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Are third-party interventions in civil wars desirable? Multi-method approach to ending intrastate conflicts

Ph.D Dissertation

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Contents

Abstract

This dissertation examines the effectiveness and political support surrounding third-party interventions in civil wars, which have increased in frequency, type, and number of actors since the collapse of Cold War bipolarity. The existing literature has mainly examined the individual effects of third-party strategies, though the growing presence of concurrently occurring types of third-party interventions necessitates exploration of their interactive effects. Thus, this thesis seeks to understand different actions from multiple actors dependently rather than independently. Understanding the effectiveness of these strategies is only one step towards realizing whether third-party interventions are desirable. The motivation and the will of the actors responsible for the policy execution are crucial in realizing the full picture.

The ubiquitous problem arising from the third-party interventions requires a multipronged methodological approach. This thesis, therefore, combines both observational and experimental data to explore this issue. While the primary results show that peacekeeping and mediation are the most effective and supported strategies of engagement, both effectiveness and support appear to be highly context dependent. Further, this thesis surveys American public and political elites to delve into the determinants of support for third-party interventions. It finds that both the public and the political elite are sensitive to civilian casualties, yet in the face of political rivalry these humanitarian concerns dissipate. Additionally, political elites are interested in ending hostilities only as long as their national security interests are at stake.

By filling a gap in the literature, generating original data, and utilizing novel methodological approach, these results have underlined the need for improvement of policy decisions in the area of international conflict management and, at the same time, builds upon the new direction of research in the field of conflict dynamics.

Introduction

Civil wars have become a major security challenge and a predominant form of violence in the post-Cold War period. Since the international community accepted a doctrine to protect civilians at large in a broader scheme of maintaining international peace and security, interventions into civil wars by third parties have moved to the forefront as a means to tackle these often complex and protracted armed conflicts. Deploying peacekeeping missions, sending envoys to negotiate a truce between belligerents, or supporting one of the disputants with military aid are only some, though the most pronounced, strategies employed by third parties to influence the course of conflicts.

The second half of the twentieth century has been characterized by several changing trends in the human history of war: a decrease in international wars, a rise of intrastate wars, an increase in third-party interventions, and a decline of conflicts in general. In the aftermath of World War I. and II. armed conflicts between states have markedly decreased. Interstate conflicts have been replaced by growing civil unrest and ideological or liberation movements that often resulted in intrastate wars. During the Cold War, a majority of the ongoing civil conflicts were penetrated by the two blocks in order to extend their sphere of influence, weaken "the other side", and/or sway the allegiance of the contested country. This trend continued, despite the motivation behind engagements in civil war shifted slightly, with third-party interventions recording dramatic increases. Following the collapse of the bipolar system, instances of third-party interventions have become close to commonplace. Peacekeeping missions and diplomatic interventions have increased in number, by type, and by actors. This rapid growth of interventions into armed conflicts of other states is associated with an increase in joint actions initiated by the UN and other regional organizations (Fortna, 2009; Pinker, 2011). The end of Cold War competition allowed joint actions such as peacekeeping and mediation to proliferate. Interestingly, other incidents of external support into civil conflicts such as providing either rebels or government with men, weapons, or funds have remained prominent since the World War II. In fact, the majority of ongoing conflicts experience some form of third-party interventions (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2012; Karlén, 2016).

The first decade of the 21st century was pronounced by yet another trend: the world becoming more peaceful. Decrease in conflicts launched a wave of scholarly work celebrating this trend (Pinker, 2011), though perhaps prematurely. While in the grand scheme of history of humankind and in contrast to two deadly World Wars at the beginning of the twentieth century, this trend stands out significantly, the curve of conflict frequency returned to an upward direction following the Arab Spring. Outbreaks of civil wars in Syria, Ukraine, or Yemen are vivid reminders of this trend reversing. Some argue that the decline of armed conflicts was due to a rise in third-party engagements (Fortna, 2009; Kreutz, 2010). Yet, others have argued that too many players in the game may render these efforts counterproductive (Cunningham, 2006). This raises an important question whether third-party interventions in civil wars are, in fact, desirable. Untangling this relationship is not only important for improving current research, but also vital for focusing the third-party energies on strategies that are best set to anchor lasting peace.

This dissertation recognizes that there are many forces that influence choices third parties make when engaging in civil wars. One of them is public support for foreign policy decisions made by their constituent leaders. Garnering public support, at least in democratic countries, is deemed to be crucial before launching expensive or confrontational strategy to contain civil wars from spreading (Holsti, 1992). Ultimately, it is the political elite who make and deliver upon the decision of civil war engagements. One of the prerequisites for galvanizing support is a belief that such foreign policy action is indeed effective in containing conflict violence. There is some evidence of the effect individual strategies might exercise in civil wars. The positive effects of peacekeeping (Fortna, 2008; Hultman et al., 2013) and mediation (Beardsley, 2011; Gartner, 2013) is often juxtapose to the negative effects of military aid to belligerents (Regan, 2002; Regan and Aydin, 2006). Growing presence of parallel third-party involvements have prompted the academic community to explore the conjoint contribution of these strategies (Diehl and Regan, 2015). However, the results for this demand are yet to be delivered. To find out whether and which third-party interventions are beneficial, this thesis examines three distinct sets of populations using a multi-method approach. These three elements need to be studied together in order to answer the underlying research question. The effectiveness of third-party interventions, the popular support for such foreign policy action, and the ultimate execution of these

interventions by political elite function as parameters to understand their overall desirability.

Research Questions and Goals

The literature on interventions into civil wars is well advanced in investigating determinants and outcomes of these strategies. This dissertation takes a novel approach into the study of these questions and examines the effect and the popular and elite support for the most common third-party interventions —peacekeeping, mediation, and external military support.

To answer the main research question on whether third-party interventions are desirable, two related questions need to be answered separately. What is the effectiveness of third-party interventions and their multiplicative effect on civil conflicts? When and how do third parties decide to intervene? To answer these questions this thesis uses two methodological approaches. To study the effect of these strategies, the first empirical chapter examines observational data using the count of civilian casualties as a measure of their effectiveness. Next, this thesis provides original data from two survey experiments with (a) the American public and (b) the American political elite auditing their support for distinct third-party interventions in the face of treatments of conflict attributes. These survey experiments seek to investigate when and under what conditions these two sets of populations are willing to engage in civil war intervention. When, why, and which of these strategies receive the most support from the public and elite provides an interesting juxtaposition showing whether support corresponds with the effectiveness of these interventions.

Besides seeking an answer to the research questions, testing new hypotheses generated by the theoretical literature, and providing new empirical evidence, this thesis attempts to achieve two additional contributions. Recently, a more traditional segment of the IR academic community lamented that the field had fallen prey to the simplistic hypothesis testing that do little to extend the cumulative knowledge of the discipline (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2013), this thesis aims to demonstrate the contrary.

The first contribution is to incorporate multiple methodological approaches to the study of third-party interventions to show how various research designs can contribute and advance the knowledge of this phenomenon. Simultaneously, using observational and experimental designs, this thesis attempts to demonstrate

that using distinct methodological approaches is not only beneficial for furthering the insight but also shows that a multi-method approach can yield complementary results.

As for the second contribution, this thesis provides original data from both survey experiments and extends the existing observational data collected on each individual third-party intervention. Research on third-party interventions has a long standing tradition of focusing on a single strategy to asses or predict its effect. Therefore this thesis combines exiting data on a wide array of behaviours of third parties in civil war and disaggregates them to a monthly count to increase the number of observations and improve the precision of the results. Simultaneously, this allows for testing conditional hypotheses measuring the conjoint effect of simultaneous forces of interventions. The remaining two experimental studies generates original data from two survey experiments with distinct sets of populations. The first experiment was administered on a sample of the American public and the second surveyed a random sample of members of the American political elite.

This thesis argues that using multiple research methods to study treatment effects can be a beneficial way to at least partly tackle the limitations of internal and external validity. The following section discusses the selected methods and instruments in further detail.

Methods and Instruments

In order to answer the research questions specified above, two methodological approaches are used to investigate the effectiveness of and support for selected third-party strategies. An observational study is designed to fit data with a range of modelling strategies to establish links between civil war interventions, their combinations, and their mitigation of violence. To ascertain determinants of public support and determinants of politicians' decision making about potential war involvement, a series of survey experiments are administered. The usefulness of this multi-method approach to the study of third-party interventions is three-fold.

Foremost, each empirical method comes with certain benefits and limitations. There are a myriad of imperfect methods to collect and analyze data. Using only one particular method will render the research susceptible to a lack of external or internal validity, generally speaking. On the one hand, observational studies suffer from limitations to internal validity as a consequence of a lack of random assignment that is

crucial for determining causal relationships (Gerber and Green, 2012). On the other hand, experimental studies are characterized for their ability to randomly assign treatment or intervention to treated and controlled groups, while their results are usually pertinent only to a specific group or time and space (Angrist and Pischke, 2015). Due to these imperfections, some critics consider exercising these methods an act of ultimate futility. Fortunately, these flaws are not identical and these methods are not mutually exclusive alternatives among which researchers are forced to choose and thus passively face said pitfalls (Brewer and Hunter, 2006). To quite the contrary, researchers can selectively choose and combine these methods, not only to take advantage of their cumulative strengths, but also to limit their individual flaws.

Next, using multiple methods to study a specific sociological or political problem might deliver a more complete picture and broader insights. As mentioned earlier in this introduction, there are many forces that may bear an impact on the third-party interventions. Multi-method design brings together various angles engaging different actors and environments that can enrich the overarching umbrella of knowledge about a given problem. In the case of third-party interventions these actors involve (i) the states carrying out these interventions, (ii) the public of an intervening and a target state, and (iii) the political elites who are responsible for making decisions about potential involvements. Arguably, each of these actors carries partial responsibility for why and how third-party interventions occur in the real world. Examining these actors with appropriate methods to extract respective data and taking provisions to improve these methods for better precision of these data paints a more comprehensive picture of third-party interventions.

Lastly, it allows researchers to examine diverse set of populations. This is useful especially when administering experiments is either expensive or impossible. At times controlled trials with human subjects might face ethical issues. The well known Stanford prison experiment (1971) serves as a reminder of ethical concerns and how some scientific methods can inflict harm on their human subjects. Measuring the effectiveness of civil war interventions in the form of controlled trials would create a far worse ethical conundrum. Given the severity of civil wars, submitting randomly one population to the treatment of a third-party intervention while not intervening into a controlled group of population facing the same war-time atrocities immediately raises many seriously concerning red flags. Fortunately other methods, such as observational studies, can be

used to measure the effect of a treatment without risking ethical concerns about exposing human subjects to unethical treatment. The following section describes the flow and organization of this thesis henceforth.

Thesis Structure

This thesis is organized into four main stand-alone chapters. Each chapter follows the organization of a research article. This section introduces each chapter into further detail and for clarity presents the main methods used in obtaining the data. It singles out the main challenges for each paper to highlight the necessity for a mutli-method approach.

Chapter 1 focuses on the research designs used in the field of International Relations and conflict processes to study third-party interventions. It discusses the modern debate in methodological research and development of methodological tools and data to advance the study of interventions in civil wars. It assesses the strengths and limitations of both experimental and observational research designs to show how a multi-method approach can contribute with its specific insights. The chaper then moves to review the existing literature and data, and provides three directions for extending further research. The remaining chapters build upon these recommendations. Each chapter includes a separate set of testable hypotheses and methods for investigating third-party behaviour in an empirical manner.

Chapter 2 presents an empirical paper focusing on the effectiveness of third-party interventions using observational design. Traditionally, the academic community tends to study strategies of third-party interventions into civil wars individually. There is a well established body of evidence about the additive effects of these strategies. The problem with this approach is that the effect of any one strategy might be dependent on the presence of another. To present more precise results and control for an unexpected relationship, this chapter unpacks the conditional nature of these strategies by introducing interaction terms. Collecting data on third-party interventions presents several major challenges. Since the existing data were collected using different data sources and data generating processes, some observations are presented in incompatible formats. Another challenge this paper sought to tackle is how to uniformly measure effectiveness of diverse third-party interventions, each of which seek different objectives. Mitigating civilian losses has become an

increasingly emphasized metric by which these interventions are often judged. Therefore, this chapter uses the monthly-count of civilian casualties as a measurement of effectiveness. Since interventions in civil wars lack random assignment there are limitations as to how substantiated these methodologies can be, therefore additional evidence is necessary to complete this problem.

Chapter 3 audits members of the American public to examine their support for third-party interventions in the face of civilian casualties, interstate rivalry, and international consensus. To do so, this chapter employs randomized trials to establish when and how the American public tend to approve of using force and other strategies of involvement their government considers to employ. This experiment is administered using the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) pool to distribute surveys targeting members of the American public. The instrument used to survey the American public includes two vignette experiments randomizing cues about the level of violence, international involvement, and security interest that a given conflict presents. To make sure this experiment does not introduce additional cognitive biases, the respondents are led to believe that a presented vignette is taken from an Associated Press article reporting on an actual conflict. This is to prevent respondents from answering in a way they otherwise would not in a real life scenario. Both vignette instruments together with the follow up questions about third-party intervention are attached and explained in the appendices following each experimental question. The annexes also include the demographic of the population sample that is compared to the population numbers to show the representativeness of this sample. Prior the experiment administration, this experiment was reviewed by the IRB commission at Duke University to ensure it is in accordance with provisions protecting human subjects (see appendix or contact the author for proof of IRB approval).

Chapter 4 uses a two-tier vignette experiment to survey members of the American political elite. This chapter audits a very specific set of the population, that has been surveyed only by a few studies to date Butler and Broockman (2011); Butler and Crabtree (2016). The survey experiment was distributed to local, state and federal level representatives who voluntarily took part in this survey. In order to reach political elites, almost 20,000 emails distributing the surveys have been sent to currently serving political representatives and legislators. The sample of returned responses with the results is considered as if random.

As in previous the chapter, appendices following this chapter provide all information regarding the sample demographic, instrument details and recruiting material.

Finally, the conclusion reviews the results presented in the three empirical chapters of this thesis. It summarizes the empirical findings of each chapter separately and brings them together. This way, by combining the empirical analysis developed in Chapter 2, 3, and 4 the thesis seeks to contribute to the study of determinants and effectiveness of third-party interventions.

Chapter 1: Observational and Experimental Design

Observational and Experimental Design in Study of Third-Party Interventions

Abstract

This chapter discusses the strengths and weaknesses of experimental and observational design for drawing results in the discipline of International Relations and conflict processes. It provides a brief review of the most recent literature and data on third-party interventions, developments in both methodological approaches, and concludes with suggestions for future research. This chapter argues that both methods are beneficial for extending knowledge in IR and conflict processes and while each comes with distinct set of flaws their cumulative contribution can offer an interesting perspective and provide a far-reaching insight. The purpose of this chapter is to make a case for use of a multi-method approach to study third-party interventions.

1.1 Introduction

In the field of social sciences, experimental design is often considered the 'gold standard' of methodology to provide reliable and causal results. Yet, observational studies are far more prevalent especially in the discipline of International Relations and Political Science. Only in recent years have political scientists started implementing experimental design more frequently as new avenues for their administration emerged and make them more accessible.

The growing interest in experimental studies within IR and conflict studies is also notable as experimental studies receive more citation on average than studies using different research methodology (Druckman et al., 2006). Yet, experiments are far from the typical design in Political Science and International Relations. Particularly, the discipline of International Relations has until recently suffered from a major lack of experimental method engagement and even widespread skepticism against the cumulative knowledge they can contribute (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2013). Perhaps the main reason behind this is a common misconception of experimental design contribution and, generally, uncertainty surrounding the range of topics and methods which can be utilized to obtain additional insight. Experimental studies have long been considered the main domain for clinical trials and have been seen as virtually incompatible with the study of international affairs or politics (Lowell, 1910). However, some sub-fields of Political Science have adopted the use of the experimental method more extensively, most notably the domain of public opinion and voting behavior(McDermott, 2011b). The study of public opinion has also enriched the field of International Relations and conflict processes, in particular both have benefited from the insights about public support for international interventions.

This chapter aims at specifying the main challenges and strengths of both experimental and observational studies while paving the way for the future use of both methods in the study of third-party interventions. Simultaneously, this chapter reviews emerging trends such as branching out to different sets of populations for survey experiments or using *big data* to improve the quality of observations that in turn allows researchers to test and develop a wider variety of hypotheses and produce more precise results. This chapter argues that

both methods bring their own contribution and while each of them come with a different set of flaws their results are best considered complementary.

1.2 Conceptualization

The fundamental difference between observational and experimental design lays in the power the researcher has over the controlled intervention or condition in question. In other words, the effect of treatments that researchers desire to measure are directly manipulated and controlled for in experimental designs. Whereas observational studies try to resemble experiments in the way they measure the effect of the treatment their subjects are exposed to, however, they lack direct control over the independent and dependent variables. They rely on the distribution of the treatment effect in the natural environment. This, in turn, means that observational studies are unable to confirm causal mechanisms unlike experimental studies.

While this chapter recognizes the importance and the added value of other experimental and observational approaches, the main focus of this study is to examine controlled survey experiments and cross-sectional studies. The following subsections assess the often-voiced limitations of observational and experimental works before it summarizes the new advances of the use of these methods in the study of conflict processes in general and third-party interventions in particular.

1.2.1 Strengths and Limitations of Observational Design

As discussed above the main limitation of observational studies is that they are less suited to establish causal relationships, notwithstanding, they are often use to confirm the theoretical hypotheses and can provide essential empirical evidence. As they are approaching the closest representation of controlled experiments they are sometimes called natural experiments. This is precisely because the researcher does not have any direct control over independent and dependent variables as it occurs naturally in the environment. There is also less control over remaining extraneous (control) variables that on the one hand can better resemble the real-life environment but on the other come along with potential biases and unmeasured confounding variablesGerber and Green (2012). More importantly not all observational studies can be called natural

experiments. The difference is in the random assignment or, in this case, as if random assignment of the treatment that has a significant implication for claiming causal inference. If random assignment cannot be determined, in order to increase the credibility of observational study a near-perfect understanding of the assignment process is necessary. To achieve a near-prefect understanding behind the distribution of the assignment process one needs to observe all relevant variables associated with the assignment process in order to control for them in the subsequent analysis (Imai et al., 2011). Without either of the aforementioned, the unconfoundedness cannot be proven and therefore the evaluation may be argumentative and prone to biases.

There are two main challenges to observational studies —precision and validity. Precision has to do with lack of random error whereas validity of a study has to do with systemic error(Carlson and Morrison, 2009). As discussed above, lack of random assignment may result in biased results. One way to partially alleviate this bias and increase the precision of a study is to generate a larger sample size. More observations with more balanced groups of control and treatment will result in more precise measurement. Imai et al. (2011, p. 295), however, argues that beyond a certain amount of data the precision is negligible for the purposes of inference. In terms of validity, observational studies are evaluated both based on internal and external validity. Internal validity of observational studies is related to the data generating process of dependent and independent variables and the control the researcher exercises over these elements. Therefore, internal validity of observation studies is generally weaker than in experimental designs due to the nature of the controlled assignment process. Whereas external validity is "the validity of inferences about whether the causal relationship holds over variation in persons, settings, treatment variables, and measurement variables" (Shadish, 2010, p. 4). This factor is also important for generalizability of a study to apply one's conclusions to other subjects of the population from the same data-generating process. Generalizability is often used interchangeably with external validity (Fariss and Jones, 2018). However, Fariss and Jones (2018) draw the distinctions, which might be best understood in that if a model is externally valid the model is also generalizable but the contrary is not true, thus, if a model is generalizable it does not mean it is also externally valid. There are several possibilities how to improve both internal and external validity of observational studies. One potential improvement to external validity is to increase the sample size in

order to subsequently draw a random selection to decrease the systemic measurement error or, if this is not possible, to include more heterogeneous observations from different geographic locations or facilities (Carlson and Morrison, 2009). Fariss and Jones (2018) further argue for additional improvements to the observational studies. Due to a great myriad of data properties and analytical goals of studies they wish not to settle on one uniform strategy but generally recommend researchers to use flexible, regularized models, advancing heterogeneity, engaging non-linearity and interactions, and minimizing generalization error.

In comparison to experimental design, observational studies are considered less expensive and less time consuming (Angrist and Pischke, 2015). However, with technological advances in obtaining data this argument is becoming more obsolete. It is true that obtaining a nationally representative samples of population might be still expensive, nevertheless, there are institutions which make grants available for researchers such as TESS[1] or NORC. The student pool bodies are great for obtaining quick data or testing the viability of an experiment. New online avenues for obtaining inexpensive data have emerged such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk)[2]. With regards to observational design, researchers can collect their own data or replicate data of other scholars and institutes. It is true that the initial collection of specific data can be time-consuming but their subsequent use allow researchers to use readily available data for testing a variety of hypotheses. Good examples of big data projects making their data available to other researches in political science and conflict studies are Polity IV. Project originally founded by Ted Gurr (Marshall et al., 2016) in the late 1960s and UCDP Data Program at Uppsala University (UCDP, 2018) providing datasets on organized violence and peacemaking. While the initial gathering of data might be lengthy, new technological advances and a growing focus on computational science can easily speed up the process of data collection (Grimmer, 2015). By engaging techniques such as internet scraping or machine learning, researchers are now able to amass original fine-grain data faster and cheaper. Examples of the use of such techniques might be studies including geo-spatial analysis Beardsley and Gleditsch (2015), sentiment-analysis (Liu, 2012) or network analysis (Chang, 2018).

[1]Time Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS) provide opportunities for researchers, and separately for graduate students, to apply for special grants that sponsor fielding of their experiments

[2]MTurk is a crowdsourcing marketplace or a labor pool that enables individuals and businesses to coordinate the use of human intelligence. Studies including survey experiments in political science using MTurk as a source of data are increasingly more common. For example see Walsh (2015).

1.2.2 Strengths and Limitations of Experimental Design

If experimental design is so superior to observational studies, why is it that experimental studies are not more prevalent? In fact, as McDermott (2011b) cites Peterson et al. (2005) study among students of International Relations (IR) at US Universities and Colleges, which found that only 4% of over 1,000 respondents were using experimental methodology, which is far from commonplace. One of the substantial challenges for the experimental design in IR is research question specification. Since most of the actors in IR or political sciences are states or international systems, as Hyde puts it, it may be more challenging to link these macro-level theories to their micro-level implications (Hyde, 2015). Indeed, there is a limited number of states, precisely 193 as of 2011 when South Sudan gained independence, and only one international system, nevertheless experiments require a higher number of observations for both control and treated groups. This may be one potential limit to incorporating experimental designs into IR discipline. Nevertheless, according to Hyde (2015) there are several ways on how to integrate experiments in IR: (i) assuming subjects in the lab are the desired population in IR, (ii) reaching out to political elites directly, (iii) or focusing on public opinion and mass behavior. A majority of experimental scientists agree that lack of experimental application dwells in misinterpretation of its limits (McDermott, 2002; Hyde, 2015).

One of the most often-cited limitations of experimental research design in political science is the threat to external validity and generalizability Gerber and Green (2012). The primary concern here is the lack of a representative sample of the desired population precisely assuming that student pools could sufficiently represent the decisions taken by political leaders or other IR actors. A considerable scientific body of experimental literature in political science uses the student subject as a source of their data. According to Kam, from 1990 through 2006, almost a quarter of experimental articles in general journals and seventy percent of specialized journals used student subjects in their research (Druckman and Kam, 2011; Kam et al., 2007). Often, these were used to make conclusions about political elites or military personnel. The major difference between elites and non-elites is in the skill and awareness of strategic interactions the non-elite may not be as apprehensive (Hafner-Burton et al., 2013). Yet, the comparative anatomy may be

found based on cognitive skills and ability to make decisions under certain, however limited, information and can still be valuable. In fact, when comparing cognitive abilities of student bodies and other relevant populations of political elites and military, scholars have found significant similarities Hyde (2015). Perhaps, best described by McDermott (2002, p. 334) "[t]his near obsession [with external validity] ... tend to be used to dismiss experiments." While this certainly qualifies as a limitation it does not prove the results useless. This shortcoming can be overcome by targeting only desired populations. Furthermore, generalization to other individuals is only one part of external validity. Besides individual aspect, externally valid results include translation to spacial as well as temporal dimension. This means that if a causal relationship exists it should appear across different locations, groups, settings, and time. This can only be proven by multiple replication using different measures and methods for establishing genuine cause-effect relationship (McDermott, 2011b).

Overemphasis of issues with external validity often overshadows concerns about internal validity. Yet the threat to internal validity might be far more serious than external validity. As McDermott (2002) specifies, there is no external validity without internal validity. While experimental researchers do have the power to manipulate independent and control variables —which increases the potency of the study —they still face significant concerns regarding internal validity. Internal validity refers to whether researchers do in fact measure what they intend to measure (McDermott, 2002). This is more difficult than it may seem, and goes back to the actual pre-analysis design of experiments. The pre-analysis phase is particularly important because once the experiment is administered there may be no way back (especially if administration is expensive or often impossible). If an experimental study is designed carefully and controlled meticulously, no other alternative explanation should exist to bias the casual relationship being measured. If these conditions are not met one may have just wasted resources and time. This may be the single reason why experimental studies are still so rare in the field of IR and Political Science.

Furthermore, internal validity may be impeded by the several factors such as non-compliance, social desirability, and attrition just to mention few. These may result in missing values or biased results due to respondents' tendency to answer in a socially desirable way. Respondents may want to try to answer

the questions in a way they think a researcher expects them to respond or contrary or simply just try to figure out the real hypotheses in order to game the experiment (McDermott, 2011a). This may be prevented if respondents take the experiment seriously. Enhancing the experience of the respondents, making them mentally engaged and interested in responding truthfully may be crucial in preventing some of these potential limitations. Strategies of deception have been utilized to prevent respondents figuring out the hypotheses and subsequently intentionally manipulating the results.

Another threat to internal validity is posed by non-compliance, non-responsiveness, or self-selection. These problems may result in missing values and loss of control over the randomized distribution of treatment to treatment and control groups (Dunning, 2012). Lack of random assignment is detrimental to internal validity whereby causal claims cannot be determined due to confounding or unobserved variables (Angrist and Pischke, 2015). Self-selection may result in non-equivalent group design and is characterized as quasi-experiments (Trochim and Donnelly, 2007).

1.3 Literature Review

The conflict literature in the field of IR and Political Science provide a vast array of approaches to test and develop hypotheses. Arguably, in recent years, rather than developing new hypotheses, testing them became more prevalent (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2013). This trend is expected to continue and therefore some scholars begin to emphases the need for more precise forms of estimations (Brambor et al., 2006; Brewer and Hunter, 2006; Fariss and Jones, 2018). This section will first review the state-of-the-art literature of conflict processes analyzing observational data for mediation, peacekeeping, and external support. Following a brief overview of observational studies, this section will focus on experimental studies in the field and provide an avenue for future research.

1.3.1 Observational studies in Conflict Processes

The majority of work studying third-party interventions adopted a form of observational study. This may be due to several reasons: (i) development of major data projects that allowed replication and testing as

an accessible option, (ii) over-saturation of theoretical realm of IR, (iii) a need for evidence and trends in conflict processes.

International Relations and Political Science have been long theory-dominated disciplines. Rightfully so, theories provide the "big picture", an overarching structure for hypotheses development (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2013). However, as many scholars continue to appeal the protracted debate between *isms* is no longer constructive and can teach us little about how the world works (Lake, 2011; Bennett, 2013). The centrism on IR "Great Debates" produced a common misconception of quantitative research in International Relations in that as long as studies do not engage *ism* theories they are no longer part of IR. Yet, study of third-party interventions has directly evolved as an extension of IR theories and formed a part of mid-level theories of Conflict Processes and Conflict Resolution. As Lake (2011, p. 466) points out, the contemporary IR research shifted from the third "Great Debate" towards more "contingent, mid-level theories of specific phenomena." This emerged as a result of need for non-paradigmatic research of trends in conflicts and other phenomena in order to inform policy-driven research and political elites. Theories explain how phenomena such as interventions occur but few possess systematic evidence to support their assumptions. The aftermath of World War I and the emergence of World War II stimulated the need to study war more closely and to advance solutions to prevent future nation-wide escalations.

One of the first systematic works on war was written by Quincy Wright (1942), a professor at Chicago University, during the inter-war period. The *Study of War* came out in 1942 just before the America joined WWII. This seminal work provides conceptual definitions and is considered as the first quantitative analysis of warfare. David A. Singer (1970), at Michigan University, continues in his footstep and equally believes that with systematic research into causes of war one can understand and possibly prevent deadly interstate collisions. With this article Singer (1970) introduced his then-project Correlates of War that started off in 1963 and until now remains one of the main sources for data on modern warfare since Napoleonic wars. In their common book Small and Singer (1972), introducing the Correlates of War project, provided definitions of war as a sustained combat involving at least 1,000 battle-related fatalities in combat per year and participants on both sides that had organizations able to conduct such combat(Sarkees, 2010). In the

second edition of the book in 1982 they added to international and extra-systemic wars and also civil wars that seemed to be on the rise at the time. Around the same time, a counterpart data project started to develop at the University of Uppsala in Sweden under the auspice of Peter Wallensteen. First, publications from this project started to appear in scientific journals around 1993. This project saw a rise in low intensity conflicts (Wallensteen and Axell, 1993) and these as armed conflicts with an incompatibility over government and/or territory with the threshold of at least 25 battle-related deaths in a given year (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2005). Over the years, these pioneering data projects were extended for more granular and disaggregated data to allow for more explicit and nuanced analysis [3].

Along with the data on conflicts (Gleditsch et al., 2002), its actors (Harbom et al., 2008), and termination (Kreutz, 2010), research on third-party intervention as a factor directly influencing the course and outcome of conflicts started to emerge as well. These started to evolve within two main streams: military interventions and conflict resolution strategies. This growth in studies examining third parties is particularly notable since the end of the Cold War, when the change and rise in conflict resolution strategies emerged. This shift owes largely to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and collapse of a bipolar system that kept common action initiated by the UN to the minimum. While these two streams have dealt with each third-party intervention strategy individually, this paper discusses them jointly. Each of them is a strategy a third party may consider in an attempt to get involved in civil wars of other states to influence the outcome and course of the conflict. The following subsection sheds light on the evolution and collection of data and development of the literature behind third-party interventions.

1.3.1.1 Study of Mediation

International mediation is not a new phenomena, however its systematic study has been limited to the past 25 years. The first documented diplomatic intervention dates back to 209 BC when a group of Greek emissaries sought to mediate a truce between the Aetolian League and Macedonia during the first Macedonian War (Greig and Diehl, 2012). The early literature discussing diplomatic efforts was somewhat skeptical about the

[3]For further information on the data made available by UCDP data program and Correlates of war see the official websites, respectively: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/ and http://www.correlatesofwar.org/

nature of a systematic study of mediation. Some described the systematic study of mediation as an exercise of futility as variables of mediator behaviour and timing of mediation number so many (Simkin, 1971). Most of the information about mediation processes were gathered from memoirs of eminent mediators themselves since peace negotiations usually happens behind the closed door and documents from such meetings are largely kept confidential (Meyer, 1960). The practice of mediation has been treated as a mysterious art that glorified characteristics successful mediators should have rather than mediation effectiveness.

Among the pioneers of the systematic study of mediation was Jacob Bercovitch who argued that mediation has become the most widespread third-party intervention and should no longer be treated as an unattainable mystery but examined in a systematic manner (Bercovitch, 1997). Realizing early on the need to study mediation empirically Bercovitch et al. (1991) introduced an original data set evaluating mediation incidents from 1945 to 1989, assessing different strategies of mediators and linking them to the mediation outcomes. Similarly, early literature has largely focused on mediation outcomes and tried to link them to conflict (Zartman, 1989; Vasquez, 1993) and disputant characteristics (Aggestam, 2002; McLaughlin et al., 2008), and identity of mediators (Dixon, 1996; Bercovitch and Houston, 1993).[4] Another part of the literature elaborates on the benefits of biased mediators as originally highlighted by Touval (1975). These findings were corroborated by Savun (2008) and Svensson (2009) who found that neutral mediators are prone to hasten peace negotiation at the expense of quality peace, while biased mediators make sure the negotiated agreements stipulates all provisions to protect their protégé or use their leverage to get one side to make costly concessions. On the other side, Kydd (2006) points out that such bias makes mediators less trustworthy and therefore less likely to succeed. In fact, some have pointed out that too much bias may be counterproductive (Crocker et al., 1999; Beber, 2010; Beardsley, 2011). They found that some conflicts attract multiple mediators who bring to the negotiating table their own interests, and such multi-party mediation may impede the peace process (Crocker et al., 1999). This brings the research back to the outcome of mediation and what is considered to be a successful result of peace dialogue. Some considered a mediation success merely its occurrence (Frei, 1976), while others deemed signing of a peace agreement as a successful

[4]For a thorough summary of mediation literature see Wallensteen and Svensson (2014).

result (Savun, 2008). Beardsley (2011), for example examined short-term and long-term stability following an armed conflict and found that mediation produces fragile peace that often breaks down and leads fighting to resume.

The need to study mediation systematically gave birth to several major data projects that until now serve as a major source of data on mediation. As mentioned above, Bercovitch et al. (1991) introduced their dataset gathering all mediation incidences between states for the period of 1945-1989 —this was later on extended to 2000. The International Conflict Management (ICM) dataset contains 3,377 conflict management events from 1945 to 2000 in 309 international conflicts. Alongside the ICM, DeRouen et al. (2011) develop an additional dataset focusing on civil war mediation (CWM). This data project covers all intrastate mediation events for the period of 19461–2004 —later on extended to 2014. CWM builds on the UCDP definition of civil wars and provides data on mediation cases and conflict episodes and other variables (actors, timing, strategy). A similar project has been developed by the scholars at UCDP who developed the Managing Intrastate Low-Intensity Conflict (MILC) data, covering the period of 19931–2004 (Melander et al., 2009). This dataset contains information on mediation and other diplomatic actions within this period. Another important data project, the International Crisis Behavior (ICB), was started by Brecher (1993) around the same time as Bercovitch et al. (1991). At present, it consists of 476 crises and 1,052 crisis actors and covers 1918 to 2015. This data project contains information about the involvement of third parties and mediation efforts in international conflicts. These are just a few of the most commonly used data sources for study of mediation up to date, though this list is far from complete.

1.3.1.2 Study of Peacekeeping

Empirical study of Peacekeeping is well advanced and has been studied ever since the creation of the UN. While there is an abundance of information and qualitative data on an individual case by case basis, there are surprisingly fewer data sources to study the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions quantitatively. The early quantitative studies have for the most part used country-year data as a unit of analysis (Diehl, 1988; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008). The data on the peacekeeping missions has developed on a more granular

level in the past several years. From simplified dichotomous variables capturing peacekeeping mission in a country on a yearly bases (Diehl, 1988) and specifying a type of the mission mandate (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008), data were extended to account for a number of peacekeepers and monthly contributions from member countries (Kathman, 2013), to composition of peacekeeping personnel (Hultman et al., 2013; Bove and Ruggeri, 2015), and gender composition in peacekeeping missions (Karim and Beardsley, 2016) .[5]

While some of the early studies were unable to confirm the pacifying effect of peacekeeping missions (Boot, 2000), the search for the right measure of effectiveness of peacekeeping had accelerated. Producing mixed results, peacekeeping was evaluated against a myriad of outcomes such as the level of violence produced in a conflict-year, the duration of war, conflict recurrence, and the pursuit of democratization following conflict termination (Diehl et al., 1996; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Jett, 2001; Gilligan and Sergenti, 2008; Fortna, 2008). Further disaggregation of data allowed for a more precise form of outcome variables such as monthly counts of one-sided violence or battle-related violence. Studies using these outcomes as dependent variables found that a higher number of troops within a mission deterred civilian victimization (Hultman et al., 2013) and combatants' fighting (Hultman et al., 2014). Studies focusing on spacial effects found that peacekeeping also contains violence from spreading (Beardsley et al., 2015).

