



Review

**Pareyson's Estetica: Teoria della formatività and its
implication for organization studies**

Journal:	<i>Academy of Management Review</i>
Manuscript ID	AMR-2016-0165-RE
Manuscript Type:	Review Essay
Keywords:	Abilities (Individual), Absenteeism, Adaptation/Change, Affect, Affirmative Action
Abstract:	.

1
2
3
4 PAREYSON'S *ESTETICA: TEORIA DELLA FORMATIVITÀ* AND ITS
5 IMPLICATION FOR ORGANIZATION STUDIES

6 Key words: aesthetic philosophy; formativeness; organizational aesthetics; Luigi
7 Pareyson; practice-based studies

8 **Silvia Gherardi**, University of Trento, Italy

9 e-mail: silvia.gherardi@unitn.it

10 **Antonio Strati**, University of Trento, Italy

11 e-mail: antonio.strati@unitn.it

12 **INTRODUCTION**
13
14
15
16

17 Luigi Pareyson wrote: “the whole of spiritual life is in some way ‘art’: in every field of
18 human industriousness nothing can be done without also inventing in some way how it
19 is to be done” (Pareyson, 1954: 63). Therefore, if we want to follow in Pareyson’s steps
20 and appreciate his contribution to organization and management studies, we can see
21 management as art, production processes as artistry, a work well done as a work of art,
22 and of course art in itself.
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

30 The very idea that art is always an art *of* something is what motivates us to propose a
31 reading of Pareyson’s aesthetic philosophy that can talk to the hearts and minds of
32 organizational scholars. One of our aims in reviewing Pareyson’s main *oeuvre* (1954) –
33 *Estetica: Teoria della formatività* – is to encourage the readers of this journal to engage
34 with literature that they might not normally read. The other purpose of the essay is to
35 take the opportunity provided by a recent and partial translation into English of
36 Pareyson’s work to introduce management scholars to a philosopher whose work
37 resonates with a relatively new interest in practical knowledge and in forms of knowing
38 outside the cognitive domain. In fact, if we locate a ‘turn to practice’ in social sciences
39 around the year 2000, we may argue that it is through the organizational aesthetics
40 approach that the idea of sensible knowing and aesthetic judgement arrived in practice-
41 based studies. Pareyson’s philosophy is important for grounding a philosophy of
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 knowing that is an aesthetic philosophy of production – i.e. based on doing – rather than
5
6 of contemplation.
7

8
9 The contemporary reader should note that Pareyson's book appeared in Italian in 1954
10
11 and that it was almost fifty years later that Peter Carravetta (2010: 99) wrote as follows
12
13 in the introduction to the recent publication in English of a selection of Pareyson's
14
15 essays:
16
17

18
19 [T]he appearance of a substantial selection of Luigi Pareyson's writings in English is
20
21 motive for a transnational celebration in the history of ideas. A thinker of the rank of
22
23 Gadamer and Ricoeur, to whom he is often compared, surprisingly little has been
24
25 known or written about him. An original interpreter of existentialism and German
26
27 Idealism, Pareyson developed an authentic hermeneutic in the nineteen-fifties, a time in
28
29 which the Italian panorama was being shaped by growing Marxist hegemony and the
30
31 turn towards the sciences especially linguistics.
32
33

34
35
36 Pareyson, was not attracted by Marxist philosophy, since he was a Catholic, and a
37
38 militant in «Partito d'azione» and in «Giustizia e Libertà» during the Resistance to
39
40 Nazi-fascism. He was born in 1918, and he worked at the University of Torino almost
41
42 until his death in 1991. In the years 1935-36, he spent time with Karl Jaspers in
43
44 Heidelberg, and during the 1940s and 1950s, he published in Italian several essays on
45
46 Kirkegaard, Heidegger, and mainly Schelling's existentialist philosophy. In the
47
48 following years he published on aesthetics and on interpretation: *Estetica. Teoria della*
49
50 *formatività* in 1954, *Conversazioni di estetica* in 1966, *Verità e interpretazione* in 1971
51
52 – recently translated into English (2013) –and his last work *Ontologia e libertà* in 1995.
53
54
55 As an academic at the University of Torino, among his followers were the semiologist
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 Umberto Eco and the philosophers Gianni Vattimo, Mario Perniola and Sergio Givone,
5
6 who worked on aesthetics. He was also the director of the journal *Rivista di Estetica*.
7

8
9 Today we can gain a more complete overview of his inquiries in philosophy,
10
11 hermeneutics and existentialism because of the translations of his writings beside
12
13 English, also in French, Portuguese, Spanish, and other languages. In French, thanks to
14
15 the philosopher Gilles Tiberghien and his colleagues, we have an important trilogy:
16
17 *Conversations sur l'esthétique, Ontologie et liberté* and *Esthétique. Théorie de la*
18
19 *formativité* which was published in 2007. It has been a very long time since 1954, when
20
21 Pareyson 'at the time aged thirty-six' and, despite his young age, 'was not an unknown
22
23 scholar' (Tiberghien, 2007: 5).
24
25

26
27 Why was Luigi Pareyson, who is celebrated as a great philosopher, translated after so
28
29 many years? One possible answer is that this delay was due to the fact that his work is
30
31 focused on the 'practical' character of art, and on the productive moment of art. In
32
33 common sense language – as in philosophy – 'practice' is opposed to theory, and the
34
35 two terms are considered not only oppositional but hierarchically related so that
36
37 practical knowledge is devalued with respect to 'theory' and 'theoretical knowledge'
38
39 (Gherardi, 2000). In this regard we argue that an aesthetic philosophy – like the one
40
41 elaborated by Pareyson – can provide a firm grounding for theorizing about knowing in
42
43 practice and knowing as corporeal doing.
44
45

46
47 After this short biographical presentation, our essay will address the following three
48
49 themes: (i) the Italian philosophical context in which '*Estetica. Teoria della formatività*'
50
51 appeared; (ii) how the book was received within aesthetic organizational research; and
52
53 (iii) Pareyson's contribution to the study of organizational practices. We shall conclude
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 with discussion on the value of reading Pareyson today within a community of
5
6 organizational and management scholars.
7
8
9

10 **THE ITALIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT OF THE BOOK**

11
12
13
14
15 *Estetica: Teoria della Formatività* (henceforth simply *Formatività*) was published in
16
17 Turin by *Edizioni di Filosofia* in 1954. The Second World War was now long past, the
18
19 fascist period was over, and Italy was no longer a monarchy, but a republic with
20
21 universal suffrage because the right to vote was now extended to women. In Italy this
22
23 was the historical period known as the ‘*Ricostruzione*’, and there was heated political
24
25 debate between the communist and socialist left, on the one hand, and the Christian
26
27 Democrat and liberal centre on the other, which had participated in the Resistance
28
29 against the fascist dictatorship and the Nazi occupation.
30
31

