, the new more open context might have produced a social de-encapsulation of radical Basque nationalism, with individual activists that feel close to this political family being more prone to participate in non-*abertzale* entities, and vice versa. The combination of these two processes might have expanded boundary interpenetrations, which, if coupled with increasing collaboration, would reinforce social movement relational dynamics, with more actors engaged in such mode and probably more tightly connected among them (H1b).

Secondly, regarding the profile of actors engaged in a social movement logic, the less exceptional circumstances surrounding environmental collective action in Basque territory nowadays may have caused long-held assumptions about the typical properties of environmental movement actors to become outdated. Basically, we can inspect the attributes of incumbents of the social movement mode in at least three different directions. First, we can test whether the historical association between Basque nationalism, especially radical left-wing nationalism, and the environmental movement still holds today. In particular, it is expected that such organizations were overrepresented among the social movement subset during the conflict-affected phase, while social movement incumbents would show a more proportional distribution of organizational identities during the post-conflict period (H2a). The second hypothesis that can be tested refers to the territorial scope of organizations engaged in a social movement. As previous research has shown (Barcena & Ibarra 2001; Barcena 2004), Basque environmental action has long been characterized by localist tendencies which also affected the type of organizations active in the territory, producing for instance a very modest presence of international and state-wide organizations. While it is unlikely that many purely local actors (those who work at the municipal or provincial level) would engage in the kind of intense/broad overlapping connections typical of social movement logics with many other actors at the Basque national level, those larger organizations with a Basque-wide scope of action are expected to be predominant among social movement incumbents. However, it is possible that, along with the ‘normalization’ of Basque politics after 2011, organizations with a supra-Basque scope of action might have increased their presence in recent years (H2b).

Finally, besides these Basque-specific hypotheses, we can also test whether the conclusions to which Diani arrived when comparing Bristol and Glasgow regarding the interplay between attributes and relational patterns (2015a: 189-92) also apply to our longitudinal comparison. If this was the case, we would expect that during the more polarized pre-settlement context, actors identified in social movement relational positions resembled to a large extent the classic profile of SMOs (e.g. Lofland 1996), while a more pluralistic and heterogeneous composition should be observed afterwards in a more consensual setting. Therefore, it is expected that up to 2011, actors engaged in a social movement MoC overwhelmingly possessed the stereotypical traits associated with a ‘grassroots model’ (Rucht 1996: 188): (i) loose, informal and decentralized organizational structures, (ii) an emphasis on unruly, radical protest tactics, and (iii) a reliance on strongly committed adherents organizations, which in this case are expected

to correspond to those organizations focusing exclusively or primarily on environmental issues. In contrast, in the more open post-conflict scenario this might not be the case anymore (H2c).

7.3. NETWORKS OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND BOUNDARY DEFINITION

In order to apply the MoC framework and explore the questions formulated above, a multirelational network composed of two dimensions or layers was constructed for each phase. Each layer, that is, each single-relation adjacency matrix, corresponds to one of the two analytical dimensions of the MoC framework: resource allocation and boundary definition. At the same time, both networks are aggregative in nature, as they summarize information from more than one specific tie of the same type. For instance, the network associated with resource allocation results from the combination of two specific indicators of interorganizational resource exchanges: event co-attendance and participation in enduring coalitions. In contrast, the network associated with boundary definition reflects the degree of boundary interpenetration among organizations, derived from information on ideological congruence and overlapping memberships.

Before presenting in detail how these two composite networks were constructed and what their basic statistical properties are, it is necessary to discuss a crucial operational difference that separates my application of the MoC framework from Diani's (2015a) operationalization in his study of civic networks in Bristol and Glasgow. This difference refers to the relation between the two layers of the multiplex network, that is, between ties associated with resource allocation and with boundary definition. *Social bonds* were used as indicators of boundary interpenetrations and were treated in practical terms as a "subcategory of resource exchanges" (*Ibid.*: 85), given that social bonds were defined as "those interorganizational ties that imply both resource exchanges and the deeper connections generated by the multiple memberships and/or the personal friendships of organizations' core members" (*Ibid.*: 84). This choice seemed to be the result of constraints derived from data collection, in particular from the design of the organizational surveys, as "the presence of interpersonal links between organizations was probed only for those organizations that were linked as major partners" (*Ibid.*: 86, fn. 18). While I agree with the claim that the overlap of resource exchanges and social bonds (or other indicators of boundary interpenetrations) indicates a deeper level of connection, there seems to be no theoretical reason supporting the assumption that

boundary work can only take place when organizations already exchange resources. Indeed, this operationalization is problematic, as it precludes the possibility to identify subcultural modes of coordination. It seems more congruent with the theoretical framework of the MoC approach to keep the operationalization of these two types of relationships independent from each other, allowing for the possibility of observing boundary interpenetrations even when no instrumental ties are in place, and vice versa. Indeed, Diani himself proceeded in this way in a previous examination of environmental networks in Milan (2012). Consistently with the latter example, in this research the network of resource exchanges and the one of boundary interpenetrations were first constructed following an independent logic before being jointly analyzed in a subsequent stage.

7.3.1. Resource allocation: constructing a composite measure of resource exchanges

Up to this chapter, we have mainly directed our attention to one particular indicator of resource exchanges: co-attendance at the same collective action events. In spite of all its shortcomings, information on event co-attendance still reveals meaningful patterns of resource exchanges, as the decision to participate in certain events and not in others implies a decision to share with other actors some limited organizational resources such as members' time and motivation, funds, or organizational reputation. Therefore, having already at our disposal information on event co-attendance, it would be unwise not to employ this large and detailed dataset for the construction of networks of resource exchanges. In order to adapt the event co-attendance data to our new more parsimonious diachronic comparison, the 419 environmental collective action events were split according to the two multi-year periods, grouping the 256 events that occurred during the first three sampled years (2007, 2009, 2011) and the 163 events observed during the last three years (2013, 2015, 2017) into different datasets. Following the same procedure already explained above in section 4.2.3, these aggregated organization-by-event datasets were employed to create an event co-attendance matrix for each phase, with tie values normalized using the Jaccard coefficient in order to control for the very divergent levels of participation. The basic characteristics of this undirected valued networks are reported in table 7.2 below.

Nonetheless, while event co-attendance has been an extremely useful indicator for observing the transformation of collaborative patterns over time, due to its temporal

variability and the accessibility of this information through news reports, it certainly falls short of providing a complete view of resource exchanges among organizations. As already discussed in section 4.2, event co-attendance is by no means an unproblematic nor complete indicator of interorganizational collaboration. Essentially, event co-attendance cannot reveal some other less visible forms of collaboration, which despite not taking place so publicly are often more intense and long-standing.

Thus, keeping these limitations in mind, what other kind of resource exchanges can be observed retrospectively in this case? Besides participating in collective action events, civic actors often engage in more enduring activities and projects that span through longer periods, especially as response to specific environmental aggressions, often creating *ad hoc* umbrella groups or platforms. We have already seen nine such examples among our 70 field members: *AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana*, *Araba sin Garoña*, *Fracking Ez*, *PxINME-Gure Energia*, *Foro contra Garoña*, *Movimiento contra la Incineración*, *TTIP/CETA Ez*, *Jaizkibel Bizirik*, and *REAS*. All these umbrella groups are examples of what Levi and Murphy (2006) conceptualize as ‘enduring coalitions’. Despite the fact that these forms of coalitions are very heterogeneous in terms of longevity, size, scope, public impact, and activities conducted, they belong nonetheless to the same conceptual category as they entail a long-term cooperation with chosen partners and a more explicit or even formalized structure in comparison with informal collaboration or event coalitions (*Ibid.*: 655). Therefore, joint participation in the same enduring coalitions provides meaningful information on more sustained and behind-the-scenes forms of interorganizational collaboration. More importantly for our purposes, in contrast with other forms of behind-the-scenes collaboration that can be only revealed synchronously through surveys (e.g. exchange of information and or material resources), reliable information on joint participation in the same platform could be traced retrospectively through a thorough mapping of enduring coalitions promoting environmental demands in Basque territory during the period of study and an analysis of their membership. Fortunately, the in-depth knowledge of recent socio-environmental conflicts and actors acquired through the review of previous literature and the fieldwork conducted⁹⁸ allowed me to become aware of several enduring coalitions beyond those umbrella groups that had already been identified as members of the field through the event dataset.

⁹⁸ In particular, the dozens of interviews conducted with experts and activists, and the systematic review of thousands of newspaper articles

To be included for analysis, joint environmental initiatives needed to fulfill several conditions in order to be regarded as ‘enduring coalitions’. First, these joint initiatives needed to be interorganizational in nature, that is, being composed of organizations, even if in some cases individual activists could also participate without representing any particular collectivity. Therefore, several well-known initiatives that in common language are often misleadingly referred by activists and journalists alike as “platforms” (*plataformas*) were discarded whenever it was confirmed that they were exclusively composed of individuals as members. Second, these enduring coalitions needed to be active during at least one entire year within the 11-year period of analysis. Finally, the geographic scope of the enduring coalition could not surpass the scope of Euskal Herria, thus including local, provincial and Basque-level initiatives, but leaving aside international coalitions. For this reason, enduring coalitions developed at the international level like *La Via Campesina* or Stop TTIP were not included despite of the fact that a handful of Basque actors members of our civic network partook in these initiatives. In the end, as many as 19 enduring coalitions were uncovered, 12 being active in the conflict-affected phase, while 13 were in place during the post-conflict period. Table 7.1 lists all considered enduring coalitions that worked, at least partially, on environmental issues during the period examined, highlighting in bold those umbrella groups that were among the 70 field members themselves. The number of active ECAF members (nodes of our civic networks) that took part in each enduring coalition is reported as well.

Given that a large share of these 19 enduring coalitions were active only for a fraction of the entire 11-year period analyzed, the relational analysis of their membership allows us to trace temporal variations in collaboration patterns among organizations. Applying the same logic followed for the construction of event co-attendance matrices (see section 4.2.3), in a first step, two-mode ‘organizations-by-enduring coalition’ matrices were built, reflecting the affiliation of each network to the different enduring coalitions active during each period. In a second step, these networks (of dimensions 43x12 and 46x13, respectively) were converted into one-mode data, with values normalized through the Jaccard coefficient (see section 4.2.3). As a result, one-mode undirected and valued networks of co-participation in enduring coalitions were obtained, with discrete organizations as nodes, connected among them by the extent to which their engagement in enduring coalitional structures coincided.

Table 7.1. List of enduring coalitions included in the analysis

Conflict-affected phase (2007-11)		Post-conflict phase (2013-17)	
Name	Participating ECAF members (N=43)	Name	Participating ECAF members (N=46)
<i>Initiatives spanning over both phases</i>			
AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana	15	AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana	10
Araba sin Garoña	11	Araba sin Garoña	16
Barakaldo Naturala	7	Barakaldo Naturala	6
Jaizkibel Bizirik	12	Jaizkibel Bizirik	7
REAS	3	REAS	3
Plat. Ribera por el Tren Público y Social	4	Plat. Ribera por el Tren Público y Social	3
<i>Initiatives active during one phase only</i>			
Arantzadi Bizirik / Salvemos las huertas	2	Bidasoaldeko Lagunak	2
Coordinadora de Grupos en contra del proyecto de la Supersur	2	Elikaherria	1
Koordinadora Auzolan Erretereria	3	Foro Contra Garoña	17
Red por un Tren Social	13	Fracking Ez	9
Plataforma Parque Arriaga	5	Movimiento Anti-incineracion	3
Alianza Social por la Soberanía Alimentaria de los Pueblos	4	Px1NME/Gure Energia	19
		TTIP/CETA Ez	29

Once data on event co-attendance and co-participation in enduring coalitions had been gathered for each phase, the resulting networks were merged into a single composite matrix of resource exchanges, with tie values reflecting the average of the two indicators of interorganizational collaboration considered. Table 7.2 reports some basic descriptive statistics of the composite network summarizing ties associated with resource allocation, as well as of the two networks of specific indicators of resource exchanges on which the former was built.

All networks present very high levels of connection, as most organizations establish some form of resource exchange with dozens of other field members, albeit with varying intensity, reflected in tie weights. The environmental field seems to be well integrated and cohesive in terms of resource exchanges, with the composite networks being formed by single components despite the existence of several isolates in the networks of co-participation in enduring coalitions, that is, organizations that did not partake in any such platforms. Therefore, when not directly connected, any given pair of organizations is indirectly connected through one or, at most, two intermediaries. When comparing the two temporal observations of the composite resource exchange network, it is important to remark how the overall density increased significantly in the post-conflict phase. Moreover, resource exchanges were not only more numerous, but also more intense –

since tie values increased as well– and more evenly distributed among actors, with much lower centralization scores. Actually, this intensification of resource exchanges in the post-conflict phase seems to have been evenly produced by the parallel increase in density and average tie strength of the two individual proxies of resource exchanges ties, which maintained a very similar correlation score at both phases (.289 and .33 respectively).

Table 7.2. Structural properties of networks associated with resource allocation

	Conflict-affected phase (2007-11)	Post-conflict phase (2013-17)
Number of nodes	43	46
Event co-attendance		
Average degree	15.488	22.261
Average distance	1.641	1.534
Diameter	3	3
Isolated nodes	0	0
Components (apart from isolates)	1	1
Density	.369	.495
Centralization	.612	.412
Closure	.657	.696
Edge value range (min – max)	Interval: 0 – 1	Interval: 0 – .692
Average edge strength (<i>s.d.</i>)	.053 (.102)	.071 (.102)
Co-participation in enduring coalitions		
Average degree	10	22.957
Average distance	1.526	1.117
Diameter	3	2
Isolated nodes	13	8
Components (apart from isolates)	1	2
Density	.238	.510
Centralization	.376	.257
Closure	.762	.920
Edge value range (min – max)	Interval: 0 – 1	Interval: 0 – 1
Average edge strength (<i>s.d.</i>)	.083 (.176)	.185 (.229)
Composite network of resource exchanges [<i>average of events and enduring coalitions</i>]		
Average degree	18.605	30.609
Average distance	1.564	1.344
Diameter	3	3
Isolated nodes	0	0
Components (apart from isolates)	1	1
Density	.443	.680
Centralization	.534	.288
Closure	.719	.842
Edge value range (min – max)	Interval: 0 – .655	Interval: 0 – .846
Average edge strength (<i>s.d.</i>)	.068 (.114)	.128 (.140)

7.3.2. Boundary definition: constructing a composite measure of boundary interpenetrations

As mentioned earlier, the composite network of boundary interpenetrations results from the combination of two indicators of boundary definition processes. Similarly to the previous section, one of the two indicators –shared members– is already known to the reader from previous chapters and therefore requires little explanation, while the other one –ideological congruence– requires a longer elaboration.

The first of these indicators refers to the interpersonal bonds between organizations created by overlapping memberships, that is, by activists who are simultaneously active members in more than one organization. In fact, shared members between organizations were already employed in Diani's (2015a: 81-5) original operationalization as one of the proxies for the assessment of boundary work in relational terms (the other being close friendships). Inspired by Simmel's (1955) theorization on the intersection of social circles, the fact that a given pair of organizations share some of their core members can be read as a form of boundary interpenetration. Because shared members do not only play a brokerage role crucial for alliance building by facilitating the circulation of information and the generation of mutual trust (as mentioned in section 6.2.1) but do also facilitate "the creation of shared understandings of reality and shared identities" (Crossley & Diani 2019: 158), the presence of overlapping members is usually a reflection of deeper feelings of solidarity and mutual recognition between organizations. As Baldassarri and Diani argue, these interpersonal connections are particularly important for "organizations relying heavily—if not exclusively—on voluntary work", establishing bonds that often reflect "a logic of belongingness" (2007: 743). Even from a skeptical point of view, it should be noted that the existence of overlapping members reveals, at the very least, the compatibility of organizations' identities from the point of view of those activists with multiple affiliations (Diani 1995: 14, 83, 100-1; 2015a: 83; Diani & Bison 2004).

In operational terms, since interpersonal bonds created by overlapping memberships have already been used in the previous chapter as one latent predictor of event co-attendance (see section 6.1.2), this time we just needed to adjust the already collected information to the new periodization, constructing nodelists encompassing the 43 and 46 organizations respectively included in each multi-year phase. Network characteristics of overlapping members within the environmental field during both conflict-affected and post-conflict phases are reported in table 7.5.

Even though the relevance of shared members as an indicator of symbolic connections and solidarities between organizations is indisputable, it is important to note that this is just one possible proxy for assessing boundary work at field level, but not the only one (Diani 2015a: 81-2). Indeed, Diani himself recognizes that processes of boundary definition “might be primarily associated with ideational elements, social representations and framing processes” (*Ibid.*: 14). Given this insight, I decided to complement data on interpersonal bonds with a more symbolic type of boundary interpenetration reflecting exceptional levels of ideological congruence between organizations. I argue that, just like ties created by shared members, organizations that display very similar ideological identities and that belong to the same distinctive political milieu, are more likely to be bounded by feelings of solidarity and mutual recognition.

The construction of these networks of ideological congruence involved several steps. In the first place, similarity matrices were built for each of the four ideological dimensions considered in the previous two chapters as predictors of collaboration: nationalist orientation, position towards ETA’s armed struggle, general left-right position, and environmentalist orientation. Basically, these four individual similarity matrices reflect, in a scale ranging from 1 to –1, whether any given pair of organizations shared a very similar ideological stance on the considered dimension (in which case a tie of value 1 is assigned) or an opposing view (assigning a tie of value –1), with intermediate variables also created when appropriate. Technically, this data transformation rested upon the different tools available in UCINET for converting attributes to networks (see Borgatti *et al.* 2013: 86-7; Hanneman & Riddle 2005: 83-4). Table 7.3 summarizes the categorization applied to each ideological dimension and the tie values assigned in the similarity matrices to different combinations of those ideological attributes. It is important to note that in the case of nationalist and left-right orientation, this categorization differed from the less fine-grained dichotomizing approach applied for the construction of their respective latent networks used in chapters 5 and 6.

For the second step, these four independent similarity matrices were summed, creating a merged similarity matrix of overall ideological congruence, with tie values ranging from a maximum value of 4 (perfect overlap in all four considered dimensions) to a minimum value of –3 (extreme ideological antagonism). On a third and final step, tie values were transformed into a simpler ordinal scale differentiating three levels of ideological congruence: low ($x < 2$, recoded as 0), high ($2 \leq x < 3$, recoded as 1) and very high ($x \geq 3$, recoded as 2).

Table 7.3. Value assignment for the construction of individual proximity matrices of ideological congruence for the four dimensions considered

	Categories	Attribute combinations and resulting edge values
Nationalist orientation	A. Basque nationalist B. Spanish nationalist C. No clear organizational position	$a_{AA} a_{BB} \rightarrow 1$ $a_{AC} a_{BC} a_{CC} \rightarrow 0$ $a_{AB} \rightarrow -1$
Position towards ETA	A. Lenient B. Critical C. No clear organizational position	$a_{AA} a_{BB} \rightarrow 1$ $a_{AC} a_{BC} a_{CC} \rightarrow 0$ $a_{AB} \rightarrow -1$
Left-right orientation	A. Far left-wing B. Center-left C. Center-right D. No clear organizational position	$a_{AA} a_{BB} a_{CC} \rightarrow 1$ $a_{AB} \rightarrow 0,5$ $a_{AD} a_{BD} a_{CD} a_{DD} \rightarrow 0$ $a_{BC} \rightarrow -0,5$ $a_{AC} \rightarrow -1$
Environmental specific orientation	A. Political ecologist B. Reformist C. Conservationist D. Not applicable (no environmentalist profile)	$a_{AA} a_{BB} a_{CC} \rightarrow 1$ $a_{AB} a_{BC} \rightarrow 0,75$ $a_{AC} \rightarrow 0,5$ $a_{AD} a_{BD} a_{CD} a_{DD} \rightarrow 0$

Once data on overlapping memberships and ideological congruence had been obtained, I proceeded to merge them into a single composite matrix of boundary interpenetrations. However, in contrast with the mean-based approach followed for resource exchanges, this time I applied an additive approach, summing the binary matrix of shared members to the three-value measure of ideological congruence. As it can be observed in table 7.4, the combination of both indicators allows generating an ordinal scale in which four different degrees of boundary interpenetration were differentiated: null or weak (0), moderate (1), strong (2), and very strong (3).

Table 7.4. Strength of boundary interpenetrations and assigned values

	Overlapping memberships	
Ideological congruence	<i>No (0)</i>	<i>Yes (1)</i>
<i>Very high (2)</i>	Strong (2)	Very strong (3)
<i>High (1)</i>	Moderate (1)	Strong (2)
<i>Low (0)</i>	Null/weak (0)	Moderate (1)

The basic structural properties of the composite network of boundary interpenetrations are reported in table 7.5, along with the overall characteristics of the two specific proxies used.

Table 7.5. Structural properties of networks associated with boundary definition

	Conflict-affected phase (2007-11)	Post-conflict phase (2013-17)
Number of nodes	43	46
<u>Overlapping memberships</u>		
Average degree	3.535	6.304
Average distance	2.244	2.099
Diameter	4	4
Isolated nodes	11	4
Components (apart from isolates)	1	2
Density	.084	.140
Centralization	.336	.318
Closure	.237	.304
Edge value range	Binary: 0 / 1	Binary: 0 / 1
<u>Ideological congruence</u>		
Average degree	6.047	8.609
Average distance	1.664	1.654
Diameter	4	4
Isolated nodes	17	15
Components (apart from isolates)	2	2
Density	.144	.191
Centralization	.199	.311
Closure	.726	.740
Edge value range	Ordinal: 0 / 1 / 2	Ordinal: 0 / 1 / 2
Average tie strength (<i>s.d.</i>)	.185 (.482)	.229 (.502)
Edges of value 1	10.3 %	15.4 %
Edges of value 2	4.1 %	3.8 %
<u>Composite network of boundary interpenetrations</u>		
	<i>[sum of overlapping memberships and ideological congruence, normalized on a 0-1 scale]</i>	
Average degree	8.465	12.609
Average distance	1.906	1.778
Diameter	5	3
Isolated nodes	9	2
Components (apart from isolates)	1	2
Density	.202	.280
Centralization	.313	.334
Closure	.598	.606
Edge value range	Pseudo-interval: 0 / .33 / .67 / 1	Pseudo-interval: 0 / .33 / .67 / 1
Average edge strength (<i>s.d.</i>)	.090 (.200)	.123 (.221)
Edges of value 0.33	14.7 %	20.5 %
Edges of value 0.67	4.1 %	6.2 %
Edges of value 1	1.3 %	1.4 %

The first feature that stands out in contrast with resource exchanges' indicators is that networks associated with boundary definition mechanisms are significantly less dense, which is not surprising given the more exclusive and meaningful nature of this type of relations. Apart from the overall level of connection, these networks are also significantly less cohesive, as indicated by the larger average path lengths. Indeed, considerable levels of fragmentation are observed, with several actors being completely disconnected, especially during the conflict-affected phase, not displaying any significant bonds with other field members. The aforementioned characteristics also lead to relational structures that are quite decentralized, implying that there are no dramatic imbalances in the level of connectivity shown by nodes.

When comparing the two temporal observations, we see again a significant increase in overall density during the post-conflict phase. In particular, the proportion of existing boundary interpenetrations increased by almost 50% between both periods, as a result of an expansion in interpersonal ties and rising ideological congruence. As it already occurred for indicators of resource exchanges, the correlation coefficients between the two proxies of boundary work remained stable over time (.181 and .187), indicating a fairly parallel evolution.

7.4. UNCOVERING MODES OF COORDINATION THROUGH BLOCKMODELING

Once we have described how both layers of the comprehensive two-relational datasets have been constructed and what their main characteristics are, it is time to detail how different modes of coordination are empirically identified. It has become clear from the discussion presented in section 7.1 how the different modes are associated with distinctive patterns of ties. So, in theory, all we need to do is identify subsets of nodes within the network where incumbents share a distinct pattern of ties and then associate such pattern with one of the four ideal-type roles defined in the MoC approach (Diani 2015a: 188). While relatively straightforward in conceptual terms, unfortunately, the applicability of this task is not as simple as it seems. The main hurdle comes from the inherent complexity of network data, which impedes relying on visual inspection of the matrices and/or network graphs as a way to generate meaningful interpretations of the distribution of ties. If this is true for binary single-relational networks, complexity drastically increases when simultaneously considering more than one type of relation, and when these relations are valued, reflecting different intensities, as it happens in this case.

To deal with this complexity, some numerical techniques of data reduction are needed (Diani 2015a: 73).

Positional approaches to social network analysis developed within mathematical sociology can be particularly helpful for the sake of data reduction. These techniques seek to uncover different structural positions within the network, that is, classes of actors with patterns of ties that are similar in some meaningful ways. As Saunders notes, positional analyses “can be explored through a variety of algorithms, and the degree and type of equivalence can vary” (2011: 284). Despite their heterogeneity, positional analyses usually resort to the same general empirical procedure: blockmodeling, initially introduced by White, Boorman and Breiger (1976). In a nutshell, blockmodeling is concerned with the identification and classification of actors that are equivalent in some meaningful sense into discrete subsets (called ‘positions’ or ‘clusters’) and the subsequent analysis of the patterns of ties within and between such positions (Wasserman & Faust 1994: 395). The basic goal of blockmodeling is to reduce a large and messy network to a smaller and more comprehensible structure that can be more easily interpreted. Given an adjacency matrix, a blockmodel is created by sorting the rows and columns according to these sets of equivalent nodes, where the delineated *blocks* (sub-matrices reflecting ties within and between such positions) are compared to different sets of ideal blocks and summarized accordingly. Based on this block idealization, the initial adjacency matrix can be reduced to a ‘block image’ or ‘image matrix’ that ideally captures in a succinct fashion the role structure of the network (Nordlund 2016: 161) by assigning all actors with similar patterns of ties to positions and presenting network ties between these positions rather than between single actors (Faust & Wasserman 1992).

Agreeing with Saunders on the need for analysts to “be more explicit about the steps taken in deriving their block models” (2011: 284) I proceed to specify how the blockmodels that were used to classify field members according to their prevailing mode of coordination were generated. In short, the strategy adopted relied on the combined assessment of the most accurate blockmodels –inductively generated– which were selected based on objective goodness-of-fit criteria. The methodological procedure followed in this case is rather complex but can be unpacked into five different stages.

7.4.1. Defining equivalence: structural equivalence

The first decision that needs to be taken when conducting any positional approach is to define the specific type of equivalence in which we are interested, since “there are

many ways in which actors could be defined as ‘equivalent’ based on their relations with others” (Hanneman & Riddle 2005: 198). In practical terms though, there are two widely used definitions of equivalence: *structural* and *regular*.⁹⁹ The concept of structural equivalence was developed first, introduced by François Lorrain and Harrison White (1971), and defines two actors as structurally equivalent if they have the same set of ties to all other actors in the network (independently of whether or not they are tied between them). By contrast, regular equivalence, introduced later on by Douglas White and Karl Reitz (1983), provides a significantly looser but less intuitive definition, defining two nodes as equivalent “if they have the same profile of ties with members of other sets of actors that are also regularly equivalent” (Hanneman & Riddle 2005: 201). Indeed, as noted by Doreian and colleagues, “strictly speaking, we could say, simply, (...) that structural equivalence is a special case of regular equivalence” (2005: 25), a more restrictive version of it.

In this case, I follow Diani (2015a: 73-6) in defending the use of structural equivalence for the identification of MoC over the more sophisticated notion of regular equivalence. Two main reasons support this choice. First, despite the fact that structural equivalence is defined by ties to specific concrete alters and can therefore fail to unite actors with the same role but with different immediate connections, Diani argues that this bias can actually be regarded as an advantage for our specific type of networks under study:

Structural equivalence makes even more sense in the analysis of organizational fields consisting of organizations that are relatively homogeneous and for which the variety of role systems is relatively limited. In the analysis of civic networks, it is of paramount importance to identify specifically who works with whom. This exercise may reveal important information about the salience of ideological differences, the rank of issue priorities, the acceptability and popularity of specific tactics and strategies, and so forth. (Diani 2015a: 75)

⁹⁹ There are other alternative definitions of positional equivalence. For instance, Hanneman & Riddle also discuss the concept of ‘automorphic equivalence’, which defines actors as identical when they are embedded in local structures displaying the same patterns of ties (2005: 200). Indeed, automorphic equivalence falls somewhere in between structural and regular definitions of equivalence, since “any set of structural equivalences are also automorphic and regular equivalences. Any set of automorphic equivalences are also regular equivalences. Not all regular equivalences are necessarily automorphic or structural; and not all automorphic equivalences are necessarily structural” (*Ibid.*: 228). Wasserman and Faust (1994: 487-502) also review two other equivalence definitions, *local role* and *ego algebra* equivalence, which are less restrictive (and therefore more abstract) than regular equivalence. In any case, given that the empirical application of these alternative definitions of equivalence has been much more limited than for the structural and regular versions, I decided to limit the discussion to the latter, which are the most widely used definitions.

Secondly, in more practical terms, some popular algorithms available for the identification of regular equivalent positions, such as REGE, are not particularly reliable when applied to undirected ties such as the ones we deal with. Indeed, Hanneman & Riddle explicitly advise that REGE “should be used cautiously, if at all, with undirected data”, due to the fact that “with undirected data, most cases will appear to be very similar to one another (in the ‘regular’ sense), and no algorithm can really ‘fix’ this” (2005: 246).

As a consequence, the positional analysis conducted in this chapter follows the original structural definition of equivalence, in which the ideal block types are either ‘complete’, filled with all ones (and therefore also called ‘oneblocks’) or ‘null’ (‘zeroblocks’). However, it is important to keep in mind that pure structural equivalence –pairs of actors sharing the exact same ties to the exact same others– is seldom found in empirical network data and, therefore, blocks are rarely perfect. Thus, analyses of structural equivalence aim more modestly at identifying subsets of actors that are “approximately structurally equivalent,” that is, that present sets of ties that are very similar and, ideally, *almost* identical. Consequently, the derived blockmodels will consist of blocks in which strong ties are predominant, approximating complete blocks, and blocks in which ties are mostly absent and/or weak, approximating null blocks. The extent to which this ideal block structure corresponds to the actual observed data determines the fit of the model, a tricky issue which will be tackled later (section 7.4.4.c).

Another important aspect to note is that in this case the network datasets to be analyzed contain two types of relations linking the same set of actors. In such cases, (*approximate*) structural equivalence is the result of presenting very similar connections in the two considered types of ties, in this case, resource exchanges and boundary interpenetrations. This simultaneous approach differs from Diani’s (2015a: ch. 4), as he applied a nested and consecutive approach through which civic organizations were first partitioned into a number of structurally equivalent positions based on the examination of resource exchanges and then, successively, he found that the distribution of ties reflecting boundary definition mechanisms were as well associated with these positions in a nonrandom fashion. While this ‘nested’ approach was coherent with the hierarchical operationalization of social bonds as a subcategory of resource exchanges (see section 7.3), the independent operationalization of each analytic dimension followed in this case logically leads to the adoption of a simultaneous analysis of both relations.

7.4.2. Adopting an exploratory simultaneous-indirect approach

Having specified the type of equivalence on which we are interested, the next question that needs to be addressed is how to deal with the clustering problem that blockmodeling entails: finding an ‘appropriate’ assignment of structurally equivalent units into a reduced number of cluster. There are two basic strategies to solve this issue: the indirect and the direct approach (Batagelij *et al.* 1992). The indirect approach proceeds in two steps, first transforming the original network data into a matrix displaying the similarities or dissimilarities between all pairs of actors’ profiles of ties to alters, and subsequently clustering these (dis)similarity matrices. The direct approach only works with matrices’ original data entries, rearranging actors until it reaches the lowest possible number of errors given the number of clusters and the type of ideal block types permitted (Saunders 2011: 286), where ‘errors’ refer to the number of changes that would be necessary to make the permuted matrix fit the prespecified ideal blockmodel structure.

While the indirect approach is inherently inductive or exploratory, meaning that “clusters and blocks are simply found in the (transformed) data and then interpreted in some fashion” (Doreian *et al.* 2005: 26), direct approaches can be used either inductively or deductively, though they are mostly employed deductively. Inductive approaches to direct blockmodeling only require the analyst to specify the desired number of positions and the type of ideal blocks that are permitted (for instance, complete or null), asking the computer to find an optimized solution, that is, the one with the lowest possible error score. When the analyst tries several partitions with a different number of positions and then picks the most appropriate one, this process is still eminently exploratory (e.g. Borgatti *et al.* 2013: 218-20; Saunders 2011). However, the analyst can also operate deductively, developing “a theory about a network’s structure, creating a blockmodel based on that hypothesis, and then assessing it against an observation of the actual network” (Saunders 2011: 288), that is, inferring a blockmodel and fitting the observed data to it. The deductive or confirmatory use of direct blockmodeling has been extended and formalized into what has come to be known as ‘generalized blockmodeling’ (Doreian *et al.* 1994, 2005), where not only the number of clusters or positions is prespecified, but also other elements. The level of *prespecification* can vary from the “location of at least one block with regard to its type” to a completely prespecified blockmodel “in which all

of the block types are specified by location in the blockmodel” and even the clusters’ membership can be partially constrained (Doreian *et al.* 2005: 26).¹⁰⁰

Even though the merits of generalized blockmodeling are undisputed, particularly in terms of its power to explicitly operationalize previous theories in relational terms and test them transparently with a clear criterion function to assess the blockmodel’s fit, I disagree with Saunders when she asserts that blockmodeling “should only be used deductively” (2011: 299). To be fair, I share many of her sharp critiques of earlier empirical applications of blockmodeling within the literature on social movements for their low transparency in reporting how the presented blockmodels were obtained and how their fit compares to alternative solutions. Nonetheless, I believe her much needed calls to social movement scholars to engage more closely with mathematical sociology and to exert more caution when interpreting ‘packaged’ blockmodels presented by researchers in an almost deterministic and unproblematic fashion should not necessarily lead us to dismiss inductive approaches altogether. When no specific theory-driven expectations about the number of positions and/or the location of specific block types can be formulated, as in this case (see section 7.1), I see no problem in adopting an explorative approach in which the structure of the network is inferred inductively from the data, as long as the selection of the derived blockmodel does not exclusively rely on the subjective judgement of the researcher about the interpretability of the results. Regarding this last requirement, as Wada (2014) has shown, it is indeed possible to conduct blockmodeling inductively while still following transparent and rigorous methodological procedures that seek to maximize the fit of the blockmodel with the observed network and minimize arbitrary decision-making through the establishment of objective criteria for blockmodel selection.

Once it was decided to adopt an explorative approach for the blockmodeling of our two-relational network datasets, a ‘simultaneous-indirect’ strategy was followed, since the direct blockmodeling of multiple relations remains an open problem (Doreian 2006: 128) and the few implementations that have been proposed are explicitly designed for the deductive framework of generalized blockmodeling (e.g. Dabkowski *et al.* 2015).¹⁰¹ As

¹⁰⁰ It should also be noted that the other major contribution of generalized blockmodeling has been the extension of ideal block types beyond the null, complete and regular ones, introducing other types of equivalence that can be combined when testing a hypothetical blockmodel (see Doreian *et al.* 2005).