While there are a plethora of data sources on international mediation, there are far fewer data sources on peacekeeping, with most of them published as research articles using original datasets. One of the data projects collecting data on both UN and non-UN multilateral peace operations is located in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). It presents an annual snapshot of multilateral peace operation deployments and includes more than 120 peace operations covering the period of 2000-2010. Data on states' contribution to peacekeeping missions and gender distribution are readily available on the UN websites [6]. These data, however, only cover the period from 2000 onward. Kathman (2013) reports that data for his article prior 2000 were obtained from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) directly in the form of hard copy. These data provide a monthly count of contributions in military, police, and civilian observers by each country for the period of 1990-2011. One limitation to note is that these data only provide

[5]For a current review of Peacekeeping literature see (Sandler, 2017; Salvatore and Ruggeri, 2017)
[6]To access the data visit: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/open-data-portal

information on UN peacekeeping missions. Another source for peacekeeping operations is the Third-Party Peacekeeping dataset developed by Mullenbach (2013) that includes peacekeeping operations initiated by the UN, other International Organizations, or states, and covers the period of 1946 to 2012. While this data set captures peacekeeping as dichotomous variables, it further distinguishes the mandate of the mission and the use of force during the mission that allows for some form of military personnel control.

1.3.1.3 Study of Military Interventions and External Support

Military interventions play inextricably important role in the foundations of International Relations and Political science. Use of force against other countries was limited by the Treaty of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Year War in 1648 and established territorial sovereignty of countries over its own population. Moreover the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of other countries has been codified in the Charter of the United Nations. Since then military interventions have been studied more closely, precisely for the fact that the principle of non-interference was never fully respected as a state practice. During the Cold War, military interventions were used to protect or change the regime of a target country to solidify alliances of the bipolar world. The sanctity of the non-interference principle was challenged by multiple scholars (Krasner, 1999; Weber, 1995). In fact, the international practice shows the majority of civil wars experienced some form of internationalization following World War II (Linegarger and Enterline, 2016). Even though this form of third-party intervention is often associated with selfish interest of outside states, there are some precedents of military interventions with humanitarian goals.

The early quantitative literature predominantly focused on linking determinants and motivation of military interventions to the conflict duration. In order to differentiate by the type of interventions, this part of the literature distinguishes between government-biased, rebel-biased, and neutral interventions. The results over the effect of military interventions on the duration of civil wars however remain mixed if not contradictory (Regan, 2002; Collier et al., 2004; Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008). These heterogeneous results are, according to Gent (2008), largely do to the fact that third parties do not get militarily engaged to shorten the duration of conflicts but to influence its outcome. He argues that outside states support militarily local

rebel groups only when the rebel group is sufficiently strong. Another body of literature argues that this form of third-party support is not solely limited to military interventions but includes a greater array of behaviour Linegarger and Enterline (2016). In fact, third parties do support rebels or governments with weapons and other military material, funds, training, intelligence, or territory access among others (Byman et al., 2001; Salehyan, 2010). Studies that had controlled for these types of external support found that civil wars experiencing such internationalization tend to last longer (Cunningham, 2011), produce higher number of casualties (Salehyan et al., 2014), see less negotiated settlements(Cunningham et al., 2009), and often relapse (Karlén, 2017).

One form of data on military intervention war developed within Correlates of War project is the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) dataset (Jones et al., 1996). This data project consist of all military crises when one state threatened, displayed, or used force against another for the 1816-2010 period and can be used to study interstate conflicts. Regan (2002) developed an original dataset that was later extended by Koga (2011) capturing all military interventions for the period of 1945 to 1999. Pearson and Baumann (1993) also initiated a data project that covered all military interventions for the period of 1946 to 1988 and was subsequently extended to 2005 by Pickering and Kinsangani (2009). Additionally, UCDP data program created a dataset consisting of external military support of third-party states for the 1975-2009 period (Högbladh et al., 2011). This dataset provides information on the existence, type, and identity of third party supporters; the type of states' support includes troops' access to territory and to military or intelligence infrastructure, weapons, funding or economic support, training, and logistics.

While these studies offer reasonable expectations of determinants and effectiveness of third-party interventions they present several challenges. One common challenge to the study of third-party interventions - be it mediation, peacekeeping, or military and external support for combatants - is that their distribution is not random and therefore it hinders any attempt to ascertain a causal relationship (Salvatore and Ruggeri, 2017). Moreover, these studies face omitted variable bias, selection bias, and confoundedness among others (Gerber and Green, 2012; Angrist and Pischke, 2015). Several studies have offered improvements to selection bias (Gartner and Bercovitch, 2006; Beber, 2012), use of matching techniques (Gilligan and Sergenti, 2008)

that helps balance out the treated and control group, or use of surveys to explore their effect (Beber et al., 2016). The following section will focus precisely on one of these possible improvements, experimental design.

1.3.2 Experimental Studies in Conflict Processes

As discussed above, experimental design is considered a gold standard of research methods in social sciences. Yet, their use is still limited in IR and political science more generally. While some areas of social science swiftly adopted experimental method, there is still considerable skepticism as to how to best integrate them into the study of IR and Political Science.

Areas of study focusing on public opinion and electoral behaviour have incorporated experiments much sooner than the rest of the field. In fact, the first experiment in political science dates back to 1926. Gosnell (1926) conducted an experiment on voter turnout in selected districts of Chicago. Since then, measurements of public opinion have penetrated topics beyond electoral voting. The need to measure peoples' opinion about public, and later on foreign, policies have led to the emergence of institutions such as Gallup (1935), the National Opinion Research Center (1941), and the American Association for Public Opinion Research (1947). These institutions have been used to measure the public appeal of diverse public policies. Research in public opinion on foreign policies in general and the use of force in particular have become prominent especially following the anti-war protests against the US involvement in the Vietnam war around America in 1960s. These events kick-started the demand to incorporate experiments in IR and conflict studies. These studies, however, measured the popular support for third-party interventions rather than their effect on the target population.

One of the first academic works screening the public opinion for support of governmental foreign policies during war times was study by Mueller (1973). In his study, he found that an increase in the cumulative log of military casualties decreased the support for use of force. The effect of loss of national military lives as a main determinant of public support for military interventions has been well established by ensuing studies (Larson, 1996; Gartner and Segura, 1998; Gelpi et al., 2006; Boettcher and Cobb, 2006; Gelpi et al., 2009; Kriner and Shen, 2013). Gelpi et al. (2009) have closely examined the public tolerance for military casualties

and found that presumed victory and justification of war played strong roles in these relationships. They found that the expectation of victory and perception that the intervention is just can increase the tolerance for military casualties. This shows that the public is not so altruistic and "liberal" as previously believed (Drezner et al., 2008). More recently with the increase in humanitarian interventions, scholars have tried to determine the effect of foreign civilian casualties on the support for use of force (Boettcher, 2004; Johns and Davies, 2017; Kreps and Maxey, 2017). Their findings suggest that while the public is sensitive to civilian casualties they are less tolerant towards the loss of lives of national military. However, this hypothesis is still in its inception and requires further examination. Others have identified partisanship as a main predictor of public support for the use of military force (Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2007). Berinsky (2007) criticizes the previous studies for assuming that the public makes rational decisions, instead he establishes a strong relationship between political elite consensus and support for war-time behaviour. According to this logic, public will support the use of force when elites agree on military intervention and lose support when elites are divided over a military decision. Scholars have identified other cue-givers as relevant actors that influence public support, one of these is international organizations (Grieco et al., 2011) and military elites (Golby et al., 2018). Whether the public can influence elites' decisions about foreign interventions is therefore inconclusive, yet both approaches remain important sources of information about war-time behaviour.

All of the above mentioned studies have contributed immensely with their insights to the public support for the use of force and study of IR and conflict studies more broadly. Yet, there are still new avenues for experiments to be implemented to broaden our understanding and test the theories of IR and conflicts. It is important to stay aware of certain limitations on when and how to integrate experimental studies in social sciences. Besides some analytic challenges discussed above in this chapter such as missing values or poor measurements, experiments might counter some ethical issues. At times when it might not be ethical to implement experiments, quasi-experiments or observational studies are useful methods in the scholarly tool-kit that can be used to provide evidence for certain relationships. With an emergence of *big data* these methods can produce more precise results. Instead of considering experimental design as a gold standard of research methods, one should consider the complementary power of observational and experimental studies

and how their different insight can extend the cumulative knowledge of IR and Political Science. This thesis therefore provides three distinct chapters that utilizes both experimental and observational data in order to provide insight into the study of third-party interventions. In the following section, this chapter discusses new directions on how to incorporate experimental and observational designs in order to advance the knowledge of IR and conflict studies.

1.4 Future research

To sum up, while the current research of third-party interventions in IR and conflict studies is well advanced there are at least three directions that this chapter identifies as worth focusing on. First, scholars should continue to generate and examine more fine-grained data to increase the precision of observational studies. To improve the precision, researchers using observational data to measure the effect of third-party interventions should aim to implement flexible methods and verified models (Fariss and Jones, 2018). As Fariss and Jones (2018) recommend, researchers should focus on searching for unexpected relationships by implementing nonlinear models and interaction terms, try to decrease generalization error to enhance their prediction results, and use different datasets to replicate and confirm new findings. Using different datasets to confirm recurring results is a necessity to compensate for the lack of random assignment in observational studies. Scholars using different datasets have proved that peacekeeping missions have a positive effect on mitigating and containing conflict violence (Fortna, 2008; Hultman et al., 2013; Beardsley and Gleditsch, 2015; Ruggeri et al., 2016). Researchers should follow this trend to ascertain additive effects of these interventions. Additionally, extending verified models for interaction terms can reveal new relationships and reinforce existing ones if certain rules are followed (Brambor et al., 2006). Studies by Beardsley et al. (2015) and Clayton and Dorussen (2018) focus on multiplicative effects of mediation and peacekeeping and both find that the conditional effect of mediation and peacekeeping mission increase the positive effect on attenuating conflicts. Including interaction terms is an effective way to unpack the existing relationships and find conditional effects. If researchers continue implementing aforementioned techniques they are decreasing generalization error and increasing precision of observational studies.

Second, to measure the causal effect of an intervention experimental design should be utilized. However, to administer a control experiment to measure the effect of peacekeeping, mediation, or external military support may face ethical issues. There are, however, ways how to measure other less direct effects of these interventions. For instance, Beber et al. (2016) conduct a survey experiment in Liberia to determine an effect of peacekeeping troop on sexual abuses of local female population. Survey results revealed that half of sampled Liberian women had engaged in transactional sexual encounters; at least 75% of women reported such encounters happened with the UN personnel. They found that each additional unit of UN peacekeepers caused a significant increase in a woman1's probability of engaging in her first transactional sex (Beber et al., 2016). Future research should take similar vein and try to implement more experiments to capture the effects of third-party interventions.

While experimental designs are useful tools for measuring an effect of a specific policy, they are also a great resource for advancing the knowledge in conflict studies and IR as well. Notably, a large body of literature examining public support for use of force has greatly enriched our understanding of when and how population can influence the political elites' decision to intervene or retreat from civil wars. Despite some neoclassical realists arguing that public does not make the foreign policy, some historical events show the opposite. Widespread anti-war protests against Vietnam intervention around the US were at least in part responsible for the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam beginning in 1973. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1991 is deemed to be a direct response to the pressure from public for humanitarian intervention to prevent the starvation of women and children as a consequence of an atrocious civil war. Additionally, public polls became a crucial part of the strategy political leaders use to adjust their electoral campaigns and policies in order to maintain high popularity. While there is lack of consensus about whether the public does have an impact on foreign policies or not, few incidents suggest the former. There is still a need to confirm theoretical hypothesis generated by grand and middle-ranged IR theories. Furthermore, the research of public support for foreign policies needs to answer which type of third-party interventions are preferred and under what conditions.

Finally, a step further to directly contribute to the study of IR and conflict studies is to concentrate on

specific population relevant to the IR researcher. The future of experimental research should focus on reaching a diverse set of populations relevant to IR other than the public. Therefore, the third recommendation is to reach directly to political elites, practitioners, or military personnel instead of assuming that subjects in lab are the desired population (McDermott, 2011b; Hyde, 2015). Recent studies are beginning to include a more diverse set of populations for experiments such as political elites (Butler and Broockman, 2011; Butler and Crabtree, 2016). These studies focus on responsiveness of political elites to their constituents and single out ethnic bias as a main determinant in this relationship. This is an important contribution as it opens up an avenue for testing theories on a whole new set of populations that are directly relevant for IR and conflict studies. This allows for testing the wide range of theoretical hypotheses about motivations and mechanisms of when and why states, or political elites, decide to intervene.

1.5 Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the most recent literature concerning third-party interventions using both observational and experimental data. It also compared the limitations of these two methods and their added value. It also assessed the most recent improvements that aided precision and viability of these methods and how they can be applied in study of third-party engagements. Finally, it offered some avenues for future research of third-party interventions and the direction of IR and conflict studies more generally.

In the following chapters, this dissertation presents three distinct empirical papers dealing with third-party interventions in civil wars. These chapters engage both observational and experimental design to show how these methods can contribute with their different insights and test different hypotheses to extend the cumulative knowledge of IR and conflicts. Each of the papers attempts to take a step further in the direction of future research which were identified in this chapter.

The first empirical paper examines the multiplicative effects of third-party interventions to search for unexpected relationships. As shown in this chapter, the additive effects of peacekeeping, mediation, and external support are relatively well established. However, scholars have provided limited evidence about the conjoint effects of these strategies. Therefore, the first paper attempts to unpack this conditional relationship through interactive effects. The second empirical paper surveys the American public to find out which of the third-party interventions garners the most popular support and under what conditions. Specifically, it tests how tolerant the American public is towards foreign civilian casualties and what type of interventions they would support. The third empirical paper delivers upon the final recommendation to diversify the set of target populations in experimental research. The final chapter presents findings from the first survey experiment administered on the sample of the American political elites, examining their motivation to intervene in civil conflicts.

Each of the ensuing empirical chapters provide original data, insight, and analysis of effectiveness and support for third-party interventions in the current state of affairs. This thesis is a direct response to the growing need for research in internationalized conflicts. Increasingly, civil wars are becoming more

internationalized and, as a result, more complicated. Employing diverse methodologies, reaching target populations, and generating more precise data will subsequently contribute to more accurate findings.

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Chapter 2: The effectiveness of Third-party Interventions

Ending Civil Wars: The role of Third-party Interventions in Reducing Conflict Violence

Abstract

Do third-party interventions lead to negotiated settlements, reduced violence, or lasting peace? The empirical literature covering this question presents widely differing answers. One reason why this might be the case is because studies typically model the additive effect of individual strategies. The concern with this approach is that the effect of any one strategy might be conditioned by the presence of another. If the effects of strategies are conditional, then the existing quantitative literature on the subject would require significant revision. This paper presents an original theory of third-party interventions which seeks to unpack the conditionality of these strategies. It then uses a range of modeling strategies to estimate their conjoint effects. The findings contribute to the growing research communities that study civil wars and conflict management as well as to the larger conflict literature.

2.1 Introduction

Third-party interventions in civil wars such as peacekeeping, mediation, or military intervention have been articulated, tested, and evaluated since the international community lurched away from Cold War bipolarity. Some of these strategies have been successfully implemented, while others have been wasteful of both resources and political energies. While there is no such thing as a one-size-fit-all strategy for conflict resolution, this paper identifies third-party interventions as a variable that requires further research in understanding how to prevent conflict recurrence and reduce violence.

For the past 25 years, third-party involvement in intrastate conflicts has become widely accepted as a factor in managing ethnic tensions. Since the end of the Cold War, new patterns and actors in conflict management have emerged and shaped the outcomes of civil wars. More attention has been given to the increased number of conflicts that have ended with negotiated settlements. It has been suggested that this shift is due to the increased ability of the international community to engage in conflict management efforts (Fortna, 2004; Pinker, 2011). However, how does the increased ability to engage in conflicts manifest on the ground? In other words, how effective are third-party interventions and how these interventions influence each other1's effectiveness remains to be answered.

The study of third-party intervention as a factor influencing the duration, outcomes, and intensity of civil wars has gained more traction in recent years. Indeed, it has been argued that third parties have been essential in overcoming the uncertainty and mistrust of combatants in instances of grave post-conflict situations (Walter, 2002). During the last decade, some political scientists and economists have begun to examine the role of interventions in the post-conflict settlements. Yet, peace agreements do not necessarily bring peace or reduce violence. Therefore, conducting research on the type, scope, and interactions of third-party interventions might shed light on why some cases of conflict management strategies have proven successful while others have failed to reduce the extent of violence. This paper aims to identify those conflict management strategies that are best set to anchor peace in war-torn societies and develop a typology that links third-party involvement and post-war peace.

2.2 Puzzle

The common expectation is that third-party involvement is beneficial. The rationalist explanation of war suggests that third parties can help to overcome the uncertainty and mistrust in situations where combatants lack information about the other side1's intention (Fearon, 1995). However, there is empirical evidence that some forms of third-party interventions may prolong the duration of wars. Recent history in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya are vivid reminders of those limitations. In contrast, other extensive external involvement such as in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor laid the ground work for peace to take place. Therefore, the initial step necessary to resolve this puzzle is to clarify the effects of third-party involvement in reducing violence and enhancing the prospects for a stable peace following a civil war.

Conventional wisdom holds that third parties intervene in conflicts to manage inter-ethnic tensions, reduce the duration of wars, and increase the odds of negotiated settlements. However, this paper challenges the notion that all third-party interventions can exert this effect on peace-making processes. Although third parties do intervene in conflicts to shape the outcomes, systematic data show that they do not always result in negotiated settlements, lasting peace, or even reductions in violence. Indeed, there are many disagreements in the literature about the effectiveness of these strategies. One reason for these differences may be because it typically theorizes about and empirically models the effect of only one strategy. The argument here is that the effect of any one strategy might be conditioned by the presence of another. If the effects of strategies are conditional, then the existing empirical literature on the topic would require significant revision. This chapter unpacks the conditionality of these strategies and estimates their conjoint effect. In doing so, it contributes to the growing research communities that study civil wars and conflict management and the larger conflict literature. Specifically, this chapter aims to unify the disparate strands of literature on third-party interventions.

This research becomes more important especially in the context of a post-Cold war period when civil wars are increasingly becoming international events. This period has been also marked by a growing frequency of peacekeeping and mediation efforts (Fortna, 2009; Crocker et al., 1999). Although, not all direct third-party

interventions have followed the same pattern as mediation and peacekeeping. External military support was used to change the course of civil wars long before the end of the Cold War. Importantly, these efforts were typically not made by neutral third-party arbitrators and are associated with a negative effect on the duration and magnitude of violence. The external military and/or financial support provided to either side of a conflict has usually been motivated by third parties' preferences to help one side outbalance the other. While external support to belligerents might be historically more frequent, it is the interplay of all three types of intervention that needs to be considered in the broader analysis of third party effectiveness and dynamics of civil wars.

Third-party interventions have become an increasingly common component of peace-making processes among belligerents (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2005; Wallensteen and Svensson, 2014). Particularly, mediation has become the most common form of third-party intervention in international conflicts (Gartner and Bercovitch, 2008). As one of the prominent cases of mediation successes is the case of El Salvador. The UN has taken a role of a mediator in the early 1990s to facilitate negotiations to a decade-long civil conflict between the government of El Salvador and a coalition of groups known as Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). Often less pronounced, however, are the conditions under which then the UN envoy, Alvaro de Soto, entered the conflict in his role as a mediator. The Salvadorian military was heavily sponsored by the US government until 1989 when the Bush administration, under pressure by the Democrat-dominated Congress, halted its military aid to the government. As a result, the El Salvadoran government was forced to engage in negotiations with the FMLN (de Soto, 2008). The military support was restored after the negotiations started.

In contrast, since its beginning in 2011 the Syrian civil war has changed four UN envoys responsible for mediating peace talks between Assad's government and Syrian rebel groups, while a handful of invested countries and organizations have provided military or financial support to both parties. Russia has been actively supporting the Syrian military since September 2015, while the Syrian opposition has received weapons and financial support from Saudi Arabia and the United States in response to Russian air strikes. While some combinations of third-party interventions can have mutually reinforcing effects for establishing

stable settlements such as in the case of El Salvador, other forms of interventions may prevent peace to take place and violence to decline as in Syria. The research on third-party intervention has failed to distinguish between military interventions and a much wider range of behavior along with their conjoint effect (Linegarger and Enterline, 2016). This chapter, therefore, attempts to measure the impact of different strategies that third parties employ to bring wars to an end.

2.3 Literature review

Before diving into the literature review itself, it is important to define what is meant by third-party interventions. This paper defines third-party intervention in a broader sense to be able to account for a wider scale of behavior third parties employ when trying to influence the course of civil wars. Borrowing from Regan (2000, p. 9), a third-party intervention can be defined as a unilateral or multilateral involvement by a government, group of governments, international/regional organization or non-state actor/s in an internal conflict, of which it is not considered to be a warring party, with an intent to influence the outcome of the conflict. Under this broad definition, wider behaviour of third parties such as arbitration, mediation, peacekeeping, military support, international sanctions, or even propaganda can be included. While taking into account the different objectives and forms of these interventions, it is important to recognize that the common denominator of third-party interventions is to influence the outcome of a conflict. Influencing the outcome of a conflict may include different effects, such as prolonging or ceasing the fight or duration, or helping one party to prevail over the other. For this reason this definition purposefully disregards the intent to intervene as a neutral arbiter or on behalf of one or the other side of the conflict.

This is not to undermine the effect of motivation of the third parties to intervene. For example while mediation is usually considered a neutral third-party arbiter as it often unfolds upon invitation and agreement by both parties of the conflict, some instances of mediation have been operating their bias to leverage warring parties to signing of agreements. To this end, bias mediation have been found more effective than a neutral one (Kydd, 2003; Svensson, 2014). However, it may be difficult at times to ascertain a specific bias of multiple mediators, particularly those composed of ad hoc groups of states. Similarly, some

scholars have differentiated between military interventions by type into government biased, rebel biased, and balanced interventions (Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008; Regan, 2002; Regan and Aydin, 2006; Collier et al., 2004; Linegarger and Enterline, 2016). These scholars have found that interventions on behalf of governments increase the odds of negotiated settlements (Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008), rebel biased interventions increase the opposition victories (Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008) and decrease the duration of civil wars (Regan, 2002), while intervention on behalf of both belligerents decrease the odds of negotiated settlement and lengthen the duration of hostilities (Regan, 2002; Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008). Yet these findings failed to provide conclusive evidence due to 1) using widely different data sets and definitions of civil wars and interventions, as well as 2) using different dependent variables (Regan, 2010). The previous research has pushed the study of third-party behavior forward in several directions. Generally, third-party interventions have been measured against the duration of conflict and peace years, likelihood of peace agreements, or recurrence of conflicts. Notably, most of the research has identified only the additive effects of these strategies.

Research behind peace mediation have struggled with defining mediation success (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2014). Some, mostly early works, suggested that a mere occurrence of mediation should be considered a success (Frei, 1976). Following, generations of scholars measured mediation success relative to the number of peace years or cessation of hostilities (Bercovitch, 1991; Regan and Aydin, 2006; Beardsley, 2011), signing of peace agreements (Beardsley et al., 2006; Savun, 2008), or even democratization (Nathan, 1999). Although mediation, possibly due to its relatively inexpensive character, is the most widespread conflict management strategy, it is notorious for its poor track record for providing a long-lasting peace (Bercovitch, 1991). It has been argued that due to a time inconsistency problem mediation produces rather fragile peace, as peace agreements tend to be broken and conflicts allowed to resume (Beardsley, 2011). Nevertheless, more recent research into the strategies that mediators employ to tackle the difficult salient conflict scenarios suggests that the effectiveness of mediation efforts increases once selection bias is addressed (Beber, 2012; Beardsley et al., 2015).

Supporting belligerents with military or material assistance is another direct form of third-party action. Some scholars have shown that military interventions, as well as material support to combatants, tend

to prolong armed conflicts (Regan, 2002), make negotiated settlements less likely (Salehyan et al., 2014), and render these conflicts deadlier (Cunningham et al., 2009). As opposed to other forms of third-party intervention, external support to combatants has not increased in the aftermath of the Cold War. In fact, this form of intervention remained relatively stable since 1975. At least two thirds of all civil conflicts have experienced some kind of external support from third parties since 1975 (Karlén, 2017).

Another way third parties get involved in civil conflicts is through deployment of peacekeeping missions. The early literature has been mostly inconclusive on the effects of peacekeeping operations, inferring they have no effect on resolving civil wars (Diehl, 1988; Jett, 1999), produce longer lasting peace (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008), and most recently finding UN missions deploying larger amounts of armed troops as best set to alleviate civilian suffering (Hultman et al., 2016).

The evidence from this extensive body of literature has only produced results for each third-party involvement acting on its own. These findings, however, do not capture the actual dynamic on the ground. Rather than testing the effect behind the interactions of these strategies, the previous research has only accounted for the additive effect of individual strategies. An exception is Beardsley et al. (2015), whose model accounts for peacekeeping, diplomacy, and sanctions to show the reinforcing effect of mediation and peacekeeping in the reduction of civilian casualties. Noteworthy is also a work of Heldt (2009) who ponders about the effect of conflict management sequencing Heldt (2009) differentiates between various mediation strategies and suggest that different strategies may be more effective in different phases of the conflict. This idea is further elaborated by Clayton and Dorussen (2018) who assess mediation and peacekeeping to find that mediation increases the likelihood of conflict termination in particular when followed by a peacekeeping mission.

2.4 Methods and discussion

In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in third-party interventions in the internal conflicts of other states (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2005; Wallensteen and Svensson, 2014). Recent developments in Syria are a case in point. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Syria has seen over the 8 years

of conflict violence spikes in the midst of a very complex landscape of third-party involvements. Due to the opposition within the UN Security Council, the UN was unable to send peacekeepers to neither separate the belligerents nor protect civilians on the ground. While falling short on peacekeeping action, the UN has dispatched several mediators to help find the solution to the Syrian conflict. Most recently the coalition of mediators made of Russia, Iran, and Turkey have brokered the Astana "de-escalation" agreement in May 2017. Over the course of 8 years, Syrian civil war saw multiple domestic and foreign actors siding with or against the Syrian government and each other. On one side, Iran and Russia supported the Assad government in his fight to stay in power. On the other side, while Turkey aided Syrian rebels together with other Arab states, Trump halted almost a four-year clandestine CIA program to arm and train Syrian rebels, at the beginning of summer 2017. The continued support of the US and other EU and Arab states to the SDF in the fight against ISIL however helped disperse the terrorist group from its territory.

Although the Syrian conflict seems to be an outlier on the scale of global interventionism with its exceptionally high number of invested parties, international involvement in conflicts has been rising steadily since the end of the Second World War. Another example of a conflict with large number of invested parties is the civil war in South Sudan that started in 2013 between the president Salva Kiir Mayardit, formerly SPLA, and his vice president Riek Machar, who fled to create SPLA-IO. The conflict between the two over an alleged attempt of coup d'état, has returned a civil war to a country that had just 2 years prior concluded a decades-long civil conflict over the separation of South Sudan. The government forces of Salve Kiir were reinforced by the presence of Ugandan troops and SPLA-IO allegedly received external support from Sudan. The conflict hosts UN peacekeeping mission UNMISS since 2011 that was established with the independence of South Sudan and extended in 2013 by additional military component to help curb the conflict violence. Since the beginning of the conflict, IGAD alongside other countries and organizations —China, the EU, African Union, UK, USA, and Norway —tried to mediate ceasefire agreements, with the latest partial agreement singed in September 2018.

This clearly demonstrates the increasingly complex landscape of civil conflicts due to raising level of interventionism. In fact, over 63% of all conflicts included three or more distinct types of third-party

Figure 1: Instances of third-party intervention over time



interventions between 1989 and 2010. Peacekeeping missions, mediation initiatives, and direct or indirect military support have increased in frequency as well as intensity. The mediation efforts grew from 24 active mediation events in 1993 to 270 ongoing mediation events in 2007 (DeRouen et al., 2011). Before 1992, only 7 peacekeeping missions took place. From 1992 to 2014 total of 39 peacekeeping missions with military deployment on the ground have emerged, with 8 of these missions still ongoing at the end of 2014 (Mullenbach, 2013). Although the frequency of external support to belligerents has remained relatively constant since the Second World War, the end of Cold War recorded an increase in the number of supporters, before 1990 only 111 distinct supporters aided belligerents compared to 244 recorded third-party external supporters following the end of the Cold War, although this could have been due to better availability of data.

As the international involvement in civil wars has increased, it raises a question whether there is a grand strategy for coordinating these efforts to mitigate the conflict violence. To uncover the effects of these relationships, this thesis relies on the inclusion of interaction terms as a representation of conditional hypotheses. The motivation behind using interaction terms is to test the joint effects of these strategies to better reflect the situation on the battlefield. This is based on the idea that outcome of an intervention depends on the context. In other words, the effect of one third-party intervention depends on the presence of another. As opposed to the previous models, instead of focusing on an additive effect when estimating an outcome of an intervention as demonstrated in the equation A, a multiplicative model estimates effects by

taking into consideration how variables effect one another, demonstrated in equation B. Additive models only account for the effect of individual variables on the outcome without recognizing the relationships between them. Additive models therefore reduce the ability to capture the complex dependencies between multiple interventions. Whereas interaction terms modify the effect of the two attributes considered individually and estimate their effect conditionally upon each others presence.

A)

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2$$

B)

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_1 X_2$$

The following chapter unpacks the mechanisms behind third-party interventions and their potential interactions. This paper deals primarily with three most widespread forms of third-party actions: peacekeeping missions, mediation, and external military support for warring parties. First, this chapter examines the objectives and mechanisms of each third-party engagement to uncover their effect on severity of violence. Finally, it outlines the main testable hypotheses before presenting the research design and data collection.

2.4.1 Peacekeeping

Although the primary role of the UN is to keep international peace and security, the UN charter contains no mention of peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, peacekeeping missions have become the signature method of securing this goal. The UN has been deploying peacekeeping missions since its first deployment in 1948 in the Middle East. The role of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was to observe the military armistice between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Subsequently, the number and the extent of missions' mandate expanded, especially following the Cold War.

Ideally, UN mandated missions should acquire the consent of the main warring parties. However, this requirement is not always possible and some peacekeeping missions have been deployed without a direct consent of at least one of the disputants or even a UN mandate. Consequently, some UN peacekeeping

missions are deployed to empower a state's government by helping to defeat a competing rebel group. In turn, peacekeepers become enemies to at least one party to the conflict, which inhibits their capacity to act impartially. Lack of impartiality and voluntary consent can be reflected on the ability of peacekeepers to carry out their mandate without the need for substantial military capability (Findlay, 2002). Examples of such expansions are recent deployments in Mali and Somalia. Therefore, for the purposes of this analysis, this chapter will take into consideration all peacekeeping missions regardless of whether the mission was deployed by the UN, other Inter-governmental organizations, or an ad hoc group of states.

Initially, the literature on peacekeeping criticized the UN for being ill-equipped to bring peace to war-torn societies. This literature analyzed all peacekeeping mission up to the early 2000s. This time frame constitutes only a small sample of all missions and raises several methodological issues. First, it has been argued that UN peacekeeping missions are only deployed in the direst cases. Therefore this sample may suffer from a bias in selection. Second, since the early 2000s UN missions have increased in number as well as in size; consequently, it is necessary to account for later UN missions as well to extend the sample size. This bolstered sample size improves the prospects for causal inference. Third and last but not least, the type of peacekeeping mission differs based on their mandate; hence, peacekeeping missions might be designed to achieve differing objectives. For example, a verification mission is designed to observe whether parties to a conflict abide by the achieved agreement or truce, while other peacekeeping missions might be designed to separate combatants on the ground.

A few studies have noted that peacekeeping operations and other conflict management strategies exist in more nuanced forms than simplified dichotomous variables, which have generally underpinned the quantitative study of third-party interventions. UN peace operations can involve multiple forms from verification and observation missions, through disarmament supervision, to multidimensional peace operations. The UN usually mandates its missions with a specific objective relative to the needs of specific conflicts. These objectives may vary from establishing ceasefire, through observing whether the terms of agreement are met by all combatants, to restraining combatants from further fighting to reduce the number of civilian casualties. Instead of holding peacekeeping missions to standards beyond their mandate, the evaluation should

consider these varieties while focusing on the more immediate effects such as reducing the level of conflict violence. Peacekeeping can, in fact, reduce the conflict intensity and amount of total fatalities by separating the warring parties and keeping the parties from targeting civilian population.

This is paramount especially in light of the provision for protection of civilians. Since 1999, when the first UNSC Resolutions 1265 (1999) put the protection of civilians onto the agenda of the Security Council, most of the Peacekeeping missions —beginning with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (1999-2006) —introduced a provision concerning protection of civilians in their mandate. While protection of civilians could have been a motivation of deployed UN missions prior to this resolution, it has become a uniform desired outcome of most peacekeeping mission following the 1989. Therefore, measuring the effect of peacekeeping against the conflict intensity can provide a better and more unifying measurement of effectiveness.

2.4.2 Mediation

As opposed to peacekeeping, which is designed to keep combatants apart, mediation efforts are conducted to bring adverse parties together. As defined by Bercovitch (1997, p.130), mediation is "a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider (whether an individual, an organization, a group, or a state) to change their perceptions or behavior, and do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law." This means that mediation is a diplomatic effort offered by third parties to transform conflicts and provide safe spaces for disputants to discuss their differences. The practice of mediation is based on a voluntary agreement of belligerents to enter into and respect the outcome of negotiations with each other. The objective is to create such an environment by enabling belligerents to settle or at least to find a temporary resolution to their differences. Since the intensity and source of conflict varies, mediators often have to adjust their strategies to appease disputants and identify a way for constructive discussion. This adjustment of tactic can manifest in different types of mediation talks such as direct talks, shuttle diplomacy, informal talks, or good offices.

To measure the effectiveness of mediation, previous studies provided different benchmarks. Mediation

success was measured in peace years and secession of hostilities Bercovitch (1991); Regan and Aydin (2006); Beardsley et al. (2015), generation of peace agreements **?**Savun (2008), short-term and long-term stability (Beardsley, 2011) or even democratization (Nathan, 1999). Further, **?** argues that dissecting peace agreements into institutional arrangements can provide a better measurement of mediation outcome. Signing of peace agreements or secession of hostilities might be too broad and disregard the long term effect of mediation (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2014). However, to provide a uniform measurement for all considered third-party intervention, this study measures mediation against conflict intensity. It is important to note, however, that mediation can often occur during active clashes. Nonetheless, mediation can directly affect the magnitude of civilian fatalities in several ways. Despite the sometimes-negative depiction of mediation producing only a fragile peace that often breaks down (Beardsley, 2011), mediation opens a channel of communication between warring parties. Since warring parties often face the information problem, mediation can dissolve the information uncertainty surrounding disputant1's military capabilities and intentions (Kydd, 2003). However, disputants can enter mediation talks to misuse the leverage of the mediator to negotiate a larger share of a pie, to buy time, or to block the entire peace process (frozen conflicts). Mediation is a powerful tool that legitimizes the claims of disputants.