32
33 There was also a sharp division among communist, socialists, Catholic or liberal
34
35 intellectuals in regard to aesthetic philosophy. It opposed the aesthetics of marxist origin
36
37 to phenomenological or existentialist aesthetics. The Italian philosophical context of
38
39 *Formatività*, therefore, was influenced by social ideologies at the basis of political and
40
41 economic choices that would give rise to both the decade of the ‘economic boom’ of the
42
43 1960s and the student protests and the workers’ and trade union struggles of 1968-69.
44
45

46
47 If, therefore, on the one hand, *Formatività* “marked the decisive moment of the renewal
48
49 of Italian aesthetics in the middle of this century involving, besides the legacy of pre-
50
51 Hegelian German idealism, also the ontological-hermeneutic current of twentieth-
52
53 century existentialism” – wrote Gianni Vattimo (1977: 42), an Italian philosopher
54
55 internationally known for his theory of ‘weak thought’ – on the other, there were other
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 currents that creatively rethought themes of marxist (Galvano della Volpe) or
5
6 phenomenological (Luciano Anceschi and Antonio Banfi) origin.
7

8
9 The decisive renewal represented by *Formatività* was due to the definitive liberation of
10
11 Italian aesthetics from the 'dictatorship of Crocean idealism'. Benedetto Croce had
12
13 published in 1902 his theses on aesthetics as the science of expression in which art is
14
15 considered to be knowledge that is intuition and expression at the same time because
16
17 there are no profound intuitions unless they are formed and expressed, as happens with
18
19 a musical motif, of which there is no intuition unless it is heard almost as if it were
20
21 being played. Moreover, for Croce intuition was art, and the distinction between the
22
23 intuition of ordinary people and that of an artist was a mere empirical distinction due to
24
25 the fateful separation of art from common spiritual life. For Croce, in fact, art
26
27 techniques, and practices constituted a level of reflection that had little to do with
28
29 aesthetics because it was an economic fact that reverberated on the diversity of arts and
30
31 artistic genres.
32
33

34
35 These theses of Benedetto Croce are well known because they had broad international
36
37 resonance and projected the Italian aesthetic philosophy of the twentieth century along
38
39 idealist lines also outside Italy (Restaino, 1991; D'Angelo, 1997).
40

41
42 What is perhaps less known is that the devaluation of the 'practical' character of art and
43
44 the productive moment of art was the aesthetic issue that generated aversion to Crocean
45
46 theoreticism. This aversion was shared by several salient movements of Italian aesthetic
47
48 philosophy in the post-war period because it developed both among philosophers
49
50 extraneous to Crocean idealism, such as Luigi Pareyson or Luciano Anceschi, and
51
52 among philosophers tied to Croce's thought. What happened in Italy, in fact, was that
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 much of the aesthetics of the 1950s set itself *on the part of the producer* rather than that
5
6 of the user or the art work. This is interesting also out of [the Italian] context, because
7
8 an attitude of this kind is relatively rare in the history of aesthetics. We find it, to a very
9
10 marked extent, also in Pareyson and Brandi, and in Anceschi's strong interest in critics
11
12 who are also artists [...] (D'Angelo, 1997: 174-5)
13
14

15
16 Added to this rare occurrence in the history of aesthetics was the fact that, whilst Croce
17
18 considered the artwork when it had been accomplished, both Pareyson and other Italian
19
20 philosophers like Diano or Brandi were interested in the artwork 'in its making': that is,
21
22 the work of art as a research process, and doing art as an artistic process. Pareyson
23
24 himself (1954: 7) says so, in the 1988 preface:
25
26

27
28
29 first of all, it was extremely urgent to discuss those issues that Croce's censorship had
30
31 detrimentally expunged from Italy; and it was also necessary to develop categories that
32
33 could meet the new needs of the changed situation. This was the starting point and the
34
35 ambitious design of this book, which came out in serial form in a philosophical journal
36
37 between 1950 and 1954.
38
39

40
41
42 This was also the starting point for the flourishing of other philosophical inquiries
43
44 developed during the first half of the twentieth century in Italy. The next section
45
46 examines Pareyson's theory of aesthetic formativeness and its place in the philosophy
47
48 and epistemology of the aesthetic study of organizational life.
49
50

51
52
53 **FORMATIVITÀ AND PHILOSOPHY OF AESTHETIC ORGANIZATIONAL**
54
55 **RESEARCH**
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4
5
6 *Formatività* made its appearance in organization studies a decade before both its partial
7 translation into English, in 2009. It did so in the context of the organizational research
8 on the aesthetic dimension of everyday working life in organizations that, during the
9 late 1980s, was one of several new lines of inquiry pursued by organizational theories.
10 Subsequently, *Formatività* would also be a theoretical reference for the study of social
11 practices in organizational contexts, in particular in the area of practice-based studies
12 (Gherardi and Strati, 2012), as we shall see in the third and concluding section of this
13 essay.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24 The first reference in organizational studies to the aesthetic philosophy of Luigi
25 Pareyson is to be found in the book *Organization and Aesthetics* (Strati, 1999). That is
26 to say, when study of the aesthetic dimension of organization was becoming
27 established, and not at its beginnings in the late 1980s, nor even contemporaneously
28 with the proposal for the ‘aesthetic’ study of organization made in the early 1990s in the
29 pages of this journal, the *Academy of Management Review* (Strati, 1992) This signals an
30 important aspect of aesthetic research on organizational life. In fact, if one reviews the
31 first decade of reflection on the aesthetic side of organization, one notes that specific
32 references to aesthetic philosophy were sporadic and sometimes appeared ritualistic;
33 one notes, that is, that these references indicated a process that was weak, a dialogue
34 between organizational literature on aesthetics and philosophy which was still in its
35 infancy. Some philosophers, such as Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Giambattista
36 Vico, or Immanuel Kant were posited at the basis of aesthetic organizational research,
37 while others such as Susanne Langer, Jaques Derrida or Maurice Merleau-Ponty were
38 recurrently present. But real ‘dialogue’ with philosophical aesthetics became established
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 in the next decade, which was the period in which attention to aesthetics by
5
6 organizational scholars was especially animated, as noted by Pasquale Gagliardi (2006:
7
8 702), thanks to

10
11
12 a growing body of literature on aesthetic themes, one in which systematic reflection is
13
14 conducted on the relationships between these and organization (Dean et al. 1997; Strati
15
16 1999) and between art and management (Guillet de Monthoux 2004); there are research
17
18 anthologies as well as special journal issues (*Organization* 3/2, 1996; Linstead and
19
20 Höpfl, 2000; *Human Relations* 55/7, 2002), which have resulted from seminars and
21
22 conferences expressly devoted to analysis of the methodological implications of taking
23
24 an aesthetic approach to the study of organizations. The aesthetics of organization is
25
26 therefore taking shape as a distinct field of inquiry within organizational studies [...].
27
28
29
30