¹⁰¹ The application of the ‘simultaneous-direct’ approach developed by Dabkowski, Breiger and Szidarovszky is already tremendously time-consuming and computationally expensive even when trying to fit the data to a specific deductively blockmodel with a fixed number of clusters (2015: 11). Therefore,

it has been explained above, the indirect approach proceeds in two steps, first producing a matrix summarizing “the overall similarity (or dissimilarity) of each pair of actors in terms of their ties to alters” (Hanneman & Riddle 2005: 226), and subsequently submitting this matrix to a standard clustering routine. The next section deals with the first of these steps, discussing the choice of specific (dis)similarity measures that have been used in this case.

7.4.3. Choosing appropriate (dis)similarity metrics

As it has already been noted in section 7.4.1, pure structural equivalence is rarely found in real-world network data, especially in the case of valued or weighted networks such as ours, in which ties are not merely present or absent, but if so, present varying strengths. In most valued networks it is extremely unlikely that two actors are connected to the same alters with exactly the same strength to every single alter. Still, the concept of structural equivalence provides an ideal model on which it is possible to use several measures that try to capture the degree to which two actors are structurally equivalent to each other. To do this, it is enough to compare their *profile* of ties to all other nodes of the network, that is, to compare either their respective row vectors in the case of undirected matrices, or both their row and column vectors in the case of directed data. In this case, since our network datasets are composed of two undirected adjacency matrices, the profile of each actor needs to include the ties values for both relations, for which row entries (which are identical to the column entries) of boundary interpenetrations are concatenated to the row entries of resource exchanges and then analyzed as a single vector of length equal to $2(n-1)$.

While there are many measures of (dis)similarity that can be used as metrics of structural equivalence, the two most widely used are Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient and Euclidean distance. Thus, we will restrict the discussion of indirect metrics of structural equivalence to these two most popular measures. Pearson correlation, being a similarity measure, assigns a higher value as the similarity between two actors' profiles increases, with values ranging from -1 to $+1$, with a value of $+1$

its potential application in an exploratory fashion (which would imply exploring different numbers of clusters and reducing prespecifications to a minimum), while conceptually possible, remains nowadays unfeasible in practical terms. On the other hand, a 'sequential-direct' approach which partitions each single relation separately and subsequently attempts to obtain a meaningful structure from these two independent blockmodels is completely undesirable, as the output “may be incongruent, difficult to rectify, and distant from the multiple objective, global optimum.” (*Ibid.*: 8)

corresponding to perfect structural equivalence. In contrast, if using Euclidean distance (which equals the root of the sum of squared differences in tie values), a value of 0 indicates perfect structural equivalence, and the larger the value the less similar a given pair of actors is. Apart from this technical difference, both measures also entail two slightly different approaches for the operationalization of structural equivalence, which become particularly relevant in the case of valued networks (Wasserman & Faust 1994: 374). Whereas correlation is more inclined to capture similarities in patterns of ties, discounting for differences in means and variances of row vectors, Euclidean distance is more sensitive to absolute differences in tie strengths. For instance, it would be possible for a pair of actors to have a perfect correlation score without being perfectly structurally equivalent technically speaking, for instance, having ties to the same alters with tie values that are not of the exact same strength but nonetheless display a perfect linear association. Apart from this extreme case, generally speaking, “Euclidean distance reflects a smaller amount of structural equivalence than does a correlation coefficient if the actors differ in the mean and variance of their ties” (*Ibid.*).

Given these slight but relevant divergences, which measure of structural equivalence should be used in this case? On the one hand, the two adjacency matrices reflect two types of interactions (instrumental and symbolic) and the unequal rates of participation of each actor produce significant differences in the total number of ties, their average strength and the variance of these strength values. The correlation metric will control for these differences, providing similarities in the overall pattern of ties, and therefore might be more likely to detect equivalence among heterogeneous field members (e.g. between large and small organizations or between local and Basque-wide actors). At the same time, information on the relative amount of resource exchanges and the intensity of boundary interpenetrations are considered to be very important in this case (after all, that is the point of not dichotomizing the networks) so the fact that Euclidean distance is influenced by the exact differences in tie values might also be regarded as a positive trait. Moreover, the measurement scale of both types of ties have already been normalized on the same 0-1 interval scale for all actors, so tie values have a relatively similar interpretation across actors. Indeed, from a theoretical perspective, we may want to capture these unequal relational capacities as part of what defines structural equivalence (Nordlund & Žibera 2020: 167, 184). For instance, the obvious constraints that impede small local actors to partake in events and/or enduring coalitions outside of their localities is part of what

makes them structurally different from more resourceful multi-issue groups, and therefore we might want our Euclidean-based metric to capture these divergences.

As there is no preference in this case about the convenience to emphasize patterns or absolute differences in tie strengths, and both metrics present pros and cons, I decided to use both indirect measures. Therefore, for each period, two alternative matrices of structural equivalence were produced and used as input data for clustering actors into structurally equivalent subsets. In these symmetric and valued matrices (obtained through UCINET's 'Profile similarity' option)¹⁰² each cell entry reports the extent to which the row actor and the column actor are structurally equivalent, taking both resource exchanges and boundary interpenetrations into account.

7.4.4. Generating alternative blockmodels and comparing their fit

Once it has been decided to adopt a simultaneous-indirect approach to network clustering based on both Pearson correlation and Euclidean distances as indirect measures of structural equivalence, we are ready to engage with the fundamental task of positional analyses: describing in simplified terms the basic relational structure of our networks. This is done through the generation of adequate blockmodels, that is, parsimonious representations of the relational structure of networks, which consist of the clustering of relatively equivalent actors into the same structural positions and the description of the patterns of ties within and between such positions. Three steps can be differentiated in this process of blockmodel generation: (a) the partition of relatively equivalent actors into discrete structural positions, (b) the description of ties between structural positions for the two relations considered, and (c) an assessment of the adequacy of this representation to the actual data.

7.4.4.a) Clustering structural equivalence matrices

There is no single 'correct' way of clustering the (dis)similarity matrices of structural equivalence generated in section 7.4.3. On the contrary, for any such matrix, a dizzying number of alternative partitions of actors into subsets where members are more similar among themselves than with members of other subsets can be obtained. The obtainment of a specific partition over other depends mainly on two decisions: which clustering algorithm is applied, and how many positions should be identified. Instead of making a

¹⁰² Diagonal values were ignored for computation, since neither the network of resource exchanges nor the one of boundary interpenetrations contain self-ties.

single choice for a specific clustering algorithm and certain number of subsets, I decided to adopt an open and comparative approach. Inspired by Wada's (2014) inductive blockmodeling of protest co-participation among Mexican civil society actors, I avoid making an arbitrary choice by generating instead a large number of alternative partitions and then selecting those that generate more accurate representations of the studied networks.

Regarding the selection of clustering algorithms, upon noting that different clustering algorithms can deliver different partitions of the same input matrix, I decided to explore three standard clustering approaches: CONCOR, hierarchical clustering, and tabu search optimization. CONCOR (which stands for 'convergence of iterated correlations') uses a correlation matrix as the primary input and then continues to correlate the resulting correlation matrices until, at a certain point, all values of the correlation matrix equal +1 or -1, partitioning the matrix into two subsets. The analyst can subsequently repeat this process on the submatrices generated by earlier splits to produce finer partitions. Hierarchical clustering, which can be used with both Euclidean or correlation metrics of equivalence as input, joins actors that are most similar among them in a series of agglomerative nested partitions, until all actors are joined into a single cluster. Several specific criteria exist for joining clusters together, of which we will use the complete-link and the weighted average linkage methods. Finally, the Tabu search optimization routine functions in a quite different way, relocating actors into a user-provided number of clusters until it finds the most optimal combination of actors into k positions, maximizing a certain criterion function.

Given that for each of these approaches two different methodological variants were tried out, in the end, six different clustering methods were used, all implemented in UCINET 6 (Borgatti *et al.* 2002). These were:

- i.* **CONCOR** handling diagonal ties through the default '**reciprocal single count**'
- ii.* **CONCOR** ignoring diagonal ties
- iii.* **Hierarchical clustering** with the **complete-link** method for cluster aggregation
- iv.* **Hierarchical clustering** with the **weighted average** method for cluster aggregation
- v.* **Tabu search** optimization procedure with **correlation** fit criterion
- vi.* **Tabu search** optimization procedure with **density** fit criterion

The last four algorithms were applied to both the correlation- and the Euclidean-based structural equivalence matrices. By contrast, CONCOR only works by default with a correlation-based metric as its primary input. As a consequence, a total of 10 –and not

12– different clustering procedures (specific combinations of similarity measures and clustering algorithms) were explored.

Regarding how to establish an optimal number of clusters, this is almost always a tradeoff between accuracy and parsimony. While it is obvious that, at least in most situations, increasing the number of positions will deliver blockmodels that fit the data more closely, the amount of data reduction is lessened when more positions are added, hindering interpretation. In this case, lacking any solid theoretical criteria (see section 7.4.2), 8 different levels of complexity were tried out for each of the 10 clustering procedures, varying the number of clusters (k) from 2 to 9. Why was the permitted number of distinct structural positions capped specifically at 9? This choice, while always somewhat arbitrary, was based upon the establishment of a minimum 1:20 ratio of data reduction as a threshold. Blockmodels that did not simplify the original matrices by at least 20 times were considered undesirable for being excessively complex.

Based upon the previous decisions, 80 alternative partitions of the network were produced for each phase, 48 having the correlation matrix of structural equivalence as input and 32 obtained from the clustering of the Euclidean distance matrix.

7.4.4.b) Describing relational patterns within and between positions

From that sample of different partitions of actors into (approximately) structurally equivalent classes or positions, let's see how we can generate, a minimum of 80 different blockmodels. Besides assigning every single actor to specific discrete subsets, blockmodels contain a simplified statement of how these subsets or positions are related to each other, that is, a summary of the ties between and within equivalent positions, usually expressed through image matrices. Each of the entries in the image matrix represents a block (a submatrix composed of intra- or inter-position ties), which, when working with a pure definition of structural equivalence, can be modelled in two simplified ways: complete or null. Of course, details are lost in this simplification process, but we gain a clean description of the general features of the network structure. That said, in substantive terms, especially when working with relatively dense and valued network data as in this case, complete and null blocks will rarely correspond to the full presence or absence of ties but will rather indicate intense or limited levels of connection within or between structurally similar actors.

At this point, a new question emerges: how do we decide when to characterize a block as complete or null? A specific rule to decide the assignment of one-blocks or zero-

blocks is needed, and there are multiple options available (see, for instance, Wasserman & Faust 1994: 397-408). In this case, I adopt the *mean value* criterion, which sets the average edge value observed for each relation as a threshold. As such, when the average strength of ties in a certain block is equal or higher than the mean of the entire network the block is considered to approximate a complete block ideally filled with ones. On the contrary, blocks showing a density lower than average were characterized as null or zero-blocks.

An example may help clarify how these simplified statements of the relations within and between equivalent actors are obtained for each partition. Let's consider for illustrative purposes the three-position partition of our multiplex network, observed during the conflict-affected phase, produced by CONCOR without considering diagonal values (solution B-3 in table 7.8.A). When dividing the network into three subsets of approximately structurally equivalent actors, the best of the two possible solutions provided by CONCOR places 17 actors in the first position, 15 in the second one and 11 in the third. Once we have this partition of the network's nodes into three discrete groups, the next step is to examine the densities of ties within and across the identified positions. Thus, we should produce a density matrix that summarizes the mean value of ties within and between groups for both relations, generating two respective density matrices, shown in table 7.6.

Table 7.6. Densities between structural positions, according to the three-cluster partition of the conflict-affected network produced by CONCOR, ignoring diagonal values

		Resource exchanges			Boundary interpenetrations		
		Overall density = .068			Overall density = .09		
		I	II	III	I	II	III
Positions	N						
I	17	.075	.103	.018	.272	.071	.002
II	15	.103	.134	.028	.071	.235	.004
III	11	.018	.028	.046	.002	.004	.006

In a second step of data reduction, we apply the mean value criterion to generate an image matrix for each relation. As it can be observed, the image matrices displayed in table 7.7 are the result of assigning a value of 1 to blocks with a mean value above overall the weighted density of the network (in bold in table 7.6). Position III is isolated from the other two, with weak connections in terms of resource allocation and boundary definition. Positions I and II are instead densely connected internally for both relations but are related

differently depending on the type of tie. While they show intense levels of mutual resource exchanges, their boundary interpenetrations are limited.

Table 7.7. Image matrices resulting from the application of a mean value criterion to the density matrices presented in table 7.6

	Resource exchanges			Boundary interpenetrations		
	I	II	III	I	II	III
I	1	1	0	1	0	0
II	1	1	0	0	1	0
III	0	0	0	0	0	0

These two image matrices (one for each type of tie), along with the specification of which actors have been assigned to which positions (which is not reported in this example), constitute a blockmodel. However, since we do not know to what extent this blockmodel represents the actual observed data accurately, it is necessary to develop some indicator of adequacy (goodness-of-fit) that eventually will allow us to compare this blockmodel with the other 79 alternative representations of structural equivalence.

7.4.4.c) Evaluating and comparing alternative blockmodels

Once we have built a given blockmodel (and we have 80 of them for each temporal observation) we must define how well this ideal representation actually fits our observed two-relational network. In this case, similarly to Wada (2014), I base this goodness-of-fit evaluation on comparing the original observed matrices (X) for each relation to the hypothetical network matrices predicted by a given blockmodel (“target” matrices $X^{(t)}$; Wasserman & Faust 1994: 685). This comparison was conducted making use of the QAP correlation tool in UCINET, using the correlations’ R^2 as a measure of the goodness of fit of the blockmodel to the data, as recommended by Panning (1982). Table 7.8 shows for each phase how well each of the 80 alternative blockmodels generated fits the observed data matrices, reporting the average R^2 value of the two considered relations. For instance, it turns out that the blockmodel reviewed as an example in the previous section (solution B-3 in table A) does not provide a very good representation of the observed data, as their target matrices show moderate correlations with either the observed matrices of resource exchanges (.332) and boundary interpenetrations (.392), resulting in an average R^2 value equal to .132 $[(.11+.154)\div 2]$.

Table 7.8. Goodness-of-fit statistics (R^2) of alternative blockmodels

A – CONFLICT-AFFECTED PHASE (2007-11)										
<i>Clustering procedure</i>			<i>Number of clusters (k)</i>							
<i>Metric</i>	<i>Clustering algorithm</i>		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	Correlation	CONCOR (reciprocal single count)	.083	.154	.193	.246	.261	.267	.297	.303
B	Correlation	CONCOR (ignore diagonal)	.028	.132	.194	.237	.283	.291	.331	.355
C	Correlation	Complete-link hierach clustering	.160	.160	.195	.209	.211	.230	.321	.257
D	Correlation	Weighted avg hierach clustering	.065	.094	.158	.005	.005	.169	.183	.183
E	Correlation	Tabu search (correlation criterion)	.153	.191	.265	.301	.305	.327	.327	.327
F	Correlation	Tabu search (density criterion)	.153	.191	.294	.294	.224	.316	.321	.387
G	Euclidean dist.	Complete-link hierarch clustering	.190	.354	.221	.328	.329	.376	.395	.396
H	Euclidean dist.	Weighted avg hierarch clustering	.196	.374^a	.229	.197	.329	.344	.337	.388
I	Euclidean dist.	Tabu search (correlation criterion)	.190	.374^a	.355	.129	.255	.347	.263	.313
J	Euclidean dist.	Tabu search (density criterion)	.248	.209	.257	.312	.331	.321	.367	.389

B – POST-CONFLICT PHASE (2013-17)

B – POST-CONFLICT PHASE (2013-17)										
<i>Clustering procedure</i>			<i>Number of clusters (k)</i>							
<i>Metric</i>	<i>Clustering algorithm</i>		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
A	Correlation	CONCOR (reciprocal single count)	.079	.176	.201	.262	.293	.311	.358	.386
B	Correlation	CONCOR (ignore diagonal)	.079	.176	.201	.228	.253	.278	.289	.278
C	Correlation	Complete-link hierach clustering	.058	.104	.228	.234	.264	.276	.303	.295
D	Correlation	Weighted avg hierach clustering	.061	.072	.190	.199	.217	.215	.244	.243
E	Correlation	Tabu search (correlation criterion)	.087	.181	.209	.229	.272	.162	.116	.266
F	Correlation	Tabu search (density criterion)	.087	.199	.229	.226	.320	.318	.322	.322
G	Euclidean dist.	Complete-link hierarch clustering	.096	.145	.208	.276	.315	.338	.358	.370
H	Euclidean dist.	Weighted avg hierarch clustering	.120	.284	.264	.285	.336	.421	.428	.409
I	Euclidean dist.	Tabu search (correlation criterion)	.130	.303	.285	.206	.307	.294	.147	.184
J	Euclidean dist.	Tabu search (density criterion)	.171	.284	.300	.314	.318	.344	.372	.386

*Exceptionally well-performing blockmodel solutions, that is, those with a goodness-of-fit score above the mean plus one standard deviation (.348 for the conflict-affected phase and .336 for the post-conflict phase), are highlighted in bold. Among these, the most parsimonious solution within each clustering procedure was selected, being shaded in grey.

^a Solutions H3 and I3 in table A were identical. The selected three-cluster partition was assigned to solution I3 so an exception to the parsimony criterion could be made, selecting the other solution produced by procedure H that provided a fit surpassing the minimum threshold (H9).

Rather than choosing a single “optimal” blockmodel for each phase, I decided to select a reduced number of well-performing blockmodels for a closer examination and interpretation of positions in terms of the MoC framework. Since different clustering

procedures do not necessarily deliver fully consistent results, it was decided to compare a handful of select alternative blockmodels in order to increase the robustness of the interpretative labelling process conducted in the next section (Knoke *et al.*, in preparation: ch.5). More specifically, as indicated by the shadowed cells in tables 7.8, 6 blockmodels of the conflict-affected network were selected, while 4 were picked for the post-conflict phase. This selection relied on two criteria:

- Among the sample of tested blockmodels, only those showing outstanding measures of adequacy (with an average R^2 at least one standard deviation above the mean) were considered, filtering out those with lower goodness-of-fit values.
- In those cases where more than one well-performing blockmodel were produced by the same clustering procedure, a parsimony criterion was applied. In short, solutions with lower number of positions were favored as long as the improvement in the variance of ties provided by more complex blockmodels was not larger than .02.

7.4.5. Interpreting selected best-fitting blockmodels in terms of the MoC framework: from positions to modes of coordination

Once several specific blockmodels have been selected based on objective fit measures, it becomes possible to associate the relational patterns of each identified position (and therefore its incumbents) to one of the four ideal-type modes of coordination of collective action. In this sense, I build upon Diani's (2015a: 187-9) suggestion to interpret the typology of modes of coordination as a typology of basic roles that collective actors can play in civic networks. My operationalization of the MoC is based upon a view of modes of coordination as classes of structural positions that are alike in the way ties associated with resource allocation and with boundary definition mechanisms combine. While the blockmodeling procedures reviewed in the previous section classified actors in structurally equivalent subsets, this final stage in the process of unveiling modes of coordination consists of associating these emerging structural positions into one of four main roles, that is, types of structural positions: social movement (SM), coalitional (C), subcultural (S), or organizational (O).

Since this process is largely interpretative and requires a close examination of each selected blockmodel solution, I deem it better to explain how modes of coordination were identified through a specific example. In the rest of this section, we will illustrate this process with the network corresponding to the conflict-affected phase. It must be noted that the very same interpretative process was also applied to the post-conflict phase data.

As reported above in table 7.8, six different best-fitting solutions were selected. While the final assessment took into account all six blockmodels, we will first take a closer look at one of them for illustrative purposes. This is solution G-7, that is, the blockmodel stemming from the 7-cluster solution obtained from the complete-link hierarchical clustering of the Euclidean-based equivalence matrix. The weighted density of ties within and between identified positions for both resource exchanges and boundary interpenetrations are reported in table 7.9. Based on these density matrices and applying the mean value criterion already explained in the previous section, we can construct two image matrices, one for resource exchanges and other for boundary interpenetrations. This time, however, instead of showing the matrices corresponding to each type of tie separately, a single combined image matrix can be constructed, using a color-based system for representing complete blocks of different relations. In this combined image matrix, displayed in figure 7.2, blue squares represent intense connections in terms of resource exchanges, yellow squares above-average connections in terms of boundary interpenetrations, while high levels of both types of ties between the same set of actors (a multiplex complete block) is represented in green. Finally, white indicates sparse or null connections for both types of ties.

Taking into consideration the combined image matrix of figure 7.2 –and to a lesser extent the density matrices of table 7.9 and the permuted adjacency matrix (not shown)– it is possible to describe each of the seven positions in terms of the four-fold MoC typology. Block VII undoubtedly reflects an organizational mode, as organizations in this position are very sparsely connected among themselves and with the rest of the network for both types of relations. While the other six positions are not as homogeneous as the former, as we see blocks of different columns for a single row or column, a predominant mode of coordination can still be assigned, paying particular ties to diagonal blocks, indicating intra-position densities. Position VI can be associated with a subcultural mode, as it is completely disconnected in terms of resource exchanges but shows high levels of boundary work, internally as well as with three other positions. Position V could instead be characterized as coalitional, as blue blocks clearly predominate, even if it happens to relate in a subcultural way with actors in position IV. Finally, positions I to IV are certainly closer to the social movement mode of coordination, as actors in these blocks tend to show high levels of engagement in terms of resource exchanges and boundary interpenetrations with themselves as well as with at least another social movement cluster.

Table 7.9. Density tables of the two-relational conflict-affected network, resulting from the 7-cluster solution obtained through complete-link hierarchical clustering

		Resource exchanges							Boundary interpenetrations						
		Overall density = .068							Overall density = .09						
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Positions	N														
I	7	.218	.209	.160	.198	.134	.045	.038	.841	.038	.429	.036	.024	.295	.014
II	5	.209	.192	.291	.177	.176	.047	.034	.038	.667	.467	.367	.083	.067	.031
III	1	.160	.291	-	.118	.357	.033	.027	.429	.467	-	.000	.000	.133	.000
IV	4	.198	.177	.118	.165	.063	.038	.058	.036	.367	.000	.722	.104	.317	.049
V	4	.134	.176	.357	.063	.429	.014	.024	.024	.083	.000	.104	.000	.067	.005
VI	5	.045	.047	.033	.038	.014	.000	.014	.295	.067	.133	.317	.067	.233	.012
VII	17	.038	.034	.027	.058	.024	.014	.026	.014	.031	.000	.049	.005	.012	.012




Figure 7.2. Combined image matrix of the conflict-affected network, resulting from the 7-cluster solution obtained through complete-link hierarchical clustering (solution G-7 in table 7.6)

*Color key: white = null blocks for both resource exchanges (RE) and boundary interpenetrations (BI); blue = complete block for RE but null for BI; yellow = complete block for BI but null for RE; green = complete blocks for both RE and BI

The same interpretative exercise conducted for blockmodel G-7 was repeated for the other five selected blockmodels. Figure 7.3 displays the combined image matrices of all six selected blockmodels for the conflict-affected phase, reporting the mode of coordination ascribed to each position.




Figure 7.3. Combined image matrices for the 6 best-performing blockmodels of the conflict-affected network
 *See color key above in figure 7.2

After linking each identified structural position to a specific mode of coordination, actors falling consistently in structural positions associated with the same mode of coordination were classified as adopting that mode. This way, a robust classification of each member of the environmental field according to its prevailing mode of coordination was obtained (see table 7.10 below).

Before moving to the results, it is necessary to make a short terminological clarification. Hereafter, I will use terms such as ‘coalitional actors’ as an abbreviated version of ‘actors involved in a coalitional MoC’, and the same for the other three modes of coordination. It is important to warn the reader that this terminological choice simply serves the purpose of concision, but the use of the different MoC as adjectives does not imply the attribution of specific organizational properties to those actors, since the profile of actors involved in a certain MoC may vary considerably in different contexts (Diani 2015a: 202). This is particularly important in two cases where this terminology could potentially lead to some confusion. In the case of ‘organizational actors’, the term does not intend to separate field members according to their organizational structure nor level of formalization (e.g. formal associations vs. informal collectives). In the case of ‘social movement actors’, these should not be equated to the conventional concept of SMOs as radical grassroots organizations, as some social movement actors will coincide with this profile while others will not.

7.5. RESULTS: THE REINFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT LOGICS AFTER THE END OF VIOLENCE

In this section, the results of the structural analyses conducted to unveil the prevailing mode of coordination in which each field member was embedded will be examined in order to address the two broad questions outlined in section 7.2. First, the consolidated classification of field members according to their prevailing mode of coordination in each phase of observation will be presented and validated. On a second step, we will examine the temporal variations between these two phases regarding the quantitative distribution of the four modes. Finally, we will focus on the most numerous and, arguably, most interesting of the four modes, the social movement, looking at which particular characteristics distinguish social movement actors from the rest of the environmental field members and testing to what extent such particularities have varied over time.

7.5.1. The distribution of modes of coordination at each phase

As it has been explained in section 7.4.5, the close examination of selected blockmodels in light of the MoC framework allowed to classify each single organization according to its prevailing mode of coordination. The final classification of field members in each phase is presented in table 7.10. While the comparative assessment of several best-fitting blockmodels for each phase yields quite robust results, the fact that different clustering procedures do not necessarily provide fully consistent results makes it necessary to identify those few dubious cases where the placement of an actor in a given mode is less certain (in italics and underlined in the table). Nonetheless, overall agreement levels between blockmodels were quite high, with dubious cases (for which two of the examined solutions led to a different assignment than the one finally decided) amounting to only 8 and 6 organizations in each phase. Instead, for the vast majority of organizations, the labels assigned to their structural positions in each blockmodel either matched perfectly or presented just one exception.


Table 7.10. Final classification of actors according to their prevailing mode of coordination

<u>MoC</u>	<u>Conflict-affected phase (2007-11)</u>		<u>Post-conflict phase (2013-17)</u>	
	<i>N</i>	<i>Incumbents</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Incumbents</i>
<i>Social movement</i>	17	AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana, Alternatiba, Aralar, Asamblea contra el TAV, Batasuna, Berdeak-LV, Bildu, EB-Berdeak, EHNE, ELA, ESK, Eguzki, Ekologistak Martxan, Elkartzen, LAB, MSV, Zutik	26	AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana, Askapena, CC.OO., Desazkundera, EB-Berdeak, EH Bildu, EHNE, ELA, ESK, Eguzki, Ekologistak Martxan, Elkarrekin Podemos, Equo, Ernai, Ezker Anitza, Foro contra Garoña, Fracking Ez!, Hiru, Irabazi, LAB, MSV, Mugarik Gabe, Podemos, PxlNME, Steilas, TTIP/CETA Ez!
<i>Coalitional</i>	4	Araba sin Garoña, <u>CC.OO.</u> , CGT, LSB-USO	6	Araba sin Garoña, CGT, CNT, LSB-USO, PAH/Stop Desahucios, UGT
<i>Subcultural</i>	5	Dale Vuelta-Bira beste aldera, Desazkundera, Landare, Lurra, Sustrai Erakuntza	5	<u>Carta DD.SS. de EH</u> , <u>Coord. de Platfs Anti-incineración de Gipuzkoa</u> , <u>Duintasuna</u> , <u>Goienet</u> , <u>Greenpeace</u>
<i>Organizational</i>	17	CADE, C.A.Tabira, <u>C.Vasco de Camping</u> , <u>Coord. de Platfs Anti-incineración de Gipuzkoa</u> , <u>EA</u> , <u>Greenpeace</u> , Gurelur, Izate, <u>Jaizkibel Bizirik</u> , PNV, Plat. Central Térmica Pasaia, REAS, <u>SEO/Birdlife</u> , Salhaketa, Txingudi Bizirik, <u>WWF/Adena</u> , Zero Zabor	9	Aroztegia...eta gero zer?, Asoc. Vecinal San Jorge, <u>Haritzalde</u> , Kakitzat, Movimiento contra la Incineración, PNV, PSE, Sustrai Erakuntza, Zero Zabor

Besides issues of reliability, the validity of the resulting classification is reinforced when examining the resulting network graphs and image matrices. The two-relational network graphs displayed in figure 7.4 visually confirms that actors classified to different modes of coordination behave according to the expectations of the MoC analytical framework. Before interpreting the graphs, it is necessary to clarify some of their elements. Boundary interpenetrations are represented by dashed yellow edges, resource exchanges by dashed blue edges, while multiplex ties of both resource exchanges and boundary interpenetrations are represented by continuous green lines. It is important to note that, to favor visual interpretability, only relatively strong resource exchanges are shown. Specifically, the weakest half of these resource exchanges are omitted, using the median of positive ties as a cut-off value (.111 for the conflict-affected phase and .166 for the post-conflict phase). Regarding nodes' colors and shapes, these represent, respectively, assigned modes of coordination (following the same color codes employed for combined image matrices, see section 7.4.5) and types of actors (circles for environmental organizations, squares for political parties, diamonds for trade unions and triangles for other civic organizations).

Moving to the visual validation of the MoC classification, we can see how actors engaged in an organizational mode (in white) appear in quite peripheral positions, being connected to the rest of the network through very few ties of any type. In contrast, organizations identified in a social movement mode ('social movement actors' in relational terms, in green) are tightly intertwined with a large number of other nodes through continuous green edges, representing the overlap of both boundary interpenetrations and strong resource exchanges (at least above the median value). In turn, the few actors engaged in coalitional (in blue) and subcultural (in yellow) modes of coordination present a contrasting picture, with high degrees of connectivity for one type of ties but not for the other, with either resource exchanges or boundary interpenetrations being clearly predominant, respectively, over the other.

Conflict-affected phase (2007-11)



Post-conflict phase (2013-17)




Figure 7.4. Two-relational network during the conflict-affected and the post-conflict phases

Table 7.11 reports inter- and intra-mode densities for ties associated with resource allocation and boundary definition mechanisms at both periods. The examination of these density tables and the resulting composite image matrices displayed in figure 7.5 are again perfectly coherent with the MoC typology (see section 7.1), with the only particularity that in the post-conflict phase, subcultural actors are only sparsely connected among themselves in terms of boundary interpenetrations.

Table 7.11. Mean tie values within and between modes of coordination, both phases

Conflict-affected phase (2007-11)			Resource exchanges [density = .068]				Boundary interpenetrations [density = .09]			
Modes of coordination (N)			A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
A	Social movement	(17)	.198	.143	.043	.041	.321	.059	.224	.027
B	Coalitional	(4)	.143	.429	.014	.024	.059	.000	.067	.005
C	Subcultural	(5)	.043	.014	.000	.014	.224	.067	.233	.012
D	Organizational	(17)	.041	.024	.014	.026	.027	.005	.012	.012

Post-conflict phase (2013-17)			Resource exchanges [density = .128]				Boundary interpenetrations [density = .123]			
Modes of coordination (N)			A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
A	Social movement	(26)	.222	.200	.071	.031	.274	.015	.154	.050
B	Coalitional	(6)	.200	.372	.064	.032	.015	.000	.011	.025
C	Subcultural	(5)	.071	.064	.047	.052	.154	.011	.067	.030
D	Organizational	(9)	.031	.032	.052	.031	.050	.025	.030	.019

Notes: Shaded and bold figures indicate average tie strengths above the overall mean




Figure 7.5. Combined image matrices with modes of coordination as partitions (blocks' areas are proportional to the number of edges contained)

*See color key above in figure 7.2.

7.5.2. A dynamic perspective: the reinforcement of social movement modes at the expense of organizational logics

When comparing the overall distribution of modes of coordination in which field members are embedded at both periods in table 7.12, we can see that the overall distribution of modes of coordination does not differ dramatically in both phases,¹⁰³ which is logical up to some extent given the very limited time frame of the analysis. Even though there seems to be more continuity than change, a few notable differences can be noted. The most important variation refers to the opposite evolution of the social movement and the organizational modes. During the conflict-affected phase, both were equally prevalent from a quantitative point of view, with 17 (40%) incumbents each. During the post-conflict phase, social movement logics increased their salience, as more than half of the environmental field members (57%) could be characterized as social movement actors. At the same time, organizational actors were halved, representing just 20% of field members in the post-conflict phase. By contrast, both coalitional and subcultural modes remained quite marginal during both phases. Thus, the very modest expansion of the coalitional mode of coordination leads us to reject hypothesis H1a about the enhancement of coalitional logics of interaction. On the contrary, hypothesis H1b is confirmed, as social movement logics, despite being already quite extended during the conflict-affected phase, have become hegemonic in the new post-conflict phase, mainly at the expense of the self-centered collective action represented by the organizational mode.

Table 7.12. Distribution of modes of coordination in each phase

	Conflict-affected phase (2007-11)		Post-conflict phase (2013-17)	
	N	(%)	N	(%)
Mode of coordination				
<i>Social movement*</i>	17	(40)	26	(57)
<i>Coalitional</i>	4	(9)	6	(13)
<i>Subcultural</i>	5	(12)	5	(11)
<i>Organizational**</i>	17	(40)	9	(20)
<i>Total</i>	43	(100)	46	(100)

Notes: Significance levels for one-tailed two-sample proportion tests: *<.1; **<.05

¹⁰³ The p-value of Fischer's exact test being .2.

How can these findings be reconciled with the conclusions derived from the previous two chapters, where it was shown that event co-participation was more cross-cutting from an ideological point of view? A closer examination of the overlap between the single indicators of boundary interpenetrations (ideological and interpersonal) and the two different resource exchanges considered reveals a more complex picture than the one portrayed by chapters 5 and 6. The evolution of QAP correlation scores between matrices displayed in figure 7.6 shows that, in effect, there was a clear disentanglement between ideological congruence and common participation in the same collective action events, with the correlation between both networks suffering a sharp decline, as displayed by the continuous red line. However, ideological congruence remained strongly associated with common commitment to the same enduring coalitions, with only a minor decline in correlation scores between phases. Most importantly, the overlap between interpersonal bonds created by shared active members and interorganizational cooperation almost doubled for both forms of collaboration, as shown by the purple lines.




Figure 7.6. Correlations between individual indicators of resource exchange and boundary interpenetrations over time

This indicates that the sharp increase in overall levels of resource exchanges (see table 7.2) cannot only be explained by the adoption of a coalitional logic based on ‘pragmatic collaboration’ (Ibarra & de la Peña 2004), as I speculated above in section 6.3. Contrary to the expectations set out in hypothesis H1a, collaboration at field level is not more dissociated from solidarity bonds between organizations. The crucial difference is that, in the conflict-affected phase, solidarity built through ideological congruence was a much more decisive factor influencing the exchange of organizational resources than interpersonal connections. In contrast, in the aftermath of the conflict, collaboration is based to a larger extent on solidarities generated by the presence of shared core members.

Here, the bridging role played by new environmental actors without particularly contentious external ideological profiles such as *Desazkundera*, *Fracking Ez!*, *Foro contra Garoña* or *PxINME-Gure Energia* is likely to have been crucial.