There is a moral hazard attached to the decision of stepping in as a mediator. If a third party decides to intervene, it risks a situation where instead of easing and facilitating the bargaining process, it provides one side with a negotiation advantage in the process. Such actions may stiffen one of disputants who refuse to make concessions and may use the third-party presence to negotiate a better deal. This may create, in turn, a resentment of the opposing side whose expectations and barging position depreciates in the wake of third-party intervention. In such a sensitive context, mediation has to be employed strategically to maximize its effectiveness.

2.4.3 External Support

While peacekeeping and mediation are relatively new conflict management strategies, external military support to belligerents is the most prevalent tactic for influencing the outcome of war. External support to

either a rebel group or a government is a strategy that is more often associated with a self-serving objective rather than a conflict management aim [1]. The main intuition here is that third parties back combatants militarily to help one party or the other achieve victory. Hence, external support can be defined as a unilateral intervention by a government, group of governments or organized group in an internal armed conflict in favor of a current government or opposition group directly involved in that dispute (Karlén, 2016).

Except direct military support (e.g. troops and weapon supplies), external support includes less direct forms of intervention such as providing belligerents with funding, training, intelligence, or territorial access. These seemingly unsubstantial forms of support might make all the difference in sustaining rebel activities or even provide for the sole existence of these groups. Financial support for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka mainly come from the worldwide Tamil diaspora to maintain local governance, including the control of areas such as education, cultural activities, and food distribution (Mampilly, 2011). Similarly, offering territorial access often results in physical sanctuaries for rebel groups commonly known as safe havens. Physical sanctuaries are in many cases indispensable for the survival of these groups. Pakistan has selectively provided access to its territory to multiple terrorist organizations over time, including the Taliban and the Haqqani Network (Riedel, 2008; Tricia Bacon, 2015).

The effect of external support on conflict intensity can be twofold. First, third parties provide external military support in order to help one party in the conflict prevail militarily. As a result, third parties are able to influence the outcome of a conflict by helping one side defeat the other more effectively. Second, third parties get involved due to security or rivalry concerns where both disputants —government and rebel —receive some form of military support. This military injection may make the resources for belligerents virtually infinite and exhaustion of one side impossible. Neither of the disputants is forced to capitulate or make any concessions. There is empirical evidence suggesting that the external military support increases the duration of conflicts, renders these conflicts more lethal, and makes negotiated settlements less likely.

[1] Some scholars use more general term instead of 1‘external support1’such as 1‘partial1’or 1‘bias interventions1’, however, these were mostly limited to military interventions. This article choses to use the terminology developed by the UCDP as it accounts for broader scope of support.

2.4.4 Theoretical Expectations

These strategies often occur simultaneously, in parallel to each other, or in rivalry with one another. The way that these objectives interact and play out on the battlefield is an important question and one that needs to be answered. This question is all the more pressing in times of increasing international involvement in civil wars. This trend has steadily increased following the Cold War and the recent armed conflicts in Syria or Ukraine are illustrative of this trend.

From previous research that examined a sample of all UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, we know that those peacekeeping missions with higher levels of military deployment are more effective in reducing civilian violence (Hultman et al., 2016). The same sample of countries has shown that once peacekeeping missions are supported by mediation efforts the pacifying effect of these two strategies combined is increased (Beardsley et al., 2015). Beardsley et al. (2015) further find that mediation has a strong pacifying effect on conflict violence as well, however using a MIC dataset that allows them to control for specific strategies on the African continent. Although previous scholarship on mediation effectiveness has demonstrated that peace talks do not always lead to a long-lasting peace because agreements often break down and fighting resumes, there is some evidence that by controlling for selection effect of mediation it increases a positive effect on peace duration (Gartner, 2013; Beber, 2012). While the literature on external military support argues that this form of intervention tends to prolong fighting and make negotiated settlements less likely and more fatal (Cunningham, 2010; Salehyan et al., 2014), there is potential that when paired with other conflict management strategies this effect might change or even intensify the pacifying effect of other strategies. The expected effects of third-party interventions on the severity of the conflict violence are summarized in the following testable hypotheses. The following hypotheses are divided into base (additive) expectations and multiplicative expectations.

The base expectations for the individual effects of third-party interventions follows previous research findings. According to those, this paper expects to see a) attenuating effect of peacekeeping missions on conflict intensity, b) pacifying effect of mediation efforts, but also c) intensifying level of violence when

belligerents receive external military support.

Based on previous findings from Hultman et al. (2013) and Hultman et al. (2016) that peacekeeping decreases civilian casualties and battle related deaths, it can be expected that the effect of peacekeeping has a mitigating effect on the severity of violence. The intuition here is that peacekeeping is deployed to countries where the peacekeepers were invited to provide guarantees to a peace agreement or monitor a ceasefire. Conflict violence may intensify when a power imbalance occurs between belligerents. Alternatively, if a peacekeeping operation is set to support a government or protect civilians against terrorist groups, it may aggravate the hostility situation and increase the conflict intensity.

BH1: The effect of peacekeeping decreases the level of fatalities overall.

Second base expectation draws from previous findings, it can be expected that the additive effect of mediation will have a violence-reducing effect overall. However, mediation efforts do not always produce a negotiated settlement or long-lasting peace. Rather, they involve thorough and often protracted processes in order to reach a final mutually accepted solution to a conflict or an armistice. Before any agreement or ceasefire is agreed upon, protracted negotiations may be accompanied with an increase in casualties. This can create a potential for a selection effect but can be overcome by controlling for this bias.

BH2: The effect of mediation decreases the level of fatalities overall.

Previous research has shown that external military support can negatively impact the course of a conflict. By providing external support to a government, an imbalance of power is created and the incentives for a government to keep power and defeat rebels are reinforced. In turn, this can lead to an increase in violence due to a lack of government motivation to compromise with the rebel group and a desire to conclude conflict entirely by defeating the rebels. Similarly, if the rebels receive external support, they may feel that the balance of power was tipped to their benefit. Emboldened rebels may want to prolong fighting to achieve a better deal or overpower the government. Therefore, it may be expected that an external support to the rebel groups will result in increased conflict intensity.

BH3: The effect of government support increases the level of fatalities overall.

BH4: The effect of rebel support increases the level of fatalities overall.

These hypotheses, however only account for additive effect of these strategies but do not take into consideration their conditional relationships. In other words the effectiveness of any one strategy may be conditional upon the presence of a different strategy. For example the effect of mediation may depend on the balance of power between the belligerents or more specifically on the presence of external military support for these combatants. If the balance of power is tipped towards one side of the conflict the effect of mediation may be enhanced or diminished. Given the individual expected effect of these strategies it is possible that the expected effect of one third-party intervention is influenced by the effect of another and their joint effect may be reinforced or completely reversed. Previously used additive models assume independence between these variables and often focus only on one strategy at a time, yet these do not fully capture the landscape of the internationalized conflicts that are on the rise. Therefore multiplicative models better reflect the real interconnectedness of forces shaping the course of conflict. This interdependence may be visible in the most complex cases. The involvement of multiple third-party interventions saw expansion following the Cold War. With the growing trend of third-party involvement, it is important to analyze how these forces interact and what strategies may be used in order to limit the amount of casualties. To unpack this relationship this paper provides the following conditional hypotheses.

The first of the conditional expectations focuses on the relationship of mediation and peacekeeping. Both mediation initiatives and peacekeeping operations are typically implemented upon invitation of warring parties. This implies a voluntary and consent-based agreement of the disputants to enter a phase of peace-making compromise. Since the end of the Second World War these two strategies, indeed, began to appear simultaneously or sequentially to manage inter-ethnic tensions in order to mitigate the levels of fatalities. More specifically, mediation brings the warring parties to the negotiating table to agree on a solution to a conflict and peacekeeping is employed in order to provide guarantees that signatories of the agreement keep their promises. Although these efforts have been implemented with the intention of complementing each other, there is not much evidence for effectiveness of this relationship [2]. Therefore it is expected that when

[2]Exceptions to the rule are studies by Beardsley, Cunningham and White (2015), and Clayton and Dorussen (2018)

a peace agreement is reached during mediation talks, the effect of a peacekeeping mission which provides substantial guarantees for this agreement should reinforce its pacifying effect and vice versa.

H1: The effect of mediation decreases the level of fatalities when peacekeeping is employed.

Second, while the effect of external support to government or rebels is expected to increase the magnitude of violence due to asymmetry of the balance of power, providing such support to both belligerents however may create a different scenario. Once rebels and government both receive support from their benefactors the asymmetry of balance of power might be overcome. While the external support makes resources of both belligerents virtually impossible to exhaust, the commitment problem makes it implausible for belligerents to compromise. Emboldened belligerents might want to attempt to increase their bargaining power by showing off their strength forcing the other side to compromise. This strategy might work if one side of the dyad perceives that the other side might have a comparable advantage and making a compromise outweighs the gains of further fighting. Yet, due to the information problem the belligerents cannot be certain about security guarantees of an agreement and are better off fighting.

H2: The effect of external support for government increases the level of fatalities when external support for rebels is employed.

Next, it has been suggested that cases that experience external support for both belligerents were less likely to see negotiated settlements (**?**) and therefore last longer (Cunningham, 2006) and produce more fatalities. Despite the research suggest that conflicts with higher external involvement are more difficult to resolve they do experience mediation efforts producing peace deals or ceasefires. In these escalated situations, when peacekeeping is not an option due to the inability of UNSC members to agree on a resolution, mediation efforts can act as a diffuser of brewing atrocities. Mediators provide facilitation that can dilute information problem yielding avenues for intermediate settlements or ceasefires that can immediately decrease the rising death toll, at least temporarily.

H3: The effect of mediation decreases the level of fatalities when external military support for government and rebels is employed.

However, the effect of mediation may differ when the balance of power between belligerents is asymmetric. If only a rebel group receives external support, mediation may not be sufficient to break the fighting, moreover it can be misused by rebels. Due to this external support rebels can feel empowered to extort government in order to negotiate better deal or completely overthrow the incumbents. In turn, mediation efforts can be misused to compel the government to comply with additional concessions in return for reduced hostilities.

H4: The effect of mediation increases the level of fatalities when external military support for rebels is employed.

If the balance of power is tipped towards the government side of the conflict, the government may not feel motivated to subdue and share the power with the rebel group. Given the voluntary character of mediation, its presence in this scenario would signal that fighting strategy of a rebel group employ in civil wars such guerrilla warfare or hit and run can cause sufficient inconvenience to the government, rendering it ready to make certain concessions in order to appease the rebel group and subsequently the end the hostilities. As the rebel group does not receive any external support, it is motivated to reach any agreement as oppose to continued fighting while potentially risking exhaustion or defeat.

H5: The effect of mediation decreases the level of fatalities when external military support for government is employed.

A similar rationale might be applied for the expected effect of peacekeeping missions. Typically, peacekeeping missions are deployed to provide guarantees to an agreement between the warring parties. Likewise, as in the previous case, if only a rebel group receives external military support, emboldened rebels may renege on their promises in the agreement. By intensifying hostilities rebels may want to force the government to make additional concessions they deem to deserve. Alternatively, peacekeeping may be deployed to help a government defeat rebels or to protect civilians, which in turn may increase the death toll on the side of a rebel group. It can be expected that the peacekeeping increases the level of fatalities if rebel group receives significant military support.

H6: The effect of peacekeeping increases the level of fatalities when external military support for rebels is employed.

Providing that the assumption that government has a higher incentive to keep hostilities to a minimum holds, peacekeeping missions might have a pacifying effect even when the government receives external support. The idea here is that if peacekeeping is indeed deployed (preferably) by invitation to provide guarantees to an already agreed peace deal, government has a strong interest in preserving this peace. At the same time, if rebel group does not receives additional support, they might also have a strong preference to reach some form of a deal to a prolonged fighting.

H7: The effect of peacekeeping decreases the level of fatalities when external military support for government is employed.

However, when mediation and peacekeeping join forces, it can be expected that in both cases of power imbalance —when only rebels or only a government receives external military support —their joint effect will have an attenuating effect on conflict intensity. Since both mediation and peacekeeping are generally deployed upon invitation, belligerents are this way signalling their commitment to resolve the issues at stake by laying down the weapons and joining together at the negotiating table. The peacekeeping provides a third party guarantees to any mediated agreement so that both belligerents can overcome the uncertainty and mistrust.

H8: The joint effect of mediation and peacekeeping decreases the level of fatalities when external military support for government is employed.

H9: The joint effect of mediation and peacekeeping decreases the level of fatalities when external military support for rebels is employed.

Finally, when thinking about very complex cases where both belligerents receive external support, two possible scenarios may unfold. One, due to the complexity of the situation and resources provided to both belligerents, the conflict violence may intensify. As the resources on both sides are abundant, belligerents

may want to continue the fight despite peacekeeping presence. In fact, it can be difficult for peacekeeping troops to gain the trust of the belligerents without the supporting effect of mediation, especially in highly internationalized conflicts. Since in conflicts where warring parties have an abundance of resources flowing in from their external supporters, they are not forced to strike a deal with each other but rather strive for an overall victory. There is no point of ripeness or exhaustion in the conflict, which makes it difficult to incentivize belligerents towards negotiated settlement. Arguably, settlements, whether verbal or in a form of signed peace agreements, can best be delivered through mediation talks. In instances where no incentives are provided for disputants to achieve a form of agreement or to abide by it, peacekeeping missions might face difficulties to end the fighting. Second, the intense fighting may drive the belligerents to a point of exhaustion or a stage of hurting stalemates (Zartman, 1989). This deadlock describes a situation where neither of the parties can achieve their goals and may reach a point when the cost of continuing the struggle exceeds the benefits to be gained. At this point peacekeeping may provide a great opportunity to deescalate the conflict. Yet, it is important to note that if peacekeeping is deployed following a peace agreement, the implementation period following the agreement might be the most critical in sustaining the peace. During the implementation period, rebels or government may renege on their promises and resort back to arms. If the peacekeeping mission is deployed without a specific peace agreement in place or to expand the forces of one of the belligerents (usually government), the conflict violence may intensify as a result of enforcing the peace.

H10: The effect of peacekeeping increases the level of fatalities when external military support for government and rebels is employed.

Last but not least, the join effect of peacekeeping and mediation should have a pacifying effect on the overall magnitude of the violence when both belligerents are aided with external military support. Mediation can de-escalate the tensions and defuse the clashes of interests, while peacekeeping missions can provide guarantees for belligerents that neither of the parties will renege on its promises. However, conflicts with both belligerents being able to secure flows of external support were found to last longer and see less negotiated settlement and produce more casualties and therefore may be more complex to solve. While it

is expected that joint effect of mediation and peacekeeping might decrease the level of casualties it is also expected that conflicts where the presence of mediation and peacekeeping is required might be particularly difficult to solve.

H11: The effect of mediation decreases the level of fatalities when peacekeeping mission and external military support for both disputants is employed.

2.5 Research Design

In order to examine the effect of the third-party actions in civil war and their effect on magnitude of violence, this study examines the correlates of the monthly counts of battle-related fatalities in all civil wars between the period from 1989 to 2010. The dependent variable comes from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset and represents the monthly counts of total battle-related and civilian fatalities in all civil conflicts between 1989 and 2010 (Sundberg and Melander, 2013).[3] Total count of deaths is a count variable that is coded into three distinct variables. The first is the highest reliable estimate of total fatalities in a month, while the second represents the lowest reliable estimate of total fatalities and third is the best (most likely) estimate of total fatalities resulting from an event and is used as the main dependent variable.

The unit of analysis follows the dyad-month structure of all active civil conflicts in this period. The dyad, in this context, consists of a government on the one side and a rebel group on the other. This approach may result in multiple observations of conflicts in one country when the conflict involves more than one rebel group. This variable was previously used by Hultman et al. (2016) to measure the effect of the UN missions on severity of civil conflicts on the African continent in the period following the Cold War until 2008 and by Beardsley et al. (2015) to analyze the effect of UN peacekeeping missions conditional upon the presence of mediation and UN sanctions. This article extends the data collection to all active civil wars in the period from 1989 to 2010, resulting in 72,936 observations. Out of all observations, there are 12,520 observations of monthly-count peacekeeping operations for a total of 128 dyad cases. The data also includes 2,028 observations of mediation efforts in 105 dyad cases in addition to 6,696 recorded cases of external

[3] Sundberg and Melander (2013) created this variable as a sum of deaths sustained on side A (government), side B (rebel movement), and civilian deaths.

support for government and 6,468 cases of external support for rebel groups.

This paper gauges the effect of third-party interventions on the magnitude of conflict violence once interacted with other interventions. By introducing multiple forms of third-party interventions —peacekeeping, mediation, and external support —this chapter can estimate their multiplicative effect on the severity of these conflicts. The reasoning is that instead of trying to find the effect of only one type of third-party intervention on severity of violence, this chapter assumes that it is the combination of these strategies that needs to be scrutinized to better understand their true effect.

2.5.1 Independent Variables

Data used for this paper primarily consists of three main datasets. To measure peacekeeping missions, this chapter relies on a definition of third-party peacekeeping missions collected by Mullenbach (2013) for the period from 1946 to 2014. This dataset contains all peacekeeping missions deployed by the UN, Regional Inter-Governmental Organizations, and ad hoc groups of states. Simultaneously, it indicates the UN mandate and a type of resolution as well as the objective of the missions. It is possible to distinguish between missions with a military deployment and missions with only an observation character. These additional variables allows a control for the extent and type of the mission deployed. Therefore, peacekeeping missions are coded into two dichotomous variables. The first accounts for all peacekeeping missions identified by Mullenbach (2013) from 1989 to 2010. The second is a subset of a sample of those peacekeeping missions that had a UN resolution with a military deployment mandate in order to protect civilians.

Mediation is coded as a dichotomous variable based on the CWM dataset (DeRouen et al., 2011) that includes all mediation episodes from 1945 to 2014. This allows for coding each mediation episode with a month count precision. Since the unit of the analysis for this paper is conflict-dyads, a mediation episode that includes more rebel groups will be coded for each dyad separately. For instance, the Paris Peace Accord brokered between the Cambodian government, Khmer Rouge, Khmer People's National Liberation Front, and FUNCINPEC led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk in 1991 is coded 3 times for each dyad separately.

To examine the effects of external military support, this paper distinguishes between support to a govern-

ment and support to a rebel group. The support for disputants is again coded into two dichotomous variables that were recoded from UCDP External Support Primary Warring Party Dataset v. 1.0-2011 (Högbladh, 2011). These are confirmed cases of third-party military support that accounts for direct deployment of military personnel, weapons, and financial assistance, as well as providing training and intelligence support to any of the disputants.

2.5.2 Control Variables

Based on the previous research, this chapter accounts for additional control variables. As a set of standard control variables this paper includes GDP, population, and a regime type (D.Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The model includes the log of state population and log of GDP. These two variables are standard control variables in many conflict studies. The reasoning for including these variables is that the larger the population and the lower the GDP the more civilians face the risk of becoming a target and the lower the state capacity to mitigate their suffering. Further, the data includes a mapping of the regime type of the country in dispute. This variable is taken from the Polity IV project developed by Gurr et al. (2016). As the type of the regime approaches democracy the level of atrocities decreases as democracies are better equipped to deal with national unrest according to democratic peace theory.

Control variables for measuring conflict intensity also differ from measurements of other outcome variables used in conflict dynamics research such as conflict duration or peace spells. Control variables used in previous studies estimating effects on conflict intensity included existence of ceasefire or peace agreement, rebel strength and/or number of rebel groups, number of intervening third parties or conflict duration (Regan, 2002; Hultman et al., 2014,0; Beardsley et al., 2015). Arguably, inclusion of these control variables may be useful for better explaining the model yet, due to a high number of interaction terms additional variables need to be viewed through the strict lenses of collinearity and parsimony. Since this paper includes other third-party interventions, some of the them may reflect the commonly used control variables in conflict intensity models. One example of this would be the inclusion of rebel strength. Since this paper estimates external rebel support among other third-party interventions, it, in part, measures rebel strength by proxy and

including the variable of rebel strength in addition to external support may risk the problem of collinearity.

The existence of a ceasefire agreement may also influence the conflict intensity. Having a ceasefire agreement may be indicative of a willingness of belligerents to solve the conflict as opposed to a conflict where there is no such willingness. However, it is important to note that the existence of a ceasefire agreement does not necessarily mean that peace has been achieved. Indeed, a lot of ceasefires have been broken soon after they have been signed. Moreover, if peacekeeping missions only intervene when warring parties have demonstrated willingness to suspend hostilities, the effect of peacekeeping may be reflective in reduction in violence produced by an accord between belligerents (Hultman et al., 2014, p.745). Similarly, these agreements are often products of mediation efforts, therefore a reduction of hostilities following the ceasefire accord may be in part due to the effect of mediation talks. The data for the variable peace agreement are taken from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Pettersson et al., 2019). This dataset codes all peace agreements that are signed by "at least two opposing primary warring parties, which addresses the disputed incompatibility, either by settling all or part of it, or by clearly outlining a process for how the warring parties plan to regulate the incompatibility" (Pettersson et al., 2019, p. 2). The data also include duration of the conflict episode in months that is calculated using similar methodology as Regan (2002), that is each conflict month is coded 1 if the conflict continues during that month and 0 if it terminates during the month. A conflict episode is considered terminated when fatalities have ceased for a period of at least 6 months.

Every additional variable constitutes an additional restriction on the model. Since this paper models several interaction terms (which makes this model already very complex), it is in the best interest to include as few additional restrictions as possible. While some of the above mentioned control variables may help explain the level of conflict violence, to keep the model parsimony with greatest explanatory power this paper does not include additional control variables so as also not to risk increased collinearity.

2.5.3 Model Specification

First, the analysis excludes the OLS estimator since the dependent variable is a count of fatalities and therefore its distribution is highly skewed. These variables are used to measure count of events, incidents, or

as in this case, a number of casualties. They can only take positive values and often includes high numbers of zeros (Long, 1997). To test the argument that the effect of one strategy of third-party intervention might be conditioned on the presence of another third-party action resulting in differential effects on conflict violence, a negative binomial and a zero-inflated negative binomial regression models are employed. While both models are well suited to account for over-dispersion, only the zero-inflated model is used to fit data with a high excess of zeros as seen in the battle related deaths data. The zero-inflated model estimates two different processes within a single model, a zero-inflated logit model and a count negative binomial model. This is to account for any additional effect that might be driving a high number of 0s and an occurrence of any battle violence separately.

In order to control for multiplicative effects and test for the conditional hypotheses, the interaction terms are introduced to simulate conditional relationships among all strategies third parties engage in within civil wars. It has been established in social science literature that interaction terms are well suited to capture the intuition behind conditional hypotheses (Aiken and West, 1991; Brambor et al., 2006). Often, arguments in international relations and political science point to a relationship that varies depending on international or institutional context. Conditional hypotheses are best set to reflect strategic interactions and are part to any causal claim (Brambor et al., 2006). It has been suggested that scholars should incorporate interaction terms wherever applicable to be able to unpack any possible relationship otherwise hidden in a model. However, one limitation is that interaction terms require large amounts of data in order to estimate the multiplicative effects. This may have been the reason why only a few works accounted for interaction terms in the study of third-party interventions.

To make sure the multiplicative models are interpreted correctly this chapter follows the advice of Brambor et al. (2006) and Berry et al. (2012) who develop a "checklist" for interpreting interaction models correctly. According to Brambor et al. (2006), multiplicative models needs to include all constitutive terms in the model specification. Not including all constitutive term in a model specification is equivalent of assuming that the effect of one of the constitutive terms is equal to 0 and may result in inferential error. In terms of interpretation, Brambor et al. (2006) suggest not to interpret the coefficients on constitutive terms

as if they are unconditional marginal effects. This is because the constitutive term X_1 in multiplicative models represent an average effect of constitutive terms X_1 on Y when X_2 is 0 (recalling the equation B)). Most importantly, however, is to calculate substantively meaningful marginal effects and standard errors.

The first set of models depict the additive effect of third-party interventions on battle related violence. The second set of models include two interaction terms to show how unpacking the formal model extends and alters its explanatory power. It opens the room for improvement by further disaggregating the effect of one strategy given the presence of another. As third parties often change strategies during the course of a civil war, accounting for a single strategy only estimates additive effect and likely withholds the explanatory potential of any model. It is essential to dissect multiplicative effects of combinations of these third-party actions. Second, this paper compares the negative binomial with the zero-inflated model to demonstrate a better fit of the zero-inflated model. Applying interaction terms pose a risk of false positives (Esarey and Sumner, 2017), this will be demonstrated by fitting the data into a negative binomial. To assess the magnitude and statistical significance of interaction models, it is necessary to analyze the marginal effects of individual relationships. This further unpacks the behavior and effect third-party action causes when another strategy is involved. Third, the following section compares the best fit of models and discusses the results for the proposed hypotheses.

2.6 Results and Discussion

Table 1 shows the result from the first set of analysis. The analysis confirms all the additive effects from previous academic research. For ease of interpretation, the exponentiated coefficients of odds ratios are used wherever applicable. In the first part of the analysis, the data are fitted using both the negative binomial and the zero-inflated model for comparison. The first set of analysis found all coefficients statistically significant. In both cases, peacekeeping mission does decrease the level of violence when holding all other variables constant. The first two models, thus, both confirm the findings of Hultman et al. (2013) and Beardsley et al. (2015) and show that the presence of peacekeeping reduces the odds of conflict violence by a factor of 0.705 and 0.759 respectively. The presence of peacekeeping mission thus decreases the likelihood of conflict

fatalities by 24.1% holding all other variables constant. This confirms the base hypothesis BH1 that the effect of peacekeeping decreases the level of fatalities overall.

Table 1 also shows that mediation increases conflict violence and in particular demonstrates that the presence of mediation increases the level of fatalities by 40.9% when all other variables are held constant. This result confirms the earlier studies that were not able to determine pacifying effect of mediation. However two reasons may be responsible for this. First, the model does not control for any selection effect. Controlling for selection effect —be it strategy, identity of mediators, or sequencing —proved that mediation has a positive effect on ending conflicts and reaching negotiated agreements. Second, the way the data are coded for this paper may have introduced an additional effect. Since the data follow dyad-month format, the mediation is coded 1 for every month the peace talks were ongoing. This period of time may include periods of breaches of ceasefires that are very common, or if the mediation occurred during the active conflict. As opposed to previous studies which code mediation in conflict-year manner, mediation disaggregated to dyad-month format may have inflated the number of mediation months and hence resulted in significant increase in conflict fatalities. Some scholars have found a pacifying effect of mediation using similar coding of mediation without controlling for additional selection bias, such as Beardsley et al. (2015). However Beardsley et al. (2015) estimate this effect using only African cases. When sampling for the same set of cases same conflict-reducing effect of mediation was found. Nevertheless, this result does not confirm the hypothesis BH2 that the effect of mediation decreases the level of fatalities.

Finally, the estimate for military aid to both government as well as to rebel groups is more likely to increase the death toll in civil wars. It again corroborates the result of previous scholars arguing for negative impact of military aid and interventions such as Regan (2002),Salehyan et al. (2014), orSawyer et al. (2015). While the external support to government increases the conflict fatalities by 25% holding everything else constant, the military support to rebel groups increases the conflict violence by 205% holding all else constant. The stark difference between the two lines of support suggests that the support for rebel groups can reinvigorate battle to a greater extent and leave behind higher number of casualties. This is however far from surprising, given that the rebel group is the one challenging the status-quo and the objective of the government is to

Table 1: Effect of TPI on conflict intensity in civil wars, 1989-2010

	Dependent variable:			
	Conflict intensity			
	negative binomial	*zero-inflated count data*	*negative binomial*	*zero-inflated count data*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
pko	−0.350***	−0.276***	−0.311***	−0.209**
	(0.070)	(0.075)	(0.071)	(0.083)
mediation	1.818***	0.343***	1.745***	0.536***
	(0.140)	(0.080)	(0.175)	(0.099)
gov_sup	2.135***	0.229***	2.645***	0.008
	(0.096)	(0.054)	(0.119)	(0.069)
reb_sup	2.472***	1.117***	3.013***	0.843***
	(0.098)	(0.053)	(0.125)	(0.074)
polity	−0.006***	−0.012***	−0.007***	−0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
gdp_log	−0.276***	−0.241***	−0.276***	−0.235***
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)
pop_log	0.752***	0.361***	0.768***	0.339***
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.027)
pko:mediation			−0.041	−0.459***
			(0.285)	(0.167)
gov_sup:reb_sup			−1.673***	0.495***
			(0.200)	(0.103)
Constant	−5.614***	2.634***	−5.906***	2.929***
	(0.298)	(0.360)	(0.297)	(0.365)
Observations	66,108	66,108	66,108	66,108
Log Likelihood	-58,102.700	-53,097.830	-58,065.960	-53,081.960
Akaike Inf. Crit.	116,221.400	106,223.700	116,151.900	106,195.900
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

preserve the current state of affairs. The rebels may try to use all necessary tactics to force government to meet their requirements including targeting civilians. By bolstering the resources of rebels, their tactic may increase in intensity and result in higher fatalities. On the other side, supplying government with external

support may exacerbate the fighting between the belligerents in order for the incumbents to preserve the status quo. The government might want to try to defeat the rebels so that they do not have to share the power resulting in increased conflict violence. This confirms the base hypothesis BH3 and BH4 that the effect of government and rebel support increase the level of fatalities.

The second set of models, displayed in Table 1, extends the analysis by including interaction terms in addition to all relevant constitutive terms - forms of third-party interventions. The presence of an interaction term measures the effect of one predictor variable on the response variable at different values of another predictor variable. Adding multiplicative terms allows for testing of conditional hypotheses specifically H1 and H2. The first term interacts peacekeeping missions with mediation efforts and the second interacts external military support to governments with support for rebels. For the first interaction term, the negative binomial model (3) finds a decrease in conflict violence when peacekeeping is conditioned by a mediation activity with no statistical significance. Whereas the zero-inflated model (4) clearly demonstrates a negative effect on conflict violence 1–reducing casualties 1–with high statistical significance $p < 0.01$. The negative binomial model also confirms the finding from the previous model that the presence of peacekeeping is 26.7% more likely to have a pacifying effect on conflict violence, this effect however drops to only 4.1% when peacekeeping is conditional to the presence of mediation holding everything else constant. Interestingly, both models produce different results for the second interaction term. The first interaction model (3) shows that when both warring parties are supplied with military aid, these strategies are purportedly inducing pacifying effect when fitted by negative binomial, which is contrary to findings of other scholars as well as expectation of H2. While the zero-inflated interaction model shows that once both disputants receive external support there is a statistically significant increase in battle related violence.

This may be due to the fact that models working with interaction terms are prone to a type I error and may produce false positives that results in rejection of a true null hypothesis (Esarey and Sumner, 2017). To prevent such misleading inference, it is necessary to check the results against calculated marginal effects together with confidence intervals. In Figure 2 using post-estimation method of predicted probabilities, a substantial effect graph A shows the conditional relationship estimating external support to both disputants

fitted by the negative binomial model. Despite the model suggested that this relationship points to the violence-reducing effect, the substantive effect reveals that, in fact, this relationship intensifies the battle related violence by approximately 60 causalities on average.

Figure 2: Substantive effect plots of interaction terms (Table 1)



A) Interaction term of Government and Rebel Support (Model (3)



B) Interaction term of Peacekeeping and Mediation (Model (4))

Similar results are produced by the zero-inflated model, suggesting that all else equal the level of conflict violence increases by 63.9 % when both disputants receive external support with $p < 0.01$; however, this time the direction of the relationship from the model corresponds to the substantial marginal effect. This corroborates previous findings that not only are conflicts where both disputants receive military support from outside states are more likely to last longer, recur, and see less negotiated settlement, but also cause a higher number of casualties and therefore might be more difficult to resolve. This confirms the H2 that the effect of external support for government increases the level of fatalities when external support for rebels is present.

At the same time, the zero-inflated model from Table 2 supports a pacifying effect by peacekeeping missions, which is associated with even fewer fatalities in the presence of mediation efforts. Holding everything else constant, the level of conflict violence decreases by 18.9% when peacekeeping mission is present, while the interaction of peacekeeping mission and mediation decrease the level of fatalities by 36.8%.This relationship is clearly visible in Figure 2 graph B which shows the marginal effect of peacekeeping on conflict violence

at the presence of mediation. It is clearly visible that the line delineating the effect of peacekeeping without mediation has flatter slope than peacekeeping conditional on mediation, which slope is more steep. As predicted, this supports the H1 hypothesis that the effect of mediation indeed decreases the level of conflict fatalities when peacekeeping is employed, and the effect of this relationship is statistically significant at a 95% confidence interval. This confirms similar findings by Beardsley et al. (2015) using a different sample and sources of data.

Since the negative binomial demonstrated substantial complications when fitting count data with excesses of 0s for the interaction model (see also the Akaike Information criteria number in Table 1, the second part of analysis drops the negative binomial and continues with the zero-inflated model only. Both multiplicative models in Table 2 estimate more complex higher-order interaction terms to determine relationships of different combinations of third-party actions. These models are used to test the remaining hypotheses. The first model estimates the effect of all peacekeeping missions included in Mullenbach's dataset and the second focuses on UN peacekeeping missions only. This is to check whether there is some additional effect of UN operations, but as it is clear from the result in Table 2 there is no significant change. Since the zero-inflated model assumes that there are two ongoing processes, one group of population that only sees positive count of fatalities and second group that only sees zeros (Long, 1997). The models in Table 2 display both processes included in zero-inflated model; "count" part of the model shows the process considering the case where fatalities are > 0 - presence of fatalities —and "zero" part considers cases where fatalities are equal to 0 —absence of conflict violence.