31 For obvious reasons, this ‘dialogue’ does not set organizational aesthetics and
32
33 philosophical aesthetics in a symmetrical and interactive relationship with each other,
34
35 given that philosophical aesthetics has its origins in the works of Baumgarten (1750),
36
37 Vico (1725), in the writings of Joseph Addison on ‘the pleasures of the imagination’
38
39 published in June 1712 in his and Richard Steele’s journal *The Spectator*. There is no
40
41 dialectical relation between them also because contemporary scholars of philosophical
42
43 aesthetics have not paid particular attention to organizational reflection on aesthetics,
44
45 with rare exceptions such as the volume on ordinary beauty edited by Janusz
46
47 Przychodzen, François-Emmanuel Boucher, and Sylvain David (2010).
48
49

50
51 The aesthetic discourse on the organization, on the other hand, has not ‘appropriated’
52
53 philosophical aesthetics; rather, it has resorted to it in a diversified and sporadic manner.
54
55 It has ‘conversed’ with some philosophical aesthetics and instead neglected others,
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 depending on both the personal taste of the organization scholar and the peculiarities of
5
6 the organizational context studied.
7

8 Hence, among the philosophers that have gradually become part of the theoretical
9 heritage of organizational aesthetics, besides the already-mentioned Addison,
10 Baumgarten, Derrida, Langer, Kant and Vico, we find Schopenhauer and Nietzsche's
11 aesthetics of the crisis of rationalism, Schiller's romantic aesthetics, Dewey's naturalist
12 pragmatism, Husserl's phenomenological aesthetics, Benjamin's marxist aesthetics,
13 Gadamer's hermeneutics, and Pareyson's existentialist hermeneutics. Other
14 philosophers and philosophical aesthetics may be added to complete this overview of
15 organization studies philosophical reflections; but the variegated picture, composed of
16 facets often at odds with each other, which emerges does not change.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

28 There are three 'philosophical sensibilities' that characterize aesthetic research on
29 organization: the *hermeneutic sensibility*, the *aesthetic sensibility*, and the *performative*
30 *sensibility* (Strati, 2016). Luigi Pareyson's aesthetic theory is an important philosophical
31 referent for all three of these sensibilities, as we shall now see.
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

39 **Pareyson's personalistic hermeneutics**

40
41 The *hermeneutic philosophical sensibility* has characterized the aesthetic discourse on
42 organization since its inception, because it distinguishes the works most concerned with
43 study of the symbolism of organizational aesthetics. The interpretation of aesthetics in
44 terms of their symbolic construction and as expression of organization as organizational
45 culture has drawn mainly on the philosophical reflections of Hans-Georg Gadamer, who
46 more than Schlegel, Schleiermacher or Heidegger himself, applied hermeneutic thought
47 to aesthetics. Gadamer (1977) maintained that the experience of beauty through art is
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 not only an authentic experience that transforms us; it is also an experience inherently
5
6 characterized by the symbolism that distinguishes the human being. In the same years
7
8 when Gadamer propounded the close link between hermeneutics and aesthetics in
9
10 philosophy, Pareyson was arguing that art “is the locus *par excellence* of interpretation:
11
12 the interpretation of truth” (Vercellone, Bertinetto and Garelli, 2003: 357). It is
13
14 important to emphasise that Pareyson contributed independently from Gadamer to the
15
16 development of hermeneutic aesthetics, and that the theories of these two philosophers
17
18 do not coincide at all. To grasp the originality of Pareyson’s contribution to
19
20 hermeneutics, one must return to his reading of Sören Kierkegaard’s existentialism, and
21
22 in particular to his *Scritti sull’esistenzialismo*:
23
24
25
26
27

28 Only in the *essential relation* between myself and the situation am I really myself:
29
30 unique, incarnated, placed, singularized, concrete. Thus after all, incarnation is a
31
32 relation I maintain with myself, a concrete and singularized self-identity: my own
33
34 ipseity (Pareyson, 1943: 15-16; Eng. transl. 2009: 42).
35
36
37

38
39 In this way, Pareyson proposes the hermeneutic perspective that is defined as
40
41 *personalistic hermeneutics*, whereby “hermeneutics is the consistent outcome of an
42
43 existentialism that does not lose its ties to the being and rights of the person”
44
45 (Vercellone, Bertinetto and Garelli, 2003: 356). In fact, he reprises from the thought of
46
47 Kierkegaard the distinctiveness of the individual’s peculiarities and his/her irreducibility
48
49 to objectification.
50
51

52 With his existentialist hermeneutics, therefore, Pareyson takes a polemical position
53
54 towards the hermeneutics of Heidegger, which he nevertheless appreciated – “I am
55
56 ‘thrown’ to live in a situation, as might be said using a fitting expression of Heidegger”,
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 he comments (Pareyson, 1943: 15-16; Eng. transl. 2009: 42) – precisely because the
5
6 German philosopher neglected the concreteness of the person’s human existence and
7
8 reduced it to an ontological instance.
9

10
11
12 I have *this* body, *these* relatives, *these* friends, *this* homeland, *this* job, *these* relations
13
14 with others and other things: that is I have a very definite position in the universe, a
15
16 specific place in the world. In a word: a situation, or better, *my* situation. I cannot regard
17
18 my situation as one among many others, any of which I could have been given at
19
20 random. My situation is my concreteness, my configuration, or, to use Marcel’s word,
21
22 my ‘incarnation’: without it, I, as a single person, would not exist. The bonds that
23
24 connect me to my situation are very tight, and above all, they are essential to me: they
25
26 are not links of ‘features’, but of ‘essence’ (Pareyson, 1943: 15-16; Eng. transl. 2009:
27
28 42).
29
30
31
32

33
34 But, Pareyson warns, the person must not be reduced to the situation, as if there were no
35
36 clear distinction between them, because incarnation “is a choice: I do not reduce myself
37
38 to my situation, but I choose it. Choice, through which I assume my situation, acts so
39
40 that I do not identify myself with it” (Pareyson, 1943: 18; Eng. transl., 2009: 44).
41
42
43

44 **Formatività and the aesthetic and performative sensibilities**

45
46 ‘Aesthetics’, in the philosophical tradition of Addison, Baumgarten and Vico which has
47
48 informed a large part of the aesthetic discourse on organization, means taste, sensory
49
50 perception and aesthetic judgment through the senses, imagination and symbolic
51
52 construction, mythical thinking and poetic logic.
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 It signifies not only art and artistic worlds but also the ordinary beauty and the ordinary
5 ugliness that are collectively constructed even in non-artistic organizations, through
6 negotiation of the aesthetic and the interaction among aesthetic feelings that are like the
7 thinking of the body in a world of sensible knowing. Aesthetics is action: it is action
8 when we activate our perceptive faculties and aesthetic judgement to perform a task, to
9 enjoy a product, to imagine ourselves in a situation which does not yet exist, or to
10 immerse ourselves in a context; it is action when we activate the proprioceptive
11 faculties that enable us to move in a situation; it is action when we set about
12 contemplating a work of art, listening to a concert, or being entertained by a story.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24 Aesthetics is therefore 'doing', and intertwined in this 'doing' are both the philosophical
25 aesthetic sensibility and the performative sensibility of aesthetic research on
26 organization.
27
28
29
30
31
32

