



МАТИЦА СРПСКА
ОДЕЉЕЊЕ ЗА КЊИЖЕВНОСТ И ЈЕЗИК

ЗБОРНИК

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СЛИКА НА КОРИЦАМА – COVER PICTURE

Сребрна шарнирска фибула на корицама потиче из околине Сомбора. Датује се у другу половину 4. века пре нове ере. Нађена је у гробу или остави заједно са три друге сребрне фибуле истог типа и четири нарукнице од сребрног лима. Данас се налази у Природњачком музеју у Бечу. Фибула припада последњој фази развоја шарнирских фибула, тзв. варијанти Чуруг, које су под грчким утицајем израђиване на територији данашње Војводине.

The silver fibula of the “Scharnier” type on the cover was found in the surrounding of Sombor. It is dated to the second half of the 4th century B.C. It was found in a grave or a hoard together with three silver fibulae of the same type and four bracelets of silver sheet. It is now in the Natural History Museum in Vienna. The fibula belongs to the last development phase of “Scharnier” fibulae – the variant Čurug – which was produced under Greek influence in the territory of present day Vojvodina (North Serbia).

Лого – Logo: Dr. Rastko Vasić

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СТУДИЈЕ И ЧЛАНЦИ
STUDIES AND ARTICLES



23. међународног (светског) конгреса византолога, који ће се одржати августа 2016. године у Београду. Ти су послови последњих месеци обављани паралелно са онима везаним за организовање Шесте конференције, у чему су се посебно истакли чланови Комитета, који су изабрани у Организациони одбор Шесте конференције: Срђан Пириватрић (потпредседник Српског комитета за византологију и научни сарадник Византолошког института САНУ), Смиља Марјановић Душанић (Филозофски факултет Универзитета у Београду), Ђорђе Бубало (Филозофски факултет Универзитета у Београду), Миша Радујко (Институт за историју уметности Филозофског факултета Универзитета у Београду) и, у својству секретара Организационог одбора, Милош Цветковић (истраживач сарадник Византолошког института САНУ). Будући да за годину дана долази велика међународна смотра византолога, окупљање наших научника на Шестој конференцији представљало је и у тематском и у организационом смислу неку врсту генералне пробе пред споменути велики конгрес. Зато је успех Конференције значио велики подстрек за организаторе долазећег Конгреса.

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Eleatica 2015.
Ascea-Velia, 10–13. September 2015.

The core of *Eleatica 2015* – held at Ascea-Velia between the 10th and the 13th of September, with the organization of the Fondazione Alario and the steering committee made by Livio Rossetti, Stefania Giombini and Massimo Pulpito – consisted the Eleatic Lectures, delivered by an important and renowned scholar on Eleatism. In 2015 these lectures were given by Alberto Bernabé, professor of Greek Philology at the Universidad Complutense, Madrid, and author of many important contributions on Orphism and linguistics, but also on Parmenides (see Bernabé 1979, pp. 371–376, 1988, pp. 320–325, and 2013). His three Eleatic Lectures were called *Parmenide: tra linguistica, letteratura e filosofia* (published in a preprint version: Bernabé 2015). He proposed an interpretation of the poem which is new in some important respects.

Not unlike its previous editions, *Eleatica 2015* hosted the public reviews of some recent books on the Presocratics and included some new features. On the one hand, the event hosted the inauguration of the first *Paradox Museum* in Italy – and probably Europe, if not the world. On the other hand, the program included the grant of the Honorary Citizenship of Elea to Giovanni Cerri, who gave the 2013 Eleatic Lectures, and an extraordinary Honorary Citizenship to Emanuele Severino, the author of an unforgettable article, *Ritornare a Parme-*

nide, printed in 1964, and a public conversation between him, Luigi Vero Tarca, and other participants.

The present chronicle offers a synthetic report of Bernabé's lessons on Parmenides, a short mention to the reviews and some reflections on the two main novelties of the program. Although the Eleatic Lectures deserve a much closer attention, I prefer here to give a complete picture of the event, rather than to concentrate on a single part. Those who desire to have a more detailed account of Bernabé's lessons might read an expanded version of these pages, to appear in *ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ. Yearbook of the Research Center for Greek Philosophy of the Academy of Athens* in 2016.

* * * * *

The central thesis of the first of Bernabé's lectures (*Parmenide poeta: tradizione e innovazione nel proemio* = Bernabé 2015, pp. 7–35) is that Parmenides' proem constitutes a fundamental piece of philosophy (p. 8), for it allows him to show that the true knowledge on Being which the goddess is going to reveal is located outside the human world. The scholar argues that the text delivers its philosophical message through a significant poetic device: the use of intentional ambiguity (pp. 17, 34). Bernabé's suggestion is, in other words, that the many ambiguities we find inside the proem are not literary embellishments, nor involuntary obscurities that depend on bad writing, but images full of epistemic and theoretical value.

