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NEW MAPS FOR AFRICA?

Contextualising the 'Chinese Model' within Ethiopian and Kenyan Paradigms of Development

by

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ABSTRACT

Since the early 2000s, there has been a sharp increase in speculations that China's development trajectory may provide a model for other developing countries—particularly those in Africa—to follow, and that this poses a profound challenge to the dominant global development paradigm. A highly-charged media and policy debate has increasingly made its way into the academic literature, with central questions focusing around the lessons that African and developing countries are drawing from China and around the desirability of such emulation. Due to the exploratory and recent nature of this growing literature, however, very few studies have been sufficiently grounded in empirical or theoretical analysis.

This dissertation seeks to remedy this situation by examining the ideational influence of China's development on those ultimately charged with evaluating and implementing these purported 'models': developing country elites. Drawing on the theories of cross-societal emulation (Westney 1987) and lesson-drawing (Rose 1991), it finds that elites in two countries cases—Ethiopia and Kenya—indeed seek to emulate countries in East Asia. China, however, is viewed as only one source of potential 'lessons', and its elites often embed its experiences within a wider East Asian development trajectory. In both country cases, this emulation challenges many of the assumptions that have driven development since the 1970s. Unlike the Washington Consensus, the development paradigm prompted by this lesson-drawing is historically-contingent and views nation-building by a strong, visionary political leadership as the country's single most important priority. Because it favours large physical infrastructure projects, rapid economic growth, technologically-optimistic solutions and a civilisatory discourse, its divergence from the more recent

'Augmented' Washington Consensus is even more striking. In these and in other central lessons drawn, the development approach it most resembles, in fact, is the modernisation theory of the 1950s and 1960s.

Despite the fact that both Kenya and Ethiopia thus possess modernising elites that seek to emulate aspects of the East Asian experience, different dynamics drive the process in each national context. In Ethiopia, a country slowly emerging from a history of communism and isolationism, a strong and ideologically unified ruling party looks to China, South Korea and other countries with a history of strong state intervention. In Kenya, by contrast, a coalition of business leaders, technocrats and planners view Singapore and Malaysia as potential models by virtue of a shared colonial history and divergent post-colonial path. Kenya's vision, whilst more moderate, is also more constrained due to the relative lack of influence its modernisers wield in the political process. In both cases, historical factors bound and condition elites' choice of model.

The emerging literature on the 'Chinese Model' of development deserves credit for beginning to theoretically and empirically substantiate an important current policy debate, but it also vastly underestimates the importance of its predecessors. Given the extent to which Ethiopian and Kenyan elites root their emulation in the region as a whole, the East Asian 'developmental state' model is one such fore-runner. Most importantly, however, this emulation illustrates the enduring topicality of many of the assumptions of modernisation theory—assumptions that are likely to play a central role in informing African and even global development paradigms in the future.

DEDICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

Dedicated to Clara –

You are not yet here and already you inspire me

This dissertation would not have been possible without the help and generosity of a great many people. Institutions in four countries hosted me as a visiting researcher and allowed me to use their facilities. I would therefore like to thank the staff at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (at the University of Addis Ababa), the Centre for Development Studies (at the University of Bath) and the Institute for Development Studies (at the University of Nairobi). I would particularly like to thank the staff and doctoral researchers at the Brussels School of International Studies (at the University of Kent) for providing such a warm and welcoming community during those final, difficult months of writing up.

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Those who have supported a friend or family member through their doctoral studies are aware that this can be a task as demanding, at times, as the writing of the dissertation itself. The patience and understanding of my parents and closest friends have made a bigger difference than they know. To Joe, especially: it is no less true for being a truism – I could never have done this without you.

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A NOTE ON THE DEATH OF MELES ZENAWI

On 20 August, 2012, on the eve of this dissertation's completion, it was announced that Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi had passed away after a period of illness. Given the central role played by Meles in steering the policy and ideological direction of the EPRDF and, by extension, the country as a whole, this development will almost certainly have an impact on the issues covered in this study.

Due to the very recent nature of this event, I have been unable to incorporate its implications into my analysis. The political direction that Ethiopia is likely to take in future remains highly uncertain at the time of writing, and long-term prospects will undoubtedly take some time to emerge. I remain confident, however, in my analysis of Ethiopia's emulation of East Asia under Meles' rule; I also believe that the impact of this emulation will outlive the former Prime Minister, regardless of Ethiopia's overall future political direction.

Ethiopia's Acting Prime Minister at the time of this dissertation's submission was Hailemariam Desalign. As chief whip of the EPRDF-led parliament during my period of primary research in Addis Ababa in 2010, Hailemariam was one of the elites I interviewed for this dissertation. His and Meles' original positions are retained in the body of the text, with new positions noted in footnotes only where deemed relevant.

'In my head, I've got practically everything mapped out – if you give me ten years, I will give you South Korea.'

- Senior official, Ministry of Information, Kenya (KG9)

'The issue of adopting and implementing the East Asian developmental model in Ethiopia today may be not only a possible alternative developmental paradigm that will offer us a much needed uplift in the direction of fast economic and social development but will also provide us a golden opportunity of fulfilling the age-old dream of our forebears.'

- Former Ethiopian Ambassador to South Africa (Tesfaye 2007)

INTRODUCTION

If ideas about development can be said to have 'tipping points'—moments when their hitherto-limited expression reaches a critical threshold and begins to spread exponentially— the 'Chinese Model's' own such moment surely came in May 2004. On the 26th and 27th of that month, over a thousand developing policy-makers gathered in Shanghai to share best practices and lessons in poverty reduction. The 'Scaling Up Poverty Reduction' conference marked the culmination of a year-long 'learning process' sponsored by the World Bank and hosted by the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC).[1] The conference may have covered a dozen country case studies and numerous cross-national thematic cases, but all eyes returned again and again to the development experiences of one country in particular —that of China. 'The conference venue in Shanghai is symbolic of the progress that China has made in lifting 400 million people out of poverty since 1981' wrote the World Bank (2004: 16) of the event, explaining that 'China's willingness to share its experiences led to the idea of inviting policymakers and people working on poverty programs in other developing countries to learn from each other'. China's example was a theme that then-President James D. Wolfensohn (2004) returned to in his closing address: 'We've had the remarkable opportunity to look at China, which is a particular experience in itself. How could we have found a place to deal with scaling up that was more an example of scale than China itself?'

The same month also saw the birth of the term 'the Beijing Consensus' in a provocative working paper of the same name, written by Goldman Sachs advisor Joshua

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[1] Hereafter simply 'China'.

Cooper Ramo (2004). Ramo's assertion that China's post-reform development experiences were transforming global development practices by encouraging imitation in areas as far afield as Africa and Latin America has, in the years that followed, sparked a wave of discussion in the media and in policy fora. Much of this has come from traditional donors and from the West. At the 2007 African Union Summit, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon (2007) expressed the 'hope that African leaders and African countries will also try to emulate the Chinese experience and economic development and policies, bringing about good governance and the importance of partnership with the outside world'. The *Economist* magazine has hosted an online debate on the motion that 'China offers a better development model than the West' (Economist 2010b), an article in the *International Herald Tribune* has cited lesson-drawing from China as one of the key motivations underpinning current diplomatic relations between China and Africa (Zhang 2006) and the *Financial Times* has named developing-country emulation of China 'the biggest ideological threat the west has felt since the end of the cold war' (Leonard 2005).

A host of countries and regions have been proposed as likely recipients for Chinese-inspired development policies and practices, but sub-Saharan Africa has come in for particular attention, with everything from Zimbabwe's slum clearances (McLaughlin and Truscott 2005) to South Africa's use of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to boost employment (Herskovitz 2011) attributed to the phenomenon. Africa, then, is often held to be 'the BC's [Beijing Consensus'] main testing ground' (Sautman and Hairong 2007: 85).

Beyond the vague and largely unspoken agreement that Africa is a key locus of this debate, there is very little agreement on the implications such emulation may have—or even whether it exists in practice. For every suggestion that China constitutes a dangerous model

that allows African elites to privilege stability over democratic freedoms and transparency (e.g. Callick 2007), there are several who either view it—as does Ramo himself—as a valuable driver of growth in Africa, or alternatively who object to the very notion that China's domestic experiences could ever be replicated outside its borders (e.g. Altman 2005)

Few major Western news and policy outlets have failed to weigh in on the debate, but the question of China's potential as a development model has also been debated more widely. It is openly discussed by China itself, where caution over being perceived as prescriptive and arrogant abroad is tempered by the recognition that emulation of China strengthens the country's soft power among other developing countries. Then-Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's (2009) dismissal of the 'Beijing Consensus' on the grounds that 'Africa's development should be based on its own conditions and should follow its own path' belies the raft of lesson-sharing initiatives China organises annually with governments (particularly those in Africa), and does not prevent China's state media from reporting each expression of interest in China's model that emanates from the continent (e.g. People's Daily 2002).

Such expressions are indeed frequent. More than is the case with any other developing region, African elites are often publicly quoted expressing their desire to draw lessons from China. Since the mid-2000s, newspaper editorials with titles such as 'Chinese medicine just the tonic for developing countries' (Kaluba 2004) and 'Lessons for Kenya to learn from China' (The People Daily 2008) have accompanied numerous similar pronouncements by African policymakers. Nigerian Senate President Ken Nnamini's assertion that 'China has become a good model for Nigeria in its quest for an authentic and stable development ideology' and that 'China is a lesson to Nigeria on the enormous good that a focused and patriotic leadership can do' (quoted in Shelton and Paruk 2008: 25) is one example, as is

Liberian Finance Minister Antoinette Sayeh's pronouncement that 'we all have a lot to learn from China' (China Daily 2007).

Even in Africa, however, the debate is a controversial one, with some commentators echoing a position of self-sufficiency articulated most forcefully by Ghanaian economist George Ayittey (2010). 'For decades', Ayittey writes, 'hordes of African leaders travelled abroad and blindly copied all sorts of foreign paraphernalia to transplant to Africa. The continent is littered with the putrid carcasses of such failed imported systems. Now, we are being told to emulate China. Enough.'

A final arena in which the concepts of the *Chinese Model* and the *Beijing Consensus* are being increasingly discussed and contested is in the academic literature. As my review of the literature demonstrates, three schools of thought have tentatively begun to emerge around the question of the transferability of China's domestic development trajectory. Whereas advocates (Ramo 2005, Peerenboom 2007, Zhang 2007) view such emulation as both a real and a positive development in developing countries looking to achieve rapid economic growth and industrialisation, opponents (Halper 2010; Kurlantzick 2007) primarily argue that this lesson-drawing has dangerous consequences for human rights and democratic governance; sceptics (Kennedy 2010; Dirlik 2006, 2011), constituting a third group, argue that China's model is either too internally flawed, too historically and culturally specific, or (conversely) too generic to constitute a unique yet transferable model.

This dissertation is first and foremost an attempt to contribute to this literature by addressing its key empirical and theoretical flaws. Some of the central texts in this area have begun to cast the debate in theoretical terms, but span numerous disciplines and therefore differ widely on the conceptual lenses they employ. Others continue to engage in the

discussion on an *ad hoc* policy rather than a theoretical level, resulting in a collection of purported 'lessons' that span various levels of analysis. My own study seeks to ground the discussion in theories of emulation (Westney 1987; Bennett 1991a) and lesson-drawing (Rose 1991; Bennett 1991b) in the disciplines of sociology and political science; it is, to my knowledge, the first on this subject to explicitly do so.

After harnessing these theories to determine the direction and extent to which China is held to be a model by elites in two African countries, I then situate the 'lessons learned' by these elites within the evolution of post-colonial development paradigms, allowing for a clearer understanding on how the emulation of models can influence the broader worldviews of lesson-drawers. The first half of the dissertation thus uses emulation theory to understand *whether* this process is taking place; the second then looks to theories of development in order to ascertain the *content* of such emulation. Taken together, they ask whether China— and, as we shall later see, other countries in the region—provide African elites with new mental 'maps' towards development, and whether the contents of these maps differ in any way from previously charted territory.

Very few of the existing studies on the influence of the Chinese Model have drawn on primary data in determining the influence of China's example, and even fewer have situated their analysis in a large body of systematically-collected empirical data. By interviewing 91 governmental and non-governmental elites from two country cases, subjecting the resulting transcripts to systematic coding and analysis and supplementing this information with other sources of official discourse, this study aimed to fill this gap in the literature. The two case studies, Ethiopia and Kenya, were selected both due to the prominent positions each has occupied in development discourses on Africa and due to the vast divergences in

development approaches that each has adhered to in its recent history—together, the two countries are seen as intrinsically important as well as emblematic of the diversity of post-independence development paradigms on the continent. My primarily interview-based methodology was chosen based on a hermeneutic epistemology and a constructivist ontology that view social reality as empirically 'knowable' but subject to intersubjective interpretations. For this reason, as well as due to the difficulties involved in tracing emulation from existing policies, my aim was to arrive at a Weberian *verstehen* of elites' perceptions of development and the Chinese trajectory rather than a list of concrete policies derived from the Chinese example (although these did sometimes emerge).

This dissertation took a number of iterative and often surprising deviations from its original research question. An initial interest in comparing the much-discussed Chinese Model with the notion, popular in certain policy circles, that India could provide an alternative and perhaps more suitable model for emulation in Africa proved less compelling than expected, particularly given the relatively minor influence of the Indian example on current African development paradigms. On the other hand, the prominence of the entire East Asian region as a source of African emulation was not anticipated by the original research design, and proved a central finding. As a result, my analysis encompasses a model that is far broader in geographical scope than China; my dissertation is less about the Chinese Model *per se* than it is about situating this model within the East Asian model of which it is seen by African elites to be a part. Countries such as Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea are incorporated into the discussion, as one key finding of the dissertation is the extent to which the Chinese Model overlaps with and is located within a broader regional model—at least as far as African lesson-drawing is concerned.

A further key finding lies in the content of these 'models'. Although China and other East Asian countries are serving as exemplars to key groups of elites in Ethiopia and Kenya, this emulation heralds the return of a broader paradigm of modernisation rather than an adherence to a more narrowly-conceived East Asian developmental state. This paradigm is therefore most fruitfully captured through a look at the modernisation theory that influenced leaders of each country case during its heyday in the 1950s and 1960s. In many ways—in its technological optimism, sequenced approach to structural transformation, emphasis on 'strong' elite-led national development, focus on rapid 'catch-up' growth and more—this East-Asian-inspired paradigm shares much with the older thinking of theorists such as Marion Levy and Walt Whitman Rostow, and of practitioners such as Kenya's Tom Mboya and Ethiopia's Haile-Selassie.

As the above discussion demonstrates, the extent to which China acts as a model for African elites has important repercussions. On the one hand, an answer to this question helps to lend a theoretical and empirical basis to a debate which currently provokes more heat than light in its ideological intensity. My findings also have implications that extend beyond the immediate research question, however. The continued relevance, as demonstrated here, of concepts such as lesson-drawing, emulation and modernisation has implications for the theories that they underpin, and for the general study of development. The contents and levels of influence of the Chinese and East Asian 'models' are also likely to play an important role in shaping the practical ways in which Ethiopia and Kenya—and potentially other African countries—approach development and modernisation. These models make powerful claims about many of the central issues of our time: the role of the state, the desirability of democracy, the sources of sustainable economic growth. Although

development paradigms by no means always translate directly into policy, they embody the ideational environment in which policy decisions are taken. As the ebb and flow of these paradigms in Africa has illustrated, the implications for national decision-making and international aid efforts have been vast indeed.

This dissertation comprises nine chapters, contained in four sections: *Section One* provides the framework and rationale within which the subject matter will subsequently be analysed. Chapter One reviews the contemporary literature on the 'Chinese Model' and 'Beijing Consensus', contrasting it briefly with the relevant historical literature and explaining this dissertation's envisioned contribution. Chapter Two explains the research design and methodological underpinnings of the study and makes the case for a hermeneutic constructivist approach to the research problem.

Section Two, the first of two largely empirical sections, analyses the extent to which Ethiopian and Kenyan lesson-drawers wish to emulate foreign development models, and asks from which countries or regions these models originate. Chapter Three provides this discussion with a theoretical foundation by introducing the concepts of cross-societal emulation and lesson-drawing. In applying these conceptual lenses, Chapter Four finds that elites from Ethiopia's ruling party do indeed view China as a major development exemplar, but that they situate this country within a broader East Asian Model that serves as their primary source of lessons. Chapter Five finds the East Asian Model to be an equally important exemplar for those technocrats and business leaders occupying influential positions in Kenya's long-term development plan, but discovers that these emulators view the Chinese Model—when taken in isolation—with some distrust. The historical

backgrounds of Ethiopia and Kenya are shown to be an important determinant in the specific country that each case chooses to emulate.

Section Three moves away from country cases' choice of model to the substance of their emulation, asking what specific lessons elites wish to draw when they look to the models identified in the previous section. In so doing, this section requires a different theoretical framework from its predecessor. As the second theoretical chapter, then, Chapter Six provides an overview of the development paradigms influential in Africa since the post-colonial era; it focuses particularly on the earliest of these, namely modernisation theory. Chapter Seven analyses the first set of lessons that Ethiopian and Kenyan elites draw from the East Asian Model; these lessons relate to the processes and mechanisms that drive development, and each corresponds closely to the beliefs of earlier modernisation theorists. Chapter Eight addresses a second set of lessons, namely those that relate to the role of the state and its representatives in national development. Although these in particular exhibit considerable overlap with the literature on the East Asian Model (and on various country-specific East Asian models), these again fit into the broader paradigm of modernisation.

The conclusion found in *Section Four* synthesises and summarises these findings, bringing together the three pillars—China's growing international role, elite emulation and the theory of modernisation—on which my enquiry rests. It argues that while East Asia acts as a development model for African elites, the result is neither an entirely new direction for Ethiopia and Kenya nor a return to the 1990s-era debates on the developmental state. Instead, it is a return to an even earlier era—one witnessed previously in both Ethiopia and Kenya under the indigenous modernisers of the 1950s and 1960s. Contemporary emulation of China is indeed occurring in Africa, but can only be understood within a broader

contextualisation within the East Asian Model and an even wider-encompassing understanding of Africa's return to the paradigm of modernisation.

PART I: PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

CHAPTER ONE:
THE 'CHINESE MODEL' DEBATE

Within the relatively short period since their emergence, concepts such as the 'Chinese Model' and the 'Beijing Consensus' have generated a substantial body of analysis and conjecture. Although the 20th century witnessed certain limited attempts by developing countries to learn from China, the vast majority of literature has instead accompanied the growth of post-reform China's more contemporary role in the global order and the developing world. This chapter very briefly reviews historical attempts to understand and theorise China's status as exemplar to the 'Third World', before exploring the contours of the current debate. It finishes by identifying gaps in this literature and by explaining how this dissertation contributes to a broader understanding of this subject.

1.1   China as a Development Model: The Historical Literature

Limited attempts to analyse the wider impact and transferability of a Chinese Model predate contemporary policy and academic discussions by several decades. Against the ideologically-fraught backdrop of the Cold War, the establishment of the PRC—a socialist yet peasant-based alternative to the development model promoted by the Soviet Union—

attracted the attention of a number of scholars concerned with development in the Third World.[2]

In the early decades of the People's Republic of China, the mainstream academic literature was generally ambivalent, often reflecting Western concerns that Chinese propaganda might inspire developing nations to undertake Maoist social revolutions (Tang 1960; Halpern 1961; Van Ness 1970). Tang (1960), for example, warned that the solidarity engendered by the spread of a Chinese model could be almost as influential in bringing about the spread of global communism as the efforts of the Soviet Union could be. The Chinese model under examination was thus largely the Chinese Revolutionary Model—'the way the Chinese Communists have represented the significance for others of their experience in achieving power by revolutionary means' (Halpern 1961: 1).

Even those who did not take this particular view of emulation of China retained severe doubts. Boorman (1961: 228) surmised that 'during the years ahead the People's Republic of China may, in important respects, become the principal model for other developing nations of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America' but felt that this stemmed as much from a scapegoating of the United States as from inherent strengths in the

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[2] The term *Third World* originated from comparisons with the French 'Third Estate', that hitherto-marginalised class of people with whose allegiance and sovereignty the post-revolution French Republic was founded. In 1952, its originator wrote of those countries lying outside the Western and Soviet blocs during the Cold War that the 'ignored, exploited, scorned Third World, like the Third Estate, wants to become something too' (Sauvy quoted in Rothwell 2008: 893). This third bloc, from the beginning, thus, connoted an ability to decide the shape and values of a dawning world order – a danger that both the First and Second Worlds demonstrated a keen awareness of. No pejorative meaning is implied with the term, and my usage of it will be limited to the Cold War context.

model.   MacFarquhar (1963: 372, 385) noted that 'in recent years, commentators have devoted much attention to the possibility of China acting as a model for other underdeveloped countries' and himself viewed Chinese leadership as a possible lesson for others, but concluded that this lesson was virtually untransferable in practice. A small literature has also explored specific policy lessons taken from China during this period, the most notable African example being Nyerere's emulation of Chinese 'villagisation' strategies in Tanzania (Hyden 1980: 100; Bailey 1975: 41-42). Finally, a number of contemporary works (Cullather 2007; Gilley 2004) have also explored the ways in which the Indian model was in turn presented as an alternative to the Chinese model, particularly by an American leadership that felt, in the words of John F. Kennedy, the 'real India-China struggle' to be 'for the opportunity to demonstrate whose way of life is the better' (quoted in Gilley 2004: 22).