33 The beauty of nature is a beauty of forms, and so it is evident for a gaze that is capable
34 of seeing the form as a form, after having searched for it, inquired into it, surveyed it,
35 interpreted it, to finally admire and enjoy it. Therefore the vision and the appreciation of
36 the beauty of nature presuppose an effort of interpretation, an exercise of faithfulness,
37 discipline of attention, a concentrated gaze, and the cultivation of a way of seeing, to
38 reach that deep and all-seeing view, which is, in one way, vision of forms, and in
39 another, production of forms, since an interpreted form and formed image must coincide
40 in that conformation which is peculiar to contemplation (Pareyson, 1954: 212; Eng.
41 transl. 2009: 101).
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

53 Pareyson's aesthetic theory is particularly congenial to the intertwining of aesthetic
54 sensibility and performative sensibility in the aesthetic discourse on organization
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 because, among the many different aspects that the concept of ‘doing’ may assume,
5
6 Pareyson posits as ‘formativeness’ the doing which, while it is being done, invents how
7
8 to do it, and which for this reason is a doing that forms:
9

10
11
12 Forming, therefore, means ‘doing’, but it is a doing that as it is being done, *invents how*
13 *it is to be done*. This is doing without how it is to be done being predetermined and
14 imposed so that it suffices to apply it to do well: it must be found by doing, and only by
15 doing can one discover it, so that, properly speaking, it is a matter of inventing, without
16 which the operation fails [...]. To form, therefore, means to ‘do’ and ‘know how to do’
17 together: to do while inventing at the same time how in the particular case what is to be
18 done lets itself be done. Forming means ‘being able to do’, that is, doing in a way that,
19 without appeal to pre-established technical rules, one can and must say that what has
20 been done has been done as it should have been done (Pareyson, 1954: 59).
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

33 The whole of human experience is characterized by the aesthetic dimension, says
34 Pareyson (1954: 19), because “present in the entirety of human industriousness is an
35 inventive and innovative side that is the precondition for any achievement” and because
36 “it is precisely the formative character of all human industriousness that explains how
37 one can speak of the beauty of any work”. This is a conception of aesthetics that is not
38 new in the philosophy of the twentieth century and which brings Pareyson’s thought
39 close to that, for example, of Dewey on aesthetics and human experience. But it
40 highlights Pareyson’s distance from Crocean idealism, his connection to other Italian
41 philosophers attentive to the practice of aesthetics, and also the importance of
42 *Formatività* for the aesthetic study of organization and for Practice-based Studies. There
43 is no evaluation of human work that does not involve, in everyday organizational work,
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 some aesthetic appreciation, from the beauty of an argument to that of a way of
5
6 working, from a work of thought to the proposal of a style in the performance of an
7
8 activity.
9

10
11
12 In these cases one certainly performs an aesthetic evaluation, and one can use such
13
14 language with good reason, because these are successful works, and the work, whatever
15
16 the activity in which it concludes, will fail without making form, definite and consistent,
17
18 because no activity, be it moral or speculative, can generate works if not by exercising
19
20 the process of invention and production that constitutes the forming (Pareyson, 1954:
21
22 20).
23
24
25
26

27 For Pareyson, therefore, it takes art to do anything. This is apparent in the most diverse
28
29 of human activities, because every human experience has an aesthetic character due to
30
31 the formativeness that distinguishes it, because it is done with art, it is done artfully, or
32
33 the art of doing it is discovered or invented. Formativeness thus coincides with the
34
35 aesthetics of the art of organizing, with the art of managing a firm, with the art of tuning
36
37 a machine, with the art of industrial design, as well as with the experience of an event in
38
39 the organization or an organizational space. Art, however, occupies a position apart in
40
41 these experiential dynamics because art is not 'art of', but art *tout-court*.
42
43
44
45
46

47 If every operation is always *formative*, in the sense that it cannot be itself without
48
49 forming, and one cannot think or act without forming, instead the artistic operation is
50
51 *formation*, in the sense that it intentionally seeks to form, and within it thought and
52
53 action intervene only to make it possible that it cannot but be formation. The artistic
54
55 operation is a process of invention and production undertaken, not to achieve
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 speculative or practical works, or others besides, but only for itself: forming to form,
5
6 only pursuing the form for itself: *art is pure formativeness* (Pareyson, 1954: 23).
7
8
9

10 It is, however, the emphasis on the fact that one needs ‘art to do’ that has most
11
12 interested the study of organization, as we shall discuss further in the next section.
13
14
15

16 **LUIGI PAREYSON’S INFLUENCE ON ORGANIZATION STUDIES**

17
18
19

20 The thought of Pareyson is important for the understanding of organizational life and
21
22 for the theory and empirical analysis of work practices. We will illustrate this point by
23
24 referring to a broader set of studies based on practice, which we will denote with the
25
26 umbrella term of ‘practice-based studies’ without going into details on the different
27
28 theories of practice that inform them.
29
30

31
32 In fact, the field of practice-based studies has being growing very fast in the last years
33
34 and it is complex to give a brief but accurate map. Therefore we can refer to the
35
36 distinctions provided by Feldman and Orlikowski (2011: 1240), who differentiates
37
38 among different ways of engaging in practice research: ‘an empirical focus on how
39
40 people act in organizational contexts, a theoretical focus on understanding relations
41
42 between the actions people take and the structures of organizational life, and a
43
44 philosophical focus on the constitutive role of practices in producing organizational
45
46 reality’. Our work is positioned within the third way of engaging practice as
47
48 philosophical focus, and thus we consider that practices are fundamental to the
49
50 production and reproduction of social reality and organizations are constituted in
51
52 ongoing knowledgeable practices. Our understanding of the central phenomenon in
53
54 practice-based studies is knowing-in-practice. Therefore we define knowledge as a
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 practical activity and Pareyson's work has been influential in grounding an aesthetic
5
6 theory of knowledge.
7

8
9 It is through organizational aesthetics that Pareyson's contribution enters the
10
11 theorization of work practices, in that sensible knowledge, the body, and the aesthetic
12
13 judgement are present in various ways in knowing in practice (Strati and Gherardi,
14
15 2015).
16