It is such an aspect that mostly distinguishes Parmenides and the archaic poets – both of the epic and the Orphic tradition, from which Parmenides borrows a great number of motifs, *i.a.* the idea that truth is divinely inspired and the image of the journey on a chariot. In this sense, we could say that Parmenides' poetry is traditional. However, he at the same times innovates this conventional imagery by deliberately presenting it within the proem in ambiguous ways. Indeed, while the poets typically claim that a specific deity inspired their verses and describe a charioteer's journey to a specific location, like Hades or the heavens, Parmenides does not identify the goddess who caused his inspiration, but uses traditional poetical motifs that could equally be applied to many goddesses (pp. 27–28 and 33), and does not specify where his chariot is going, but employs images that could refer to either Hades or the heavens (pp. 12–22). These obscurities have theoretical value, for, Bernabé claims, they communicate to the reader that the truth on Being has a divine origin and lies outside the human world, in a region of the cosmos that nobody can identify with certainty.

According to Bernabé, Parmenides differs from the ambiguities expressed by the archaic poets as he uses them in order to refer to things that escape immediate human understanding. Indeed, they allude to transcendental realities, which only a trained mind aided by a goddess will finally comprehend. In this sense, Parmenides is completely divorced by the poetic tradition, where instead ambiguity is just an aesthetical device, or in the best cases is a mean of expression of poetic comparisons (cf. *e.g.* the one between the bronze object and the soul of the sinner in Aeschylus, *Ag.* 390–395) which are in themselves obscure, but that nonetheless can be deciphered by the reader or the listener who wants to understand them.

Bernabé's second lesson (*Parmenide attraverso il prisma della linguistica* = Bernabé 2015, pp. 37–68) concerned the semantic coherence of the verb “to be”. The scholar argues that Parmenides probably believed that only the enunciations which are expressed in the present tense and build the *σήματα* of fr. 8 (“is ingenerated” or ἀγένητον, “is untroubled” or ἀτρεμές, etc.) are sound references to Being. The reason lies in the fact that they are semantically compatible with the verb “to be” and reject the concept of “what is not”, which instead is implicitly employed in future or past statements. For example, to say that “I was a fan of Star Trek” implies “I *am not* a fan of Star Trek”, *i.e.* invokes the absurd notion of not-Being. A positive conclusion of this perspective is that Being is extraneous to the categories of “time” and “becoming”, which necessarily involve past and future tenses. A negative one is instead that most of the enunciations allowed by the linguistic system are false, for they refer to something that does not correspond to Being or reality, as well as that those utterances that involve “not to be” are a sign of our weak understanding (p. 67). Together, I may add, the two conclusions help to understand better the contents of fr. 7 of Parmenides’ poem. Indeed, the command of the goddess to reject the ἔθος πολύπειρον of the γλῶσσα might allude to a control of the acquired linguistic habits of the κοῦρος, who as a man wrongly switches from the sound grammar of Being to the absurd language of not-Being, which in itself is unthinkable and unnamable.

Finally, the third lesson (*Affermare negando: composti negativi in Parmenide* = Bernabé 2015, pp. 69–93) analyzed the negative adjectives employed by Parmenides. According to Bernabé, many of them were borrowed from the poetic tradition and can be divided in three groups:

1. Negative adjectives which are meant to highlight the extraordinary qualities of the entity to which they refer. They include the ἀγένητον and ἀτρεμές ones I mentioned above and refer to Being.
2. Negative adjectives that disqualify the faculty of knowledge of men *a parte subiecti*, such as ἄκριτος in fr. 6.7 and ἄσκοπος in fr. 7.4. Bernabé mentions also the substantive ἀμηχανίη (fr. 6.5–6): indeed, although it is not an adjective, it is analyzed in comparison with the adjective ἀμήχανος, often employed by the archaic or epic poets.
3. Negative adjectives that refer to something that escapes human knowledge *a parte obiecti*. Here we find a single instance, namely the qualification of night as ἀδαής (fr. 8.59).

This division does not only prove how much Parmenides was indebted to the poetic tradition. It also shows, on the one hand, that he often reads these adjectives with a new meaning. For example, if the poets usually described with the negative adjectives of group 2 a *natural* impossibility to know things that instead the gods fully grasp, Parmenides expresses through them only a *temporal* impossibility. The proof is that the goddess asks the κοῦρος to judge her discourse on Being (see κρίναι in fr. 7.5), which means that she is confident that at least this young man is not ἄκριτος, ἄσκοπος, ἀμήχανος like the rest.