Moving beyond the comparison of both network snapshots, we can also examine in more detail how these quantitative changes in the adoption of different modes came about. Since the two temporal observations do not result from two completely independent samples but as many as 19 actors were active field members at both phases, we can take a closer look at the flows occurring between modes of coordination over time. Figure 7.7 contains a Sankey diagram summarizing these flows, together with the sources of exits due to organizational demobilization and the relational logics adopted by new field actors in the post-conflict phase. Surprisingly, the increase in social movement actors did not result from actors previously engaged in other modes transitioning to movement relational logics, as only two actors, one coalitional (CC.OO.) and one subcultural (Desazkundera), followed this path. Instead, the post-conflict strength of the social movement mode can be explained by its relatively high rates of continuity (since 9 of 17 actors continued to be actively engaged in the field) and, especially, by the fact that new actors overwhelmingly adopted a social movement logic (15 out of 27). By contrast, the vast majority of organizational actors (13 out of 17) either ceased to exist or became disengaged from environmental collective action, leaving a void that was not compensated by a new cohort of incoming actors.




Figure 7.7. Flows among modes of coordination at both phases

7.5.3. A closer look at social movement actors

We now direct our attention to the incumbents of the social movement mode of coordination, which apart from being the most numerous in the field studied is arguably the most relevant from a theoretical point of view. As already presented above in section 7.2, the second overarching question structuring this empirical analysis explores the characteristics of actors adopting a social movement mode of coordination, ‘social movement actors’ for concision. Are social movement actors distinct from actors involved in other modes of coordination? If so, have such defining traits changed in any significant way during the post-conflict period? In this examination of the interplay of relational behavior and actors’ aggregate properties, three specific types of traits are explored: ideological, geographic, and organizational (see as table 7.13).

Table 7.13. Properties of actors in a social movement mode of coordination

	Conflict-affected phase (2007-11)						Post-conflict phase (2013-17)						
	Social movement		Other modes		All field members		Social movement		Other modes		All field members		
	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	N	(%)	
<u>Ideological profile</u>							<u>Ideological profile</u>						
Basque nationalist***	13	(76)	2	(8)	15	(35)	Basque nationalist**	13	(50)	3	(15)	16	(35)
Radical Basque nat**	7	(41)	0	(0)	7	(16)	Radical Basque nat**	7	(27)	0	(0)	7	(15)
Far left-wing***	17	(100)	8	(31)	25	(58)	Far left-wing***	25	(96)	8	(40)	33	(72)
Political ecologist**	9	(53)	5	(19)	14	(33)	Political ecologist**	12	(46)	3	(15)	15	(33)
<u>Geographic scope</u>							<u>Geographic scope</u>						
Local/Provincial***	0	(0)	14	(54)	14	(33)	Local/Provincial***	1	(4)	8	(40)	9	(20)
Basque Country***	15	(88)	5	(19)	20	(47)	Basque Country***	18	(69)	5	(25)	23	(50)
Supra-Basque	2	(12)	7	(27)	9	(21)	Supra-Basque	7	(27)	7	(35)	14	(30)
<u>Organizational traits</u>							<u>Organizational traits</u>						
Environmental organizations**	4	(24)	17	(65)	21	(49)	Environmental organizations	7	(27)	9	(45)	16	(35)
Communitarian-egalitarian org models	2	(12)	1	(4)	3	(7)	Communitarian-egalitarian org models	6	(23)	4	(20)	10	(22)
Open to disruptive tactics	5	(29)	3	(12)	8	(19)	Open to disruptive tactics	6	(23)	5	(25)	11	(24)
N	17	(100)	26	(100)	43	(100)		26	(100)	20	(100)	46	(100)

Notes: Stars display significant levels of association between categorical variables according to Fischer’s exact test. Significance levels: * $<.1$; ** $<.05$; *** $<.01$.

Bold fonts indicate significant differences (p -value $<.1$) in the proportion of social movement actors with a certain property between both phases, regardless of whether that property is significantly associated with the social movement incumbents at each phase.

With respect to the ideological distinctiveness of social movement actors, the Basque environmental movement (BEM) has long been characterized by the predominance among its most important actors of marked anti-capitalist stances and a widespread

identification with Basque nationalism in general and with the radical Basque nationalist milieu in particular, often referred simply as the *abertzale* left (see section 3.2.2). Regarding the different ideological strands specific to environmentalism, political ecology has always been hegemonic, with conservationist and reformist positions being marginal within Basque environmentalism (Barcena *et al.* 2000). The cross tabulation of the aforementioned ideological traits with social movement modes of coordination adopted by each actor confirms our expectations, showing that Basque nationalist (both radical and non-radical), far left organizations, and political ecologists disproportionately adopt a social movement mode of coordination. While these statistical associations hold for both the conflict-affected and the post-conflict period, it should be noted that the proportion of actors with these marked organizational identities among social movement incumbents is smaller in the post-conflict period (though only reaching statistical significance in the case of Basque nationalism, broadly understood). In other words, this means that social movement actors are slightly more diverse and heterogeneous ideologically speaking in the post-conflict phase. Therefore, even though organizations with specific ideological profiles are still overrepresented among social movement actors in the environmental field, hypothesis H2a is partially confirmed, as their relative number has diminished over time, particularly for Basque nationalist actors.

Regarding the geographic scope of social movement actors, organizations with a Basque scope of action (organized in several Basque provinces, if not all, without extending its actions beyond Basque territory) disproportionately adopt a social movement mode of coordination in the ECAF during both phases. In contrast, local organizations mostly behave according to organizational logics, with only one case in which a social movement mode was adopted, while the distribution of Spanish and international actors is relatively balanced. As it happened for ideological organizational identities, social movement actors are not drastically different either when focusing on their geographic scope, although a weak tendency towards a more mixed composition can be observed. For instance, the number of organizations with a supra-Basque scope of action raised from just 2 in the conflict-affected phase to 7 in the post-conflict network. While this growth of non-Basque social movement actors could be attributed to their overall increase within the environmental field as a whole, it coincides with a significant reduction in the share of Basque-national organizations within social movement incumbents. All in all, we only find partial evidence in support of hypothesis H2b, as the concerns of most social movement actors are still primarily restricted to the Basque

context, though to a lesser extent than in previous periods. At the same time, the Basque environmental field seems nowadays more permeable to local chapters of non-Basque organizations, parties and unions, which have increased both in number and in centrality.

Finally, social movement actors in the Basque ECAF do not seem to distinguish themselves from others in terms internal organizational models nor tactical choices. Neither organizations that display horizontal communitarian-egalitarian models of internal organization nor those actors that resort –at least occasionally– to more confrontational protest tactics show a significant tendency to engage in social movement modes of coordination. Therefore, the aforementioned distributions lead us to refute hypothesis H2c, since social movement actors in the Basque ECAF are notably heterogeneous in terms of preferred tactics and forms of organizations, being practically indistinguishable from other civic actors.

The only association between general organizational profiles and the movement-like relational behavior refers to environmental organizations in the conflict-affected phase and, contrary to expectations, it is negative. Civic organizations focusing primarily –when not exclusively– on environmental issues, despite constituting the “focal population” (Zietsma *et al.* 2017) of the ECAF, used to favor non-movement modes of coordination, particularly organizational and subcultural ones. While paradoxical at first sight, it must be noted that many of these environmental organizations were, particularly during the first phase, local NIMBY and conservationist groups that tended to establish very few instrumental ties with other organizations, conducting collective action largely on their own. This negative association between the social movement mode of coordination and environmental actors traditionally labelled as ESMOs, which it is likely to be found in other environmental fields elsewhere, points out once again the potential inconsistencies between what we consider (environmental) ‘social movement actors’ from a classical aggregative point of view and from a purely relational and data-driven MoC perspective.

7.6. SUMMARY

Adopting the analytical framework of ‘modes of coordination’ (MoC) of collective action (Diani 2015), this chapter has explored whether the underlying relational logics through which civic actors engage with one another have significantly changed before and after the end of violence. In particular, this explorative analysis has relied on the inductive blockmodeling of two pre– and post-settlement multi-relational networks that

reflect, on the one hand, the intensity of collaboration among actors (both in events and in more enduring umbrella platforms) and, on the other, ideological and social bonds.

Through the comparative assessment of alternative partitions of the two multi-relational networks into sets of (approximately) structurally equivalent nodes, it was possible to assign a prevailing mode of coordination to each single actor. Although actors engaged in a social movement mode –that is, displaying both high levels of collaborative ties and boundary interpenetrations with roughly the same alters– were already numerous before 2011, their overall share and internal diversity have significantly grown, while organizational logics have become marginal.

What do these findings mean in terms of the general characterization of the Basque environmental field? Drawing upon Diani's typology of politics (2015a: 193), we can construct a similar four-fold typology suited for our more restricted object of study: a particular collective action field, the Basque ECAF. This typology result from the combined assessment of two aspects resulting from any MoC analysis:

(a) the extent to which actors' traits, normally associated with movements and protest politics, are concentrated within a social movement structural position rather than being spread across society, and (b) the extent to which local civic actors are actually involved in a social movement mode of coordination (Ibid.)

When a majority of civic actors engaged in a certain collective action field adopt a social movement mode, we may characterize the field as *movement-dominant*, in contrast to *movement-marginal* fields where social movement logics of engagement are rare. On the other hand, we may speak of a *pluralistic* field when we observe a high heterogeneity among incumbents of social movement positions, whereas an extremely *segmented* field would be one in which social movement actors come from the same sector of civil society and are neatly different in key aspects from actors embedded in other modes of coordination. As shown in figure 7.8, our two observations of the Basque ECAF do not neatly correspond to any of the four extreme ideal types of fields that result from combining both twofold categorizations. Still, the typology remains useful to conceptualize the changes that have been revealed by the analyses of section 7.5.




Figure 7.8. A typology of collective action fields and the evolution of the Basque ECAF (Source: own elaboration, based on Diani 2015a: 193)

The Basque environmental field during the conflict-affected phase was clearly segmented, especially from an ideological perspective, as the actors that adopted a social movement mode of coordination were not representative of all civic organizations active in the field. Instead, Basque nationalists (radical and moderate), far leftists, and political ecologists showed a marked tendency to be embedded in a social movement mode rather than any other. Organizations with a Basque national scope were also overrepresented among social movement actors. In contrast, regarding the predominance of social movement relational logics, these were as popular as the inward-looking organizational logics, both with a 40% presence. Therefore, the field in that period cannot be characterized neither as movement-dominant nor as movement-marginal, standing somewhere in between both extremes. With the reinforcement of the social movement mode during the post-conflict phase, the Basque ECAF came much closer to a movement-dominant model, while the slight rise in ideological heterogeneity of social movement actors made the field less segmented and slightly more pluralistic.

Thus, despite diminishing overall levels of mobilization (less collective action events), the current less polarized post-conflict context seems to have strengthened environmental social movement dynamics, which are nowadays more widely adopted, including actors that do not correspond to the typical profile of central Basque environmental organizations of previous decades. The expansion of social movement dynamics among civic organizations concerned with environmental protection provides

not only a promising potential for upcoming cycles of environmental mobilization but can also be interpreted as a positive sign in terms of peacebuilding and the strengthening of democracy through social capital in the region.

Besides its substantive findings, the analyses conducted in this chapter represents a novel attempt to apply the MoC framework for the study of temporal dynamics, bringing time dynamics into the picture and, therefore, potentially contributing to more fine-grained theorizations about the evolution of collective action fields. Moreover, from a methodological standpoint, the data-driven and transparent procedure I propose for selecting specific blockmodels on which subsequent interpretations and categorizations are based, may be applied to other exploratory structural network analyses. Hopefully, the methodological procedures applied here might be a model, or at least a source of inspiration, for researchers that prefer to follow an inductive approach to structural analysis rather than a deductive one while paying a great deal of attention to the reliability and reproducibility of result

8. CONCLUSION

8.1. IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS: TOWARDS A MORE INTEGRATED BASQUE CIVIL SOCIETY?

Throughout the preceding chapters I have examined in which ways the allegedly fragmented and polarized nature of collective action fields in the Basque Country evolved after ETA's abandonment of violence in 2011, taking the environmental field as a crucial case study. In particular, I have looked at the evolution of the intricate network of multiple overlapping relations that connect civic organizations engaged in environmental collective action during the period 2007-2017.

Drawing upon a rich self-collected dataset containing information about the characteristics and changing interactions among civic organizations involved in environmental collective action, quantitative social network analyses have revealed several significant changes in network patterns over the period examined. Two main findings stand out:

- Public collaborative ties –observed through event co-attendance– are now denser, stronger, and more cross-cutting ideologically speaking than they were during the last phase of the violent conflict. This indicates that traditional socio-political boundaries have been deactivated, at least for relatively ephemeral and highly visible forms of interorganizational collaboration reflected in event co-attendance. In the meantime, pragmatic-instrumental ties have increased their relative weight in collaborative decisions, reinforcing issue-based cooperation.
- When adopting a deeper level of analysis based on the MoC analytical framework, we can observe an expansion of relational patterns typical of the social movement mode, which has become more widespread among field members. Furthermore, in the aftermath of conflict, solidarity-building among social movement incumbents is not so dependent anymore solely upon ideological congruence but also upon interpersonal connections, at least to a larger extent than in previous years. A final point to note is the increasingly pluralistic character of the field, with social movement actors having become slightly more diverse when examining their organizational characteristics.

In substantive terms, the empirical findings outlined above can be interpreted as positive signs of post-conflict normalization of socio-political life in the Basque Country. The fact that environmental civic networks are now denser and more heterogeneous does not only mirror the lower saliency of the cleavages that used to severely condition Basque politics, but it can also serve as a powerful mechanism through which a more tolerant and vibrant democratic community can progressively be built.

The empirical evidence presented throughout this dissertation has confirmed that traditional ideological divisions used to pervade the environmental collective action field even in the very last phases of the violent conflict. These boundaries reflected the general saliency of the ethno-national and the violence-related cleavages within Basque society. At the same time, these sectarian tendencies, prevalent in relations between civic actors, contributed to sustain them, hindering the integrative and democratic potential of civil society. While it is almost certain that these divisions might had run deeper in the decades preceding our period of analysis, the fact that boundaries were still observable at the meso-level of civil society at a time when violence was much less intense and ETA retained very little popular support makes our findings even more revealing of the impact of ETA's definitive abandonment of violence in 2011 as a critical *transformative* event.

Without the distortive effect of political violence, traditional descriptions of unconventional collective action in the Basque Country as fragmented and polarized may not be valid anymore. That said, despite the fact that environmentalism represents the most paradigmatic case of contamination of collective action by the national question and the violent conflict in the Basque Country, further research on interorganizational interactions that extends the analysis to earlier periods and other fields within the Basque context should be conducted in order to confirm whether a similar boundary deactivation process has occurred in other sectors of Basque civil society. While it is true that this remains an open empirical question, the personal perceptions of several interviewed activists and observers from other fields seem to suggest that this is likely a general process, that the debilitation of previous divisions is not exclusive to the environmental field. For instance, the reflections of Epelde, Aranguren and Retolaza (2015) on the recent evolution of relational dynamics within the feminist movement also point in this direction:¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴ I am grateful to Lia Gonzalez Estepa, from Deusto University, for calling my attention to the parallels between my work and some observations made by Epelde and colleagues (2015) in a recent book published in Euskara, and generously translating some of its passages to Spanish.

It is obvious that the armed political conflict had an impact on the feminist movement of Euskal Herria. On the one hand, because the movement also endured its direct consequences and many situations of suffering were generated. On the other hand, because the intensification of the conflict introduced difficulties in making alliances, working together, and building common ground. Nonetheless, from the year 2010 onwards, little by little, the feminist movement also became encouraged by the new atmosphere based on the intuition that a peace process in Euskal Herria was about to start (Epelde et al. 2015: 317).

Moving beyond the Basque Country, the insights produced by this case study can contribute to deepen our knowledge on the particularities of civil society and social movements in relatively similar ‘deeply divided communities’. My results coincide with previous empirical studies examining contexts as diverse as Northern Ireland (Cinalli 2002, 2003; Nagle 2008, 2016), Lebanon (Nagle 2016, 2017) or Bosnia-Herzegovina (Milan 2020; Murtagh 2016) in showing how the most long-standing ethno-national and political cleavages can permeate almost every aspect of social life, dividing civic actors and hindering common collective action initiatives. That said, it is important to emphasize that even in the most extremely segmented settings, exogeneous boundaries do not produce completely separated clusters, and cross-cutting initiatives of ‘mobilization beyond ethnicity’ (Milan 2020) cannot be ruled out. This observation entails an obvious yet crucial lesson: that the evaluation of civil society’s segmentation or integration is a matter of degree for which network-analytic techniques can be particularly useful.

One particularity of my results is that, in contrast with most available evidence from other divided polities, the boundaries exacerbated by the conflict have not proven to be so long-lasting in the Basque case as in other places, as they have quickly been deactivated shortly after the definitive end of political violence. Thus, my results recall in this regard Cinalli’s (2002, 2003) findings on the rapid generation of new cross-cutting networks within environmental mobilizations in Belfast during the very first post-settlement years in the early 2000s. The question of whether there is something special about environmental mobilizations that make them more amenable than other collective action fields to developing cross-cutting relations and become truly ‘new social movements’ in relational terms (Diani 2000) could only be addressed by comparative cross-national and cross-movement research. However, it could also be the case that the Basque Country stands out as an outlier within the universe of divided societies, due to the particular evolution of the violent conflict and the non-ascriptive nature of divisive socio-political identities. If this is so, future comparative research could attempt to

identify the specific characteristics of violent conflicts that account for the varying strength and durability of socio-political boundaries in the post-conflict period.

8.2. THEORIZING THE LINK BETWEEN THE SHIFTING CONTEXT AND THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIC NETWORKS

Having summarized how the network structure of the Basque ECAF evolved –based on the rich empirical explorations of chapters 5 to 7– a fundamental question has remained so far unanswered: how can we connect network evolution to the large-scale contextual shifts occurred during the 2007-17 period? In this section, I offer a tentative explanatory model of how the changing external circumstances of Basque political context (discussed in section 5.1) led to a significant rearrangement in the patterns of relations among civic actors involved in the environmental field, which could presumably be indicative of similar dynamics in other sectors of Basque civil society. This explanatory model is mostly deductively built upon Charles Tilly’s (2004, 2005) theorization on the mechanisms driving social boundary change. Thus, this section does not claim to provide a factual account of how boundary blurring actually occurred, but more modestly, engages in rather speculative exercise of theory-building and historical interpretation. Over the following pages, I will set out a plausible explanatory hypothesis of the reported findings that can be corroborated or corrected by future research drawing upon more appropriate qualitative data gathered for this purpose. Figure 8.1 visually summarizes the most important aspects of this proposed explanatory model.




Figure 8.1. Simplified explanatory model of the evolution of the Basque ECAF in the aftermath of violent conflict (source: own elaboration)

Throughout the dissertation, I have recurrently emphasized that, coinciding with the turn of the first decade of the 21st century, the broader Basque political context suffered important transformations. In section 5.1, I identified the most important shifts of the context structure affecting environmental collective action. Looking at the realm of political culture we observed two main developments: (a) increasing levels of socio-political involvement and decreasing feelings of fear about participating in politics at the individual level, and (b) the decreasing salience of the ethno-national and the violence-related cleavages in the public sphere. Regarding institutional political opportunity structures (POS), pro-environment collective actors saw the institutional representativeness of potential allies significantly increased, at the same time as authorities' propensity for repression diminished. Finally, the worsening of socio-economic conditions among the Basque population raised the profile of economic and anti-austerity demands, increasing the resonance of anti-capitalist and social inequality frames. The aforementioned transformations took place almost simultaneously and in a relatively short period of time, precipitated by two large-scale critical events (Staggenborg 1993): the definitive abandonment of armed struggle by ETA at the local scale, and the advent of the Great Recession resulting from the 2008 global financial crisis. The former could be regarded as the major source of cultural and political-institutional shifts, while the latter was behind socio-economic transformations.

These simultaneous contextual transformations could be interpreted as a major reconfiguration of the incentives affecting collective actors' decisions to collaborate with specific alters. In other words, the changing external conditions might have favored the emergence of one of the mechanisms causing social boundary change identified by Charles Tilly, *incentive shift*. Incentive shift refers to a significant alteration of the “rewards or penalties that affect their pursuit of within-boundary relations, cross-boundary relations, and representations of the boundary zone” (2004: 220). In my view, two different and complementary arguments could link the mechanism of incentive shift with the resulting boundary de-activation of traditional ideological boundaries within Basque collective action fields.

The first path is relatively straightforward and relates to the rational dimension of organizations' coalitional decisions. The combination of the aforementioned contextual changes probably made issue-based mobilizations more attractive. That is, rewards associated with this type of collective behavior were perceived as higher due to the wider availability of political-institutional allies and the growing potential of mobilization

provoked by the rising rates of civic engagement and generalization of grievances about economic inequality and democratic malfunctioning. At the same time, the penalties associated with collaboration across ideological divides became weaker. For instance, while a coalition between civic organizations holding opposing views on the center-periphery cleavage might have provoked in the past significant opposition among the organizations' constituency and membership, risking internal fragmentation, these risks are likely to be smaller in the less polarized post-conflict political atmosphere. Consequently, this would have provoked a general reconfiguration of the relative weight of the different logics of interorganizational cooperation (see section 2.4) on final collaborative decisions. Basically, in this new configuration of underlying relational logics, the importance of ideology-based solidarities was significantly reduced while pragmatic-instrumental considerations acquired more influence. Nonetheless, it is also remarkable that personal connections generated through the multiple affiliations of individual activists, which are also important sources of interorganizational solidarity, became denser and seem to have favored joint initiatives of collective action, which cannot be regarded as entirely pragmatic.

The second causal path assumes that the impact of the incentive shift mechanism on boundary de-activation was indirect, mediated by another mechanism liable to promote boundary change: *conversation*. Under this assumption, the context-driven incentive shift would have more modestly reduced the reputational penalties associated with attending non-public meetings and participating in internal fora in which actors with opposing identities were also present, therefore increasing the opportunities for micro-level interactions in what Ann Mische (2008) refers as 'publics'. These "interstitial spaces in which actors temporarily suspend some aspects of their identities and involvements in order to generate the possibility of provisionally equalized and synchronized relationships" (*Ibid.*: 21) would not only be more common in the aftermath of conflict but, more importantly, more likely to enable productive communication that allows heterogenous actors to cope with diversity and generate shared bases for common collective action. In the less polarized post-conflict atmosphere, conversations would be sustained to a larger extent upon more collaborative modes of political communication such as *exploratory dialogue* and *reflective problem-solving* (*Ibid.*: 186-92), being more often adopted by activists and/or more effectively deployed.

8.3. MAIN LIMITATIONS

It is appropriate at this point to acknowledge two major limitations of this research and suggest some strategies that might be applied by future researchers to overcome them. Arguably, the most important weaknesses of this investigation stem precisely from the blind spots of the structuralist and quantitative empirical strategy adopted. Even though the initial research project was designed as a mixed-methods endeavor that included a closer engagement with cultural-symbolic aspects and with interpretative and qualitative methodologies, unforeseen limitations of access to some organizations and their documents, as well as a significant delay in the collection and analysis of the dataset of collective action events, skewed the balance towards quantitative analytic techniques based on a predominantly *etic* approach to the selection of variables and their categorization and operationalization. That said, the dozens of qualitative interviews conducted with experts and activists still made an invaluable contribution, providing innumerable insights without which the interpretation of results would have been more shallow.

The first main flaw refers to the static, external, and relatively crude treatment of collective identities. As explained in chapters 4 and 5, the assessment of organizational identities was restricted to four pre-established ideological aspects and to their external appraisal by other expert observers and myself. While external identities might be arguably more important for coalitional dynamics than organizations' self-definitions, the latter –including their symmetry or asymmetry with external perceptions (Diani & Pilati 2011)– should be ideally included as well in research focusing on the role of ideological affinities for coalition work whenever it is feasible. Organizational identities could be assessed from a more *emic* perspective through carefully devised survey items (Saunders 2015) and systematic frame analyses of open-ended responses in semi-structured interviews or of organizations' written documents. Focusing on written documents, in fields where organizations' textual production is prolific and retrospectively traceable through online or offline archival records, it would also be desirable to use some form of qualitative text analysis (e.g. frame analysis) that may be able to trace displays of organizational identities over time. This option would allow to obtain a much more sophisticated dynamic perspective on the operationalization of organizational identities. That said, such more nuanced approaches would probably have to restrict their empirical

focus to a smaller sample of organizations but could nonetheless complement and enrich findings from more quantitative studies like the present one.

Somewhat related to the previous point, the second major deficiency that I would like to discuss here refers to the impossibility of exploring in this case the ‘micro-dynamics’ (Beamish & Lubbers 2009) of interorganizational relations. In other words, the research framework and analytic strategies selected for this investigation impeded us from looking more closely at the micro-level interactions between activists and the conversational dynamics that enabled them to cope with ideological disagreements in the post-conflict phase. As noted by Mische (2008), the characteristics of *publics* and their potential bridging effects depend on activists’ use of specific communicative styles that combine different modes of political communication, selected for different purposes and deployed with varying skillfulness. In this case, it was not possible to conduct participant observations of meetings where these conversational dynamics could be analyzed, due the retrospective nature of the research and the scarcity of active environmental campaigns gathering multiple civic actors at the time most of the fieldwork was conducted, in 2018. Furthermore, even though I initially planned to carry out focus-groups and/or a second round of in-depth interviews with activists in order to obtain insider interpretations and micro-level experiences of the structural patterns observed through quantitative network analyses, the complexity of the latter delayed the research process significantly, making it impossible to conduct these interpretative sessions with activists within the timeframe at my disposal. Despite the additional difficulties imposed by diachronic research designs, future research on the evolution of collective action networks should seek to complement, whenever possible, quantitative network analyses such as the ones conducted in this dissertation with more qualitative evidence obtained through ethnographic work.

8.4. BROADER CONTRIBUTIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

Despite its limitations, this dissertation makes several contributions to social movement scholarship that extend well beyond the aforementioned implications for the study of civil society and collective action in deeply divided communities.

First of all, this in-depth diachronic examination of relational patterns in a complex collective action field adds to our collective understanding of interorganizational cooperation among civic actors, contributing to the rich stream of literature focusing on ‘social movement coalitions’. From a theoretical perspective, this examination of

changing patterns of collaboration over a period marked by abrupt major transformations of external conditions underscores the need to pay more attention to the complex interplay between historical conjunctures and the underlying logics that lead collective actors to collaborate (or not) with one another. While we have known for a long time that ideological orientations are extremely influential in shaping collaborative behavior, this investigation demonstrates that this impact is remarkably context-dependent. When deep changes in the broader external context occur, especially when these happen abruptly - e.g. large-scale critical events-, entrenched ideological fault lines that seemed unchangeable can be softened or even erased. Vice versa, contextual shifts can also make previously irrelevant ideological orientations acquire cohesive and/or divisive power. Precisely, this dissertation delves deeper into the contextual nature of interorganizational cooperation, not only by pointing at the most obvious influence of opportunities or threats in encouraging or discouraging alliances but, more importantly, by underscoring how the reconfiguration of the context structure –broadly conceived– alters the influence of the different underlying logics driving collaborative behavior. In this regard, I believe that the analytical framework developed in section 2.4 can serve as a theoretical point of departure for other researchers studying collaborative dynamics in collective action, regardless of whether a network-analytic perspective is adopted or not for empirical analyses.

To better study such complex interactions between time-variant external circumstances and the strength of organizational predictors of coalition making -such as ideological congruence- researchers should also explore other contextual factors that may not neatly fit within the political opportunity structure (POS) tradition. In my view, adopting a broader analytical framework that moves beyond only considering political-institutional opportunities or threats would prove more beneficial. One attractive alternative is represented by Rucht's (1996) notion of the 'context structure', which, in addition to the *political* context -i.e. POS-, encompasses two other dimensions: the *cultural* and the *social* context. Indeed, in this case study, changing collaborative patterns do not seem to be related to emerging opportunities or threats specific to environmental demands but seem rather the consequence of the lower saliency of traditionally pervasive cleavages after the demise of the violent conflict, which at the same time fostered a less polarized political culture. In this regard, my findings resonate with the evidence generated by other studies that have explicitly taken into account the varying salience of societal cleavages in examining the evolution of interorganizational coalitions (Cinalli

2003; Diani 1995; Diani *et al.* 2010). In short, activists' efforts to cope with internal differences and work together towards common goals seem to have less chances of success when the broader political culture is marked by polarization along salient socio-political fault lines. In contrast, more pacified contexts appear to be more conducive for the generation of cross-cutting collaboration.

This last point leads us to another potential contribution I would like to highlight. In my view, by analyzing patterns of relationships among civic organizations as part of the assessment of social integration in a post-conflict setting, this research points towards potential new avenues of research at the intersection between social movement scholarship and research on peacebuilding. Despite the increasing attention of the latter to the role of civil society for social integration and reconciliation (e.g. Cox 2009; Paffenholz 2010), both fields remain until now scarcely connected. While it is true that social movement scholarship has devoted quite a lot of attention to political violence from multiple theoretical perspectives (see, for instance, della Porta 2013), violent phenomena have been examined, almost exclusively, as dependent variables. As a result, the study of the long-lasting and often hidden impacts of political violence on socio-political behavior remains a gap in the literature.

From a methodological standpoint, the replication or adaptation of the empirical design employed in this dissertation can hopefully help the proliferation of more empirical analyses of network structures emerging from collective action over time, which remains an under-researched area (Crossley & Diani 2019). Even though a handful of other previous studies had already conducted diachronic analyses of networks of collective actors drawing upon PEA datasets and looking at event co-participation (Bearman & Everett 1993; Diani 2015: ch. 6; Franzosi 1999; Pirro *et al.* 2019; Wada 2014; Wang & Soule 2012), this approach towards retrospective network generation has not been fully explored yet, which hampers diachronic empirical examinations of collective action networks. That said, brighter prospects seem to lie ahead. The current digitalization of printed media provides many opportunities to exploit the dualistic logic of two-mode networks of events and participants. While this strategy had been available for a long time, the wide online availability of past news articles from multiple sources and the efficiency that keyword queries provide makes such strategies of diachronic network generation much more feasible. The possibility to access multiple local sources without dramatically increasing the workload of data collection contributes to improving the quality of the data, diminishing the impact of two potential selection biases that could

be particularly problematic for the generation of event-based collective action networks: the non-random misreport of events (Franzosi, 1987: 7-9), and the selective identification of participants (Bearman & Everett, 1993: 179-80). Additionally, apart from providing information on collaborative interactions, event data was also crucial for establishing a clear criterion of inclusion in the environmental civic network based on actors' behavior rather than on certain organizational traits prespecified by the researcher. The application of this realist approach to the recurring problem of network boundary specification allows for a more sophisticated operationalization of the theoretical construct of 'collective action fields' (Diani & Mische 2015) –or, alternatively, 'social movement exchange fields' (Zietsma *et al.* 2017)– as units of analysis.

Lastly, the relatively new MoC analytical framework (Diani 2013b, 2015a) has been employed in chapter 7 to analyze the same interorganizational field at two different points in time, thus being, to the best of my knowledge, the first dynamic empirical application of this innovative approach to the analysis of civic networks. I hope that, despite its many disputable aspects, my operationalization can serve as an inspiration for future research applying the MoC framework, thus fully incorporating socio-historical processes when examining modes of coordination within collective action fields.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abbott, Andrew. 2001. *Time Matters: On Theory and Method*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press.
- Acheson, Dr Nicholas, and Carl Milofsky. 2008. "Peace Building and Participation in Northern Ireland: Local Social Movements and the Policy Process since the 'Good Friday' Agreement." *Ethnopolitics* 7 (1): 63–80. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17449050701858548>.
- Aguilar, Paloma. 1998. "The Memory of the Civil War in the Transition to Democracy: The Peculiarity of the Basque Case." *West European Politics* 21 (4): 5–25. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402389808425268>.
- Aguilar, Salvador. 2011. "La Teoría de Los Clivajes y El Conflicto Social Moderno." In *Recuperando La Radicalidad*, edited by Pedro Ibarra and Mercè Cortina, 209–36. Barcelona: Hacer.
- Ahrne, Göran, and Nils Brunsson. 2011. "Organization Outside Organizations: The Significance of Partial Organization." *Organization* 18 (1): 83–104. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1350508410376256>.
- Aierdi, Victor, and Mario Gaviria. 1992. "Nacionalismo Vasco y Movimientos Ecológicos." In *Movimientos Sociales y Nacionalismo*, edited by Jokin Apalategi, 81–85. Estella: Instituto de Estudios sobre Nacionalismos Comparados = Nazionalismo Konparatuen Ikasketarako Institutua.
- Aldrich, Howard. 1999. *Organizations Evolving*. Los Angeles, Calif: SAGE.
- Alejos, Luis. 2018. "El movimiento de pensionistas, fenómeno singular de largo alcance." *Lan harremanak: Revista de relaciones laborales*, no. 40: 2.
- Alkorta, Eider, and Rafael Leonisio. 2019. "Not Just Identity: Key Factors Involved in the Basque Pro-Independence Movement, Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas 165: 25-44." *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas (REIS)* 165: 25–44.
- Alonso, Carlos, Iñaki Barcena, and Izaro Gorostidi. 2014. "Repression and Criminalization of the Ecologist Movement in the Basque Country: The Case of the High Speed Train Project." *Oñati Social-Legal Series* 4 (1): 13–34.
- Alonso, Rogelio, Florencio Domínguez, and Marcos García Rey. 2010. *Vidas Rotas. Historia de Los Hombres, Mujeres y Niños Víctimas de ETA*. Madrid: Espasa Calpe.
- Andrews, Kenneth T., and Neal Caren. 2010. "Making the News: Movement Organizations, Media Attention, and the Public Agenda." *American Sociological Review* 75 (6): 841–66. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122410386689>.
- Andrews, Kenneth T., and Bob Edwards. 2004. "Advocacy Organizations in the U.S. Political Process." *Annual Review of Sociology* 30 (1): 479–506. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110542>.
- . 2005. "The Organizational Structure of Local Environmentalism." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 10 (2): 213–34. <https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.10.2.028028u600744073>.