17
18 The practical knowledge acquired through the five senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste,
19
20 and touch was also considered by Michael Polanyi (1958) when he drew the distinction
21
22 between explicit and tacit knowledge: the former type of knowledge is formalized in
23
24 scientific terms; the latter is constituted by the awareness of knowing how to do
25
26 something without being able to provide an adequate analytical description of it and,
27
28 therefore, without being able to translate it into formal, and generalizable knowledge. It
29
30 is for this latter form of knowledge that the aesthetic understanding is fundamental for
31
32 studying situated practices.
33
34

35
36 In this framework, the contribution of Pareyson's aesthetic philosophy to the study of
37
38 practices comprises three main topics (i) the concept of formativeness makes it possible
39
40 to analyse and interpret how the object of a practice acquires form; (ii) the idea of the
41
42 inseparability of knowing and expressing supports an understanding of practice as
43
44 collective taste-making; (iii) finally, the inseparability of knowing and sensing explains
45
46 practice as grounded in sensible knowledge and therefore in the materiality of bodies
47
48 that work. We will develop these three topics starting from the theoretical and
49
50 methodological issues of a practice-based approach in order to focus on how Pareyson's
51
52 thought is relevant to the argument.
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Formativeness: how the object of a practice acquires form

One of the main concerns of a practice-based approach is to theorize the relationship between the activities that form a practice and what is the effect of their being practiced. For example, in an elderly residential care home the activities that form various work practices relate to cleaning, feeding, entertainment, medical treatment, and so on, while 'care' is the object of the practice and is realized within a texture of interdependent work practices.

While the objectives of an activity are the intended outcomes of that process, the object of a practice is the thing, or project, that people are working on to transform. This distinction between the output of the activities that form care practices and care as an emergent object makes it possible to conceive the elderly as receivers not of service but of solicitude. In fact taking care of a sick body without considerateness is mere service-work, not care. Therefore the object of a practice is also an epistemic object – defined by Knorr Cetina (2001: 184) as “always in the process of being materially defined, they continually acquire new properties and change the ones they have” – and they are simultaneously given, socially constructed, contested, and emergent (Blackler and Reagan, 2009: 164). Therefore in producing care as the emergent object of different professional practices there is the idea that practice is a collective knowledgeable doing. In Pareyson's terms we can see formativeness in the process whereby care takes form and becomes realized. In fact, Pareyson's aesthetic theory is an aesthetics of production – as opposed to an aesthetics of contemplation – and it concerns the becoming of the form, i.e. the outcome of a formation process. He is fascinated by the idea of human life as the invention of forms which acquire lives of their own: they detach themselves from their creators and become forms, engendering styles. There is hence a formative

1
2
3
4 character in the whole of human industriousness, and art is only a specific domain of
5
6 this formativeness, as we illustrated above. Pareyson proposes that a work of art be
7
8 regarded as pure formativeness, and the topic of his book on aesthetics is the work of art
9
10 in its process of forming and being formed. But he also writes:

11
12
13
14
15 if all spiritual life is formative, behold the possibility of beauty possessed by every
16
17 work, be it speculative, practical or utilitarian [...] and formative, too, is the sensible
18
19 knowledge that grasps every 'thing', producing it, and 'forming thereof' the image, so
20
21 that this is 'accomplished' and reveals and captures, indeed *is* the thing' (Pareyson,
22
23 1954: 11).
24
25
26

27
28 The realization of the object of a practice therefore emerges from a formative process in
29
30 which an attempt is made to produce the image that renders the 'thing', and the outcome
31
32 of knowing is seeing the 'thing' formed. Particularly evident in the production of
33
34 objects is the performative and creative aspect that characterizes every 'doing', even
35
36 when it consists in thinking or acting: "one does not operate without completing,
37
38 performing, producing, and realizing" (Pareyson, 1954: 18). A work is 'accomplished'
39
40 in so far as its doing comprises the way in which it must be done.
41
42

43
44 There is formativeness both in the way a material object – like the craft work of the
45
46 artisan women studied by Gherardi and Perrotta (2014) – is manufactured and in the
47
48 narratives on their creative practices that the craftswomen performed for the researchers.
49
50 In fact, in our empirical research we used Pareyson's concept of formativeness to
51
52 interpret how the research participants described the creative process whereby form was
53
54 given to an object understood as unique, and how they were showing us the difference
55
56 between an accomplished piece (*fait comme il faut*) and one less well done. Competence
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 was performed for us researchers, making the art of doing present to an audience.
5
6 Nevertheless a process of giving form, as a doing that invents the way of doing, was at
7
8 work not only as material production but also in the discursive practices that were
9
10 authoring the craftswoman as she was using words that expressed her knowledge and
11
12 her sense of identity and competence in doing. Therefore we can say that in
13
14 formativeness the boundaries among epistemic objects, materiality and discursivity are
15
16 blurred or, in other words, that there is no need to presume distinctions between the
17
18 knowing, doing and talking.
19
20

21
22 In this sense, the epistemology of practice may be defined as an epistemology of
23
24 becoming in order to stress impermanence and the tentative and ongoing process of
25
26 knowledge production, or an epistemology of transformation in order to point to how
27
28 knowledge changes through its use, or in the Wittgenstein (1953) tradition as
29
30 knowledge in transition, an expression intended to capture the difficulties that we face
31
32 ‘in trying to make sense of activities that are still incomplete, still unfolding in relation
33
34 to their actual surroundings’ (Shotter, 2012: 247).
35
36

37
38 These considerations on the fundamental formative nature of all human industriousness
39
40 enable us to move a step further in considering Pareyson’s argument on the
41
42 inseparability of knowing and expressing and its relevance to theorizing on the relation
43
44 between practitioners’ knowledgeable doing and their emotional attachment to the
45
46 object of their practice.
47
48
49
50

51 **Inseparability of knowing and expressing: how a collective taste-making sustains**
52 **practices**
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 In order to consider practitioners' attachment to their practices we need to define our
5 understanding of practice in terms of normative accountability of various performances.
6
7
8 Rouse (2001: 190) writes: "actors share a practice if their actions are appropriately
9 regarded as answerable to norms of correct or incorrect practice". In other words,
10 practices are not only recurrent patterns of action (level of production) but also recurrent
11 patterns of *socially* sustained action (production and reproduction). What people
12 produce in their situated practices is not only work but also the (re)production of
13 society. In this sense practice is an analytic concept that enables interpretation of how
14 people achieve active being-in-the-world.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24 A practice is not recognizable outside its intersubjectively created meaning, and what
25 makes possible the competent reproduction of a practice over and over again and its
26 refinement while being practiced (or its abandonment) is the constant negotiation of
27 what is thought to be a correct/beautiful or incorrect/ugly way of practicing within the
28 community of its practitioners. Within every community of practitioners, discussing and
29 disputing practice, developing different cultures of practice yet identifying with a shared
30 practice, and making practice into terrain legitimately contestable by its practitioners,
31 are dynamics that socially sustain that practice. These dynamics construct the conditions
32 in which the practice is reproduced. They can be conceived as the everyday work of
33 practice reproduction, and as the dynamic work which adapts the practice to changed
34 circumstances, so that it is once again performed "for another first time" (Garfinkel,
35 1967: 9). The attachment to the object of practice – be it of love or hate, or of love and
36 hate – is what makes practices socially sustained by judgments related not only to
37 utility, but to ethics and aesthetics as well.
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 Taste and amateur practices like those of music buffs, food or wine tasters, or even
5
6 those of drug addicts, constitute the empirical basis on which a sociology of attachments
7
8 has developed (Hennion, 2001; 2004). The relationship with the object – food, music,
9
10 drug – exemplifies a relation in which the practitioner is indeed active, that is, deploys a
11
12 set of situated practices in order to use and enjoy the object of his/her passion
13
14 individually and collectively; but s/he is also passive, in that s/he deliberately, and in
15
16 ‘cultivated’ manner, abandons him/herself to the effect of the object in so far as s/he
17
18 predisposes the material conditions for the enjoyment of music, food or drugs, and
19
20 socially shares this passion within a community of amateurs.
21
22