As dependency theory and neo-Marxist approaches gained popularity in the 1970s, the Chinese Model also gained advocates within academia. Eckstein (1977) argued that China's egalitarian and 'highly disciplined' approach could potentially be transferred outside its borders, Rifkin (1974: 257) viewed 'the growth of an indigenous scientific and technological capability through self-reliance' in China as a model for others and Imfeld (1976: 157) posited that China's suitability as a model stemmed in part from it purportedly having 'eliminated hunger'. Socialist scholar Thomas Weisskopf (1980: 314) argued that emulation of China could help only those countries who were willing to undergo radical social revolution, as 'Chinese-style revolutions might succeed in generating historical and political-economic conditions approximating those which have contributed to the success of the Chinese strategy of development'. The literature had always been

ideologically polarised and thus more preoccupied with the inherent virtues and transferability of China's experience than with the views of Third World policymakers themselves; it now became even more explicitly activist.

Despite the existence of these debates, they have a limited relevance for my own research question. To begin with, the historical literature on the Chinese model remained relatively limited in size and influence, tending to be greatly overshadowed by the vaster literatures on Western and Soviet development models. In addition, the 'China' of the 1960s and 1970s is so fundamentally different from today's 'China' that many of the parameters of the debate have shifted. Many contemporary discussions of the Chinese model contrast China's direct interference in the domestic politics of African governments during this earlier era—China supported Marxist guerrilla movements in Mozambique, Nigeria and Angola, for instance—with today's emphasis on soft power and voluntary, demand-led emulation (Kurlanzick 2007; Halper 2010). The 'rise' of China is a relatively new phenomenon, with the increases in international standing and domestic material welfare that Imfeld so desired for the country proving to be only of fairly recent provenance. There is thus little suggestion in contemporary academic and policy discussions that developing country elites are today attempting to draw many lessons from the China of the Cold War era—and it is, after all, the contemporary Kenyan and Ethiopian situations with which this dissertation is concerned. Finally, the activist stance of much of the literature led to the conflation of issues such as the transferability and the impact of Chinese lessons, precluding empirical assessments able to trace the impact of a set of lessons from one geographical location to another.

The concept of a Chinese Model further receded in prominence during the 1980s and 1990s, when a China in flux became more politically insular and focused on its own evolving

domestic situation. The large literature on the 'East Asian Model' of development (Amsden 1994; Wade 1990; Cline 1982; Kuznets 1988; Berger 1988; World Bank 1993) and the 'developmental state' (Johnson 1982; Woo-Cumings 1999) became the most influential treatment on the subject of lesson-drawing between developing countries during this era. Because both of these concepts are explicitly capitalist in nature (Johnson 1999: 35; Wade 1990: *xiii-liv*), China was excluded from these analyses. If anything, more observers have commented on China's emulation of other Asian countries during that era (Chung 2008: 26-28; Tønnesson 2004; Friedman 2009) than the reverse.

It is only in the present century, then, that a truly influential and somewhat cohesive literature on the Chinese Model has emerged. China's full-fledged entry into the international arena—and particularly into Africa—has been accompanied by a rapid increase in speculation that this growing influence has an ideational as well as a material impact. The next section discusses this growing debate.

1.2 The 'Chinese Model' and the 'Beijing Consensus': The Contemporary Literature

The contemporary debate surrounding the 'Chinese Model' and 'Beijing Consensus' emerged in the first decade of the 21st century and focuses on several key questions. Observers disagree as to the very existence of such a phenomenon, with sceptics questioning both the extent to which developing-country leaders truly wish to reproduce the development experience of China and the extent to which this experience is actually unique and coherent enough to warrant the label of *model* or *consensus*. Even those authors who do feel China

possesses a model of development disagree on its contents and its influence: those who view the model as promoting 'lessons' that conflict with their own development paradigms tend to hold more pessimistic views on its efficacy, while the opposite holds true for the model's supporters. An analysis of the key contributions to these questions uncovers three broad camps; each is explored in further detail below.

1.2.1 The Advocates

The advocates of a Chinese Model believe both that developing-country leaders wish to emulate the example of China and that this emulation is delivering broadly positive results. The publication that in 2005 sparked the entire discussion—Joshua Cooper Ramo's *Beijing Consensus*—falls into this category. In this working paper, Ramo argues that China's development trajectory is sufficiently unique and attractive as to allow the country to lead the world 'by the electric power of its example' (Ramo 2005: 3). He points to three lessons that China could offer the numerous 'nations examining China's rise and trying to see what pieces of this miracle they might make manifest in their own land' (Ramo 2005: 26). These are: 'innovation-based development' that harnesses the forces of science, technology and pragmatic experimentation; an economic model that prioritises sustainability and equality over growth in a country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP); and self-determination for countries wishing to be free from the constraints of the Washington Consensus (Ramo 2005).

Peerenboom (2007) also takes a broadly optimistic view, situating the Chinese example within a broader East Asian 'model' of modernisation and arguing that this model can help poor countries to break free from age-old developmental stalemates. Once again, this model is deconstructed into specific lessons. According to Peerenboom (2007: 5-9),

these are: a pragmatic approach to reforms; strong state intervention in national economic affairs; the sequencing of economic reforms before political liberalisation; a 'flexible' and 'contextual' approach to human rights; a communitarian approach to human problems that offers an alternative normative framework to Western liberal individualism; and a foreign policy based on sovereignty, self-determination and mutual respect. Li *et al* (2009) construct a similar list of principles they view as constituting the Beijing Consensus: localisation of best practices borrowed from abroad, an economic system shaped by both markets and the state; flexibility in pursuit of a common end; the freedom to choose ones' own development policies; political stability; self-reliance; industrial upgrading, investment in science and technology; cautious financial liberalisation and 'economic growth for social harmony' (Li et al 2009: 20). Such lists are also found with some frequency in the policy literature; Shelton and Paruk (2008: 43-45), for example, cautiously view China as a model for Africa, citing its success in developing export markets and investment incentives, its investment in education and its strict family planning policies as potentially transferable lessons.

Sautman and Hairong shift their focus to Africa, and particularly to the perceptions of policymakers themselves, several of whom are quoted as admiring China's path to development (Sautman and Hairong 2007: 80-81). According to the authors, China presents policymakers with an example of a country that invests heavily in infrastructure, acts independently of Washington Consensus prescriptions and promotes industrialisation in the global South. Africans who are disenchanted with Western neoliberalism', they hold, 'regard the PRC as a plausible alternative' (Sautman and Hairong 2007: 83). A later piece by the same authors, one of very few to utilise surveys or other systematically-collected primary data, finds Ethiopian and Kenyan respondents to be positive about China as a development

model (Sautman and Hairong 2009: 736). However, the study's respondents comprise university students and faculty rather than policy elites; in addition, the question of China's attractiveness in the area of emulation is only one of several questions more broadly aimed at ascertaining general attitudes towards China.

After an almost overwhelmingly sceptical reception to this debate within China, certain Chinese authors have also begun to take the position that their country provides a welcome alternative to Western development orthodoxies. Zhao (2010), for example, argues that China demonstrates to other developing countries the importance of pragmatism, selective learning from others, state intervention in the economy and gradualism.

Finally, there has been an increase in scholarship by those who view specific aspects of China's development as worthy of emulation but who do not use the broad terms 'Chinese Model' or 'Beijing Consensus'. Lesson-drawing in the areas of agriculture, rural development, industrialisation and science and technology policy is a particular focus, with some of the most interesting outputs on this subject originating either from African writers (Juma 2011; Davies 2008, 2010) or from the World Bank, which cautiously but increasingly advocates the limited transfer of 'best practices' from China to Africa (Ravallion 2008; Dollar 2008).

Despite the range of interpretations held by advocates of a Chinese development model, virtually all observers in this group defines their object of study in opposition to 'Western' models and particularly in opposition to the Washington Consensus. To this group, then, emulation of China's distinctive development trajectory would in turn allow lesson-drawers to follow their own unique paths of development. In this context, the World Bank's

own writings seem largely reactive, constituting attempts to respond to and correct these criticisms.

1.2.1 The Opponents

Not all those who view China as an object of emulation perceive this development to be desirable. As in the writings of the advocates discussed above, the purported 'lessons' contained within the Chinese Model also determine opponents' overall views of the desirability of the models' wider adoption. The vast majority of views which hold China to be setting a dangerous example to other developing countries stem from the West, and particularly from the United States. While membership stretches beyond the 'neo-conservatives' charged by Sautman and Hairong (2007: 84) as most representative of this group, these authors do often express a concern with the declining influence of Western values such as political liberalism and democracy. 'Many authoritarian African regimes desperate to invigorate their fraying economies while maintaining a strong grip on political power seem to find the Chinese economic development and reform model preferable to the free-market and representative-government policies promoted by the United States' (Brookes and Shin 2006: 6), charges one American conservative think tank, for example.

The most extensive treatment of this subject is Stefan Halper's *Beijing Consensus* (2010), a pessimistic namesake of Ramo's original work. To Halper, China's model is marked by the specific combination of two key ingredients: capitalism and authoritarianism. While Western models have advocated progressive liberalisation in both the economic and political spheres, he charges, China is offering developing countries in Africa and elsewhere the chance to partake in the economic growth offered by the former whilst rejecting the democratisation that was hitherto assumed to accompany it (Halper 2010). Numerous

articles in the Western media have also taken this approach, contrasting China's 'economic freedom' with its 'political repression' (Callick 2007) and consequently charging the country with presenting others with a model of 'authoritarian growth' (Yao 2010). African literature with similarly negative views is relatively rare, but Obiorah (2007), Askouri (2007) and Gaye (2008) all view the Chinese Model as a smokescreen through which African leaders may instrumentally entrench their own power at the expense of democracy and transparency.

A larger and more moderate body of work analyses China's potential to act as a development model within the broader framework of the country's 'soft power'; in this formulation, China's growing popularity as a model of development is only one facet of a broader arsenal of tools it deploys to strengthen its reputation and normative appeal around the world and especially in developing countries. Kurlantzick's *Charm Offensive*, for instance, details China's use of public and cultural diplomacy in the dissemination of values such as authoritarian growth and non-interference in the affairs of other sovereign states. 'Over the past decade', he claims, 'Beijing has begun to use aid, trade, investment, and the allure of China's economic model, which combines growth with state control, to charm other nations' (Kurlantzick 2007: 84). Not all analysts of China's growing soft power are generally critical of this trend, but the majority view it as at least potentially problematic, or as detrimental to democratic governance in the developing world (Leonard 2010: 96). In another influential exploration of China's soft power, Gill and Huang (2006: 20) primarily list authoritarian regimes such as Russia, Iran, Laos, Uzbekistan and Vietnam as some of the potential 'loyal disciples' of the Beijing Consensus.

1.2.3 The Sceptics

A final subset of the literature is sceptical of the very notion that a Chinese Model or a Beijing Consensus indeed exists. In *The Myth of the Beijing Consensus*, Scott Kennedy summarises many of these objections. Firstly, he argues that both terms imply a long-term coherence and unity that has simply not been present in China's post-reform political establishment and the policies it has enacted (Kennedy 2010). In addition, he argues, whether the terms are employed to refer to an export-oriented growth strategy, a general departure from the Washington Consensus or a trajectory of authoritarian growth, neither is sufficiently unique to constitute a model. Of the last-mentioned criterion, he writes, 'if this is the only basis of the model, then surely it does not deserve the adjective China, since many countries have successfully pursued economic development in the context of a strong authoritarian state' (Kennedy 2010: 475).

Critiques of the Beijing Consensus come from various points in the political spectrum. Socialist scholar Arif Dirlik (2006, 2011) accuses Ramo's characterisation of Chinese development of utopianism; given the vast environmental and economic problems created by Chinese reform, he argues, the country is hardly in the position to act as a model for others. Critics of Western hegemony dismiss Western fears of being overtaken by a Chinese exemplar as insecure, self-serving and rooted in a desire to unfairly maintain influence over the domestic affairs of developing countries (Suzuki 2009; Pang 2007: 132). Many who argue that Western-influenced values and economic institutions remain important in global development paradigms thus dismiss the discussion as faddish and premature (Pang 2007; Huang 2011).

Perhaps the largest group of sceptics of the terms 'Chinese Model' or 'Beijing Consensus' is situated in the Chinese-language literature, as summarised by Kennedy (2010: 472-473). As he points out, neither idea originated among Chinese scholars, who watched the rise of the notion that China's experience could in some way be universalised with some initial bemusement. As previous sections in this chapter have shown, some Chinese scholars have begun to add their support to this claim. However, the majority remain sceptical, arguing that the notion of a Beijing Consensus overestimates China's departure from the Washington Consensus, underestimates China's current developmental challenges and downplays internal debates within the country (Kennedy 2010: 473). Huang, for example, while conceding that 'one country's experiment is another country's theory', argues that Chinese economic growth is due to economic liberalism rather than 'the economic statism so enthusiastically endorsed by the Beijing Consensus' (Huang 2010: 46).

Notably, some of the most vociferous critics of the terms 'Chinese Model' and 'Beijing Consensus' nonetheless admit to their discursive and political potential. Kennedy (2010: 477), too, admits that leaders use the Chinese example both instrumentally and ideationally, even as the incoherent and uninformed nature of their emulation virtually condemns them to failure. Although he rejects the notion that China presents developing country elites with a substantive set of lessons to emulate, Dirlik (2006: 2) suggests that the Beijing Consensus acts as a 'pole in the global political economy which can serve as a gathering place for those who are opposed to Washington imperialism'. For this reason, he argues that the Chinese Model may be viewed, at most, as a loose and uncertain '"paradigm" for inspiration' (Dirlik 2011: 129).

Although the distinction between a 'paradigm' and a 'model' will be explored in greater detail in the following chapter, one related point of terminological confusion should be clarified here. As this overview of the literature has shown, the terms 'Chinese Model' and 'Beijing Consensus' form dual strands of a single debate; while both refer to emulation of China by the developing world, each differs slightly from the other in its emphasis and assumptions. The latter is the more polarising of the two, and contains within it a *de facto* assertion that China's approach to development is fundamentally different from that of the West. It is the preferred term both in the most positive account of the Chinese example (Ramo 2004) and the most negative (Halper 2010), leading Chinese scholars in particular to view it as overly combative and divisive (Kennedy 2010: 473). Finally, the term 'Beijing Consensus' is often used in a way that elicits considerable confusion: analysts often use it to refer to those elements of China's domestic development trajectory from which others seek to (or sometimes *should* seek to) draw lessons whilst at the same time equating it with China's mode of engagement with Africa and the developing world, particularly as this contrasts with the approach of traditional donors (e.g. McKinnon 2010). As my focus here is on the perceived transferability of China's *domestic* policies to Ethiopia and Kenya, the latter emphasis on China's policies of non-interference in Africa's political arrangements or on China's privileging of trade and investment over aid on the continent is less relevant; I believe a stronger distinction must be made between these two sets of dynamics.

The term 'Chinese Model' is less prone to this blurring of boundaries, usually focusing on China's domestic situation—rather than on China-Africa relations or China's approach to development assistance. At the same time, it is less tightly-linked to Ramo's original formulation and therefore more flexibly encompasses the myriad aspects of China's

development experience which may be emulated by others. It also does not imply the internal coherence and discursive unity which Dirlik (2006: 1) rightly objects to *vis a vis* former term. It fits more comfortably with discussions of emulation and resonates with earlier literatures on the 'East Asian Model' of development. Debates on this subject also occasionally use the term 'China Model' as a synonym, but this is less common overall and, when used, occurs mainly in the media (Economist 2010a; Jian 2011). For these reasons, this dissertation prefers to use the term 'Chinese Model'.

1.3 The Proposed Contribution to the Literature

The contemporary literature has made important strides in beginning to summarise and interrogate the fast-moving but often superficial debates found in policy and media circles. Readers may wonder why I have chosen to focus on Africa as my central point of enquiry, given the vast geographical range (or, as frequently, the highly generalised, aspatial approach) in much of this literature. There are several reasons for this decision. Firstly, although the elites drawing inspiration from China are said to be located in countries as geographically diverse as Vietnam, Cuba, Russia and even India, Africa—as the largest collection of developing countries on the planet—is often viewed as a particularly important locus of the debate. Although this is not always explicitly stated, several key texts (eg Halper 2010; Ravallion 2008), devote more attention to this region than to any other. A recent review article on the subject (De Haan 2010) also singles out Africa as a particular focus of the literature, and Callick (2007) phrases it thus: 'from Vietnam to Syria, from Burma to Venezuela, and all across Africa, leaders of developing countries are admiring and emulating what might be called the China Model'.

A significant sub-section of the now very large 'China in Africa' body of scholarship also comments on this emulation, often addressing it as one aspect of the burgeoning relationship between Africa and China (e.g. Alden 2005: 156; Taylor 2009: 23-27; Brautigam 2010). By emphasising the ideational impact of China's domestic policies, a focus on lesson-drawing by African elites is thus also an important counterpoint to more frequent discussions of the direct, 'on-the-ground' impact of Chinese investment, trade and diplomacy on the continent. A final reason for this focus concerns the discourses of African elites themselves: in no other region in the world are the merits (and, to a lesser extent, the dangers) of the Chinese model as openly expressed as in Africa itself—as illustrated by the declarations of African leaders frequently quoted in the international, Chinese and African media. It is precisely these declarations that non-Africans often draw on in making their case for the existence of a 'Chinese Model', but my intention was partially to ascertain the extent to which such quotes illustrated the full and true state of views on the subject.

This is necessary because despite the strengths of the literature discussed here, the current body of work remains incomplete and weak in several important areas. Firstly, much of it conflates several important questions, namely: whether China is viewed as a development model among leaders in developing countries; whether this is (or would be) a desirable or feasible phenomenon; which specific lessons developing-country elites wish to draw from the Chinese experience, and whether these lessons are uniquely Chinese. By specifying more clearly what exactly a 'model' is and what it does, scholars can avoid conflating these normative, empirical and theoretical issues. As I shall illustrate, a country need only inspire others towards emulation to be considered a model. For this reason, the content and existence of lesson-drawing is here considered to be more important—at least

given the nascent state of the literature—than the feasibility and wisdom of such emulation. On a closely related point, the current literature also fails to distinguish between different areas of China's influence, with some studies taking a global approach and a small number focusing on Africa alone.

Secondly, much of the 'evidence' given for the influence of a Chinese model in Africa and elsewhere is anecdotal and highly speculative. According to Gill and Huang (2006: 20), 'no systematic information is available to assess the popularity of this model', while Ramo's (2004: 26) argument for the existence of a Chinese model is premised on the assertion that 'increasingly around the world, you stumble on anecdotes of nations examining China's rise' and attempting to emulate it. To my knowledge, no in-depth empirical study has yet been undertaken to specifically assess the attractiveness of a Chinese Model anywhere in the world. By systematically collecting and analysing primary qualitative data, my study has sought to fill that gap.

Finally, few studies have attempted to situate the question of China's ideational influence within a theoretical framework. The debate has largely been located loosely within the discipline of international relations (IR), but this dissertation introduces two large and well-established literatures from the related disciplines of policy studies, sociology and development studies. In so doing, it seeks to move the debate beyond its current mainstay in highly topical and often descriptive policy-oriented fora. The theoretical frameworks that I employ are concerned, firstly, with processes of cross-societal emulation and lesson-drawing and, secondly, with the evolution of development paradigms in the post-colonial period, with a particular emphasis on modernisation theory.[3] As explained in my chapter on

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[3] Because these are each reviewed in subsequent theoretical chapters, they are not covered in this section.

methodology, the purpose of my research was not to inductively contribute covering-laws to either of these literatures, but rather to harness the theories they provide towards a better understanding of the specific empirical question under consideration. This dissertation does attempt a limited theoretical contribution, however, by illustrating the wider applicability and relevance of these theories to one of the key contemporary debates in development.

This does not preclude a contribution to debates in the area of applied policy studies, however. The extent to which China is viewed as a model by African elites has important implications for the development policies and practices of development agencies and actors worldwide as well as in my country cases. As a later discussion of the interaction between ideational and material factors in the social sciences demonstrates, this is likely to be true even if many of these lessons are not directly transformed into policy outcomes.