Bibliography

- Andrews, Kenneth T., Bob Edwards, Akram Al-Turk, and Anne Kristen Hunter. 2016. "Sampling Social Movement Organizations." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 21 (2): 231–46. <https://doi.org/10.17813/1086-671X-21-2-231>.
- Anheier, Helmut K. 2004. *Civil Society: Measurement, Evaluation, Policy*. London: Earthscan.
- Ansell, Christopher K. 2003. "Community Embeddedness and Collaborative Governance in the San Francisco Bay Area Environmental Movement." In *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, edited by Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, 122–44. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Baldassarri, Delia. 2009. "Collective Action." In *The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology*, edited by Peter Hedström and Peter Bearman, 391–418. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2011. "Partisan Joiners: Associational Membership and Political Polarization in the United States (1974-2004)." *Social Science Quarterly* 92 (3): 631–55.
- Baldassarri, Delia, and Mario Diani. 2007. "The Integrative Power of Civic Networks." *American Journal of Sociology* 113 (3): 735–80. <https://doi.org/10.1086/521839>.
- Bandy, Joe, and Jackie Smith, eds. 2005. *Coalitions Across Borders: Transnational Protest and the Neoliberal Order*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Barcena, Iñaki. 1994. "¿Etnoecología o Econacionalismo? Breve Introducción a La Realidad Ecológica y Nacional En Estonia, Ucrania y Euskadi." *Ecología Política* 7: 121–43.
- . 2004. "The Organizational Evolution of the Basque Ecologist Movement: Between Virtue and Necessity." *Il Dubbio* 5 (1): 104–25.
- Barcena, Iñaki, and Rafael Ajangiz. 2011. "Basque Social Movements." In *Basque Political Systems*, edited by Pedro Ibarra and Xabier Irujo Ametzaga, 219–34. Reno, Nev.: University of Nevada Press.
- Barcena, Iñaki, Eunáte Guarrotxena, Jon Torre, and Pedro Ibarra. 2000. "Institutionalization and Radicalization in the Organizational Evolution of the Basque Ecologist Movement (1975-1999): Between Virtue and Necessity." In *ECPR Joint Sessions*. Copenhagen.
- Barcena, Iñaki, and Pedro Ibarra. 2001. "The Ecologist Movement in the Basque Country." In *Environmental Politics in Southern Europe: Actors, Institutions and Discourses in a Europeanizing Society*, edited by Klaus Eder and Maria Kousis, 175–96. Environment & Policy. Dordrecht: Kluwer academic. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0896-9_8.
- Barcena, Iñaki, Pedro Ibarra, Eunáte Guarrotxena, and Jon Torre. 2003. "The Basque Country." In *Environmental Protest in Western Europe*, edited by Chris Rootes, 200–215. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Barcena, Iñaki, Pedro Ibarra, and Mario Zubiaga. 1995. *Nacionalismo y Ecología: Conflicto e Institucionalización En El Movimiento Ecológico Vasco*. Madrid: Los libros de la Catarata.
- . 1997. "The Evolution of the Relationship between Basque Ecologism and Nationalism." In *The International Handbook of Environmental Sociology*, edited by Michael Redclift and Graham Woodgate, 300–315. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- . 1998. "Movimientos Sociales y Democracia En Euskadi: Insumisión y Ecologismo." In *Los Movimientos Sociales*, edited by Pedro Ibarra and Benjamín Tejerina, 43–68. Madrid: Editorial Trotta.

Bibliography

- Barcena, Iñaki, and Josu Larrinaga. 2010. "Luces y Sombras En La Lucha Contra El Tav En Euskal Herria." *Anuario de Movimientos Sociales 2009. Fundación Betiko*, 1–7.
- Barkan, Steven E. 1986. "Interorganizational Conflict in the Southern Civil Rights Movement." *Sociological Inquiry* 56 (2): 190–209. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-682X.1986.tb00083.x>.
- Barranco, José, and Dominique Wisler. 1999. "Validity and Systematicity of Newspaper Data in Event Analysis." *European Sociological Review* 15 (3): 301–22. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.esr.a018265>.
- Batagelj, Vladimir, Anuška Ferligoj, and Patrick Doreian. 1992. "Direct and Indirect Methods for Structural Equivalence." *Social Networks*, Special Issue on Blockmodels, 14 (1): 63–90. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733\(92\)90014-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733(92)90014-X).
- Baumgarten, Britta, Priska Daphi, and Peter Ullrich, eds. 2014. *Conceptualizing Culture in Social Movement Research*. Basinstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Beamish, Thomas D., and Amy J. Luebbbers. 2009. "Alliance Building across Social Movements: Bridging Difference in a Peace and Justice Coalition." *Social Problems* 56 (4): 647–76. <https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2009.56.4.647>.
- Bearman, Peter S., and Kevin D. Everett. 1993. "The Structure of Social Protest, 1961–1983." *Social Networks* 15 (2): 171–200. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733\(93\)90004-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733(93)90004-5).
- Beck, Ulrich, and Natan Sznaider. 2006. "Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social Sciences: A Research Agenda." *The British Journal of Sociology* 57 (1): 1–23. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2006.00091.x>.
- Belloni, Roberto. 2008. "Civil Society in War to Democracy Transitions." In *From War to Democracy*, edited by Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk, 182–210. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Beorlegui, David. 2009. "Los Nuevos Movimientos Sociales En Euskal Herria: Los Movimientos Ecologistas, Pacifistas y Antimilitaristas Desde La Transición Hasta El Cambio de Siglo." *Sancho El Sabio* 30: 161–85.
- Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. 1966. *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. London: The Penguin Press.
- Bernard, H. Russell, Peter D. Killworth, and Lee Sailer. 1982. "Informant Accuracy in Social-Network Data V. An Experimental Attempt to Predict Actual Communication from Recall Data." *Social Science Research* 11 (1): 30–66. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0049-089X\(82\)90006-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/0049-089X(82)90006-0).
- Bernard, H. Russell, Peter Killworth, David Kronenfeld, and Lee Sailer. 1984. "The Problem of Informant Accuracy: The Validity of Retrospective Data." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 13 (1): 495–517. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.an.13.100184.002431>.
- Bernhard, Michael, Tiago Fernandes, and Rui Branco. 2017. "Introduction: Civil Society and Democracy in an Era of Inequality." *Comparative Politics* 49 (3): 297–309. <https://doi.org/10.5129/001041517820934258>.
- Biggs, Michael. 2018. "Size Matters: Quantifying Protest by Counting Participants." *Sociological Methods & Research* 47 (3): 351–83. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124116629166>.
- Blumer, Herbert. 1969. *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Bibliography

- Boix, Carles, and Daniel N. Posner. 1996. "Making Social Capital Work: A Review of Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy." Working Paper Series 96-4. Harvard University.
- Bonet, Eduard, Irene Martín, and José Ramón Montero. 2006. "Las Actitudes Políticas de Los Españoles." In *Ciudadanos, Asociaciones y Participación En España*, edited by José Ramón Montero, Joan Font, and Mariano Torcal, 105-32. Madrid: CIS.
- Booth, John A., and Patricia Bayer Richard. 2001. "Civil Society and Political Context in Central America." In *Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and the Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective*, edited by Michael W. Foley, Bob Edwards, and Mario Diani, 43-55. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England.
- Borgatti, Stephen P., Martin G. Everett, and Linton C. Freeman. 2002. *Ucinet 6 for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis*. Harvard, Mass.: Analytic Technologies.
- Borgatti, Stephen P., Martin G. Everett, and Jeffrey C. Johnson. 2013. *Analyzing Social Networks*. London: SAGE.
- Borgatti, Stephen P., and Daniel S. Halgin. 2011. "Analyzing Affiliation Networks." In *The SAGE Handbook of Social Network Analysis*, edited by John Scott and Peter Carrington, 417-33. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Bosi, Lorenzo, and Gianluca de Fazio. 2017. "Contextualizing the Troubles: Investigating Deeply Divided Societies through Social Movements Research." In *The Troubles in Northern Ireland and Theories of Social Movements*, edited by Lorenzo Bosi and Gianluca de Fazio, 11-32. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Bottero, Wendy, and Nick Crossley. 2011. "Worlds, Fields and Networks: Becker, Bourdieu and the Structures of Social Relations." *Cultural Sociology* 5 (1): 99-119. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1749975510389726>.
- Bourdieu, Pierre, and Loïc J.D. Wacquant. 1992. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. Cambridge: Polity press.
- Bourne, Angela. 2015. "Why Ban Batasuna? Terrorism, Political Parties and Democracy." *Comparative European Politics* 13 (3): 325-44. <https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2013.28>.
- Bozzini, Emanuela. 2013. "Advocacy Coalitions." In *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Bert Klandermans, Donatella della Porta, and Doug McAdam, 1:11-12. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Brass, Daniel J., Joseph Galaskiewicz, Henrich R. Greve, and Wenpin Tsai. 2004. "Taking Stock of Networks and Organizations: A Multilevel Perspective." *The Academy of Management Journal* 47 (6): 795-817. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20159624>.
- Breiger, Ronald L. 1974. "The Duality of Persons and Groups." *Social Forces* 53 (2): 181-90. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2576011>.
- Brooker, Megan E., and David S. Meyer. 2019. "Coalitions and the Organization of Collective Action." In *The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Holly McCammon, 2nd ed., 252-68. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.
- Brulle, Robert, Liesel Turner, Jason Carmichael, and J. Jenkins. 2007. "Measuring Social Movement Organization Populations: A Comprehensive Census of U.S. Environmental Movement

Bibliography

- Organizations.” *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 12 (3): 255–70.
<https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.12.3.j08421508773764m>.
- Burt, Ronald S. 1983. “Network Data from Archival Records.” In *Applied Network Analysis: A Methodological Introduction*, edited by Ronald S. Burt and Michael J. Minor, 158–74. Beverly Hills, California: SAGE.
- Byrne, Robert. (2013) 2019. *Save Text to File Firefox*. JavaScript.
<https://github.com/bobbyrne01/save-text-to-file-firefox>.
- Caiani, Manuela. 2014. “Social Network Analysis.” In *Methodological Practices in Social Movement Research*, edited by Donatella della Porta, 397–417. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Carroll, William K., and R. S. Ratner. 1996. “Master Framing and Cross-Movement Networking in Contemporary Social Movements.” *The Sociological Quarterly* 37 (4): 601–25.
- Casado da Rocha, Antonio, and Jose Antonio Pérez. 1996. *Itoiz: Del Deber de La Desobediencia Civil al Ecosabotaje*. Pamplona-Iruña: Pamiela.
- Casquete, Jesús. 1996. “The Sociopolitical Context of Mobilization: The Case of The Antimilitary Movement in The Basque Country.” *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 1 (2): 203–12.
<https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.2.2.h261467624182737>.
- . 2001. “Accion Colectiva y Sociedad de Movimientos: El Movimiento Antimilitarista Contemporáneo En El País Vasco-Navarro.” *Cuadernos Sociológicos Vascos*. Vitoria-Gasteiz: Gobierno Vasco.
- . 2005. “Manifestaciones e identidad colectiva.” *Revista Internacional de Sociología* 63 (42): 101–25. <https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2005.i42.198>.
- . 2006. “The Power of Demonstrations.” *Social Movement Studies* 5 (1): 45–60.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14742830600621183>.
- . 2009. *En El Nombre de Euskal Herria: La Religión Política Del Nacionalismo Vasco Radical*. (Colección de Ciencias Sociales. Ciencia Política). Madrid: Tecnos.
- . 2013. “Commemorative Calendar and Reproduction of Radical Basque Nationalism.” *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 14 (1): 21–35. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2012.739968>.
- Chapman, Terrence. 2009. “The Pacific Promise of Civic Institutions? Causal Ambiguity in the Study of Social Capital.” In *Social Capital and Peacebuilding*, edited by Michaelene Cox, 157–71. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Cinalli, Manlio. 2002. “Environmental Campaigns and Socio-Political Cleavages in Divided Societies.” *Environmental Politics* 11 (1): 163–71. <https://doi.org/10.1080/714000594>.
- . 2003. “Socio-Politically Polarized Contexts, Urban Mobilization and the Environmental Movement: A Comparative Study of Two Campaigns of Protest in Northern Ireland.” *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 27 (1): 158–77.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.00437>.
- Ciordia, Alejandro. 2020. “La Evolución de La Acción Colectiva Ecologista En Euskal Herria De1988 a 2017.” In *Acción Colectiva, Movilización y Resistencias En El Siglo XXI. Vol. 2: Genealogías*, edited by Antonio Álvarez-Benavides, Francisco Fernández-Trujillo Moares, Ariel Sribman Mittelman, and Andy Eric Castillo Patton, 69–88. Abadiño, Bizkaia: Betiko.

Bibliography

- Clark, Robert P. 1979. *The Basques, the Franco Years and Beyond*. Reno, Nev.: University of Nevada Press.
- Clemens, Elisabeth S. 1993. "Organizational Repertoires and Institutional Change: Women's Groups and the Transformation of U.S. Politics, 1890-1920." *American Journal of Sociology* 98 (4): 755–98. <https://doi.org/10.1086/230089>.
- . 1997. *The People's Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890-1925*. University of Chicago Press.
- Clemens, Elisabeth S., and Debra C. Minkoff. 2004. "Beyond the Iron Law: Rethinking the Place of Organizations in Social Movement Research." In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, 155–70. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Cochrane, Feargal. 2005. "The Limits of Civil Society within a Divided Community: The Case of Northern Ireland." In *Democracy and the Role of Associations*, edited by Sigrid Roßteutscher, 41–56. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. 1991. *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Conversi, Daniele. 2000. *The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation*. Reno: University of Nevada press.
<http://127.0.0.1:8180/oseegenius/resource?uri=000005574829>.
- . 2011. "Ideology and Nationalism." In *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict*, edited by Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff, 26–43. London: Routledge.
- Conversi, Daniele, and Gorka Espiau. 2019. "Basque Country." In *Comparing Peace Processes*, edited by Alpaslan Özerdem and Roger Mac Ginty, 56–72. London: Routledge.
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315436616-4>.
- Cox, Michaelene. 2009. *Social Capital and Peace-Building: Creating and Resolving Conflict with Trust and Social Networks*. London: Routledge.
- Coy, Patrick G., and Lynne M. Woehrle. 1996. "Constructing Identity and Oppositional Knowledge: The Framing Practices of Peace Movement Organizations during the Persian Gulf War." *Sociological Spectrum* 16 (3): 287–327. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02732173.1996.9982134>.
- Crossley, Nick. 2010. *Towards Relational Sociology*. London: Routledge.
- Crossley, Nick, and Mario Diani. 2019. "Networks and Fields." In *The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Holly J. McCammon, 2nd ed., 151–66. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.
- Curtis, Russell L., and Louis A. Zurcher. 1973. "Stable Resources of Protest Movements: The Multi-Organizational Field." *Social Forces* 52 (1): 53–61. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2576423>.
- Dabkowski, Matthew, Ronald Breiger, and Ferenc Szidarovszky. 2015. "Simultaneous-Direct Blockmodeling for Multiple Relations in Pajek." *Social Networks* 40 (January): 1–16.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2014.06.003>.
- Dalton, Russell J. 1994. *The Green Rainbow: Environmental Groups in Western Europe*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Bibliography

- Damen, Marie-Louise. 2013. "Political Alignments and Cleavages." In *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Donatella della Porta, Bert Klandermans, and Doug McAdam, 943–46. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Danzger, M. Herbert. 1975. "Validating Conflict Data." *American Sociological Review* 40 (5): 570–84. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2094196>.
- Davenport, Christian. 2009. *Media Bias, Perspective, and State Repression: The Black Panther Party*. Cambridge University Press.
- de la Calle, Luis. 2007. "Fighting for Local Control: Street Violence in the Basque Country." *International Studies Quarterly* 51 (2): 431–55. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00458.x>.
- . 2015. *Nationalist Violence in Postwar Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- de la Calle, Luis de la, and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca. 2013. "Killing and Voting in the Basque Country: An Exploration of the Electoral Link Between ETA and Its Political Branch." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 25 (1): 94–112. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.733271>.
- de Pablo, Santiago. 2009. "Los Medios de Comunicación." In *Historia Del País Vasco y Navarra En El Siglo XX*, edited by José Luis de la Granja Sainz and Santiago de Pablo, 2nd ed., 381–404. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva.
- de Pablo, Santiago, Ludger Mees, and José A. Rodríguez Ranz. 1999. *El Péndulo Patriótico. Historia Del Partido Nacionalista Vasco*. Barcelona: Critica.
- della Porta, Donatella. 2013. *Clandestine Political Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2015. *Social Movements in Times of Austerity: Bringing Capitalism Back Into Protest Analysis*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- . 2020a. "Protests as Critical Junctures: Some Reflections towards a Momentous Approach to Social Movements." *Social Movement Studies* 19 (5–6): 556–75. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2018.1555458>.
- . 2020b. "Building Bridges: Social Movements and Civil Society in Times of Crisis." *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, March. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-020-00199-5>.
- Den Hond, Frank, Frank G.A. de Bakker, and Nikolai Smith. 2015. "Social Movements and Organizational Analysis." In *The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements*, edited by Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, 291–305. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Di Gregorio, Monica. 2012. "Networking in Environmental Movement Organisation Coalitions: Interest, Values or Discourse?" *Environmental Politics* 21 (1): 1–25. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2011.643366>.
- Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. JHU Press.
- Diani, Mario. 1992. "The Concept of Social Movement." *The Sociological Review* 40 (1): 1–25. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.1992.tb02943.x>.
- . 1995. *Green Networks: A Structural Analysis of the Italian Environmental Movement*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Bibliography

- . 2000. “Simmel to Rokkan and Beyond: Towards a Network Theory of (New) Social Movements.” *European Journal of Social Theory* 3 (4): 387–406. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13684310022224868>.
- . 2012. “Modes of Coordination of Collective Action: What Actors in Policy-Making?” In *Networks in Social Policy Problems*, edited by Marco Scotti and Balázs Vedres, 101–23. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2013a. “Networks and Social Movements.” In *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Donatella della Porta, Bert Klandermans, and Doug McAdam. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
- . 2013b. “Organizational Fields and Social Movement Dynamics.” In *The Future of Social Movement Research. Dynamics, Mechanisms and Processes*, edited by Jacquelin van Stekelenburg, Conny Roggeband, and Bert Klandermans, 145–68. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.
- . 2015a. *The Cement of Civil Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2015b. “Promises and Limits of the Modes of Coordination Perspective.” *Partecipazione e Conflitto* 8 (3): 932–43.
- Diani, Mario, and Ivano Bison. 2004. “Organizations, Coalitions, and Movements.” *Theory and Society* 33 (3/4): 281–309.
- Diani, Mario, Henrik Ernstson, and Lorien Jasny. 2018. “‘Right to the City’ and the Structure of Civic Organizational Fields: Evidence from Cape Town.” *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, January, 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-018-9958-1>.
- Diani, Mario, and Maria Kousis. 2014. “The Duality of Claims and Events: The Greek Campaign Against the Troika’s Memoranda and Austerity, 2010-2012.” *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 19 (4): 387–404. <https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.19.4.d865w28177575673>.
- Diani, Mario, Isobel Lindsay, and Derrick Purdue. 2010. “Sustained Interactions? Social Movements and Coalitions in Local Settings.” In *Strategic Alliances: Coalition Building in Social Movements*, edited by Nella Van Dyke and Holly J. McCammon, 219–38. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.
- Diani, Mario, and Ann Mische. 2015. “Network Approaches and Social Movements.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements*, edited by Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, 306–24. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Diani, Mario, and Katia Pilati. 2011. “Interests, Identities, and Relations: Drawing Boundaries in Civic Organizational Fields.” *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 16 (3): 265–82. <https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.16.3.k301j7n67p472m17>.
- Diaz-Veizades, Jeannette, and Edward T. Chang. 1996. “Building Cross-cultural Coalitions: A Case-study of the Black-Korean Alliance and the Latino-Black Roundtable.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 19 (3): 680–700. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.1996.9993930>.
- Díez Medrano, Juan. 1995. *Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- DiMaggio, Paul. 1986. “Structural Analysis of Interorganizational Fields.” *Research in Organizational Behavior* 8: 335–70.

Bibliography

- DiMaggio, Paul, and Walter Powell. 1983. "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields." *American Sociological Review* 48 (2): 147–60.
- Doreian, Patrick. 2006. "Some Open Problem Sets for Generalized Blockmodeling." In *Data Science and Classification*, edited by Vladimir Batagelj, Hans-Hermann Bock, Anuška Ferligoj, and Aleš Žiberna, 119–30. Studies in Classification, Data Analysis, and Knowledge Organization. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.
- Doreian, Patrick, Vladimir Batagelj, and Anuška Ferligoj. 1994. "Partitioning Networks Based on Generalized Concepts of Equivalence." *The Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 19 (1): 1–27. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.1994.9990133>.
- Doreian, Patrick, Vladimir Batagelj, and Anuska Ferligoj. 2005. *Generalized Blockmodeling*. Cambridge University Press.
- Douglass, William A. 1985. *Basque Politics: A Case Study in Ethnic Nationalism*. Associated Faculty Press.
- Earl, Jennifer, Andrew Martin, John D. McCarthy, and Sarah A. Soule. 2004. "The Use of Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action." *Annual Review of Sociology* 30 (1): 65–80. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110603>.
- Edwards, Bob, and Michael Foley. 2003. "Social Movement Organizations Beyond The Beltway: Understanding The Diversity Of One Social Movement Industry." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 8 (1): 87–107. <https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.8.1.ej215xx422863312>.
- Edwards, Bob, Michael W. Foley, and Mario Diani, eds. 2001. *Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and the Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective*. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England.
- Edwards, Bob, and Sam Marullo. 1995. "Organizational Mortality in a Declining Social Movement: The Demise of Peace Movement Organizations in the End of the Cold War Era." *American Sociological Review* 60 (6): 908–27.
- Edwards, Michael. 2011. *The Oxford Handbook of Civil Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA.
- . 2014. *Civil Society*. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Eggert, Nina. 2014. "The Impact of Political Opportunities on Interorganizational Networks: A Comparison of Migrants' Organizational Fields." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 19 (4): 369–86. <https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.19.4.d5p65x6563778xv6>.
- Eggert, Nina, and Elena Pavan. 2014. "Researching Collective Action Through Networks: Taking Stock and Looking Forward." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 19 (4): 363–68.
- Eggert, Nina, and Katia Pilati. 2014. "Networks and Political Engagement of Migrant Organisations in Five European Cities." *European Journal of Political Research* 53 (4): 858–75. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12057>.
- Elorrieta, Joxe. 2012. *Renovación sindical: Una aproximación a la trayectoria de ELA*. Tafalla: Txalaparta.
- Elzo, Javier, and Félix Arrieta. 2005. "Historia y Sociología de Los Movimientos Juveniles Encuadrados En El MLNV." *Ayer*, no. 59: 173–97.

Bibliography

- Emirbayer, Mustafa, and Jeff Goodwin. 1994. "Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency." *American Journal of Sociology* 99 (6): 1411–54. <https://doi.org/10.1086/230450>.
- Epelde, Eurne, Miren Aranguren, and Iratxe Retolaza. 2015. *Gure Genealogiak Feministak: Euskal Herriko Mugimendu Feministaren Kronika Bat*. Donostia: Emagin Elkarte.
- Erikson, Bonnie H. 1988. "The Relational Basis of Attitudes." In *Social Structures: A Network Approach*, edited by Barry Wellman and S. D. Berkowitz, 99–121. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Euskal Soziometroa / Sociómetro Vasco. 2015. "58. Euskal Soziometroa / Sociómetro Vasco 58 - Kultura Demokratikoa / Cultura Democrática." Vitoria-Gasteiz: Gabinete de Prospección Sociológica del Gobierno Vasco.
- . 2018. "68. Euskal Soziometroa / Sociómetro Vasco 68 - Kultura Demokratikoa / Cultura Democrática." Vitoria-Gasteiz: Gabinete de Prospección Sociológica del Gobierno Vasco.
- Faust, Katherine, and Stanley Wasserman. 1992. "Blockmodels: Interpretation and Evaluation." *Social Networks*, Special Issue on Blockmodels, 14 (1): 5–61. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733\(92\)90013-W](https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733(92)90013-W).
- Fennema, Meindert, and Jean Tillie. 1999. "Political Participation and Political Trust in Amsterdam: Civic Communities and Ethnic Networks." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 25 (4): 703–26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.1999.9976711>.
- Ferguson, Julie, Peter Groenewegen, Christine Moser, Stephen P. Borgatti, and John W. Mohr. 2017. "Structure, Content and Meaning of Organizational Networks: Extending Network Thinking." *Research in the Sociology of Organizations* 53 (October): 1–15.
- Fernández Ortiz de Zárate, Gonzalo. 2015. "EH Bildu, El Reto de La Definición Política." In *Anuario de Movimientos Sociales 2014*. Abadiño, Vizcaya: Betiko.
- Fernández Sobrado, Jose Manuel, and Xabier Aierdi Urraza. 1997. "Entramado Organizativo Del Movimiento Feminista En El País Vasco." *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas (REIS)* 80: 183–201. <https://doi.org/10.2307/40183922>.
- Fernández Sobrado, Jose Manuel, and José Enrique Antolín Iria. 2000. "Estructura organizativa de los nuevos movimientos sociales en el País Vasco: claves para su comprensión." *Política y sociedad* 35: 153–64.
- Fillieule, Olivier, and Manuel Jiménez. 2003. "The Methodology of Protest Event Analysis and the Media Politics of Reporting Environmental Protest Events." In *Environmental Protest in Western Europe*, edited by Christopher Rootes, 258–79. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fishman, Robert M. 2004. *Democracy's Voices: Social Ties and the Quality of Public Life in Spain*. Cornell University Press.
- Flesher Fominaya, Cristina. 2010. "Collective Identity in Social Movements: Central Concepts and Debates." *Sociology Compass* 4 (6): 393–404. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2010.00287.x>.
- . 2015. "Redefining the Crisis/Redefining Democracy: Mobilising for the Right to Housing in Spain's PAH Movement." *South European Society and Politics* 20 (4): 465–85. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2015.1058216>.
- Fligstein, Neil, and Doug McAdam. 2012. *A Theory of Fields*. Oxford University Press.

Bibliography

- Franzosi, Roberto. 1987. "The Press as a Source of Socio-Historical Data: Issues in the Methodology of Data Collection from Newspapers." *Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History* 20 (1): 5–16. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01615440.1987.10594173>.
- . 1999. "The Return of The Actor. Interaction Networks Among Social Actors During Periods of High Mobilization (Italy, 1919-1922)." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 4 (2): 131–49. <https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.4.2.480g12700535663l>.
- Fuhse, Jan A. 2009. "The Meaning Structure of Social Networks." *Sociological Theory* 27 (1): 51–73. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9558.2009.00338.x>.
- . 2013. "Social Relationships between Communication, Network Structure, and Culture." In *Applying Relational Sociology*, edited by François Dépelteau and Christopher Powell, 181–206. Palgrave Macmillan US. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137407009_8.
- Funes, María J. 1998. "Social Responses to Political Violence in the Basque Country: Peace Movements and Their Audience." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (4): 493–510. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002798042004005>.
- Fung, Archon. 2003. "Associations and Democracy: Between Theories, Hopes, and Realities." *Annual Review of Sociology* 29 (1): 515–39.
- Galante, Chato. 1999. "Tribuna: Ecologistas En Acción." *Daphnia*, July 1999. <http://www.istas.ccoo.es/intra/wi/daphnia.asp?articulo=364>.
- Galtung, Johan. 1969. "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." *Journal of Peace Research* 6 (3): 167–91.
- Gamson, William A. 1961. "A Theory of Coalition Formation." *American Sociological Review* 26 (3): 373–82. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2090664>.
- García Albacete, Gema M. 2010. "The Saliency of Political Cleavages and the 'Dark Sides' of Social Capital: Evidence from Spain." *American Behavioral Scientist* 53 (5): 691–716. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764209350832>.
- Geller, Armando, Kristen Rucki, and Joshua Fisher. 2015. "Gure Esku Dago and the Right to Decide. Viewpoints, Challenges, and Ways Forward." Report. New York: The Advanced Consortium on Cooperation, Conflict, and Complexity & Scensei LLC. http://ac4.ei.columbia.edu/files/2015/12/GEDlayout_for_print_edited_compressed.pdf.
- Gerhards, Jürgen, and Dieter Rucht. 1992. "Mesomobilization: Organizing and Framing in Two Protest Campaigns in West Germany." *American Journal of Sociology* 98 (3): 555–96. <https://doi.org/10.1086/230049>.
- Gerring, John. 2008. "Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, edited by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier, 645–84. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Giddens, Anthony. 1984. *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Gillan, Kevin, and Gemma Edwards. 2020. "Time for Change." *Social Movement Studies* 19 (501–515): 1–15. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2020.1806813>.
- Gillespie, Richard. 2000. "Political Polarization in the Basque Country." *Regional & Federal Studies* 10 (1): 112–24. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13597560008421111>.

Bibliography

- Goffman, Erving. 1959. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. London: Penguin Books.
- Goodwin, Jeff, and James M. Jasper, eds. 2004. *Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotion*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Goodwin, Jeff, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, eds. 2001. *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press.
- Gould, Roger V. 2003. "Use of Network Tools in Comparative Historical Research." In *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, 241–69. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. *Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*. Edited by Geoffrey Nowell-Smith and Quintin Hoare. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
<http://ezp.biblio.unitn.it/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsebk&AN=470674&lang=it&site=eds-live&scope=site>.
- Guelke, Adrian. 2012. *Politics in Deeply Divided Societies*. Malden, MA: Polity.
- Hannan, Michael T., and John Freeman. 1977. "The Population Ecology of Organizations." *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (5): 929–64. <https://doi.org/10.1086/226424>.
- Hanneman, Robert A., and Mark Riddle. 2005. *Introduction to Social Network Methods*.
[http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/Introduction to Social Network Methods.pdf](http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/Introduction_to_Social_Network_Methods.pdf).
- Heiberg, Marianne. 1987. *The Making of the Basque Nation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <http://127.0.0.1:8180/oseegenius/resource?uri=000006331085>.
- Heupel, Monika. 2011. "Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Ethnically Divided Societies." In *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict*, edited by Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff, 212–22. London: Routledge.
- Hocke, Peter. 1999. "Determining the Selection Bias in Local and National Newspaper Reports." In *Acts of Dissent*, edited by Dieter Rucht, Ruud Koopmans, and Friedhelm Neidhardt, 131–63. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Hoffman, Andrew J. 1999. "Institutional Evolution and Change: Environmentalism and the U.S. Chemical Industry." *Academy of Management Journal* 42 (4): 351–71.
<https://doi.org/10.5465/257008>.
- Horowitz, Donald L. 2000. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. 2nd ed. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Hutter, Swen. 2014. "Protest Event Analysis and Its Offspring." In *Methodological Practices in Social Movement Research*, edited by Donatella della Porta, 335–67. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ibarra, Pedro. 1987. *La Evolución Estratégica de ETA*. Donostia: Kriselu.
- . 2018. "Gure Esku Dago. Las Consultas Locales." In *Movimientos Sociales y Derecho a La Ciudad Creadoras de Democracia Radical*, edited by Pedro Ibarra, Ricard Gomà, Salvador Martí, and Ricard González. Barcelona: Icaria.
- Ibarra, Pedro, and Igor Ahedo. 2004. "The Political Systems of the Basque Country: Is a Non-Polarized Scenario Possible in the Future?" *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 10 (3): 355–86.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13537110490518237>.

Bibliography

- Ibarra, Pedro, and Elena Grau. 2007. "Presentación: En El Conflicto / Contra El Conflicto." In *La Red En El Conflicto: Anuario de Movimientos Sociales 2007*, edited by Pedro Ibarra and Elena Grau, 7–12. Barcelona: Icaria.
- Ibarra, Pedro, and Alberto de la Peña. 2004. *De la confrontación militante a la cooperación pragmática: Nuevas formas de acción colectiva en Euskadi*. Madrid: Catarata.
- Jacomy, Mathieu, Tommaso Venturini, Sebastien Heymann, and Mathieu Bastian. 2014. "ForceAtlas2, a Continuous Graph Layout Algorithm for Handy Network Visualization Designed for the Gephi Software." *PLOS ONE* 9 (6): e98679. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0098679>.
- Jasper, James M. 2014. *Protest: A Cultural Introduction to Social Movements*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Jenkins, J. Craig, and Thomas V. Maher. 2016. "What Should We Do about Source Selection in Event Data? Challenges, Progress, and Possible Solutions." *International Journal of Sociology* 46 (1): 42–57. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00207659.2016.1130419>.
- Jenkins-Smith, Hank C., and Paul A. Sabatier. 1994. "Evaluating the Advocacy Coalition Framework." *Journal of Public Policy* 14 (2): 175–203. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X00007431>.
- Jeram, Sanjay, and Daniele Conversi. 2014. "Deliberation and Democracy at the End of Armed Conflict: Postconflict Opportunities in the Basque Country." In *Democratic Deliberation in Deeply Divided Societies: From Conflict to Common Ground*, edited by Juan E. Ugarriza and Didier Caluwaerts, 53–72. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137357816_4.
- Jiménez, Manuel. 2005. *El impacto político de los movimientos sociales: un estudio de la protesta ambiental en España*. Madrid: CIS.
- . 2007. "The Environmental Movement in Spain: A Growing Force of Contention." *South European Society and Politics* 12 (3): 359–78. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13608740701495244>.
- Jiménez Sánchez, Manuel, Raúl Álvarez Pérez, Gomer Betancor Nuez, and Antonio Álvarez Benavides. 2020. "Construyendo Una Voz Propia: Las Movilizaciones de Pensionistas En España En 2018." In *Acción Colectiva, Movilización y Resistencias En El Siglo XXI. Vol. 2: Genealogías*, edited by Francisco Fernández-Trujillo Moares, Ariel Sribman Mittelman, and Andy Eric Castillo Patton, 109–24. Abadiño, Bizkaia: Betiko.
- Johnston, Hank. 1995. "The Trajectory of Nationalist Movements: Catalan and Basque Comparisons." *Journal of Political & Military Sociology* 23 (2): 231–49.
- Johnston, Hank, and Bert Klandermans, eds. 1995. *Social Movements and Culture*. London: UCL Press.
- Kadushin, Charles. 2012. *Understanding Social Networks: Theories, Concepts, and Findings*. Oxford University Press, USA.
- Kasmir, Sharryn. 2002. "'More Basque than You!': Class, Youth, and Identity in an Industrial Basque Town." *Identities* 9 (1): 39–68. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10702890210366>.
- Kerr, Stephanie. 2019. "Ally or Competitor? Militant Basque Nationalism's Reaction to the New Spanish Left." *Nations and Nationalism* 25 (2): 587–606. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12461>.