At the offset of the analysis, it is useful to consult the result with the coefficient plot that is included in Appendices in Figure 4. Figure 4 shows the confidence intervals of the estimated coefficients of model (1) in Table 2. First, this analysis looks at the interaction terms already confirmed in previous models —H1 and H2. Again, model (1) in Table 2 shows that peacekeeping mission conditional upon the presence of mediation has conflict-reducing effect. Holding everything else constant, once peacekeeping and mediation are employed together their joint effect reduces conflict intensity by 43.9% and is statistically significant at $p < 0.1$. This reconfirms the finding from the previous set of models in Table 1. As in the previous

Table 2: Effect of TPI on conflict violence in civil wars, 1989-2010

	Dependent variable:			
	Conflict Intensity			
	All PKO (1)		*UN PKO* (2)	
	count	*zero*	*count*	*zero*
pko	0.195	0.201**	0.239	0.189**
	(0.131)	(0.065)	(0.222)	(0.063)
mediation	0.688***	−2.066***	0.561***	−2.073***
	(0.174)	0.116	(0.159)	(0.117)
gov_sup	0.120	−4.620***	0.101	−4.611***
	(0.077)	(0.236)	(0.075)	(0.231)
reb_sup	0.692***	−3.579***	0.679***	−3.592***
	(0.078)	(0.118)	(0.077)	(0.120)
duration	0.006***		0.005***	
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
peace agreement	−0.148**		−0.219***	
	(0.071)		(0.074)	
pop_log	0.390***		0.386***	
	(0.027)		(0.027)	
gdp_log	−0.325***		−0.325***	
	(0.018)		(0.018)	
polity		−0.021***		−0.021***
		(0.001)		(0.001)
pko:mediation	−0.579*		−0.206	
	(0.298)		(0.383)	
pko:gov_sup	−0.511**		−0.777*	
	(0.218)		(0.466)	
mediation:gov_sup	−0.646**		−0.550**	
	(0.283)		(0.265)	
pko:reb_sup	0.413		0.747*	
	(0.305)		(0.440)	
mediation:reb_sup	0.959***		0.825***	
	(0.285)		(0.244)	
gov_sup:reb_sup	0.624***		0.672***	
	(0.112)		(0.108)	
pko:mediation:gov_sup	2.085***		2.711***	
	(0.633)		(0.956)	
pko:mediation:reb_sup	−1.095**		−1.580**	
	(0.503)		(0.635)	
pko:gov_sup:reb_sup	0.128		0.509	
	(0.366)		(0.647)	
mediation:gov_sup:reb_sup	−0.963**		−0.974***	
	(0.397)		(0.355)	
pko:mediation:gov_sup:reb_sup	−1.352*		−1.673	
	(0.803)		(1.161)	
Constant	4.197***		4.279***	
	(0.356)		(0.352)	
Observations	66,108		66,108	
Log Likelihood	-52,862.320		-52,864.850	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

models, this analysis is unable to confirm the conflict-reducing effect of mediation, yet when paired with peacekeeping their effect decreases the level of fatalities. This might be the case because when mediation is deployed with peacekeeping it usually signals that a peace agreement has been reached and peacekeeping is stepping in to provide guarantees to back the agreement implementation phase. This period might be significant for decreasing the level of conflict violence due to presence of mediated agreement and deployment of peacekeepers who can provide third-party guarantees to back the provisions of ceasefire or other regulatory provisions provided by the peace settlement. The coefficient plot in Figure 4 (see Appendices) reveals that the confidence intervals cross 0 and therefore this estimation is not considered statistically significant at a 95% confidence interval.

However, there is a clear support for the H2 that external support to both belligerents increases the level of fatalities. All else equal, external support for both belligerents increases the conflict violence by 86.5%. This relationship corresponds to substantively marginal effect and is statistically significant at 95% confidence interval with $p < 0.01$. As explained above, the external support feeding the resources of both belligerents may prolong fighting and make it deadlier. This is because belligerents rely on military aid that makes their resources abundant so they can sustain longer and fiercer fighting. Military support to both belligerents may create balance of power where no side is able to prevail over the other or compromise with each other, hence fighting remains the only way out. As previous research found these seemingly impenetrable conflicts last longer and bring about less negotiated settlement. Yet, mediation effort in these conflicts not only occur but also deliver peace agreements. In fact, due to the duration and lethality of such conflict, belligerents may reach a stalemate, where the benefit to be gained from continued fighting might no longer outweigh the cost. This impasse came to be known as a mutually hurting stalemate (Zartman, 1989). This stalemate suggests that the conflict is ripe for resolution and third parties might be more successful in reaching an agreement or at least a ceasefire.

There seems to be support for the hypothesis H3 that the effect of mediation decreases the level of violence when external military support for government and rebels is present. To test this hypothesis, the three-way interaction term is included in the model. Holding everything else constant, the model shows

that the level of fatalities decreases by 61.8% when mediation and external support for both belligerents is present. Graph A in Figure 3 illustrates the substantive effect of this relationship. This is an important finding that demonstrates that civil wars where both disputants receive external support —conflicts that are deadlier and last longer —can be appeased by mediation. Such situations with military support on both sides —potentially very lethal situations —mainly persist due to the asymmetric information problem. According to the information asymmetry argument, in these situations combatants are incentivized to misinterpret or withhold information in an attempt to secure the greatest benefits. Combatants misrepresent private information to appear stronger and are determined to enhance their bargaining position. Since neither of the parties can be trusted to disclose their true intentions there is a need for a third party that can pave a way to an agreement. Once a channel of communication among warring parties is established by a third party, it can defuse the information problem and the disputants are given a chance to find common ground to resolve their issues. This is not to say that mediation is a panacea to all conflicts, however it can mitigate the information problem and help negotiate an armistice or a temporary ceasefire to spare lives. In cases like Syria where both parties to the conflict received military support and the prospects for UN peacekeeping deployment was slim, the efforts of the mediators helped to seal temporary ceasefires in multiple regions and some even persisted for nearly a year. For instance the south-western part of Syria where the "de-escalation" agreement —negotiated by the US, Russia, and Jordan —took place since July 2017 (International Crisis Group, 2018). While this has not provided for a long-lasting peace in the entire territory of Syria, it has decreased the level of fatalities and clashes in specific areas.

The pacifying effect, however, does not hold for the conditional relationship between peacekeeping and military support for both disputants. The support for the third hypothesis H10 is mixed. As opposed to the previous relationship, peacekeeping does not seem to possess the power to appease warring parties who rely on military support from the outside states without an accompanying diplomatic effort. Although note that this estimate does not reach the level of statistical significance. Therefore, this paper is unable to reject the hypothesis and confirm the H10 hypothesis that the effect of peacekeeping increases the level of fatalities when external military support for government and rebels is present. Moreover, the substantive effect graph

Figure 3: Substantive effect plots of interaction terms (Table 2, Model(2))



reveals that this relationship has in fact a descending tendency, see graph B in Figure 3. While the previous models find that peacekeeping has a violence reducing effect, the model in Table 2(2) shows almost no effect of peacekeeping on the level of violence. The shortcoming of the direct pacifying effect of peacekeeping may occur due to occasional delays in the deployment of peacekeepers to target countries (Ruggeri et al., 2016). The deployment of peacekeepers often faces many administrative and logistical obstacles and may hamper the immediate effect of peacekeeping on conflict violence. However, the results do not change after lagging the peacekeeping variable for 1, 2, or 6 months.

If the power balance is asymmetric, meaning that only one side of the conflict receives external support, the effect of conflict management strategies might vary more than when the power balance is relatively symmetric. Generally, during the conflict events a government has to navigate between fighting in order to preserve the status quo and preserving the legitimacy among its citizens. This may suggest that a government might have a greater stake to lose if a conflict continues. With this in mind, looking at the conditional hypotheses H5 and H7 that expect the effect the mediation (H5) and the effect of peacekeeping (H7) to decrease the level of fatalities when external support for government is present might explain the

results for both interaction terms. In both cases the results point to a decrease in violence. Holding everything else constant, the effect of mediation decreases the level of fatalities by 43.9% when government support is present with $p < 0.05$. Simultaneously, the effect of peacekeeping decreases the level of conflict violence by 40.1% when government receives military aid with $p < 0.05$, holding everything else constant. In hypothesis H5, the presence of mediation might signal that both parties have accepted the mediator's offer to facilitate a peace settlement, hence it also signals the belligerents' commitment to find a solution. Since the balance of power is tipped towards a government, the rebel group might be willing to accept settlement more readily since further fighting may result in their defeat. Government might want to broker a ceasefire or compromise to appease the rebel group and prevent them from resuming the fights. As the government has higher incentive to preserve its legitimacy, the level of violence might decreases as a result of this power imbalance. Similar logic might be adopted with regards to hypothesis H7. The presence of peacekeeping typically signals the existence of a peace deal and absence of support for the rebels might result in motivation to preserve such a deal since the chances to prevail against the government are slim. Since government holds an upper hand in the conflict by receiving external support, the conflict might witness a decrease in fatalities as the government is more willing to preserve the period of peace in order to minimize further cost of the conflict and preserve its legitimacy.

On the contrary, if the rebel groups receives support from the outside sponsor, mediation might experience a harder time to negotiate sustainable truce and peacekeeping might find it harder to preserve such peace. Table 2 (1) shows that, holding other effects constant, the effect of rebel support increases the level of conflict violence by 161% when the mediation is present with $p < 0.01$. This suggest that during the peace talks when the balance of power is tipped towards rebels, conflict might not see appeasing effect of mediation. By increasing fatalities, rebels might want to increase their bargain power to cut a larger piece of shared power. This finding is statistically significant and confirms the hypothesis H4. Similarly, when the rebel group receives external support the peacekeeping efforts might not fare as well in reducing conflict violence. In fact, the results show that presence of peacekeeping that is conditional upon the presence of rebel support increase conflict intensity by 51%. This brings back the time inconsistency problem (Beardsley, 2008) that

describes a situation whereby the preferences of rebels once stipulated in an agreement change over time and do not match preferences in the later stages. This change in preference might be due to receipt of international military aid that tips the balance of power towards the rebels. Emboldened rebels might feel they deserve a greater cut of shared power and might resume fighting. This result is not statistically significant and therefore the hypothesis H6 cannot be confirmed.

Drawing on the findings of this and previous papers Beardsley et al. (2015); Clayton and Dorussen (2018) showing the joint effect of mediation and peacekeeping has conflict reducing effect, it is expected that this relationship holds whether the external military support for the government (H8) or for the rebel group (H9) is present. The results in Table 2 (1) show this relationship holds when rebel group receives military aid. The joint effect of peacekeeping, mediation, and rebel support decreases the conflict violence by 66.6% with $p < 0.01$. This is a stark difference compared to cases when rebel support is conditional only on the presence of either mediation or peacekeeping. The joint effect of mediation together with peacekeeping seems to revert conflict increasing effect of the previous two-way interactions of rebel support with either mediation or peacekeeping deployment. The reason for this might be that once the mediators broker an accord between the belligerents and peacekeepers step in to provide third-party guarantees, rebels might prefer to abide by the provisions of the peace deal despite receiving military aid due to conducive condition for peace and/or international pressure. By invalidating the agreement rebels might actually be risking losing the international support and external sponsorship. The asymmetric balance of power in this case suggests that rebels might be in stronger position to negotiate more demanding peace agreement. While governments usually have an upper-hand in civil wars due to their established and well-functioning institutions, military, and financial reserves, rebel groups often operates within less institutionalized and sustainable structures, posses fewer funds, and have a weaker military relative to the government (Cunningham and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, 2013). Based on this asymmetric relationship, it is clear that rebel groups might have an incentive for cooperative behavior when outside states attempt to settle or transform the conflict. For rebels, any deal should be better than no deal. Once rebels find themselves an external support, their negotiating power might increase with the influx in resources and relative strength, which present an opportunity for striking

even better deal. Rebels might want to use their increased negotiating power while it lasts and lock down better deal, which can contribute to the pacifying effect on conflict intensity. A peace process that is backed by continuous mediation and peacekeeping might produce conditions conducive for peace to hold not only by providing the international pressure but also by channeling the needs of rebels and government and simultaneously translating agreed changes into security guarantees provided by peacekeepers.

Graph C and graph D in Figure 3 show two substantive marginal effect of these relationships, the conditional relationships of peacekeeping and mediation when (C) rebels receive military support and (D) when governments receive external support respectively. Graph C shows that in cases when only rebel groups receive the external support, mediation and peacekeeping are more likely to have a decreasing effect on the level of violence. Graph D shows that chances for increased fatalities are higher when peacekeeping and mediation are conditioned by the presence of military support to governments. While this may seem to suggest that rebels are more peaceful or cooperative than governments, the contrary might be true. The lack of external support for rebel group may indicate that the rebel group is perceived unfavorably on the international scene. Recently some of the peacekeeping operations have been granted a more offensive mandate to protect the civilians from advances of rogue groups or remove rebel groups from power.

A good example of such a group is the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), a rebel group formed by a former military man Johnny Paul Koroma in Sierra Leone. He used the group to seize power over the government in a military coup in 1997. The AFRC faced resistance on multiple fronts, domestically from national guard loyalists, and internationally from imposed sanctions by the United Nations Security Council. By the beginning of 1998, the AFRC rebels were pushed out of the capital by the ECOWAS forces. The following year, the AFRC attempted to retake the capital for the second time in January, and for the second time it was forced out by the ECOWAS forces. Afterwards, the AFRC lost all support and dissolved into smaller splinter groups and limited its activity to guerrilla tactics. Despite the fact that the Lomé peace agreement was signed in July 1999 and the deployment of the UN peacekeeping mission, UNAMSIL, in November of that year, the fighting not only continued but intensified and the conflict persisted until 2001. This was primarily due to the loose leadership and fractured structure in the core of AFRC and

RUF who refused to disarm and continued to attack civilians and UN peacekeeping troops. This analysis was, however, unable to confirm that the joint effect of mediation and peacekeeping increase the fatalities when government receives external support. The reason for this is that while this relationship is statistically significant, the amount of cases that received this specific types of involvement is too low to determine any conclusive result (only 28 dyad-month observation that receives such third-party involvement in 5 conflict dyads were recorded).

Finally, a four-way interaction term that estimates the conditional relationship of all examined third-party interventions provides support for violence-reducing effect. The relationship does not reach statistical significance, though does confirms the directionality —the violence reducing effect —of H11 hypothesis. Once mediation, peacekeeping, and external support for belligerents are present the level of conflict violence decreases by 74.2% with $p < 0.1$.

Going back to the cases where balance of power is achieved due to external support to belligerents, when such cases were assisted by mediation the conflict violence dropped whereas if the external support to belligerents was conditional on peacekeeping no significant effect was estimated. In comparison with interaction term estimating peacekeeping and external support to both belligerents, once the interactions term is conditioned by mediation efforts it changes the effect from a casualty-producing to a casualty-reducing relationship. This finding suggests that mediation might be the ingredient that helps to ameliorate dire situations of highly escalated conflicts. Although this analysis was not able to confirm hypothesis H2 that the effect of mediation decreases the level of fatalities on overall, it has demonstrated that mediation can fare better in specific circumstances in reducing civilian suffering.

This effect can be observed in multiple cases. For instance, during the Liberian civil war that started in 1989 where all partied to the conflict received some form of external support, ECOWAS deployed a multinational force (ECOMOG) to Liberia in August 1990. The ECOMOG forces, which amounted to 4,000-5,000 troops and consisted mostly of Nigerians and Ghanaians, were deployed to impose a ceasefire upon the invitation of President Doe. However, the following month President Doe was killed by forces of Prince Johnson, a challenger to the NPFL leadership held by Charles Taylor who did not approve of

ECOMOG forces. Taylor saw it as a personal attack to prevent him from taking power in Liberia (Ero, 1995). At the same time, ECOWAS intervened diplomatically with a series of mediation talks. The first of these talks took place on November 27 in Bamako, Mali and introduced the Interim Government of National Unity under Amos Sawyer (Wippman, 1993). The ECOMOG forces managed to get control over Monrovia by November 1990 and establish a full ceasefire with the support of ECOWAS mediation efforts. Although these actions did not provide a lasting peace, they did create a full ceasefire for a period of time. Charles Taylor did not recognize the legitimacy of the Interim Government and created his own alternative government based in Gbarnga, Bong county. The fightings resumed in March the following year due to spill-over of the conflict into the territory of Sierra Leone and the emergence of a new warring faction, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) in May 1991 —a leftover military group of Doe's army. The conflict then continued until 1995.

The results show that mediation efforts tend to tame the level of violence during highly escalated civil wars —when both rebels and governments receive military support —while the results for peacekeeping under the same conditions are spurious. There are two major reasons why this might be the case. First, in recent years peacekeeping missions have engaged in an offensive to protect civilians many times at the expense of assisting governments in fighting against rebel groups. Examples of such missions are the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). This means that peace-keepers do engage in direct fighting in order to protect civilians from being deliberately targeted by either party to the conflict. Second, if indeed the peacekeeping missions are deployed in the most difficult cases (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003; Fortna, 2008), such conflicts might take more time and resources to solve.

All in all, peacekeeping performs better in tests estimating additive effects, and as proven by many others (Hultman et al., 2016; Beardsley et al., 2015), it decreases the conflict intensity (see Table 1). Furthermore, when peacekeeping is aided with mediation efforts the effect of these two strategies intensify the pacifying effect and help to reduce conflict casualties. It is important to take note of the benefit of the combination of both peacekeeping and mediation simultaneously. Though each perform well given specific conditions,

their combination shows the most benefit to pacification of conflict.This effect is most pronounced in highly escalated conflicts when both belligerents receive some form of support. It is rather to show the reinforcing power of diplomacy and peacekeeping that this paper sought to recover.

This model holds both the statistical significance and the directionality of these relationships under a series of robustness checks. To check whether the relationships are robust the models estimated a lagged mediation and lagged peacekeeping variable to control for time dependencies and substituted control variables such as polity and logged GDP with polity2 and GDP per capita. The results for the four primary variables of interest do not change substantially when controlling for the lagged dependent variable. The results hold true even when only controlled for peacekeeping mission mandated by the UN provided for comparison in Table 2 (2).

2.7 Conclusion

In the past 25 years, civil wars have become a pervasive form of violence attracting the attention of outside parties attempting to contain these conflicts from spreading, to change the outcome of these conflicts to their favor, or to prevent civilian casualties. Third parties with vested interests tend to intervene in civil wars at an increasing pace using all the strategies available to them. The aim of this paper has been to examine when and which of these strategies are most likely to prompt an immediate effect to alleviate human suffering.

A growing ability to engage in civil conflicts often results in a complex patchwork of parallel third-party interventions. To unpack the impact of third-party behavior, this paper analyzed conditional relationships to demonstrate that there is a multiplicative effect of these strategies. Instead of controlling only for the additive effect of individual strategies, this paper introduced interaction terms to test for conjoint effects.

The results provide support for the violence-reducing effect of peacekeeping missions. This effect is intensified when accompanied by mediation initiatives. In other words, the conjoint effect of a peacekeeping mission supported by mediation reinforces the pacifying effect in civil conflicts. On the contrary, unilateral and multilateral military support that involves supplying governments and rebel groups with men and weapons increases the lethality of civil conflicts. To assuage such conflicts with high level of internationalization and lethality 1–where both warring parties are supplied with military aid 1–mediation efforts fare best at reducing atrocities against civilians. In contrast, the effect of peacekeeping without any intermediating effect of mediation does not pacify such situations. Once the mediation channels the communication among warring parties, the peacekeeping helps to appease extremely escalated conflicts. The results of this analysis suggest that mediation is the indispensable ingredient that is best set to alleviate civilian suffering in the most lethal cases.

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Appendices

Appendix: Coefficient Plots

Figure 4: Coefficient plot for model (1) in Table 2



Figure 5: Coefficient plot for model (4) in Table 1



Chapter 3: Survey Experiment with American Public

Support for the US Involvement in Civil Wars: Evidence from a Survey Experiment with the American Public

Abstract

In recent years, conflicts in Syria and Ukraine have divided members of the international community over the UN's authorization for use of military force, which attempts to curb violence against civilians. Up until now, the evidence from experimental scholarly works suggest that authorization from the UN may help garner support for the use of force. The inability to produce such authorization sends a signal to the public that military involvement is not warranted. The results from randomized trials show that while Americans prefer to support multilateral use of force and peaceful forms of conflict resolution to minimize civilian casualties, Americans are also likely to support interventionist policies that may prolong the duration of these conflicts and further civilian suffering when multilateral action is not possible.

3.1 Introduction

Why does the American public support American involvement in some civil wars but not others? This is an important question as the United States is the most frequent third-party intervener in civil wars, projecting its influence in approximately 10 percent of all such conflicts (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015). The answer then has important consequences and implications for both American foreign policy and broader world order.

Perhaps the most intuitive explanation for such discrimination in support for conflict involvement is that the public backs interventionist policies in only the most violent cases. The reasoning would be that a military intervention on behalf of, or in support for, a party with men and material may reduce bloodshed. Yet, this is obviously not the line of thinking that guides elected officials1'decisions. The US intervened militarily in Somalia, when the US attention was primed by the media coverage of dying children, but did not intervene in Syria where the possibility (and later the true extent) of violence against the civilian population was equally devastating [1]. While at first the US had galvanized sufficient popular support and UN recognition for its humanitarian intervention in Somalia, it has not managed to revive similar support for the Syrian or Myanmarese cases. Despite the international attention and the humanitarian appeal of the Syrian war, the support of the American public to engage militarily in Syria was at its lowest in the aftermath of the first chemical attack linked to the Assad regime in 2013 (Duncan, 2013). Why didn't these conflicts activate the same set of values in the US public to pressure the government to use military force?

The American public is mostly concerned with US military lives and is perhaps no longer willing to sacrifice US lives in traditional military operations Gelpi et al. (2009). Involvements in Iraq or Afghanistan have shown a lack of positive or tangible results and necessitate long-term military commitments. Alternatively, other forms of interventions might come to mind when considering international involvement in civil wars. The international conflict resolution attempts made by the UN —whether in the form of peace mediation or a peacekeeping mission —have been on the rise since the end of the Cold War. The American public may prefer to support governmental actions within the boundaries of international consensus rather than isolated attempts initiated by American political elites.

[1] The US did engage in the fight against the ISIS but not against the Assad regime

In the post-Cold War era, the world has experienced several humanitarian crises such as in Rwanda, Somalia, or Bosnia. The inability to protect civilians has not only changed UN policies and given birth to the concept of 'responsibility to protect', but also changed the way the public perceives international use of force. The pressure of the US public to use force in Somalia and the support for intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo were however within the framework of international consensus. Once international consensus was impossible to reach, the support for the use of force dissolved. Good examples of this are recent cases of Syria or Ukraine.

It is important to identify those cues which catalyze the most support for military interventions and other forms of involvements by the American public. While current debate and past survey experiments shed light on which cue givers the public looks to in order to make judgment about involvements (Berinski 2007, Greico et al. 2011, Golby et al. 2017), it is still important to find out what attributes of conflicts trigger public support for governmental action and how the interaction of these conflict attributes affect the popular support for these involvements.

While the theoretical literature on the subject provides several possible explanations for these differential levels of intervention support, empirical work has provided only limited support for any of those accounts. One possible reason for such findings is that the majority of prior empirical work on this question have relied on observational designs, typically using cross-sectional survey data. Though it is important to note, these types of studies have many potential limitations. These include endogeneity, selection issues, and confounding, among others (Angrist and Pischke, 2015; Gerber and Green, 2012). Those problems can impede scholars1'ability to draw unbiased causal inferences and lead to inconsistent findings (Morgan and Winship, 2007).

To deal with these issues, this paper conducted a survey experiment. The goal of which is to test existing theories about support for interventions with a representative sample from the American public. In the next section, a set of theoretical expectations is introduced. After that, the experimental design is summarized.

3.2 Literature review

The experimental literature examining public opinion about the use of force can be divided into two major realms of focus. The first examines the attributes of a conflict such as human costs, possibility of victory, or whether the war was justified (Mueller, 1973; Gelpi et al., 2009; Kreps and Maxey, 2017). The second focuses on identifying who, or what, are the main cue givers that can garner the support for governmental action, such as partisanship, International organizations, or elite military experts (Berinsky, 2007; Grieco et al., 2011; Golby et al., 2018). While the literature on public opinion is extensive, this section provides only a brief overview of the most influential works that inspired this study and elaborates on the most recent studies before outlining the theoretical framework.

In the past 25 years, the study of public policy and opinion exploded with experimental work examining the public's support for government policies. The experimental approach to ascertain how public support for foreign policies changes depending on randomized attributes of conflicts or cue givers became more popular in International Relations in recent years. Despite the sudden rise in experimental designs in the discipline of International Relations, the spark of scholarly interest in public support for military involvement dates back to 1973. In his seminal work, Mueller (1973) posits that the log of cumulative casualties is the best predictor of war time opinion. Using the examples of the Korean and Vietnamese wars, he found that each tenfold increase in military casualties is proportional to a 15 point decrease in polled opinion of the wars. Since then, the relationship between public support and military casualties has been well studied (Larson, 1996; Gartner and Segura, 1998; Gelpi et al., 2006,0; Boettcher and Cobb, 2006; Kriner and Shen, 2013).

The casualty hypothesis has remained dominant until recently. In their influential work, Gelpi et al. (2009) assembled an immense collection of data from survey experiments to study the relationship of public tolerance to military casualties and support for the use of force. They found that the public's tolerance of military casualties is most dependent on two factors: expectation that the military mission will be successful and that the involvement in the war was just. Based on the cost-benefit analysis, the risk averse public considers the expended national military lives as a "necessary evil to be minimized but tolerable under the

right circumstances" (Gelpi et al., 2009, p. 255). While most of the previous works have focused on the tolerance of military casualties, few articles have attempted to test public support for the use of force in the face of foreign civilian casualties (Boettcher, 2004; Walsh, 2015; Kreps and Maxey, 2017; Johns and Davies, 2017). It is therefore a logical next step to extend the analysis in humanitarian motivations to test the public attitude towards civilian casualties.

Johns and Davies (2017) found that a higher number of civilian casualties decreased the support for the use of force. They ran several experiments in which their results confirm the casualty-aversions of the public to support military air strikes as the number of casualties aggravates (from 0 - 50,000). Their findings, however, also corroborate previous results that the national military casualties outweigh the foreign civilian casualties (Boettcher, 2004; Kreps and Maxey, 2017). The fact that both experiments estimate the support for military air strikes as a form of intervention —which is indicative of reduced national military losses —might signal even higher sensitivity towards the national military casualties (Walsh, 2015). In addition, both context scenarios were projecting a situation where the US is about to take preemptive actions against governments which are amassing nuclear weapons —a scenario implying aggression against the US. As Jentleson (1992) shows, the objective of military interventions matters. He found that those missions which were designed to stop foreign aggression against America and its allies result in greater support than missions designed to affect internal political change. The same might be true for interventions in humanitarian contexts. While the findings of Johns and Davis are valuable, there are still avenues for further research where public support may be triggered by a different set of values —such as humanitarian interventions.

The second camp of literature moves beyond the intensely studied casualty hypothesis and emphasizes the study of cue givers. This camp criticizes the earlier literature for assuming that the public always makes rational cost-benefit decisions about war involvement (Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2007). Berinsky (2007) argues that the public rarely makes complex cost-benefit calculations when evaluating military action. Rather than following the development of events, the public will follow their elite representatives. He found that the primary mechanism for gathering support for military action lies in the hands of partisan political actors; if there is partisan consensus the public will give their consent, but when the political elites disagree the public

will, in turn, divide along the partisan lines.

However, those segments of a population that do not have any trust in government might search for cues elsewhere. Grieco et al. (2011) examined whether the public seeks a second opinion from International Organizations. Drawing from theoretical literature describing the importance of this relationship (Thompson, 2006; Fang, 2008; Chapman, 2011), Grieco et al. (2011) found that people who do not have confidence in their president and value the International Organization might find the second opinion instrumental in their support for the use of force. However, how the public decides when the international community is unable to reach a consensus over a conflict, which consequently attracts other states to extend their unilateral military support, remains to be addressed.

To fill this gap in, this paper brings in a considerable body of theoretical literature on the motivation of states' involvements in civil conflicts. State support is the most traditional form of support for insurgencies or governments and remains significant today. This body of literature defines the external support "as a unilateral intervention by a third-party government (or groups of governments) in an internal armed conflict in favor of either the government or the opposition movement involved in that conflict" (Karlén, 2016, p. 117). External support includes, beside direct military involvement on behalf of governments or rebels, supplying these parties with weapons and/or funds as well as less direct forms of support such as training, access to territory, or national intelligence services.

The most dominant, though not limited to, theoretical hypotheses posited by this body of literature contends that states extend their military support to governments or rebels to project state rivalry relationships (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski, 2005; Findley and Teo, 2006; Salehyan, 2010; Maoz and San-Akca, 2012; Aydin and Regan, 2012; Salehyan et al., 2014), to increase their regional influence (Byman et al., 2001; Findley et al., 2012), to protect certain groups or irredentas (Cunningham, 2010; Salehyan et al., 2011; Byman, 2013), and to protect their borders from proximity of war (Heraclides, 1990; Kathman, 2010). While the theoretical literature on the subject provides several possible explanations for these different levels of intervention support, empirical work has provided only limited support for any of those accounts. One possible reason for such limited empirical support is that the majority of prior empirical work on this question have

relied on observational designs, typically using cross-sectional survey data. Though these types of studies have many potential limitations. These include endogeneity, selection issues, and confounding, among others (Angrist and Pischke, 2015; Gerber and Green, 2012). Those problems can impede scholars1'ability to draw unbiased causal inferences and may lead to inconsistent findings (Morgan and Winship, 2007).

As an example, the endogeneity problem may arise when strictly assuming that the attributes of conflicts have a direct effect on shaping the public opinion or that public opinion is strictly endogenous to the preferences of political institutions (Presidential decision, international organizations). The endogeneity problem between the public opinion and attributes of conflicts may ensue from the fact that the selection of information about the conflict is in the hands of the individuals (Knecht and Weatherford, 2006). Therefore, if a member of the public has a preconceived idea of a conflict —for example, based on the location (Afghanistan, Iraq, North Korea) who have been historically framed as pariah states —s/he would be seeking information that confirm the pre-existing opinion about a conflict as well as a potential use of force. Similarly, as Berinsky (2007) pointed out, members of public often look for the cues from their elite representatives instead of following closely the event development assuming that public opinion is completely endogenous to preferences of political elites. Endogeneity of information selection, therefore, presents a dilemma for experimental researchers as the causal inference requires control over communication environments as well as account for information-seeking behavior occurring outside the confines of a particular experimental study (Druckman et al., 2012).

While it might be difficult for the public to balance such nuanced reasons for these interventions against other attributes of conflict such as loss of US lives, the experimental literature found that security issues play an important role in people's perception about the necessity of force (Larson, 1996; Herrmann et al., 1999; Drezner et al., 2008). It is hence necessary to put some of these findings to the test.

3.3 Theoretical framework

Before diving into the theoretical discussion of mechanisms that can stimulate the public opinion in support of interventions into civil wars, there are two issues that need to be addressed; how does public opinion affect

the decision making of political elites about foreign policies and whether this effect is sustained across the wider range of foreign policy strategies (peace talks, support for governments or rebels).

Since the end of WWI, scholars have been arguing about whether the general public in democratic countries have any bearing on foreign policy making. This debate has over time split scholars into two camps. On the one hand are those that think of the public as an emotional, moody mass with unstructured attitudes who have limited influence on foreign policy (Almond, 1950; Lippmann, 1922; Almond, 1955; Cohen, 1973). This camp became known as Almond-Lippmann consensus and dominated the public opinion scholarship for a good part of the early 20th century (Holsti, 2004). Following the Vietnam war and the strong opposition to the American involvement in the war, scholars began to find evidence that public opinion is more stable and reasonable than had been previously thought (Jentleson, 1992) and, in fact, the shift in public opinion tended to precede policy changes (Shapiro and Page, 1992). In terms of how the public opinion might influence decision-making, there are several important works worth mentioning. Fearon (1994) sought to define the effect of the public on decision-makers in a form of audience cost that represent the domestic political punishment a leader sustains if s/he publicly threatens a foreign actor and subsequently backs down. The rationale goes that because in democracies the leaders are more accountable to the public they are able to generate audience cost, hence making their signals of threat more credible.

Others have found an effect of public attitudes on shaping congressional voting on foreign policy (Fordham, 1998), use of force (James and Oneal, 1991), or defence spending (Hartley and Russett, 1992). These studies have shown that the public can exercise its influence outside the scope of use of force limits. Some have argued that it was the public attitude stemming from the Vietnam war experience that consequently shaped the level of the US involvement in Nicaragua, where the extent of the US support for Contra rebels only consisted of external assistance (Sobel, 2001). It is, therefore, possible that the support for the use of force or lack thereof may be instrumental in giving rise to other forms of civil war intervention such as rebel support. Other, more peaceful and multilateral means of intervention such as peace talks or peacekeeping operations have become dramatically more frequent following the end of the Cold War to the extent that they can be considered strategies of first-resort to solving civil conflicts. The expectation is that these strategies

are also generally supported by the public.

Yet, arguments of the limited-responsiveness of political elites to attitudes of general public remain vocal (Jacobs and Page, 2005; Burstein, 2006; Wood, 2009), forming the lack of consensus about the influence of public on foreign policy formation. The lack of consensus about the efficacy of this influence did not stop the research into more in-depth analysis of the attributes shaping public opinion. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to reconcile this discussion, instead it aims at highlighting the relevance of the triangular relationship of foreign policy formation between the media coverage, public opinion, and elite decision-making.

This section will highlight the most influential works in the field and pave the way to testable theoretical expectations. The following section is divided into four subsections, each describing the mechanisms that might affect public opinion and also map the existing literature onto the context of these four mechanisms. There are still avenues for this research that should be explored in more depth.

3.3.1 Humanitarian mechanism

Despite most of the empirical evidence showing that the public is more sensitive to military casualties than with foreign civilian deaths, there are reasons to believe that zooming in on civilian fatalities is a timely undertaking. First, the change of focus is particularly important as a majority of survey experiments treated their groups with examples of actual conflicts, many times using Iraq and Afghanistan. Treating groups with particular events may create bias since all respondents posses their own preconceived ideas of international events. These are many times constructed by information coming from the media. Media reporting of events may vary and so does the framing and narration of events or conflicts. Entire bodies of literature on inaccurate reporting and its effects on public opinion have accrued since the Iraq war. Media reports on civilian casualties, particularly in Iraq, were less frequent than reports on US military casualties (Eric V. Larson, 2006; Johns and Davies, 2017). Accounts of dehumanization of civilian victims and pro-war bias were recorded from mainstream US media vis-à-vis war time reporting (Kriner and Shen, 2013; Payne, 2005). It is therefore possible that overemphasis on military casualties may have overshadowed the effect civilian

casualties have on public support.

Second, as the Cold War bipolarity faded away, it gave rise to a more cooperative behavior among the UN Security Council members (Voeten, 2001). More UNSC resolutions under Chapter VII have passed in the first ten years of the post-Cold War period than in the entire forty years of the Cold War. Until 1990 only 15 peacekeeping missions had been deployed. That number has more than quadrupled since. The trend of humanitarian interventions authorized by the UN started to emerge by virtue of a more cooperative spirit in the UN Security Council. As Voeten (2001) noted this trend does not imply that the relationships of the member states became harmonious and that the end of the Cold War put an end to a whole-time rivalry between Russia and the US. As we can see more recently, the relations between Russia and the US have started to deteriorate with the Georgian war of 2008, annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the inability to reach a multilateral agreement on Syria. Nevertheless, a large portion of efforts to become involved in civil conflicts include the motivation to mitigate civilian suffering (Finnemore, 2003; Wheeler, 2001). Even if the humanitarian justification does not stand alone as a sole motivation for an intervention, it is still an important facet to consider in the current era of international involvement.

Lastly, looking at the three most lethal conflicts of the past few years, such as in Syria, Myanmar, or Yemen, the loss of civilian lives began to be more emphasized by the media (Landay et al., 2015). Reminiscent of the humanitarian intervention in 1992, *Operation Restore Hope* in Somalia was sparked by the unprecedented media coverage of starving children. Note that the conflicts in Syria, Myanmar, and Yemen received similar reporting. Media wildly reported on the horrific pictures of a body of three-year old Alan Kurdi washed out on a Turkish shore in September 2015. Testimonies of displaced Rohinga Muslims about their alleged sexual abuse by the Myanmar army and pictures of starving children in besieged cities in Yemen had gone viral. Why didn't these conflicts activate the same set of values in the US public to pressure the government to use military force? Most importantly, the humanitarian intervention in Somalia was shielded by the approval of the UN and faced virtually no opposition, while no such support occurred during the genocide in Rwanda only a year later, the UN in addition scaled down the number of deployed troops instead of trying to cease the killings. Neither Syria nor Yemen have received a UN resolution

activating Chapter VII and each of them poses a security threat or interest to a strong state (Russia's military base in Syria, Saudi Arabia's involvement in the Yemeni war). Humanitarian interventions usually appear low on the scale of national security stakes for the intervener, whereas Syria or Yemen impose a high risk to Russia or Saudi Arabia. The humanitarian mechanism might therefore work similarly to the military casualty hypothesis. Hence, the increase in civilian casualties might reinforce the support for use of force only under certain circumstances.