1.4 Conclusion

The Cold War era witnessed a number of academic attempts to analyse the wider adoption of a Chinese Model. It is only in the 21st century, however, that what can be truly termed a literature on the Chinese Model has come into being. Prompted by the publication of Ramo's *Beijing Consensus* (2005) and a host of suggestions in media and policy forums that developing country leaders are seeking to draw lessons from the contemporary Chinese experience, the academic debate is now virtually as vibrant as its journalistic counterparts. Although scholars agree on the importance of this subject, they differ vehemently on the model's suitability, its influence and its very existence.

In this chapter, I have constructed a three-part typology that differentiates between the *advocates*, the *opponents* and the *sceptics* in this debate. Despite the important strides

that these groups have collectively made in interrogating and exploring the question of drawing lessons from China by others in the developing world, I have also highlighted several key weaknesses that these share. By conducting empirical analysis on the impact of lesson-drawing on emulating elites and by leaving aside questions of suitability and desirability, my study contributes to this broader literature and seeks to understand the veracity of each group's claims. It also situates these insights within selected interdisciplinary theoretical frameworks in order to move these debates from their descriptive and somewhat disjointed nature.

CHAPTER TWO:
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

In seeking to address the research topic introduced in the introduction and preceding chapter, this dissertation follows a qualitative research design that focuses on understanding the role of specific ideational constructs in policymaking and draws on semi-structured interviews with a wide range of Ethiopian and Kenyan elites. The following chapter explains the reasoning behind these methodological choices. It begins by posing the central research question and hypotheses and detailing how these evolved as the project progressed. It clarifies two key concepts, before providing a detailed analysis of the ontological and epistemological issues that arose during research. The sections that follow explain how I selected my cases, sampled my data sources and collected and analysed my findings, as well as situating these choices within the methodological literature. The chapter closes with a brief discussion on ethical considerations.

2.1   Research Questions and Hypotheses

This dissertation's central research question evolved considerably as the empirical phase of research progressed. I was initially interested in contrasting attitudes towards two highly topical and prominent potential models, namely China and India. Discussions in the international media and among policymakers, particularly in the West, had recently contrasted the approaches to development taken by these two countries. More specifically, China's putative strategy of 'authoritarian growth' was frequently contrasted with India's slower, 'messier' but more democratic path to development (Summers quoted in Bajaj 2010;

Friedman and Gilley 2008; Elliot 2009). Discussions that considered the Chinese Model in isolation—or contrasted it with the Washington Consensus—remained most prevalent, but these were supplemented by a growing body of debate on India as a potential alternative exemplar for developing countries.

In order to situate these models within a broader literature, my early research approached both as examples of modernisation.[4] A small number of discussions on the Chinese Model had already sought to analyse China's development, and its potential to act as an exemplar, through the prism of modernisation (Peerenboom 2007; Zhao 2010). This did not go far enough, however, in reflecting the overwhelming importance of the concept within China, where it continues to be one of the central preoccupations of Chinese academics and policy-makers. According to the most comprehensive English-language review of Chinese discourse on the subject (Wheeler 2005: 18), in recent decades the 'center of modernization theorizing has followed the center of the process itself…to China'. In the words of another, modernisation is 'a meta-narrative informing common explanations and predictions of China's development trajectory' and to which 'all aspects of human life...are commonly viewed as adjuncts' (Barabantseva 2011).

One of the aims of this dissertation was thus originally to reconcile China's status as potential exemplar for African countries with the striving for modernisation at the heart of its

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[4] According to Habermas' (1990: 2) classic definition, 'Modernization refers to a bundle of processes that are cumulative and mutually reinforcing: to the formation of capital and the mobilization of resources; to the development of the forces of production and the increase in the productivity of labor; to the establishment of a centralized political power and the formation of national identities; to the proliferation of rights of political participation, of urban forms of life, and of formal schooling; to the secularization of values and norms; and so on.'

reform-era development. Although far fewer observers linked India's reform-era development to the concept of modernisation, I hypothesised that India, too, offered African lesson-drawers a model not just of development, but of modernisation. While both China and India were undergoing processes of technologically-driven, rapid economic growth and the construction of 'modern' nation-states, China was doing so through carefully-sequenced structural transformation and a prioritisation of economic liberalism over civil and political rights; India, on the other hand, was undergoing a more *ad hoc*, pluralist version of this process. My interest lay in first delineating the contours of these two 'models', before understanding which variant of modernisation (if any) appealed most to Ethiopian and Kenyan lesson-drawers. I hypothesised that a number of factors would render the Chinese approach more attractive to such elites, the existence of a perhaps more feasible approach notwithstanding. My *initial* research question, therefore, ran as follows: *to what extent do Ethiopian and Kenyan elites admire and seek to emulate the Chinese and Indian models of modernisation?*

It is not uncommon for preliminary research questions to be reformulated in the light of new evidence gathered during the research process (Boeije 2009: 26). Non-linear research paths, where knowledge is generated in a cyclical and iterative fashion, are frequently found in qualitative research (Neuman 2006: 153). As Flick (quoted in Neuman 2006: 152) points out, this circularity can often be a strength as 'it forces the researcher to permanently reflect on the whole research process and on particular steps in light of the other steps'.

My own early research question underwent two significant revisions. Firstly, it had initially vastly underestimated the prominence of East Asian models other than China in the development policies and discourses of African elites. The attraction felt by the majority of

Ethiopian and Kenyan respondents towards the region as a whole, as well as to certain key countries in it, proved more compelling than my findings on the Indian Model, which largely corresponded to existing literature on the subject. These results, which demonstrated that India served as a very limited model in certain spheres such as law and information technology (IT) policy, are discussed briefly in Chapters 4 and 5. However, the Indian Model (such as it exists) occupies a less prominent position in this dissertation than originally envisioned.

A second shift concerned the study's theoretical framework. During the process of data collection, the very broad nature of my earlier definition of modernisation became clear. Modernisation, it emerged, was indeed central to Ethiopian and Kenyan emulation of East Asia, but as part of a specific worldview that had underpinned developmental practices at points in each country's history. This paradigm most closely resembled the 'modernisation theory' so influential in the United States and large parts of the developing world in the 1950s and 1960s. In short, then, Ethiopian and Kenyan lesson-drawing fitted more readily into the developmental debates of the post-colonial period than into broader sociological disagreements on the existence or attractiveness of country-specific 'modernisations'/'modernities'. The major contribution of the research has lain in the former rather than the latter area of enquiry.

For the reasons given above, the revised research question is the following:

To what extent is the development experience of China viewed as a model by Ethiopian and Kenyan elites? If it is indeed seen as a model, what lessons do elites draw from China and how does this phenomenon inform broader Ethiopian and Kenyan development paradigms?

Despite the visible influence of my preliminary line of enquiry on my interview design, it is the revised research question, above, that is reflected in my review of the literature and in the analysis of my findings.

Although my focus will remain on the two key questions above, the answers to these have several larger potential theoretical and empirical implications, some of which are explored within this dissertation and others that are left to the reader to infer insofar as he or she feels that my geographical and thematic foci are analytically generalisable (a concept that is explored, *qua* Kvale [1996: 265], in greater detail later in this chapter). Firstly, the extent to which Ethiopian and Kenyan decision-makers draw on external models has ramifications for both the content and relevance of the theories of emulation and lesson-drawing: the fact that both groups voluntarily seek to apply lessons from the East Asian experience suggests that emulation can be as potent a force as non-voluntary policy transfer in the policymaking processes of developing countries, and the geographical sources of these lessons illuminate the criteria that emulating elites use when searching for models. The influence of Chinese and East Asian models of development also feed into broader

discussions regarding the putative rise in Chinese and Asian 'soft power' in Africa and elsewhere (Gill and Huang 2006: 20; Kurlantzick 2007: 84).

Finally, the influence that this emulation is likely to have on the content and application of future development paradigms in Africa should not be underestimated. The fact that the assumptions of modernisation theory are so often contained within Kenyan and Ethiopian emulation of East Asia demonstrates this school of thought's return to prominence on the continent, and suggests that critiques of the 'neoliberal' development model may not always originate from the directions hitherto expected in the literature. The post-Washington Consensus' greater focus on bottom-up participation, local ownership, traditional forms of knowledge, decentralisation and transparency may in fact be at odds with much of what Ethiopian and Kenyan elites wish to draw from East Asia's success, and this sometimes uncomfortable truth is an important area of further research for the academic and policy communities.

Despite these wider areas of relevance, my research question does preclude the answering of certain other lines of enquiry that may be equally valid but fall outside the scope of this study. One debate to which I will not attempt to contribute concerns the non-ideational impact of China's growing political and especially economic ties with Ethiopia, Kenya or Africa more broadly. I do analyse these where my interpretive methodology finds them to have an influence on Ethiopian and Kenyan emulation, but am not here directly interested in the material impact of Chinese investment, trade and diplomacy on my country cases. This places my study largely outside the purview of the bulk of the very large 'China in Africa' literature (Brautigam 2010; Alden *et al* 2005; Kaplinsky *et al* 2007) that has emerged in the past decade. Another question that falls outside the scope of this project is

the extent to which the implementation of a Chinese Model is either feasible or desirable in Kenya or Ethiopia. This, again, is an important area for further research; for it to be explored, however, it is first necessary to understand how such a model is understood by those who would be most likely to implement it. It is this latter concern I address in this dissertation.

2.2 Defining Key Concepts: 'Model' and 'Paradigm'

There is some confusion and disagreement in the literature on the Chinese Model regarding the closely related concepts of 'model' and 'paradigm'. Peerenboom (2007) uses the terms interchangeably, while Dirlik (2012) argues that the vague content of China's example renders it a loose 'paradigm' for inspiration rather than a model. Given the centrality in the research question of these concepts, it is important here to distinguish between the two and to provide a clear working definition of each.

At their most fundamental, models in the social sciences are simplified versions of reality that accurately represent certain aspects of the original object being described whilst omitting others (Lave and March 1993: 3). Standard definitions of the concept also accord it a second meaning; a model is also 'a thing used as an example to follow or imitate' (OED 2011).

Although explicit definitions of the concept are surprisingly rare in the literature on lesson-drawing, both of these definitions accord with the concept's usage in such discussions. Rose's (1991: 20) classic article on lesson-drawing, for example, emphasises the importance of conscious simplification and generalisation by those policymakers who wish to apply an erstwhile idiosyncratic programme or process to non-local contexts, while other authors

emphasise the ways in which cognitive 'short-cuts' and mental schemata constrain and condition policymakers in their selection and understanding of external models (Weyland 2004; Goldsmith 2005). These lessons are models in that they correspond with real-world examples rather than being constrained to the theoretical realm (Kuznets 1988: S11), but are simultaneously the products of abstraction and selection.

The normative, aspirational aspect of modelling is also present in these literatures, although (as I shall show in the following chapter) theories of lesson-drawing prefer the term emulation over imitation due to its more selective nature. A polity from which 'desirable' policy lessons emerges is very frequently referred to as a 'model' — as labels such as the 'Chinese Model' and 'East Asian Model' make clear. Models are, by definition, perceived by their emulators as successful in some way. Kuznets (1988: S11), writing of the East Asian model, holds that 'any economic development model must have particular attributes...The record, in short, should be a successful one that is worth emulating'. Combining the two criteria discussed above, this dissertation defines a development model as *a simplified version of an existing or historical development policy (or set of policies) that is viewed by others as an example for emulation*. The term *exemplar* is frequently used as a synonym (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 252; Bennett 1991b: 36), and I have chosen to do the same.

Authors who are sceptical about the existence of a Chinese Model often argue that the Chinese development trajectory is not sufficiently distinctive, coherent or successful to constitute a model (Kennedy 2010: 475; Huang 2010). My definition, however, does not require any of these characteristics to be present before China can be labelled a model. If the Chinese experience is viewed by the subjects of this study as an example worthy of

emulation, a Chinese model can be said to exist, regardless of its uniqueness or 'intrinsic' value (if the latter can indeed be said to exist).

My definition above contains another term requiring clarification, namely *development*. I refrain here, for the most part, from engaging in the notoriously heated discussion concerning what constitutes or does not constitute 'true' development for a country's citizens. In a bid to remain as open as possible to the competing conceptualisations of development that research subjects may hold, I will use Bailey and Skladany's (1991: 67) broad definition of development as 'conscious actions which promote sustainable and equitable processes of change leading to improvement in the quality of life for most members of a society'. This allows for inclusion of the economic, political, social and even cultural facets of development. Bailey's emphasis on conscious agency also meshes well with existing theories of lesson-drawing and cross-societal emulation. These are most frequently policy-oriented in nature, where policies signify broad 'statements of intention...which generally denote the direction policy-makers wish to take' (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 12). Those efforts undertaken by a country's leaders to improve (whether

ostensibly or sincerely) their society's overall wellbeing can thus be targets of emulation by others—and are therefore the focus of my own research.[5]

A 'paradigm' is, like a model, a cognitive, simplified representation of reality. Unlike the latter term, however, a paradigm is generally taken to correspond with a broader explanatory framework and world view (Kuhn 1970: 111). Ethiopian leaders may thus use China as a model of economic growth, but fit this into a broader set of explanations regarding the nature of global inequality or national poverty. Paradigms contain assumptions about causality and reality that aim to solve scientific (in the original Kuhnian (1970: 37) formulation) 'puzzles'. A policy paradigm, by extension, 'provides policymakers with the terminology and a set of taken-for-granted assumptions about the way they communicate and think about a policy area' (Carter 2007: 181). Most influential, and most useful for my purposes, is Hall's classic definition, which guides my own understanding of a policy paradigm throughout this work. A paradigm, accordingly, is the interpretative *'framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing'* (Hall 1993: 279). The answers to development's central questions lie bound up

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[5] A final note on my use of this particular term in this dissertation: Certain Ethiopian and Kenyan leaders view East Asian countries as adhering to a single broad model, while others differentiate between sub-regional, national and occasionally even sub-national approaches to development. For this reason, I use the term 'East Asian Model' to refer both to the literature of the same name (this encompasses—but is not limited to—closely related discussions on the 'East Asian Economic Model') and to cases where my findings are applicable to the region as a whole. When reporting and analysing the responses of interview subjects, however, I often also use the plural 'East Asian models', as the distinction between single countries, groups of countries and the entire region is enforced to a lesser extent in practice than in theory.

within the paradigms held by those tasked with 'doing' development: why do poverty and inequality exist and how can they be alleviated? What constitutes development and who drives it? While emulation of individual models can alter broader paradigms of development, it can also lead only to what Hall (1993) calls 'first- order' or 'second order' learning, which take place within established explanatory frameworks.

Development in the post-colonial era is generally acknowledged to have undergone a series of paradigm shifts (Gore 2000; Thorbecke 2007). Although this viewpoint is not universally held (see e.g. Pieterse (1998) for a conflicting reading) and although the lines of division between particular paradigms are disputed, four approaches—modernisation, dependency, the 'Washington Consensus' and various critiques of the Washington Consensus —have emerged as likely contenders. Chapter Six of this dissertation reviews this literature and finds that shifts between these approaches have indeed taken place at a paradigmatic level. Only the last-mentioned ('post-development' to some, a 'post-Washington Consensus' to others) is better described as an augmentation rather than a replacement of its immediate predecessor. As I go on to show, emulation of the East Asian and Chinese models takes place within this broader 60-year old debate, harking back to many of the assumptions and practices found in the paradigm of the modernisation theory of the 1950s and 1960s.

With these definitions taken into account, it becomes clear that the term *paradigm* is neither a synonym nor a more fitting substitute for the term *model,* particularly when these are used to discuss the influence of a foreign exemplar on the worldviews of local elites. A 'Chinese development paradigm' would refer to the worldviews of *Chinese* development actors, but it is African worldviews that concern us here. In short, models are more

transferable than are paradigms; the latter are influenced by a broader range of factors and are rooted in the cognitive frameworks of those who adhere to them.

Finally, there is a significant overlap between paradigms and what Scott, in the classic *Seeing Like a State*, has called 'maps'. In modern statecraft, he holds, developmentalist visions resemble mental maps in that they act as abridged versions of reality for those government actors and other officials who make use of them. These tools, 'when allied with state power, would enable much of the reality they depicted to be remade' (Scott 1998: 3). A map, therefore, presents the representatives of the state (or, slightly expanding on Scott's definition, elites who prevail on the policy decisions of the state) with a vision of both the present and desired state of affairs, as well as with the means by which to move between the two: essentially, it informs these actors how to get from 'point A' to 'point B'. Although it is not a term often used in this study, it is—given the central role that state power, leadership and developmental bureaucracy plays in both Kenyan and Ethiopian emulation of East Asia—nevertheless important for our purposes.

2.3 Epistemological and Ontological Framework

The choice to study ideational constructs such as models and paradigms of development required significant attention to the epistemological and ontological frameworks underpinning such analysis. Development studies is an inherently multidisciplinary social science encompassing elements of *inter alia* sociology, economics and political science. Certain of these disciplines and their sub-disciplines have long been premised on the notion that 'ideas matter' deeply, others have been the beneficiaries of a more recent 'ideational turn' and still others maintain a more rationalist and materialist foundation. This section on my

understanding of the nature and 'knowability' of social knowledge will both explain my own decision to focus on ideas and clarify the means by which I will do so.

2.3.1 A Constructivist Ontology

One of the important ways in which this study is bounded is through a focus on specific cognitive constructs, namely development models and development paradigms. This focus is rooted in a broader understanding that ideational structures—including but not limited to ideologies, perceptions, identities, discourses and worldviews—constitute social 'reality' at least to the same extent as do material interests and resources.

In international relations, this approach has been termed 'constructivism' (Onuf 1989) or 'social constructivism' (Wendt 1999). Although constructivism is viewed by many as an epistemology due to the great impact it has had on widening the scope for non-positivist research designs in its home discipline, I use it here in much the same way as does Alexander Wendt, who has done the most to elaborate the concept into a research agenda. According to Wendt (1999: 40), constructivism is as much a means of understanding how reality is constituted as of how it is understood; 'What really matters is *what* there is rather than *how* we know it [my emphasis]' (Wendt 1999: 40).

Although the approach has since undergone great fragmentation, it is underpinned by a view of reality as intersubjectively shaped by the collective understandings of social agents (Adler 1997: 322). This is not to imply that constructivism necessarily denies the existence of structural constraints and a physical world; ideational constructs and material interests are, rather, mutually constituted (Hopf 1998: 172). The importance of behavioural norms means that actors are as much motivated by a 'logic of appropriateness' as by a 'logic of

expected consequences' (March and Olsen 1989). Ideas are thus not dichotomous with interests: because they create the normative framework through which actors understand their interests, frequently 'interests *are* ideas' (Wendt 1999: 114).

When applied to my research question, the key role that visions of development play in constraining and enabling policy decisions and outcomes becomes clear. At a minimum, they act as filters to simplify decision-making, while they may even remake entirely the set of assumptions on which such decision-making rests. While the precise nature of this interplay does not fall within the scope of my study, a constructivist approach allows for the recognition that 'political elites approach new decisions with pre-existing beliefs, ideologies, or worldviews and lean heavily on those generalized frameworks in judging specific situations and making specific choices' (Jacobs 2009: 253).

The influence of ideational aspects on policy and material outcomes does not negate the existence of other, competing demands on the decisions of African policymakers. These include but are not limited to donor conditionalities, international economic/political institutional structures and natural resource endowments. The lessons that elites draw from external models may even compete with other domestic ideational factors not fully explored in this dissertation. In isolating one often undervalued strand of Ethiopian and Kenyan policymaking, and in demonstrating the important place it occupies in shaping development paradigms, however, this dissertation hopes to contribute to our understanding of the development process in general. Given the central role that I find for emulation of East Asia in informing Ethiopian and Kenyan elites' development paradigms, the extent to which these elites eventually do visibly emulate the region in future decades may even illustrate the extent to which they possess freedom of action in their policymaking.

Materialist and rational-choice approaches frequently object to the study of intangible concepts such as values or perceptions on the grounds that it is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain and observe their impact on tangible political institutions and policy (e.g. Moravcsik 1999). I would argue, however, that even were the paradigms of policymakers never to find concrete expression in policy (an unlikely outcome given the mutually constitutive nature of the material and ideational worlds), their existence would be no less 'real' than the policy itself. Although the former may be more difficult to quantify or measure, they exist, according to a constructivist ontology, at least to the same extent that policies and budgets—which, after all, are merely symbols printed on pieces of paper—do. Policies and resources are more than their physical manifestations; they are embedded in a set of intangible norms and understandings that give them their power. Were this study to discover that African elites had indeed taken concrete policy actions to emulate East Asia, it would still not be able to prove that such actions would have an observable impact on the lives of ordinary Africans. As Reis and Moore (2005: 9) point out, 'we all know of political reforms that had no impact, policy changes that were ineffective and laws that remained fiction – because they were in no way grounded in prevailing values and beliefs'. One only has to look as far as the impact of structural readjustment in Africa to confirm this. An understanding of political perceptions and values can thus be an end in itself rather than an intervening variable.