Bibliography

- Kirchner, Corinne, and John W. Mohr. 2010. "Meanings and Relations: An Introduction to the Study of Language, Discourse and Networks." *Poetics, Toward a Relational Sociology of Meaning: Language and Socio-cultural Processes*, 38 (6): 555–66.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.poetic.2010.09.006>.
- Kitschelt, Herbert P. 1986. "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science* 16 (1): 57–85.
- Klandermans, Bert, and Jackie Smith. 2002. "Survey Research: A Case for Comparative Designs." In *Methods for Social Movement Research*, edited by Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg, 3–31. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.
- Knoke, David. 1986. "Associations and Interest Groups." *Annual Review of Sociology* 12 (1): 1–21.
<https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.so.12.080186.000245>.
- Knoke, David, Mario Diani, Dimitrios Christopoulos, and James Hollway. In preparation. *Multimodal Political Networks*. Book manuscript.
- Koopmans, Ruud. 2002. "Codebook for the Analysis of Political Mobilisation and Communication in European Public Spheres." Europub.
<https://europub.wzb.eu/Data/Codebooks%20questionnaires/D2-1-claims-codebook.pdf>.
- Koopmans, Ruud, and Susan Olzak. 2004. "Discursive Opportunities and the Evolution of Right-Wing Violence in Germany." *American Journal of Sociology* 110 (1): 198–230.
<https://doi.org/10.1086/386271>.
- Koopmans, Ruud, and Dieter Rucht. 2002. "Protest Event Analysis." In *Methods of Social Movement Research*, edited by Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg, 231–59. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.
- Koopmans, Ruud, and Paul Statham. 1999a. "Ethnic and Civic Conceptions of Nationhood and the Differential Success of the Extreme Right in Germany and Italy." In *How Social Movements Matter*, edited by Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, 225–51. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.
- . 1999b. "Political Claims Analysis: Integrating Protest Event and Political Discourse Approaches." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 4 (2): 203–21.
<https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.4.2.d759337060716756>.
- Kousis, Maria. 1999. "Sustaining Local Environmental Mobilizations: Groups, Actions and Claims in Southern Europe." In *Environmental Movements: Local, National and Global*, edited by Christopher Rootes, 172–98. London: Frank Cass.
- Krakenberger, Andrés. 2013. "País Vasco y Derechos Humanos: ¿Podrá La Sociedad Vasca Superar El Severo Juicio de La Historia?" In *Reflejos de Una Euskadi En Paz: Retos Para Un Futuro Sin ETA*, edited by Mikel Mancisidor, 41–62. Madrid: Cata.
- Kriesberg, Louis, and Bruce W. Dayton. 2017. *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution*. 5th ed. London: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1996. "The Organizational Structure of New Social Movements in a Political Context." In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, edited by Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, 152–84. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2004. "Political Context and Opportunity." In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, 67–90. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Bibliography

- Kriesi, Hanspeter, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marco G. Giugni, eds. 1995. *New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter, Laura Morales, and Melanie Walter-Rogg. 2007. "The Political and Cultural Context of Associational Life." In *Social Capital and Associations in European Democracies: A Comparative Analysis*, edited by William A. Maloney and Sigrid Roßteutscher, 244–68. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Lahusen, Christian. 1993. "The Aesthetic of Radicalism: The Relationship between Punk and the Patriotic Nationalist Movement of the Basque Country." *Popular Music* 12 (3): 263–80.
- Laumann, Edward O., Joseph Galaskiewicz, and Peter V. Marsden. 1978. "Community Structure as Interorganizational Linkages." *Annual Review of Sociology* 4: 455–84.
- Laumann, Edward O., Peter V. Marsden, and David Prensky. 1983. "The Boundary Specification Problem in Network Analysis." In *Applied Network Analysis: A Methodological Introduction*, edited by Ronald S. Burt and Michael J. Minor, 18–34. Beverly Hills, California: SAGE.
- Laumann, Edward O., and Franz U. Pappi. 1976. *Networks of Collective Action: A Perspective on Community Influence Systems*. London: Academic Press.
- Lecours, André. 2007. *Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State*. Reno: University of Nevada Press.
- Lederach, John Paul. 1997. *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Lee, Jung-eun. 2011. "Insularity or Solidarity? The Impacts of Political Opportunity Structure and Social Movement Sector on Alliance Formation." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 16 (3): 303–24. <https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.16.3.458783qv58255m58>.
- Leifeld, Philip. 2017. "Discourse Network Analysis: Policy Debates as Dynamic Networks." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Networks*, edited by Jennifer N. Victor, Mark N. Lubell, and Alexander H. Montgomery, 301–25. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . (2013) 2017. *Dna: Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA)*. JavaScript. <https://github.com/leifeld/dna>.
- Leonisio, Rafael, and Raúl López Romo. 2017. "Between Fear, Indignation and Indifference: Basque Public Opinion and Socio-Political Behaviour Facing Terrorism." In *ETA's Terrorist Campaign*, edited by Rafael Leonisio, Fernando Molina, and Diego Muro, 143–62. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Leonisio, Rafael, Fernando Molina, and Diego Muro. 2017. *ETA's Terrorist Campaign: From Violence to Politics, 1968–2015*. London: Routledge.
- Leonisio, Rafael, and Matthias Scantamburlo. 2019. "La Competición Política En El País Vasco, 1980-2016. El Equilibrio Entre La Dimensión Económica y La Nacionalista." In *En Busca Del Poder Territorial. Cuatro Décadas de Elecciones Autonómicas En España*, edited by Braulio Gomez, Laura Cabeza, and Sonia Alonso, 255–79. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
- Letamendia, Arkaitz. 2011. "Represión Legal y Vínculos Organizacionales. El Caso Del Conflicto Vasco." In *Recuperando La Radicalidad*, edited by Pedro Ibarra and Mercè Cortina, 149–69. Barcelona: Hacer.

Bibliography

- . 2012. “Cambio de rumbo en el proceso político vasco, año 2011. Cronología y análisis.” *Anuari del Conflict Social 2011*, 377–87. <https://doi.org/10.1344/test.acs.2011.1.6261>.
- . 2015. “La Forma Social de La Protesta En Euskal Herria 1980-2013.” PhD Thesis. Leioa: University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU).
- . 2019. “Las Transformaciones de La Movilización Social En Euskal Herria: Del Posfranquismo a La Década de 2010.” *Anuario de Movimientos Sociales 2018. Fundación Betiko*, 1–29.
- Letamendia, Francisco. 2006. *Acción colectiva Hegoalde-Iparralde*. Editorial Fundamentos.
- . 2011. “ETA: Political Violence, Its Historical Evolution, and Conflict Resolution.” In *Basque Political Systems*, edited by Pedro Ibarra Güell and Xabier Irujo Ametzaga, 185–208. Reno, Nev.: University of Nevada Press.
- Levi, Margaret, and Gillian H. Murphy. 2006. “Coalitions of Contention: The Case of the WTO Protests in Seattle.” *Political Studies* 54 (4): 651–70. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2006.00629.x>.
- Lichterman, Paul. 1995. “Piecing Together Multicultural Community: Cultural Differences in Community Building Among Grass-Roots Environmentalists.” *Social Problems* 42 (4): 513–34.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1977. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan, eds. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York, N.Y.: Free Press.
- Llera, Francisco J., José M. Mata, and Cynthia L. Irvin. 1993. “ETA: From Secret Army to Social Movement – the Post-Franco Schism of the Basque Nationalist Movement.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 5 (3): 106–34. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546559308427222>.
- Llera, Francisco José. 1984. “El Sistema de Partidos Vasco: Distancia Ideológica y Legitimación Política.” *Reis*, no. 28: 171–206. <https://doi.org/10.2307/40183104>.
- . 1999. “Basque Polarization: Between Autonomy and Independence.” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 5 (3–4): 101–20. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537119908428572>.
- Lofland, John. 1996. *Social Movement Organizations: Guide to Research on Insurgent Realities*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers.
- López Romo, Raúl. 2008. “Tiñendo La Patria de Verde y Violeta. Las Relaciones Del Nacionalismo Vasco Radical Con Los Movimientos Antinuclear y Feminista En La Transición.” In *Ayeres En Discusión. Temas Clave En Historia Contemporánea Hoy*. Universidad de Murcia, Spain: Universidad de Murcia. https://www.arovite.com/documentos/2008_Lopez.pdf.
- . 2012. *Euskadi En Duelo: La Central Nuclear de Lemóniz Como Símbolo de La Transición Vasca*. Bilbao: Fundación.
- . 2015. *Informe Foronda: Los Efectos Del Terrorismo En La Sociedad Vasca*. Madrid: Catarata.
- López Romo, Raúl, and Daniel Lanero Táboas. 2011. “Antinucleares y nacionalistas. Conflictividad socioambiental en el País Vasco y la Galicia rurales de la Transición.” *Historia Contemporánea* 43: 749–77.

Bibliography

- López Romo, Raúl, and Barbara Van der Leeuw. 2013. "Forjando nación desde abajo: violencia e identidades en el País Vasco y el Ulster." *Cuadernos de historia contemporánea*, no. 35: 15–39.
- Lorrain, François, and Harrison C. White. 1971. "Structural Equivalence of Individuals in Social Networks." *The Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 1 (1): 49–80.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250X.1971.9989788>.
- Lustick, Ian. 1979. "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control." *World Politics* 31 (3): 325–44. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009992>.
- Malthaner, Stefan, and Peter Waldmann. 2014. "The Radical Milieu: Conceptualizing the Supportive Social Environment of Terrorist Groups." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 37 (12): 979–98.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.962441>.
- Mann, Leon. 1974. "Counting the Crowd: Effects of Editorial Policy on Estimates." *Journalism Quarterly* 51 (2): 278–85. <https://doi.org/10.1177/107769907405100212>.
- Mansvelt Beck, Jan. 2005. *Territory and Terror: Conflicting Nationalisms in the Basque Country*. London: Routledge.
- . 2008. "Has the Basque Borderland Become More Basque after Opening the Franco-Spanish Border?" *National Identities* 10 (4): 373–88. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14608940802518914>.
- March, Luke. 2008. "Contemporary Far Left Parties in Europe: From Marxism to the Mainstream?" International Policy Analysis. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- . 2012. *Radical Left Parties in Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Martin, John Levi, and Forest Gregg. 2015. "Was Bourdieu a Field Theorist?" In *Bourdieu's Theory of Social Fields*, edited by Mathieu Hilgers and Eric Mangez, 39–61. New York, N.Y.: Routledge.
- Martin, John Levi. 2003. "What Is Field Theory?" *American Journal of Sociology* 109 (1): 1–49.
<https://doi.org/10.1086/375201>.
- Martínez Palacios, Jone, and Iñaki Barcena. 2012. "Conflictos Socioambientales, Democracia y Ciudadanía Ecológica. Un Análisis Comparado Entre Las Comunidades Autónomas de Cataluña y El País Vasco." *Revista Española de Ciencia Política* 28: 31–54.
- Martínez Palacios, Jone, and Inaki Barcena. 2013. "Environmental conflicts and injustices. Fragility and resistance in Basque socio-environmental conflicts." *Partecipazione e conflitto* 6 (1): 14–39. <https://doi.org/10.3280/PACO2013-001002>.
- Martínez Portugal, Tania. 2017. "Transformando Imaginarios Sobre Violencia Sexista En El País Vasco. Narrativas de Mujeres Activistas." País Vasco: Emakunde.
- Martínez Riera, Meritxell, and Mario Zubiaga. 2015. "Nation and State Building as Collective Action: A Comparative Analysis of Mechanisms and Processes in Catalonia and the Basque Country." *Anuario Del Conflicto Social* 2014 4. <https://doi.org/10.1344/test.acs.2014.4.12287>.
- Mata, José Manuel. 1993. *El nacionalismo radical vasco: discurso, organización y expresiones*. Bilbao: Servicio Editorial, Universidad del País Vasco.
- McAdam, Doug. 1996. "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions." In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, edited by Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, 23–40. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bibliography

- McAdam, Doug, Robert Sampson, Simon Weffer, and Heather MacIndoe. 2005. "‘There Will Be Fighting in The Streets’: The Distorting Lens of Social Movement Theory." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 10 (1): 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.17813/mai.10.1.a62814651h028540>.
- McAdam, Doug, and W. Richard Scott. 2005. "Organizations and Movements." In *Social Movements and Organization Theory*, edited by Gerald F. Davis, Doug McAdam, W. Richard Scott, and Mayer N. Zald, 4–40. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McAdam, Doug, and William H. Sewell. 2001. "It’s About Time: Temporality in the Study of Social Movements and Revolutions." In *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics*, edited by Ronald Aminzade, 89–125. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McCammon, Holly, and Karen Campbell. 2002. "Allies On the Road to Victory: Coalition Formation Between The Suffragists and The Woman’s Christian Temperance Union." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 7 (3): 231–51. <https://doi.org/10.17813/mai.7.3.p61v8117914865qv>.
- McCammon, Holly J., and Minyoung Moon. 2015. "Social Movement Coalitions." In *The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements*, edited by Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, 326–39. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McCammon, Holly J., and Nella Van Dyke. 2010. "Applying Qualitative Comparative Analysis to Empirical Studies on Social Movement Coalition Formation." In *Strategic Alliances: Coalition Building and Social Movements*, edited by Nella Van Dyke and Holly J. McCammon, 292–315. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.
- McCarthy, John D., Clark McPhail, and Jackie Smith. 1996. "Images of Protest: Dimensions of Selection Bias in Media Coverage of Washington Demonstrations, 1982 and 1991." *American Sociological Review* 61 (3): 478–99. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2096360>.
- McCarthy, John D., Clark McPhail, Jackie Smith, and Louis J. Chrishock. 1999. "Electronic and Print Media Representations of Washington DC Demonstrations, 1982 and 1991." In *Acts of Dissent*, edited by Dieter Rucht, Ruud Koopmans, and Friedhelm Neidhardt, 113–30. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.
- McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory." *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (6): 1212–41. <https://doi.org/10.1086/226464>.
- McPhail, Clark, and David Schweingruber. 1999. "Unpacking Protest Events: A Description Bias Analysis of Media Records with Systematic Direct Observations of Collective Action - The 1995 March for Life in Washington, D.C." In *Acts of Dissent: New Developments in the Study of Protest*, edited by Dieter Rucht, Ruud Koopmans, and Friedhelm Neidhardt, 164–95. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
- McPherson, Miller, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M. Cook. 2001. "Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks." *Annual Review of Sociology* 27: 415–44.
- Mees, Ludger. 2003. *Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. <http://127.0.0.1:8180/oseegenius/resource?uri=000005652450>.
- Melucci, Alberto. 1985. "The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements." *Social Research* 52 (4): 789–816.

Bibliography

- . 1989. *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society*. London: Hutchinson Radius.
- . 1995. "The Process of Collective Identity." In *Social Movements and Culture*, edited by Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans, 41–63. London: UCL Press.
- . 1996. *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Meyer, David, and Catherine Corrigan-Brown. 2005. "Coalitions and Political Context: U.S. Movements Against Wars in Iraq." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 10 (3): 327–44. <https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.10.3.f8u6t4u2708kw442>.
- Meyer, David S., and Debra C. Minkoff. 2004. "Conceptualizing Political Opportunity." *Social Forces* 82 (4): 1457–92. <https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.2004.0082>.
- Meyer, John W., and Brian Rowan. 1977. "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony." *American Journal of Sociology* 83 (2): 340–63. <https://doi.org/10.1086/226550>.
- Milan, Chiara. 2020. *Social Mobilization Beyond Ethnicity: Civic Activism and Grassroots Movements in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Milbrath, Lester W. 1984. *Environmentalists: Vanguard for a New Society*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Minkoff, Debra, and John McCarthy. 2005. "Reinvigorating The Study of Organizational Processes in Social Movements." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 10 (2): 289–308. <https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.10.2.rp8h757h42752w76>.
- Mische, Ann. 2003. "Cross-Talk in Movements: Reconceiving the Culture-Network Link." In *Social Movements and Networks*, edited by Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, 258–80. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2008. *Partisan Publics: Communication and Contention Across Brazilian Youth Activist Networks*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- . 2011. "Relational Sociology, Culture, and Agency." In *The SAGE Handbook of Social Network Analysis*, edited by John Scott and Peter J. Carrington, 80–97. Los Angeles, Calif: SAGE.
- Mohr, John W. 1998. "Measuring Meaning Structures." *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (1): 345–70. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.345>.
- Morales, Laura, and Marco Giugni. 2011. "Political Opportunities, Social Capital and the Political Inclusion of Immigrants in European Cities." In *Social Capital, Political Participation and Migration in Europe: Making Multicultural Democracy Work?*, edited by Laura Morales and Marco Giugni, 1–18. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Morales, Laura, and Fabiola Mota. 2006. "El Asociacionismo En España." In *Ciudadanos, Asociaciones y Participación En España*, edited by José Ramón Montero, Joan Font, and Mariano Torcal, 77–104. Madrid: CIS.
- Moreno, Luis. 2004. "Divided Societies: Electoral Polarisation and the Basque Country." In *Democracy and Ethnic Conflict: Advancing Peace in Deeply Divided Societies*, edited by Adrian Guelke, 29–51. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230523258_3.

Bibliography

- Mota, Fabiola, and Joan Subirats. 2000. "El quinto elemento: el capital social de las Comunidades Autónomas. Su impacto sobre el funcionamiento del sistema político autonómico." *Revista Española de Ciencia Política* 2: 123–58.
- Mueller, Carol. 1997. "Media Measurement Models of Protest Event Data." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 2 (2): 165–84. <https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.2.2.n043476m01q7463u>.
- Muro, Diego. 2008. *Ethnicity and Violence: The Case of Radical Basque Nationalism*. Routledge.
- . 2013. "ETA: Basque Nationalist and Separatist Organization." In *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Donatella della Porta, Bert Klandermans, and Doug McAdam. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
- . 2015. "Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Social Movements." In *The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements*, edited by Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, 185–99. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2017. "ETA during Democracy, 1975-2011." In *ETA's Terrorist Campaign. From Violence to Politics*, edited by Rafael Leonisio, Fernando Molina, and Diego Muro, 35–53. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Murphy, Gillian. 2005. "Coalitions and The Development of The Global Environmental Movement: A Double-Edged Sword." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 10 (2): 235–50. <https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.10.2.8u3626408607643t>.
- Murtagh, Cera. 2016. "Civic Mobilization in Divided Societies and the Perils of Political Engagement: Bosnia and Herzegovina's Protest and Plenum Movement." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 22 (2): 149–71. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2016.1169060>.
- Murua, Imanol. 2016. *Ending ETA's Armed Campaign: How and Why the Basque Armed Group Abandoned Violence*. London: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315619323>.
- . 2017. "No More Bullets for ETA: The Loss of Internal Support as a Key Factor in the End of the Basque Group's Campaign." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 10 (1): 93–114. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2016.1215628>.
- Nagle, John. 2008. "Challenging Ethno-National Division: New Social Movements in Belfast." *Social Movement Studies* 7 (3): 305–18. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14742830802485700>.
- . 2016. *Social Movements in Violently Divided Societies: Constructing Conflict and Peacebuilding*. London: Routledge.
- Nordlund, Carl. 2016. "A Deviation Approach to Blockmodeling of Valued Networks." *Social Networks* 44 (January): 160–78. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2015.08.004>.
- Nordlund, Carl, and Aleš Žiberna. 2020. "Blockmodeling of Valued Networks." In *Advances in Network Clustering and Blockmodeling*, edited by Patrick Doreian, Vladimir Batagelj, and Anuška Ferligoj, 151–88. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Obach, Brian K. 2004. *Labor and the Environmental Movement: The Quest for Common Ground*. MIT Press.
- . 2010. "Political Opportunity and Social Movement Coalitions: The Role of Policy Segmentation and Nonprofit Tax Law." In *Strategic Alliances: Coalition Building and Social Movements*, edited by Nella Van Dyke and Holly J. McCammon, 197–218. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.

Bibliography

- O'Flynn, Ian, and David Russell. 2011. "Deepening Democracy: The Role of Civil Society." In *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict*, edited by Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff, 225–35. London: Routledge.
- Okamoto, Dina G. 2010. "Organizing across Ethnic Boundaries in the Post-Civil Rights Era: Asian American Panethnic Coalitions." In *Strategic Alliances: Coalition Building and Social Movements*, edited by Nella Van Dyke and Holly J. McCammon, 143–69. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.
- Ortiz, David, Daniel Myers, Eugene Walls, and Maria-Elena Diaz. 2005. "Where Do We Stand with Newspaper Data?" *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 10 (3): 397–419. <https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.10.3.8360r760k3277t42>.
- Osa, Maryjane. 2003. "Networks in Opposition: Linking Organizations Through Activists in the Polish People's Republic." In *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, edited by Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, 77–104. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pachucki, Mark A., and Ronald L. Breiger. 2010. "Cultural Holes: Beyond Relationality in Social Networks and Culture." *Annual Review of Sociology* 36 (1): 205–24. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.012809.102615>.
- Paffenholz, Thania, ed. 2010. *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Paffenholz, Thania, and Christoph Spurk. 2006. "Civil Society, Civic Engagement, and Peacebuilding." 36. Social Development Papers. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
- Panning, William H. 1982. "Fitting Blockmodels to Data." *Social Networks* 4 (1): 81–101. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733\(82\)90014-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733(82)90014-4).
- Pavan, Elena. 2015. "The Cement of Civil Society. Foundations for a More Genuine Understanding of Online Collective Action." *PARTECIPAZIONE E CONFLITTO* 8 (3): 910-918–918. <https://doi.org/10.1285/i20356609v8i3p910>.
- Paxton, Pamela. 2002. "Social Capital and Democracy: An Interdependent Relationship." *American Sociological Review* 67 (2): 254–77. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3088895>.
- Payne, Stanley G. 1975. *Basque Nationalism*. University of Nevada Press.
- Pérez-Agote, Alfonso. 2006. *The Social Roots of Basque Nationalism*. Translated by Cameron Watson and William A. Douglass. Reno: University of Nevada Press.
- Pilati, K. 2016. *Migrants' Participation in Exclusionary Contexts: From Subcultures to Radicalization*. Basinstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pirro, Andrea LP, Elena Pavan, Adam Fagan, and David Gazsi. 2019. "Close Ever, Distant Never? Integrating Protest Event and Social Network Approaches into the Transformation of the Hungarian Far Right." *Party Politics*, July, 1354068819863624. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068819863624>.
- Portos, Martín. 2016. "Movilización social en tiempos de recesión: un análisis de eventos de protesta en España, 2007-2015." *Revista Española de Ciencia Política* 41 (July): 159–78.
- . 2017. "Voicing Outrage, Contending with Austerity: Mobilisation in Spain under the Great Recession." Thesis, Florence, Italy: European University Institute. <https://doi.org/10.2870/069849>.

Bibliography

- . 2019. “Keeping Dissent Alive under the Great Recession: No-Radicalisation and Protest in Spain after the Eventful 15M/Indignados Campaign.” *Acta Politica* 54 (1): 45–74.
<https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-017-0074-9>.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- . 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Reese, Ellen, Christine Petit, and David S. Meyer. 2010. “Sudden Mobilization: Movement Crossovers, Threats, and the Surprising Rise of the U.S. Antiwar Movement.” In *Strategic Alliances: Coalition Building and Social Movements*, edited by Nella Van Dyke and Holly J. McCammon, 266–91. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.
- Romanos, Eduardo. 2014. “Evictions, Petitions and Escraches: Contentious Housing in Austerity Spain.” *Social Movement Studies* 13 (2): 296–302.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2013.830567>.
- . 2018. “Del 68 al 15M: Continuidades y Rupturas Entre Ciclos de Protesta.” *Arbor* 194 (787): a430.
- Rootes, Christopher. 1999. “Environmental Movements: From the Local to Global.” In *Environmental Movements: Local, National and Global*, edited by Christopher Rootes, 1–12. London: Frank Cass.
- . 2004. “Environmental Movements.” In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, 608–40. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
- Rootes, Christopher, and Robert Brulle. 2013. “Environmental Movements.” In *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Donatella della Porta, Bert Klandermans, and Doug McAdam. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Rose, Fred. 2000. *Coalitions Across the Class Divide: Lessons from the Labor, Peace, and Environmental Movements*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Roßteutscher, Sigrid. 2002. “Advocate or Reflection? Associations and Political Culture.” *Political Studies* 50 (3): 514–28. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00382>.
- Rothschild-Whitt, Joyce. 1979. “The Collectivist Organization: An Alternative to Rational-Bureaucratic Models.” *American Sociological Review* 44 (4): 509–27.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2094585>.
- Rucht, Dieter. 1989. “Environmental Movement Organizations in West Germany and France: Structure and Interorganizational Relations.” *International Social Movement Research* 2: 61–94.
- . 1996. “The Impact of National Contexts on Social Movement Structures: A Cross-Movement and Cross-National Comparison.” In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, edited by Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, 185–204. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2010. “PRODAT-Codesheet Deutsch/Englisch.”
<https://www.wzb.eu/en/research/completed-research-programs/civil-society-and-political->

Bibliography

[mobilization/projects/prodat-dokumentation-und-analyse-von-protestereignissen-in-der-bundesrepublik](#).

- Rucht, Dieter, and Thomas Ohlemacher. 1992. "Protest Event Data: Collection, Uses and Perspectives." In *Studying Collective Action*, edited by Mario Diani and Ron Eyerman, 76–106. London: SAGE Publications.
- Sabatier, Paul A. 1998. "The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe." *Journal of European Public Policy* 5 (1): 98–130. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501768880000051>.
- Sampson, Robert J., Doug McAdam, Heather MacIndoe, and Simón Weffer-Elizondo. 2005. "Civil Society Reconsidered: The Durable Nature and Community Structure of Collective Civic Action." *American Journal of Sociology* 111 (3): 673–714. <https://doi.org/10.1086/497351>.
- Santos, Felipe G. 2019. "Social Movements and the Politics of Care: Empathy, Solidarity and Eviction Blockades." *Social Movement Studies* 0 (0): 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2019.1665504>.
- Saunders, Clare. 2007a. "Comparing Environmental Movement Networks in Periods of Latency and Visibility." *Graduate Journal of Social Science* 4 (1): 109–39.
- . 2007b. "The National and the Local: Relationships among Environmental Movement Organisations in London." *Environmental Politics* 16 (5): 742–64. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644010701634083>.
- . 2007c. "Using Social Network Analysis to Explore Social Movements: A Relational Approach." *Social Movement Studies* 6 (3): 227–43. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14742830701777769>.
- . 2008. "Double-Edged Swords? Collective Identity and Solidarity in the Environment Movement." *The British Journal of Sociology* 59 (2): 227–53. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2008.00191.x>.
- . 2011. "Unlocking the Path to Effective Block Modeling in Social Movement Research." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 16 (3): 283–302. <https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.16.3.a70276715p171144>.
- . 2013. *Environmental Networks and Social Movement Theory*. London: Bloomsbury.
- . 2015. "The Challenges of Using Survey Instruments to Measure the Identities of Environmental Protesters." In *The Identity Dilemma*, edited by Aidan McGarry and James M. Jasper, 85–107. Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press.
- Scott, John. 2013. *Social Network Analysis*. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE.
- Sewell, William H. 1996. "Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille." *Theory and Society* 25 (6): 841–81. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00159818>.
- . 2005. *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press.
- Simmel, George. 1955. *Conflict and The Web Of Group Affiliations*. New York, N.Y.: The Free Press.
- Simsa, Ruth, and Marion Totter. 2017. "Social Movement Organizations in Spain: Being Partial as the Precognitive Enactment of Social Change." *Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management: An International Journal* 0 (0): 1–23.

Bibliography

- Smith, Jackie, John D. McCarthy, Clark McPhail, and Boguslaw Augustyn. 2001. "From Protest to Agenda Building: Description Bias in Media Coverage of Protest Events in Washington, D.C." *Social Forces* 79 (4): 1397–1423. <https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.2001.0053>.
- Snow, David. 2001. "Collective Identity and Expressive Forms." University of California, Irvine eScholarship Repository. <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2zn1t7bj>.
- Snow, David A., and Robert D. Benford. 1988. "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization." *International Social Movement Research: From Structure to Action* 1 (1): 197–217.
- Spencer, Anthony T., and Stephen M. Croucher. 2008. "Basque Nationalism and the Spiral of Silence: An Analysis of Public Perceptions of ETA in Spain and France." *International Communication Gazette* 70 (2): 137–53. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048507086909>.
- Spurk, Christoph. 2010. "Understanding Civil Society." In *Civil Society and Peacebuilding*, edited by Thania Paffenholz, 3–28. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner.
- Staggenborg, Suzanne. 1986. "Coalition Work in the Pro-Choice Movement: Organizational and Environmental Opportunities and Obstacles." *Social Problems* 33 (5): 374–90. <https://doi.org/10.2307/800657>.
- . 1993. "Critical Events and the Mobilization of the Pro-Choice Movement." *Research in Political Sociology* 6 (1): 319–45.
- Stekelenburg, Jacquelin van van. 2013. "Collective Identity." In *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Donatella della Porta, Bert Klandermans, and Doug McAdam. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Stryker, Sheldon, Timothy Joseph Owens, and Robert W. White, eds. 2000. *Self, Identity, and Social Movements*. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.
- Sullivan, John. 1988. *ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euskadi 1890-1986*. London: Routledge.
- Tajfel, Henri, ed. 1978. *Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. European Monographs in Social Psychology 14. London [etc.]: Academic Press.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 1998. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, Verta. 2013. "Social Movement Participation in the Global Society: Identity, Networks, and Emotions." In *The Future of Social Movement Research*, edited by Jacquelin van Stekelenburg, Conny Roggeband, and Bert Klandermans, 37–58. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.
- Taylor, Verta, and Nella Van Dyke. 2004. "'Get up, Stand up': Tactical Repertoires of Social Movements." In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, 262–93. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
- Taylor, Verta, and Nancy E. Whittier. 1992. "Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities: Lesbian Feminist Mobilization." In *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, edited by Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg, ed. Mueller, 104–29. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Tejerina, Benjamín. 2001. "Protest Cycle, Political Violence and Social Movements in the Basque Country." *Nations and Nationalism* 7 (1): 39–57. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1469-8219.00003>.

Bibliography

- . 2010. *La Sociedad Imaginada: Movimientos Sociales y Cambio Cultural En España*. (Colección Estructuras y Procesos. Serie Ciencias Sociales). Madrid: Trotta.
- . 2015. “Nacionalismo, Violencia y Movilización Social En El País Vasco. Factores y Mecanismos Del Auge y Declive de ETA.” *Papeles Del CEIC. International Journal on Collective Identity Research* 2015/3 (136): 1–19. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/pceic.15159>.
- Tejerina, Benjamín, Jose Manuel Fernández Sobrado, and Xabier Aierdi Urraza. 1995. *Sociedad Civil, Protesta y Movimientos Sociales En El País Vasco: Los Límites de La Teoría de La Movilización de Recursos*. Vitoria-Gasteiz: Servicio Central de Publicaciones del Gobierno Vasco.
- Tilly, Charles. 2003. *The Politics of Collective Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2004. “Social Boundary Mechanisms.” *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 34 (2): 211–36. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393103262551>.
- . 2005. *Identities, Boundaries and Social Ties*. London: Routledge.
- Tilly, Charles, and Sidney G. Tarrow. 2007. *Contentious Politics*. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1954. *Democracy in America*. Edited by Phillips Bradley and Francis Bowen. New York: Vintage Books.
- . 2011. *Tocqueville: The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution*. Edited by Arthur Goldhammer and Jon Elster. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
<http://ezp.biblio.unitn.it/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=e000xww&AN=366260&lang=it&site=eds-live&scope=site>.
- Torcal, Mariano, and José Ramón Montero. 1999. “Facets of Social Capital in New Democracies: The Formation and Consequences of Social Capital in Spain.” In *Social Capital and European Democracy*, edited by Jan W. Van Deth, Marco Maraffi, Kenneth Newton, and Paul Whiteley, 154–77. London: Routledge.
- Torcal, Mariano, José Ramón Montero, and Jan Teorell. 2006. “La Participación Política En España: Modos y Niveles En Perspectiva Comparada.” In *Ciudadanos, Asociaciones y Participación En España*, edited by José Ramón Montero, Joan Font, and Mariano Torcal, 47–76. Madrid: CIS.
- Tuchman, Gaye. 1973. “Making News by Doing Work: Routinizing the Unexpected.” *American Journal of Sociology* 79 (1): 110–31. <https://doi.org/10.1086/225510>.
- Ullrich, Peter, Priska Daphi, and Britta Baumgarten. 2014. “Protest and Culture: Concepts and Approaches in Social Movement Research - An Introduction.” In *Conceptualizing Culture in Social Movement Research*, edited by Britta Baumgarten, Priska Daphi, and Peter Ullrich, 1–22. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Van Der Meer, Tom W.G., and Erik J. Van Ingen. 2009. “Schools of Democracy? Disentangling the Relationship between Civic Participation and Political Action in 17 European Countries.” *European Journal of Political Research* 48 (2): 281–308. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2008.00836.x>.
- Van Dyke, Nella. 2003. “Crossing Movement Boundaries: Factors That Facilitate Coalition Protest by American College Students, 1930–1990.” *Social Problems* 50 (2): 226–50. <https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2003.50.2.226>.

Bibliography

- Van Dyke, Nella, and Bryan Amos. 2017. "Social Movement Coalitions: Formation, Longevity, and Success." *Sociology Compass* 11 (7): e12489. <https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12489>.
- Van Dyke, Nella, and Holly J. McCammon, eds. 2010. *Strategic Alliances: Coalition Building and Social Movements*. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Vilaregut, Ricard. 2007. "Las Movilizaciones Como Actor En El Proceso de Paz." In *La Red En El Conflicto Anuario de Movimientos Sociales 2007*, edited by Pedro Ibarra and Elena Grau, 70–84. Barcelona: Icaria Editorial.
- Wada, Takeshi. 2014. "Who Are the Active and Central Actors in the 'Rising Civil Society' in Mexico?" *Social Movement Studies* 13 (1): 127–57. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2013.860876>.
- Wang, Dan J., Hayagreeva Rao, and Sarah A. Soule. 2019. "Crossing Categorical Boundaries: A Study of Diversification by Social Movement Organizations." *American Sociological Review* 84 (3): 420–58. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122419846111>.
- Wang, Dan J., and Sarah A. Soule. 2012. "Social Movement Organizational Collaboration: Networks of Learning and the Diffusion of Protest Tactics, 1960–1995." *American Journal of Sociology* 117 (6): 1674–1722. <https://doi.org/10.1086/664685>.
- Warren, Mark E. 2001. *Democracy and Association*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Wasserman, Stanley, and Katherine Faust. 1994. *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Watson, Cameron. 2003. *Modern Basque History: Eighteenth Century to the Present*. Reno, Nev.: University of Nevada Press.
- Wellman, Barry. 1988. "Structural Analysis: From Method and Metaphor to Theory and Substance." In *Social Structures: A Network Approach*, edited by Barry Wellman, 19–61. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- White, Douglas R., and Karl P. Reitz. 1983. "Graph and Semigroup Homomorphisms on Networks of Relations." *Social Networks* 5 (2): 193–234. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733\(83\)90025-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733(83)90025-4).
- White, Harrison C. 1992. *Identity and Control: A Structural Theory of Social Action*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- White, Harrison C., Scott A. Boorman, and Ronald L. Breiger. 1976. "Social Structure from Multiple Networks. I. Blockmodels of Roles and Positions." *American Journal of Sociology* 81 (4): 730–80.
- White, Harrison C., Frédéric C. Godart, and Matthias Thiemann. 2013. "Turning Points and the Space of Possibles: A Relational Perspective on the Different Forms of Uncertainty." In *Applying Relational Sociology*, edited by François Dépelteau and Christopher Powell, 137–54. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Whitfield, Teresa. 2014. *Endgame for ETA: Elusive Peace in the Basque Country*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Williams, Rhys H. 2004. "The Cultural Contexts of Collective Action: Constraints, Opportunities, and the Symbolic Life of Social Movements." In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, 91–115. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Bibliography

- Wimmer, Andreas. 2008. "The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory." *American Journal of Sociology* 113 (4): 970–1022. <https://doi.org/10.1086/522803>.
- . 2013. *Ethnic Boundary Making: Institutions, Power, Networks*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wood, Lesley J., Suzanne Staggenborg, Glenn J. Stalker, and Rachel Kutz-Flamenbaum. 2017. "Eventful Events: Local Outcomes of G20 Summit Protests in Pittsburgh and Toronto." *Social Movement Studies* 0 (0): 1–15. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2017.1319266>.
- Woodworth, Paddy. 2007. *The Basque Country: A Cultural History*. Oxford: Signal Books.
- Zabalo, Julen, and Mikel Saratxo. 2015. "ETA Ceasefire: Armed Struggle vs. Political Practice in Basque Nationalism." *Ethnicities* 15 (3): 362–84. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796814566477>.
- Zald, Mayer N., and Roberta Ash. 1966. "Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change." *Social Forces* 44 (3): 327–41. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2575833>.
- Zernova, Margarita. 2017. "Restorative Justice in the Basque Peace Process: Some Experiments and Their Lessons." *Contemporary Justice Review* 20 (3): 363–91. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10282580.2017.1348899>.
- Zietsma, Charlene, Peter Groenewegen, Danielle M. Logue, and C. R. (Bob) Hinings. 2017. "Field or Fields? Building the Scaffolding for Cumulation of Research on Institutional Fields." *Academy of Management Annals* 11 (1): 391–450. <https://doi.org/10.5465/annals.2014.0052>.
- Zirakzadeh, Cyrus Ernesto. 1991. *A Rebellious People: Basques, Protests, and Politics*. Reno, Nev.: University of Nevada Press.
- Zmerli, Sonja, and Ken Newton. 2007. "Networking among Voluntary Associations: Segmented or Integrated?" In *Social Capital and Associations in European Democracies*, edited by William A. Maloney and Sigrid Roßteutscher, 153–74. Abingdon: Routledge.