On the other hand, the divisions of the negative adjectives attests that Parmenides did not believe in the existence of ineffable realities (p. 91). Everything

that is defined through negative language is positively understood, so that only non-Being or nothing which is impossible to express/conceive is not given a name (indeed, it is ἀνόνημον: fr. 8.17–18). In this sense, non-Being completely differs from night. For this adjective shows that about the *νύξ* one can say/think that it is an entity that cannot be known, whereas about nothing one cannot say/think even such a thing.

* * * * *

Between the lessons of Bernabé, many books on Parmenides and other Presocratic thinkers were presented to the public. The event took place in two different sessions. The first one presented the books involving the Honorary Citizens or the steering committee of *Eleatica 2015* or by distinguished scholars who were protagonists of previous editions of *Eleatica*, as well as the proceedings of Casertano's lessons of *Eleatica 2014*. The second session offered instead the public reviews and detailed analysis of new books, published between the 2013–2015.

There is no sense, nor reason, nor the possibility to present here even a simple sketch of all the speeches which were delivered. Almost all the reviews will be soon published in the journal *Peitho*, which means that those who are interested will have the opportunity to read the direct words of the reviewers in short time. I decide then to report synthetically only one speech. I chose Cordero's review of Solana's *Parmenides. El canto del filósofo* (Solana 2014 – to which I had no access). The exception is motivated by the fact that this is the only non-scientific book presented at *Eleatica 2015*. Solana wrote indeed a *Bildungsroman* on Parmenides.

Cordero's presentation of Solana was a sympathetic and touching one. Although scholars in Presocratic philosophy are aware of the importance and the seriousness of the work of the former on Parmenides, he had the moving humility to declare in this occasion the following statement: Solana knows Parmenides far better than Cordero. Indeed, the writer is not only familiar with the verses of the Parmenidean poem and their historical context, as the contents of his book – full of precise and well-documented references to the Greek society at the beginning of the fifth century BC – show. Solana also had the privilege to discover, through poetic fiction, how Parmenides developed his complex personality and had an impact on his contemporaries. The reader thus sees how the thinker moved from the first acquaintance with Xenophanes to the maturity, when he wrote the poem (supposed of being as long as Hesiod's *Theogony*) and gave to the city of Elea its laws, and then had the occasion, during old age, to teach his doctrines to Melissus and Zeno, to meet the young Socrates, to see the first poetical attempts of Empedocles.

Nothing of what Solana narrates is obviously true and verifiable. But Cordero rightly underlines that his suppositions are “well-found” and have at least the merit to present Parmenides in a lively picture, which reveals that he was a man whose intellectual activity had a strong connection with daily life. I quote by memory Cordero's almost exact ending remarks, which deserve to be left without further comments:

Without talking about philosophy, it [Solana's novel] is a lesson in philosophy. The characters live philosophically, while thinking in the city and in the behalf of the city. It is not a biography of Parmenides, but a chronicle of a young man who becomes a philosopher and flees the ivory tower, in order to give at the end with his poetic work a fundamental contribution to active life.

* * * * *

And now something on the *Paradox Museum*. The structure holds a great number of artistic works (pictures, videos, *etc.*) produced by students of Italian high schools and previously submitted to the two editions of the context *Pensare per Paradosi*. A selection of them are showed within the halls of the museum itself, while all the others are collected in a database and might be seen by the visitors through a PC. As far as I can judge, all the students who participated to the context manifest great artistic skills: many of them could even become professionals in the arts in the future.

I had the occasion to hear the inaugural speech about the opening of the museum delivered by professor Livio Rossetti, who is also one of the minds behind the creation both of the context *Pensare per Paradosi* and the museum. After reflecting on it and on myself, I discovered that the structure is not only a way to preserve these works from the consumption of time. It also strives to reach the following goals, concerning both the young artists and the visitors of the museum:

1) To represent the paradoxality of our life's situations with artistic means. The museum attempts, in other words, to persuade to fight our usual attitude towards paradoxes, which are conceived as strange claims that distorts reality and must therefore be rejected as mere verbal phantoms. On the contrary, artistic paradoxes are creation that *express* in the best way the hidden face of our experience and to understand its course. Life itself hides infinite paradoxes: and the arts reveal them, while at the same time inviting humans to face them with courage.

2) To search in this way to construct and to keep an identity of our own, namely to find an order in our existence and to not succumb to the paradoxical events of daily life. Therefore, artistic paradoxes appears to be, so to speak, paradoxes that free from the paradoxes of real life.