23
24 The concept of taste-making has been proposed (Gherardi, 2009) to account for
25
26 practitioners’ attachment to the object of practice and negotiation of an aesthetic
27
28 judgement on it. Taste-making refers to the process of giving voice to passion and
29
30 negotiating aesthetic criteria that support what constitutes ‘a good practice’ or ‘a sloppy
31
32 one’ and ‘a beautiful practice’ or ‘an ugly one’ within a community of practitioners. It is
33
34 formed within situated discursive practices. The aesthetic judgement is made by being
35
36 said – and therefore it presupposes the collective elaboration and mastery of a
37
38 vocabulary for saying – and it is said by being made. Taste-making is therefore the
39
40 process that socially sustains the formation of taste and the sophistication of practices
41
42 through the mobilization of sensible knowledge (the bodily ability to perceive and to
43
44 taste), the sharing of a vocabulary for appraising the object and the object in place.
45
46 Developing a vocabulary of appraisal enables the community of practitioners to
47
48 communicate about sensible experiences, to draw distinctions of taste, and to spread
49
50 them through the community.
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 Pareyson's contribution to the reading of practices sustained by sensation, sentiment
5
6 and sensory knowledge proceeds in the following way:
7
8
9

10 It is impossible to know sensitively without experiencing a sentimental reaction, and on
11 the other hand sentiment is always a mood which colors and accompanies a sensation.
12
13 [...] If it is true that I cannot make contact with the world except through the emotions I
14 feel about it, it is also true that I do not feel emotions unless I make contact with the
15 world. (Pareyson, 1950; Engl. trans. 2009: 79)
16
17
18
19

20
21
22 Therefore sensation and sentiment are inseparable, but also between knowing and
23 expressing there is a relation of mutual constitution:
24
25
26
27

28
29 There is neither knowing which is not expressing, nor expressing that is not knowing: I
30 know only while expressing, and through expression I know. (Pareyson, 1950; Engl.
31 trans. 2009: 82)
32
33
34
35
36

37 Intuition is in Pareyson what includes sensation and sentiment and it constitutes the
38 principle of the aesthetic nature of knowledge:
39
40
41
42

43 knowledge does not grasp something without expressing the knower, and that
44 expression does not express sentiments without also grasping something known. I do
45 not know something unless I express myself, and in expressing myself I declare
46 knowledge of something. This is the principle of the aesthetic nature of knowledge.
47
48 (Pareyson, 1950; Engl. trans. 2009: 82)
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 This relationship among the process of knowing, the formation of a subjectivity as
5
6 ‘knower’ and the expression of a collective taste that sustains (or does not sustain) a
7
8 certain way of practicing is what enables researchers to inquire into how practitioners
9
10 are able to put their passions into practice (Gherardi, Nicolini and Strati 2007) and how
11
12 practicing their passions may contribute to the development of a field of practices and to
13
14 the elaboration of an aesthetics of practice.
15
16

17
18
19
20 **Inseparability of knowing and sensing: how sensible knowing is embodied in**
21
22 **practicing**
23

24 In the writings of Pareyson, language mainly depicts the single individual knower in
25
26 relation with the world, while the collective and social dimension of sensations,
27
28 sentiments and sensory knowledge has to be intuited rather than read. By contrast, a
29
30 practice approach addresses the same phenomena in their social dimension, leaving the
31
32 individual in the background. We have emphasized the collective dimension of
33
34 knowing-in-practice in the previous section, and we pass now to focus more on the
35
36 individual, embodied, and sensory knowledge. In fact, the relationship between the
37
38 (individual) body – origin of sensations and emotions – and the process of interpreting
39
40 and relating is at the heart of what constitutes sensory knowledge and how it is shaped
41
42 by social processes and shapes social processes in working practices.
43
44

45
46 People participate in working practices on the basis of their individual capacities to see,
47
48 hear, smell, taste, feel and judge aesthetically. It is this that differentiates among them,
49
50 given that not everyone sees the same things, reacts to the same odours, or has the same
51
52 taste: there are those who ‘have an eye’ for things while others do not; those who have
53
54 an ‘ear’ or a ‘nose’; those who are ‘good with their hands’, ‘have taste’. This is personal
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 knowledge that is ineradicable and irreducible. In fact, if we take a remark on an
5
6 organizational event like: 'I don't like this thing' it is unarguable, given that further
7
8 reason-based negotiation on the matter is impossible.
9

10
11 Sensible knowledge reveals the continuous interactions between the knowing subject
12
13 and the Other. The Other is usually considered as a human being; but also the non-
14
15 human element sensed via touch, hearing, smell, sight and taste reveals its active
16
17 involvement in the process of producing sensible knowledge. To give an example we
18
19 can consider the case of honey (Strati, 2007). Honey is fluid, but has some consistency
20
21 and is viscous. Whenever it is touched, it 'touches' in its turn. The non-human element
22
23 shows an ability to be active in its relationship with the human being, since it takes the
24
25 initiative of spattering his or her fingers with mud, or colouring and perfuming them, or
26
27 dirtying them. It may be unpleasant to feel the honey on one's fingers; a negative
28
29 emotion that only subsides when the honey stops 'touching' the fingers. Or, one may
30
31 feel disgust at the viscosity of the honey; or alternatively one may feel pleasure at its
32
33 sweetness and perfume. These are sensitive judgements 'of the senses', as if they were
34
35 the body's thought. In fact, sensory activity always involves passion, and every
36
37 sensation is affective. In other words, sensible knowledge involves what is 'got'
38
39 emotionally, the affectivity connected with what is perceived, taste-based judgment, the
40
41 style of action.
42
43
44