APPENDICES


APPENDIX 1 – Network graphs of interorganizational collaboration	240
APPENDIX 2 – Descriptive statistics of the networks of latent linkages employed as independent variables	244
APPENDIX 3 – Main attributes of all 70 organizations identified as members of the Basque ECAF.....	248
APPENDIX 4 – Informal consultations with expert informants for the mapping of core organizations in five fields.....	257
APPENDIX 5 – In-depth qualitative interviews with activists and experts.....	258
APPENDIX 6 – Organizational survey respondents.....	260
APPENDIX 7 – Questionnaire of the organizational survey	261
APPENDIX 8 – Main facilitators and obstacles for interorganizational collaboration according to survey respondents	285
APPENDIX 9 – Coding instructions for event identification	286
APPENDIX 10 – Coding procedure and codebook of environmental collective action events	292
APPENDIX 11 – Within-2011 analyses: QAP regression results and descriptive statistics of networks	300

APPENDIX 1 – Network graphs of interorganizational collaboration


Legend:

- Ties between nodes represent event co-attendance, with edge width proportional to the strength of the tie, expressed in Jaccard coefficients (value range: 0 to 1).
- Node colors represent the four broad types of organizations: environmental organizations (green), political parties (blue), trade unions (red), other civic organizations (yellow).
- Node size proportional to total number of events attended (logarithmic scale).
- Layout algorithm: Force Atlas 2 (Jacomy *et al.* 2014)


2007




2009




2009 bis




2011




2013



2015



2017



**APPENDIX 2 – Descriptive statistics of the networks of latent linkages
employed as independent variables**

A. IDEOLOGICAL NETWORKS

	2007	2009	2009bis	2011	2013	2015	2017
Number of nodes	28	23	20	21	23	32	30
<u>Shared Basque nationalist orientation</u>			<i>edge value range: binary (0/1)</i>				
Average degree	4.714	4.783	4.500	3.428	3.130	3.483	4.400
Average distance	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Diameter	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Isolated nodes (%)	57	52	50	57	61	66	60
Components (apart from isolates)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Density	.175	.217	.237	.171	.142	.111	.152
Centralization	.251	.260	.263	.253	.242	.226	.244
Closure	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
<u>Different public position towards ETA</u>			<i>edge value range: binary (0/1)</i>				
Average degree	5.143	5.739	5.500	3.333	3.478	4.875	4.200
Average distance	1.529	1.515	1.542	1.470	1.560	1.544	1.475
Diameter	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Isolated nodes (%)	36	26	20	43	39	41	47
Components (apart from isolates)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Density	.190	.261	.289	.167	.158	.157	.145
Centralization	.274	.262	.322	.203	.325	.280	.177
Closure	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<u>Shared far left-wing orientation</u>			<i>edge value range: binary (0/1)</i>				
Average degree	8.571	10.435	9.100	11.429	9.130	14.438	15.400
Average distance	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Diameter	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Isolated nodes (%)	43	30	30	24	35	31	27
Components (apart from isolates)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Density	.317	.474	.479	.571	.415	.466	.531
Centralization	.256	.227	.228	.197	.242	.226	.207
Closure	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
<u>Shared environmental-specific orientation</u>			<i>edge value range: binary (0/1)</i>				
Average degree	3.500	3.478	3.000	4.857	7.043	5.063	3.400
Average distance	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Diameter	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Isolated nodes (%)	39	39	40	33	30	50	57
Components (apart from isolates)	3	3	3	2	2	2	2
Density	.130	.158	.158	.243	.320	.163	.117
Centralization	.179	.225	.234	.229	.247	.239	.207
Closure	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

B. INTERPERSONAL NETWORKS

	2007	2009	2009bis	2011	2013	2015	2017
Number of nodes	28	23	20	21	23	32	30
Shared active members <i>edge value range: binary (0/1)</i>							
Average degree	2.071	2.522	1.900	4.381	3.826	4.375	5
Average distance	2.421	2.242	2.305	1.995	2.100	2.148	1.991
Diameter	5	5	4	4	4	4	4
Isolated nodes (%)	32	22	25	5	9	9	7
Components (apart from isolates)	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
Density	.077	.115	.100	.219	.174	.141	.172
Centralization	.276	.323	.298	.532	.506	.297	.369
Closure	.138	.161	.105	.290	.375	.377	.251

C. PRAGMATIC-INSTRUMENTAL NETWORKS

	2007	2009	2009bis	2011	2013	2015	2017
Number of nodes	28	23	20	21	23	32	30
Overlapping issue-agenda <i>edge value range: interval (0 – 1)</i>							
Average degree	10.929	10.783	10.400	11.333	12.696	18.625	14.667
Average distance	1.395	1.347	1.235	1.316	1.232	1.315	1.267
Diameter	2	2	2	3	2	2	2
Isolated nodes (%)	18	13	15	10	13	6	17
Components (apart from isolates)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Density	.405	.490	.547	.567	.577	.601	.506
Centralization	.442	.409	.327	.313	.314	.357	.345
Closure	.749	.779	.885	.827	.853	.807	.829
Average edge strength (standard deviation)	.144 (.218)	.182 (.240)	.193 (.223)	.188 (.221)	.195 (.221)	.201 (.228)	.181 (.233)
Overlapping territorial scope of action <i>edge value range: interval (0 – 1)</i>							
Average degree	25.929	21.304	18.600	18.381	21.130	29.625	28.627
Average distance	1.040	1.032	1.021	1.081	1.040	1.044	1.025
Diameter	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Isolated nodes (%)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Components (apart from isolates)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Density	.960	.968	.979	.919	.960	.956	.975
Centralization	.043	.035	.023	.089	.043	.047	.027
Closure	.970	.971	.980	.934	.968	.964	.977
Average edge strength (standard deviation)	.575 (.328)	.604 (.308)	.638 (.313)	.547 (.353)	.603 (.326)	.640 (.313)	.670 (.329)

Appendices

Centripetal attraction among parties & unions		<i>edge value range: binary (0/1)</i>					
Average degree	2.571	2.348	2.500	1.714	1.739	3.188	3.200
Average distance	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Diameter	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Isolated nodes (%)	54	52	45	57	57	53	57
Components (apart from isolates)	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Density	.095	.107	.132	.086	.079	.103	.110
Centralization	.137	.182	.146	.182	.113	.166	.214
Closure	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Different internal organizational models		<i>edge value range: pseudo-interval (0 / .5 / 1)</i>					
Average degree	15.714	13.217	9.900	11.333	13.826	19.188	19.533
Average distance	1.418	1.399	1.479	1.433	1.372	1.381	1.326
Diameter	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Isolated nodes (%)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Components (apart from isolates)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Density	.582	.601	.521	.567	.628	.619	.674
Centralization	.410	.387	.064	.479	.307	.303	.128
Closure	.300	.343	0	.232	.421	.405	.505
Average edge strength (standard deviation)	.323 (.298)	.344 (.312)	.261 (.250)	.310 (.292)	.379 (.333)	.370 (.330)	.433 (.354)

Different tactical profiles		<i>edge value range: binary (0/1)</i>					
Average degree	11.429	8.870	6.400	6.476	7.826	12.000	12.600
Average distance	1.577	1.597	1.663	1.676	1.644	1.613	1.566
Diameter	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Isolated nodes (%)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Components (apart from isolates)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Density	.423	.403	.337	.324	.356	.387	.434
Centralization	.342	.405	.561	.582	.506	.413	.310
Closure	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Membership of single orgs in umbrella groups		<i>edge value range: binary (0/1)</i>					
Average degree	1.500	1.391	1.500	1.619	2.870	3.125	5.067
Average distance	2.050	2.176	2.205	2.438	1.908	2.282	1.942
Diameter	4	4	4	4	3	4	4
Isolated nodes (%)	43	39	35	29	22	16	7
Components (apart from isolates)	1	1	1	1	1	1	2
Density	.056	.063	.079	.081	.130	.101	.175
Centralization	.419	.429	.380	.353	.504	.374	.478
Closure	0	0	0	0	.072	.107	.142

D. STRUCTURAL CONTROLS

	2007	2009	2009bis	2011	2013	2015	2017
Number of nodes	28	23	20	21	23	32	30
<u>Geographic unconnectedness</u>			<i>edge value range: binary (0/1)</i>				
Average degree	1.071	.696	.400	1.619	.783	1.563	.733
Average distance	1.727	1.200	1.333	1.394	1.571	1.545	1.267
Diameter	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Isolated nodes (%)	61	78	80	62	70	66	80
Components (apart from isolates)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Density	.040	.032	.021	.081	.036	.050	.025
Centralization	.356	.165	.094	.187	.260	.222	.158
Closure	.231	.667	0	.310	.375	.079	.581
<u>Specific second-order nodes and members</u>			<i>edge value range: binary (0/1)</i>				
Average degree	.214	.174		.381		.250	
Average distance	1.500	1.333		1.600		1.429	
Diameter	2	2		2		2	
Isolated nodes (%)	86	87		76		81%	
Components (apart from isolates)	1	1		1		2	
Density	.008	.008		.019		.008	
Centralization	.111	.091		.200		.095	
Closure	0	0		0		0	

APPENDIX 3 – Main attributes of all 70 organizations identified as members of the Basque ECAF

KEY:

VARIABLE	CATEGORIZATION
<i>National identity</i>	2 = Basque nationalist 1 = Spanish nationalist 0 = Ambiguous / Not applicable
<i>Position towards ETA</i>	2 = Lenient 1 = Critical 0 = Ambiguous / Not applicable
<i>Left-right ideology</i>	3 = Far left-wing 2 = Center-left 1 = Center-right 0 = Ambiguous / Not applicable
<i>Environmental orientation</i>	3 = Political ecologist 2 = Reformist 1 = Conservationist 0 = Ambiguous / Not applicable
<i>Organizational model</i>	3 = Communitarian-egalitarian 2 = Structured-voluntary 1 = Professionalized
<i>Tactical profile</i>	2 = Open to disruption 1 = Exclusively moderate

Appendices

#	NAME <i>[English translation]</i>	TYPE	YEARS AS ACTIVE NETWORK MEMBERS	NATIONAL IDENTITY	POSITION TOWARDS ETA	LEFT-RIGHT IDEOLOGY	ENVIRONMENTAL ORIENTATION	ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL	TACTICAL PROFILE
1	AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana <i>[Stop HST! Collaboration]</i>	Environmental umbrella group	2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017	2	2	3	3	2	2
2	Alternatiba <i>[Alternative]</i>	Political party	2009	2	1	3	0	1	1
3	Araba Sin Garona <i>[Araba/Álava without Garoña]</i>	Environmental umbrella group	2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017	0	0	0	2	2	1
4	Aralar	Political party	2007, 2009, 2011	2	1	3	0	1	1
5	Aroztegia... eta Gero Zer? <i>[Aroztegia... and then what?]</i>	Environmental local platform	2015	0	0	0	1	3	1
6	Asamblea contra el TAV <i>[Assembly against the HST]</i>	Environmental organization	2007, 2009	0	1	3	3	3	2
7	Askapena <i>[Liberation]</i>	Internationalist organization	2015	2	2	3	0	2	2
8	Asoc Vecinal San Jorge <i>[San Jorge Neighborhood Association]</i>	Neighborhood organization	2015	0	0	3	0	2	1
9	Batasuna^a <i>[Unity]</i>	Political party	2007, 2009	2	2	3	3	1	1
10	Berdeak – Los Verdes <i>[The Greens]</i>	Political party	2009	0	1	3	3	1	1
11	Bildu <i>[Gather/Reunite]</i>	Political party coalition	2011	2	2	3	3	1	1

Appendices

#	NAME <i>[English translation]</i>	TYPE	YEARS AS ACTIVE NETWORK MEMBERS	NATIONAL IDENTITY	POSITION TOWARDS ETA	LEFT-RIGHT IDEOLOGY	ENVIRONMENTAL ORIENTATION	ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL	TACTICAL PROFILE
12	CADE (Collectif des Associations de défense de l'Environnement Pays Basque-Sud des landes) <i>[Collective of Associations for the Defense of the Environment of Basque Country-South of Les Landes]</i>	Environmental umbrella group	2007	0	0	0	2	2	2
13	Carta de Derechos Sociales de EH / EH-ko Eskubiden Sozialen Karta <i>[Euskal Herria's Charter of Social Rights]</i>	Social exclusion umbrella group	2015, 2017	2	0	3	0	2	1
14	CC.OO. (Comisiones Obreras) <i>[Workers' Commissions]</i>	Trade union	2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017	0	1	3	0	1	1
15	CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo) <i>[General Confederation of Labor]</i>	Trade union	2007, 2015, 2017	0	0	3	0	2	2
16	Club Alpino Tabira <i>[Alpine Club Tabira]</i>	Recreational/outdoor organization	2007	0	0	0	1	2	1
17	Club Vasco de Camping <i>[Basque Camping Club]</i>	Recreational/outdoor organization	2009	0	0	0	1	2	1
18	CNT (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo) <i>[National Confederation of Labour]</i>	Trade union	2015, 2017	0	0	3	0	2	2
19	Coordinadora de Plataformas Antiincineración de Gipuzkoa <i>[Gipuzkoa's Coordinator of Platforms Against Incineration]</i>	Environmental local platform	2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017	0	0	0	2	2	1
20	Dale Vuelta – Bira beste aldera <i>[Turn it around]</i>	Environmental organization	2011	0	0	3	3	2	1

Appendices

#	NAME <i>[English translation]</i>	TYPE	YEARS AS ACTIVE NETWORK MEMBERS	NATIONAL IDENTITY	POSITION TOWARDS ETA	LEFT-RIGHT IDEOLOGY	ENVIRONMENTAL ORIENTATION	ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL	TACTICAL PROFILE
21	Desazkundea <i>[Degrowth]</i>	Environmental organization	2011, 2013, 2015	0	0	3	3	3	1
22	Duintasuna <i>[Dignity]</i>	Pensioners organization	2017	2	0	3	0	2	1
23	EA (Eusko Alkartasuna) <i>[Basque Solidarity]</i>	Political party	2007, 2009	2	1	2	0	1	1
24	EB-Berdeak^b <i>[United Left-Greens]</i>	Political party	2007, 2009, 2011, 2013	0	1	3	3	1	1
25	Eguzki <i>[Sun]</i>	Environmental organization	2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017	2	2	3	3	2	2
26	EH Bildu <i>[Euskal Herria Reunite/Gather]</i>	Political party coalition	2013, 2015, 2017	2	2	3	3	1	1
27	EHNE (Euskal Herriko Nekazarien Elkartasuna) <i>[Farmers' Solidarity of Euskal Herria]</i>	Trade union	2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017	2	2	3	3	1	1
28	Ekologistak Martxan <i>[Ecologists on the move]</i>	Environmental organization	2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017	0	1	3	3	2	2
29	ELA (Eusko Langileen Alkartasuna) <i>[Basque Workers' Solidarity]</i>	Trade union	2007, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017	2	1	3	0	1	1
30	Elkarrekin Podemos <i>[Together we can]</i>	Political party coalition	2007	0	1	3	3	1	1
31	Elkartzen <i>[Coming together]</i>	Social exclusion organization	2007, 2009	2	2	3	0	3	2

Appendices

#	NAME <i>[English translation]</i>	TYPE	YEARS AS ACTIVE NETWORK MEMBERS	NATIONAL IDENTITY	POSITION TOWARDS ETA	LEFT-RIGHT IDEOLOGY	ENVIRONMENTAL ORIENTATION	ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL	TACTICAL PROFILE
32	Equo	Political party	2013	0	1	3	3	1	1
33	Ernai <i>[Awake]</i>	Youth political organization	2017	2	2	3	0	3	2
34	ESK (Ezker Sindikalaren Konbergentzia) <i>[Leftist Union Convergence]</i>	Trade union	2011, 2013, 2017	2	1	3	0	1	1
35	Ezker Anitza <i>[Plural Left]</i>	Political party	2015	0	1	3	0	1	1
36	Foro Contra Garoña <i>[Forum Against Garoña]</i>	Environmental umbrella group	2017	0	0	0	2	3	1
37	Fracking Ez! <i>[No Fracking!]</i>	Environmental umbrella group	2013, 2015	2	0	3	3	3	2
38	Gipuzkoa Zero Zabor / Zero Zabor I.B.E. <i>[Gipuzkoa's Zero Waste / "Zero Waste", Association for Environmental Protection]</i>	Environmental organization	2011, 2013, 2015	0	0	0	2	2	1
39	Goienar	Green energy consumers' cooperative	2013, 2015, 2017	0	0	0	3	1	1
40	Greenpeace	Environmental organization	2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017	0	1	0	3	2	2
41	Gurelur – Fondo Navarro para la Protección del Medio Natural) <i>[Gurelur – Navarrese Foundation for the Protection of the Environment]</i>	Environmental organization	2013	0	0	0	1	2	1

Appendices

#	NAME <i>[English translation]</i>	TYPE	YEARS AS ACTIVE NETWORK MEMBERS	NATIONAL IDENTITY	POSITION TOWARDS ETA	LEFT-RIGHT IDEOLOGY	ENVIRONMENTAL ORIENTATION	ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL	TACTICAL PROFILE
42	Haritzalde	Environmental organization	2007	0	0	0	1	2	1
43	Hiru – Garraiolarien Euskal Herriko Sindikatua <i>["Three" – Euskal Herria's Union of Truck Drivers]</i>	Trade union	2017	2	0	3	0	1	1
44	Irabazi ^c <i>[To Win]</i>	Political party coalition	2015	0	1	3	0	1	1
45	Izate	Environmental organization	2009	0	0	0	1	2	1
46	Jaizkibel Bizirik <i>[Jaizkibel Alive]</i>	Environmental organization	2007	0	0	0	1	2	1
47	Kakitzat	Anti-militarist organization	2017	0	2	3	0	3	2
48	LAB (Langile Abertzaleen Batzordeak) <i>[Nationalist/Patriotic Workers' Committees]</i>	Trade union	2007, 2009, 2011, 2015, 2017	2	2	3	0	1	1
49	Landare <i>[Plant/Vegetable]</i>	Food consumers' cooperative	2011	0	0	0	2	1	1
50	LSB-USO (Langile Sindikal Batasuna – Unión Sindical Obrera de Euskadi) <i>[Workers' Trade Union]</i>	Trade union	2007, 2015	1	1	1	0	1	1
51	Lurra <i>[Earth]</i>	Environmental organization	2007	0	0	3	3	2	1
52	Movimiento Anti-Incineración / Errausketaren Aurkako Mugimendua <i>[Movement Against Incineration]</i>	Environmental umbrella group	2017	0	0	0	2	3	1

Appendices

#	NAME <i>[English translation]</i>	TYPE	YEARS AS ACTIVE NETWORK MEMBERS	NATIONAL IDENTITY	POSITION TOWARDS ETA	LEFT-RIGHT IDEOLOGY	ENVIRONMENTAL ORIENTATION	ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL	TACTICAL PROFILE
53	MSV, Mayoria Sindical Vasca ^d <i>[Basque Trade Union Majority]</i>	Trade union informal coalition	2007, 2009, 2011, 2015	2	0	3	0	1	1
54	Mugarik Gabe Euskadi <i>["Without borders" Euskadi]</i>	International solidarity NGO	2015	0	1	3	3	1	1
55	PAH / Stop Desahucios <i>[Platform of Those Affected by Mortgages / Stop Evictions]</i>	Social exclusion organization	2017	0	0	3	0	3	2
56	Plataforma contra la Central Termica de Pasaia <i>[Platform against Pasaia's Thermal Power Plant]</i>	Environmental local platform	2007	0	0	0	2	2	1
57	Plataforma TTIP/CETA Ez <i>["No to TTIP/CETA" Platform]</i>	Anti-globalization umbrella group	2017	0	0	3	0	3	1
58	PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco – Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea, EAJ) <i>[Basque Nationalist Party]</i>	Political party	2007, 2013	2	1	1	0	1	1
59	Podemos <i>[We can]</i>	Political party	2015	0	1	3	0	1	1
60	PSE-EE (Partido Socialista de Euskadi-Euskadiko Ezkerra) <i>[Socialist Party of the Basque Country–Basque Country Left]</i>	Political party	2013, 2015, 2017	1	1	2	0	1	1
61	Px1NME – Gure Energia <i>[Platform for a New Energy Model – Our Energy]</i>	Environmental umbrella group	2013, 2015, 2017	0	0	3	3	3	1
62	REAS (Red de Redes de Economía Alternativa y Solidaria) <i>[Network of Networks of Alternative and Solidarity Economy]</i>	Solidarity/alternative economy umbrella group	2011	0	0	3	0	1	1

Appendices

#	NAME <i>[English translation]</i>	TYPE	YEARS AS ACTIVE NETWORK MEMBERS	NATIONAL IDENTITY	POSITION TOWARDS ETA	LEFT-RIGHT IDEOLOGY	ENVIRONMENTAL ORIENTATION	ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL	TACTICAL PROFILE
63	Salhaketa	Prisoners' rights organization	2009	0	0	3	0	2	1
64	SEO/Birdlife <i>[Spanish Ornithological Society]</i>	Environmental organization	2009	0	1	0	1	2	1
65	Steilas / STEE-EILAS (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Enseñanza de Euskadi – Euskalherriko Irakaskuntzako Langileen Sindikatua) <i>[Union of Education Workers of the Basque Country]</i>	Trade union	2013, 2017	2	1	3	0	1	1
66	Sustrai Erakuntza <i>[Sustrai Foundation]</i>	Environmental organization	2011, 2013, 2015, 2017	0	0	3	3	2	1
67	Txingudi Bizirik <i>[Txingudi (Bay Area) Alive]</i>	Environmental local platform	2007	0	0	0	1	2	1
68	UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores) <i>[General Union of Workers]</i>	Trade union	2015, 2017	1	1	2	0	1	1
69	WWF/Adena <i>[World Wildlife Fund for Nature / Association for the Defense of Nature]</i>	Environmental organization	2007	0	1	0	1	2	1
70	Zutik <i>[Stand up]</i>	Political party	2007, 2009	2	1	3	0	1	1

^a Batasuna had already been judicially proscribed due to its alleged links with ETA in 2003 after the enactment of a new party law in 2002 that permitted the courts to dissolve parties that ‘violated democratic principles in a repeated and grave form, or aimed to undermine or destroy the regime of liberties, or injure or eliminate the democratic system’ (Organic Law 6/2002, article 9.2). Nonetheless, despite being barred from participating in elections, the party was still active in the Basque public sphere during the years 2007 and 2009, promoting events and demonstrations and circulating public statements covered in the press, often identified as ‘members of former Batasuna’, the ‘abertzale left’ or under the acronyms of two political organizations through which the radical Basque nationalism attempted to compete in electoral processes. These were the Basque Nationalist Action (ANV) and Communist Party of the Basque Homelands (EHAK), which were banned in 2008 for being considered successors of the illegal Batasuna. Therefore, mentions to the participation of members of ANV, EHAK, ‘former Batasuna’ or ‘representatives of the abertzale left’ were coded as Batasuna in the event database.

^b EB-Berdeak (or *Ezker Batua – Berdeak*) refers to the the Basque section of the state-wide post-communist party United Left (IU). The party kept using the word *berdeak* (greens) long after holding an electoral coalition with the small ecologist party *Berdeak-Los Verdes* between 1994 and 1999. The party did not dissolve itself until 2014, two years after the emergence of the splinter party *Ezker Anitza* (Plural Left), nowadays the official Basque section of IU.

^c Irabazi, a short-term electoral coalition of leftist parties and independent candidates that was formed for the 2015 municipal elections, being being *Ezker Anitza* and *Equo* the two most important political parties (see endnote 13 of the manuscript). The coalition was coded as a participant in 2015 events either whenever it was directly mentioned in news reports (in which case additional references to the participation of *Ezker Anitza* and *Equo* were omitted, since the presence of Irabazi logically entailed the participation of the members of the coalition), or, alternatively, when both *Ezker Anitza* and *Equo* participated together in the same event.

^d The MSV (see section 5.2.2.e) was coded as a single unified collective actor when there were explicit references to the participation of at least 5 of its 6 constituent unions, necessarily including the two most important ones: ELA and LAB.

APPENDIX 4 – Informal consultations with expert informants for the mapping of core organizations in five fields

Note: The eight expert informants with whom the environmental collective action field was explicitly reviewed figure on the left column, while the other seven are on the right.

Benjamín TEJERINA

Professor of Sociology (UPV/EHU)

Fields reviewed: all

November 7th, 2017 – Bilbao

Arkaitz LETAMENDIA

Postdoc Researcher in Sociology (UPV/EHU)

Fields reviewed: all

November 7th, 2017 – Bilbao

Iñaki BÁRCENA

Professor of Political Science (UPV/EHU) & activist in *Ekologistak Martxan*

Fields reviewed: environmentalism

November 8th, 2017 – Bilbao

Pedro IBARRA

Emeritus professor of Political Science (UPV/EHU)

Fields reviewed: all

November 8th, 2017 – Bilbao

Raúl LÓPEZ ROMO

Professor of Contemporary History (UPV/EHU)

Fields reviewed: conflict-related, environmentalism

November 9th, 2017 – Bilbao

Nagua ALBA

Member of the Spanish Parliament & Secretary-General of *Podemos Euskadi*

Fields reviewed: all (with focus on party ties)

November 15th, 2017 – Madrid

Aitor URRESTI GONZÁLEZ

Politician (member of the green party *Equo*) & activist at several environmental groups

Fields reviewed: environmentalism

November 28th, 2017 – Bilbao

Tinixara GUANCHE SUÁREZ

Member of the Basque Parliament & *Podemos Euskadi*'s coordinator of relations with civil society

Fields reviewed: labour, social exclusion, environmentalism, feminism

November 30th, 2017 – Vitoria

Monika HERNANDO PORRES

Director of the Office of Victims and Human Rights of the Basque Government

Fields reviewed: conflict-related

November 23rd, 2017 – Bilbao

Estibaliz DE MIGUEL CALVO

Professor of Sociology (UPV/EHU)

Fields reviewed: social exclusion, feminism

November 24th, 2017 – Vitoria

Isabel URKIJO AZKARATE

Activist, former coordinator of *Gesto por la Paz* (a leading pacifist organization in B.C.)

Fields reviewed: conflict-related

November 28th, 2017 – Bilbao

Iñaki GARCÍA ARRIZABALAGA

Victim of terrorism, member of the plural collective of victims *Eraikiz*

Fields reviewed: conflict-related

November 29th, 2017 – Vitoria

Irantzu MENDÍA

Professor of Sociology (UPV/EHU) & activist at several feminist groups

Fields reviewed: feminism

November 29th, 2017 – Vitoria

Sergio CAMPO LLEDÓ

Member of the Basque Parliament & *Podemos Euskadi*'s coordinator of political discourse

Fields reviewed: conflict-related

November 30th, 2017 – Vitoria

Andrés KRAKENBERGER

Activist, President of the pro-human rights association *Argituz*, and former president of Amnesty International (AI) Spain & Euskadi

Fields reviewed: conflict-related

November 30th, 2017 – Vitoria

APPENDIX 5 – In-depth qualitative interviews conducted with activists and experts

1. Academic, expert in peace-related mobilizations / Bilbao / June 22nd, 2018
2. Activist, Member of a non-environmental civic organization included in the analysis / San Sebastian / July 18th, 2018
3. Academic and activist, expert in social movements and protests in the Basque Country / Leioa / July 19th, 2018
4. Experienced trade union activist / Bilbao / July 24th, 2018
5. Academic and activist, expert in the feminist movement / Bilbao / August 1st, 2018
6. Journalist covering social issues and social movements / Bilbao / August 1st, 2018
7. Academic and activist, expert in the environmental movement / Leioa / September 19th, 2018
8. Social consultant and expert in policies of social assistance / Bilbao / September 24th, 2018
9. Academic, expert in social movements and protests in the Basque Country / Leioa / September 25th, 2018
10. Experienced feminist activist / Zarautz / October 4th, 2018
11. Academic and activist, expert in the feminist movement / San Sebastian / October 8th, 2018
12. Members of a non-environmental civic organization included in the analysis / Bilbao / February 13th, 2019
13. Members of an environmental organization included in the analysis / Bilbao / February 19th, 2019
14. Former politician and experienced environmental activist, member of several environmental organizations included in the analysis / Bilbao / February 19th, 2019
15. Members of an environmental organization included in the analysis / San Sebastian / February 21st, 2019
16. Member of an environmental organization included in the analysis / San Sebastian / February 21st, 2019
17. Member of an environmental organization included in the analysis / Vitoria / February 22nd, 2019
18. Experienced environmental activist, member of several organizations included in the analysis / San Sebastian & Trento (phone interview) / March 6th, 2019

Appendices

19. Former politician and member of an environmental organization included in the analysis / San Sebastian / August 7th, 2019
20. Environmental and pro-refugee activist / Güeñes / August 7th, 2019
21. Member of several environmental organizations included in the analysis / San Sebastian & Madrid (phone interview) / August 9th, 2019

APPENDIX 6 – Organizational survey respondents

- **AHT Gelditu! Elkarlana** [self-administered, electronic version]
- **Asamblea contra el TAV – AHT aurkako Asanblada** [self-administered, electronic version + follow-up phone call]
- **Askapena** [face-to-face]
- **Asociación Vecinal San Jorge**, Pamplona [self-administered, electronic version]
- **CC.OO.** [self-administered, electronic version]
- **CNT** [self-administered, electronic version]
- **CADE** [self-administered, electronic version]
- **Coordinadora de Plataformas Antiincineración de Gipuzkoa** [face-to-face]
- **Desazkundera** [self-administered, electronic version]
- **Eguzki** [face-to-face]
- **Ekologistak Martxan** (block D only) [self-administered, electronic version]
- **ELA** [self-administered, electronic version]
- **Elkartzen** [face-to-face]
- **Ernai** [self-administered, electronic version]
- **Foro contra Garoña** [self-administered, electronic version + follow-up phone call]
- **Fracking Ez!** [face-to-face]
- **Gipuzkoa Zero Zabor** [self-administered, electronic version]
- **Goienar** [self-administered, electronic version]
- **Greenpeace** [face-to-face]
- **Hiru** [self-administered, electronic version]
- **Landare** [self-administered, electronic version]
- **Movimiento Anti-Incineración** (block D only) [self-administered, electronic version]
- **Mugarik Gabe Euskadi** [self-administered, electronic version]
- **Px1NME – Gure Energia** [face-to-face]
- **REAS** [self-administered, electronic version]
- **SEO/Birdlife** [self-administered, electronic version]
- **Steilas (STEE-EILAS)** [self-administered, electronic version]
- **WWF/Adena** [self-administered, electronic version]

APPENDIX 7 – Questionnaire of the organizational survey

**The original version was drafted and distributed in Spanish. Translation in English is provided in between brackets, in italics and with a slightly different font and color.*

LA EVOLUCIÓN DE LAS REDES ECOLOGISTAS VASCAS (2007-2017)

[THE EVOLUTION OF BASQUE ENVIRONMENTAL NETWORKS (2007-2017)]

Cuestionario de organizaciones – Declaración de consentimiento

[Organizational questionnaire – Consent statement]

Mi nombre es Alejandro Ciordia, soy doctorando en sociología política en la Universidad de Trento (Italia). La tesis doctoral en la que estoy trabajando (financiada con fondos públicos por la Universidad de Trento) analiza la evolución del sistema de colaboraciones y alianzas entre organizaciones sociales y políticas involucradas en mayor o menor medida en reivindicaciones y causas ecologistas en Euskadi y Navarra, o Hegoalde, entre 2007 y 2017. El caso de la acción colectiva ecologista ha sido seleccionado por sus altos niveles de movilización y su indudable relevancia histórica desde los años 70. así como por sus particularidades respecto a otros contextos geográficos, marcadas en gran medida por la influencia de un contexto político que tradicionalmente ha sido fuertemente convulso. Esta investigación pretende contribuir a una mejor comprensión de la influencia de diversos factores (ideológicos, estratégicos, interpersonales, etc) a la hora de facilitar o dificultar la colaboración entre organizaciones políticas y de la sociedad civil, y de cómo la importancia de cada uno de estos factores varía a lo largo del tiempo de acuerdo con cambios en el contexto político.

[My name is Alejandro Ciordia, I am a doctoral student in political sociology at the University of Trento (Italy). The doctoral thesis on which I am working (funded with public funds by the University of Trento) analyzes the evolution of the system of collaborations and alliances between social and political organizations involved, to a greater or lesser extent, in the promotion of environmental claims and causes in Euskadi and Navarra, or Hegoalde, between 2007 and 2017. The case of environmental collective action has been selected for its high levels of mobilization and its undoubted historical relevance since the 70s, as well as for its particularities with respect to other geographical contexts, marked to a large extent by the influence of a political context that has traditionally been strongly turbulent. This research aims to contribute to a better understanding of the influence of various factors (ideological, strategic, interpersonal, etc.) in facilitating or hindering collaboration between political and civil society organizations, and how the importance of each of these factors vary over time according to changes in the political context.]

Como parte de esta investigación, su organización es invitada a participar completando un cuestionario. **Su organización ha sido seleccionada por haber sido identificada a través de la prensa local como organizadora o participante en más de un evento público relativo a causas ecologistas durante al menos alguno de los años analizados.** El siguiente cuestionario está redactado en castellano y consta de 30 preguntas (duración aproximada de 30-45 minutos) agrupadas en cuatro bloques temáticos:

*[As part of this research, your organization is invited to participate by completing a questionnaire. **Your organization has been selected for having been identified through***

extensive examination of the local press as an organizer or participant in more than one public event related to environmental issues during at least one of the years analyzed. The following questionnaire is written in Castilian and consists of 30 questions (approximate duration of 30-45 minutes) grouped into four thematic blocks:]

- A) Características de la organización y sus miembros
[The characteristics of the organization and its members]
- B) Áreas temáticas de trabajo y movilización
[Thematic areas of work and mobilization]
- C) Tácticas empleadas y contacto con instituciones públicas
[Forms of action and contact with public institutions]
- D) Relaciones con otras organizaciones
[Relations with other organizations]

Los datos obtenidos a través de este cuestionario serán almacenados en una base de datos electrónica para ser analizados con diversas técnicas estadísticas y cualitativas. Dicha base de datos permanecerá accesible únicamente para el investigador y el supervisor académico del proyecto, pudiendo parte de la misma ser cedida a terceras personas u organismos únicamente cuando sean requeridos con una finalidad de evaluación científica. Los datos personales de los miembros de las organizaciones que completan el cuestionario serán tratados confidencialmente y no podrán ser cedidos a terceros sin el consentimiento expreso de los mismos. Por otra parte, el investigador se reserva el derecho de nombrar a las organizaciones objeto de análisis en eventuales publicaciones que se puedan derivar de la misma siempre y cuando dicha inclusión ayude a la mejor comprensión de los resultados. Se entiende que dado el carácter público de dichas organizaciones este hecho no supone ningún perjuicio para éstas ni para sus miembros (con la excepción de la pregunta C1, relativa a las tácticas empleadas, en la que por su carácter potencialmente sensible, algunas respuestas serán tratadas de forma totalmente anónima).