This study, then, does not aim to predict or describe policy outcomes. Where I do discuss concrete policies that appear to reflect the influence of lesson-drawing from East Asia, this primarily follows from elites' own discursive linking of the two. And just as an understanding of elite views on foreign development models does not necessarily translate

into an understanding of future development outcomes, so too an apparent similarity between East Asian and African policy agendas would not serve to demonstrate the existence of emulation. Desires and beliefs must be measured independently from action unless preferences are to be inferred from behaviour alone (Rathburn 2008: 691; Bevir and Rhodes 2003: 132); policy-makers must thus explicitly demonstrate the utilisation of information from foreign experiences in order for such a conclusion to be drawn (Bennett 1991b: 32). I would argue that this is particularly true in the case of my own study, given the uncertain nature of the defining characteristics of an 'East Asian Model' or a 'Chinese Model'.

2.3.2 A Hermeneutic/Interpretive Epistemology

Although constructivists in the field of international relations are usually loosely bound by the principles detailed above, they make use of a wide variety of epistemologies. Some (e.g. Finnemore 1996) adopt a positivist approach, making use of the scientific method to arrive at covering-law propositions and to construct generalised theories on the genesis and influence of certain international norms. Radical, post-modern and critical constructivists, on the other hand, accuse these 'mainstream' constructivists of insufficient distance from assumptions of rationalism and causality (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986). This latter grouping often uses discourse analysis, deconstruction and other non-positivist methods to uncover and query the unequal power relations that they see as lying at the heart of much social and political life (e.g. Onuf 1989). Hopf's (1998) distinction between 'conventional' and 'critical' constructivists and Adler's (2002) division between 'strong' and 'weak' programmes of constructivism both reflect this division. As Marcel (2001: 3) phrases it, 'Constructivism is,

indeed, increasingly divided along epistemological lines between post-modernism and positivism, making many constructivists strange bedfellows'.

To myself and a small number of other scholars, a hermeneutic or interpretive[6] epistemology offers a third course between these two poles. At its simplest, hermeneutics is the detailed understanding of texts, be these written or spoken (Neuman 2008: 88). In the social sciences, hermeneutics is rooted in the Weberian concept of *Verstehen* or 'understanding', which posits that social action can be understood only by 'penetrating to the subjective meanings that actors attach to their own behaviour and the behaviour of others' (Coser 1977: 219). Human action is driven by the motives, values and ideas of individuals (Bevir and Rhodes 2002) which in turn are best understood by empathic and ideographic analysis and by 'thick' description. As Neuman (2006: 91) phrases it, 'instead of a maze of interconnected laws and propositions, theory for interpretive social science tells a story....it contains concepts and limited generalizations, but does not dramatically depart from the experience and inner reality of the people being studied'.

The hermeneutic approach sets itself apart from positivism by making a clear distinction between the natural sciences (the '*Naturwissenschaften')* and the social sciences '*Geisteswissenschaften*' (Dilthey discussed in Bernstein 1983: 112-113). Unlike their positivist counterparts, interpretive epistemologies do not rely on the scientific method to construct universal generalisations, nor do they generally engage in the deductive testing of theories.

Nor does the hermeneutic approach fit comfortably within 'critical' or radical constructivism, however. Unlike either of these, it is based on the systematic observation of

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[6] In keeping with the majority practice in the literature, I shall use these terms as synonyms.

real-world phenomena, making it empirical in nature (Guzzini 2000: 156).[7]   Several interpretivist scholars therefore defend the importance of empiricism whilst simultaneously rejecting positivism (Guzzini 2000: 156; Morrow 2006: 444; Jarvis 2000: 101; Neuman 2006: 107; Adler 2002: 100). Rational critique, meaning and 'knowledge' are still possible, but this knowledge often extends to the intangible and unmeasurable elements of social life. This intermediate stance, then, usually 'accepts that not all statements have the same epistemic value' (Adler 2002: 96) and holds that 'the study of human meaning can aspire to objectivity' (Delanty 1997: 41). It is this tradition to which my own research belongs.

Some argue that constructivism's emphasis on mutual constitutiveness makes it uniquely suited to a hermeneutic interpretation of science and thereby allows it to avoid the most dangerous pitfalls of both the positivist and critical approaches (Guzzini 2000: 15; Adler 2005: 12). As the above-mentioned debates attest, however, the widely differing epistemologies used by those calling themselves constructivists make the straightforward equation of constructivism with interpretivism somewhat problematic. Taking Marcel's (2001) point on the diversity of constructivism and the need to carve out a specifically hermeneutic epistemology within this theoretical stance, my study combines the ontological assumption that social knowledge is both ideational and mutually constituted with the desire to understand this knowledge through the empirical interpretation of the spoken and written word.

One final remark on the possibility of determining causality is necessary here, given the fact that even those scholars united by a hermeneutic epistemology often disagree profoundly on this point. On the one hand, some argue the concept of causal explanation as

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[7] This empiricism also distinguishes this stance from the philosophical approach.

inextricably linked to positivism, and therefore outside the realm of interpretation (Marcel 2001: 1); such approaches often prefer to take a narrative approach, or what Geertz (1973) has termed 'thick description'.

On the other hand, Weber (quoted in Coser 1977: 219) himself defined his discipline, sociology, as 'that science which aims at the interpretative understanding of social behavior in order to gain an explanation of its causes, its course, and its effects.' This dissertation follows Weber's approach in allowing for a cautious, limited understanding of causality. This causality is bounded in two important ways. Firstly, it denies the validity of mono-causal explanations. Due to the reflexivity of social actors and the complexity of social life, social scientists can only hope to isolate those social forces they believe—through observation and interpretation—to be most important and to express the impact of these forces in probabilistic terms. Causes and effects can also impact each other in a mutually constitutive fashion.[8] It is for this reason that the development paradigms of Ethiopian and Kenyan elites can both reflect the influence of ideational *and* material factors (increased Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) being an example of the latter) and in turn change development policies and practices in their countries. Elites are agents not because they make decisions in a vacuum, but insofar as they 'can act creatively for reasons that make sense to them' (Bevir and Rhodes 2002: 138).

On a closely related second point, causality cannot be expressed in the form of universal laws, but can only be surmised for the specific phenomena under discussion. Steadfast causal links do not exist in the social sciences, say interpretivists, but conditional

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[8] See Weber 2011 [1905/1949]: 180-188 and Holton (2003: 31-32) for the primary and secondary discussions of Weberian causality from which my own summary is drawn.

and volitional links can nevertheless be explored and established through narratives (Bevir and Rhodes 2002: 136). Weber (2011 [1905/1949]: 78-79) phrased it thus:

> An exhaustive causal investigation of any concrete phenomena in its full reality is not only practically impossible - it is simply nonsense. We select only those causes to which are to be imputed in the individual case 'the essential' feature of an event. Where the *individuality* of a phenomenon is concerned, the question of causality is not a question of laws but of concrete causal relationships, it is not a question of the subsumption of the event under some general rubric as a representative case but of its imputation as a consequence of some constellation. It is in brief a *question of imputation* [emphasis in original].

A constructivist hermeneutic approach was dictated by my central research question and, in turn, had implications for my choice of the interview as the primary research method. A desire to understand African elites' views on Asian development models is premised on the assumption that processes of national development are at least partially rooted in the mental frameworks of those tasked with influencing and formulating development policy. My findings on these questions are used not to deductively or inductively 'test' theories of development or emulation/lesson-drawing; instead, these theories are used to inform my understanding of the particular cases on which I focus. This is by no means the only ontological and epistemological approach used by scholars of lesson-drawing and emulation, but I would argue that is the approach most compatible with my specific research question.

2.4 The Selection of Country Cases

As discussed in the previous chapter, my study's isolation of Africa as a region of particular interest has a compelling logic rooted both in the existing literature and in the data on which it draws. The choice of Ethiopia and Kenya as case studies within this region, however, requires further clarification here.

The study of one or multiple cases that are bounded in space and time is a very frequently-used method in the social sciences; the classic study on the subject judges the method, 'by the standard of praxis', to be 'thriving' (Gerring 2004: 341). The case study approach constitutes one of the principle means by which an individual researcher can collect empirical data, whether that data is to be used inductively or deductively, and qualitatively or quantitatively.

When the case study is defined in narrower terms, as 'an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units' (Gerring 2004: 342), the method is not without controversy. Numerous scholars have criticised the notion that one or a few cases may generate knowledge about a broader population as unscientific and lacking in rigour (e.g. Campbell and Stanley quoted in Flyvbjerg 2006: 219). Nonetheless, a large body of literature has sought to demonstrate that—under certain specific conditions—cases can be generalised for the purposes of theory generation, theory testing and description (Eisenhardt 1989; George and Bennet 2005). These studies often admit that case study researchers sacrifice a certain degree of parsimony and breadth in exchange for the explanatory depth and richness they uncover, but treat this as a spectrum of choices rather than a dichotomy (e.g. George and Bennett 2005: 31).

This study takes a similar approach, seeking to mediate these inevitable tensions between specificity and wider applicability. On the one hand, its choice of the case study method is conditioned by its aim of obtaining a rich, context-specific understanding of a phenomenon that has hitherto been approached primarily in an exploratory manner. Its use of a broadly constructivist ontology and hermeneutic epistemology necessitates an understanding of agents within their social and political contexts; it is highly doubtful that a broader survey of disparate African elites could have achieved this.

In his discussion on case selection, Stake (2003: 137) distinguishes between a case that is studied solely for its intrinsic value and an instrumental case study that 'plays a supportive role' and 'facilitates our understanding of something else'; he also states that cases can occupy intermediate roles between these poles (Stake 2003: 137). In this case, the case selection does contain an element of intrinsic value: Ethiopia and Kenya are both large and historically important African countries. Both are among the most populous countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and each plays a leading political or economic role in its sub-region. The attitudes of their elites are therefore inherently important in illuminating the influence of East Asian development models. As Giddens (quoted in Flyvbjerg 2006: 328) points out, particularistic studies such as these, when carried out in numbers, can help a discipline in its understanding of a particular issue.

On the other hand, this study seeks not to ask 'What influences Ethiopian and Kenyan development strategies?' but rather 'Does the current literature accurately describe and explain the influence of Chinese and East Asian development models in Africa?' As such, it is important that the two African countries chosen here offer information that is at least potentially relevant beyond their borders. One way in which they do so is by constituting

what Flyvbjerg (2006: 232) calls 'paradigmatic cases'. Since the colonial era, Kenya has occupied a central role in the popular Western, and by extension the academic, imagination of Africa. As host to and focus of the paradigmatic 'Kenya debate' in the 1970s, which pitted Marxist scholars against those positing the existence of an indigenous pre-colonial Kenyan capitalist class (see Kitching 1985 for an overview), it has also had a particularly strong impact on political economy debates. Although the country is unusual in certain respects, many of its major problems—corruption, ethnic discord, inequality, climatic and demographic pressures on land—are those seen as most troubling for the continent overall.

If Kenya is the emblematic post-colonial political economy, Ethiopia is, in turn, the paradigmatic aid recipient. To a certain extent, Ethiopia has long been treated as an African 'anomaly' due to its atypical status as the sole sub-Saharan African country to resist colonisation and engage in nation-building activities of the kind more frequently seen in European history (Tibebu 1996). Nonetheless, Ethiopia's status as one of Africa's poorest and most aid-dependent countries has given it a broader relevance in the study of development. Where Kenya has exemplified Africa's problems of governance and ethnicity, Ethiopia has typified the drought, hunger and extreme poverty found in many countries on the continent. As a result, several assessments of international development assistance cautiously extrapolate Ethiopia's experiences to other contexts (Maxwell 1996; Fengler and Kharas 2010).[9]

It is often fruitful to combine more than one logic when selecting cases (Flyvbjerg 2006: 233). Both Kenya and Ethiopia are paradigmatic when considered in isolation; when

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[9] Fengler and Kharas (2010), respectively the current and former chief economists at the World Bank, select Kenya as the other of the two African countries they select as providing a 'cross-section' of aid performance.

considered in conjunction, however, Kenya and Ethiopia also constitute cases of 'maximum variation' (Flyvbjerg 2006: 230). This allows for a certain level of extrapolation to those cases that fall between these extremes on a certain dimension, particularly when these divergent cases are broadly representative of the greater population of cases (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 298-299).

Because this study is concerned primarily with the influence of foreign models on African development paradigms, the most important dimension on which cases could diverge was in the particular development paradigms they inherited prior to the current emergence of the 'China Model' debate. Ethiopia once provided the setting for one of the most avowedly and uncompromisingly communist regimes found in Cold War Africa, namely Mengistu Hailemariam's *Derg* dictatorship. This translated into an adherence to many of the precepts of dependency and neo-Marxist theories of development, such as a reliance on import-substitution, nationalisation and a single-party state. Kenya's development paradigm during the Cold War was virtually a mirror-image. Its post-independence elites retained many of the organisational patterns and modes of economic organisation in place at independence, and the country became one of those most firmly situated in the Western capitalist 'bloc'.

These periods were bracketed by eras in which Kenya and Ethiopia's development strategies showed greater evidence of convergence: each country, as shall be shown, witnessed indigenous efforts in the 1960s and early 1970s to apply the precepts of modernisation theory to development. Likewise, aid dependence and regime decline have somewhat weakened the influence of local development ideologies and allowed for the implementation of many of the demands of the Washington Consensus. Nonetheless, each country bears the historical legacy of its respective Cold War development strategy. Where

the influence of East Asian models of development is similar across these two diverse cases, it would be reasonable to infer that other African cases exist with similar dynamics. Where the influence differs, it would also be reasonable to conclude that historical differences in development paradigms at least contributes to this divergence.

Because this study does not follow a positivist epistemology, this divergence is not conceptualised as an independent variable, and the aim is not to prove causal links that can be used to construct covering laws. Instead, the Ethiopian and Kenyan cases are presented simply as two countries that are emblematic for the study of development, but which differ vastly in the paradigms that have informed their developmental experiences in recent decades. The generalisability aimed for is neither that of systematic statistical sampling, nor of theory-building. Instead, it is 'analytic generalizability,...a reasoned judgement about the extent to which the findings of one study can be used as a guide to what might occur in another situation' (Kvale 1996: 262) with which I am concerned. This method relies partially on the explicit arguments regarding transferability that I have raised here and in the conclusion, but also partially on the induction and reasoning of the reader (Kvale 1996: 265). Generalisation, by its very nature, depends on unstated assumptions about similarity and difference (Firestone 1993: 21), and different observers are likely to extrapolate the significance of my findings to different extents.

One final practical consideration, that of feasibility, played a role in determining case selection. According to Miles and Huberman (1994: 34), it is important to take practical factors such as funding, timing and accessibility into account when carrying out sampling. In this case, it was most practical to conduct fieldwork in countries situated near to each other. The danger does exist that, in so doing, I have limited generalisability to the East

African region. However, this danger is greatly diminished by two factors. Firstly, there is general, albeit unvoiced, agreement in the literature on the Chinese and East Asian models that regional variation does not play a significant role in African emulation. Countries said to be following these models range from Angola (Powers 2012) to Rwanda (Collier 2011) to Ethiopia (Gamora and Mathews 2010: 96). Variation, where it does exist, is held to occur along institutional or political lines; African governments with a strong grip on power, for example, are often said to be more willing and able to implement lessons from China (Gill and Huang 2006: 20). Secondly, the factor that most distinguishes East Africa from other regions on the continent is its history of British colonisation. I thus took care not to select two former British colonies, as this could indeed have skewed the research findings.

2.5 Sources of Data and Methods of Data Collection/Analysis

2.5.1 The Use of an Interview Methodology

Semi-structured interviews with the 91 elites listed in *Appendix C* constituted the primary source of data for the study. These were conducted in Addis Ababa from June 2010 to September 2010, and in Nairobi from September to December 2010. Interview length varied between 30 and 90 minutes; the average length was 53 minutes.

There is a long tradition of using interview data in the hermeneutic approach. Interviewing 'gives privileged access to people's basic experiences of the lived world' (Kvale 1996: 29) and is the research method best-suited 'for gathering data on those characteristics of the social world that differentiate it from the natural world: human beings' effort to intentionally transform their environment on the basis of cognition, reflection and learning

(Almond and Genco quoted in Rathburn 2008: 690). My own commitment to placing interview data at the centre of this study—rather than in employing it in the supplementary and more casual manner more often seen in policy-oriented literature—reflects these beliefs.[10]

A qualitative interview methodology does entail certain inherent challenges. Positivist researchers, in particular, have raised issues surrounding the validity, reliability and objectivity of findings garnered by this and other qualitative techniques (detailed in Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 8; Kvale 1994). At the other end of the ontological spectrum, these criteria have been rejected altogether by those critics of positivism (Guba and Lincoln 1985) who view credibility, transferability, reliability and confirmability as more suitable criteria by which to address post-positivist research designs. The terms used to judge the soundness of my findings are less important here than the fact that I have aimed for research that is rigorous and empirical. Taking as my guideline Cherryholmes' concept of *construct validity* (discussed in Kvale 1996: 240) , whereby a study is validated to the extent that its findings are persuasive to the research community, I focused in making my research design

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[10] A brief note is required here regarding a term to which this study does not otherwise devote significant attention, namely *discourse analysis*. I engage in discourse analysis only insofar as I rigorously examine interviews and other written or spoken statements emanating from Ethiopian and Kenyan leaders. Although a broad term, discourse analysis often entails an epistemological or ontological commitment either to understanding how language itself is constructed, or to interrogating and deconstructing the ways in which language is used to dominate and oppress (see the chapters on discourse analysis by Potter and Wetherell and by Fairclough and Wodak (in Seale 2004) for classic examples of each approach). My own study of paradigms and cognitive constructs is interested in discourse only insofar as it is often the most direct way, in its own imperfect manner, in which these can be understood.

transparent, falsifiable and self-critical. The means by which I have sought to do so are detailed throughout this section.

One of the key challenges researchers face when using interview data is the fact that interviewees may have faulty memories or understandings of particular events and processes; their highly subjective views may be clouded by emotion or ideology (Richards 1996: 200). For this reason, it sometimes proved fruitful to confront elite perceptions with the understanding, in the existing literature, of the processes by which elites' 'model countries' developed. In this way, whilst the dissertation remained consistently focused on subjective understandings, these were, when necessary, contextualised by an examination of the development trajectories of China, Malaysia and others in the region.

An interview methodology even presents the danger of outright lying, or what Rathburn (2008: 689) calls 'strategic reconstruction'. However, several key works on this subject see outright dishonesty as extreme and unusual rather than the norm (Richards 1996: 200; Rathburn 2008: 689). Furthermore, my interest in my subjects' cognitive perspectives means that emotional and subjective responses become important sources of data rather than obstacles. Even where elites engage in more conscious dissembling, constructivist ontology holds that interests and ideas are mutually constituted; what elites choose to share—how they *want* their development paradigms to be perceived—is arguably inseparable from their 'actual' development paradigms. These will reflect intersubjective norms that are formed through consultation and debate not only with members of an 'in-group' such as their own political parties, but also with 'out-groups' such as Western donors and Asian investors.

During the course of my own research, I found strategic reconstruction to be a severe problem only in one area, namely in gauging Ethiopian elites' attitudes to issues of

democracy and authoritarianism. These challenges are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Eight. Even here, however, a close interpretation of the discourse—again supplemented by the existing literature and other forms of discourse—enabled me to draw certain bounded conclusions. The very reticence of Ethiopian elites on this question, for example, was in itself an indication of the tight control that the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) exercises over discourse in this area. In addition, as discussed below, the use of other sources of elite discourse on this subject aided validity through triangulation.

Aside from the issue of interviewee 'truthfulness', interviewers face other potential practical pitfalls which may affect the quality of findings. These are often specific to the type of interviewee being targeted. Elite interviews, in particular, are often hampered by lack of access and by potential power imbalances between the interviewer and interviewee (Richards 1996). Because many of these issues can be minimised if the researcher approaches her interviews with an awareness of their existence, I took care to familiarise myself with the practical aspects of conducting elite interviews (Odendahl and Shaw 2001; Ostrander 1995; Moyser and Wagstaffe 1987; Richards 1996) before undertaking my own fieldwork. This improved the design of my interview questions, my own conduct during interviews and the subsequent transcription and analysis of results. For example, Ostrander (1995) details the ways in which interviewers may overcome the power imbalances inherent in the elite interview through their behaviour before, during and after an interview; I was able to apply many of these to my own interviewing technique.