45
46 The valorization of aesthetics in organizational practices has led to the appreciation of
47
48 the corporeality of personal knowledge in the process of knowing in practice. It shows
49
50 that knowing cannot be confined to the sphere of cognition, nor should all forms of
51
52 knowledge be translated into cognitive knowledge. Rather, due account should be taken
53
54 of the personal knowledge based on the faculty of aesthetic judgement and the
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 perceptive-sensorial capacities. On this rests the radical break of practice-based studies
5
6 with the dominant tradition of cognitive theory as regards knowing in practice. A
7
8 radical break to which *Formatività* has contributed: “It is always a concrete person that,
9
10 from his/her point of view, seeks to render and bring to life the work as *itself* wants”
11
12 (Pareyson, 1954: 11).
13
14
15
16

17 CONCLUSIONS

18
19
20
21 In this essay we have illustrated how the philosophical aesthetics expounded in
22
23 Pareyson’s *Estetica: Teoria della formatività* has been relevant to the study of social
24
25 practices in organizational life.
26
27

28 We have shown that this happened in the context of renewed interest in organization
29
30 studies towards philosophical aesthetics that was developed through organizational
31
32 aesthetics research (Chytry, 2008; Guillet de Monthoux, 2004; Strati, 1999) and the
33
34 debate on the concept of practice and of knowing and learning in organization that has
35
36 configured practice-based studies (Gherardi and Strati, 2012). Thus, ‘philosophy’
37
38 constituted the link between Pareyson’s *Formatività* and the aesthetic discourse on
39
40 organizational life, while ‘practice’ constituted the link among ‘formativeness’,
41
42 organizational aesthetics research and practice-based studies. We have argued that these
43
44 two terms – ‘philosophy’ and ‘practice’ – are closely bound up with each other in
45
46 Pareyson’s aesthetic theory; as well as in other Italian philosophies contemporary to
47
48 Pareyson’s thought, i.e. Banfi’s (1988) and Anceschi’s (1936) phenomenological
49
50 aesthetics and della Volpe’s (1960) neo-marxist aesthetics. Pareyson pointed out this
51
52 theoretical relation throughout *Formatività*, from its ‘Preface’ onwards:
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4
5
6 The aesthetic theory proposed in this book starts from the aesthetic experience and then
7
8 returns to it according to the above idea of philosophy as based on the inseparability of
9
10 experience and thought, so that it is constantly open to ever new contributions and ever
11
12 new developments. It arose from living contact with the aesthetic experience as it results
13
14 from the industriousness of artists, studied both in their ongoing work and their valuable
15
16 thoughts and statements about it, from the activity of readers and interpreters and art
17
18 critics, as well as from the attitudes of the producers and contemplators of beauty
19
20 wherever this is to be found, either in the natural sphere or in the practical and
21
22 intellectual one. (1954: 8).
23
24

25
26
27 The core of the aesthetics set out in *Formatività* is ‘doing’ in practice, which is why it is
28
29 a philosophy that has a “concrete character because it starts from experience and
30
31 adheres to it” (Pareyson, 1954: 17) and a speculative character that prevents it from
32
33 being reduced to experience and being identified with it.
34

35
36 It is a strong and forcefully expressed philosophical ontology. It starts with opposition
37
38 to the idealism of Benedetto Croce and dissent with the hermeneutic aesthetics of
39
40 Heidegger, and it ends with the differences that distinguish it from Italian
41
42 phenomenological or Marxist aesthetics. There are no other Italian aesthetic
43
44 philosophies that had so much importance in the Italian philosophical landscape of the
45
46 post-World War II period and the years of reconstruction and the Italian miracle.
47

48
49 This is why the question on the lack of prompt translations into other languages like
50
51 English or French or Spanish is so important. Certainly, the recent translations of
52
53 *Formatività* – even though in English there is not yet a complete translation of the book
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 – have prompted us to illustrate its importance both for Italian aesthetic philosophy and,
5
6 especially, for the study of organizational life.
7
8

9 REFERENCES

10
11 Anceschi, L. 1936. *Autonomia ed eteronomia dell'arte. Saggio di fenomenologia delle*
12 *poetiche*. Reprinted 1992, Milano: Garzanti.

13
14
15 Banfi, A. 1988. *Vita dell'arte. Scritti di estetica e di filosofia dell'arte – Opere*. Vol. V.
16 Edited by E. Mattioli and G. Scaramuzza. Reggio Emilia: Istituto 'A. Banfi' (1st ed.
17 1947).
18

19
20 Baumgarten, A. G. 1750-58. *Aesthetica*. Voll. I-II. Frankfurt am Oder: Kleyb,
21 (Photostat: Olms, Hildesheim, 1986).
22

23 Blackler, F. & Regan, S. 2009. Intentionality, agency, change: Practice theory and
24 management. *Management Learning*, 40(2): 161–176.
25

26 Carravetta, P. 2010. Review article: Form, person, and inexhaustible interpretation:
27 Luigi Pareyson, *Existence, interpretation, freedom. Selected writings*. Translated, and
28 with an introduction, by Paolo Diego Bubbio. Davies group publishers, 2009.
29 *Parrhesia*, 12: 99–108.
30
31

32 Chytry, J. 2008. Organizational aesthetics: The artful firm and the aesthetic moment in
33 contemporary business and management theory. *Aesthesis: International Journal of*
34 *Art and Aesthetics in Management and Organizational Life*, 2(2): 60–72.
35 <http://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/aesthesis/23>.
36
37

38 Croce, B. 1902. *Estetica come scienza dell'espressione e linguistica generale*.
39 Reprinted 1990, Milano: Adelphi.
40

41 D'Angelo, P. 1997. *L'estetica italiana del Novecento*. Roma–Bari : Laterza.
42

43 Dean, J. W., Ramirez, R. & Ottensmeyer, E. 1997. An aesthetic perspective on
44 organizations. In C. Cooper & S. Jackson (Eds.), *Creating Tomorrow's Organizations:*
45 *A Handbook for Future Research in Organizational Behavior*: 419–437. Chichester:
46 Wiley.
47
48

49 Della Volpe, G. 1960. *Critica del gusto*. Milano: Feltrinelli.
50

51 Feldman, M. & Orlikowski, W. 2011. Theorizing practice and practicing theory.
52 *Organization Science*, 22(5): 1240–1253.
53
54