3.3.2 International Consensus mechanism

Despite the increase in UN authorized military operations, superpowers in their action to intervene are not solely reliant on the UN. Both during and after the Cold War, large states have turned to international organizations —most of the time the UN or NATO —for an approval to intervene (Thompson, 2006). According to Thompson there are two reasons and thus two types of audiences the states approaching the UN are trying to reach. First is the 'society of states' or foreign leaders that are also potential contributors to the intervention. The logic being that the more states that support an intervention, the more likely an initiating state is to win over the consensus of the international community. Multilateralism of this kind may also signal that the use of force is necessary and just, and a consortium of states is more resilient to pressure from international opposition. The possibility of sharing the financial burden of intervention is also an important aspect to consider. The second audience to reach this way is the domestic public. Especially, leaders of democratic countries who are the most likely to be constrained by their domestic audiences might strive to get the UN authorization. Getting UN authorization may signal to the public that the use of military force is warranted and legitimate (Thompson, 2006; Chapman, 2009,0; Fang, 2008; Grieco et al., 2011).

Such influence over the public is because the UN is generally seen as a neutral organization. However, Chapman (2011) claims that the post-1945 quest to replace the old world order created an environment where strong states demanded a decisive role in maintaining international peace and security but their interests did not always coincide with preservation of such values. When the UNSC is unable to produce a resolution,

it may not hinge on the fact that the humanitarian crisis is not critical enough and that the intervention into the conflict is not warranted. The UN decision-making is still driven by the states' interests who might veto the request for authorization of interventions due to their own self-interests. Nonetheless, governments attempted to obtain UN authorization in a majority of cases. As Thompson points out, "intervention[s] without some effort to gain approval is now virtually obsolete" (Thompson, 2006, p. 2).

Grieco et al. (2011) examined this relationship in more depth. They argue that domestic audiences face the information problem when evaluating the President's decision about the use of force. Without having access to classified information or true objectives of their leader, some members of the public will turn to the international organizations to get a 'second opinion' to cope with this problem. By approving a multilateral operation an international organization such as the UN can signal to the public (a) the competence of a leader in a sense that he or she initiates "good policies" (Fang, 2008) and (b) that such policies are worth supporting (Voeten, 2005). Disapproval from an international organization may signal to the contrary, that the policy is overly aggressive or costly. A President might decide to intervene without UN approval or public support, yet such an action could be detrimental for his or her future reelection or popularity. The public might be, however, more forgiving if other factors such as levels of security interest are considered. Hence, this relationship might be dependent on the degree of security interest at stake, and/or the source and extent of an opposition. This security mechanism is discussed in the next subsection.

3.3.3 Security mechanism

In the history of International Relations, scholars from the liberal and realist camps have argued that liberal public attitudes are divorced from the realpolitik of country leaders (Krasner, 1978; Doyle, 1983; Mearsheimer, 2001). The assumption of a liberal public suggests that Americans are generally a risk averse nation unwilling to follow their leaders' aspirations in military adventurism. This notion was challenged by some authors and by the extent of actual events following 9/11 which demonstrated that the public is as inclined to support the use of force as political and military elites (Herrmann et al., 1999; Feaver and Gelpi, 2004; Drezner et al., 2008). In light of recent developments in Syria and Ukraine, the security mechanisms

should be reassessed vis-à-vis increased reporting on civilian casualties.

There are considerable empirical findings that relate security interests with motivation of third-party interventions in civil wars. With regards to public opinion, the conventional wisdom holds that the public will support interventions that pertain to their national security interests. Public support may vary with differential levels of security perception. First, the security levels are often primed by the type of intervention (Jentleson, 1992). For example, a military intervention to contain a country's aggressive nuclear program might garner more support than a humanitarian intervention in a remote country with no strategic interest. Humanitarian interventions, however, might gain a premium support if the UNSC authorizes such intervention. This essentially lowers the cost of the intervention in terms of burden sharing as well as the opposition that may arise against such intervention. Second, UN authorization is important as it provides information about the international consensus and by extension an opposition against such intervention (Voeten, 2005). Whereas if authorization is not provided, a (risk averse) public might not be willing to risk the lives of US soldiers to support instances of American involvement.

Yet, the American public has proven that when the US security interests are at stake they are willing to endorse military interventions as in Afghanistan and Iraq, at least in the first year of the intervention (Joner, 2014). However, over the years and arguably with rising civilian victims toll, the support for both wars radically decreased. The rivalry mechanism further explores this relationship with regards to a humanitarian crisis where the UNSC was unable to authorize a multilateral operation due to a veto from UNSC members pursuing their own strategic interests.

3.3.4 Rivalry mechanism

Chapman (2011, p. 117) has extended the security hypothesis by testing whether the ideological similarity between member states that oppose the resolution might affect this support. He found that there is a small decrease in support when ideologically distant members (like Russia) oppose the intervention. However, this support decreases even more when the resolution is opposed by ideologically similar member (like the UK or France). To circle back, the theoretical and empirical findings provide sufficient grounds to especially

consider intervention based on rivalry (Maoz and San-Akca, 2012). Interstate rivalries are one of the main motivations for an external state's support to a non-state actor or a rebel group fighting in a civil war. States engaged in enduring rivalries often get involved in a conflict indirectly through supporting one side of a conflict with arms or funds. Occasionally, these states are responding to a rival1's own support for insurgency by supporting rebels against the sponsoring government. The goal of rivalry support is not to help one or the other side to prevail or end the war, but rather to create a stalemate or otherwise force a rival to expend resources and remain unstable (Byman, 2013). This support has indeed been found to prolong civil wars and render such wars deadlier (Salehyan et al., 2014). This paper will test these findings empirically on whether the public interacts and supports these motivations in the same way.

3.3.5 Theoretical Expectations

When evaluating American interventions abroad, intuition and theory suggest that the public might evaluate civil-war interventions along three major dimensions. These are humanitarian, security, and international consensus. There are many factors that play a role in public support for the use of military force. This paper limits its scope to these three main dimensions. The first dimension captures the magnitude of potential violence. Americans are sensitive to national military causalities. The loss of US soldiers decreases the support for any intervention, however, the directionality towards foreign civilian casualties is not so straightforward. The rising civilian casualties might hinder support for operations designed to bolster American security interests. Contrary to the instances of humanitarian crises, such as outbreak of civil war, the support to intervene might increase. For purposes of this paper the type of intervention is limited to civil war. All else equal, the public should be more likely to support interventions as the potential level of human suffering increases. The Humanitarian Hypothesis outlines such a logic.

Humanitarian Hypothesis: Americans are more likely to support the use of force in civil wars as the magnitude of potential violence increases.

The second dimension deals with whether the conflict could threaten American security interests. When it does, it may be intuitive that the public should be more likely to approve of US intervention. Civil wars

can spread conflict like contagion, creating cross-national or regional instability (Kathman, 2010). This uncertainty can lead to increased security threats. Since Americans are extremely concerned about national security, they should be more likely to support interventions into civil wars that threaten that interest. This argument is stated in the Security Hypothesis.

Security Hypothesis: Americans are more likely to support the use of force in civil wars that threaten US security interests than ones that do not.

Last but not least, is the American understanding of international consensus over a country in dispute. The logic of this mechanism suggests that if the US public is not certain about the presidential decision to initiate military engagement, people tend to seek a 1"second opinion1"from an international organization (IO) such as the UN (Grieco et al., 2011; Tingley and Tomz, 2012). However, the international consensus resulting in a Security Council Resolution is not always possible and the masses are often left to their own judgment or to follow a bipartisan divide. This argument is stated in the International Consensus Hypotheses.

International Consensus Hypothesis: Americans are less likely to support use of force in civil wars if the international community is unable to produce a resolution.

Additionally, in some instances International Organizations are unable to produce an agreement on multilateral action and states often act in support of one or the other side of a dispute to secure their own strategic interests. The desire to prevent a rival from achieving its security interest, together with the overall humanitarian character of the crisis, may result in overall growth in support for the intervention. An example of this is the support for Libyan rebels promoted mostly by France and Britain, and to a lesser extent the United States, at the United Nations. Framing the rebels as liberators and the Libyan government together with all its allies as oppressors and rivals to the Western States, sparked international support among the public. Emboldened insurgency is thus more likely to succeed and galvanize its supporters, who see the international support as a sign of success (Byman, 2013). Another example would be the conflict in Ukraine where Russia was a main supporter of the Yanukovitch government and later on a main military

donor of pro-Russian groups in the Donbass area of Ukraine. The public opinion in the EU and the US overwhelmingly sided with the protesters of Euromaidan. On the contrary, if one of the US allies pursues its strategic interests, it may be more difficult to generate approval from the public. Take for example Saudi Arabian support of the Yemeni government fighting against Houthi rebels. This relationship can be seen as an extension of the security hypothesis. Based on the extensive literature on states' external support in civil wars, leaders are more likely to engage in civil wars due to their enduring rivalries with other states. Closely related to the security dimension, this relationship is expressed in the Rivalry Hypothesis.

Rivalry Hypothesis: Americans are more likely to support interventions in civil wars if one or more competing powers are involved in supporting the opposite side.

3.4 Research design and data collection

To assess the hypotheses on civilian casualties, security motivation, international consensus, and rivalry, this paper designed a vignette-based survey experiment. The survey experiment was implemented in September 2018 among respondents over the age of 18 and located in the United States.

The survey experiment is comprised of two parts. In the first part, survey respondents were asked to read a short vignette, purportedly taken from a recent Associate Press wire service report. The fictional account focuses on the possibility of American intervention in an escalating civil war. Within this vignette there were three randomized factors 1–the potential level of violence, whether the conflict endangers American security interests, and whether the international consensus over the military action was feasible. The first factor has two levels (massive casualties, high number of displaced population), the second factor has two levels (the US security interest, the US ally's security interests), and the third factor has two levels (the international community reached an agreement, the international community did not reach an agreement). Hence, the survey used a complete factorial design with 8 total treatment arms (2x2x2). In the second part, survey respondents are asked about what type of intervention they would support, if any.

A second vignette experiment was displayed following the set of questions about the type of interventions. Within the second vignette, the survey held constant the inability of the international community to agree

Table 3: Summary of the vignette experiment

		Experiment 1:	Experiment 2:
Context		*Unknown country*	*Unknown country*
Scenario		*Autocratic government*	*UN unable to compromise*
		Democratic rebels	*Rise of civilian deaths*
Manipulated Cues:	*Humanitarian Cues*	*Massive casualties/* *Displaced population*	
	Security Cues	*Allie's security/* *US security*	
	Int. Community Cue	*IC presence/* *IC absence*	
	Rivalry Cue		*Rival/* *Ally*
Dependent variables:		5-point oppose-support *scale*	5-point oppose-support *scale*

on military action and a rising level of civilian casualties. Further, the second vignette randomized the external military support to the opposite side of the conflict by one of the US political 'rivals' or 'allies'. Similarly, in the following part, survey respondents were asked about what type of intervention they would be likely to support. See the Table 3 for the summary of the two experiments or appendix A which presents the vignettes and the questions.

The survey experiment was administered online using Amazon Mechanical Turk online labor market (MTurk). Berinsky et al. (2012) evaluate the effectiveness of using Mturk as a tool to conduct survey experiments with human subjects against other national representative samples including American National Elections Study (ANES), Current Population Survey (CSP), and American National Elections Panel Study (ANESP). They conclude that the MTurk samples fare well compared to other national representative samples.[2] The recruited sample consists of 601 respondents. Within this sample 52.9% are male and 47.1% are female. For further information on the demographics and recruitment of respondents consult Appendix B.

[2]For further discussion on the representativeness of samples recruited by Amazon1's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) interface for subject recruitment see Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz (2012)

3.4.1 Dependent Variable

Since countries are not limited to military intervention engagement in conflicts, the range of diverse involvements for respondents to support included are: the possibility to intervene militarily, engage in military air-strikes, offer military support to a government or a rebel group, initiate peace talks, seek authorization from the United Nations Security Council, or seek out a multilateral coalition of states. Previous experiments made an attempt to differentiate between other forms of third-party interventions aside from military intervention (boots on the ground) such as military air-strikes (Walsh, 2015; Johns and Davies, 2017), UNSC authorization (Grieco et al., 2011; Tingley and Tomz, 2012), or economic sanctions (McLean and Roblyer, 2017; Onderco, 2017). Until now the research has not accounted for public support of more diverse levels of engagements in civil wars.

To measure the support for each governmental action a five-point scale for each intervention type asks the respondents to chose from 'extremely likely', 'somewhat likely', 'nether likely nor unlikely', 'somewhat unlikely', and 'extremely unlikely'.This variable is coded from 1 to 5, where 1 stands for extremely likely and 5 to extremely unlikely. This means that a decreasing direction of association would mean increased support for a given intervention type.

3.4.2 Independent Variables

Prior to the five-point assessment, the respondents were asked to read an excerpt from the news article. They were also asked a series of screening questions about their age, gender identification, political ideology, current residency, and whom they voted for during the last election (2016). To determine their confidence in the government they were asked how confident they were about the president's decision to initiate a military intervention. This question was coded 1 if respondents were 'very confident' in the president's decision and decreased as their confidence lessened on a five-point scale to 'not at all confident' coded as 5. Additionally, to ascertain opinions about military interventions respondents were asked how effective can military interventions be, in their opinion. Respondents were asked to mark the five-point scale from 'very effective' coded as 1 to 'not at all effective' coded as 5. Moreover, respondents were asked at the end of the

experiment about a name of the country where they thought the purported conflict might have taken place.

3.4.3 Potential Limitations of the Research Design

This experiment includes a deception that was approved by IRB commission (protocol No 2018-0327) at Duke University. The deception was revealed to the respondents at the end of the questionnaire. The nature of the deception was claiming that the article excerpt was taken from a recent Associate Press wire service report and, therefore, represents a real life scenario. The reason for including a deception is twofold. First, it was used to illustrate a situation that is not likely to arise naturally (Kimmel, 1998), such as many variations of civil war scenario. It also eased the manipulation of the situational factors. Second, previous articles utilizing vignette experiments disclosed to the respondents that they are considering a fictional scenario Grieco et al. (2011); Walsh (2015). This is risking that the respondents might not be answering the questions truthfully or answer differently from how they otherwise would. Hence, the deception was used to prompt respondent to assume they are reacting to a real life scenario.

However, including a deception in a study might come with several ethical issues. As Hertwig and Ortmann (2008) summarize in their review, the ethical issues include a resentment from being deceived which may compromise future studies or a suspicion of respondents that they are being deceived which may alter experimental performance. The main finding of Hertwig and Ortmann (2008) was that such effect very much depends on the nature and size of the deception. It is up to the reader to evaluate the magnitude of the deception and its potential effect on the subjects. Given the deception included in this study is minor, these potential effects on respondents and the results might be negligible.

To eliminate external biases and reinforce external validity, the vignette experiment did not include a name of a country in which the conflict takes place. The advantage of this method is that it, at least partially, strips the experiment from certain background beliefs respondents may assume. Such as a country's location or religion. However, when faced with a decision in real life, the factors influencing their opinion might be precisely those this vignette is trying to omit. In other words, this methodology seeks to reduce bias from preconceptions. The results from this control variable show that 176 respondents associate the conflict with

the ongoing civil war in Syria, 40 respondents with the war in Iraq, 39 think the conflict was taking place in answered Iran, 35 answered China, 34 said the conflict involved USA, and 21 answered Afghanistan (for more results on this, see Table 10 in appendix). Furthermore, 30 respondents (about 5%) didn't know where the conflict was taking place. From the total number of respondents, 61% associated the country in dispute to be from the Middle East. While this seems like a high percentage, at least 38% associated the conflict to be from other parts of the world –11% in Asia, 9% in Europe, 5% Latin America, 6% North America, and only about 3% identify the location of the conflict to be Africa.

Other limitations due to information equivalence (Dafoe et al., 2018) may arise, however. The concern could be that the background information may confound the effects of the randomized treatments if not stated carefully (Tomz, 2015). The vignette outlines a scenario of deteriorating relationships between an autocratic government and a local rebel group. To increase the degree of US interest, the vignette further specifies that the country in dispute has long standing economic relations with the US. To intensify the ideological distance between the government and the rebels, the opposition group is portrayed as willing to fight for democratic values. However this vignette does not refer to the scenario as a humanitarian crisis as the randomized levels of violence are provided to intensify humanitarian appeal.

Another possible limitation is social desirability bias that can arise when respondents suspect that negative behaviours are being observed and may therefore alter their answers to appear as socially desirable as possible. Since, this study is measuring support for a wide array of third-party interventions, that might be considered by some people as politically sensitive issues, it is possible that this may effect how respondents reported their answers. For example, some participants in the study may perceive that by supporting more peaceful means of involvement such as peace talks, they are appearing more in conformity with what is expected to be "right" as oppose to what they would support without being observed. This may result in over-representation of support for peace talks.

Next, it is important to address additional limitation that can ensue as a result of using Amazon MTurk as a recruiting tool. While Amazon MTukr is considered as a reliable tool for recruiting low-cost and relatively representative national sample of population (Berinsky et al., 2012), it is important to note that recruiting

respondents through MTurk begs the inevitable selection of respondents who have access to internet and are aware of MTurk. It would be naive to assume that all Americans have access to internet and, even if they do, to expect they all have the same knowledge of MTurk service. Recent studies also warn against abuse of MTurk by using the Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) to fraudulently gain access to surveys restricted to US residents, thus lowering the quality of data (Kennedy et al., 2019).

Finally, it is crucial to address a limitation of this study stemming form the sample size. The sample collected from this experiment include 601 respondents. This is relatively small number given the number of vignette variations that further divided this sample into treatment groups. Because the vignette experiment discriminate between 8 different vignette scenarios, the participants have been randomly divided into 8 treatment groups. This reason for the limited amount of respondents, which rendered the study underpowered, is due to limited amount of resources in the research budget. Problems resulted from an underpowered study may include high variability that may lead to biased results. The lack of statistical significance in the results is another symptom of small sample size. This is because as the sample size increases the uncertainty about the mean population decreases and so does the p-value.

3.5 Results and discussion

The collected data were analyzed using linear and ordered logistic regressions. Despite that the main dependent variable should be considered as ordinal, some have posited that parametric statistical procedures can be used to estimate ordered categorical data under certain circumstances (Lubke and Muthèn, 2004).

The first experiment reveals very low support for unilateral military intervention overall (see Table 4). As one might expect, civil wars pose less of a security threat to the US public than an aggressive state assembling a nuclear arsenal, hence the low support for the use of force. Out of 601 respondents, only about 3.5% would be extremely likely to support military intervention after being presented with the first vignettes and at least 18% would be somewhat likely to support a traditional military intervention. Table 4 shows that only 2.9% of Democrats would be extremely likely to support the intervention while at least 5.3% of Republicans would support the use of force. Out of those that were somewhat likely to support boots on

the ground, 18% were Democrats and 27% were Republicans. Over 58% are somewhat unlikely or extremely unlikely to support a military intervention based on the vignettes shown to them.

Prior to the experiment, the respondents were asked whether they are confident in the President's decision to initiate a military intervention. From our sample, 172 respondents were very confident or somewhat confident and 230 were not very confident or not at all confident in the President's decision to use force. Of those who were confident in the President's military decision, 37.2% were extremely likely or somewhat likely to support military interventions, and 44.19% were somewhat unlikely or extremely unlikely to support such a decision. From those who were not confident in the President, only 14.86% would support an intervention and 68.92% would not. A Fisher's Exact test was executed to ascertain whether these differences are statistically significant. The proportions of those that were generally confident in the President and supported the decision to intervene militarily is significantly smaller than those who would not extend their support to intervene ($p < 0.01$). Likewise, the proportion of those who were skeptical of the President's military decisions and keen to support military intervention were significantly smaller than those who were opposed to military intervention ($p < 0.01$). In both instances, the difference was statistically significant.

Moreover, respondents were asked how effective military interventions can be in their opinion. The sample contains 441 respondents who think that military interventions are extremely, somewhat, or moderately effective and 160 respondents who think that interventions are not very effective or not at all effective. From those who think that military interventions are effective, only 27.66% would support military intervention

Table 4: Overall support for the military intervention based on political affiliation

	How likely are you to support US military intervention?			
	all respondents	*Democrats*	*Republicans*	*Independents*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Extremely Likely	21(3.49%)	8(2.88%)	7(5.22%)	5(2.86%)
Somewhat Likely	110(18.3%)	50(18.0%)	36(26.9%)	24(13.7%)
Neither	117(19.5%)	46(16.5%)	25(18.7%)	44(25.1%)
Somewhat Unlikely	205(34.1%)	106(38.1%)	41(30.6%)	55(31.4%)
Extremely Unlikely	148(24.6%)	68(24.5%)	25(18.7%)	47(26.9%)
Total	601	278	134	175

given the context presented to them and 50.11% would oppose a decision for military interventions. From respondents who think that military interventions are ineffective, only 5.62% would support decision to get involved militarily and 82.5% would oppose such a decision. Clearly, the proportion of those who support military interventions is smaller than the proportion of those that do not support them among those who think military interventions are effective and this difference is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), again through the use of Fisher's Exact test. Similarly, the proportion of those who support military interventions are smaller than the proportion of those that do not support intervention within the respondents who do not believe that traditional use of force can be effective and this difference is again statistically significant ($p < 0.001$). The next section will introduce results from the first experiment.

3.5.1 Results from Experiment 1

The first vignette randomizes 3 different cues: the magnitude of violence, level of security, and whether the international community was present. This resulted in 8 distinct vignettes which were randomly shown to respondents. Table 5 offers estimations for the effect of support for military intervention and air strikes based on experimental conditions. Table 5 shows the estimated effect size between the treatment group relative to the base treatment category AS-IC-MC; where AS stands for ally's security interests, IC describes the presence of international community, and MC indicates massive casualties (see footnote for explanation of abbreviations)[3]. Since the dependent variable of support is an ordered variable where 1 indicates the highest likelihood of support and 5 the highest opposition to support for interventions, decreasing tendency indicates greater support. The data were fitted by the ordered logistic model and OLS.

The results in Table 5 (1) show that there is 16.2% increase in support for military interventions between the base category (AS-IC-MC) and first treatment conditions, AS-IC-DP, holding everything else constant. Since the only difference in treatment between the two vignette scenarios is in the level of violence, the support for military interventions seems to be higher for displaced population, holding everything else equal. The change in the effect size in going from base category (AS-IC-MC) to second treatment condition, AS-

[3]MC treatment describes massive casualties; DP treatment indicates displaced population. AS describes ally1's security interest; USS describes US1's security interest. IC treatment describes international community; no-IC indicates absence of international community.

Table 5: Results from Ordered Regression and OLS Models

	Dependent variable: Support for			
	Military Interventions		Air-strike	
	ordered logistic	*OLS*	*ordered logistic*	*OLS*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age	0.033***	0.019***	−0.008	−0.004
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Political Affiliation	0.135	0.058	0.139	0.051
	(0.087)	(0.048)	(0.088)	(0.052)
Gender	−0.731***	−0.387***	−0.003	0.016
	(0.156)	(0.087)	(0.153)	(0.095)
Confidence in President	0.231***	0.130***	0.243***	0.150***
	(0.066)	(0.036)	(0.065)	(0.039)
Effectiveness of Interventions	0.708***	0.365***	0.711***	0.392***
	(0.097)	(0.050)	(0.096)	(0.054)
AS-IC-DP	−0.176	−0.086	0.374	0.176
	(0.304)	(0.170)	(0.305)	(0.185)
AS-noIC-MC	−0.166	−0.069	0.059	0.001
	(0.310)	(0.174)	(0.306)	(0.189)
AS-noIC-DP	0.018	0.001	0.085	−0.007
	(0.314)	(0.174)	(0.314)	(0.190)
USS-IC-MC	0.239	0.163	−0.238	−0.197
	(0.302)	(0.169)	(0.299)	(0.184)
USS-IC-DP	−0.067	−0.022	0.362	0.245
	(0.322)	(0.181)	(0.315)	(0.197)
USS-noIC-MC	0.157	0.021	0.446	0.187
	(0.318)	(0.176)	(0.311)	(0.191)
USS-noIC-DP	0.118	0.064	0.070	0.031
	(0.303)	(0.169)	(0.300)	(0.184)
Constant		−3.539***		−4.078***
		(0.667)		(0.726)
Observations	601	601	601	601
R^2		0.206		0.190
Base Category	AS-IC-MC		AS-IC-MC	

Note: (-) indicates greater sup. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

noIC-MC, shows 15.4% increase in support for military intervention, all else equal. The difference in the treatment condition manipulates the presence/absence of international community. It seems that the absence of international community increases the support for military intervention.

The change in the treatment condition from base category (AS-IC-MC) to AS-noIC-DP indicates 1.8% decrease in support for military interventions, holding everything else constant. It seems that the absence of international community and displeased population mark a decrease in support for troops on the ground in comparison to the base category —massive casualties and presence of international community when an ally's security is at stake. There is a 26.9% decrease in support of military intervention between the respondent treated with base category vignette (AS-IC-MC) and those treated with fourth category, USS-IC-MC, holding everything else constant. The difference between the base category (AS-IC-MC) and USS-IC-MC treatment condition is in the presence of US security interest. It seems that the US security interests decreases the support for troops on the ground, provided that the presence of international community and threat of massive casualties holds.

There is a 6.6% increase in support for military interventions between the base category (AS-IC-MC) and USS-IC-DP treatment condition, holding all else equal. Manipulating US security interest and displaced population seems to increase the support for military involvement. Finally, manipulating US security interest and absence of international community demonstrated 17.0% and 12.5% decrease in support of military interventions when risking massive casualties and displaced population respectively, holding everything else constant.

Although these results are not statistically significant they are useful pointers of the directionality of these relationships. The results in Table 5 show these associations. There are two main reasons why these results are not statistically significant. One important potential reason might be that the number of observations is small relative to the number of randomized experimental conditions. With 601 respondents paired with 8 possible vignette combinations from the (2x2x2) factorial design, there are only an average of 75 respondents per vignette combination. The second reason is that the relationships might be further confounded by the use of vignettes. To dissect the effect of cues, it is useful to look at substantive effect of how support

Figure 6: Support for Military Intervention by Experimental Condition



Predicted Probability of Support for Military Intervention by experimental condition. MC treatment describes massive casualties; DP treatment describes displaced population. AS treatment describes ally's security; USS treatment describes US's security. IC treatment describes international community; no-IC treatment describes the absence of the international community. Sample sizes for each treatment group are: AS, IC, MC (n = 68); AS, IS, DP, (n = 64); AS, no-IC, MC (n = 70); AS, no-IC, DP (n = 70); USS, IC, MC (n = 73); USS, IC, DP (n = 77); USS, no-IC, MC (n = 74); USS, no-IC, DP (n = 76).

for military interventions changes from one vignette to another controlling for cue variations. Figure 6 shows the marginal effect of predicted probabilities to respond likely in support of military intervention by experimental conditions. The figure displays a larger variance of responses based on pro-military support for different scenarios. To account for the differences of manipulated cues between the individual scenarios, it is necessary to hold some cues at their specific value. In other words, it is useful to focus only on one pair of vignettes at a time where the only varying cue is the level of violence.

To wit, in Figure 6, a visible drops can be observed in predicted probabilities of support for the level of violence between massive casualties and displaced population. This change is clearly visible between the second pair of vignettes, AS-noIC-MC and AS-noIC-DP; where AS stands for ally's security, noIC describes no International consensus, and the levels of violence as described by MC as in massive casualties, and DP as displaced population. This indicates that respondents treated with a vignette where international community was not able to compromise on a common action and where ally's interests were at stake, were predicted to be 24.08% more likely to support use of force when the possibility of violence reaches massive casualties as oppose to a large number of displaced populations.

A similar change can be observed between the last pair of vignettes, USS-noIC-MC and USS-noIC-DP; where USS describes the possibility of harm to the US security interests, noIC describes no International consensus, and MC and DP describes levels of violence as in the previous case. Again, it can be observed that the level of violence has an effect on the support for use of force. There is a 17.28% increase in the predicted probability that respondents would support use of force when they are treated with massive casualties over displaced populations.

Another, although substantially smaller, increase can be observed between the third pair of treatments, USS-IC-MC and USS-IC-DP; where USS stands for US security, IC for common consensus of the international community and the same as previous two levels of violence (MC/DP). There is 0.2% increase in the predicted probabilities that the respondents presented with massive casualties would support the use of force than those presented with displaced population. There is however a 5.15% decrease in predicted probabilities that those presented with massive casualties would support military intervention to those presented with a threat of displaced population between the first pair of vignettes, AS-IC-MC and AS-IC-DP; where AS stands for US's ally's security, IC for common consensus of international community and two levels of violence. This inconsistency with other results may be in part due to a different composition of people within this specific category of treatment. Indeed, within the group of respondent that were treated with AS-IC-DP experimental conditions, over 40% of respondents thought that interventions are effective in contrast to only 25% from comparison category AS-IC-MC. This difference in respondent-composition between the two vignettes might be responsible for the disruption of the humanitarian trend that massive casualties increase the support for military interventions.

To estimate the average effect of humanitarian cues on the predicted probability for support for military intervention, Figure 7 graph A shows the mean predicted probability —weighted by the number of respondents presented with massive casualties or displaced population cues —of how likely respondents are to support military intervention. The change is an increase of 5.96% from displaced population to massive casualties. This corroborates the humanitarian hypothesis that Americans are more likely to support the use of force in civil wars as the magnitude of potential violence increases.

Figure 7: Support for Military Intervention based on Randomized Cues



Note: Figures are used to capture directionality of the relationship therefore confidence intervals are excluded from the graph

Additionally, it seems that those vignette pairs which lacked international consensus scored somewhat higher in predicted probabilities for military support than those with international consensus. To check this, the mean predicted probability for each category of international consensus cues had been calculated and weighted by the number of respondents for each category as in the previous case. Figure 7 graph B shows a 13.38% increase in predicted probability of military ground force support for those respondents that have been presented with the absence of international consensus over those presented with the presence of international consensus. This finding goes against the expected *international consensus hypothesis* that Americans are less likely to support use of force when the international community is unable to produce a resolution. At the same time the results show 18.6% increase in predicted probabilities for military support when ally's security interests were at stake. This conflicts with the *security hypothesis* that Americans are more likely to support the use of force in civil wars that threaten US security interests than ones that do not.

The findings demonstrates that the civilian casualties as well as the absence of international consensus and ally's security interests marginally increases the support for the use of force. The absence of international consensus indicate the absence of international help for suffering civilians. The American public might realize that without the engagement of the international community, the clashes of belligerents would take a

high toll on civilians, hence the support for military engagement increases with the absence of international consensus. This may indicate that once the international community makes its first attempts to engage in a conflict, Americans are not so willing to sacrifice the lives of US soldiers or engage in potentially long military interventions. It can be speculated that Americans maintain high trust in the international community as they are more reluctant to support US unilateral use of force when the international community is already involved.

This result might seem to go against the previous findings, which suggested that civilian casualties also increase the support for the use of force once the authorization from an international organization was obtained. These studies, however, do not specify whether the use of force could be used interchangeably with the UN's peacekeeping deployment. By differentiating options for the US involvement, this paper provides respondents with alternatives to unilateral use of ground forces that is often associated with long-term and costly commitments, and US military casualties. Therefore, opting to oppose the unilateral deployment of US military when the international community had already engaged in conflict might be signaling a trust in capacities and capabilities of the international community.

To make sure these interpretations hold, it is useful to analyze respondent answers for the support of alternative actions in civil war. More specifically, it might clarify whether members of the public discriminate between the types of US interventions. For example if the public evaluates the use of military air-strikes differently from traditional military engagement. Since military air-strikes have different features than military operations with boots on the ground, the expected support for air-strikes might see different results. The most pronounced feature of military air-strikes is their precision to attack an enemy while also minimizing casualties on both sides —foreign civilian and national military lives. Another feature of military air-strikes is that they usually do not involve long-term commitments as opposed to more traditional military interventions that include ground forces. Military air-strikes can be effectively used to send a 'message'. An example of this might be air-strikes executed by the Trump administration in April 2017 on a Syrian airbase, following the alleged chemical attack on Syrian civilians. Although air-strikes can be effectively used in longer campaigns to force governments or irregular rebel groups to surrender or retreat as seen in the NATO bombing

Figure 8: Support for Air-strike by Experimental Condition



Predicted Probability of Support for Air-strikes by experimental condition. MC treatment describes massive casualties; DP treatment describes displaced population. AS treatment describes ally's security; USS treatment describes US's security. IC treatment describes international community; no-IC treatment describes the absence of the international community. Sample sizes for each treatment group are: AS, IC, MC (n = 68); AS, IS, DP, (n = 64); AS, no-IC, MC (n = 70); AS, no-IC, DP (n = 70); USS, IC, MC (n = 73); USS, IC, DP (n = 77); USS, no-IC, MC (n = 74); USS, no-IC, DP (n = 76).

of former Yugoslavia in 1999. Military air-strikes can be also used alongside traditional interventions as seen in both Gulf Wars. Nonetheless, military air-strikes are generally considered more flexible in sparing lives and time in costly traditional interventions.

Table 5 shows largely decreasing effect of support for air-strikes between the base category (AS-IC-MC) and the rest of vignette treatments. The only increasing effect was recorder for the USS-IC-MC manipulating US security interest, international consensus and massive casualties. Holding everything else constant, there is a 21.2% in support for military air-strikes from base category to USS-IC-MC. This might at first glance suggest that changing the ally's security interest to US security interest increased the support for air-strike involvement, however it is useful to take a closer look at substantive significance as in the previous case with military interventions.

Figure 8 shows a graph of predicted probabilities for air-strike support based on experimental conditions. The graph displays pairs of those treatments that hold security and international consensus at the same value and differentiate the level of violence. The connecting lines between the pairs of treatment show the effect of humanitarian cue on the support for air-strikes. As visible from Figure 8 the effect of massive casualties

increased a support for air-strike. The first pair, AS-IC-MC and AS-IC-DP, demonstrate 32.7% increase in predicted probabilities for air-strike support when the risk of massive casualties was manipulated, holding everything else equal. Second pair, AS-noIC-MC and AS-noIC-DP, indicates 1.9% increase in support for air-strikes when the threat of massive casualties was present. Third pair, USS-IC-MC and USS-IC-DP, shows the largest drop in air-strike support when level of violence decreased. Holding everything else constant, the threat of massive casualties in the third pair of vignettes, demonstrate 55.1% increase in predicted probabilities for air-strike support.

The only one exception to the effect of *humanitarian hypothesis* comes from the last pair - USS-noIC-MC and USS-noIC-DP. This pair shows 33.5% decrease in predicted probabilities when the level of violence climb to massive casualties. It is however possible that the group differences may influence this distribution. In fact, almost 30% of the respondents treated with experimental condition USS-noIC-MC thought that military interventions are extremely ineffective. From the same group, 35.2% of respondents were self-identified democrats while only 22.5% identified as republicans. From the total number of respondent in the treatment group USS-noIC-MC, 52.1% answered that were not very or not at all confident in president's decision to initiate military intervention. This proportion in respondents distribution may have an impact on low support for air-strike when treated with the risk of massive casualties.