3) To present Zeno, namely the silent "Muse" of the museum and of all its creations, as a thinker who deserves not only the attention of historians / philosophers, but also of a wider audience. Indeed, if artistic paradoxes are truly means to reveal and govern the paradoxicality of our daily experience, then also Zenonian paradoxes might have this same role. His creations would therefore no longer be just a find of the past. They would be important tools for leading better lives and for developing better thinking, in other words devices for thinking or "macchine per pensare" (I recover the expression from Rossetti 2014; on the topic, see also Migliori 1984, pp. 78–79, and Rossetti 1992, pp. 22–24).

In my opinion, all these comments might open many other reflections. I just mention what I think are the two most promising ones. First of all, since the arts show that the existence is full of paradoxes, we could derive the con-

sequence that even the arts themselves, philosophy and any other activity, for the simple fact that they operate on and in life, *are* paradoxes. They show indeed some inner contradictions, which escape the comprehension of those who are not proficient in them. This point can be traced back to Heraclitus (fr. 22 B 58 DK). But it has been also recognized by Epictetus and, concerning the art of acting, by Denis Diderot, who wrote:

“The philosophers talk paradoxes”, you say. But are there not paradoxes in the other arts? And what is more paradoxical than to lance a man in the eye in order that he may see? If anyone said this to a man who was inexperienced in the art of surgery, would he not laugh at the speaker? What is there to be surprised at, then, if in philosophy also many things which are true appear paradoxical to the inexperienced? (Epictetus, *Diatr.* I 25.32–33, transl. Oldfather 1978)

Mais quoi, dira-t-on, ces accents si plaintifs, si douloureux que cette mère arrache du fond de ses entrailles et dont les miennes sont si violemment secouées, ce n'est pas le sentiment actuel qui les produit, ce n'est pas le désespoir qui les inspire? Nullement; et la preuve, c'est qu'ils sont mesurés, qu'ils font partie d'un système de déclamation; que plus bas ou plus aigus de la vingtième partie d'un quart de ton, ils sont faux; qu'ils sont soumis à une loi d'unité; qu'ils sont, comme dans l'harmonie, préparés et sauvés; qu'ils ne satisfont à toutes [les] conditions requises que par une long étude; qu'il concourent à la solution d'un problème proposé; que pour être poussés juste, ils ont été répétés cent fois, <et que malgré ces fréquentes répétitions, on les manque encore> (Diderot, *Paradoxe sur le comédien*; 1995 edition, p. 55)

Does not this reflection disclose the possibility that even education could be a form of paradox? For “to educate” means to reach some apparently contradictory effects, such as raising in the students the roots of new ideas by explaining and presenting old ones (*e.g.*, old history in order to understand present history), or learning to do what we can already do (like logically thinking). And it could be added that, since philosophy and the arts involve education, more precisely teach often paradoxical doctrines, one might say that they are paradoxes that create paradoxes. Therefore, the “paradox of education” also leads to what we might call an “education to paradox”.

The second reflection that I promised earlier is in reality a simple suggestion, which I cannot develop here and that involves once again Zeno. If it is true that the Zenonian paradoxes have the same characteristics of the artistic paradoxes, namely that they express the paradoxicality of existence and give the instruments needed to understand-govern it, then Zeno would be a man who helps us to overcome through reasoning immediate appearances, to “purify” from our bad cognitive acquired habits (for more indications, see Gemelli Marciano 2013, pp. 112–115) and to learn to conduct a good life. He would in this sense be a moral thinker, whose intellectual creations aims at leading men toward happiness.

* * * * *

The short but intense conversation between Tarca and Severino did not contemplate a discussion of Eleatism itself. However, it began with a deliberate

connection with the third of Bernabé's lessons and the somewhat disturbing preference of Parmenides to negative adjectives.

After summarizing in very short terms its contents to Severino (who was absent from the lesson and could also be present to the conversation through a Skype call), Tarca made a theoretical supposition and claimed that this predilection is not casual. Parmenides wanted to present to his audience the truth, but the truth is truth if (and only if) resists all the negations which intend to dismiss it, therefore if it is necessary / eternal. That is why negative adjectives are so plenty within the poem: they are intentional forms of negation which show how the positive hearth of the well-rounded truth remains always unscathed. Starting from these considerations, Tarca then posed two questions to Severino. How it has to be conceived the Parmenidean truth? Secondly, what does it mean to return to Parmenides in our age of technology, namely in an age which recognizes only the becoming?