2.5.2 The Sampling of Interview Subjects

In order to narrow my focus and allow for in-depth analysis, the study is bounded in several important ways. Firstly, rather than looking at all segments of society in Kenya and Ethiopia, it focuses solely on these countries' elites. To a large extent, this delineation follows directly from the research question. This study seeks to provide an empirical underpinning to debates on the influence of a putative Chinese Model on African development policies; as Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 43) point out, elites are almost *by definition* the most powerful individuals in society—when actors become powerful enough to influence national decision-making, they are classified as elites. The vast majority of theories of cross-societal emulation and lesson-drawing also retain this focus, either by empirically illustrating how specific elites across the world have historically learnt from each others' development experiences (e.g. Westney 1987) or by theorising the cognitive or institutional contexts that guide national decision-makers in their assessments of external models (Rivera 2004). For people in management or leadership positions, external models hold greater promise as sources of lessons than internal models, since 'by looking within they only learn what they already know' (Rose 1988: 233).

This is not meant to imply that elites alone can or should drive development; in the long term, wider consensus may well need to accompany any sustainable social, political or economic change. As Moyser and Wagstaffe (1987: xi) point out, one does not have to be an elitist to study elites. However, there is a strong argument to be made that African elites are the only actors in society with the capacity to examine and institute (or, for that matter, decisively reject) outside models. There may well be a gap between the views of African

elites and non-elites regarding the attractiveness of the various models (Horta 2009), but a limited study of this nature can shed light on at least one side of this complex equation.

The question of who qualifies as an elite is sometimes contentious and conceptually ambiguous. Moyser and Wagstaffe (1987: 7) contrast maximalist definitions that adhere to Meisel's three 'C's'—coherence, consciousness and conspiracy—with more flexible definitions with allow for the inclusion of dissident groups and gradations of unity. The extent to which elites are conscious of their own status and to which they 'conspire' to maintain their privilege are questions largely outside the scope of this study. The extent to which elites are inherently coherent in their views on emulation and the Chinese Model is directly relevant to my research; rather than assuming a coherence prior to sampling, however—and thereby focusing only on elites in a particular institution or sector—I viewed coherence (or lack thereof) as a research finding. My aim was thus to attain a broad cross-section of those Ethiopian and Kenyan elites representing various inputs into the policy-making process.

My methodology in this regard has been inspired by previous studies with a similar scope, in particular Reis and Moore's (2005) analysis of elite perceptions of poverty and inequality. I adopt their definition of elite as 'the very small number of people who control the key material, symbolic and political resources within a country' (Reis and Moore 2005: 2). Rather than attempting to measure levels of actual power held by each individual, they operationalise the concept in institutional terms, selecting respondents occupying 'prominent positions in institutions that help to frame policy and discourse' in their area of interest (Reis and Moore 2005: 59). This definition of elites by occupation is a common approach, although elites can also be defined by income level, by educational background or by other

factors (Kvale 1996: 302). This approach aids feasibility, as well as allowing for an understanding of how attitudes to emulation diverge and coalesce among different political groupings.

My population of interview subjects, therefore, comprised *all occupants of senior positions in those organisations or institutions contributing to the formulation of development policy and discourse in Ethiopia and Kenya*. In sampling interviewees within this population, I primarily drew on Patton's (2002) influential elaboration of the 'purposive sampling' method. This method, also called 'judgment sampling', is one of main qualitative alternatives to the statistical/probability sampling used by quantitative studies. Purposive sampling 'focuses on selecting information-rich cases whose study will illuminate the questions under study' (Patton 2002: 230). Generalisability to a broader population may still be one goal of the research design, but it is tempered with the need for a deeper understanding of the complexity of individual cases; as with the selection of my country cases, this is a spectrum whereby calculated trade-offs are made between depth and breadth of inquiry (Patton 2002: 244).

Several logics may drive purposive sampling, and these may be combined for the purposes of triangulation and flexibility (Patton 2002: 244). I combined two logics in particular, and these were supplemented by a third. These are, in order of importance:

a) 'Critical case' (Patton 2002: 236): This method focuses on cases that are particularly important. In this dissertation, this translated to individuals and organisations occupying influential formal or informal positions in the formulation and implementation of development policy. This information was drawn from existing

literature or from interviews as these progressed. Interviewees did not necessarily have to exercise an influence on the top national leadership, but could be involved in disseminating and implementing development policies within the country. Large umbrella organisations representing trade unions and NGOs in Ethiopia, for example, are in practice heavily subordinate on the government; nevertheless, the role they play in liaising with their members on behalf of the government validated their inclusion. Where the views of these elites differ from those of their government, they are valuable in illustrating which divergent developmental views are still tolerated within the political mainstream.

b) 'Maximum variation' (Patton 2002: 243): I also took care to select interviewees and organisations that represented the full spectrum of development discourse in the country. The political, business and civil society sectors were thus all included. In the political sector, I took care to select elites from several political parties. This was true even in Ethiopia, where the main opposition party, Medrek, now holds only a single seat in parliament. Because the leaders of Medrek are often marked by the influential positions they have held in previous (now-defunct) political administrations and by their close educational ties to the West, they represent a distinctive political discourse in Ethiopia—one to which the EPRDF often purposefully sets itself in opposition. These views are partially useful, in fact, precisely because they reveal the strands of development discourse which increasingly fall outside the Ethiopian political pale.

c) Once a group of varied and important interviewees had been identified, purposive sampling using the snowball or chain referral method (Biernecki and Waldorf 1981) was used. In this method, the interviewer contacts subjects that have been recommended to her by those she has already interviewed. This step contributed to the feasibility of the study, but it was strictly nested *within* the previous two. In other words, recommendations from previous interviews were only followed up if they adhered to criteria a), b) or both.

Table 1: Classification of Interviewees by Sector and Country

	Ethiopia	Kenya	Total
Parliamentarians	18	6	24
Bureaucrats	8 *	10	29
Advisors to government	1	6	7
Business leaders	3	6	9
Media	4	3	7
NGOs	2	7	9
Trade unions	2	1	3
Religious organisations	1	2	3
Other non-governmental	5 **	2	7
Foreign representatives ***	2	2	4
TOTAL	46	45	91

Notes:

* In Ethiopia, senior bureaucrats are almost invariably members of the EPRDF, and the distinction between elected politicians and civil servants is thus virtually nonexistent.

** Includes those leaders of opposition parties who did not occupy seats in the National Assembly or Parliamentary Federal Assembly at the time of writing but who nonetheless represent distinctive strands of the existing national discourse.

*** Refers to Chinese and Indian diplomatic representatives to Ethiopia or Kenya – these are therefore not African elites.

One further note must be included in this discussion of sampling. As regards the geographical origins of respondents, I defined as 'Ethiopian' or 'Kenyan' elites those originating from and currently living in these countries. The Ethiopian diaspora, in particular, comprises numerous elites who are often vociferously critical of the EPRDF. The influence that these elites have on internal development discourse is minimal, however, as their (primarily internet-based) writings are effectively banned within the country.[11] This selection criterion also allowed for the inclusion of Kenyans of Indian and non-African origin, two of which were interviewed for this study.

I selected one small supplementary group of interview respondents according to a very different logic. In addition to the 87 interviews I conducted with Kenyan and Ethiopian elites, I interviewed four senior officials representing the governments of China and India in Nairobi and Addis Ababa. Unlike the interpretive interviews that constituted my main source of data, these were primarily descriptive in nature. Here the aim was not to understand the subjective worldviews of subjects but rather to discover the extent to which Ethiopian and Kenyan elites approached each Asian country for lesson-drawing purposes, and to understand the extent of current lesson-sharing. Data was gathered on the number and extent of study visits, the main policy areas discussed at such events and the extent to which Chinese and Indian representatives were approached informally by Ethiopian and Kenyan elites for the purposes of lesson-drawing. This data was used to supplement the main body of findings, but was not analysed electronically and comparatively.

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[11] Websites such as www.ethiopianreview.com and www.nazret.com and the writings of US-based dissidents such as Berhanu Nega and Alemayehu G. Mariam are blocked, albeit not always consistently (ONI 2009).

When presenting the findings garnered from elite interviewing, it is important to acknowledge the extent to which a lack of access to particular respondents inhibited representativeness (Richards 1996: 200). In the case of this dissertation, response rates were generally fairly good, and I was able to attain access to the vast majority of the individuals and organisations I targeted. In most cases, interviewees were drawn from the highest or second-highest level of seniority within an organisation or group.

Access proved challenging within one sector in Kenya, where it was difficult to interview senior parliamentarians, particularly those without ministerial positions. This was in part due to the commencement in 2010 of the highly fractious and time-consuming process of devolution necessitated by the implementation of the country's then-newly passed constitution. In addition, in Ethiopia I was unable to include those few select elites held (by internal and external observers) to exercise a shadowy, corrupting and often unofficial influence on the executive. An example is the leadership of the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigrai (EFFORT), an organisation that masquerades as an NGO but is, in fact, a vast multi-million dollar conglomerate headed by the wife of Meles Zenawi (Abbink 2006: 5; Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 76). The leadership of EFFORT declined to meet with me.

I contend that neither omission has seriously compromised my findings, although I detail them here for the sake of transparency and to allow readers to engage in their own evaluation of the 'analytical generalisability' of my findings. In the Kenyan case, those members of the legislature whom I did interview were sufficiently numerous to demonstrate the contrast between this sector and the executive, which exhibited a greater enthusiasm for emulation and whose lesson-drawing is largely the focus of the final two chapters. This

sector's lack of interest in meeting with me also illustrated an apathy in the topic of my research, making its non-responsiveness a finding in itself. In the case of Ethiopia, it is likely that the omitted interviewees would not have been responsive to any sensitive questions I put to them, even had interviews been secured. It is highly likely that their input into governmental decision-making operates at a level other than that of policy outcomes. To compensate, I was able to secure interviews with other highly controversial presidential advisors who occupied more transparent positions.

2.5.3 The Structuring, Transcription and Analysis of Interview Data

Although semi-structured interviews allow for greater flexibility and interviewer discretion than do survey-style or structured questionnaires, their design still requires a great deal of planning and knowledge; this is particularly true of interviews with time-pressed elites (Richards 1996: 201). Care must be taken, for example, to avoid the posing of leading questions. In the case of the research detailed here, there was a further need to avoid specific mention of the Chinese, Indian or East Asian Models in the interview planning stage, as I wished for these to initially be given the chance to emerge organically from the discourse of interviewees themselves.

The majority of my interviews were, therefore, loosely structured in such a way that five broad topics were covered, most frequently in the following order:[12]

1. Subjects' views on the concept of *modernisation*, as well as on socio-economic phenomena (industrialisation, rapid economic growth, urbanisation) typically

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[12] A more detailed list of interview questions can be found in *Appendix B*.

associated with modernisation. This introductory section also covered selected questions on elites' understanding of the nature of development, such as the relationship between economic growth and democracy, or the obstacles hindering development in elites' own countries.

2. Subjects' general views on *cross-societal emulation*. This section contained the most important question of the interview, namely 'Do you think your country should follow the development model of any other country or group of countries?' The answer to this question was probed in some depth in order to gain an understanding of the reasons behind elites' choice of model (or, in some instances, their lack of model). Non-governmental elites were also asked whether they discerned any emulation on the part of their national governments.

3. Subjects' views on the potential of *China* to act as a development model for their own countries. The perceived desirability and transferability of a Chinese model was probed at length.

4. Subjects' views on the potential of *India* to act as a development model for their own countries. The perceived desirability and transferability of an Indian model was probed at length.

5. Subjects were asked to rank several potential countries (from the West, Africa, South America and East Asia) in order of their attractiveness as models.

The prominent place given to the concept of modernisation and to the Indian Model reflects my dissertation's initial research question, which treated most current models available to African decision-makers as models of modernisation and accorded a greater importance to the Indian example than does my revised research question. While the danger exists that the ordering and inclusion of these questions may have distorted my findings, I have taken care to minimise this risk. For example, due to the danger that interviewees might follow my example and adopt my initial terminology, I have not taken interviewees' use of the term *modernisation* as evidence of their support for the associated content of this term unless this was warranted by the remainder of the interviewees' answers; I was also careful to avoid citing quotes that would give a false impression in this regard.

In many instances, the ordering and inclusion of these questions actually contributed to the rigour of my findings. The fact that each question on lesson-drawing from China was accompanied by a similar question on lesson-drawing from India provided a useful basis for comparison. India, in this sense, was able to act as a 'control' that highlighted the attractiveness of China to Ethiopian lesson-drawers and the attractiveness of East Asia to Kenyan lesson-drawers. The inclusion of questions on modernisation and development at the beginning of the interview provided me with the opportunity to understand elites' interpretations of the drivers, aims and processes of development before the discussion of individual models associated these elements with a particular country's experiences. It also allowed me to understand interviewee responses to specific terms such as 'industrialisation' and 'modernisation'—an important set of data given my argument that the emulating elites in

both Ethiopia and Kenya are more favourably disposed to modernisation theory than any others since the 1950s and 1960s.

Not every interview followed the pattern set out above; a handful of interviews deviated substantially, with only the most essential pre-determined questions remaining. During semi-structured interviews, 'the interviewer has a core set of open-ended questions that he or she supplements liberally with probes and questions tailored to the specific [respondent]' (Sinclair and Brady 1987: 67). The order of questions may vary and the researcher is free to follow up interesting tangents or alter the format based on the particularities of the interviewee. At the same time, a semi-standardised approach allows for a certain amount of cross-interview comparison.

Semi-structured interviews occupy the middle ground between open-ended, ethnographic interviews and the close-ended technique most often used for quantitative surveys (Rathburn 2008: 687). This interview format is non-positivist without ruling out the possibility that researchers can approach some degree of objective truth by weighing conflicting evidence offering the most convincing possible interpretation (Rathburn 2008: 687); this makes it well-suited to my hermeneutic, interpretivist epistemology. Two other factors similarly militated for a semi-structured approach: elites in particular are more likely to answer questions they feel do not constrain them, and the exploratory and under-theorised nature of research topic made a survey approach impractical (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674).

Interviews were recorded where possible. In Kenya, 100% of interviewees consented to being recorded, while in Ethiopia the figure was roughly 90%.[13] Where recording was not possible, notes were taken in shorthand during the interview, and then expanded on immediately after the interview based on my recollection of the subject matter. One interviewee opted to speak in Amharic and have a colleague act as interpreter. Recorded interviews were transcribed in full upon completion.

The decision whether to transcribe interviews 'naturalistically'—and thereby indicate the occurrence of involuntary vocalisations, response tokens ('um', 'uh huh', etc), dialect and non-verbal gestures—or whether to 'de-naturalise' transcripts is a contentious one (Oliver *et al* 2005). While a faithful reproduction of the mechanics of an interview can yield benefits in research that focuses on discourse and conversation analysis, my own research has opted for a 'denaturalised' approach. Here, 'the focus is less how one communicates perceptions...but the perceptions themselves' (Oliver *et al* 2005). Light editing of transcripts, if done with restraint and self-awareness, can assist readers with readability and comprehension (Powers 2005: 63). It also, I believe, more faithfully represents the intentions of interviewees, who were all second-language speakers of English and would presumably not have made these grammatical mistakes if speaking in their native languages. Transcriptions were thus lightly edited for grammar purposes and readability, although repetitions, unusual phrasing and profanities were, for the most part, left untouched.

After transcription, interviews were analysed using Nvivo (Version 9). In recent years, the use of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) has

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[13] A small number of non-governmental respondents within this 90% spoke for a considerable length of time off the record.

increased rapidly in the social and political sciences, and Nvivo is currently the most commonly-used CAQDAS platform in these disciplines (Budding and Cools 2008: 23). It allows researchers to either manually or automatically code document contents along a number of themes or 'nodes' determined by the user. Documents can also be assigned attributes (e.g. 'age', 'gender' or, in my case, 'sector'); patterns in the data may then be discerned by comparing the prevalence of themes by specific attribute or the data sample as a whole.

The use of CAQDAS may, *inter alia*, allow researchers to retrieve and organise their data more effectively, oblige them to be clearer and more transparent regarding the reasoning behind their conclusions, and assist them in extracting meaning from large bodies of data (Fielding 2002). It even allows for the production of basic quantitative data, enabling a mixed method approach. However, even cautious advocates of the approach often advise against becoming overly-reliant on the automation that such software allows (Fielding and Lee 2002: 210; Thompson 2002); for this reason, I coded all my documents manually. The only automated aspect of my analysis lay in the comparisons (between themes and between groups of interviewees) generated; the implications of these, particularly as they relate to the literature, were then again analysed by myself alone. In this way, I believe I was able to delegate what Thompson (2002) calls the 'mechanical' aspects of the research to the software programme, whilst remaining in control of the 'conceptual' (Thompson 2002) elements.

2.5.4 Triangulation and the Use of Supplementary Documents

Although interviews constituted this work's key source of data, I also used a selection of written documents for the purposes of triangulation. These fell into three categories:

1. Policy documents issued by the Ethiopian and Kenyan governments. Cross-sectoral and 'flagship' documents were given higher priority than sectoral and lower-profile documents.

2. Documents originating from the ruling parties of each country. These documents were not necessarily aimed at readers outside the party, allowing for a rare but valuable insight into internal party discourse (particularly in the case of Ethiopia).

3. Opinion pieces and other documents by elites writing (or quoted) in their personal capacities. As I also regarded certain journalists as elites, editorials in the media were also viewed as examples of elite discourse. The status of individual elites and publications were, however, taken into account when weighing the relative importance of these texts.

The principle of triangulation is based on the assumption that 'any finding or conclusion in a case study is likely to be much more convincing and accurate if it is based on several different sources of information, following a corroboratory mode' (Yin quoted in Budding and Cools 2009: 12). It is frequently used in qualitative studies in order to improve the validity and rigour of findings. The most influential typology of triangulation distinguishes between four forms of triangulation (Denzin 1970): 'data triangulation', which uses different sampling strategies to arrive at different datasets; 'investigator triangulation', in which more than one researcher collects and analyses data; 'theoretical triangulation', whereby more than

one theoretical stance is taken in analysing data; and 'methodological triangulation', whereby more than one method is used for collecting data.

As the sets of elites whose views are contained in the above documents sometimes differed from those whom I interviewed personally, the form of triangulation used in this dissertation is primarily the first-mentioned. The fact that these elites did overlap on occasion, combined with the difference in nature between the collection/analysis of interview transcripts and the collection/analysis of other documents used, lends my strategy an additional element of methodological triangulation. Denzin (1970: 472) terms this use of more than one form of triangulation 'multiple triangulation'.

The selective borrowing of certain elements of classic content analysis—such as the quantification of key terms and the quantitative analysis of manually coded sources—also contributes to methodological triangulation in this work. The dissertation does at times take advantage of the opportunities offered by CAQDAS to introduce features of quantitative analysis into those sections of the dissertation where the number of interviewees or volume of text involved is sufficiently high to allow for the discernment of broad patterns of elite perception. This shares important features with Roller *at al*'s (1995) 'hermeneutic-classificatory content analysis', whereby data is first coded qualitatively and interpretively before being subjected to numerical analysis; 'this technique', the authors hold, 'is especially suited for analysing unstructured or semi-structured interviews in which people describe and explain their views on specific topics in their own words (Roller et al 1995: 175).

As detailed in previous sections, I have used purposive rather than random sampling methods, and these quantitative elements can therefore not be viewed as statistically transferable to a broader universe of cases. The fact that 92% of Ethiopian interviewees

viewed China as either an example of outright or qualified success, for example, should not be taken to mean that the same percentage of Ethiopian elites necessarily share this sentiment. Instead, the principle of analytical generalisability allows the reader to access the list of interviewees consulted (in *Appendix B*) and the positions they hold (in *Table 1*) and thereby come to a reasoned judgement regarding their broader applicability. In order to avoid distortions based on very low numbers of cases, however, I have avoided introducing quantitative analysis where less than a dozen elites are being analysed at any one time. This has allowed me to methodologically triangulate my findings and to use the often vast amounts of data generated by this study without compromising the work's interpretive focus.

2.6 Ethical Considerations

It is important for research to adhere to international professional ethical standards, particularly where live research participants such as interviewees are concerned. I took particular care to follow the research standards set by the Political Studies Association (Berrington *et al* 2011), a leading professional organisations in my discipline.

One important set of considerations relates to my ethical duty towards those I interviewed. This includes the need to obtain informed and voluntary consent from each interview subject: subjects must not be coerced into participation, must understand how the results of their participation will be used and must agree to this usage; prior to participation they must also be as informed as possible about the goals and aims of the research without the legitimate aims of the research being compromised (Neuman 2006: 135).