To check the marginal effect of humanitarian cues, Figure 9 graph A shows the mean of predicted probabilities for air-strike support based on level of violence. The graph A demonstrate 12.9% increase in predicted probabilities for air-strikes in respondents treated with massive casualties. This confirms *humanitarian hypothesis* that Americans are more likely to approve of use of force in civil was as the magnitude of potential violence increase. Graph B shows the mean of predicted probabilities for air-strike support based on the international consensus. There is a 3.3% increase in predicted probabilities for air-strike when international consensus was reached over the use of force in a conflict. This marginally confirms the *international consensus* hypothesis that Americans are more likely to support use of force in civil wars when the international community reaches a consensus. There is almost no marginal effect of the security cue in support for air-strikes.

Figure 9: Support for Air-strikes based on Randomized Cues



Note: Figures capture substantive effect based on the order logistic model (3) from Table 5

It has been generally accepted that national military casualties decrease the level of support for the US military interventions (Mueller, 1973; Larson, 1996; Feaver and Gelpi, 2004). The tolerance for military casualties increases with the possibility of success and justification for war (Gelpi et al., 2009). Gelpi et al. (2009, p. 255) do not directly focus on the role of civilian casualties, but they hypothesize that, 1"the American public views civilian casualties much the same way they view military casualties 1—as a necessary evil to be minimized, but tolerable under the right conditions1". The evidence on the tolerance of civilian casualties is however less straightforward.

Based on the results from Experiment 1 it seems that support for use of force changes depending on treatment effects but also on the type of force used (boots on the ground/military air-strikes). On the one hand, when considering traditional military interventions, the support for use of force increases substantially with the treatment of massive casualties and sees a reduction when the international consensus treatment is applied. On the other hand, when controlling for military air-strikes, the support for use of force increases with the treatment of massive casualties but decreases with the treatment of international consensus absence. Different objectives and features of these types of interventions need to be considered when analyzing the results.

Given the features of both types of forces it can be speculated that by controlling for these different

types of involvements, the analysis, by extension, controls for predicted military losses. As discussed before, military air-strikes are most pronounced for their reduction of military casualties and short-term engagement as opposed to more traditional interventions. It might be the combination of these features that shape public thinking about the use of force. Whilst Americans might not want to sacrifice US military lives in a protracted mission overseas if the international community can get involved instead, they might feel a sense of moral responsibility to get involved in a conflict that does not garner the support of international community. The explanation for this result might be that Americans are willing to get involved in civil wars alone when a local civilian population could become the victim of protracted and internationalized war. Military air-strikes on the other hand can aid the international community engagement without the US taking a lead in an operation. Yet when executed in an environment without the structured engagement of the international community, Americans are less likely to approve. Such acts might be considered an act of war by siding with one side or the other.

More generally, it is useful to estimate the numbers of population proportions for respondents' support for military intervention, military air-strikes, and alternative actions included in the response variables. Out of all 601 respondents, 131 were somewhat likely or extremely likely to support traditional military interventions, while 353 were in opposition to the use of ground force regardless of conflict cues. It can be stated that 58.7% of the American population would be likely to oppose such interventions with a 95% confidence interval. While 169 respondents were likely to support the use of military air-strikes, 323 respondents were somewhat unlikely or extremely unlikely to grant their approval. Therefore, it can be concluded that 53.74% of American citizens would be unlikely to support military air-strikes to begin with.

Contrary to these type of forces, the support for multilateral use of force that would include a coalition of states, which can share the financial and political burden, generated 306 respondents to be somewhat likely or extremely likely to support such use of force and only 132 would oppose it. It can be said that almost 51% of the American public would support use of force under the coalition of states with a 95% confidence interval. Moreover, 477 and 416 would be likely or extremely likely to support US-led peace talks and pushing their government to issue for a UNSC resolution and only 70 and 86 would oppose such endeavors,

Table 6: Results from Ordered Regression Models

	Dependent variable: Support for		
	Peace Talks	UNSC Resolution	Coalition of states
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	−0.011	−0.005	−0.007
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Political Affiliation	0.131	0.126	0.020
	(0.090)	(0.086)	(0.085)
Gender	0.010	−0.105	−0.212
	(0.162)	(0.154)	(0.152)
Confidence in Presiden	−0.242***	−0.351***	−0.304***
	(0.068)	(0.066)	(0.065)
Effectiveness of Interventions	0.091	0.185**	0.553***
	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.093)
AS-IC-DP	0.028	−0.083	0.231
	(0.330)	(0.306)	(0.300)
AS-noIC-MC	0.033	−0.003	0.400
	(0.337)	(0.310)	(0.309)
AS-noIC-DP	0.670**	0.327	0.410
	(0.325)	(0.310)	(0.311)
USS-IC-MC	0.315	0.080	0.315
	(0.323)	(0.300)	(0.296)
USS-IC-DP	0.916***	0.500	0.515
	(0.342)	(0.319)	(0.319)
USS-noIC-MC	0.232	0.382	0.498
	(0.337)	(0.308)	(0.305)
USS-noIC-DP	0.159	0.042	0.319
	(0.324)	(0.300)	(0.296)
Observations	601	601	601
Base Category	AS-IC-MC	AS-IC-MC	AS-IC-MC

Note:(-) indicates greater support *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

respectively. More then half of the American population would be likely to support initiation of peace talks and seeking of the UNSC resolution before initiating use of force. As visible from Table 6 the support for peace talks decreased in all treatment conditions from the base line category but significantly only in two cases, AS-noIC-DP and USS-IC-DP. Both of these conditions show change in the level of violence form the base category indicating that support for peace talks significantly increases when the threat of massive casualties is present. It can be concluded that the majority of Americans are risk-averse and generally unwilling to support the use of force unless the use of force has generated support from other states as well. Americans are more likely to support more peaceful engagements of their country in humanitarian scenarios. Moreover, they are more willing to support actions that involve the approval of the international community, such as a UNSC resolution authorizing the use of force or a multilateral coalition of states.

The next section will present findings from the second experiment and further elaborate on the *Rivalry Hypothesis*. Since the first experiment wan not able to confirm the *security hypothesis*, the second experiment dives deeper into public consideration for strategic involvement. The rivalry hypothesis goes a step further in examining the security hypothesis. More precisely, it analyzes how the American public thinks about situations where the US government might get involved in a conflict with no engagement from the international community.

3.5.2 Results from Experiment 2

The vignette in the second experiment manipulates only the rivalry cue. It delineates a scenario of a civil war where the international community was not able to reach a conclusive resolution but isolated instances of external support occurred on the side of government. The autocratic government and rebels continue fighting despite agreed ceasefires and civilian fatalities continue to rise. The respondents were told that support for the government was coming either from a US rival or a US ally. The rivalry cue can be seen as an extension of the security mechanism as it maps US strategic security interest to support an insurgency against a rival's own support for the opposite party. States often get involved in providing military aid to belligerents to indirectly weaken the capacity of competing states involved or to diminish a competing state's

pursuit of strategic interests. This may provoke counterbalancing and intensify support of rival states to the opposing government or insurgency, rendering such conflicts deadlier and longer (Cunningham, 2010; Byman, 2013).

Despite how this strategy might be reminiscent of the Cold War rivalry, it is not strictly limited to the era of a bipolar world order or to the behavior of a superpower. Such behavior remains dominant across international affairs. For instance, Qatar, among other states, pro-actively provided weapons and military training to the Libyan rebels to help in the ousting of Muammar al-Qaddafi (Roberts, 2011). Ethiopia and Eritrea provided external support to each other's insurgencies to destabilize one another's already fragile political systems (Byman et al., 2001). Recent conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, and Yemen are good examples of this form of support as well. The US alone was involved in arming FMLN rebels in El Salvador in the early 90s, Contra rebels in Nicaragua from the early 80s throughout the duration of conflict, and more recently arming and training anti-Assad Syrian rebel groups, efforts that were reportedly canceled over the summer of 2017.

The rivalry cue can be effectively used to indirectly examine how serious the American public feel about increasing military casualties. Regression results in Table 7 show an increase in support for the use of force or military aid to a rebel group when a US rival is involved but not when a US ally is involved, suggesting that Americans are willing to support risk-taking involvement for rivalry or security reasons and not to protect foreign civilian lives, at least in the short-run.

Table 7 presents results from the second experiment. The data were fitted to ordered logistic models. The models control for age, political ideology, gender, the confidence in the President's decision to initiate an intervention, and opinion on intervention effectiveness as in previous cases. The second experiment provides large support for traditional military intervention and rebel aid when US rival is involved in the conflict. The results in Table 7 (1) show that Americans are more likely to support unilateral military interventions in civil wars when the autocratic government receives support from a US rival compared to US ally. Holding all else equal, Americans are 38.42% more likely to support military intervention if a US rival power is empowering the government. This result is statistically significant at $p < 0.01$, which confirms the *Rivalry Hypothesis*

Table 7: Regression Results from ordered logistic models for Experiment 2

	Dependent variable: Support for		
	Military Interventions	Rebel sup.	Government sup.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	0.030***	−0.002	0.022***
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Political Affiliation	0.192**	0.175**	0.196**
	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.084)
Gender	−0.726***	−0.049	−0.383**
	(0.156)	(0.151)	(0.151)
Confidence in President	0.149**	−0.020	0.174***
	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.063)
Effectiveness of Interventions	0.703***	0.444***	0.223**
	(0.097)	(0.092)	(0.091)
Rival	−0.495***	−0.339**	0.050
(base = Ally)	(0.152)	(0.147)	(0.147)
Observations	601	601	601

Note: (-) indicates greater support *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

that Americans are more likely to support interventions in civil wars if one or more competing powers are involved in supporting the opposite side.

The second models (2) in Table 7 demonstrate that Americans are also more likely to support provisions of rebel aid to help them to sustain fighting against an autocratic government emboldened by a US rival. Holding everything else constant, the American public is 27.69% more likely to support material aid to rebels when the autocratic government is supported by a US rival as opposed to a US ally, and this finding is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). This finding corroborates the findings of the first set of models and reaffirm the *Rivalry Hypothesis*. The third model (3) in Table 7 shows 5.1% decrease in support for empowering government when the rival supports the government side, holding everything else constant.

At the same time, there is evidence that the US public might be more concerned with the strategic interest to compete with a US rival than with protecting civilian lives. As discussed above, the vignette only

randomizes rivalry cues and holds constant the rising number of civilian casualties. This means that the observed difference in support for military intervention pertains only to who is aiding the government. In other words, the US public support for military interventions is predicated upon whether it is an ally or a rival supporting the government and not upon an increasing level of civilian deaths. This suggests that the American public is more compelled with US rivalries than civilian casualties.

Overall, the respondents were more likely to oppose both forms of intervention, the military intervention and the rebel aid. Out of all 601 respondents, 358 opposed traditional interventions while only 141 respondents approved of it. Similarly, 257 respondents were extremely unlikely or somewhat unlikely to support rebel aid, while 177 were extremely likely or somewhat likely to support. To estimate the population's proportion from the sample proportion a proportion test was executed. The result points to a conclusion that 59.57%, a majority of Americans would be likely to oppose instances of traditional military intervention and at least 42.76% of Americans would oppose external support to a rebel group with a 95% confidence interval.

As in the previous experiment, the second experiment examined other dependent variables that included, among those already discussed, support for military air-strikes, external support for a government, support for peace talks initiated by the US, and support for seeking a coalition of states for multilateral intervention. The dependent variables of support were reduced by support for the UNSC resolution, as according to the vignette the UN resolution was not possible to reach. However, neither of the independent variables for the remaining dependent variable were statistically significant, though the results are still telling in terms of magnitude of the effect. The reason for limited statistical significance might be rooted in small number of sample size. The broader generalization of these findings might suffer due to this limitation.

Since the results revealed that the American public would support traditional military operation and external rebel support in instances when the government was sponsored by a US rival rather than as a result of civilian victimization, it is useful to see if the same held for other instances of use of force. For example, the use of force led by a coalition of states reveals that 348 respondents would be likely or extremely likely to support multilateral use of force and only 107 respondents would oppose it. The difference between whether the support for government came from a rival state or an ally state is not large enough to yield statisti-

cal significance. Though it can be concluded that the majority of Americans would support multilateral intervention to protect civilians with a 95% confidence interval.

With regards to the use of military air-strikes, only 28.95% of all respondents would be likely or extremely likely to support it, whereas 53.91% would be likely to oppose it. Also, support for military aid to a government saw 32.11% of respondents who would support and 39.26% of respondents who would oppose it. Out of those in support of government aid, 54.40% would support the American ally in their effort to arm the government. All in all, most of Americans are unwilling to support any instance of use of force except that of multilateral use of force. Out of all respondents, 76.0% would be extremely likely or somewhat likely to support peace talks initiated by the US. Only 11.31% would be somewhat likely or extremely likely to oppose a mediation effort, the rest were undecided. The proportional difference between those who would support mediation when a rival or ally were reinforcing the government was not large enough to reach any statistical significance. Nonetheless, it can be observed that a majority of Americans would be more likely to support mediation led by the US with a 95% confidence interval.

Overall, the prevalent majority of the support lays with more peaceful or multilateral interventions such as peace talks, seeking the UNSC resolution, or seeking the coalition of willing states for multilateral intervention. The series of experiments analysed above found some evidence for when the American public is willing to give their approval for the use of force. To sum up, this chapter found marginal increase in support for military interventions and air-strikes when civilian casualties were at stake. This confirms substantive effect of *humanitarian hypothesis* that Americans are more likely to support the use of force in civil wars as the magnitude of potential violence increases. The effect of international consensus marginally decreased the support for military interventions but increased the support for air-strikes. This suggests that the respondents in this sample perceive the use of air-strikes differently from traditional military operations that often require long-term political and financial commitment. While the results for support of military interventions goes against the expectation articulated in *international consensus hypothesis*, the results for air-strike support lends credence to the claim that Americans are less likely to support use of force in civil wars if the international community is unable to produce a resolution. This is somewhat counter intuitive but not

entirely surprising. Based on the results, members of American public are more likely to support military interventions when the lack of international consensus does not allow for joint multilateral intervention under the auspice of the international organization. It is important to note that the vignette scenario paints a picture of a humanitarian crisis with rising civilian toll, which might suggest that Americans are willing to commit to traditional military intervention especially when the international community cannot reach consensus and civilians are left unprotected.

While the effect of *security hypothesis* was inconclusive in the first experiment, the second experiment elaborates more on *rivalry hypothesis* and found statistically significant evidence that Americans are more likely to support use of force in civil wars if one or more competing powers are involved in supporting the opposite side. Additionally, there is some evidence that members of public are willing to support direct material aid to rebels when the government is supported by the US rival despite the rising civilian fatalities. This form of interventions have been found to prolong conflicts, make them deadlier, and more resistant to resolutions.

Finally, while the sample generated from the M-Turk service provide relatively well balanced, it is not representative of adult population in the United States and therefore raises some concerns regarding generalizability of these findings. One concern that remains even for the large nationally representative samples is a threat to external validity. This threat can ensue if the treatment setting exaggerates the effect of a stimulus or if the phenomena in question does not reflect a real life scenario (Barabas and Jerit, 2010). In reality, other factors may also play into the effect of a phenomena, such as different exposure to a media coverage (Zaller, 1992). In turn, this may amplify the effect for those exposed but exaggerate for those unexposed to the treatment. The moderate effect of a treatment in reality may be due to different levels of attention payed to the phenomena in question as well as different framing of various media outlets - media bias. All in all, the treatment likely provides respondents with more information and lead them to think about the problem more intensely than they otherwise would.

The sample in the experiment focuses exclusively on the American public that comes along with several aspects that can affect the level of generalization to population in other countries. America, arguably the last

superpower with a substantial defence power might conceive matter of civil war intervention on a different magnitude as a smaller country with much more limited defence forces. Even if considering Russia or China as superpowers, America is the only democratic superpower, that should in theory be accountable to the public opinion. Based on this, it places America into a unique position and makes the generalization of the findings in the experiment limited, however it would be interesting to compare these results with public in other countries such as France, UK, Canada, Australia, or South Africa.

3.6 Conclusion

Since the end of the Cold War allowed for greater cooperation among states via International Organizations, new avenues for managing conflicts have become more prominent. The number of peacekeeping operations have grown since the fall of the Cold War by at least 50 UN operations, out of which 15 are currently ongoing. Yet, recent conflicts in Ukraine and Syria are vivid reminders that joint action authorized by the UN is not always an option. In conflicts like Ukraine and Syria, the use of force and support for belligerents remain the dominant forms of third-party intervention.

This chapter examined when the American public is willing to support foreign policies of the US government in humanitarian crises. Using experimental design, this analysis surveyed a sample of the American population to determine the support for the use of force along three main dimensions: humanitarian, security/rivalry, and international consensus. By way of introducing multiple avenues of governmental action the public might support, this paper examined not only when but also how the American public is willing to support the use of force in civil wars.

The first experiment found that the American public is indeed sensitive to civilian casualties, but they are also sensitive about the type of force being used. Rising civilian casualties sparked greater support for traditional US military involvement especially when the international community was not able to reach an agreement on a common action and civilians were left unprotected. The US public was found to be supportive of involvements that would minimize US military casualties, such as the use of air-strikes. Foreign civilian casualties increased support for the use of air-strikes when the international community made its first attempts to engage in civil war. Americans were generally more supportive of the multilateral interventions lead by a coalition of states, United Nations, as well as the initiation of peace talks.

The second experiment revealed that Americans are even more concerned with US security interests and interstate rivalry rather than civilian casualties. The results show that while Americans are willing to support military interventions when foreign civilians lives are at stake, they are also likely to empower one side of the conflict if the other side is supported by a US rival. These forms of support are, however, more

likely to prolong conflicts, make them deadlier, and more resistant to resolutions.

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Appendices

Appendix: Survey Instruments

B.1 Experiment 1:

Vignette.1:

Please read below an excerpt from a recent Associated Press report. We have redacted the name of the country that this report describes.

"In recent weeks, the dispute between an autocratic government, which has a long-standing trade relationship with the United States, and a rebel faction has increased substantially. Formal ties between the groups have dissolved and national and rebel leaders have recently issued public statements warning about the imminent possibility of violent clashes. Furthermore, the rebel leaders have claimed they are willing to fight for democratic values. In light of this, leading members of the international community have begun to ask whether the United States might provide military or material support to the government or the rebel group of the country in dispute. The general concern is that [humanitarian cue]. [security cue]. [International consensus cue]"

Randomized cues:

Humanitarian cues

- "the conflict will soon lead to a large number of displaced population in the region"
- "the conflict will soon lead to massive casualties in the region"

Security cues:

- "In addition, if this conflict continues, it would likely damage the US's security interests"
- "In addition, if this conflict continues, it would not likely damage one the US allies" security interests"

International consensus cues:

– "Nevertheless, the international community has made its first join attempt to engage in the conflict"

– "Since, the international consensus over the dispute was not reached, several isolated attempts of external military support to both the government and the rebel faction were initiated"

B.2 Experiment 2:

Vignette.2:

Please read below an excerpt from a recent Associated Press report. We have redacted the name of the country that this report describes.

"After a series of unsuccessful efforts of the government and the rebel faction to prevail in the conflict, both parties decided to enter the first round of peace negotiations. Engaging in the peace talks while the truce has been violated, by both sides, ensures the continuation of the conflict and the rise of civilian death tolls. Since the direct action by the UN could not be agreed upon, one of the major political US [Rivalry Cue] started supporting the government with military equipment and intelligence."

Following both vignettes, the respondents were asked to chose ho likely they are to support distinct interventions.

	Extremely Likely	Somewhat Likely	Neither	Somewhat Unlikely	Extremely Unlikely
Q1	○	○	○	○	○
Q2	○	○	○	○	○
Q3	○	○	○	○	○
Q4	○	○	○	○	○
Q5	○	○	○	○	○
Q6	○	○	○	○	○
Q7	○	○	○	○	○

Note: Questions Q1-Q7 indicate support for: Q1 = unilateral military intervention, Q2 = military air-strike; Q3 = peace talks led by the US; Q4 = support for UNSC resolution; Q5 = multilateral intervention; Q6 = rebel aid; Q7 = government aid

Appendix: Administration and Demographics

The protocols for the experiment were subjected to Duke University IRB Commission prior implementation and consequently approved (Protocol: 2018-0327 on 22 February 2018). The experiment was approved containing a deception about an identity of a war-torn country presented by a media article purportedly taken from Associate Press wire service report. Before administering the survey experiment, a pilot test was exercised in cooperation with Duke University Political Science Research Pool (PSRP) on a sample of University Students. The pilot testing were used to probe the efficacy of questions and vignettes presented to the respondents.

Subsequently the experiment was administered on-line using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Respondents who completed the surveys and entered a unique identification code assigned on the Mechanical Turk website were rewarded with payments of 0.50$ (rewards for respondents were funded from a research grant by the University of Trento). The survey in experiments were administered on 7 September 2018. It is important with surveys administered on-line to ensure that respondents may pay at least some attention to the vignettes and questions, and that they are members of the target population of adults in the United States. To address this, the respondents were vetted according to (1) the time of completion, (2) whether they completed all the answers, or (3) completed the survey more than once, which was allowed to controlled for through their traceable Mechanical Turk worker identification numbers.

Another concern was whether the sample was at least close to being representative of the US population. Table 9 show how the sample corresponds to the US population proportions based on the US Census Bureau and American National Election Survey.

Table 9: Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

	Experiment	Population
Gender:		
Male	52.9	49.2
Female	47.1	50.8
Party Identification		
Democrats	46.3	30
Republicans	22.3	26
Independents	29.1	41
Confidence in President:		
Confident	28.6	
Neither	33.1	
Not Confident	38.3	
Effectiveness of Interventions:		
Very Effective	73.4	
Not effective	26.6	
Observations:	601.0	

Notes. Data are in percentage representation displayed only for one experiment as both experiments were executed at the same sample. Population is the United States; data from US Census Bureau and American National Election Survey.

Table 10: Summary statistic of state residence

Alabama	7	Idaho	3	Mississippi	6	Oklahoma	7	Washington	13
Alaska	0	Illinois	28	Missouri	10	Oregon	11	West Virginia	3
Arizona	12	Indiana	12	Montana	3	Pennsylvania	35	Wisconsin	11
Arkansas	4	Iowa	1	Nebraska	1	Puerto Rico	1	Wyoming	0
California	65	Kansas	5	Nevada	9	Rhode Island	3		
Colorado	9	Kentucky	10	New Hampshire	2	South Carolina	10		
Connecticut	10	Louisiana	2	New Jersey	17	South Dakota	1		
Delaware	1	Maine	0	New Mexico	5	Tennessee	11		
District of Columbia	0	Maryland	9	New York	38	Texas	44		
Florida	60	Massachusetts	18	North Carolina	19	Utah	3		
Georgia	14	Michigan	18	North Dakota	0	Vermont	3		
Hawaii	2	Minnesota	14	Ohio	17	Virginia	14		

Appendix: Conflict perception

Table 11: Summary statistics of conflict perception

Afghanistan	21	I don't know	30	Myanmar	1	Sudan	5
Africa	2	India	1	Namibia	1	Syria	176
Bangladesh	1	Iran	39	Nepal	1	Turkey	24
Bosnia	2	Iraq	40	Nicaragua	2	UK	1
Chad	1	Israel	14	Nigeria	2	Ukraine	6
China	35	Japan	1	North Korea	11	USA	34
Colombia	4	Jordan	2	Pakistan	5	Venezuela	14
Congo	2	Kenya	1	Palestine	1	Yemen	18
Cuba	3	Korea	3	Qatar	3		
Egypt	15	Kuwait	1	Russia	13		
France	3	Latvia	1	Saudi Arabia	27		
Georgia	1	Lebanon	2	Serbia	4		
Germany	1	Libya	1	Somalia	2		
Greece	1	Mexico	7	South Korea	10		
Guatemala	1	Middle eastern	3	South Sudan	1		

Chapter 4: Survey Experiment with American Political Elite

Why do politicians provide military or material support to civil war combatants? Evidence from a survey experiment with political elites

Abstract

A large body of literature offers many theoretical and empirical explanations on why states support belligerents in civil wars. This paper provides unique data from a survey experiment with American political elites. While the findings demonstrate that politicians are indeed motivated to intervene in civil wars because of humanitarian concerns, their decisions are strongly affected by strategic interests. The experiment reveals that respondents are likely to support interventions to mitigate civilian casualties only in cases where US security interests are at stake. Once US interests are no longer threatened, politicians are less willing to come to the humanitarian rescue at the expense of US lives and resources. The findings also show that politicians are willing to support interventions in civil wars that may prolong and intensify conflict violence in order to satisfy their interest to weaken their rivals or help their allies.

4.1 Introduction

What drives politicians to provide military or material support to civil war combatants in some cases but not others? Understanding this puzzle is crucial because it has important consequences for both domestic and foreign policy along with broader world order. The most intuitive explanation is that politicians back interventionist policies in only the most violent cases. The reasoning for this intuition is that intervening militarily on behalf of, or in support of, one party with men and material might reduce bloodshed. Yet, this is obviously not always the logic that guides elected officials1'decisions. What is less intuitive is why politicians commit to some conflicts but not others. For example, the United States intervened militarily in Kosovo and Iraq but not in Rwanda, or presently Myanmar, where both the eventual extent of violence and necessity for intervention was much higher.

Why and how political elites support interventions in civil wars is an important question and one that needs to be answered. The United States is the most frequent third-party intervener in civil wars, projecting its influence in approximately 10 percent of all such conflicts (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015). The theoretical literature on the subject provides several possible explanations for these differential levels of intervention support. The ground work of International Relation theory rely on an elite-centric idea that policymakers decide on the matters of foreign policy based on national interest and disregard the emotional and subjective views of the masses (Mearsheimer, 2001; Knecht and Weatherford, 2006). Based on realist theories, leaders makes rational decisions fueled by survival and maximisation of power in an uncertain international system. This stance was confronted by liberal theories arguing for more pluralist model of decision-making. In the liberal view, decision-makers are accountable to public will and want to maintain their popularity that can help them to get re-elected (Holsti, 2004), while assuming that the public would oppose military involvement in civil wars.

The empirical and theoretical scholarship provide limited support for both accounts. One possible reason for this is that prior empirical studies of this question have relied on observational designs. Though importantly, these types of studies have many potential limitations such as endogeneity, selection issues,

and confounding, among others (Angrist and Pischke 2014; Gerber and Green 2012). These shortcomings can hinder the ability to draw unbiased causal inference and lead to spurious results (Morgan and Winship 2007). This thesis provides answers from a survey experiment with political elites, to tackle some of these issues. The goal is to test existing theories about the use of force and material support with a cross-national sample of political officials. In the next section, an insight into previous literature is introduced along with a brief set of theoretical expectations.

4.2 Literature Review

1"There is such a gap between how one lives and how one should live that he who neglects what is being done for what should be done will learn his destruction rather than his preservation.1" (Machiavelli, 1527, p. 91).

One of the first works to study the decision making of political leaders dates back to the 16th century. Niccolò Machiavelli in his letter to Lorenzo de Medici, the duke of Urbine province in medieval Italy, outlines a guide for the survival of political leaders. By divorcing morals from politics, his work is undisputedly considered a turning point for political thinking. For Machiavelli, the leader's only chance to survive is to see things as they are and not as they should be. This primarily distinguishes his writing from other thinkers of the era who instead wrote about ideal republics or imaginary utopias. Leaders have to make unpopular yet rational decisions to stay in power. As he writes, if one refuses to act in this way, his or her destruction is inevitable. This is also the main reason why Machiavelli's writing is so often associated with political realism.

In Machiavelli's world, there is relatively no concept of institutional constraints much like in a realist world where the only constraining, and at the same time driving, force in international affairs is the power of anarchy (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001). Realists believe that their view of the world best describes the art of statecraft in world politics. The world has changed since medieval Machiavelian times and, as the liberal institutionalist camp contends, so did the constraints for leaders (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Grieco, 1988). Leaders in democracies are confronted with multiple limitations to their power. More specifically, the US president has to face limitations on at least two major fronts —domestic and international.

On the domestic front, the President might first deal with institutional limitations in the form of congressional approval for the declaration of war, provided by Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the US Constitution. The President, meanwhile, enjoys the power to direct the military at all times whether or not there is a formal declaration of war, given by Article II, Section 2, which names the President as the "Commander-in-Chief" of the armed forces. Further limitations to presidential decisions to engage militarily were imposed by the Congressional statutory law stipulated by the "War Powers Resolution", passed in 1973 (Masters, 2017). Congress gave approval for both of the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, though congress would have probably disapproved of President Obama's authorization for air-strikes against Assad's regime in 2013 had Assad not agreed to give up chemical weapons (Blake, 2013). Nevertheless, these provisions have been largely ignored by the administrations of both sides given that both President Trump and President Obama have authorized air forces to attack the Syrian government.

On the international front, the President might want to win over public support for the use of force abroad so as not to diminish future chances for reelection. There is strong evidence for a relationship between public opinion and politicians' policy position (Brody and Page, 1972). Although the realist camp is extremely skeptical about the capacity of the public to influence politicians, liberals argue that, "foreign policies of democracies tend to be more peaceful, at least in part because the public can play a constructive role in constraining policy makers; only accountability to the public can restrain the war-making proclivities of leaders" (Holsti, 1992, p. 440). Some have suggested an alternative explanation that the public might dogmatically adopt opinions based on their representatives (Zaller, 1992; Larson, 1996; Berinsky, 2007). According to this literature, there is no rational public as Shapiro and Page (1992) posited. To wit, people rarely make cost-benefit analyses about matters of war.

Since the end of Cold War bipolarity, civil wars have become international events and matters of intervention subject to closer international scrutiny. More often than not, world leaders first attempt to get approval from an International Organization to intervene (Thompson, 2006). This is virtually for two reasons according to Thompson (2006). Namely, to appeal to the leaders of other states to join the interventions and to reach the audience of domestic public that might approve or pressure the government to do so. Leaders of

democratic countries who are the most likely to be constrained by their domestic audiences especially might want to seek an international consensus over the legitimacy of a use of force (Thompson, 2006; Chapman, 2009). Such action might send a signal to the public that an intervention is warranted and legitimate (Fang, 2008; Grieco et al., 2011). Leaders could prefer to reach out to fellow members of the UNSC for other reasons as well. One such reason as example could be the potential for sharing the financial burden of an intervention. Decreasing the financial, human, and unilateral costs might be the combination for perceived success of an intervention.

The literature on leaders' decision-making about military involvement shows a variety of approaches and presents a great deal of theoretical and empirical findings. However, most of the vast empirical findings used observational designs, typically using cross-sectional survey data or decision-making models. This renders their findings susceptible to many potential limitations such as selection bias or confoudedness among others (Gerber and Green, 2012). Employing experimental design to test these findings might help circumvent these potential shortcomings.

Most experiments have been carried out with representative samples of the national public. Only a few have attempted to conduct surveys recruiting political elites (Butler and Broockman, 2011; Butler et al., 2012) focusing on issues related to domestic politics. Most of the experimental work involving political elites, until now, focused on the inequality of how elected representatives respond to their different constituencies. In other words, they study racial or ethnic bias of elected representatives towards their constituents (Butler and Broockman, 2011; Butler et al., 2012; Costa, 2017). Nevertheless, these studies have proved that political elites can be effectively recruited to test theoretical findings about leaders. These studies have paved the way for new avenues of research to provide results that are causally interpretable.

4.3 Theoretical Framework

The empirical findings on the question why politicians intervene in some conflicts but not others has predominantly focused on drawing data from two strands of scholarship, determinants of interventions and influence of public opinion. Determinant of interventions draw their findings from observational data spelling out

several explanations for interventions —for instance survival or maximization of power —while the effect of public opinion collects data from experimental setting surveying samples of public. The answers to what influences foreign-policy decisions lay somewhere in between, however. While political elites might be motivated by survival or maximization of power in arriving to the decision to intervene, they are in part limited by the preferences of public opinion.

Political elites are expected to consider national interests in making the decision to intervene while evaluating how this decision might affect their popularity rating (Chan and Safran, 2006), their credibility on the international scene (Fearon, 1994), or business groups at home (Jacobs and Page, 2005). To answer the research question, this thesis recruits political elites for survey experiment to determine what drives political leaders to support interventions in civil wars. While this chapter does not examine the extent to which political elites might be constrained by the public preference, the similarity of the surveys provides an opportunity to systematically compare the two sets of populations.

There are three major mechanisms this paper outlines which stem out of International Relations theory. The first is the security mechanism that is reflective of a realistic view of the world that actions of leaders are driven by a compulsion for survival and power. The second mechanism has to do with a more normative view of the world. Particularly, with how the world has changed following the Cold War. This transition allowed states to join common actions through International Organizations and cooperate in the anarchic system. Emboldened interstate cooperation gave a way to the third mechanism, the humanitarian mechanism. Since the end of the Cold War, several humanitarian interventions have been authorized by the UNSC. These aimed at protecting those who had their voices stolen by the loud noise of violent clashes. Protecting civilians has become, in theory, a responsibility from a mere collateral damage. The following section discusses each of these mechanisms and its implications for the behavior of political leaders. After that, these mechanisms are summarized in four testable hypotheses.

4.3.1 Security mechanism

The security mechanism draws from the realist perception of the international system that politicians are driven by survival and maximization of power in an anarchic system. According to the realist school, leaders make their decision based on national interests and ignore the unstable and uninformed public (Almond, 1955; Holsti, 1992; Mearsheimer, 2001). The assumption is that political elites do so because they can make the necessary and pragmatic decision for the benefit of the country. Political leaders make rational choices to achieve the best outcomes in the interest of the state. As far as realists are concerned, politicians lead, they do not follow. In fact, leaders can prompt public to hold certain values (Almond, 1955; Knecht and Weatherford, 2006). An example would be an intervention in Iraq. The American and the British government committed significant amount of time and resources to convince the public that Saddam Hussein constituted a threat to the national security due to alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (Robinson, 2008). In this thread of thought, politicians either ignore or steer public opinion to their own advantage.

Yet, to make important decision about foreign engagement, leaders might want to consult other interest groups. Jacobs and Page (2005) examine the extent foreign policies have been influenced by several groups such as business interest groups, foreign policy experts, and the public. They found that business groups and experts enjoy the largest influence on decision-makers. The finding also confirms relatively modest effect of the public on some on very high-salience issues of foreign policies. While this thesis does not examine who constraints the foreign policy considerations of political elites, it hypothesizes that security might be an important driver behind the support for use of force. The security mechanism holds that political elites would be more likely to use force when national security interests are at stake.

4.3.2 Humanitarian mechanism

According to the humanitarian mechanism, political leaders might consider to support the use of force based on the magnitude of violence that might threaten foreign civilians. Though, politicians might be concerned by myriad of other factors such as about maintaining norms and values in the international system or their international credibility, this mechanism is best described in relationship with domestic public.