[The data obtained through this questionnaire will be stored in an electronic database to be analyzed with various statistical and qualitative techniques. This database will remain accessible only to the researcher and the academic supervisor of the project, and part of it may be transferred to third parties or organizations only when they are required for the purpose of scientific evaluation. The personal data of the members of the organizations that complete the questionnaire will be treated confidentially and may not be disclosed to third parties without their express consent. On the other hand, the researcher reserves the right to name the organizations object of analysis in eventual publications that may be derived from it, as long as this mention helps to better understand the results. It is understood that given the public nature of these organizations, this fact does not entail any detriment to them or to their members (with the exception of question C1, relative to the tactics used, in which due to its potentially sensitive nature, some answers will be treated completely anonymously.).]

Declaración de consentimiento informado:

[Declaration of informed consent:]

Teniendo en cuenta lo anterior, como representantes de la organización _____, expresamos nuestro consentimiento a colaborar en la investigación completando las preguntas del siguiente cuestionario.

Appendices

[Taking the above into consideration, as representatives of the organization _____, we express our consent to collaborate in the investigation by completing the questions of the following questionnaire.]

Por favor, especifique también sus preferencias respecto a las siguientes cuestiones:
[Please, also specify your preferences regarding the following issues:]

¿Consiente que la entrevista sea grabada? SÍ / NO
[Do you consent the interview being recorded? YES / NO]

¿Desea ser informado en el futuro de la evolución de la investigación y recibir copia electrónica de eventuales publicaciones? SÍ / NO
[Would you like to be informed in the future of the evolution of the research and to receive electronic copies of possible publications? YES / NO]

¿Desea participar en eventuales grupos de discusión que se puedan realizar con miembros de otras organizaciones incluidas en la investigación? SÍ / NO
[Would you like to participate in eventual discussion groups that might be held with members of other organizations included in the research? YES / NO]

Fecha y lugar:
[Date and place:]

Firma y nombres de los miembros participantes:
(por favor, escriba su nombre y apellidos debajo de su firma)
[Signature and names of participating members:
(please write your name and surname below your signature)]

Para cualquier duda o reclamación puede ponerse en contacto en cualquier momento con el propio investigador, Alejandro Ciordia, así como con el supervisor, profesor Mario Diani. Ambos podrán atenderle sin problema en castellano.
[In case you have any questions or complaints, you can contact at any time the researcher himself, Alejandro Ciordia, as well as the supervisor, Professor Mario Diani. Both will be able to attend you in Castilian without problems.]

Datos de contacto del investigador:
[Contact details of the researcher:]

Alejandro Ciordia Morandeira
Doctorando en Sociología
Scuola di Dottorato in Sociologia e
Ricerca Sociale, Università di Trento
Via Verdi, 26 – 38122 Trento, Italia
a.ciordiamorandeira@unitn.it

Datos de contacto del supervisor:
[Contact details of the supervisor:]

Mario Diani
Profesor de Sociología
Dipartimento di Sociologia e Ricerca
Sociale, Università di Trento
Via Verdi, 26 – 38122 Trento, Italia
mario.diani@unitn.it

LA EVOLUCIÓN DE LAS REDES ECOLOGISTAS VASCAS (2007-2017)

CUESTIONARIO DE ORGANIZACIONES

[THE EVOLUTION OF BASQUE ENVIRONMENTAL NETWORKS (2007-2017)]

ORGANIZATIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE]

Advertencias previas: [Previous warnings]

*A lo largo de este cuestionario, el término “organización” se utiliza para referirse a grupos o colectivos identificables (con nombre) de participación voluntaria y orientación pública (con voluntad de que sus acciones tengan incidencia más allá de sus miembros), independientemente de si están formalmente constituidas o no.

*[*Throughout this questionnaire, the term “organization” refers to externally recognizable groups or collectives (with name) of voluntary participation and public orientation (with the will that their actions have an impact beyond their members), regardless of whether they are formally constituted or not.]*

**Es posible que algunas de las preguntas de este cuestionario no se ajusten por su carácter general a las experiencias y circunstancias de cada organización entrevistada. Si es el caso, gracias por su comprensión cuando esto ocurra.

*[** It is possible that some of the questions in this questionnaire, because of their general character, are not well suited to the experiences and circumstances of each interviewed organization. If that is the case, thank you for your understanding when this happens.]*

Información preliminar (a rellenar por entrevistador)

[Preliminary information (to be completed by the interviewer)]

NOMBRE DE LA ORGANIZACIÓN _____

[ORGANIZATION'S NAME]

SIGLAS / ABREVIATURA _____

[ACRONYM / ABBREVIATION]

EMAIL(S) DE CONTACTO _____

[CONTACT EMAIL(S)]

TELEFONO(S) DE CONTACTO _____

[CONTACT PHONE NUMBER(S)]

PÁGINA WEB DE LA ORGANIZACIÓN _____

[ORGANIZATION'S WEBSITE]

REDES SOCIALES DE LA ORGANIZACIÓN _____

[ORGANIZATION'S SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS]

Nº DE REPRESENTANTES QUE COMPLETAN EL CUESTIONARIO _____

[NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES WHO FILL THE QUESTIONNAIRE]

PERSONAS QUE COMPLETAN EL CUESTIONARIO _____

Appendices

[NAMES OF PEOPLE FILLING THE QUESTIONNAIRE]

POSICIÓN / ROL DE LAS PERSONAS QUE COMPLETAN EL CUESTIONARIO

[POSITION / ROLE OF PEOPLE FILLING THE QUESTIONNAIRE]

FECHA DE LA ENTREVISTA _____

[INTERVIEW DATE]

LUGAR DE LA ENTREVISTA _____

[INTERVIEW PLACE]

HORA Y DURACIÓN DE LA ENTREVISTA _____

[TIME AND DURATION OF THE INTERVIEW]

REGISTRACIÓN AUDIO DE LA ENTREVISTA: SÍ / NO

[WAS THE INTERVIEW AUDIO RECORDED? YES / NO]

NOMBRE ARCHIVO AUDIO _____

[NAME OF AUDIO FILE]

BLOQUE A: CARACTERÍSTICAS DE LA ORGANIZACIÓN Y SUS MIEMBROS

[BLOCK A: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ORGANIZATION AND ITS MEMBERS]

A1 – ¿En qué año fue fundada su organización? _____

[In what year was your organization founded?]

A2 – ¿Cómo describiría su organización entre las siguientes categorías?

[Among the following categories, how would you describe your organization?]

- Una organización independiente *[An independent organization]*
- Sección local/regional de una organización con presencia en otras partes del Estado español (especificar cuál) *[A local/regional chapter of an organization with presence in other parts of the Spanish state (please, specify which)]*
- Sección local/regional de una organización internacional (especificar cuál) *[A local/regional chapter of an international organization (please, specify which)]*

A3 – Dentro del contexto vasco, ¿a qué nivel territorial opera por lo general su organización?

[Within the Basque context, at what territorial level does your organization generally operate?]

- A nivel de un barrio concreto (especificar) *[At the level of a specific neighborhood (specify)]*
- A nivel local, de uno o unos pocos municipios (especificar) *[At the local level, one or few municipalities (specify)]*
- A nivel regional, una o unas pocas comarcas (especificar) *[At the regional level, one or few regions/districts (specify)]*
- A nivel provincial (especificar) *[At the provincial level (specify)]*
- En toda la Comunidad Autónoma Vasca *[Throughout the Basque Autonomous Community]*
- En todo Hegoalde (CAV + Navarra) *[Throughout Hegoalde (BAC + Navarre)]*
- En toda Euskal Herria (Hegoalde + Iparralde) *[Throughout Euskal Herria (Hegoalde + Iparralde)]*

A4 – ¿Dónde suelen realizar sus reuniones y actividades internas?

[Where do you usually hold your internal meetings and activities?]

- En un espacio público (plaza, cafetería, etc) *[In a public space (square, cafeteria, etc)]*
- En domicilios particulares de miembros *[In members' homes]*
- En un local propiedad de la organización *[In an establishment owned by the organization]*
- En un local alquilado por la organización *[In an establishment rented by the organization]*
- En un local cedido por alguna institución pública (especificar) *[In an establishment lent by a public institution (specify)]*
- En un local cedido por otro grupo/organización (especificar) *[In an establishment lent by other group/organization (specify)]*
- En un local de una institución pública que usamos de forma puntual reservándolo previamente *[In an establishment of a public institution that we occasionally use with prior booking]*
- En un local de otro grupo/organización que usamos de forma puntual reservándolo previamente *[In an establishment of other group/organization that we occasionally use with prior booking]*
- No solemos realizar reuniones y actividades internas presenciales *[We do not usually hold in-person internal meetings nor activities]*

Appendices

A5 – ¿Cuenta su organización con...? (marcar todas las que correspondan)

[Does your organization have...? (check all options that apply)]

- Inscripción en el registro de asociaciones
[Formal registration in the public register of associations]
- Estatutos escritos *[Written statutes]*
- Asambleas generales ordinarias / periódicas *[Ordinary/periodic general assemblies]*
- Director/a, presidente/a, secretario/a general, o similar
[Director, president, secretary general, or a similar figure]
- Junta directiva *[Steering committee]*
- Secretario/a *[Secretary]*
- Tesorero/a *[Treasurer]*
- Comités / subgrupos sectoriales para temas específicos
[Sectoral issue-specific committees or subgroups]
- Comités / subgrupos territoriales locales *[Local committees or subgroups]*

A6 – Por favor, describa brevemente cómo se organiza habitualmente la toma de la toma de decisiones. (Pregunta abierta)

[Please, briefly describe how decision-making is usually organized. (Open question)]

A7 – Por favor, indique cuántas personas forman parte de la organización para cada una de las siguientes categorías:

[Please indicate how many people are part of the organization for each of the following categories:]

Tendencia últimos 10 años

[Trend over past 10 years]

	Número <i>[Number]</i>	A la baja <i>[Declining]</i>	Estable <i>[Stable]</i>	Al alza <i>[Growing]</i>
<i>Miembros/socios registrados</i> <i>[Registered members]</i>				
<i>Miembros/participantes ocasionales</i> <i>[Occasional members (regardless of formally status)]</i>				
<i>Miembros/participantes habituales</i> <i>[Regular members (regardless of formally status)]</i>				
<i>Miembros remunerados a tiempo parcial</i> <i>[Part-time paid members]</i>				
<i>Miembros remunerados a tiempo completo</i> <i>[Full-time paid members]</i>				

A8 – Centrándonos en los miembros/participantes habituales y el personal remunerado (excluyendo por tanto a los miembros que simplemente se encuentran registrados o que participan solo ocasionalmente), me podría decir aproximadamente en qué proporción son:

[Focusing on regular members and paid staff (therefore excluding members, registered or not, who do not participate regularly or at all), could you tell me, approximately, in what proportion they are...?]

	Ninguno/a <i>[None]</i>	Pocas <i>[A few]</i> (1-20%)	Minoría considerable <i>[A minority]</i> (20-40%)	En torno a la mitad <i>[About half]</i> (40-60%)	Mayoría clara <i>[A majority]</i> (60-80%)	Casi todos/as <i>[Almost everybody]</i> (80-99%)	Todos <i>[All]</i>
Mujeres <i>[Women]</i>							
Jóvenes menores de 30 años <i>[Young people under 30 years old]</i>							
Mayores de 65 años <i>[Senior people over 65 years old]</i>							
Con estudios superiores <i>[Hold a higher education degree]</i>							
Nacidos en CAV/Navarra <i>[Were born in the BAC / Navarre]</i>							
Nacidos en otras partes del Estado español <i>[Were born in other parts of the Spanish state]</i>							
Nacidos en otras partes del mundo <i>[Were born in other parts of the world]</i>							
Euskaldunes <i>[Euskara speakers]</i>							

A9 – Las reuniones y actividades de la organización, por lo general, ¿en qué lengua se celebran de forma principal?

[Generally speaking, in which languages are organizational meetings and activities held?]

- Castellano *[Castilian]*
- Euskera *[Basque]*
- Ambas *[In both languages]*

A10 – ¿Cuáles son los principales gastos en el funcionamiento de su organización?

(Pregunta abierta) *[What are the main expenses in running your organization? (Open question)]*

A11 – ¿Cuánto es el presupuesto anual con el que cuentan aproximadamente? (opcional)

[How much is, approximately, your annual budget? (optional)]

A12 – Por favor, entre las siguientes fuentes de financiación de sus actividades, indiquen si reciben alguna cantidad en la primera columna y, entre éstas, indicar cuáles constituyen una fuente principal de ingresos en la segunda.

[Please, among the following sources of funding for your activities, indicate if you receive any amount in the first column and, among those that you receive, indicate in the second column whether they are a main source of income.]

	Fuente ingresos <i>[Source of income]</i>	Fuente principal <i>[Main source]</i>
Cuotas de miembros <i>[Membership fees]</i>		
Financiación de plataformas u organización matriz <i>[Funding from platforms or parent organization to which we belong]</i>		
Subvenciones de autoridades locales <i>[Public grants from local authorities]</i>		
Subvenciones de diputaciones forales <i>[Public grants from provincial councils]</i>		
Subvenciones de comunidades autónomas <i>[Public grants from autonomous communities]</i>		
Subvenciones del Estado español <i>[Public grants from the Spanish state]</i>		
Subvenciones de la UE <i>[Public grants from the European Union]</i>		
Ingresos por venta de productos y/o servicios <i>[Income from the sale of goods/merchandise and/or services]</i>		
Recaudación por eventos <i>[Income raised at events]</i>		
Donaciones/Auto-financiación de miembros particulares <i>[Donations and personal payments of individual members]</i>		
Donaciones de particulares externos <i>[Donations from individuals external to the organization]</i>		
Donaciones de fundaciones benéficas <i>[Donations from charitable foundations]</i>		

BLOQUE B: ÁREAS DE TRABAJO E IDENTIDAD ORGANIZACIONAL

[BLOCK B: AREAS OF ACTION AND ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY]

B1 – Por favor, marque las categorías que describan adecuadamente a su organización:

[Please, check all categories that adequately describe your organization:]

Organización ecologista [Environmental organization]	Organización de asistencia social [Social assistance organization]	
Organización vecinal [Neighborhood organization]	Organización de movimiento social [Social movement organization]	
Organización pacifista-antimilitarista [Peace-antimilitary organization]	Lobby / grupo de presión ciudadana [Lobby / public interest group]	
Organización cultural [Cultural organization]	Grupo de consumo [Consumer group]	
Organización deportiva / de ocio al aire libre [Sports / outdoor recreational organization]	Organización <i>ad hoc</i> / de objetivo único [Ad hoc single-issue organization]	
Organización de cooperación y ayuda humanitaria [Development and humanitarian aid organization]	Otros (especificar) [Other (specify)]	
Otras (especificar) [Other (specify)]	Otras (especificar) [Other (specify)]	

B2 – A continuación puede ver una lista de asuntos relacionados con el ecologismo y la protección del medio ambiente que han sido relevantes durante los últimos 10-15 años en Euskal Herria, así como de otros asuntos fuera del ecologismo. Por favor, marque aquellas causas por las que su organización se ha movilizad de forma significativa, marcando con un 1 aquellas centrales/prioritarias (aquellas que definen la identidad de su organización y a las cuáles se destinan una mayor proporción de recursos y tiempo), con un 2 aquellas más secundarias y con un 3 aquellos temas en los que han participado sólo esporádicamente.

[Below you can see a list of issues related to environmentalism and environmental protection that have been relevant during the last 10-15 years in Euskal Herria, as well as other issues outside of environmentalism. Please checking those causes for which your organization has mobilized in a significant way, assigning 1 for those that are more central/important (those that define the identity of your organization and to which the largest proportion of resources and time are allocated), 2 for those more secondary, and 3 for those issues in which your organization has participated only sporadically.]

(Si no encuentra alguna causa relevante para su organización en la lista, puede añadirlas en los huecos libres al final)

[In case you do not find a cause that was relevant for your organization in the list, you can add it in the blank spaces left at the end]

Appendices

Movilidad urbana [<i>Urban mobility</i>]	Energía nuclear / cierre de Garoña [<i>Nuclear energy / closure of Garoña nuclear station</i>]
Sostenibilidad producción agroalimentaria (agricultura, ganadería, pesca) [<i>Sustainability of agri-food production (agriculture, stockbreeding, fishing)</i>]	Fracking
Incineración de residuos (p.ej. Zubieta) [<i>Waste incineration (e.g. Zubieta)</i>]	Refinerías (p.ej. Petronor en Muskiz) [<i>Refineries (e.g. Muskiz's Petronor)</i>]
Tauromaquia [<i>Bullfighting</i>]	Proyecto del TAV [<i>The High Speed Train (HST) project</i>]
Cambio climático [<i>Climate change</i>]	Otras grandes infraestructuras de transportes y portuarias [<i>Other large transport and port infrastructures</i>]
Energías renovables [<i>Renewable energy</i>]	Reciclaje y gestión de residuos [<i>Recycling and waste management</i>]
Protección/Conservación de espacios naturales [<i>Protection/conservation of natural spaces</i>]	Expansión urbana [<i>Urban sprawl</i>]
Contaminación de ríos y océanos [<i>Pollution of rivers and oceans</i>]	Bienestar animal [<i>Animal welfare</i>]
Consumo responsable y sostenible [<i>Responsible and sustainable consumption</i>]	TTIP-CETA
Decrecimiento [<i>Degrowth</i>]	Consumo de plástico [<i>Plastic consumption</i>]
Caza [<i>Hunting</i>]	Alimentos transgénicos [<i>Genetically modified food</i>]
Multiculturalidad / integración personas migrantes [<i>Multiculturalism / social integration of migrants</i>]	Pobreza, desempleo y exclusión social en EH [<i>Poverty, unemployment, and social exclusion in the Basque Country</i>]
Pobreza y desarrollo en tercer mundo [<i>Poverty and development in the third world</i>]	Acogida de refugiados [<i>Protection/reception of refugees</i>]
Militarización en EH [<i>Militarization in the Basque Country</i>]	Turismo de masas [<i>Mass tourism</i>]
Globalización económica [<i>Economic globalization</i>]	Promoción del euskera [<i>Promotion of Euskara (Basque language)</i>]
Feminismo / igualdad de género [<i>Feminism / gender equality</i>]	Violencia de género [<i>Gender violence</i>]
Desahucios y acceso a la vivienda [<i>Evictions and access to housing</i>]	Defensa de educación pública [<i>Defense of the public education system</i>]
Recortes sociales [<i>Cuts in social public spending</i>]	Condiciones de presos (p.ej. acercamiento) [<i>Conditions of Basque prisoners (e.g. approach to prisons closer to the Euskal Herria)</i>]
Personas sin hogar [<i>Homelessness</i>]	Dº a decidir / soberanía nacional [<i>Right to decide / national sovereignty</i>]
Defensa de sanidad pública [<i>Defense of the public health system</i>]	Derechos y condiciones laborales [<i>Workers rights and conditions</i>]
Participación política y calidad democrática [<i>Political participation and democratic quality</i>]	

B3 – ¿Cuáles son en opinión de su organización las principales causas de los problemas medioambientales que su organización lucha por resolver? (Pregunta abierta)

[What are, in your organization's opinion, the main causes of the environmental problems that your organization aims to solve? (Open question)]

B4 – ¿Cuáles son en opinión de su organización las posibles soluciones a los problemas medioambientales que conciernen a su organización? (Pregunta abierta)

[What are, in your organization's opinion, the possible solutions to the environmental problems that concern your organization? (Open question)]

B5 – ¿Considera que su organización es parte del movimiento ecologista? SÍ / NO

[Do you consider your organization to be part of the environmental movement? YES / NO]

B6 – ¿Colabora su organización con otros grupos que considere miembros del movimiento ecologista? SÍ / NO *[Does your organization collaborate with other groups that you consider to be part of the environmental movement? YES / NO]*

B7 – ¿Considera que su organización es parte de la “izquierda”? SÍ / NO

[Do you consider your organization to be part of “the left”? YES / NO]

B8 – ¿Considera que su organización es parte del movimiento anti-capitalista? SÍ / NO

[Do you consider your organization to be part of the anti-capitalist movement? YES / NO]

B9 – ¿Considera que su organización es parte del movimiento nacionalista vasco? SÍ / NO

[Do you consider your organization to be part of the Basque nationalist movement? YES / NO]

B10 – ¿Se identifica su organización como parte de algún otro movimiento social o político? Si es así, por favor, indique cuáles: *[Does your organization identify itself as part of some other social or political movement? If so, please indicate which ones:]*

BLOQUE C: TÁCTICAS Y CONTACTO CON INSTITUCIONES

[BLOCK C: TACTICS AND CONTACTS WITH INSTITUTIONS]

C1 – Por favor, indique cuáles de los siguientes tipos de actividades ha realizado o promovido su organización durante los últimos 10-15 años. Como en el caso de las causas o temas de movilización, le voy a pedir que marque en una escala del 1 al 3 la importancia de cada táctica (siendo 1 el nivel más alto, las tácticas más frecuentemente empleadas, 2 aquellas empleadas de forma secundaria y 3 aquellas utilizadas esporádicamente).

[Please, indicate which of the following types of activities your organization has carried out or promoted over the past 10-15 years. Similarly to the question about causes or issues of mobilization, I am going to ask you to assign the importance of each tactic/form of action on a scale of 1 to 3 (1 being the highest level, for those tactics most frequently employed, 2 for those secondarily used, and 3 for those used sporadically).]

(las respuestas a esta pregunta serán tratadas de forma confidencial)

[(answers to this question will be treated confidentially)]

Contactar con prensa local <i>[Reaching out to local media]</i>	Manifestaciones / concentraciones <i>[Demonstrations / rallies]</i>
Contactar con prensa estatal/internacional <i>[Reaching out to state-wide/international media]</i>	Huelgas <i>[Strikes]</i>
Recursos administrativos / alegaciones <i>[Administrative appeals / allegations]</i>	Interrupción / disrupción de eventos ajenos (institucionales o no) <i>[Interruption/disruption of external events (institutional or not)]</i>
Recursos judiciales <i>[Taking legal action]</i>	Parodias y protestas simbólicas <i>[Parodies and symbolic protests]</i>
Mociones en los ayuntamientos <i>[Promoting motions in city councils]</i>	Ocupaciones/acampadas <i>[Occupations / encampments]</i>
Promover ILPs a nivel autonómico <i>[Promoting popular legislative initiatives at the regional level]</i>	Bloqueo de carreteras / infraestructuras <i>[Road/infrastructure blockades]</i>
Promover ILPs a nivel estatal <i>[Promoting popular legislative initiatives at the state level]</i>	Pegada no autorizada de carteles <i>[Unauthorized posting]</i>
Promover ILPs a nivel europeo <i>[Promoting popular legislative initiatives at the European level]</i>	Realización de grafitis / pintadas <i>[Graffiti]</i>
Otras recogidas de firmas <i>[Other forms of petitioning and public collection of signatures]</i>	Sabotajes <i>[Sabotage]</i>
Marchas interurbanas a pie <i>[Inter-city marches]</i>	Ataques contra objetos o edificios <i>[Attacks against objects or buildings]</i>
Marchas en bicicleta <i>[Collective bicycle rides]</i>	Escraches
Boicot de productos / empresas <i>[Boycott of products / companies]</i>	Elaboración y presentación de informes técnicos <i>[Drafting and publishing technical reports]</i>
Ruedas/comparecencias ante la prensa <i>[Press conferences]</i>	Consultas populares no vinculantes <i>[Non-binding popular referendums]</i>
Cadenas humanas <i>[Human chains]</i>	Mercadillos solidarios / reivindicativos <i>[Solidarity/protest street markets]</i>
Acciones cívicas directas (p.ej. limpieza de playas o ríos, reparto de comida/servicios a colectivos necesitados, etc) <i>[Direct civic actions (e.g. cleaning of beaches or rivers, distributing food or providing services for groups in need, etc)]</i>	Eventos culturales (exposiciones, proyecciones de películas, actuaciones de música, danza, etc) <i>[Cultural events (exhibitions, film screenings, music and dancing performances, etc)]</i>
Eventos lúdico-festivos (fiestas populares, excursiones montañeras, concursos, etc) <i>[Festive events (e.g. popular festivals, mountain hikes, popular competitions, etc)]</i>	Eventos académico-pedagógicos (charlas, conferencias, cinefóruns, debates) <i>[Academic-educational events (talks, conferences, cinefóruns, public debates)]</i>

C2 – ¿Su organización se relaciona habitualmente con instituciones políticas públicas?

Indique qué tipo de relación ha entablado con cada nivel de gobierno. (En caso de que NO se relacione con ninguna institución pública, por favor, salte a la pregunta C4)

[Does your organization regularly interact with public political institutions? Please indicate what type of relationship you have established with each level of government. (In case you have NOT interacted with any public institution, please skip to question C4)]

	Ayuntamientos <i>[City councils]</i>	Diputaciones / CC.AA. <i>[Provincial councils or Autonomous Communities]</i>	Administración estatal <i>[State administration]</i>	Unión Europea <i>[European Union]</i>	Agencias públicas especializadas <i>[Specialized public agencies]</i>
Contacto con funcionarios <i>[Contact with officials]</i>					
Contacto con representantes políticos <i>[Contact with political representatives]</i>					
Redacción, diseño o asesoramiento de políticas públicas <i>[Drafting, designing or providing advice on public policy making]</i>					
Colaboración en implementación de políticas públicas <i>[Collaboration in the implementation of public policies]</i>					

C3 – En caso de que SÍ, suelen entablar contacto con instituciones públicas, cuál ha sido su experiencia en términos generales con los diferentes niveles de gobierno.

[In case you are regularly in contact with public institutions, how has been your experience, in general terms, with the different levels of government?]

	Ayuntamientos <i>[City councils]</i>	Diputaciones / CC.AA. <i>[Provincial councils or Autonomous Communities]</i>	Administración estatal <i>[State administration]</i>	Unión Europea <i>[European Union]</i>	Agencias públicas especializadas <i>[Specialized public agencies]</i>
Nada positiva <i>[Not positive at all]</i>					
No muy positiva <i>[Not very positive]</i>					
Positiva en ocasiones <i>[Occasionally positive]</i>					
Muy positiva por lo general <i>[Very positive in general]</i>					

C4 – En caso de que NO suelen entablar contacto con instituciones públicas, ¿por qué?

[In case you are NOT regularly in contact with public institutions, why is it so?]

- Nos gustaría pero no hemos podido; las instituciones no nos hacen caso cuando intentamos influir o colaborar con ellas *[We would like to, but we have not been able to do it; institutions ignore us when we try to influence or collaborate with them]*
- No queremos tener nada que ver; preferimos realizar nuestras actividades fuera de las instituciones *[We do not want to have anything to do with them; we prefer to carry out our activities outside the institutions]*
- Otro *[Other]* _____

BLOQUE D: RELACIONES CON OTRAS ORGANIZACIONES [BLOCK D: RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS]

D1 – A continuación se muestra una lista de organizaciones, sindicatos y partidos políticos que –con mayor o menor intensidad– se han involucrado en eventos en defensa del medio ambiente durante los últimos 10-15 años¹⁰⁵. Me gustaría que me indicasen en las columnas correspondientes aquellas organizaciones que:

[Below there is a list of organizations, unions and political parties that –with greater or lesser intensity– have been involved in events in defense of the environment during the last 10-15 years. I would like you to indicate in the corresponding columns all those organizations that:]

0) *No conocen ni han oído hablar nunca [You have never heard of them]*

O bien conocen y comparten alguna o varias de las siguientes relaciones (para cada organización puede marcar todas las relaciones que correspondan; también puede dejarlas todas en blanco si las conoce pero no aplica ninguna relación):

[Or, alternatively, you know and share one or more of the following relationships (for each organization you can check all relationships that apply; you can also leave all cells blank if you know them but none of these relationships apply):]

1) *Intercambiamos información (p.ej. emails, boletines, etc) de forma regular [We regularly exchange information (e.g. emails, newsletters, etc)]*

2) *Compartimos recursos (dinero, espacios, servicios profesionales, asesoría legal, etc) habitualmente [We regularly share resources (money, spaces, professional services, legal advice, etc.)]*

3) *Hemos colaborado conjuntamente en la organización de eventos y campañas [We have collaborated in the organization of events and campaigns]*

4) *Pertenecemos a ellas (en el caso de plataformas/coordinadoras) [We belong to them (in case these of platforms/coordinators)]*

5) *Algunos de nuestros miembros habituales mantienen estrechas relaciones personales con miembros habituales de esa organización [Some of our regular members keep close personal relationships with regular members of that organization]*

6) *Algunos de nuestros miembros habituales pertenecen o militan a su vez en esa organización. [Some of our regular members also belong or actively participate in that organization]*

¹⁰⁵ Como podrá observar, algunas de las organizaciones no han estado activas durante todo el periodo estudiado. En el caso de aquellas organizaciones que han desaparecido o que por el contrario, han aparecido en los últimos años; por favor responda igualmente en referencia al periodo en el que estaban activas.
[As you can see, some of the organizations have not been active during the entire period studied. In the case of those organizations that have disappeared or that, on the contrary, have appeared in recent years; anyhow, please respond in reference to the period in which they were active.]

Appendices

*Si echan en falta alguna otra organización no incluida en el listado, pueden añadir las en los huecos disponibles al final del listado.

[*If you miss any other organization not included in this list, you can add them in the blank spaces available at the end of the list.]

Nombre	(0) No la conocemos	(1) Información	(2) Recursos	(3) Colaboración conjunta	(4) Pertenece	(5) Relaciones personales	(6) Miembros compartidos
ORGS ECOLOGISTAS							
AHT Gelditu Elkarlana							
Araba sin Garoña							
Asamblea contra el TAV / AHT-ren Aurkako Asanblada							
Aroztegia... eta Gero Zer?							
CADE (Collectif des Associations de défense de l'Environnement Pays Basque-Sud des landes)							
Coordinadora de Plataformas Antiincineracion de Gipuzkoa							
Dale Vuelta – Bira beste aldera							
Desazkundera							
Donostia Bizirik							
Eguzki							
Ekologistak Martxan							
Energia Gara							

Appendices

Foro Contra Garoña							
Fracking Ez							
Gipuzkoa Zero Zabor							
GoiEner							
Greenpece							
Gurelur							
Haritzalde							
Izate							
Jaizkibel Bizirik							
Landare							
Lurra							
Plataforma contra la Central Térmica de Pasaia							
Plataforma por un Nuevo Modelo Energético (Px1NME) – Gure Energia							
SEO/Birdlife							
Sustrai Erakuntza Fundazioa							
Txingudi Bizirik							
WWF Adena							

Appendices

Nombre	(0) No la conocemos	(1) Información	(2) Recursos	(3) Colaboración conjunta	(4) Pertenece mos	(5) Relaciones personales	(6) Miembros compartidos
OTRAS ORGS CÍVICAS							
Askapena							
Asociación Vecinal San Jorge (Pamplona / Iruña)							
Carta de Derechos Sociales de EH / EHko Eskubide Sozialen Karta							
Club Alpino Tabira							
Club Vasco de Camping							
Duintasuna							
Elkartzen							
Ernai							
Kakitzat							
Mugarik Gabe Euskadi							
Mugarik Gabe Nafarroa							
PAH / Stop Desahucios							
PTM-Mundubat							
REAS							
Salhaketa							

Appendices

SINDICATOS							
CC.OO.							
CGT							
CNT							
EHNE							
ELA							
ESK							
Hiru							
LAB							
LSB-USO							
STEE-EILAS (Steilas)							
UGT							
PARTIDOS POLÍTICOS							
Alternatiba							
Aralar							
Batasuna / ANV / EHAK							

Appendices

Nombre	(0) No la conocemos	(1) Información	(2) Recursos	(3) Colaboración conjunta	(4) Pertenece	(5) Relaciones personales	(6) Miembros compartidos
Berdeak – Los Verdes ¹⁰⁶							
EA (Eusko Alkartasuna)							
EB (Ezker Batua)							
Equo							
Ezker Anitza							
PNV							
Podemos							
PSE-EE							
Sortu							
Zutik							
[Otros partidos no involucrados en el medio ambiente]							
PP							
UPN							
UPyD							

¹⁰⁶ No confundir con *EB-Berdeak*, denominación electoral que siguió usando *Ezker Batua* después de ruptura de coalición con *Berdeak – Los Verdes*.
[Not to be confused with EB-Berdeak, the electoral name that Ezker Batua continued to use after their coalition with Berdeak - Los Verdes was broken]

Appendices

OTROS							

D2 – De las organizaciones del listado, ¿hay alguna organización que pese a trabajar en los mismos temas que su grupo/organización, no colaboren o no lo hayan hecho durante un tiempo considerable? Si es así, por favor, enumérelas, indicando cuál de las tres circunstancias define su relación:

[Among those listed, is there any organization with which, in spite of working on the same issues as your group/organization, you do not collaborate or have not done so for a considerable period of time? If so, please, list them, indicating which of the three circumstances defines your relationship:]

NOMBRE [NAME]	Tolerancia y respeto mutuo, pero sin contacto [Tolerance and mutual respect, but no contact]	Conflicto latente, falta de confianza [Latent conflict, lack of trust]	Conflicto abierto [Open conflict]

Appendices

D3 – ¿Cuáles son, basándose en la experiencia de su organización, los principales factores que facilitan la colaboración entre grupos/organizaciones?

[What are, based on the experience of your organization, the main factors that facilitate collaboration between groups/organizations?]

(Marcar como máximo 4 opciones) *[(Check a maximum of 4 options)]*

Compartir unos mismos principios y valores <i>[Sharing the same principles and values]</i>	Posición similar respecto a la cuestión nacional vasca <i>[Having similar views on the Basque national question]</i>	
Compartir una misma agenda (intereses y demandas a corto plazo) <i>[Sharing the same issue agenda (interests and short-term demands)]</i>	Mismas prácticas lingüísticas en uso de euskera/castellano <i>[Having similar linguistic practices regarding the use of Euskara/Castilian]</i>	
Que cuenten con líderes en los que se pueda confiar <i>[That they have leaders who can be trusted]</i>	Uso de tácticas de protesta similares <i>[Employing similar protest tactics]</i>	
Que se compartan recursos y asesoramiento <i>[That resources and advice are shared]</i>	Funcionamiento interno y procesos de toma de decisiones similares <i>[Having similar internal functioning and decision-making processes]</i>	
Que se trate de un actor relevante e influyente <i>[That they are an influential actor]</i>	Jugar papeles complementarios <i>[Playing complementary roles]</i>	
Que cuente con conexiones importantes en el ámbito político y/o de los medios de comunicación <i>[That they have good connections in politics and mass media]</i>	Posición similar respecto al conflicto violento (ETA, violencia estatal, presos, etc) <i>[Having similar views on the violent conflict (ETA, state violence, prisoners, etc)]</i>	
Vínculos personales con sus miembros <i>[Having personal ties with their members]</i>	Otros (especificar) <i>[Others (specify)]</i>	
Otros (especificar) <i>[Others (specify)]</i>	Otros (especificar) <i>[Others (specify)]</i>	

Appendices

D4 – ¿Cuáles son, basándose en la experiencia de su organización, los principales factores que dificultan la colaboración entre grupos/organizaciones?