In my case, interviewees were given a written letter of introduction stating my institutional affiliations and a very broad description of my research focus, namely 'the

impact of non-Western models of development on development strategies in Kenya/ Ethiopia'. Those who requested a prior list of questions were provided with a brief list of topics to be covered and were informed of the non-exhaustive nature of this list. I did not disclose to elites my focus on Chinese and Indian models of development until these questions emerged during the latter half of interviews, as this would have biased my research aims. I took care, however, not to engage in deception of any kind: I disclosed the sources of my research funding where requested and stated clearly in what contexts the data obtained would be used before interviews commenced. Interviewees were provided with my contact details and were able to request transcripts of their interviews. Ostrander (1995: 139) suggests allowing research subjects to correct factual errors contained in the completed transcript whilst warning them that the researcher's interpretation of these words may not always correspond with their own; this is a convention I have followed.

Certain non-governmental interviewees expressed opinions that could potentially place them in harm's way through governmental persecution. In keeping with the fundamental ethical principle of doing no harm to subjects (Babbie 2007: 27), care was taken to protect subjects' anonymity and confidentiality. Thus interviewees were given the option of having their names and titles obscured. Anything disclosed 'off the record' was also excluded from my reported findings.

Researchers also have an ethical duty to readers and the broader academic community. This includes *inter alia* a responsibility to report findings honestly and in good faith; to acknowledge the work of others when used and to be transparent about the biases that he or she may bring to the research. Weber (1994 [1895]: 18) himself pointed out the impossibility of research unclouded by the values of the researcher; my own findings are

doubtless similarly affected. The methodological, ontological and epistemological assumptions and procedures detailed in this chapter are one way in which I have attempted to clarify and examine the assumptions and process which have underpinned this research from beginning to end. Transcripts (edited only for the purposes of confidentiality/anonymity) and coding data are, in addition, available on request to researchers who wish to corroborate my findings.

2.7 Conclusion

This dissertation seeks to understand the extent to which the much-discussed Chinese Model is truly altering development paradigms in Africa. After a careful reading of the subject-specific and methodological literatures, I felt the research design detailed in this chapter to be best suited to answering this question. By focusing on the Ethiopian and Kenyan cases, and by taking a hermeneutic approach that interprets the subjective worldviews of both governmental and non-government elites in both countries, this study provides an empirically-grounded analysis of the evolving development strategies of lesson-drawers themselves. This chapter has defended and explained these methodological choices; the following sections will present the findings garnered from this approach.

PART II: AFRICAN ELITES AND EMULATION

CHAPTER THREE: LESSON-DRAWING AND EMULATION IN THE LITERATURE

The disciplines of political science and sociology together possess a relatively large body of literature examining the ways in which countries can be said to 'learn' from each other's experiences and policies. However, virtually none of the current discussions around the Chinese Model—and surprisingly few of the earlier debates on the East Asian Model—draw on the theoretical or conceptual tools provided by this literature. This chapter makes the case for an application of the concepts of lesson-drawing and emulation to these contemporary policy debates. It begins with an exploration of these and related terms, before providing an overview of their application to policy processes and outcomes. This dissertation seeks to understand the impact of China's development trajectory on the cognitive frameworks of two groups of national elites. In keeping with this aim, the chapter ends by exploring one of the key discussions in the emulation literature, namely the role that cognitive constraints or 'shortcuts' play in influencing the choices of lesson-drawers.

3.1 The Concepts and Their Relevance

Recent decades have seen a proliferation of theoretical frameworks such as policy diffusion, policy transfer, lesson-drawing and emulation, all of which seek to explain the spread of institutions, policies or ideas from one country to another. Although the concepts are closely related and often conflated, one can, in fact, discern significant differences in focus and content.

'Policy diffusion' is the broadest of these terms; studies usually focus on the macro-level of analysis and often use large-N comparisons to examine structural changes in the international system (e.g. Simmons and Elkins 2004). In addition, much of the policy diffusion literature assumes a unidirectional spread of practices and policies from a single 'lead country' to a larger group of countries, at times leading to charges of determinism (Rose 1991: 9). One study of diffusion, for example, defines it as 'any process where prior adoption of a trait or practice in a population alters the probability of adoption for remaining non-adopters' (Strang and Meyer 1991: 325). Because convergence—rather than divergence—is the focus, theorists are more concerned with tracing patterns of policy adoption than with the agency of policy recipients or with the reasons for adoption (Bennet 1991a: 221). In fact, diffusion does not even have to imply the conscious transfer of policies, as historical, socio-economic and technological pressures may drive the ever-widening adoption of a foreign model. Where the mechanisms of transfer are examined, prominence is given to policy entrepreneurs, epistemic communities and other external forces (e.g. Adler and Haas 1992). To use Majone's (1991: 104) distinction, diffusion focuses on the 'push' of a foreign model, rather than on its 'pull'.

Where purposive adoption from one policy setting to another is under discussion, 'policy transfer' is the most commonly-used term. This adoption is not necessarily voluntary, as a country may adopt external practices due to international obligations, conditionalities and pressures. However, even where the process is coerced, 'the idea of policy transfer suggests that political agents are aware that they are drawing upon knowledge and experiences of other jurisdictions' (Jones and Newburn 2007: 23). For this reason, the most comprehensive and influential study in the field subsumes other concepts such as emulation,

lesson-drawing and copying—but not diffusion—into policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). It takes a similarly broad view in determining what may be transferred, viewing ideas, ideology and attitudes as legitimate objects of transfer (Dolowitz and March 2000). In practice, however, theorists of policy transfer have been more comfortable analysing transfer at the level of specific policies and institutions, and—perhaps for that reason—have focused on the rather narrow transfer of meso- and micro-level public policy between developed countries. Radaelli (2002), for example, focuses on the transfer of currency, tax and media ownership policies within the European Union. The theory of policy transfer has therefore made greater inroads into the fields of organisational theory and public administration than international relations and sociology. Its primary concern is the mechanisms by which policies are transferred, rather than the structural outcomes of the process. But because this transfer can be coercive as well as voluntary, it still does not focus on the cognitive mechanisms by which actors evaluate the benefits and transferability of foreign policies and programmes.

Theoretically, it would be possible to analyse the impact of the Chinese, East Asian and Indian models of development on other developing countries under the rubric of diffusion or policy transfer. Given the debate surrounding the very existence of these models, however, it would be difficult to trace the spread of any one of them from its point of origin. Policies and ideas usually reach a far greater level of coherence and observable influence before lending themselves to macro-level diffusion studies. In contrast, an emblematic policy transfer approach to the problem might examine the role of World Bank consultants in transferring China's agricultural extension programmes to Malawi's agricultural policy. However, the existence of an influential Chinese Model would require a

deeper, more far-reaching set of changes than such a study could demonstrate. In addition, the main questions that have arisen thus far in the literature on the Chinese Model centre less around the possibility of one-way transmission mechanisms and more around the model's content and attractiveness to elites in developing countries. Given China's famed reluctance to tie its aid to policy prescriptions, few have suggested that policy-makers in poor countries are coerced into adopting policies first applied in China.[14]

'Lesson-drawing', then, which refers solely to voluntary policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 344), is a more suitable concept with which to evaluate the ideational impact of the Chinese Model on Ethiopian and Kenyan elites. As Majone (1991) shows, the long-term success of policy transfer depends on the existence of not only a 'push' from the originator, but also a 'pull' from the recipient.

Several influential theorists regard 'emulation' as a specific type of lesson-drawing, defined by the level of selectivity that elites apply when importing foreign programmes. Rose (1991: 22), for example, conceives of lesson-drawing as a spectrum: on the one end lies 'copying', which entails the exact reproduction of foreign policies or ideas. 'Emulation', the 'adoption, with adjustment for different circumstances, of a programme already in effect in another jurisdiction' is the next point along the continuum. Even looser forms of lesson-learning are 'hybridisation' and 'synthesis', which draw their lessons from two or more geographical locations. 'Inspiration', at the other end of the spectrum, relies on 'intellectual stimulus' from elsewhere, but entails the creation of an entirely new programme. Similarly,

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[14] The entry of China and other emerging powers into developing countries, particularly on the African continent, may well affect the policies of domestic elites, but not necessarily in the direction of direct transfer from one policy setting to another.

Bennett (1991b: 36) views emulation as a form of lesson-drawing that uses a limited geographical scope in the search for a single exemplar.

The distinction between slavish imitation and the more selective emulation is useful, as is the observation that nations are able to inspire each other without drawing specific lessons. However, in discussions of the Chinese Model, the East Asian Model and the like, it becomes difficult and less important to draw the line between single and multiple exemplars: if elites cite lessons from Malaysia and Singapore as constituting emulation of the East Asian Model, is this hybridisation or emulation? In addition, it is difficult to know exactly how selective elites have been until the implementation stage. Some studies of voluntaristic policy transfer use only the term 'lesson-drawing' (Stone 1999), some only the term 'emulation' (Howlett 2000), and many more (Rivera 2004: 46; Radaelli 2004; Robertson 1991; Bennett 1991a) use the terms interchangeably.

Most importantly, an overly narrow definition of emulation would exclude several key contributions from the field of sociology. Westney (1987) uses the concept of 'cross-societal emulation'—'the purposeful observation and incorporation of elements of societal and cultural organization from other cultures and societies into a particular culture'—to illustrate Meiji Japan's selective incorporation of modern patterns of organisation from three Western powers. Others have demonstrated the central role that emulation—or 'selective incorporation' (Robertson 1995)—has played in the spread of modernity: elites have used certain modern nations as 'reference societies' (Bendix 1980: 292) in the articulation and formulation of national identities (Greenfeld 2003), and in the spread of modern institutions

such as the nation-state.[15]

Because the line between emulation and lesson-drawing is thus so indeterminate, I will treat the terms as synonymous. Taking two classic definitions as our benchmark, both concepts ultimately refer to 'the utilization of evidence about a programme or programmes from overseas and a drawing of lessons from that experience' (Bennett 1991a: 221) or the process by which 'political actors or decision makers in one country draw lessons from one or more other countries, which they then apply to their own political system' (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 344). It is important to note here that the term 'lesson' should not be taken to imply an objective improvement in the quality of knowledge held by elites, but simply any new piece of information that rearranges or reinforces the emulative preferences of those learning (Goldsmith 2005: 20). Nor do lessons always bring about change: 'negative lessons' (Rose 1991: 19) prevent actors from behaving in ways they view as having proved detrimental to others.

Theorists are beginning to understand the important role that emulation plays in shaping the preferences and actions of political elites. The literature is rife with examples— successful and unsuccessful—at all levels of policy: China drew lessons from South Korea and Singapore in its economic liberalisation (Chung 2000; Tonneson 2004); Latin American countries have borrowed extensively from each other in the areas of social policy reform (Weyland 2004); the United States' Freedom of Information Act was an exemplar for

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[15] Some of these studies, in particular Westney's (1987), view emulation as either coercive or voluntary. Indeed the line is not always a clear one, as Japan's emulation of the West in order to negotiate more equal treaty terms (Westney 1987) illustrates. However, the distinction found in the political science literature shall be retained in this study, with emulation taken to imply, at the very least, lessons drawn at the own initiative of elites rather than to satisfy conditions for military, economic or political assistance.

Canada's own such law (Bennett 1991b). As mentioned previously, emulation is seen as particularly instrumental to the spread of modernisation processes: the tendency of 'latecomer' states to develop a strong and modernising state in order to rival more technologically 'advanced' exemplars is both well-documented and readily apparent in the examples of Germany, Japan and Russia (Gerschenkron 1965). Japan in particular occupies a place in the literature and popular imagination as the consummate lesson-drawer, seeming as it does to prove the notion that emulators can in turn become emulated by others.

There is thus an increasing awareness that 'emulation and selective incorporation are normal, not exceptional. Indeed, they are conditions of national-societal vitality, even of survival' (Robertson 1995: 227). At the same time, the phenomenon remains understudied in the political sciences. Emulation carries a stigma, retaining connotations of weakness and intellectual piracy. Although outright imitation is very rare and lesson-drawing thus almost always involves innovation (Westney 1987: 9), emulation causes envy and resentment alongside admiration—after all, it does, by definition, imply that the exemplar is superior or more successful in some way (Greenfeld 2003: 16). For this reason, elites are still reluctant to include overt references to foreign models in official documents and pronouncements lest they are seen as out of touch with their own society. Yet the presence of similarities between the ideas, policies and practices of different countries is not necessarily evidence of emulation—claims that emulation has taken place must demonstrate an awareness of the key actors in the process, as well as the origins of their ideas (Bennett 1991a: 223); ideally, policy-makers must explicitly admit to utilisation of information from foreign experiences (Bennett 1991b: 32). To further complicate matters, deeply-held beliefs—even when uncovered—usually stem from a variety of motives, both instrumental and fundamental; this

makes causality difficult to establish. Sometimes lessons drawn from others are never put into practice, or do not result in visible change. These conundrums mean that emulation is a challenging process to study, particularly using a highly positivist epistemology.

Another, more subtle difficulty is ideological: emulation is still associated with processes of convergence, and convergence theory has been unpopular since the demise of modernisation theory (Jacoby 2001: 6). The criticisms levelled at post-war modernisation theory and, more recently, the Washington Consensus, seem to militate for locally-sourced, indigenous solutions rather than a 'one size fits all approach' taken from a foreign model.

These dilemmas are real, but not insurmountable. When observers hold that 'increasingly around the world, you stumble on anecdotes of nations examining China's rise and trying to see what pieces of this miracle they might make manifest in their own land' (Ramo 2004: 26) or that 'China's development model...provides key elements of economic success for developing countries' (Shelton and Paruk 2008: 45-46), they are essentially making the case for emulation. The need for empirical data to replace anecdotal evidence or politicking on this relatively new issue should not outweigh fears of the limitations such data is likely to have.

Epistemological difficulties notwithstanding, students of lesson-drawing have been able to study the phenomenon through a variety of means: through the quantitative analysis of surveys (Goldsmith 2005), the examination of historical documents and events (Greenfeld 2003), the comparison of cases (Bennett 1991b), the analysis of public debates (Robertson 1991), the use of interview data (Rivera 2004), to name only a few. The interpretive, interview-based approach I take here stems from a desire to know whether emulation is occurring in a specific case, and in which direction it is occurring; the testing of theory is not

within the scope of this chapter, nor is an understanding of the eventual outcome of this emulation.

The problem of convergence is more easily refuted. To find that domestic development policies are becoming more similar is not to say that such a phenomenon is desirable. In addition, emulation—as a voluntary, purposive and selective action—requires a focus on the agency of domestic rather than international elites. This is not to say the former will inevitably trump the latter, but only that an analysis of the views of the alleged recipients of the Chinese Model may indeed be a step towards the search for local solutions, albeit filtered through the experiences of others. In addition, the various limitations on rationality that many analysts agree elites are subject to when drawing lessons (and to which we turn now) should often lead to variation: 'if politicians, in their policy analysis, are indeed subject to the cognitive biases mentioned above, then they should rarely draw the same conclusions and make the same decisions' (Meseguer 2005: 77). Even when emulation does result in convergence, it weakens arguments that development is everywhere underpinned by immutable objective laws, thereby offering a corrective to the teleological, evolutionary arguments of post-war convergence theory.

3.2 The Determinants of Elites' Choice of Model

This review has defined and placed into context the key terms associated with the purposive and voluntary transfer of lessons from one polity to another. The task of this section now remains to briefly discuss two important debates within the emulation literature: the questions of how elites choose their models, and when they are most likely to look abroad for lessons. The goal of this dissertation is by no means to 'settle' these debates, but rather to

apply the issues they raise to the subject of Ethiopian and Kenyan emulation of China and East Asia in the hope of better understanding the dynamics of this specific process.

The first question is, in a sense, part of a larger debate on the rational basis of lesson-drawing. If emulation is not only purposive but also instrumental, systematic and rational (Resende-Santos 2007: 60; Waltz 1979: 121), elites 'observe the experience of countries with different policies, they use that information to update their prior beliefs using Bayes' rule, and they switch to policies with the highest expected utility' (Meseguer 2006: 39)[16]. This kind of lesson-drawing does not necessitate complete and perfect information on all foreign models in existence, but does assume that governments observe and process all available information in the same way (Meseguer 2006: 40). Their observations primarily influence their beliefs, in other words, rather than vice versa.

In studies where the question of rationality has been explicitly addressed, this view of emulation has found itself in the minority, however. Westney's (1987) Japanese elites have been widely portrayed (both by themselves and others) as 'rational shoppers' that dispassionately and eclectically surveyed all possible option before choosing exemplars, but her study rejects this notion, finding instead a reliance on a small number of models (and not always the most obviously 'successful' available). Similarly, Jacoby (2001: 24) sees the notion of 'rational shopping' as a technique used by elites to convey the impression of greater selectivity and skill than actually exists during the process. The notion that lesson-drawing follows a logic of 'bounded rationality' has thus become the more favoured hypothesis, with

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[16] Bayes' rule is a technique for decision-making under conditions of limited information. It is used by Meseguer (2006:39) and others to demonstrate the notion that policy-makers compare the amount of information they are able to gather regarding foreign models with the amount of variation they observe among these foreign models to come to a rational calculation of risk before deciding to draw lessons from abroad.

theorists positing a number of cognitive 'short-cuts' or 'heuristics' (Weyland 2004) that severely constrain rational decision-making.

Firstly, elites are said to favour models that are geographically proximate and close at hand—what Weyland (2004) calls 'availability heuristics'. Ramamurti (1999: 147) holds that a policy is most likely to be emulated if it has been successful in a nearby country, and Westney (1987: 20) finds that elites are most likely to possess information on nations dominant in their immediate environments—and therefore to emulate those nations. Theorists of 'soft power' have long pointed to the importance of personal visits and exchanges in spreading a country's values, culture and development model (Nye 2004: 13). Familiarity with a country's model does not always correspond with geographical proximity, but both of these can be said to apply to the level of *exposure* that elites have to a particular model.

Secondly, many theorists refer to the importance of a model's *prestige;* status and high international prominence are said to influence elites' choice of exemplar at least as much—if not more than—proven effectiveness. 'A policy innovation', writes Weyland (2004: 11), 'is more likely to turn into a model if it originates in a country of high status. Such a favourable image in turn arises from more advanced economic, social and political development; historical tradition or cultural attraction; and an earlier leadership role in world affairs'. Goldsmith (2005: 37) and Westney (1987: 19) also emphasise this aspect of lesson-drawing.

A third—and very often mentioned—set of mental short-cuts can be grouped together under the heading of *historical, cultural and 'social psychological' similarity*. The latter term originates from Rose (1993: 107), who uses it to explain the tendency of British policy-

makers to overlook Ireland and France as exemplars in favour of the United States, Canada, Australian and other Anglo-Saxon countries. Similarly, Simmons and Elkins (2004: 187) conclude that 'governments systematically consider the lessons their cultural peers have to offer when fashioning their own economic policy choices', and Goldman (2006) finds 'cultural match' to be an important predictor of emulation.

The fourth and final set of short-cuts concern the various ways in which certain models allow elites *ease of use*. Decision-makers often favour evidence of short-term success over long-term performance ('representativeness heuristics') and also prefer models that require fewer changes to implement ('anchoring heuristics') (Weyland 2004). A shared language—or language barrier—can help or hinder the search for exemplars (Dolowitz and March 2000: 10). Path dependency can also have a cumulative 'contagion effect': drawing one aspect of a country's political or economic system may lead to changes (particularly of an institutional nature) that make further emulation from that country more likely (Westney 1987).

Interestingly, one factor is hardly mentioned as a constraint—cognitive or otherwise —on voluntary lesson-drawing. Very few theorists find the quality of political and economic relationships between exemplar and emulator to be a deciding factor. It may affect the extent to which policymakers are willing to *admit* to emulation; Dhillon (2009: 176) and Beeson (2000: 346) find, for example, that Mahathir Mohammed's 'Look East' policy in Malaysia was actually an attempt to learn from Japan specifically, without invoking the negative connotations that a 'Looking Japan' policy would have inevitably invoked. However, the fact that the true focus remained on Japan is both important and in keeping with the rest of the literature, which finds states attempting to learn from their economic and political allies, as

well as from their economic and political rivals. If anything, as we shall see below, rivals may, under some circumstances, be seen as the most suitable exemplars. This factor provides an additional rationale for not centring my own study of emulation around China's newly-forged economic and political relations with Kenya and Ethiopia.

The four cognitive constraints listed above are not always inseparable in practice, of course. A common language is often the byproduct of a shared history and culture, or of geographical proximity. This is not always the case, however, and it is enough at this point to note that several factors combine to render 'proven effectiveness' or performance—seen as the main consideration by rational-choice approaches such as Resende-Santos (2007: 6)— only one of several factors driving emulation.