According to the realist tradition, leaders are mostly driven by security and survival. Liberals add that part of political survival is to preserve one's own electoral potential. To do so, leaders might want to, at least partially, follow public preferences. It follows that American politicians might mold their decision-making to the expectations of public preference. The public is expected to be casualty-averse towards US national military, and this relationship has been well studied by scholars of International Relations, Political Science, and Public Policy (Mueller, 1973; Larson, 1996; Feaver and Gelpi, 2004). Manifestation of this realization was most pronounced by introducing a photography ban on military coffins in the media by George Bush's administration in 1991 during the Gulf War (Bumiller, 2009). This ban stayed in effect through both of the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. It was only partially lifted in 2009 and allowed the display of US military coffins only if the families of the deceased agreed to do so.

For a long time, a notion that the public is casualty-averse was upheld by both academics and politicians. Gelpi et. all. show that while Americans are casualty-averse, they perceive it as a "necessary evil to be minimized but tolerable under certain circumstances" (2009, p. 155). According to Gelpi et al. (2009) Americans are willing to tolerate losses of national military men when a war is expected to turn into a success for America and when the war is justified. What constitutes a sound justification might be different not only between politicians and the public, but also for each individual among the public. Gelpi et al. (2009) argues that humanitarian and security justifications are the two most pronounced paradigms. While they do not focus on civilian foreign casualties, they suggest that the tolerance to foreign civilian casualties might work on a similar basis to the military casualty tolerance.

The reason why scholarly works have been so predominantly preoccupied with military casualties might in part be due to an overemphasis of military casualties reported by the media. Several studies have pointed out that during both wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, civilian casualties were given comparably less air-time in the coverage than military losses (Eric V. Larson, 2006; Althaus et al., 2014). The recent conflict in Syria, however, shows a changing trend (Landay et al., 2015). There is emerging research on how foreign civilian casualties affect public evaluations of military involvements (Johns and Davies, 2017; Kreps and Maxey, 2017). Hence, American politicians might be more interested in supporting interventions when they expect

the public to be less tolerant to civilian casualties.

4.3.3 International Consensus mechanism

There has been an increase in UN authorized military operations since the end of the Cold War. Thompson (2006) posits that leaders do approach International Organizations to request approvals to intervene, even though they do not need one. This way, political leaders try to reach at least two audiences - domestic and international. By reaching out to the UN, political leaders put their policies to a test. If their intent to intervene in a civil war is approved by an International Organization such as the UN, it can signal to the public —both international and domestic —(a) a competence of a leader in a sense that they initiate "good policies" (Fang, 2008) and (b) that such policies are worth supporting (Voeten, 2005). Multilateral forms of interventions have become increasingly more popular only in the aftermath of the Cold War. Arguably, UN authorized deployments have become the more preferred and more effective form of intervention (Beardsley and Gleditsch, 2015; Ruggeri et al., 2016; Hultman et al., 2016). The UN has increased deployments of peacekeeping operations from 7 ongoing missions in 1992 to 50 deployments in the past 25 years. Out of the 50 deployments from the last 25 years, 14 are currently in operation.

Grieco et al. (2011) examined the relationship between International Organization approval and public opinion. They argue that the public faces an information problem as to what the real objectives of their leaders are and further the public lacks first hand information about the conflict and its strategic implications. They found that those who lack confidence in the President will seek a second opinion in the form of approval from International Organizations such as the UN. Tingley and Tomz (2012) shows that the public perceives UNSC authorization as an obligation to fulfill and found that public support for war was substantially higher when the UNSC had authorized a mission than when it had not. Hence, American politicians might be more likely to support multilateral operations or missions authorized by the UN as they expect the domestic public to be in favor of such engagements.

A disapproval from an International Organization may signal the contrary, that the policy is overly aggressive or costly. The President might decide to intervene without UN approval or public support,

yet such an action may be detrimental for his or her future reelection or popularity. The public might be, however, more forgiving if other factors such as levels of security interest are considered. Hence, this relationship might be dependent on the degree of security interest at stake, and/or the source and extent of an opposition involved in the conflict.

4.3.4 Rivalry mechanism

Despite that states do often turn to the UN for authorization to use force, they are not dependent on the decision of this body, or other members states for that matter (Thompson, 2006). States can initiate unilateral use of force or chose to support belligerents with material of men directly. This form of involvement is the most common and widespread form of external support in civil wars. States may chose to engage in enforcing one of the parties to the conflict if they want to change the outcome of the war. Leaders usually decide to engage in this form of support to increase their regional influence (Byman et al., 2001; Findley et al., 2012), to protect ideologically similar groups or populations in former territories (Cunningham, 2010; Salehyan et al., 2011; Byman, 2013), to protect their borders from proximity of war (Heraclides, 1990; Kathman, 2010), or simply as a projection of a state rivalry (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski, 2005; Findley and Teo, 2006; Salehyan, 2010; Maoz and San-Akca, 2012; Aydin and Regan, 2012; Salehyan et al., 2014).

The projection of state rivalries is largely an accepted reason for why states become involved in empowering belligerents. Political leaders often get involved in this indirect form of engagement, such as supporting insurgencies of a rival state, to weaken resources or punish one's enemy. This form of support does not require any form of UN approval. Often times, it is part of a covert operation. The President and relevant departments decide on the actions regarding involvement and contracts the CIA to initiate transactions. This gives the President an option of plausible deniability. Subsequently, congress regularly signs budgetary legislation that allocates funds for this purpose. One example of such support was providing arms to the Contra rebel group in Nicaragua by the Reagan Administration between 1981-1989 to prevent a possible Communist stronghold in Central America. The US Congress was limiting this support along the years in fear of escalating another civil war. Finally, Congress banned military and financial support for Contra rebels

in 1985, yet there is evidence that President Reagan continued supporting Contras in spite of this (Kinzer, 1986). Another example of US engagement in this form of intervention is US support for the current Saudi Arabia led air campaign against Houthi rebels in Yemen that has claimed thousands of civilian lives partly due to Riyadh's involvement. The US has been providing support to Saudi Arabia in the form of refueling its planes and providing intelligence (Board, 2018). The Houthi rebels allegedly receive support from Iran, a major rival of the US.

American politicians appear to have a tough decision to make when they are balancing their incentives to intervene in order to help their ally and the expectation that the public might be opposed to involvement which causes civilian casualties. However, as shown in the previous chapter, the American public is willing to support policies that target US rival states. This shows that the public may generally rally to support decisions targeting a common enemy.

4.3.5 Theoretical expectation

The most intuitive explanation is that politicians back interventionist policies to influence the outcome of conflict. The reasoning would be that intervening militarily on behalf of, or supporting, one party with men or material might help that party to prevail militarily and to bring a war to an end. When evaluating American interventions abroad, intuition and theory suggests that the political elites evaluate civil war interventions across three dimensions. First, and so far the most pronounced, has to do with interstate political rivalries. According to this, the theoretical explanation states that those who are in enmity with a country/group involved in conflict tend to support the opposing side. These types of interventions have been also known as 1"proxy wars1"and were widespread especially during the Cold War period. However despite the Cold War transition, the US-Russian rivalry could still be observed in ongoing civil wars such as Syria and Ukraine. This indicates that these types of interventions are still relevant. The logic is thus outlined in the Rivalry Hypothesis.

Rivalry Hypothesis: American politicians are more likely to support interventions in civil wars that involve adversary states/groups.

The second dimension focuses on the humanitarian mechanism. The intuition follows the reasoning that American leaders are likely to support such interventions that they expect the American public to support. The expectation is that the American public is willing to support interventions in only the most deadly conflicts. This is not to say that elected representatives cannot feel humanitarian responsibility and follow their own intuition to support engagements that might prevent civilian suffering. Even so, they have to balance their prospects for reelection and the strategic importance of US military engagements. American politicians will therefore follow the preferences of the public in cases when the US public is expected to support involvement. This line of reasoning is captured in the Humanitarian Hypothesis.

Humanitarian Hypothesis: American politicians are more likely to support the use of force in civil wars that threaten civilian lives than ones that do not.

The third dimension deals with whether the conflict could threaten American security interests. When it does, the decision makers should be more likely to approve of a US intervention. The general idea is that civil wars can spread conflict like contagion, creating cross-national or regional instability (Kathman 2011). This uncertainty can lead to increased security threats. Since Americans are extremely concerned about national security, American politicians should be more likely to support interventions into civil wars that threaten that interest. This argument is stated in the Security Hypothesis.

Security Hypothesis: American politicians are more likely to support interventions in civil wars that threaten US security interests than ones that do not.

Additionally, another strategy is to join an existing coalition of states or peacekeeping mission to intervene in a civil strife. The literature suggests that a multilateral characteristic of an intervention or UN backing makes it easier for politicians to decide (and consequently sell the decision to the public) whether to intervene or not. The intuition is that if there is a sufficient international consensus on the decision to intervene, then American political elites will be more likely to join the existing effort.

International Consensus Hypothesis: American politicians are more likely to support intervention in civil war when a coalition of states are involved than ones that are unilateral.

4.4 Research design

This study was investigative and exploratory in nature. This experimental study can be characterized as a quasi-experiment due to its non-equivalent group design (find further discussion on this in the section below on limitation of this study). The study was conducted in the form of a series of experiments (Trochim and Donnelly, 2007). The survey experiment is comprised of two parts. In the first part, political officials read a short vignette, supposedly taken from a recent Associate Press wire service report. The fictional scenario focused on the possibility of a military intervention in an escalating civil war. Within this vignette, there were three randomized factors, which relate the attributes of the dispute as well as the country and rebels involved in the conflict. The first factor centers on the potential level of violence that might occur during the dispute. The second captures whether the conflict could influence US strategic security interests. The third deals with whether the conflict had a potential to galvanize international consensus. A complete factorial design is used with 8 total treatment arms (2x2x2). In the second part, survey respondents were asked about the type of intervention that they might support, if any.

Following the first experiment, a second vignette experiment was displayed describing a fictional account of a crisis. Within the second vignette, the inability of the international community to agree on military action and rising level of civilian casualties were held constant. Further, in the second vignette, there is a randomization of the external military support to the opposite side of the conflict by one of the US political 'rivals' or 'allies'. Similarly, in the following part survey respondents were asked about what type of intervention they would be likely to support. See Table 12 for a summary of the two experiments or Appendix A that presents the vignettes and the questions.

The survey experiment was distributed to elected representatives on both local and state levels. Elected officials were sent a personalized email request to participate in the study (see the recruiting email in the Appendix B). The email introduced the study and steps of the survey. Respondents were told that the study was anonymized and that the research design had been previously reviewed according to IRB procedures. Emails for the elected representatives were been obtained from Butler and Crabtree (2017) who had used

Table 12: Summary of the vignette experiment

		Experiment 1:	Experiment 2:
Context		*Unknown country*	*Unknown country*
Scenario		*Autocratic government*	*UN unable to compromise*
		Democratic rebels	*Rise of civilian deaths*
Manipulated Cues:	*Humanitarian Cues*	*Massive casualties/* *Displaced population*	
	Security Cues	*ally's security/* *US security*	
	Int. Community Cue	*IC presence/* *IC absence*	
	Rivalry Cue		*Rival/* *Ally*
Dependent variables:		5-point oppose-support *scale*	5-point oppose-support *scale*

them for experiment examining ethnic bias of political elites. They reported that the emails have been collected by research assistants through web search [1]. The request to participate in a short survey was sent to almost 12,000 local representatives and to 7,155 state legislators. The final number of emails sent to the representatives, is however much smaller due to several limitations (see below subsection on limitations of the study). The experiment was administered in September 2018. Elected representatives were sent the first email request on 10 September 2018 and they were sent reminder a week later. They had almost 4 weeks in total for the completion of the survey before the data were collected.

The previous studies show that about 13% of all elected representatives participated in the experiments (Butler and Crabtree, 2017), although these studies dealt with topics that might be more relatable to the local level representatives. Support for military engagements might not be as attractive of a topic for local representatives as it is not within the scope of their responsibilities. While issues of foreign policy are not on the agenda of local politicians they represent a group of elected representatives. Furthermore, Congress members often start their political careers at the local level. In fact, during the 111th-112th US Congress, 67% of all members of Congress have had legislative political experience prior to Congress, and 81% had prior

[1] For further information about obtaining emails for political representatives please see Butler and Crabtree (2017)

political experience from local, state, or federal level (Francis, 2014). Out of the total sample of Congressional members investigated by Francis (2014), 221 had prior experience from state level government, 174 had state and local experience, and 84 had only experience from a local level. Therefore it is some possibility that some of the local political elites might be responsible for decisions on foreign policy issues in the future. Nonetheless, this is the closest approximation up-to-date in obtaining experimental data from political elite measuring their motivation and support for foreign policy engagements in civil wars.

4.4.1 Dependent variable

The support for the selected possible actions taken by the government were measured on a five-point scale. The respondents could chose how likely they would be to support each possible action from 'extremely likely', 'somewhat likely', 'nether likely nor unlikely', 'somewhat unlikely', and 'extremely unlikely'. The variable is coded from 1 to 5, where 1 stands for extremely likely and 5 to extremely unlikely. This means that decreasing direction of association would mean increased support.

The primary support variable measures how likely would the respondents be to support military interventions. By military interventions, this paper refers to a traditional unilateral military involvement including boots on the ground.

Additionally to support the use of ground forces in the experiment, respondents could choose from alternative actions they would support following randomly allocated treatment cues. The offer of actions to be taken by the President included authorization of military air-strikes, external support for rebels or the government, or multilateral use of force led by a coalition of states. The experiment also included support for more peaceful actions such as peace talks led by the US and seeking authorization from the UN. A wider variety of responses were chosen to extend the explanatory potential of this study.

4.4.2 Independent variable

Prior to reading the excerpt from the news article, the respondents were asked a series of screening questions about their age, gender identification, political ideology, current residency, and who did they vote for

during the last election (2016). Respondents were asked to determine their confidence in the government by answering how confident they were about the President's decision to initiate a military intervention. the answers were coded 1 if respondents were 'very confident' in the president's decision to intervene, to 'not at all confident' coded as 5 on a five-point scale. Additionally, to determine opinion about military interventions respondents were asked how effective, in their opinion, can military interventions be. Respondents were asked to indicate their support on the five-point scale ranging from 'very effective' coded as 1 to 'not at all effective' coded as 5.

Moreover, respondents were asked about the name of the country where the conflict takes place in their opinion, at the end of the experiment. This feature was included to make sure that respondents do not think of a specific country when responding and ensure that findings are generally interpretable. The answers from respondents included wide variety of countries from current conflicts like Syria, Myanmar, Ukraine, to Afghanistan, North Korea, or Venezuela. The next section will discuss the potential limitations of this chapter.

4.4.3 Potential limitations of the research design

There are a few limitations to this study. One of them has to do with the method of recruitment. To administer the experiment, over 19,000 emails were sent to political representatives. Only 583 politicians started the survey and only 502 fully finished, that makes the respond rate for this study around 2.62%. There are possible limitations to this method of outreach. First of all, not all emails were active, some of them were outdated, and some might not have reached the representative directly. Second, the respondents' return rate was higher from the local level than from the state level, which is the more desirable level to reach. The collected data consist of 278 local representatives and 68 state level representatives. Since, there was no reward for participants to finish the study, as in the previous chapter, the survey experienced a lot of drop outs that resulted in unfinished or poorly finished responses (see Appendix C for further detail on conditions for selection of final responses and demographics of respondents).

This limitation may also result in self-selection bias. This is, in particular, due to the fact that respondents

are left to choose themselves whether they are going to participate in the study or not. Self-selection bias is a major issue as the resulting data fail to provide randomized distribution of the treatment (Dunning, 2012). Random assignment is central to internal validity, which allows the researcher to make causal claims about the effect of the treatment. The low internal validity cannot determine causal claims (Angrist and Pischke, 2015). This is because there are possible confounding or unobserved variables stemming from the self-selection bias. The estimated treatment effect will reflect both the effect of the treatment and the effect of these unobserved characteristics (Trochim and Donnelly, 2007).

To check the severity of self-selection bias, some basic demographic information from participants have been collected. From the total amount of collected responses almost 80% elected official identified as male and 20% as female. This large disparity reflects the natural distribution of elected officials in the US Congress; during the 115th United States Congress (2017-2019) the representation of female elected official were 19.4%, the rest, 80.6% were male. Based on the statistics of 115th US Congress, 54% of elected officials were affiliated with the republican party while 44% with the democratic party and only 2 independent representatives (who caucus with democrats). According to the party affiliation, based on the respondents report, 35% represents democrats, almost 43% were republicans and 22% identified as independents. Those who identified as independents were asked to whether their considered themselves closer to democrats, republicans or neither. Results show almost equal division of those leaning towards democrats and republicans. These results leave the distribution between democrats and republicans intact. The reason for increased representation of independents in the sample might be due to the nature of small scale political races that do not require strict party affiliation as opposed to the higher level politics. One last demographic feature was taken from the respondents, that of a state residence. Out of 52 US states (D.C. and Puerto Rico included) the sample distribution hit 49 US states (See Table 18 in the Appendix for more information). Given the sample demographic is close enough to the profile of 115th US Congress and the distribution of treatment was executed by Qualtrics system randomizing algorithm, thus it was not motivated by gender, political identity, or other character attributes, this study is going to treat the sample as if random.

Other biases may potentially provide limitations to this study similarly as in the previous experiment.

Political elites may be subjected to conformity or social desirability bias. This bias may in fact manifest in two ways. First, some respondents may feel the pressure to respond in a socially desirable way when being observed. This may result in over-exaggeration of responses that the respondent generally perceive as socially acceptable over the true responses. The second may result from group conformity. Because the respondents were asked to choose the party they represent prior to vignette screening, they may feel primed to respond the way it is expected of them based on their political affiliation. This is particularly relevant given the extreme political polarization unfolding the US.

As in the previous chapter, this experiment includes a deception, that was approved by the Duke University IRB commission (protocol No 2018-0327). The respondents learned about the deception at the end of the questionnaire. Again, the deception included in the experiment provided respondents with the information that they are being shown with a real life conflict scenario. The reasons for including deception were to illustrate scenarios of civil wars that are difficult to arise naturally as in the previous chapter (Kimmel, 1998). As well as to prompt politicians to assume they are responding to a real life scenario to limit the effect of some biases stemming from not responding truthfully or answering differently that they otherwise would.

To limit biases stemming from a preconceived perception of a conflict —such as religion, previous conflict history or American involvement in the region —the location of the conflict was omitted from the vignette article. Following the vignette screening, respondents were asked which country, in their opinion, the conflict took place. The responses (346) vary across continents and countries, whereas the most answered countries include Syria (129), Venezuela (24) and Yemen (17). This adhere to the most current and severe conflicts. The results also show that American political elites are biased towards the middle east when thinking of a conflict associated with the US involvement. This is partly due to the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Yemen but might also be a result of the early 2000's US involvement in the region. Out of 346 responses, 54% (186) respondents thought the conflict was taking place in the Middle East, while only 9% (31) of answers indicated Latin America, 6% (21) Europe, 4% (13) Asia, 3% (11) Africa, and 1% (4) identified North America (USA) as the location where conflict took place. However, more than 23% (80) did not know or refused to indicate

the place of conflict.

Finally, it is important to address a crucial limitation of this study, the sample size. Stemming from a high-drop out of respondents and high level on non-response, this study resulted with a small sample size. Because the vignette experiment differentiates between 8 different vignette scenarios, the already small sample is the further divided into 8 diverse groups. This leaves the groups with different treatments with a very small number of respondents rendering the experiment under-powered. Problems resulted from an under-powered study may include high variability that may lead to biased results. This is also reflected in the lack of statistically significant results, since as the sample size increases the uncertainty about the mean population and p-value decreases.

4.5 Results and discussion

In general, political representatives show little support for unilateral use of force based on the scenarios from the fist experiment. Table 13 shows that only 3.2% of elected representatives in the sample would be extremely likely to support support a US unilateral military surge and 14.5% would be somewhat likely to support it. On the opposite side of the scale, almost 33% would be extremely unlikely to support ground forces and 27.7% would be somewhat unlikely to give their approval. As one could expect, proportionally Republicans were more likely to support US unilateral intervention, as opposed to both Democrats and Independents. Only 6% of Democrats and 9.3% of Independents were extremely or somewhat likely to support traditional military intervention whereas 31.3% of Republicans would be extremely likely or somewhat likely to support unilateral use of force. While 76.6% of Democrats and 62.5% of Independent would oppose such interventions, only 49% of Republicans would be in opposition to them.

Within the sample, 173 elected representatives would have confidence in the President's decision to initiate a military intervention and 118 would not be very confident or not confident at all in this decision, the rest were neither confident nor doubtful. One possible interpretation for the relatively high number of representatives lacking confidence in the President's decision to send troops overseas might be that political representatives would make their decision based on the current administration. Indeed, 79 representatives out

of 118 that lack confidence in the President were Democrats. Another, perhaps less plausible, explanation might be that elected representatives do not have the trust in the President's military authorization in general, granted the long history of efforts to limit presidential war powers. Interestingly, out of those who had confidence in the President only 56 representatives would be likely to support military intervention while 71 would be likely to oppose it. From politicians who had no confidence in the President's decision to intervene, none would support militarily involvement and hence all 118 representatives would be opposed to such a decision. Evidently, Fisher's Exact test confirms that the proportional difference in both cases are statistically significant ($p < 0.01$).

Moreover, this sample contains 268 politicians who think military interventions could be extremely, very, or moderately effective, and only 78 think that interventions are not very or at all effective. Out of those who thought interventions could be effective, 60 were likely to support use of force following the treatment conditions and 142 were unlikely to grant their approval. Consequently, out of those that deemed military interventions ineffective, 0 would support the use of force and 68 would oppose it. Likewise the proportional tests confirm that both cases of proportional difference were statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). The next section will more closely analyze the effects of the treatment conditions on the support for individual actions the respondents would support in humanitarian crises.

Table 13: Overall support for the military intervention based on political affiliation

	How likely are you to support US military intervention?			
	all respondents	*Democrats*	*Republicans*	*Independents*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Extremely Likely	11(3.2%)	2(1.7%)	7(4.8%)	2(2.6%)
Somewhat Likely	50(14.5%)	5(4.3%)	39(26.5%)	6(7.7%)
Neither	75(21.7%)	21(17.4%)	33(22.4%)	21(26.6%)
Somewhat Unlikely	96(27.7%)	41(27.9%)	41(30.6%)	21(26.6%)
Extremely Unlikely	114(32.9%)	59(48.8%)	27(18.4%)	28(35.9%)
Total	346	121	147	132

4.5.1 Results from Experiment 1

The vignette randomizes 3 different cues: the magnitude of violence, level of security, and whether the international community has made its first attempt to reconcile the belligerents. This resulted in 8 distinct vignettes that were randomly shown to political representatives. Table 14 shows regression results fitted by linear and ordered logistic model for support of military interventions and military air-strikes based on treatment conditions. The results do not reach statistical significance for all treatments, which might be, at least in part, due to limited number of respondents.

Since p-values tend to become smaller as the sample size increases, unless H0 is true, the number of observations is important for statistically significant results. This relation is apparent in the lack of statistical significance in the findings and is connected to small number of the sample size. All coefficients are estimated against the baseline category AS-IC-MC, where AS stands for US ally's security interests, IC describes the consensus of the international community and first attempt of engagement to resolve the dispute, and MC indicates massive casualties.

From the first model estimating support for military interventions, it is visible that confidence in the President and opinion on effectiveness of military interventions could play a significant role in the variance. As the confidence in the President decreases, the support for military interventions decreases in kind. Likewise, as the opinion on effectiveness of military interventions approaches skeptical, the support for military interventions decreases, both having high statistical significance ($p<0.01$). The same applies for the second set of models estimating support for military air-strikes.

Based on the models from Table 14 it might be difficult to discern any effect individual cues have on the support for the use of force. Given that the baseline category for the vignettes is AS-IC-MC (see the footnote for explanation of abbreviated)[2], the resulting coefficients for other treatments only show the difference and the directionality of these relationships with respect to the baseline category. It can be observed that going from massive casualties in the baseline category to the treatment of displaced population in the

[2]MC indicates treatment describes massive casualties; DP indicates treatment describes displaced population. AS describes allies's security; USS describes US's security. IC indicates treatment describes international community; no-IC describes absence of international community.

Table 14: Regression Results for the Experiment 1

	Dependent variable: Support for			
	Military Interventions		Military Air-strike	
	OLS	*OL*	*OLS*	*OL*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age	0.001	0.003	0.006	0.012
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.009)
Gender	0.003	−0.003	0.176	0.372
	(0.127)	(0.254)	(0.142)	(0.250)
Political Affiliation	−0.004	−0.080	−0.151*	−0.251*
	(0.076)	(0.149)	(0.085)	(0.145)
Confidence in President	0.280***	0.512***	0.234***	0.408***
	(0.049)	(0.099)	(0.054)	(0.096)
Effectiveness of Interventions	0.330***	0.655***	0.312***	0.535***
	(0.061)	(0.127)	(0.068)	(0.123)
AS-IC-DP	0.153	0.263	−0.118	−0.135
	(0.200)	(0.398)	(0.225)	(0.384)
AS-noIC-MC	−0.111	−0.159	0.160	0.335
	(0.208)	(0.400)	(0.233)	(0.394)
AS-noIC-DP	0.086	0.170	−0.168	−0.264
	(0.205)	(0.399)	(0.230)	(0.402)
USS-IC-MC	0.055	0.116	−0.142	−0.206
	(0.196)	(0.388)	(0.219)	(0.373)
USS-IC-DP	0.275	0.620	0.084	0.164
	(0.196)	(0.398)	(0.220)	(0.376)
USS-noIC-MC	0.027	0.111	−0.168	−0.306
	(0.195)	(0.383)	(0.219)	(0.379)
USS-noIC-DP	−0.103	−0.295	−0.072	−0.120
	(0.205)	(0.405)	(0.229)	(0.398)
Constant	1.831***		3.572***	
	(0.376)		(0.421)	
Observations	346	346	346	346
Adjusted R^2	0.330		0.305	
F Statistic (df = 12; 333)	15.186***		13.632***	

Note: (-) indicates greater support *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 10: Support for Military Intervention by Experimental Condition



Predicted Probability of Support for Military Intervention by experimental condition. MC treatment describes massive casualties; DP treatment describes displaced population. AS treatment describes allies's security; USS treatment atment describes US's security. IC treatment describes international community; no-IC treatment describes the absence of international community. Sample sizes for each treatment group are: AS, IC, MC (n = 48); AS, IC, DP, (n = 43); AS, no-IC, MC (n = 37); AS, no-IC, DP (n = 39); USS, IC, MC (n = 47); USS, IC, DP (n = 46); USS, no-IC, MC (n = 47); USS, no-IC, DP (n = 39).

first estimated coefficient for treatment effect (AS-IC-DP) shows 30.03% decrease in support for military intervention, holding everything else constant. The second coefficient (AS-noIC-MC) estimates a 14.69% increase in support for military involvement where the difference in treatment is in the absence of international consensus. Subsequently, estimating another discrete change going from the base category to AS-noIC-DP, manipulating the change to absence of international consensus and displaced population, indicates a 18.50% decrease in support for military intervention, holding all else equal. Up until now the treatment providing a risk of massive casualties saw an increasing tendency in support of military interventions as well as the absence of international consensus. The following treatment conditions, USS-IC-MC and USS-noIC-MC, where the magnitude of violence was manipulated to massive casualties seem to be decreasing the support for military intervention by 12.25% and 11.72% respectively, holding everything else constant. This association is, however, estimated in relationship to the baseline category, therefore, it might be useful to visualize relationship between pairs of vignettes that hold certain cues at specific values and vary the level of violence.

Figure 10 shows a graph of predicted probabilities for military support based on experimental condition. The connecting lines bridge pairs of those treatments that hold the security and international community cues at the same value but differentiate magnitude of violence, so one can easily observe how the change from massive casualties to displaced population changes the support for military interventions. As observed from the models in Table 14, the graph of predicted probabilities in Figure 10 demonstrates that on average, the higher magnitude of violence increases the support for unilateral use of force. The only treatment that appears to go against this assumption is the treatment condition USS-noIC-DP, featured last in Table 14 (1) and (2). According to Table 14, going from the base line category to USS-noIC-DP increases support for ground force by 25.52%, holding everything else constant. One reason for this might be that the composition of respondents that were treated with this vignette were different in nature from the rest. Looking closer at the sample of elected representatives in the USS-noIC-DP category of treatment shows unequal distribution of respondents who thought that military interventions are very effective relative to other treatment groups. Within USS-noIC-DP category 82.05% of all respondents in this group thought military interventions could make an effective change contrary to the group treated with the baseline category where only 33.33% thought of military interventions as effective. It is reasonable to assume that such sample of respondents might be more likely to support military intervention regardless of the differential levels of treatment.

To estimate the average effect of humanitarian cues on the predicted probability of support for military intervention, Figure 11 graph A shows the mean predicted probability for each category of violence weighted by a number of respondents presented with massive casualties or displaced population cues of how likely respondents were to support military intervention. There is 13.59% increase in predicted probability of support for military interventions between those respondents who were presented with massive casualties.

Additionally, it seems that those treatment pairs which lacked international consensus scored somewhat higher in predicted probabilities for military support. To check this, the mean predicted probability for each category of international consensus cues was calculated and weighted by the number of respondents for each category as in the previous case. Figure 11 graph B shows a 26.87% increase in predicted probability of military support for those respondents that have been presented with the absence of international consensus

Figure 11: Support for Military Intervention based on Randomized Cues



Note: Figures are used to capture directionality of the relationship therefore confidence intervals are excluded from the graph

over those presented with presence of international consensus.

Table 14 displays results for the second set of models estimating support for military air-strikes. The association yields different results than in the case of military interventions. The reason for this might be the distinct features of air-strikes for which their use is primarily promoted. First and foremost, air-strikes are promoted as they tremendously reduce the risk to national military losses. This sought to decrease the opposition to the government's decision to initiate attack. Air-strikes can be also used to send a powerful message and attack the enemy without long-term and costly commitments, which may affect the support as well. The public generally opposes military interventions that involve lethal risk for national troops. Therefore, politicians might be more likely to support air-strikes, as the public's aversion towards military losses might be less consequential.

Furthermore, in Table 14, it is visible that the effect of manipulated cues has a different influence on support for air-strikes than on traditional use of force. The estimate for first experimental condition shows that going from the baseline category AS-IC-MC to AS-IC-DP increases the support for air-strikes by 12.66%, holding everything else constant. This means that, unlike in the previous case, the displaced population increases the probability for support of the use of force. The support for air-strike authorization decreases by 39.83% for AS-noIC-MC, holding all else equal. Contrary to the previous results, the absence of international consensus seems to decrease the support for the use of force. The third estimate shows that the absence

Figure 12: Support for Military Air-strikes by Experimental Condition



Predicted Probability of Support for Military Intervention by experimental condition. MC treatment describes massive casualties; DP treatment describes displaced population. AS treatment describes allies's security; USS treatment describes US's security. IC treatment describes international community; no-IC treatment describes the absence of international community. Sample sizes for each treatment group are: AS, IC, MC (n = 48); AS, IC, DP, (n = 43); AS, no-IC, MC (n = 37); AS, no-IC, DP (n = 39); USS, IC, MC (n = 47); USS, IC, DP (n = 46); USS, no-IC, MC (n = 47); USS, no-IC, DP (n = 39).

of international consensus paired with a displaced population increases the support for an aerial attack by 23.22%, holding everything else equal. Those that have received treatments manipulating risk to US security interests seem to be more likely to support air-strikes with the presence of international consensus and threat of massive civilian casualties. All else equal, the fourth treatment, USS-IC-MC, shows an 18.59% increase in support for the use of air-strikes. Furthermore, political elites seem to be less likely to support air-strikes when US security interests are at stake and when the threat was reduced to displaced population. Holding all else equal, politicians are 17.82% less likely to support military air-trikes when treatment changes from the baseline category to the USS-IC-MC treatment. Moreover, once the treatment altered the security interests from US ally's to US security interests, the support for air-strike authorization increases in both treatment groups that lacked international consensus. Holding everything else constant, in both USS-noIC-MC and USS-no-IC-DP treatments, US politicians are 26.35% and 11.27% more likely to support use of aerial attacks, respectively.

To get a better picture of how the security cue shapes the support of political elites for use of air-strikes,

a visualization might be useful. Figure 12 portrays paired treatments that show the relationship of changing the humanitarian cue. A clear difference in direction of these relationship can be observed between the treatments of threats to either an ally's security or US security interests. Those groups of respondents treated with a threat to the US security were more likely to support air-strikes when expectation of violence toward civilians was higher. On the contrary, those that were treated with a threat to US ally's security would be less likely to support air-strikes with the expectation of massive casualties. In this situation, politicians were more likely to support the use of aerial forces when the magnitude of violence was lower.

It seems that politicians are interested in saving civilian lives only when US interests are at stake. They are also more likely to intervene with aerial bombing when there is a threat of eruption of a displaced population when ally's interests are at stakes. Changing the security interest from US ally's to US security interests seems to redirect the priority to act more consistently with what is traditionally deemed as public values. One possible explanation is that US politicians realize that once US interests are at stake, the media will be more interested in reporting on the US actions in the target country. Expectation of closer scrutiny by the public might in turn create an incentive for politicians to support such actions that would be more desirable for the public eye, such as preventing civilian lives. Once the US security interests are no longer in danger, saving civilian lives might seem less appealing. The attention of the public might not be drawn by the conflict as much as in the case of US security interests, at least in part due to lack of public and, in turn, media attention. However, once the conflict could produce waves of refugee flows, support for the use of air-strikes increases. One explanation for this result might have to do with the latest experience with the Syrian conflict, which created mass migration flow from the Middle East and surrounded areas. Based on this experience, among others, the public might have become more sensitive to the news about refugee influx. Therefore, total inaction of American government in crises susceptible to produce large numbers of displaced population with the potential of incoming refugees to the US might end up becoming as unpopular decision among the public. There is one limitation to this distinction and that it is sometimes difficult to untangle the two phenomena. In civil wars, losses in civilian lives are often accompanied by large numbers of a displaced population and vice versa.

Table 15: Regression Results from Experiment 1

	Dependent variable: Support for		
	Peace Talks	UNSC Resolution	Coalition of States
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	0.006	−0.008	−0.001
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Gender	0.020	−0.084	0.568**
	(0.269)	(0.261)	(0.250)
Political Affiliation	0.157	0.576***	0.225
	(0.157)	(0.156)	(0.143)
Confidence in President	−0.012	−0.228**	−0.008
	(0.100)	(0.098)	(0.092)
Effectiveness of Intervention	0.057	0.233*	0.442***
	(0.129)	(0.128)	(0.123)
AS-IC-DP	−0.451	−0.101	0.038
	(0.413)	(0.393)	(0.393)
AS-noIC-MC	−0.565	−0.975**	−0.781*
	(0.433)	(0.430)	(0.404)
AS-noIC-DP	−0.854**	−1.240***	−0.136
	(0.430)	(0.435)	(0.394)
USS-IC-MC	−0.430	−0.797**	−0.651*
	(0.402)	(0.391)	(0.386)
USS-IC-DP	−0.836**	−0.782**	−0.793**
	(0.410)	(0.388)	(0.381)
USS-noIC-MC	−0.345	−0.560	−0.587
	(0.390)	(0.387)	(0.383)
USS-noIC-DP	−0.851**	−0.366	−0.856**
	(0.432)	(0.397)	(0.394)
Observations	346	346	346

Note:(-) indicates greater support *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Another possible explanation lies in the strategic interest of the US ally. US politicians might find themselves in a situation when they have to find a balance between public support and commitment to help an ally. Since air-strikes reduce the possibility of military losses, US politicians seem to be willing to use the air-strikes to help an ally in their pursuit of strategic interests and to not over-commit their resources or policies. A good way of thinking about this is the example of the conflict in Yemen. The US ally, Saudi Arabia, has been involved military in Yemen to fight Houthi rebels who overthrew the government of Mansur Hadi in 2015. This conflict has claimed 6,660 civilian lives and displaced 2 million people, according to the United Nations Human Rights Office, since March 2015 up to August 2018 (OHCHR, 2018). A Saudi led campaign is deemed to be responsible for at least a third of the casualties. The US has been supporting the Saudi Coalition in their campaign with air refueling and intelligence despite the UN calling on Saudi Arabia to halt their brutal campaign. Despite the allegedly limited involvement of the US in the conflict, some Congress members have attempted to issue a resolution to stop the support for this war at the end of February 2018. The resolution was rejected by a majority of Republicans and some Democrats. The conflict in Yemen has not sparked the interest of the public as much as Syria, possibly because of the scale of the conflict compared to the Syrian conflict but also because the nature of aid to the government and strategic interest in Yemen is not so evident.