[What are, based on the experience of your organization, the main factors that hinder collaboration between groups/organizations?]

(Marcar como máximo 4 opciones) *[(Check a maximum of 4 options)]*

Principios y valores diferentes <i>[Having different principles and values]</i>	Posición diferente respecto a la cuestión nacional vasca <i>[Having different views on the Basque national question]</i>	
Tener una agenda diferente (intereses y demandas a corto plazo) <i>[Having a different issue agenda (interests and short-term demands)]</i>	Prácticas lingüísticas diferentes en uso euskera/castellano <i>[Having different linguistic practices regarding the use of Euskara/Castilian]</i>	
Que cuenten con líderes en los que NO se puede confiar <i>[That they have leaders who CAN'T be trusted]</i>	Dificultad para contactar <i>[It is hard to contact them]</i>	
Incapacidad / falta de voluntad para compartir recursos y asesoramiento <i>[Incapacity / unwillingness to share resources and advice]</i>	Funcionamiento interno y procesos de toma de decisiones muy diferentes <i>[Having very different internal functioning and decision-making processes]</i>	
Que se trate de actores poco o nada relevantes e influyentes <i>[That they are a scarcely relevant and influential actor]</i>	Competimos por mismos recursos (financiación, miembros, etc) <i>[Competing for the same resources (funding, members, etc)]</i>	
Que dicha colaboración pueda tener un coste para las conexiones políticas y/o mediáticas de nuestra organización <i>[That collaborating with them could negatively impact connections in politics and mass media]</i>	Posición diferente respecto al conflicto violento (ETA, violencia estatal, presos, etc) <i>[Having different views on the violent conflict (ETA, state violence, prisoners, etc)]</i>	
Que existan enemistades personales previas con sus miembros <i>[That previous personal animosities between members exist]</i>	Desacuerdo en las tácticas empleadas <i>[Disagreements over the employed tactics]</i>	
Que se trate de actores excesivamente mediáticos e influyentes/poderosos <i>[That they are excessively high-profile and influential/powerful]</i>	Otros (especificar) <i>[Others (specify)]</i>	
Otros (especificar) <i>[Others (specify)]</i>	Otros (especificar) <i>[Others (specify)]</i>	

APPENDIX 8 – Main facilitators and obstacles for interorganizational collaboration according to survey respondents

The bar chart below displays the absolute frequencies of responses to questions D3 and D4 of the questionnaire (see Appendix 7), in which organizations were asked to select the most relevant factors (up to 4) that, in their experience, facilitated (D3) or hindered (D4) interorganizational collaboration. All prespecified reply options except two¹⁰⁷ referred to the same factor but in a positive or negative light depending on whether they were worded as hypothetical facilitators or obstacles. For this reason, replies about the same element are presented together, with green bars indicating the number of respondent organizations that regarded that factor as an important facilitator for collaboration and red bars representing to the number of respondents that considered it to be a particularly influential obstacle hindering cooperation.



N = 27 (one of the 28 survey respondents left these two questions unanswered)

¹⁰⁷ The two factors displayed at the bottom of the chart (marked with this sign: †) were only included as response options in question D4, that is, were exclusively presented as hypothetical obstacles to collaboration but their reverse were not included as potential facilitators.

APPENDIX 9 – Coding instructions for event identification

Unit of analysis = environmental collective action event

Definition: nonroutine public and collective gatherings which take place outside of institutional politics and advance causes and/or demands on behalf of public interests (Sampson *et al.* 2005: 682-3). Thus, the events under consideration can be of any type (such as demonstrations, press conferences, boycotts, cultural events, organized petitions, etc), as long as they fulfill three conditions:

- Being expressions of collective action taking place physically within the territory considered.
- The event presents a *public-sphere projection*. This requires that the organizers aim to reach non-members, therefore excluding events that, even if covered by the media, are part of the internal life of an organization (e.g. a general assembly of a trade union or other organization).
- Environmental causes and/or demands are advanced as one of the primary aims of the event, even if other non-environmental topics are also addressed.

Furthermore, two other delimitations apply:

Temporal delimitation = only those events that take place in the odd-numbered years of the period covered, that is: 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017.

Geographical delimitation = Hegoalde or “Southern Basque Country”, understood as the territory comprised by the Basque Autonomous (BAC) and the Foral Community of Navarre (FCN).

*The following cases are therefore excluded: events in the French Basque Country (Iparralde), neighboring territories (some newspapers also covered local information from nearby towns in Cantabria, Burgos or La Rioja) or events starring Basque actors or with demands related to Euskal Herria but which are held in other locations (eg Madrid, Paris, Brussels, Geneva, outside of prisons, etc).

**There is only one exception: events celebrated in Santa María de Garoña, where the contentious nuclear plant of Garoña is located (see footnote 51, in section 4.2.1.a). While the municipality administratively belong to Burgos, it is only 6 kilometers away from the border with Euskadi, just 50km away from the capital Vitoria-Gasteiz, and 70 from Bilbao. Therefore, this led many Basque environmental activists and groups to occasionally organized on-site protest events at the nuclear power plant. Such events were arguably directed more towards the Basque public sphere rather than towards audiences in Burgos or the rest of Spain.

PRACTICAL IDENTIFICATION CRITERIA FOR THE SCREENING OF ARTICLES

(slightly modified from Sampson *et al.* 2005: 682-3).

For being selected, a news article must report information on an event that fulfills the following characteristics:

1. **Collective event:** two or more people participate in the promotion of what is perceived to be the interest of a broader set of individuals, who are generally asked to get involved in the cause. In press conferences or institutional events, public intervention may be restricted to a single person, but its organization always involves more people, including attendees. On the contrary, an interview with one or a few activists or a statement on the street after a meeting is not consider an event.
2. **Public event:** physical gathering of people in the public sphere (either because it is held on public spaces, or because, even when held in private venues, access is not limited to members, nor is its development or content kept secret. Online-only forms of collective action (e.g. diffusion of a statement directly through social or traditional media outlets without a physical press conference or public event) or other forms of public claim-making that do not require the existence of a physical gathering are excluded.
3. **Events must be external to the routine functioning of institutional politics or other public institutions.** Therefore, events initiated by state entities (regional parliament, central state, lehendakaitza, municipalities, regional councils, courts, etc.) or political parties with institutional representation as part of the ordinary functioning of the institutions are excluded, even if this includes a certain degree of participation by civil society actors (e.g. appearance of groups in parliamentary committees, municipal motions, appearances before the media after institutional meetings, etc). Nonetheless, non-routine events promoted by institutions or parties are included when these are held in the public sphere (eg demonstrations, tributes, conferences, etc.) as long as they are public, collective and some civic organizations participate. Eventual “parallel” protest events organized by social actors (e.g. concentrations, press conferences, etc.) on the occasion of a routine institutional act (legislative initiative vote, meeting of representatives with politicians, etc.) are also included.
4. **Events must be contemporaneous with the press article in which they are mentioned.** That is, the date of the referred event must be close to the date of publication of the article. In this case, close means less than a week before a programmed event or maximum two weeks after it takes place.

*Further examples of concreted excluded cases (common false positives and doubtful cases):

- a) Press releases and statements echoed by the media (even quoting verbatim passages) but without there having been a physical and public gathering. When in doubt, if this is not clear because the article does not provide enough basic information (place, time, etc.), it will be understood that there is no such event.


- b) Private meetings held behind closed doors, even if they are publicly announced and there might be images or statements of participants before or after the event. Examples: meetings of the Lehendakari or some public official with trade unions or some other organization, or meeting between two unions to resolve a specific issue.
- c) The formal presentation of complaints and initiation of legal actions. Nonetheless, possible parallel acts such as a concentration or a press conference before the courts will be included.
- d) Events that are part of the internal life of an organization (e.g. a general assembly of a trade union or other organization, a meeting of the steering committee, etc). However, some sessions of the general congresses of prominent organizations (such as parties or trade unions) will be included when the presence of other organizations is reported (as it indicates that the event was open to the participation of non-members) and there is an evident public-sphere projection.
- e) Workshops, courses and classes, even if these are free and open access (e.g. activities for children or retirees, peace education courses, or professional retraining, etc). Despite being collective events, their public-sphere orientation is debatable and they mostly generate private-collective goods that can only be enjoyed by the attendees/participants. *“They may be announced like civic events, but self-help gatherings, unlike a community festival or church pancake breakfast, focus on the individual and are typically not open for public display and consumption.”* (Sampson *et al.*, 2005; 683).
- f) Fund-raising or petitioning campaigns that are diffused in time and space (e.g. the possibility of donating food in certain establishments during a certain period of time). However, the installation of a raffle or contest with a specific location and direct organization of a mentioned organization is considered a fundraising event. The installation of a post or the deployment of volunteers in a specific area and a short period of time not exceeding one day is considered a valid signature collection event.

STEPS TAKEN FOR THE SEARCH AND SUBSEQUENT SELECTION OF ARTICLES THAT CONTAIN INFORMATION ON A RELEVANT ENVIRONMENTAL COLLECTIVE ACTION EVENT

Sources: El Correo + Diario Vasco + Diario de Navarra + Gara [see section 4.2.1.b)]

Internet browser: Mozilla Firefox (latest version), in order to use the free "Save text to file" add-on (Byrne 2019). It is not possible to use other Internet browsers because either the add-on is not available or it does not work correctly (as in Chrome).

Screenshot with the necessary configuration of settings for a more efficient collection process:



Step 1: Search by keywords – Introduction of selected keywords (see table 4.2), one by one, in search engines of the corresponding newspaper. It is important to pay attention to the use or not of quotation marks. For El Correo and Diario Vasco, it is necessary to pay a subscription and log in with the corresponding account first


Depending on the number of query results, these can be filtered by year or not. Next, the number of search hits for a given organization at a given year was recorded in an excel file (see screenshot below).

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	
	Name	years	search terms used	#hits	#relevant	falseposit	EC_hits	EC_relev	EC_false	DV_hits	DV_relev	DV_false	G_hits	G_relev	G_false	DNav_hit	DNav_rel	DNav_false	positives					
1																								
2	AHT Gelditu Eikaria	2007	"aht gelditu"	164	120	26.83%	52	42	19.23%	64	46	28.13%	47	32	31.91%	1	0	100.00%						
3	Araba sin Garoña	2007	"araba sin garoña"	9	5	44.44%	5	5	0.00%	0	#DIV/0!	0	0	100.00%	0	0	#DIV/0!							
4	Eguzki	2007	eguzki ekologista	30	13	56.67%	10	3	70.00%	12	4	66.67%	8	6	25.00%	0	0	#DIV/0!						
5	Ekologistak Martxai	2007	"ekologistak martxai"	113	45	60.18%	31	14	54.84%	38	12	68.42%	43	18	58.14%	1	1	0.00%						
6	Greenpeace	2007	greenpeace	278	38	66.33%	117	9	92.31%	104	21	79.81%	17	6	64.71%	40	2	95.00%						
7	AHT Gelditu Eikaria	2009	"aht gelditu"	146	98	32.88%	45	29	35.56%	64	42	34.38%	32	23	28.13%	5	4	20.00%						
8	Araba sin Garoña	2009	"araba sin garoña"	5	5	0.00%	3	3	0.00%	1	1	0.00%	1	1	0.00%	0	0	#DIV/0!						
9	Eguzki	2009	eguzki ekologista	57	21	61.16%	16	8	50.00%	33	9	72.73%	6	2	66.67%	2	2	0.00%						
10	Ekologistak Martxai	2009	"ekologistak martxai"	79	25	68.35%	30	8	73.33%	42	15	64.29%	7	2	71.43%	0	0	#DIV/0!						
11	Greenpeace	2009	greenpeace	301	32	89.37%	133	14	89.47%	127	16	87.40%	12	0	100.00%	29	2	93.10%						
12	AHT Gelditu Eikaria	2011	"aht gelditu"	45	31	31.11%	7	3	57.14%	12	9	25.00%	23	16	30.43%	3	3	0.00%						
13	Araba sin Garoña	2011	"araba sin garoña"	9	8	11.11%	7	6	14.29%	0	0	#DIV/0!	2	2	0.00%	0	0	#DIV/0!						
14	Desazkundera	2011	"desazkundera"	3	1	66.67%	0	0	#DIV/0!	2	0	100.00%	1	1	0.00%	0	0	#DIV/0!						
15	Eguzki	2011	eguzki ekologista	53	10	81.13%	13	2	84.62%	33	5	84.85%	7	3	57.14%	0	0	#DIV/0!						
16	Ekologistak Martxai	2011	"ekologistak martxai"	93	36	61.29%	29	9	68.97%	32	11	65.63%	18	5	72.22%	14	11	21.43%						
17	Greenpeace	2011	greenpeace	312	16	94.87%	119	4	96.64%	128	8	93.75%	12	3	75.00%	53	1	98.11%						
18	Sustrai Erakuntza	2011	"sustrai erakuntza"	6	2	66.67%	0	0	#DIV/0!	0	0	#DIV/0!	3	1	66.67%	3	1	66.67%						
19	AHT Gelditu Eikaria	2013	"aht gelditu"	25	19	24.00%	2	1	50.00%	5	4	20.00%	14	11	21.43%	4	3	25.00%						
20	Araba sin Garoña	2013	"araba sin garoña"	16	13	18.75%	11	9	18.18%	0	0	#DIV/0!	5	4	20.00%	0	0	#DIV/0!						
21	Desazkundera	2013	"desazkundera"	8	5	37.50%	4	2	50.00%	3	2	33.33%	1	1	0.00%	0	0	#DIV/0!						
22	Eguzki	2013	eguzki ekologista	56	15	73.21%	8	3	62.50%	38	10	73.68%	10	2	80.00%	0	0	#DIV/0!						
23	Ekologistak Martxai	2013	"ekologistak martxai"	53	26	50.94%	12	7	41.67%	26	12	53.85%	12	5	58.33%	3	2	33.33%						
24	Fracking Ez Araba	2013	"fracking ez"	51	25	50.98%	15	8	46.67%	12	7	41.67%	24	10	58.33%	0	0	#DIV/0!						
25	Greenpeace	2013	greenpeace	172	12	93.02%	76	5	93.42%	57	1	98.25%	15	2	86.67%	24	4	83.33%						

Step 2: Screening the search results – Each search result was open in a separate tab and read carefully even in cases in which the article does not seem very promising (sometimes the coverage of an event is contained in a few sentences in the middle of an article that also provides other information).

*Even though the keywords are designed to minimize the number of results in Euskara and newspapers publish almost all their content in Spanish, sometimes some results appear in Euskara. These are more carefully evaluated with the help of an automatic translator and eventual consultation with native Basque speakers. (see footnote 68 and 69).

Step 3: Downloading and archiving relevant articles — When you find a relevant article is identified, it is necessary to select the full text of the article, being careful not to select related news in the margins, parts of the web structure, or text from advertisements (that is why the use of AdBlocker also helps). When right-clicking on the text a Firefox menu will be displayed in which the add-on option "Save text to file" will appear.



When this option is clicked, a download window will emerge. The text will be saved in text file format (.txt) in the default folder for downloads (which we will have configured at the beginning wherever it is more convenient). For the file name, the following structure will be used, in order to facilitate subsequent coding of content with the DNA software (see Appendix 10), as it will be able to read the file name to automatically record some metadata about each news article, saving a lot of time. The name structure is the following:

YYYY-MM-DD_newspaper_acronym_Article's heading.txt

The add-on had been configured to automatically insert the heading in the default name of the file, so it will not be necessary to write it by hand, or copy it from the page, but simply to cut and copy it in its new position, behind the date and the newspaper's acronym. That said, it is necessary to delete all underscores that might appear in the heading, given that underscores are read by DNA as separators between different pieces

of metadata. Thus, if there are more than the two prescribed ones (between the date and the newspaper and between the newspaper and the title), it would lead confuse the software, making it impossible to import the text files correctly. It is also important to pay attention to manually write ".txt" after the title, otherwise it is saved as a flat file.

Often, the same article will appear in different queries, given that more than one of the core organizations can be mention in the same article. When this happens, if the file name procedure is applied correctly, the computer will warn us that there already exists an article with the same name. In that case, the download will be cancelled, as we do not want to save two separate but identical files.

Step 4: Final register of the number of relevant articles in Excel – After reviewing all query hits resulting from an organization-year search, the number of articles downloaded are counted and recorded in an Excel file. This allows to keep track of false positives (see table 4.3).

***As it will be seen in Appendix 10, there will be many cases in which the same event is reported in multiple articles. In those cases the research strategy requires that they are downloaded in all cases, even if the coder might have the feeling that no new information is being added to the database. Even if this could be the case, counting with **multi-article events** enhances the confidence in the coding output and the co-attendance networks derived from it, as description bias (particularly the problem of selective identification of participants) will be minimized (see section 4.2.1.b).

APPENDIX 10 – Coding procedure and codebook of environmental collective action events

Software utilizado: *Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA)* (Leifeld 2017b). Free Java-based software. It allows to code a large corpus of text and exporting the results in network formats more easily than other existing software for qualitative text analysis.

For the most updated versions, documentation, and access to the user manual, please visit: <https://github.com/leifeld/dna>

STEPS OF THE CODING PROCEDURE:

Start – Open DNA, load the database (single .dna file) and once it is open, select the appropriate coder profile in the upper left corner.

Coding of events – Select the articles that you wish to code and start reading. The objective is to identify sentences or paragraphs where relevant factual information appears about a public collective event (in case, of doubt, please review the inclusion criteria reported in Appendix 9). This is done in the DNA software by selecting the text section and creating a "statement". For each event, two types of statements were completed: one called "Info event" for variables related with the characteristics of the event itself, and other named "Participants event" to register the actors who participated. Ideally, all variables listed in each statement should be filled, but in many cases there will be empty variables, which is normal and do not pose particular problems. A full codebook containing a description of each variable and their respective categories is provided below.

Coding of non-events – Some of the articles that were initially selected and that are stored in the .dna file may not contain relevant information on environmental public collective events. This might be due to mistakes when downloading irrelevant or doubtful articles, or because a given event cannot be considered environmental as it does not sufficiently cover environmental demands or issues. When this occurs, a single "No event" statement was created, selecting the part of the article that was regarded to be most illustrative of why it does not meet the identification criteria, adding a brief note explaining the reasons backing this decision.

Doubts – For doubtful decisions regarding the identification of an event or the assignment of a category to certain content, it was possible to generate another type of statement "Observations / doubts", in which further details could be annotated for later review.

*A crucial advantage of DNA is that it allows coders to go back and eliminate or modify the previous coding at any time. This way, errors can easily be amended, and corrections are automatically saved.

Complexities to keep in mind during coding.

- **Multi-article events** (very frequent). The same event is mentioned in several articles, either from the same or different newspapers. This will happen especially with the most mediatic events (large demonstrations). Even so, it is important to code all the articles in which a certain event is mentioned. To speed up the coding process, when much of the basic information on an event had already been coded it was enough to fill Event_ID variable and the new information that they add (even if it is contradictory with what appears in other articles), leaving blank those variables about which there was no new information. In any case, especially when articles referring to the same article where not coded consecutively, in most cases I still opted to code redundant information, since it allows crossing data from several articles and increase their reliability and avoids the problem of not saving new information thinking that it had already been recoded.

- **Multi-event articles.** Occasionally, the same article contains information on more than one event relevant to our database. As long as these events meet the criteria of being temporally contemporary with the article and distinguishable between each other, it is not a problem for the analysis if the same content unit (article) contains more than one unit of analysis (events).

- **Multi-activity or complex events.** Although, in general, most events are mono-activity, not all events consist of a single activity carried out in a specific and delimited place and time. There is the possibility that an event promoted by the same actors and with the same purposes (therefore constituting a coherent unit of collective action) includes the realization of different activities that might not be strictly contiguous in time or space (e.g. press conferences and demonstrations; different talks by different speakers in a week-long cultural event; etc). Within this broad category we can distinguish 3 frequent subtypes:
 - **Multi-location events.** En ocasiones, un mismo evento tiene lugar en distintos municipios (p.ej. manifestación en las cuatro capitales). *Se considerará un único evento si las actividades extendidas geográficamente han sido organizadas/coordinadas por los mismos actores y con los mismos propósitos.* En caso de que haya más de una localización no hay problema, se marca el número de municipios en los que un mismo evento se celebró en la variable correspondiente, y en la variable de nombres, se escriben los nombres de cada municipio en un mismo *statement*, separados por una coma y un espacio (p.ej. Bilbao, Durango, Pamplona). Ver tabla de variables.
 - **Events extended over time.** Not all events take place on a single day, some extend over several days (e.g. encampments, strikes, cultural or educational events, etc.). The criteria to distinguish a single event held over two or more days from several individual events held in a close period of time will be similar to that used to identify multi-location events: *a continuous or multi-day event is one held on different days but in which all the different activities have been organized by the same*

actors and with the same purposes, forming a coherent whole. In addition, when the event is not organized over several contiguous days it is considered a “continuous extended event”, there is the possibility of considering it a single discontinuous extended event if there is less than a month of separation between activities and each activity was already scheduled before the previous one took place.

- **Events comprised by core and peripheral activities.** It should be considered as a particular case of extended events in which the different activities carried out in different days do not have the same relevance (as for example, they do in an encampment of several days, a strike, or a series of talks) but there is a main activity to which the rest are subsidiary. The most paradigmatic cases are press conferences before or after a demonstration.

***Distinction of events between each other.** Taking into account the aforementioned possibilities, it was still important to clearly distinguish and code separately distinct events that are close in time, space or thematic focus. For instance, two events can be held with the same purpose on the same day but be at the same time organized by different actors (e.g. simultaneous but parallel demonstrations on May 1 by part of different unions, parallel public tributes, etc.), Or vice versa, the same actor can organize in a short period of time two events with different specific purposes, even if these are related within the same broader issue. For instance, a concentration in support for a defendant before a court hearing must be differentiated from an eventual protest for an unfavorable judicial decision. Even though these two events are clearly related, the existence of the second event is independent of the first and was not scheduled before the judicial decision was known (since, if the decision had been different, the second protest would have not occurred).

Rules about the participation of organization in special and rare fund-raising events and award ceremonies.

- The mere fact that an organization is the beneficiary of the collection of a certain charitable or fund-raising event (e.g. concert or sporting event) does not count as participation of this organization, EXCEPT when that organization has taken part in the organization or there is a public act in which a representative of the organization that receives a donation is physically there.
- The mere fact that an organization is awarded with a certain prize or recognition does not count as participation. However, the fact that an organization physically attends the ceremony in which the award is presented does count as participation in the event.

CODEBOOK

Statement: INFO EVENT

Variable name	Variable description	Values/Categories
Event_ID	Nominal, open categories. Exclusive identifier for each individual event	Format: “yymmdd + short description” (in Spanish) Example: 070307 - <i>jornadas medioambientales</i> *It is crucial that for every event, this ID coincides with the ID in the PARTICIPANTS EVENT statement → copy-paste
Date	Day in which the event took place	Format: yyyy-mm-dd *Rules for extended events (see categories below): For “central + periféricos”, the date of the central event. For extended events (whether continuous or not), I introduce the date of the specific activity reported in that news article.
Temporal_type	Nominal, closed categories. Type of event according to its temporal development (see above)	Simple. Activities take place within a single day. Central + periféricos [<i>Central + peripheral</i>] Extendido continuo [<i>Continuous extended</i>] Extendido discontinuo [<i>Discontinuous extended</i>]
Duration	Interval Number of days in which the event unfolded (leave blank for “simple” events, as it is always 1)	Whole numbers (do not use decimals)
Size	Ordinal, closed categories. Size of the evento according to the number of individual participants (including public, not only activists or conveners)	Muy pequeño: $2 < x < 10$ [<i>Very small</i>] Pequeño. $10 < x < 100$ [<i>Small</i>] Mediano. $100 < x < 1,000$ [<i>Medium-sized</i>] Grande. $1,000 < x < 10,000$ [<i>Large</i>] Multitudinario. $> 10,000$ [<i>Multitudinous</i>]
Event_type	Nominal, closed categories *Based upon Sampson <i>et al.</i> (2005: 684-6).	Protesta. [<i>Protest</i>] Events in which participants collectively formulate demands or complaints on behalf of broader interests. Such protests, however, do not necessarily have to be disruptive or confrontational, but can even be routine, festive and/or symbolic. Examples: demonstration, press conference, rally, strike, etc. Cívico. [<i>Civic</i>] “Civic events, in contrast to protest, do not have claims as much as purposes: to celebrate the community (e.g., festivals), to procure resources (e.g., fundraisers), or to accomplish collective goals (e.g., cleanups, preservation). Civic events neither desire to bring about (or

		<p><i>prevent) a change in policy, nor are they the expression of a specific grievance, as is often the case of protest events. We can also think of the difference between protest and civic claims/purposes as follows: protest events have explicit claims while civic events have implicit (or latent) purposes.”</i></p> <p>Híbrido. [Hybrid] Events that articulate explicit demands but that do not use forms of action typical of protests, but rather typical of civic events. Examples: exhibition of photographs/film screenings, conferences, culinary or sports competitions with specific demands.</p> <p>* Demands = expressions of concrete requests promoting social, political, or legal change, or resisting/opposing it.</p> <p>** Rule of thumb: If it is impossible to complete the “Claim-target” field, it will generally mean that the event does not consist of claims but only of purposes, so it would be classified as civic. If, on the other hand, it has civic forms but demands can be identified and at least one recipient of them, we would be facing a hybrid event.</p>
<p>Form_of_action</p>	<p>Nominal, semi-closed categories.</p> <p>Selection among a predefined list of categories. Only in exceptional cases should the “other” categories be used.</p> <p>*Inspired by the following previous categorizations: Koopmans (2002: 37-39), Tejerina (2010: 87 y ss), Portos (2017), Rucht (2010).</p>	<p><u>Protest forms:</u></p> <p>Rueda/conferencia de prensa. [Press conference]</p> <p>Concentración. [Rally]</p> <p>Escrache.</p> <p>Manifestación. [Demonstration]</p> <p>Marcha. [Intercity march]</p> <p>Cadena humana. [Human chain]</p> <p>Consulta popular no vinculante. [Non-binding referendum]</p> <p>Recogida de firmas. [Signature collection]</p> <p>Huelga. [Strike]</p> <p>Desobediencia civil convencional. P.ej. ocupaciones, encierros, sentadas, etc. [Conventional civil disobedience. E.g. occupations, sit-ins, etc]</p> <p>Ocupación-acampada. [Squatting-Encampment]</p> <p>Huelga de hambre. [Hunger strike]</p> <p>Interrupción de evento ajeno. [Disruption of an external event]</p>

		<p>Protesta simbólica/teatralizada. P.ej. parodia, performance, etc <i>[Symbolic/theatrical protest. E.g. parodies, performances, etc.]</i></p> <p>Sabotaje. <i>[Sabotage]</i></p> <p>Bloqueo de carreteras/infraestructuras. <i>[Blockade of roads/infrastructure]</i></p> <p>Daños menores a objetos. <i>[Minor damages to objects]</i></p> <p>Violencia contra objetos. <i>[Violence against material objects]</i></p> <p>Violencia contra personas. <i>[Violence against people]</i></p> <p>Otros <i>[Other]</i></p> <p><u>Civic forms:</u></p> <p>Acto de homenaje. <i>[Homage/tribute]</i></p> <p>Acto orgánico público. (p.ej. congreso) <i>[Public organic event (e.g. organizational congress)]</i></p> <p>Evento cultural-artístico. P.ej. exposiciones, proyecciones de documentales, visitas guiadas, etc. <i>[Cultural-artistic event. E.g. exhibitions, screenings of documentaries, guided tours, etc.]</i></p> <p>Evento académico-pedagógico. P.ej. conferencias, charlas de expertos, etc. <i>[Academic-educational event. E.g. conferences, talks by invited experts, etc.]</i></p> <p>Evento lúdico-festivo. P.ej. fiesta popular, concierto, comida popular, excursiones, concursos populares, eventos deportivos, etc. <i>[Festive events (e.g. popular festivals, popular street dinners, mountain hikes, popular competitions, sport competitions, etc)]</i></p> <p>Acción cívica directa. P.ej. limpieza de medio natural, reparto de comida, organización actividades para colectivos excluidos, etc. <i>[Direct civic action. e.g. clean-ups, distribution of food or organization of activities for groups in need, etc.]</i></p> <p>Recaudación solidaria de fondos. P.ej. tómbola, stand para donación de alimentos, etc. <i>[Fund-raising events. E.g. raffles, stands for food donation, etc.]</i></p> <p>Otros <i>[Other]</i></p>
--	--	--

Appendices

Other_form_of_action	Nominal, open categories. Only in case “other” category has been selected for <i>Form_of_action</i> variable	Brief description (3-4 words), supplemented where appropriate with further explanations in next variable (<i>Observations</i>). Use residually only when an event absolutely does not fit into any of the <i>Form_of_action</i> categories.
Observations	Open description (optional)	
Incidents	Nominal, open categories	Leave blank by default unless an incident is reported. In that case, provide a brief description in a few words (extended annotations can be made in <i>Observations</i>). Incident = altercation or violent confrontation of the participants with the authorities (e.g. police, private security in private buildings, etc.) or with other civilians. Levels of violence do not need to be particularly high. Strong verbal confrontations or peaceful detentions suffice.
Issue	Nominal, semi-open categories. Broad issue/demand that is promoted at the event.	Preference is given to already-existing categories, but new categories can be generated any time none fits the event.
Claim_target	Nominal, semi-open categories. Recipient of the demands that are voiced at an event.	E.g. Spanish state, BAC authorities, municipality, EU, etc. Preference is given to already-existing categories, but new categories can be generated any time none fits the event.
Location_type	Nominal, semi-closed categories. *Based on Portos (2017).	Calle/plaza. [<i>Street / square</i>] Local en edificio público. [<i>Public establishment/room</i>] Local en edificio privado. [<i>Private establishment/room</i>] Dentro de/frente a edificio público. [<i>Inside or in front of a public building</i>] Dentro de/frente a edificio privado. [<i>Inside or in front of a private building</i>] Entorno natural [<i>Open-air setting in the nature</i>] *Preference is given to already-existing categories, but new categories can be generated any time none fits the event, including combination of several locations.
Municipalities_number	Interval	Whole numbers (do not use decimals)
Municipalities_names	Nominal, semi-closed categories.	A bilingual list of common municipalities was used. Important to be consistent with first linguistic choice of the name. In case of more than one municipalities, these are separated by commas. E.g. <i>Bilbao, San Sebastián, Mondragón</i>

Statement: PARTICIPANTS EVENT

Variable name	Variable description	Values/Categories
Event_ID	Nominal, open categories. Exclusive identifier for each individual event	Format: “yymmdd + short description” (in Spanish) Example: <i>070307 - jornadas medioambientales</i> *It is crucial that for every event, this ID coincides with the ID in the INFO EVENT statement → copy-paste
Actor_name	Nominal, semi-open categories.	Important to use organizational names consistently. Drop-down menu of DNA statements really helped for that purpose.
Actor_status	Nominal, closed categories. Type of organization.	Organization in sample. Single organization included in the list of 11 core groups initially mapped. Platform in sample. Umbrella organization included in the list of 11 core groups initially mapped. Organization outside sample. Single organization not belonging to the list of 11 core groups. Platform outside sample. Umbrella organization not belonging to the list of 11 core groups. Political party. Public institution. Private enterprise.
Single_actor	Binary / Dichotomic	Box is checked only when the event is organized by a single actor without collaborating with other organizations (i.e. “single events”; Lee 2011).
Actor_involvement	Nominal, closed categories. *Complete only for collaborative events and when the description of events allows for it (usually not very detailed or accurate)	Initiator. Organizer/Collaborator. Miembro plataforma. <i>[Member of convening umbrella group physically present at the event]</i> Supporter/Participant.

APPENDIX 11 – Within-2011 analyses: QAP regression results and descriptive statistics of networks

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF NETWORKS

	Entire year 2011	Pre-announcement (Jan-Oct)	Pre-announcement (Jun-Oct)	Post-announcement (Nov-Dec)
Overall PEA charact				
Total events	60	48	12	12
Collaborative events	33	25	8	8
No. nodes	21	21	21	21
Density measures				
Average degree	10.286	9.333	6.667	6.286
Average distance	1.51	1.511	1.429	1.581
Diameter	3	3	3	3
Isolated nodes	0	1	6	4
Density	0.514	0.467	0.333	0.314
Centralization	0.426	0.424	0.35	0.371
Closure	0.781	0.746	0.847	0.88
Raw projection				
<i>(tie values = shared events)</i>				
Tie value range	0 to 5	0 to 4	0 to 2	0 to 2
Avg tie strength	1.048	0.719	0.405	0.329
S.D.	1.275	0.927	0.620	0.499
Normalized projection				
<i>(tie values = Jaccard coefficient)</i>				
Tie value range	0 to 0.75	0 to .667	0 to 1	0 to 1
Avg tie strength	0.127	0.120	0.166	0.176
S.D.	0.167	0.166	0.272	0.304

QAP REGRESSION RESULTS

	Entire year 2011			Pre-announcement (Jan-Oct)			Pre-announcement (Jun-Oct)			Post-announcement (Nov-Dec)		
	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model A	Model B	Model C
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES												
Ideological factors												
Shared Basque nationalist orientation	.096**	.101**	.088*	.126**	.117**	.101**	.238***	.245***	.225***	.040	.097	.069
Different public position towards ETA	.084**	.093**	.067**	.076**	.080**	.045*	.172***	.191***	.143***	.112*	.143**	.112**
Shared far left-wing orientation		-.020	-.041		.014	-.014		-.033	-.076		-.140**	-.164**
Shared environmental-specific orientation		-.032	-.046*		-.034	-.039		-.069	-.070*		-.025	-.057
Interpersonal factors												
Shared active members			-.014			-.036			-.018			.026
Pragmat-Instr factors												
Overlapping issue-agenda			.121**			.137***			.133*			.166*
Overlapping territorial scope of action			.028			.040			.099			.059
Centripetal attraction among parties and unions			.227***			.175***			.157*			.329**
Different internal organizational models			-.019			-.020			-.052			.014
Different tactical profiles			-.009			-.007			-.009			.018
Membership of single orgs within umbrella platforms			-.095**			-.089**			-.227**			-.138*
STRUCTURAL CONTROLS												
Geogr unconnectedness	-.109***	-.104***	-.094***	-.098***	-.084**	-.079**	*.112**	-.098*	-.074	-.168**	-.195***	-.141**
Specific second-order nodes and members	-.206***	-.207***	-.282***	-.225***	-.229***	-.310***	-.350***	-.354***	-.482***	-.208*	-.198*	-.313**
<i>Intercept</i>	.109	.126	.099	.098	.099	.082	.112	.142	.120	.168	.241	.157
<i>Adj R-square</i>	.158	.165	.312	.183	.186	.318	.233	.246	.341	.053	.096	.176

Notes: Values of collaborative ties normalized using Jaccard similarity measures. Unstandardized regression coefficients. Significance levels: *<.1; **<.05; ***<.01 (one-tailed tests). Network size is the same for all periods: 21 nodes, 210 symmetric dyads.

Appendices