Emulators may be bound by these four constraints and still be 'boundedly rational' in the sense that they may be driven by the genuine desire to find solutions to domestic problems through the study of foreign programmes. The literature is more divided on the question of whether elites driven by motives other than pure problem-solving can truly be said to be engaging in lesson-drawing. On the one hand, several key authors (Dolowitz and March 1996: 347; Westney 1987: 26) view motives such as the legitimation of pre-existing decisions and the need to invoke continuity with the past as consistent with the process. Another group is sceptical: May (1992: 336), for example, holds out that fundamental normative or cognitive change must occur in order for what he calls 'social learning' to take place. To yet a third group, it is precisely this which distinguishes lesson-drawing from emulation; they take lesson-drawing to be driven by 'bounded rationality' but emulation to be driven by other factors, including a desire for conformity and other instances of 'herding behaviour' (Meseguer 2006; Holzinger and Knill 2005). This latter view is a minority view,

however, and I have already established that I shall be using the two terms interchangeably. I take May's (1992) point that lesson-drawing must involve at least some measure of ideational transformation in elites, but would point to several studies to show that the line between legitimation and learning is thinner than may commonly supposed.

Most important in this regard is Bennett (1991b), who argues that elites use foreign evidence for many reasons—to put an issue on the policy agenda, mollify political pressure, identify an exemplar once policy priorities have been established, reinforce existing conclusions, and to genuinely search for the 'best' possible policy from outside. Only the last-mentioned motive would be consistent with the theory of bounded rationality, yet several of these activities can legitimately be held to constitute learning at at least some level. Policy-makers frequently argue by analogy, for example, but this, rather than serving as a mere rhetorical device, contributes to the cognitive 'schemata' (Khong 1992: 25) that simplify reality and guide political decision-making. This view is strengthened by others who see emulation and lesson-drawing as processes of social construction (Lee and Strang 2006) and political contestation (Robertson 1991), where groupthink, 'hype', symbolism and wishful thinking all play a key role in decision-making.

The mere fact that a policy-maker is driven to emulation by considerations other than problem-solving does not, therefore, preclude the existence of cognitive change. Naturally, the more the choices of policy-makers are motivated by internal political and social demands, the more selective and placatory the search for exemplars is likely to be. In the words of Christensen *et al* (2008: 368), learning will then often be partial and 'shallow'. These lessons will complement existing policy objectives, but do not act as an entirely new blueprint for reform—the latter situation would be, in any case, be quite rare (Weyland 2004:

39). Only where elites use the public policy arena to pay 'lip service' to foreign models without any further evidence of even partial emulation, could lesson-drawing be said not to exist at all.

Taking the above arguments into account, this study shall discount the possibility that emulators act according to the logic of perfect or even Bayesian rationality. On the opposite end of the spectrum, if I had found the use of rhetorical devices to be the sole factor motivating elites, emulation and lesson-drawing could not have been said to be taking place. Within these two extremes, however, lies a range of motives and cognitive outcomes. My aim will be not to find the over-arching theoretical utility of any of the heuristic shortcuts listed above, but to understand which—if any—inform the thinking of Ethiopia and Kenya's political actors.

If the literature is divided regarding cognitive constraints to elites' choice of exemplar, there is more agreement on the question of when emulation is most likely to occur. Emulation takes place in a wide variety of countries and situations, but many authors have found emulation to be most likely when elites are uncertain as to how to achieve their goals (Westney 1987: 5; Dimaggio and Powell 1983: 153), when they are dissatisfied with the status quo (Dolowitz and March 1996; 347) or when they face massive 'policy failure'. According to Goldsmith (2005: 36), this failure acts as a formative event that pushes states beyond their usual cognitive and organisational inertia to seek solutions outside their national borders. He found Russian foreign policy elites more receptive to emulation than their Ukrainian counterparts, for example, due to the former's sense of total policy failure in the post-Cold War era.

When this failure is due to imposition by other, more powerful political entities,

lesson-drawing often takes the form of geopolitical rivalry, with emulators aiming to defeat their rivals 'at their own game'. Once again, Japan—where the Meiji leadership emulated the West in order to protect from the threat of foreign domination and overcome unequal treaties —is seen as the paradigmatic example of this dynamic (Jacoby 2001: 23; Westney 1987: 22). Wehler's (1987: 343) term 'defensive modernisation' is particularly useful to describe this dynamic, which often involves the adoption of limited reforms from above and outside in order to avoid either wholesale revolution from below or defeat by more 'modern' foreign powers.

One final element of conduciveness to emulation has been convincingly posited by Goldman (2006), who finds that lesson-drawing is most likely to occur when official orthodoxy breaks down between elites, allowing for greater levels of tolerance towards diversity. A policy setting marked by recent and large-scale failure, fears of external domination, and internal dissent should thus be most conducive to emulation; the reverse is likely to be true for a polity experiencing relative success and internal cohesion.

Following this review of the theories of lesson-drawing and emulation, this dissertation now turns to their practical application, and particularly to the question of the extent to which Kenyan and Ethiopian elites engage in these practices.

CHAPTER FOUR: ETHIOPIAN EMULATION OF CHINA AND SOUTH KOREA

Previous chapters have argued that discussions around the impact of China's emerging economy on global development discourse have suffered from a neglect of empirical enquiry into the desires and perceptions of developing country elites themselves—and particularly of elites in Africa. I have also posited that this gap in the literature is best explored through the concepts of lesson-drawing and emulation, which focus on the voluntary and purposive transfer of ideas, policies and practices from one national setting to another.

This chapter presents the first set of empirical findings, exploring the attitudes of Ethiopian politicians, policy-makers, business leaders and civil society representatives to emulation. It first sets the context by arguing that the country's historical and present-day experience reveals an abiding desire to learn from the modernisation experiences of others, coupled with a wariness of outside interference and deep-rooted sense of Ethiopia's own uniqueness. It also provides a brief overview of Ethiopia under the ruling EPRDF, where— particularly since the disastrous elections in 2005—the existence of economic reform within an undemocratic political environment has echoed the 'authoritarian growth' model often associated with China and certain of its neighbours in the region.

The second section of the chapter presents elites' current views on the notion of lesson-drawing, before detailing the countries and regions these leaders wish to emulate and some of their reasons for doing so. It finds the ruling party to have a clear and cohesive policy of learning from the East Asian Model, a general category into which they subsume

the Chinese Model. This is a contentious position, however, as non-governmental elites do not generally share this desire and are often critical of the government's emulation of the region. The chapter closes with some reflections on the relevance of these findings for the broader research question. It will not explore the specific lessons that elites wish to draw, as these will be covered in a later section.

4.1 The National Context

4.1.1 A History of Emulation, Exceptionalism and Modernisation

Since the dawn of its existence, Ethiopia has been caught in the competing forces of emulation and self-sufficiency, in the tensions between modernisation and isolationism. The only country in sub-Saharan Africa with a written history dating back well into pre-Christian times, it is one of the oldest surviving political entities in the world. Its rich cultural heritage (it has a unique calendar, alphabet, and time system) and history of resistance to colonialism have fostered a strong, enduring sense of independence and exceptionalism.

Centuries of contact with more technologically advanced European nations, on the other hand, have often driven the country's leaders towards forceful projects of modernisation borne of both admiration and rivalry. 'As for the European presence', writes Bahru[17] (2001: 270), 'it was a threat to the cherished independence of the country...At the same time, it opened up new possibilities of introducing western technology, particularly military technology, and of modernizing the country'. The result of this ambivalence has been the adoption of a variety of Western and non-Western lessons throughout the country's

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[17] Ethiopians do not have family surnames, and instead use their fathers' first names as last names. In keeping with common practice, Ethiopians cited throughout this work are referred to either by their full names or by their first name alone (as here).

modern history—a highly contested, very ideological and often unsuccessful process. At the heart of attempts to learn from countries such as Britain, Japan and the Soviet Union has been the attempt to learn from others how to acquire, consolidate and expand the power and unity of the state (Clapham 2006).

From the turn of the first century A.D., the powerful Axum empire ruled the northern highlands, adopting Egyptian Orthodox Christianity in the fourth century A.D. In the seventh century, a post-Axumite kingdom emerged in the central northern highlands, expanding for the next few centuries throughout that area of Ethiopia inhabited by the Amhara people. After an interlude that saw power fall into the hands of the hitherto-subjugated Agaw people for 120 years, Ethiopia saw a succession of Amhara leaders—claiming descent from the Axumite kings and King Solomon of Israel—gradually further expand the area under their control. This Solomonic dynasty was gravely weakened in the 16th century, following a series of devastating attacks from Muslims to the north and mass population migrations of the pastoral Oromo to the south. The brief but relatively successful reign of Emperor Fasilidas that followed was unable to revive the former glories of his ancestors, and the kingdom fell into a state of fragmentation and warring fiefdoms. The only Europeans in Ethiopia – Portuguese Jesuit missionaries – were expelled following pressure from the clergy, and the country isolated itself from the rest of the world for over 200 years.

Into this power vacuum, in 1855, stepped Tewodros II, generally considered the first of the four great modernising and centralising emperors (Bahru 2001: 228; Crummey 1969: 459). Tewodros' vision of a unified Ethiopian state led him to establish an army, promote Amharic as national language, and battle the clergy's entrenched ownership of land. Tewodros had great admiration for the technology and institutions of the European powers

who were beginning to make incursions into the Horn of Africa. Letters to Queen Victoria asking for help in conquering Islam and pleading for the technical assistance that would allow 'blind', 'dark' and 'ignorant' Ethiopia to benefit from the 'light' of Europe (quoted in Bahru 2001: 37) went unanswered, however—an oversight Tewodros never forgave.

Tewedros' reign had established military victory, rather than descent, as the main mechanism for the transfer of power in Ethiopia (Clapham 1990: 28). In 1872, Yohannes IV fought his way to the throne; he too, attempted to unify and expand the country, but sought (largely unsuccessfully) to do so through the more cautious approach of feudal federalism (Ghelawdewos 1995: 14).

It took the assumption to the throne by Menelik II in 1889 to truly consolidate the unifying and modernising projects begun by his predecessors; over three-quarters of the area of modern-day Ethiopia, as well as the majority of its population (Harbeson 1998: 112), were subjugated and forcefully incorporated into the empire within the first ten years of his reign. This process of 'Amharaisation' also involved, more broadly, the construction of a 'common' Ethiopian cultural identity based on the religion and culture of its most dominant ethnic group. Menelik used revenues from the periphery of his new territories to designate Addis Ababa as the national capital, and to build in it schools, hospitals, modern government ministries and communications infrastructure.

Many of these efforts bore the mark of foreign influences and voluntary policy transfer. One of Menelik's closest advisors, the Swiss Engineer Alfred Ilg, assisted the Emperor in *inter alia* reforming the postal system, creating a national currency and building the country's first railway from the capital to Djibouti (Uhlig 2007: 121). There is also striking evidence to suggest that Ethiopian emulation of East Asia began as early as this era.

In 1903, US representative Robert P. Skinner wrote of Menelik that 'he has heard of Japan, and in his own way is trying to emulate that striking example. The new railroad, the new highways, the bridges, the telephones—all these things he probably cares very little for in themselves, but he realizes that nations must advance or they must fall' (quoted in McVety 2008: 381).

These developments may have brought partial modernisation, but they also attracted the attention of would-be colonisers, and in 1895, Italian forces invaded from Eritrea. Menelik's defeat of the invaders at the Battle of Adwa had far-reaching consequences, sparing Ethiopia from colonial rule, inspiring anti-imperialist insurgency movements across the world, and furthering the notion of a united Ethiopian nation.

The final, and perhaps the best known, of Ethiopia's modernising emperors was Haile-Selassie I. When he became regent and *de facto* ruler in 1916, Ethiopia was still a feudal society that required its peasants, or *gabbars*, to pay an elaborate system of tithes, taxes and provisions to the clergy and ruling class (Bahru 2001: 86). Its period of expansion complete, Ethiopia had become larger and more difficult to govern; it remained poor and underdeveloped but was now surrounded on all sides by foreign ideas, military threats and economic interests. The regent embarked on an even further-reaching programme of modernisation from above, gradually introducing a set of reforms designed to bring about a market economy. Trade with Europeans increased dramatically, a raft of foreign experts was brought in as advisers and a national oligarchy emerged. A permanent standing army was created, and with it 'all the rest of the imported paraphernalia of the modern state' (Clapham 1990: 29): a system of modern education (accompanied by an intelligentsia), banking, a bureaucracy, public services, and more. Development efforts were highly concentrated on

the capital, however, and Selassie focused his education efforts on a small, loyal elite (Marcus 2002: 160).

Europe was used as an exemplar in these attempts, but by no means exclusively. Most notably, the 'Japanisers', a group of progressive intellectuals prominent in the 1920s and early 1930s, urged the adoption of a 'Japanese model' due to the speed with which Meiji Japan had been able to transform itself from a feudal to an industrial power (Bahru 2001; Clarke 2004; Tesfaye 2007[18]). To Ethiopian admirers of Japan's defensive modernisation, the country had—particularly in its victory over Russia in 1905—proved that certain non-European nations could stand on a par with their European would-be oppressors, just as Ethiopia had once demonstrated its own ability to resist Western domination. In a book titled *Japan Endamen Salatanach* ('How Japan Modernized'), intellectual Kebede Michael (quoted in Clarke 2004) held that 'the only country that has succeeded in safeguarding her independence and in charting her own path of educational progress is Japan' and urged his countrymen to 'examine her history and follow her example'.

Such exhortations were not confined to academia. It was a prominent Japaniser who drafted the Ethiopian constitution, modeling it so closely on the Meiji Constitution of 1889 that numerous clauses found in the latter survived transition to the former more or less intact (Bahru 2001: 110). Haile-Selassie himself expressed similar sentiments, provoking a visiting British Minister to remark that the Emperor's wishes to emulate Japan 'however incredible it

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[18] Much of Tesfaye's text, titled *Ethiopia and the Quest for East Asian Model of Development: A Historical Perspective*, is plagiarised word for word from Clarke's article, but is included here as a source due to the prominence of its author, prominent EPRDF supporter and former Ethiopian diplomat to South Africa. Tesfaye's belief that the EPRDF is returning to this project by emulating East Asia—and his own approval of this process—is highly instructive in the light of this chapter's own findings.

may seem to foreign observers—lead him to dream of Ethiopia as the Japan of Africa' (Bahru 2001: 7).

As during the reign of Menelik, the defensive modernisation that marked Haile-Selassie's early years did not ultimately prevent Ethiopia's invasion by outsiders. In 1936, the country was occupied by Italy, and Haile-Selassie sent into exile. After five years of brutal occupation and a counter-insurgency that (with the help of British forces) defeated the Italians in 1941, the Emperor returned to Addis Ababa to continue his rule. In the same year Ethiopia annexed Eritrea, a former Italian colony and sometime territory of the Solomonic dynasty.

The next few decades saw a continuation of the reform agenda: a formally independent judiciary, second house of parliament and the constitutional recognition of human rights were all introduced in 1955. Ethiopia's civil and other legal codes were promulgated during this time, with the majority drafted by French legal advisors to the Emperor (Vanderlinden 1966: 250). Ethiopia also became a central plank in the 'Point Four Agreement for Technical Cooperation', Truman's flagship programme to export modernisation to the Third World. Technical assistance would lead to economic growth, American officials felt, and this, in the words of Truman, would help the populations of developing countries 'find out' the importance of democracy (quoted in McVety 2008: 386). Haile-Selassie's eagerness to collaborate with American technical experts was driven, according to McVety (2008), by a desire to modernise Ethiopia 'from above' and to maintain his hold on power. Thus roads, railways and schools were both ways to fuel economic growth and a way for the state to incorporate and civilise its population.

These changes had several consequences unforeseen by the Emperor, however. Even as an uneven modernisation was sweeping Ethiopia, resistance to imperial rule was growing. In 1960, a leading American modernisation theorist remarked:

> One of the most remarkable features of the Ethiopian system is that the emperor, whose position depends heavily upon the preservation of tradition, has been and remains one of the most powerful and modernizing influences in the country. On his own initiative he has introduced modern constitutional structures; he is using the resources of the state deliberately to create a new class of educated Ethiopians to staff the expanding bureaucracy and a modern army. He is, in a word, setting in motion processes of change which will most likely eventuate in profound tensions in society, and which in time could lead to a shattering of the whole traditional structure (Coleman 1960: 576).

The privatisation of land had driven down agricultural prices and left *gabbars* even worse off than before, and the government was forced to continue relying on the land-owning military, aristocracy and oligarchy for support (Keller 1991). Critics resented Selassie's close ties to Western economic and political interests, particularly those of the United States. Eritrean and ethnic Somali nationalism was growing, and Marxism was sweeping Africa. For student groups and many others, reform was simply not happening fast enough. The imperial regime's inadequate response to a famine that began in 1972 pushed discontent to breaking point.

Ethiopia entered a new phase in its history of emulation two years later, when these pressures came to a head and Selassie was violently deposed by a Marxist-Leninist inspired military junta. Led by Mengistu Hailemariam, the *Derg* ('Committee') established the

People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia as a formally one-party state. As Soviet backing and the Derg's admiration for communist ideology increased, foreign firms were brought under state control and all rural—and later urban—land was nationalised. Feudalism, imperialism and bureaucratic capitalism were declared the three main enemies of the Ethiopian people (Ghelawdewos 1995: 118). The influence of Cold War ideology was striking: the revolution had grown out of student demands for Chinese-style peasant uprisings and Soviet-style anti-imperialism, and the Derg would go on to receive military aid not only from the Soviet Union, but from Cuba, East Germany and North Korea.

For the next 17 years, Mengistu presided over one of Africa's most destructive and brutal post-colonial dictatorships. Rising urban opposition was met with the Red Terror, a counter-insurgency campaign entailing 'one of the most systematic uses of mass murder ever witnessed in Africa' (De Waal 1991: 101) through massacres, disappearances and deportations.

A key feature of the regime was its desire to destroy Ethiopia's feudal system by forcibly villigising most of its overwhelmingly rural population. Much of this was the direct result of emulation: the Derg sent officials to observe Tanzania's (still much better-known) villigisation programme, itself inspired by the Chinese example. Although the rationale of the Ethiopian scheme was borrowed from Tanzania, the former had a stronger military component, making it even more brutal and devastating than its progenitor (Scott 1998: 248). In 1985, Mengistu decried Ethiopia as a 'symbol of backwardness and a valley of ignorance', and announced plans to resettle 33 million rural Ethiopians into large collective farms (cited in Scott 1998: 248). This destroyed social ties, and purposely rendered farmers and their families completely dependent on the state by eliminating the utility of local knowledge

(Scott 1998: 251). It ultimately led to a series of widespread famines, killing approximately 400,000 people in the period from 1983 to 1985 alone (De Waal 1991: 175).

By the late 1980s, large-scale armed insurrection was rife, especially in the northern regions of Tigray and Eritrea. The economy had been decimated. The Soviet Union was beginning to collapse, depriving Mengistu of its primary source of financial support and leading to the retreat of communism around the world. In 1991, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and other ethnically- and regionally-based opposition movements, captured Addis Ababa and overthrew the Derg.

For centuries, modernisation and globalisation had been double-edged swords to Ethiopia's centralising leaders. Although foreign incursions threatened the religious and political unity that Ethiopia's leaders had fought so hard to construct, they also, paradoxically, provided the necessary tools for this process of state-building. And Ethiopia's efforts at modernisation served to incorporate the country into global dynamics of colonialisation and imperialism, even as they were designed to retain and consolidate its independence. In the end, emulation and attempted modernisation won out over isolation. This emulation was never limited to Western models, as successive waves of efforts to emulate Japan, for instance, make clear. Christopher Clapham (2006: 138), the scholar who has most thoroughly explored the dynamics of this process, puts it thus:

Ethiopia's development trajectory can correspondingly be seen as a series of attempts by 'modernising' Ethiopians to identify the mechanisms of developmental success of countries

perceived as having some similarity to their own. The idea was to draw from these countries' experiences in order to recreate Ethiopia in the resulting image of modernity'.

Like China, Japan and others of the era, Ethiopia thus overcame its first instincts towards isolationism by seeking to achieve formal recognition of sovereignty and equality with the West through modernisation. Lacking the colonial history of others on the continent, its own elites stepped in to create the machinery of the modern state. When this was seen to fail the country, the Soviet model stepped in to fill the breach—with disastrous consequences.

4.1.2 Ethiopia after the Derg: Cautious and Contradictory Liberalisation

The past two decades may constitute a new chapter in Ethiopia's history, but they have also been marked by many of the same competing forces that so chequered its past. After decades of isolation and trauma, Ethiopia is still, in many ways, a country entering the international society of nations—and its transformation in this regard has been faster than ever before. Globalisation has brought threats as well as opportunities, however, leading to suspicion and fear on the part of the country's new modernisers. The story of present-day Ethiopia is, to a large extent, the story of how they have attempted to manage these contradictions. As we shall see later, these tensions also form a central plank in their choice of China and East Asia as a model of development.