Additionally, this experiment estimates how these treatments affect support for the remaining dependent variables. The rest of the dependent variables are meant to measure support for more peaceful and multilateral involvements such as mediation efforts, seeking UNSC resolution or seeking a multilateral coalition of states for intervention. The results in Table 15 show increase of support for most of the treated groups. These engagements enjoy more universal support from political elites. Almost 90% of all political representatives would support peace talks initiated by the US, while only 4% would oppose it. Out of all politicians who participated in the study, 73.12% would be supportive of an initiative to seek UNSC resolution and 66.76% would support an attempt to seek a coalition of states for joint intervention. These numbers stand in stark contrast to 17.63% support for traditional military intervention or 32.94% support for military air-strike.

Interestingly, the support for seeking UNSC Resolution seems to have larger variation based on political

affiliation. 87.6% of all Democrats were in support of UNSC Resolution, 78.2% Independents would as well support such action, and only 57.9% Republicans would support a US initiative to ask for UN authorization.

4.5.2 Results from Experiment 2

Treatment in the second experiment was limited only to two treatment arms manipulating the identity of supporter for the autocratic government. The vignette delineates a scenario where two belligerents keep fighting despite a previously agreed ceasefire. The UN is unable to reach an agreement or produce a resolution. As the autocratic government and rebels continue fighting, the civilian death toll continues to rise. The respondents were told that the support for the government was coming either from a US rival or a US ally. The rivalry cue builds on the previous experiment, which as expected resulted in large support for use of multilateral force and use of unilateral force precisely in instances where the UN was unable to intervene. States often get involved in providing military aid to belligerents to indirectly weaken the capacity of involved competing states or to diminish their pursuit of strategic interests. This may provoke counterbalancing and thus intensify support by a rival state to the opposing government or insurgency, rendering such conflicts deadlier and longer (Cunningham, 2010; Byman, 2013).

This behavior is not only pertinent to the bipolar world during the Cold War. Countries all around the world have employed this tactic to indirectly weaken their enemies. For instance Iran, as well as Saudi Arabia, have been projecting their feuds by providing support to multiple rebel groups around and outside the Middle East to weaken each other's regional influence. Russia has been providing support to secessionist groups in Ukraine or Abkhazia to keep surrounding countries, once belonging to Soviet Block, from joining the Western Alliance. The US alone was involved in arming the government in El Salvador fighting FMLN rebels in the early 90s, supplying weapons and material support to Contra rebels in Nicaragua from early 80s throughout the duration of conflict, and more recently arming and training anti-Assad Syrian Rebel groups, an effort that was reportedly canceled over the Summer of 2017.

The results from Experiment 2 are shown in Table 16. From the first set of models it is visible that if the US rival supports an autocratic government, support from the US politicians to aid that government

Table 16: Regression Results from Experiment 2

	Dependent variable:			
	Government Support		Rebel Support	
	OLS	*ordered logistic*	*OLS*	*ordered logistic*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age	−0.006	−0.014	0.001	−0.0002
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.009)
Gender	−0.021	−0.070	0.087	0.094
	(0.139)	(0.246)	(0.143)	(0.241)
Political Affiliation	−0.042	−0.078	0.060	0.076
	(0.084)	(0.142)	(0.087)	(0.145)
Confidence in President	0.163***	0.288***	0.115**	0.192**
	(0.054)	(0.091)	(0.055)	(0.091)
Effectiveness of Intervention	0.317***	0.588***	0.245***	0.437***
	(0.067)	(0.121)	(0.069)	(0.119)
Rival	0.360***	0.606***	−0.286**	−0.501**
(base = Ally)	(0.114)	(0.200)	(0.117)	(0.198)
Constant	4.164***		4.186***	
	(0.393)		(0.403)	
Observations	346	346	346	346
R^2	0.217		0.119	
Adjusted R^2	0.203		0.103	
Residual Std. Error (df = 339)	1.048		1.075	
F Statistic (df = 6; 339)	15.648***		7.597***	
Note: (-) indicates greater support				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

with weapons or men decreases by 45.43%, holding all other variables constant. This results is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$). Consequently, if the same is true, US politicians are 64.97% more likely to aid rebel group with material support if the rival state supplies the opposite side, holding all else constant. This result also reaches statistical significance ($p < 0.05$). All in all, these findings corroborates previous conclusions (Byman et al., 2001; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski, 2005; Findley and Teo, 2006) about the nature of external support. States and their leaders are likely to supply belligerents in civil wars if one or more competing powers are involved in supporting the opposite side. This also confirms the *Rivalry Hypothesis* that American politicians are more likely to support interventions in civil wars that involve adversary states.

Overall, the support for belligerents obtained relatively low support. Out of the entire sample of US representatives, 23.69% would support aiding the government while 47.1% would oppose it. Similarly, 24.56% of US politicians would be in support of helping out the rebel group while 45.1% would oppose such engagement. Within the sample of pro-government supporters, 62.2% of the US politicians would provide support to an autocratic government if their ally was involved in supporting it and 37.8% of respondents would provide support to the government if a rival country was already involved in supporting it. This proves that US politicians would try to honor the relationship with their allies, despite the ideology of the government and rising number of civilian casualties. At the same time, from those who would be likely to support the rebels, 62.35% would provide military aid to rebel group if the government was empowered by a rival state and only 37.64% would still support the rebels if a US ally was supplying the government. This proves that (1) US politicians are likely to support involvement in a civil war to weaken their enemy, but they are also (2) likely to support engagement to help an ally in pursuing its strategic interest.

The civil war in Yemen is again an example where such balancing can be observed. The US government is willing to support its ally, Saudi Arabia, in pursuing aerial bombing against the Houthi rebels, despite the rising level of civilian casualties. It had been suggested that the Houthi rebels are allegedly armed and trained by Iran. This may come as no surprise given the long history of deteriorating relations between Iran and the US ever since the Iranian revolution 1979. Iran has been the US rival for over 35 year, until the US together with other states negotiated Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, commonly known as Iran

Nuclear Deal, in January 2016. However, with the change of US administration, the US position towards Iran changed back to the pre-deal stance. It may be no coincidence that President Trump withdrew from Iranian deal in early May 2018. The US have been allegedly intensifying support for Saudi Arabia in the past months (Board, 2018).

Besides external support for belligerents, only 21.1% of US politicians would support unilateral intervention and 57.51% would oppose it. 32.36% of elected representatives would, however, support the use of air-strikes in this situation whereas 44.79% would oppose them. Although, 68.78% would support multilateral intervention by a coalition of states with only 16.76% opposing such engagement. The distinctions between a rival or an ally supporting the government were quite small, suggesting rather universal support in both cases.

This paper provided evidence based on data from a survey experiment of political elites about their motivation for support of governmental actions in civil wars. Evidence from this data are the first of its kind in the field of conflict dynamics and international affairs. Yet, the avenues for further experiments with political elites are ripe for a closer examination. Further research on how political elites decide about the magnitude of external support for belligerents may be a good starting point.

In conclusion, it is useful to address the issue of generalizability of these findings. First, as in the previous chapter, the sample is not fully representative of the population of US political elites. This is due to the selection bias, small sample size, and drawing the sample in part from local level of government. Second, in reality, decision-makers would presumably receive even more detailed briefing about an ongoing civil conflict and potential strategies on how to get involved from a credible government institution, group of experts, or military generals rather than a media article. There is a plethora of other factors that may influence the opinion of the decision-maker about his or her support for any foreign involvement that the experimental treatment might have underestimated. Since involvement into a civil war of a foreign country is a serious decision, it might require more in depth analysis of the conflict and evaluation of pros and cons of such action. It is also necessary to take into consideration the differences in reception of the treatment in the real life and strong influence of adherence to party politics. The purpose of this exercise was to merely determine

potential triggers of support for certain civil war engagements in political elites.

Finally, as in the previous chapter, the sample exclusively focuses on American political elite that can have bearing on generalization to other population of political elites coming from different countries. Provided America is a democratic superpower, political elites of, for example, Russia or China do not have to consider public opinion to as great an extent, as their reelection might not be threatened by public account as much as that of American political elites.

4.6 Conclusion

Since early 90's, the attention of humanitarian crises in Rwanda, Somalia, or Bosnia have changed the way the world views the role of the international community in matters of global politics. The responsibility to protect civilians from atrocities of war has become the main catalyst for support of joint actions such as peacekeeping. Yet, the current events in Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen have shown the limitations of joint action via the UN and the damages of isolated attempts to change the course of war by leaders of invested countries. This chapter provides unique data acquired from a survey experiment with political elites on their decision-making in times of crises.

The main conclusion from the first vignette experiment that can be drawn is that politicians, in their support for military engagements, are motivated by humanitarian impulse. Support for traditional ground forces substantively increases in cases that may become lethal for civilian populations. This support is highest when there is a lack of consensus on the side of the international community, forcing other states to engage in isolated support to belligerents. Support for interventionist policies was generally low, suggesting that once this decision is taken it comes with the responsibility of long-term and costly commitments and the possibility of high military casualties, that are unpopular among general public.

On the other hand, while support for authorization of air-strikes increased with the expectation of growing civilian casualties, this increase is contingent upon whether the US has a vested security interest in the target country. Political elites seem to be more concerned with the strategic security interest than civilian victimization when evaluating the possibilities of governmental actions in civil war engagement. It does seem that political elites anticipate increased attention by the media when US interests are at stake, hence an increased interest of the public. There is a strong expectation that the public will prefer to engage in a conflict that may generate high casualties. Therefore, the political elites will generally follow public preference, or an expectation of public preference, in cases where they expect a high interest by the media and the public.

The results found that the largest support of US politicians for governmental action in civil wars engage-

ments were precisely support for diplomatic efforts, UNSC authorization for peacekeeping, and multilateral intervention in both experiments. Whereas the second vignette treatment showed that there was a significant increase in support for external military support to arm rebels and government. This experiment revealed that American politicians were likely to send external support to belligerents in civil wars if one of the US rivals is involved in supplying the opposite side. Concurrently, politicians seemed to be willing to support the same belligerent with war-time supplies when one of their allies is already reinforcing the belligerent. Though importantly, this form of involvement in civil wars was found to prolong and intensify conflicts and make them more resistant to negotiated solutions. It can be speculated that politicians do engage in this form of support not to end, but to prolong some conflicts; arguably, the existence of political turmoil in some regions might be beneficial for foreign or economic affairs of other states.

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Appendices

Appendix: Survey Instruments

E.1 Experiment 1:

Vignette.1:

Please read below an excerpt from a recent Associated Press report. We have redacted the name of the country that this report describes.

"In recent weeks, the dispute between an autocratic government, which has a long-standing trade relationship with the United States, and a rebel faction has increased substantially. Formal ties between the groups have dissolved and national and rebel leaders have recently issued public statements warning about the imminent possibility of violent clashes. Furthermore, the rebel leaders have claimed they are willing to fight for democratic values. In light of this, leading members of the international community have begun to ask whether the United States might provide military or material support to the government or the rebel group of the country in dispute. The general concern is that [humanitarian cue]. [security cue]. [International consensus cue]"

Randomized cues:

Humanitarian cues

- "the conflict will soon lead to a large number of displaced population in the region"
- "the conflict will soon lead to massive casualties in the region"

Security cues:

- "In addition, if this conflict continues, it would likely damage the US's security interests"
- "In addition, if this conflict continues, it would not likely damage one the US allies' security interests"

International consensus cues:

– "Nevertheless, the international community has made its first join attempt to engage in the conflict"

– "Since, the international consensus over the dispute was not reached, several isolated attempts of external military support to both the government and the rebel faction were initiated"

E.2 Experiment 2:

Vignette.2:

Please read below an excerpt from a recent Associated Press report. We have redacted the name of the country that this report describes.

"After a series of unsuccessful efforts of the government and the rebel faction to prevail in the conflict, both parties decided to enter the first round of peace negotiations. Engaging in the peace talks while the truce has been violated, by both sides, ensures the continuation of the conflict and the rise of civilian death tolls. Since the direct action by the UN could not be agreed upon, one of the major political US [Rivalry Cue] started supporting the government with military equipment and intelligence."

Following both vignettes, the respondents were asked to chose ho likely they are to support distinct interventions.

	Extremely Likely	Somewhat Likely	Neither	Somewhat Unlikely	Extremely Unlikely
Q1	○	○	○	○	○
Q2	○	○	○	○	○
Q3	○	○	○	○	○
Q4	○	○	○	○	○
Q5	○	○	○	○	○
Q6	○	○	○	○	○
Q7	○	○	○	○	○

Note: Questions Q1-Q7 indicate support for: Q1 = unilateral military intervention, Q2 = military air-strike; Q3 = peace talks led by the US; Q4 = support for UNSC resolution; Q5 = multilateral intervention; Q6 = rebel aid; Q7 = government aid

Appendix: Recruitment Material

The emails were personalized and addressed respondents either by their name or by the name of the city they represent

Dear *City* Representative / Legislator *Name*,

My name is Hana Bredikova and I am conducting research on the attitudes of American decision-makers towards the US involvement in civil wars. The research project is hosted at the Duke University. This project aims to understand what drives the support of American political elites to back an executive's decision to get involved in militarized conflicts. We would like to know your anonymized opinion on these issues.

Please, follow the link below to access the survey:

link to the survey

Or copy and paste the URL below into your Internet browser:

alternative link to the survey

In this survey, you will be asked to read a short excerpt from an Associated Press article followed by series of questions, which will be asking about your opinion on the forms of the US interventions in humanitarian crises you would support, if any.

Completing an online survey will take approximately 5-7 minutes. Your responses will be confidential, and we will not collect personal identifying information such as your name, or IP address. All data is stored in a password protected electronic format. To help protect your confidentiality, this survey will not contain information that will personally identify you. The results of this study will be used for scholarly purposes only and may be shared with Duke University representatives.

If you have any questions about the research study, please contact Hana Bredikova directly at hana.bredikova@duke.edu. This research has been reviewed according to Duke University IRB procedures for research involving human

subjects. If you have questions about your rights as a research subject, contact Duke's research review committee at campusirb@duke.edu or at 919-684-3030.

Thank you for your consideration,

Best regards,

Hana Bredikova

Appendix: Respondents Demographic

The experiment was administered on 10 September 2018. Political representatives were sent first email on this date and a reminder a week later. After that, they had almost 3 weeks to complete the survey before the data were collected. Collected data included 502 responses. Due to inconsistencies and missing responses additional 156 responses had to be excluded from the final sample. For information about the sample demographics, please, consult below Table 16.

Table 18: Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

	Number of respondents	Sample percentage
Gender:		
Male	271	79.5
Female	75	20.5
Party Identification		
Democrats	121	34.9
Republicans	147	42.5
Independents	78	22.5
Confidence in President:		
Confident	173	50.0
Neither	55	15.9
Not Confident	118	34.1
Effectiveness of Interventions:		
Very Effective	124	35.8
Moderately effective	144	41.6
Not effective	78	22.5
Observations:	346	346

Notes. Data are displayed only for one experiment as both experiments were executed with the same sample.

Additionally, state of residence was collected from the participants. The table below shows state of residence of all participants. Out of 52 states (D.C. and Puerto Rico) the distribution includes 49 US states, the only missing were representatives of Delaware. While the most responses came from representatives of

Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, Minnesota and New York, the lest responsive were Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina and West Virginia.

Table 19: Summary statistic of state residence

Alabama	1	Idaho	7	Mississippi	3	Oklahoma	1	Washington	12
Alaska	2	Illinois	24	Missouri	5	Oregon	9	West Virginia	1
Arizona	1	Indiana	10	Montana	3	Pennsylvania	15	Wisconsin	13
Arkansas	4	Iowa	12	Nebraska	2	Puerto Rico	0	Wyoming	2
California	6	Kansas	8	Nevada	1	Rhode Island	3	NA	2
Colorado	5	Kentucky	3	New Hampshire	9	South Carolina	1		
Connecticut	7	Louisiana	4	New Jersey	5	South Dakota	3		
Delaware	0	Maine	5	New Mexico	1	Tennessee	10		
District of Columbia	0	Maryland	2	New York	17	Texas	6		
Florida	8	Massachusetts	12	North Carolina	14	Utah	11		
Georgia	1	Michigan	18	North Dakota	3	Vermont	7		
Hawaii	3	Minnesota	17	Ohio	24	Virginia	4		

Appendix: Conflict Perception

Table 20: Summary statistic of Conflict Perception

Afghanistan	8	Iran	8	Philippines	1
Africa	1	Iraq	6	Saudi Arabia	2
Baltic state	1	Israel	5	Somalia	2
Bosnia	1	Lebanon	1	Sudan	4
China	2	Libya	3	Syria	129
Colombia	1	Mexico	4	Turkey	10
Congo	1	Middle East	1	Ukraine	6
Cuba	2	Myanmar	3	USA	4
DRC	1	Nigeria	2	Venezuela	24
Egypt	3	North Korea	7	Yemen	17
I don't know	80	Norway	1		
Iceland	2	Palestine	3		

Conclusion

For the past three decades, instances of third-party efforts to intervene in civil conflicts between governments and rebel groups have rapidly increased, both in terms of the number of peacekeeping missions deployed, mediators dispatched, and military assistance to belligerents delivered, as well as the type of actors invested in these processes. Accordingly, both scholars and policy analysts have become progressively more interested in two related issues, effectiveness and determinants of these third-party interventions.

Following this thread, scholarly literature and policy analysis have separately analyzed these two issues. The determinants and effectiveness of third-party interventions are, however, closely intertwined issues and one without the other lacks the complete picture. In order to understand whether third-party interventions in civil wars are beneficial for war-torn societies, three empirical chapters were designed to address these interrelated relationships.

The first empirical chapter focused on efficiency of third-party interventions and their interactive effects on the continuation of violence. It identified those strategies that are best set to anchor peace by linking intervention strategies and violence reduction. The second empirical chapter surveyed sample of the American population to identify the determinants of support for individual third-party actions. The last of the empirical chapters audited members of the American political elite about determinants of their decision-making about US involvement in civil wars using a vignette survey experiment. This thesis examined why and how decisions about employing foreign policy actions are made and which of these strategies are efficient in attenuating violence. Three empirical chapters using a multi-method approach were designed to provide a complete picture and to answer the question on whether third-party interventions are desirable.

Before diving into empirical findings and policy implications that can be drawn from these chapters, it is important to mention several methodological challenges and improvements this thesis presented. Instead of focusing on only one side of the problem arising from third-party interventions, this thesis took a more encompassing direction. It examined three different angles of the problem and engaged three actors using a multi-method approach. Each of the methods used comes with a distinct set of strengths and limitations.

These are discussed in the first methodological chapter. In order to compensate for the lack of random assignment presented in the first empirical chapter, due to its observational character, two provisions were implemented. Since observational methods are unable to establish causal relationships due to statistical issues such as omitted variable bias and confoundedness, among others, there are provisions that can improve the precision of the results. To increase precision of the estimates the number of observations in the first empirical chapter was expanded to over 73,000 data entries by disaggregating observations to monthly counts. Searching for unexpected relationships in the form of interaction terms expanded and strengthened the explanatory power of the models. Further, using interaction terms to explore the increasingly complex landscape of third-party interventions is useful in unpacking conditional relationships. Lastly, subsequent chapters adopted experimental methods. Experimental design is characterized by strong internal validity where a researcher exercises full control over the assigned treatments and sample groups to be able to determine causal effects.

Finally, one methodological contribution can be attributed to this thesis. Chapter 4 presented findings from a vignette survey experiment with political elites. While there are a handful of academic papers which have administered audit experiments with political elites, none to date have implemented experiments on a larger sample of political representatives screening the determinants of their support for third-party interventions. While this thesis recognizes the added value of field experiments and small sample interviews with political elites, the lack of random assignment and other confoundedness in general inhibits such findings from further generalization. Unlike previous studies, where the sample of respondents was small or the target population was assumed in a lab environment using students as their subjects, this paper surveyed political elites using a controlled vignette experiment. It is worthwhile to mention some limitations this study presented. First, the survey experiment was distributed via emails directly to political representatives on the local and state level. Despite the fact that over 600 respondents took part in the survey, more than half of these responses had to be discarded due to missing values. This may have been caused by dropping out of the survey process or finishing the survey prematurely. Missing data reduce the representativeness of the sample and can distort inferences about the population, therefore the missing values were excluded from the

analysis. Further potential limitations stem from the possibility of self-selection into the experiment hindering the ability to fully control for randomization and resulting in non-equivalent group design. Nevertheless, the results were sufficient to yield statistically significant results and provide directionality for some relationships.

Without indulging into an additional layer of investigation, this conclusion sought to summarize rather than analyze what has been accomplished. It is important to note, that this conclusion is not supposed to serve as a stand-alone chapter. Each paper analyzed its own set of findings and conclusions, independently. The goal of this conclusion, rather than developing additional thoughts, is to present the findings of individual chapters in a meaningful and organized manner. To do so, this conclusion is organized into three main sections. After briefly reasserting the research questions that directed this research project, the first section recalls the main empirical findings of the three empirical papers largely composing this thesis. Subsequently, the second section discusses how these findings pertain to policy implications. Finally, this thesis concludes with a section dedicated to final remarks and suggestions for future development.

Empirical Results

As indicated in the introductory remarks of this thesis, a two tier research problem was outlined in order to answer the research question. First, to determine which of the third-party interventions and their combinations are effective in reducing violence in armed conflicts. Second, to examine the determinants of support of the political leaders and the general public towards these interventions and whether they correspond to the overall efficiency. To investigate this problem three empirical chapters of this thesis focused on estimating the effectiveness and level of support for third-party interventions.

So, are third-party interventions in civil wars desirable? To answer this question, it is useful to summarize some of the main findings presented in the chapters above. Previous chapters found differing effects for individual third-party interventions. Given the different objectives of peacekeeping, mediation, and military aid, such estimations were expected. The first empirical chapter found multilateral and diplomatic interventions such as peacekeeping and mediation to be the most efficacious actions third parties can employ to mitigate conflict violence. These findings corroborated some previous results about the pacifying

effect of peacekeeping (Hultman et al., 2013,0) and mediation (Beardsley, 2011; Beber, 2010). Notably, the multiplicative effect of mediation and peacekeeping recorded the highest percentage increase in predicted probability for decreasing conflict violence. According to these findings, the pacifying effect of peacekeeping can be reinforced when belligerents accept participation in mediated peace talks.

Simultaneously, these results found that attempting to support the belligerents militarily —with men and weapons —, financially, or by providing them access to the territory or training, increased the lethality of the conflict. Conflicts experiencing such external support for either or both belligerents do not only last longer (Regan, 2002) and create a barrier to negotiated settlements (Salehyan et al., 2014), but also, as found by Chapter 2, produce a higher count of civilian fatalities. This suggests that such conflicts present major challenges to international peace and security and stand out in comparison with conflict as protracted and intractable. An example of a protracted conflict with external support aiding both belligerents can be found in the recent case of the Syrian war. Both parties, the Syrian rebels and Assad's government, have been receiving external support from their respective allies since the beginning of war. The Syrian civil war will soon turn over its eight year. However in this grim situation there is still a light at the end of the tunnel. The results of this chapter point to a significant improvement of violence levels when diplomatic forces intervene in intractable conflicts. In comparison with peacekeeping, mediation seems to have significantly pacifying effect in these situations. This relationship could not confirm similar effects for other conflict management strategies in protracted and intractable civil wars.

Further, the empirical results from the first survey experiment with American public showed that Americans are sensitive to (i) the type of the interventions, (ii) the level of violence perpetrated on foreign civilians, (iii) international consensus, and (iv) state rivalry. Accordingly, support by the American public for those interventions that required a minimal cost of national military lives such as military air-strikes was higher in comparison with an all out military deployment. This partly corroborates the largely established relationship between decreasing support for the use of force and rising military casualties (Larson, 1996; Feaver and Gelpi, 2004; Gelpi et al., 2009). Generally, high support for multilateral interventions such as peacekeeping and diplomatic efforts like mediation was recorded across the political spectrum, age, and gender, regardless

of the magnitude of violence. Growing level of civilian violence, however, substantively increased support for the use of traditional military deployment as well as for the use of air-strikes. Likewise, the support for use of force substantively increased in the absence of the international community. This suggests that the public might be more concerned about foreign civilian lives when the international community is unable to intervene, and in fact deem it as a responsibility to protect their lives. Furthermore, the records from the second experiment revealed that while Americans are willing to support military interventions when foreign civilians lives are at stake, they are even more likely to empower one side of the conflict with weapons and material if the other side is supported by a US rival. As shown in the previous chapter, such third-party actions are likely to prolong duration of conflicts and render them more fatal. It seems that the prediction made by Gelpi et al. (2009), that civilian casualties, as are military casualties, are a necessary evil which should be minimized but are tolerable under certain circumstances.

Finally, the last empirical chapter examined support by American politicians for foreign policy actions in humanitarian crises. Similarly as the previous case, the first vignette experiment showed that political elites are motivated by humanitarian concerns. Support for traditional deployment of ground forces substantively increased in cases that threatened local civilian populations with massive casualties. This support is most pronounced in the face of the absence of international consensus among members of the international community. Bringing back the case of Syrian war is useful for demonstration of how international powers can block joint actions such as peacekeeping, which in turn may prompt instances of one-sided external support for belligerents and hence prolong fighting. Notwithstanding, the support for interventionist policies was low in comparison to multilateral actions and mediation efforts. Albeit the expectation of rising casualties increased support for the use of force, this support was also highly contingent on US security interests in the target country. Once the security interests of the US were not threatened, support for mobilizing military forces disappeared in spite of the expectation of growing casualties. As expected, unlike the general public, politicians have to be wary of security and strategic interests. Accordingly, the results from the second vignette experiment demonstrates that when an ally or rival was involved in supporting one of the belligerents, these efforts were either backed up with additional military supply for belligerents empowered by the US

ally or retaliated against by supporting the opposite side to weaken the rival.

When contrasting the support for use of force generated by public and political elites two important issues stand out. First, both American public and political elites showed overwhelming support for diplomatic efforts and joint military operations such as peacekeeping or coalitions of willing. One reason for that is that these types of interventions have become a preferred form of conflict resolution due to its multilateral character that highlights the element of international supervision, political and financial burden sharing, and preventive measure. By supporting multilateral or diplomatic efforts, the American public and political elites can ensure that possibilities of solving armed conflicts peacefully or jointly are exhausted before resorting to use of unilateral force. While members of the public might turn to the international audience —UN or other states —for a 'secondary opinion' on the matter of intervention (Grieco et al., 2011), political leaders might be motivated to do so to spare themselves the political and financial burden that comes with military commitment. Regardless of the motivation, consistently high support for the multilateral and diplomatic engagements is not coincidental. Since the end of the Cold War, both peacekeeping and mediation engagements recorded a dramatic increase in frequency and became an international standard for solving armed conflicts. Moreover, these joint and diplomatic efforts have been found most effective in attenuating violence during armed conflict Beardsley et al. (2015).

Second, while the most support for engaging in armed conflicts lays with diplomatic and joint efforts, the American public, as well as political elites, are willing to support the use of force in the form of a ground military operation and aerial bombing when the humanitarian appeal of the crisis threatens massive civilian casualties. This support holds even when the international community is unable to agree on joint action. This suggests that both American public and political elites are willing to send troops in humanitarian crises despite the lack of international consensus thus taking responsibility for civilian lives. Interestingly, the support of political elites for the use of force in humanitarian cases only holds when the US security interests are at stake. When US security interests are not threatened, political elites are less eager to protect civilians. It seems that politicians are selectively opting to support the use of force to save civilian lives depending on whether the US security interests are at stake. A possible explanation might be that political

elites are expecting those conflicts involving US interests receive more media coverage, that in turn attracts more public attention. While this stands in stark contrast to American public where the effect of security interest showed almost no effect on the approval for use of force, the expectation of closer scrutiny by media and public can incentives political elites to support such actions that would appear more altruistic or socially desirable such as saving civilian lives.

The aim of this thesis was not to dictate what actions third parties considering interventions should always undertake. It is clear that not all third parties have the most altruistic intentions when considering civil war engagements. Political leaders have to consider a myriad of factors before they make a decision on foreign policy actions. Among others these include: the cost, effectiveness, and domestic and international support for interventions, but also what are they trying to achieve with such an intervention. The findings show that peacekeeping and mediation are effective conflict management tools and enjoy greater public and political support. The findings also show that while rising casualties can motivate public and political elites to mobilize their forces to engage in humanitarian actions, security concerns and a desire to weaken the enemy were even more pronounced in generating support for military aid to belligerents, that in effect may prolong and intensify rather than reduce civilian casualties. Therefore, depending on the desired objective of the interventions this thesis provides an answer to what effect and which strategy is best set to achieve that goal. The following section will assess what policy implications can be drawn from these results.

Policy Implication

Several policy implications can be derived from this thesis. Given the results from Chapter 2, multilateral interventions and peacekeeping show great value in reducing conflict violence. Peacekeeping also enjoys general support from both the public and the political elites due to several reasons such as economic burden sharing, international oversight, and recognition. However, when the deployment of a peacekeeper is not possible, due to lack of international consensus, general public and political leaders tend to lean towards supporting individual belligerents with military and material. These strategies are, in fact, negatively impacting the local civilian population as well as the duration of the conflict making it more resistant to resolution. Take

an example of Syrian case, where Russia blocked the UN Security Council from attempting any multilateral operation. Hence, Russia and several other countries including the United States have extended military support to the Assad government and Syrian rebel groups. As a result, this conflict is turning over into its eighth year. Though, the findings of this paper offer a solution to this scenario. Chapter 2 found mediation to be an efficacious remedy to conflicts experiencing a high level of internationalization. Further, Chapters 3 and 4 saw consistent support by the public and political representatives for mediation efforts. Combining the support for and effectiveness of mediation creates a realistic avenue for conflict mitigation.

In both instances of survey experiments with the public and political leaders, it appears that rivalry is a superior factor for garnering support for interventions than humanitarian concerns. Illustrating the case of Syria provides yet another great example for this demonstration. Back in 2013, the support for unilateral US intervention in the Syrian war was at its lowest following the first chemical attack allegedly perpetrated by Assad's regime on a vulnerable Syrian population. This attack has polarized world powers and their public over the possibility of retaliation against one of the belligerent in this conflict, the Assad regime. Only after Russia had officially begun to support Assad, did the support and the actual retaliatory military strike against Assad's regime occur, as a direct response to the Khan Shaykhun chemical attack on 4 April 2017. Having a US rival supporting the opposite side of the conflict may have forced the Trump administration to engage in order not to appear weak or fail to support civilians in need.

Such projection of dominance aimed to punish an enemy can be strictly pertinent to great powers and therefore hardly generalizable to the populations of other countries and their leaders, as only great powers might have the resources and deterrence power to do so. It may be useful to extend this experiment to other countries in order to compare the ratio of distribution between support for humanitarian and rivalry cues. Countries as diverse as Canada, France, Germany or Sweden could be good candidates. These countries, due to their very diverse power potential and foreign policy goals, may produce very different results. Experiments with political elites can extend our understanding of how decisions about specific policies are made and importantly what attributes of conflicts can shape this process.

Finally, it was beyond the scope of this dissertation to prove whether the general public can shape the

elites' decisions with their preferences. Some scholars have criticized the idea that the public can exercises its free will and make complex cost-benefit calculations about foreign policy action that does not affect their well being directly (Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2007). Nevertheless, as noted in the introductory remarks of this thesis, there are events in the not so distant past that prove the pressure from public might effect leaders' decisions about foreign policies. Additionally, the abundant literature studying public support for the use of force is indicative of, at least, some relationship between public preferences and elite's decision-making. Last but not least, the results from controlled trials with political elites in this dissertation show that US politicians are concerned with humanitarian casualties in cases when US strategic interests are at stake. Once US interests are no longer threatened the humanitarian concern diminishes accordingly. It can be speculated that the reason for this is the politicians' expectation that conflicts threatening the US strategic interest may receive higher media coverage and, by extension, the attention of public. With an expectation that the public is concerned about foreign civilian casualties, conflicts involving US security interests generate higher scrutiny to politicians' decision-making. This increased scrutiny, by both the media and the public, causes politicians to be more responsive to foreign civilian casualties. The responsiveness to humanitarian cues thus is likely to be seen only when there is an expectation of increased scrutiny. This could potentially be a link between public preferences and political decision-making.

Final Remarks

All in all, this dissertation provided some answers to the underlying research question on whether and how to think about third-party interventions in civil wars. It uncovered preferences of public and political elites in their support for these interventions and provided some evidence into the relationship between public preferences and political decision-making. It showed that the type of the intervention matters and that multilateral action is preferred to traditional unilateral ground deployment in terms of effectiveness to reduce civilian casualties and popular preferences. It is clear that the idea behind interventions shifted from purely opportunistic strategies to more humanitarian and joint operations. The proof of this is in an increasing number of UN peacekeeping missions following the end of Cold War, adoption of the doctrine

of Responsibility to Protect to shield civilians from failing states, and increasing media coverage of civilian casualties. The idea of all-powerful sovereigns is becoming obsolete. Instead, supranational action to protect civilians and promote respect for human rights have began to proliferate.

The hope is that conflict management strategies will continue to be utilized in order to prevent atrocities of civil wars. In cases when joint actions of the UN will not be possible —which according to recent conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, and Yemen seems to be a forthcoming trend —international mediation should try to bring the belligerents to the negotiating table, insist on concessions from both sides and immediate provisions to protect civilians. Since the mediation efforts cannot be blocked by the UN and virtually any country or organization can extend an offer to facilitate peace-talks, by this measure along with the effectiveness and support found in this thesis, it makes mediation the most desirable strategy. Despite, all the findings this thesis offered, the research into effectiveness and support for third-party intervention is far from over.

Scholars should focus their energies to replicate finding of civil war interventions effectiveness and either (a) center their attention on generating more precise results or (b) get creative about possibilities on how to measure the effect of these strategies through controlled trials. The future research should also focus on the specific links between the public preferences and political decision-making more explicitly to find out the threshold of support where public preferences might affect the political elites in their foreign policy choices.

Finally, the big data revolution started only few years ago and new methods and findings have already bore fruits for expanding the research of IR and Political Science. Continuing in this vein, developing new methods, and generating more disaggregated data will bring more precise and new findings in the future. It will be exciting, to say the least, to observe this development in future research.

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