55 Gadamer, H. G. 1977. *Die Aktualität des Schönen. Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest*.
56 Stuttgart: Phillip Reclam Jr. (Eng. transl.: The Relevance of the Beautiful. Art as Play,
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3
4 Symbol, and Festival. In H. G. Gadamer, *The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other*
5 *Essays*: 3-53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
- 6
7
8 Gagliardi, P. 2006. Exploring the aesthetic side of organizational life. In S. R. Clegg, C.
9 Hardy, T. B. Lawrence & W. R. Nord (Eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Organization*
10 *Studies*: 701–724. London: Sage.
- 11
12 Garfinkel, H. 1967. *Studies in Ethnomethodology*. Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs.
- 13
14
15 Gherardi, S. 2000. Practice-based theorizing on learning and knowing in organizations:
16 An introduction. *Organization*, 7(2): 211–223.
- 17
18 Gherardi, S. 2009. Practice? It's a matter of taste!. *Management Learning*, 40(5): 535–
19 550.
- 20
21 Gherardi, S. & Perrotta, M. 2014. Between the hand and the head: How things get done,
22 and how in doing the ways of doing are discovered. *Qualitative Research in*
23 *Organization and Management*, 9(2): 134–150.
- 24
25
26 Gherardi, S. & Strati, A. 2012. *Learning and Knowing in Practice-based Studies*.
27 Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- 28
29 Gherardi, S., Nicolini, D. & Strati, A. 2007. The passion for knowing. *Organization*,
30 14(3): 309–323.
- 31
32 Guillet de Monthoux, P. 2004. *The Art Firm: Aesthetic Management and*
33 *Metaphysical Marketing from Wagner to Wilson*. Stanford: Stanford Business Books.
- 34
35
36 Hennion, A. 2001. Music lovers. Taste as performance. *Theory, Culture & Society*,
37 18(5): 1-22.
- 38
39 Hennion, A. 2004. Une sociologie des attachments. D'une sociologie de la culture à une
40 pragmatique de l'amateur. *Sociétés*, 85(3): 9–24.
- 41
42 *Human Relations* 2002, 55(7). Special Issue on 'Organizing Aesthetics'. Edited by A.
43 Strati & P. Guillet de Monthoux.
- 44
45
46 Knorr-Cetina, K. 2001. Objectual Practice. In T. R. Schatzki, K. Knorr-Cetina & E. von
47 Savigny (Eds.), *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*: 184–197. London:
48 Routledge.
- 49
50 Linstead, S. & Höpfl, H. (Eds.) 2000. *The Aesthetics of Organization*. London: Sage.
- 51
52
53 *Organization* 1996, 3(2). Special Issue on 'Aesthetics and Organization'. Edited by E.
54 Ottensmeyer.
- 55
56
57
58
59
60

- 1
2
3
4 Pareyson, L. 1943. *Studi sull'esistenzialismo*. Firenze: Sansoni (Partial Eng. Transl.:
5 ***Existence, Interpretation, Freedom. Selected Writings***. Edited by P. D. Bubbio.
6 Aurora, Colorado: The Davies Group, 2009).
7
- 8 Pareyson, L. 1950. Arte e conoscenza: intuizione e interpretazione. *Filosofia*, 2 (Partial
9 Eng. Transl.: ***Existence, Interpretation, Freedom. Selected Writings***. Edited by P. D.
10 Bubbio. Aurora, Colorado: The Davies Group, 2009).
11
- 12 Pareyson, L. 1954. *Eстетica: Teoria della Formatività*. Torino: Edizioni di 'Filosofia'.
13 4th edn1988, Milano: Bompiani (Partial Eng. Transl.: ***Existence, Interpretation,***
14 ***Freedom. Selected Writings***. Edited by P. D. Bubbio. Aurora, Colorado: The Davies
15 Group, 2009).
16
17
- 18 Pareyson, L. 2013. *Truth and Interpretation*. Translated by R. T. Valgenti. New York:
19 SUNY Press.
20
- 21 Polanyi, M. 1958. *Personal Knowledge. Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy*. Chicago:
22 University of Chicago Press.
23
24
- 25 Przychodzen, J., Boucher, F. E. & David, S. (Eds.) 2010. *L'esthétique du beau*
26 *ordinaire dans une perspective transdisciplinaire. Ni du gouffre ni du ciel*. Paris:
27 l'Harmattan.
28
- 29 Restaino, F. 1991. *Storia dell'estetica moderna*. Torino: UTET.
30
- 31 Rouse, J. 2001. Two concepts of practices. In T. R. Schatzki, K. Knorr-Cetina & E. von
32 Savigny (Eds.), *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*: 189–198. London:
33 Routledge.
34
35
- 36 Shotter, J. 2012. Knowledge in transition: The role of prospective, descriptive concepts
37 in a practice-situated, hermeneutical-phronetic social science. *Management Learning*,
38 43(3): 245–260.
39
- 40 Strati, A. 1992. Aesthetic understanding of organizational life. *Academy of*
41 *Management Review*, 17(3): 568–581.
42
43
- 44 Strati, A. 1999. *Organization and Aesthetics*. London: Sage.
45
- 46 Strati, A. 2007. Sensible knowledge and Practice-based learning. *Management*
47 *Learning*, 38(1): 61–77.
48
- 49 Strati, A. 2016. Aesthetics and design: An epistemology of the unseen. In R. Mir, H.
50 Willmott & M. Greenwood (Eds.), *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy in*
51 *Organization Studies*: 251–259. London: Routledge.
52
53
- 54 Strati, A. & Gherardi, S. 2015. La philosophie de Luigi Pareyson et la recherche
55 esthétique des pratiques organisationnelles: un dialogue. *Le Libellio d'AEGIS*, 11(3):
56 21–33.
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4 <http://lelibellio.com/>

5
6 Tiberghien, G. A. 2007. Introduction. In L. Pareyson, *Esthétique. Théorie de la*
7 *formativité*: 3–18. French transl. and introduction by G. A. Tiberghien. Paris: Éditions
8 Rue d’Ulm.

9
10 Vattimo, G. 1977. Introduzione. In G. Vattimo (Ed.), *Estetica moderna*: 7–46. Bologna:
11 Il Mulino.

12
13 Vercellone, F., Bertinetto, A. & Garelli, G. 2003. *Storia dell’estetica moderna e*
14 *contemporanea*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

15
16 Vico, G. 1725. *Principi di una scienza nuova*. Naples: Mosca. 3rd edn 1744. (Eng.
17 trans.: *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, ed. T.G. Bergin and M.H. Fisch. Ithaca,
18 NY: Cornell University Press, 1968).

19
20 Wittgenstein, L. 1953. *Philosophical Investigations*. London: Basic Blackwell.

21
22
23
24
25 Silvia Gherardi (silvia.gherardi@unitn.it) is senior professor of sociology organization at
26
27 the Department of Sociology and Social Research, (University of Trento, Italy), where
28
29 she founded the Research Unit on Communication, Organizational Learning, and
30
31 Aesthetics (www.unitn.it/rucola). She is also professor II at the Faculty of Education
32
33 (Oslo) and Aalto University (Helsinki).

34
35
36
37
38 Antonio Strati (antonio.strati@unitn.it) senior professor of sociology of innovation and
39
40 organization at the Department of Sociology, University of Trento, Italy, and chercheur
41
42 associé at i3-CRG, École polytechnique, CNRS, Université Paris-Saclay, France, is both
43
44 a sociologist and an art photographer. He is a founder of the Research Unit on
45
46 Communication, Organizational Learning and Aesthetics (RUCOLA).

47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60