Unfortunately, the Skype connection had many flaws and was soon interrupted, so that I was just able to write down only a part of the answer. Severino believes that the recovery of Parmenides' truth means to avoid nihilism, which in its most general sense can be defined as the idea that things come from, become within and return into the nothing. On this nihilist account rests also technology, which in addition presumes to control the becoming and to increase "what it is", by producing something which was not present in the structure of Being before. Now, if the premise that only the becoming exists is questioned, then also this form of nihilism is rejected and one may recover the idea that an eternal/necessary truth exists. And Parmenides offers the conceptual tools needed for the task, for his doctrine that only "what it is" is and that "what it is not" does not exist proves that the ontological background which hides behind technology is false. The things do not come from, become within and return into the nothing, but – since only Being is – they are only related with Being. Moreover, since "what it is" is eternal, everything else is also eternal, since "what it is not" and the becoming have been rejected. Returning today to Parmenides means, in conclusion, to oppose to the falsehood of our age of technology the truth of the eternity of all the things which reside in the "house of Being".

This fascinating and speculative theory is worth of great refection, as well as of immense admiration. I however wonder if the rejection of nihilism it develops pays just a too high price. Indeed, the conversation between Tarca and Severino brought me to formulate some problems that still haunt me. First of all, if everything is eternal, then does that mean that even evil persons and events are also eternal? If so, I am afraid that this mean also that innocent souls who died under great injustice will eternally suffer this injustice, without deserving it, or also that unjust men will feel eternal joy, for they felt joy when they committed their crimes. An idea which seems to me difficult to accept and that I would gladly exchange with a mild form of nihilism. The acceptance of the nothing would at the very least allow the consolation that the pain of innocent men and the joy of criminals have now faded into dust.

Severino might reply to this first question that speaking of "good" and "evil" starts also from nihilist premises. Those two values are related with action, but action includes the recognition of the nothing. For "acting" means

to choose a direction in our life in the becoming, which as we have seen is connected with “what it is not”. When speaking of the truth, one must then refute any reference to values and rationally affirm only the following: if eternal Being is and all things have no link with the nothing, all things are eternal. However, does not this theoretical rejection of nihilism bring in turn Severino to what one might call “practical nihilism”? With this expression, I refer to the idea that ordinary values and common-sense beliefs which distinguish what is worth of being saved from what is not worth of it have no sense, since truth reveals that in the “house of Being” everything is comprehended and justified. Such a conception also pays a high price. If everything is comprehended and justified in Being, then everything is allowed in Being, including falsehood and homicide, so that Parmenides’ truth concedes to lie and kill men without feeling guilt or remorse. If everything *is*, then I am allowed to say and to do all that I want, for all that I want is also *something* and *something true* (i.e., linked with the truth of Being). In conclusion, saying that all things are eternal is not really different, under the practical perspective, from claiming that all things are nothing at all.

None of what I said pose maybe a threat to Severino, since he already somewhat solved them in what he wrote before (cf. Severino 2010, pp. 305–306). I hope then that those modest reflections and questions offer at least an homage to his stimulating work. And if what I said will prove wrong, at least I will still find another sort of consolation, for the eternal sufferings of innocents and the eternal joy of criminals. The “house of Being” will also eternally host the wonderful days of *Eleatica 2015*, as well as all the friends, colleagues, ideas and poetical reflections that reunited there. No matter which disaster will fall over humanity, these days will never get lost. *Eleatica 2015* appears to be a κτήμᾱ ἐς αἰεῖ, a steady possession of eternity.

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У Санкт Петербургу је од 15. до 19. септембра 2015. године одржана Осма европска конференција иранолошких студија. Ове конференције организује Европско иранолошко друштво сваке четири године од 1987. године, када је била прва конференција у Риму, где је друштво и основано. Овогодишња конференција окупила је преко 350 учесника из целог света. Домаћини и суорганизатори овогодишњег скупа били су Државни музеј Ермитаж и Институт оријенталних рукописа из Санкт Петербурга на челу са Павелом Б. Луријем, чланом Управног одбора Европског иранолошког друштва, и Михаилом Б. Пиотровским, директором Државног музеја Ермитаж.

У прелепом амбијенту Ермитажа и централне зграде генералштаба рад по секцијама одвијао се у шест већих група подељених према хронолошком принципу: антички Иран, средњовековни Иран, класични средњи век, модерни Иран, савремене студије и специјалне секције. Свака од ових секција била је подељена на мање секције које су обухватале археологију, уметност, историју, лингвистику и литературу, религију, философију, нумизматику, антропологију, историографију и савремене иранске студије, а специјални панели били су посвећени политици, економији, медијима и туризму у савременом Ирану.

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