As soon as the EPRDF-dominated coalition took control of Ethiopia, domestic and international pro-democratic and pro-capitalist pressures began to confront the country's history of authoritarianism and communism. In 1991, Ethiopia had no record of formally democratic governance, no political parties, no independent media and a tiny civil society.

The next 14 years saw a hesitant and incomplete move towards greater political and economic liberalisation. On the one hand, the country gained a new constitution in 1994 that saw the creation of a judiciary and a reformed, bicameral legislature. The country's first formally multi-party national parliamentary elections were held in 1995, making EPRDF chairman Meles Zenawi (a member of the country's Tigrayan ethnic group) the president of Ethiopia.[19] The party dropped all public references to Marxism-Leninism, made overtures to the United States, and promised donors that it would bring political and economic liberalisation to Ethiopia. In 2001, the party also announced that it was opening its ranks to the national bourgeoisie, integrating into the global economy and officially following capitalism (Tadesse and Young 2003: 392). Some state-owned enterprises were privatised, and a degree of press freedom permitted.

On the other hand, the same period saw the consolidation of the power of the EPRDF —and, within it, the TPLF—as the country's dominant political force. In the run-up to the 1995 elections, the originally multi-party transitional government had increasingly been whittled away to leave only the EPRDF and a handful of other political groupings, as parties representing several major ethnic groups from the south of the country had withdrawn from the interim Council of Representatives. The first formally democratic elections, although peaceful, were boycotted by the majority of opposition parties, who cited harassment and intimidation. To the majority of outside observers (e.g. Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009a; Abbink 2006: 11), this gravely compromised the legitimacy of the process. In addition, voters were largely apathetic and lacked information on the political process (ICG 2009: 7). According to Lyons (1995: 142), 'the population had acquiesced to but not necessarily accepted the new

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[19] This made him the first non-Amharic national leader to come to power in over a century.

regime. The Ethiopian transition began with a broadly inclusive national conference and ended, four years...later, with a single-party-dominant political system.' Broad international consensus views the validity of subsequent national elections in 2000 with a similar degree of scepticism; severe irregularities occurred in certain parts of the country (Pausewang and Tronvoll 2000) and although more opposition parties contested the election, their meaningful participation was hampered by *inter alia* a lack of access to government-controlled media (Shinn and Ofcansky 2004: 214). The EPRDF secured another landslide victory.

The leadership's ambivalence towards economic and political liberalism could also be seen in the many elements of Marxist-Leninist ideology that remained after the fall of the Derg; all land remained the property of the state and the EPRDF continued to cast itself as a 'vanguard party' (EPRDF 2006) with the duty of bringing about mass political mobilisation, particularly in rural areas, through 'democratic centralism' (EPRDF 2005: 36) and regular sessions of *gemgema* ('self-criticism'). The doctrine of 'revolutionary democracy' also remained central to the party's thinking: collective, communal decision-making was seen as preferable to the plural representation and individual participation advocated by western-style, liberal democracy (EPRDF 2006).

The influence of the past can be seen, also, in Ethiopia's preoccupation with the 'national question'. Ethiopia has over 80 ethnic groups or 'nationalities', and is one of the only federal states divided explicitly along ethnic lines; political sovereignty is vested in ethnic groups rather than individuals. Article 9(31) of the constitution allows each ethnically-based federal unit the right to self-determination and secession (FDRE 1994). Although Ethiopia may take the idea of ethnic federalism to new extremes (in theory, in any

case), many authors have pointed out the clear debt that such thinking owes to Stalinist ideology (Aregawi 2008: 235; ICG 2009: 23). Stalin argued that nationalities had the right to secession (1954 [1904]: 49), but viewed the imperialism and chauvinism of the 'Great Russians' as the primary cause of anti-Russian nationalism (1953b [1923]: 249); nationalities not subjected to bourgeois imperialism, then, no longer required the right to secede (1953a [1920]; 385-386). In the same way, the Tigrayan-dominated EPRDF bases much of its legitimacy on the idea that it has united Ethiopia by breaking centuries of Amhara dominance and centralism (Clapham 2006: 148).

Two crucial events in the first decade of the 21st century demonstrate the profound conflict between reform and continuity that marked Ethiopia's return to the 'society of nations'. One, the 2001 split and eventual purging of the ruling party, illustrates the extent to which these tensions reached to the heart of the country's leadership. As the EPRDF was consolidating its hold on power, the organisation at its heart was undergoing far-reaching shifts in leadership and ideology. The TPLF, a movement stemming from student- and peasant-based resistance to the Derg, had been highly influenced by Enver Hozha's Albanian variant of communism that emphasised independence from both Soviet and Western 'imperialism'; one author calls Albania the (erstwhile) 'guiding light' of the TPLF (Clapham 1992: 117). Many reasons have been posited for the EPRDF's cautious post-1991 move towards economic and political reform. Where its leadership had rarely left the country before coming to power, now it faced first-hand exposure to an outside world where communism had fallen and capitalism was triumphant. A revolutionary party once deeply anchored by its Tigrayan roots suddenly had to adjust to life as administrators of the urban centre, and of the entire country (Tadesse and Young 2003: 393). Many were eager for the

international aid and support that the United States – for tactical reasons of its own – provided in ever-increasing quantities. In addition, the TPLF was eager to expand its domestic support base, and the country's communist ideology and institutions were tainted by association with the Derg (Clapham 1992: 118). Finally, internecine struggles for power over the soul of the TPLF may, as Tadesse and Young (2003: 389) contend, have been as important a driver as ideology.

Due to a variety of factors, then, by 2001 fissures had begun to appear between the 'reformist' supporters of Meles and the Tigrayan 'hardliners' in the TPLF; the former accused the latter of Bonapartism and of being mired in defunct dogmas of the past, whereas the latter charged Meles with abandoning the socialist principles of the TPLF for bourgeois capitalism (Africa Confidential 2001: 5). In addition, members of the 'anti-Meles clique' accused their opponents of appeasement in the war with Eritrea (the conflict had begun as a border dispute in 1998 and ended with a peace treaty two years later). Finally, as Africa Confidential (2001: 5) reported at the time, 'the third prong of attack is political liberalisation (such as it is), devolution and the federal experiment. Provided the kernel of power remains in Tigrayan hands, Meles supports a greater role for the regional states than do his critics'. The outcome to these disputes was the *tehadiso* ('renewal') of May 2001, which saw critics of Meles expelled, denounced (and, in several cases, imprisoned on charges of corruption), and which left Meles unchallenged in his ideological and organisational dominance of the party.

The second key event to exemplify Ethiopia's place at the crossroads of communism and globalisation was the country's third—and now somewhat notorious—national parliamentary election in 2005. Following pressure from international donors, this election

was initially marked by unprecedented levels of openness and public participation. Amidst nationally-broadcast public debates and widespread rural campaigning by opposition groups, 'the hitherto submissive population turned into an enthusiastic electorate in a moment of near revolutionary quality' (ICG 2009: 8). Two opposition groupings emerged: the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), drawing its support primarily from the urban, educated elite and the Amhara-dominated highlands, urged economic liberalisation and pan-ethnic nationalism (Abbink 2006: 9-10); the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF) was a coalition representing a panoply of smaller ethnic groups. A deep-rooted culture of authoritarianism and widespread lack of understanding of the democratic process continued to bedevil proceedings—many voters, perplexed by the sudden visibility of opposition parties and assuming that the EPRDF had abdicated, voted for the former as the most likely new rulers (LeFort 2007). Nonetheless, it seemed that the era of absolutism and autocracy was beginning to draw to a close; as Clapham (2005) puts it, 'these were real elections'.

If the run-up to the elections saw the widening of the democratic space, its aftermath saw its swift and dramatic renarrowing. Initial polling granted 174 of 547 seats to the opposition, which immediately alleged electoral fraud and intimidation. Given the months of recriminations, recounts and legal disputes that followed, it is difficult to assess the fairness of the final results. The majority of outside observers agree, however, that the EPRDF, shocked at the extent of its losses during the initial counting process, had attempted to manipulate the results in at least some areas (Abbink 2006: 12; Clapham 2005). Controversially, the European Union Election Observation Mission concluded that 'the counting and aggregation processes were marred by irregular practices, confusion and a lack of transparency' (EU-EOM 2005: 1). In the aftermath, the CUD announced a boycott of

parliament and illegal protests broke out across the capital. Both were met with severe repression—more than 100 opposition politicians were arrested and charged with treason, and 193 protesters (according to the Ethiopian government's official enquiry commission) killed by security forces (AP 2006). The EPRDF, for its part, alleges that the opposition and elements of the media were engaging in 'hate speech' against Tigrayans, the outcome of which 'might have made the Rwandan genocide look like child's play' (quoted in Plaut 2005).

In 2005, the EPRDF thus found itself at a crucial point in its history. Having attempted simultaneously (if gradually) to democratise and to liberalise the economy in line with what it viewed as the demands of globalisation and donors, it decided to take a somewhat different tack in the aftermath of electoral chaos. In the years that followed, the ruling party has closed many of the avenues of dissent and further increased its political control. In 2008, the *Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information Proclamation* (FDRE 2008) was passed, strengthening governmental powers to initiate defamation suits, impose fines and deny broadcast licences. Several publications have been forced to close, and those few newspapers that do openly criticise the government are primarily published in English and therefore remain the preserve of a tiny educated business elite. Virtually all broadcast media is government-owned. The 2009 *Proclamation for the Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies* (FDRE 2009b) similarly restricts the activities of NGOs. Local organisations that receive more than 10% of their funding from foreign sources are prohibited from engaging in advocacy, and harassment is frequent; many of the NGOs working in this area have thus been forced to close or scale down (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012a: 30). The *Anti-Terrorism Proclamation* of 2009 completed this trio of regressive legislation, extending the government's powers of arrest and detention, expanding

both the definition of terrorism and the penalties applied to those found guilty of committing or promoting it, and lowering evidentiary standards for its prosecution (FDRE 2009a). The judiciary and the National Election Board of Ethiopia are not generally viewed as independent in practice (Abbink 2006: 185, 196; HRW 2010a: 51, 19).

The national constitution and other legislation remains fully consistent with Western-style liberal democracy; Ethiopia is formally a federal parliamentary republic, with a legally independent ombudsman and human rights commission, and is a party to the majority of major international human rights treaties. Although the basic legal framework for democratic governance is thus for the most part in place, the country operates according to what Pausewang terms a 'two track system': it possesses the formal institutions required by donors, but 'below the surface it has built a party structure that keeps tight control at all levels and makes sure that no-one can use these democratic institutions efficiently to challenge its power' (Pausewang 2002: 230). This disconnect is apparent, also, in the true status of Ethiopia's 'nationalities': in practice, the nine regional states are financially and politically weak and run by satellite organisations of the EPRDF (Keller in Asafa 1998: 114). Representatives from the TPLF also regularly act as unofficial advisors or coordinators within the regional governments (Tronvoll 2002: 163). The restive state of Oromia, for example, is governed by the Oromo People's Democratic Organisation—created by the TPLF—while the Oromo Liberation Front and other parties with explicit ethnic or secessionist agendas are regularly harassed or banned (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012a: 9).

Since the overthrow of the monarchy, Ethiopia's smallest unit of local government (and arguably its most important) has been the *kebele,* corresponding generally to neighbourhood level in cities and to the village level in rural areas. The high level of control

that the tightly-organised national network of EPRDF cadres exercises over *kebele* administrations is well documented, as is the suppression of dissent that *kebeles*—who have their own militias and prisons—are able to exercise over rural dissent (HRW 2010a: 17-19; ICG 2009: 18). Controversial reports by Human Rights Watch (2010a; 2010b) have detailed the 'one hundred ways of putting pressure' exercised by the EPRDF, including the blocking of supporters of the opposition from employment in the civil service, and the distribution of seeds and fertilisers only to supporters of the ruling party. In a country where over 85% of the labour force is employed in agriculture, the convergence of the 'food for votes' tactic with the expansion of EPRDF membership from 700 000 in 2005 to more than 5 million in 2010 (LeFort 2010) is surely not coincidental. Sectoral organisations such as the Association of Manufacturers and Chamber of Commerce have been disbanded or had their leadership replaced (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009a: 16).

The EPRDF thus had five years to conduct an extensive campaign of co-option, intimidation and 're-ideologization' (Tronvoll 2011: 124) before the parliamentary elections in 2010. Opposition to the EPRDF was vested primarily in the eight-party coalition Medrek, widely viewed as the successor to the decimated CUD. Although a decisive victory for the EPRDF was expected, the sheer dominance of the EPRDF nonetheless took many by surprise—the EPRDF took 99.6% of seats in parliament, leaving only two MPs unaffiliated with the party at the time of writing. The usual allegations of vote rigging, harassment, intimidation and outright violence against the opposition were rife (Tronvoll 2011: 124), but criticism from the international community was muted. Relations between the EU and the Ethiopian government had been severely (and publicly) damaged by the critical report of the Observer Mission five years previously; nevertheless, a large EU observer mission was

granted accreditation provided it signed a 'code of electoral conduct', consented to very late deployment, and agreed to learn from the 'mistakes' of the past. The new mission's final report in 2010 was less damning than its 2005 counterpart, but nevertheless found that 'the electoral process fell short of international commitments for elections, notably regarding the transparency of the process and the lack of a level playing field for all contesting parties' (EU-EOM 2010: 1).

This is not to imply that all movement has been unambiguously in the direction of authoritarian governance. There has been a handful of more promising developments in the arena of democratic governance: the EPRDF 'allows and even encourages the teaching of democratic values' (Pausewang *et al* 2002: 239) in schools, cadre trainings and *kebele* gatherings—as long as it is completely in control of the process. In certain aspects, minorities are less marginalised than before; the right to be educated in one's mother tongue, for example, is now generally beginning to be recognised in practice (ICG 2009: 24). Aware of the long-term dangers of being associated with rule by a single ethnicity, Meles has made efforts to appoint non-Tigrayans to senior posts in government, most notably in the composition of the 2010 cabinet. Two decades of debate, however limited, on issues of democratic rights and human rights seem to have had at least some impact on ordinary Ethiopians' level of knowledge of their civic rights and responsibilities, although this is difficult to measure. All attempts towards democratisation are, however, carefully mediated and controlled by a ruling party which seems to see the 'granting' of these rights as a tactical or developmental strategy rather than a legal or ethical duty.

Although the level of repression and state violence thus in no way even approaches that of the Derg regime, Ethiopia can nonetheless not be seen as democratic in the way the

term is commonly understood. A deep-rooted culture of fear and state dominance remains in place; no government has ever come to power in Ethiopia without the use of force, and any criticism of the government is still often treated as treasonous (Clapham 2002: xviii). 'The EPRDF has effectively merged with the state' (Tadesse and Young 2003: 389), and other societal actors depend on access to state resources and the EPRDF's favour for their survival.

Where political reform has slowed or even halted, economic reform, while still constrained, has gained considerable momentum. Banking, telecommunications and land all remain government-owned, but the country has gone to great lengths to attract FDI and promote its exports. Of these, coffee remains the most lucrative, but the government is also trying to move away from a reliance on the export of primary commodities through agro-processing and value addition (Ethiopian Investment Agency 2010). A nascent middle class is emerging in the country's urban centres, and the government's call on members of Ethiopia's 1.5 to 2 million-strong diaspora to invest in the country appears to have borne fruit; officials (quoted in Henshaw 2006) estimate that more than $800 million of investment into Ethiopia from 2001 to 2006 stemmed from the diaspora.

The government has placed rapid economic growth at the forefront of its highly ambitious five-year plans: the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) made 'a massive push to accelerate growth' the second of its central pillars, and aimed to achieve an average of 7 to 10% growth in real GDP from 2005 to 2010. (MoFED 2006: 165, 63). After exceeding its 'high-case' scenario of 10% (World Bank 2012), in 2010 it launched the even more optimistic Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), which aimed to double the country's GDP by 2015 and achieve 'middle-income status' by

2025 (MoFED 2010a)[20].   Much of this growth has been achieved—and is likely to be achieved in future—through increased external inflows of capital.

The present economic situation, however radical in the Ethiopian context, diverges from current donor orthodoxy in a number of ways. One example is the immense emphasis given, especially since PASDEP, to government investment in physical infrastructure. The government has obtained a loan from China that is to fund the construction of 2000 kilometres of railway by 2015 and an additional 3000 kilometres shortly thereafter—a more than seven-fold increase on the current situation. The project is intended to support Ethiopia's agricultural sector by transporting livestock and grain, and relies on the the China EximBank and the China Railway Corporation for funding and construction, respectively. The GTP also articulates the government's aim to increase the amount of roads in the country from 49,000 to 136,000 (MoFED 2010a: 17). Western donors have funded such projects in the past by, for example, providing grants and credits to the World Bank's Road Sector Development Program. They have not openly criticised the recent move towards an even greater focus on infrastructure, but neither have they been the driving force behind it.

At times, these projects have come up against countervailing doctrines emphasised, at least in principle, by international institutions. The most notable example is the country's controversial and extensive hydroelectric energy programme. Five hydroelectric dams are planned for the Omo River in the south of the country; the biggest of these, the Gibe III, will

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[20]   Interestingly, Amharic-language documents and unofficial English translations such as that cited above contain these figures, which have also been widely cited in the media. However, the official English-language document for presentation to donors (MoFED 2010b) omits explicit mention of these aims, perhaps due to earlier criticism by IMF officials and others that the original plan was 'overambitious' (quoted in Kirubel 2010).

be the second-largest dam (and largest hydropower plant) in Africa. Although it is expected to more than double Ethiopia's power generation capacity, it will also, according to critics, disrupt the livelihoods of up to one million rural Ethiopians (Sharife 2010). A large international campaign has emerged to oppose the 'eco-genocide' (Sharife 2010) that would ostensibly result from the dam's construction. The project was planned and executed very rapidly; a no-bid contract was awarded to Italian firm Salini Costruttori before funding or impact assessments had been carried out, leading the World Bank and other donors to decline involvement in the project (Greste 2009). The majority of funding secured by 2011 was in the form of loans from the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and the EximBank of China.

A second divergence from current Western development orthodoxy resides in the more general subject of state involvement in the economy. Aside from the wholesale public ownership of the sectors mentioned previously, the government also practices import substitution, imposes controls on foreign exchange, and protects and promotes key industries from outside competition. The Development Assistance Group (DAG), representing the 26 major traditional donors to Ethiopia, has gone on record urging the government of Ethiopia to accord a greater focus to private sector development and to open the unproductive sectors of the economy to competition (Taylor 2010).

Ethiopia remains highly dependent on the funding of Western donors, leading some critics to view the EPRDF's limited attempts at reform as commensurate solely with what the party can 'get away with' while retaining its position as 'donor darling' of Africa (Brüne 2009: 139). Ethiopia received almost $4 billion in Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) in 2009 (OECD 2011: 114), and it was the UK's second-largest recipient of aid in 2011

(DFID 2011: 30). In 2002 (the latest year for which figures are available), aid contributed a staggering 81% of the Ethiopian government's total budget (UNDP 2010: 121). Ethiopia is still one of the poorest and most drought-stricken countries in the world. Depending largely on the weather conditions in a given year, anywhere from 2.8 million (Reuters 2011) to 10.4 million Ethiopians (FEWS NET 2006: 1) are estimated to be dependent on food aid for their survival. As a result, government policy is invariably formulated in consultation with the DAG.

This picture of a self-interested government undertaking what limited reforms it must in order to stay in power is complicated by indications that Ethiopia's combination of slow (or even static) political liberalisation and moderate economic liberalisation has led to some level of tangible improvement in the material welfare of Ethiopia's poor. The government's behaviour, while authoritarian, is not consistent with the hollowed-out, patrimonial regimes that have plagued large parts of post-colonial Africa. Even sceptics note 'its clear vision on development and ambitious development agenda' (Segers *et al* 2009: 97), as well as the economic growth and expansion of public services that it has helped to bring about (ICG 2009: 29). As Ethiopia's track record on political rights has deteriorated, its performance in the area of economic rights has, paradoxically, improved. Ethiopia's score on the Human Development Index (HDI), although still one of the lowest in the world, has improved year on year since 2000; it was the African country that exhibited the greatest improvement in HDI from 1990 to 2010 (UNDP 2010: 3). A major multi-donor report has referred to Ethiopia one of 'the few countries in sub-Saharan Africa making fast progress toward the Millennium Development Goals' (ADB *et al* 2012: 196). Macro-economic figures are

equally impressive: Ethiopia was the 5th fastest-growing country from 2001 to 2010, and was predicted to be the 3rd fastest-growing from 2011 to 2015 (Economist 2011).

The picture is further complicated by the DAG's own dependence on EPRDF cooperation (Borchgrevink 2008; Brüne 2009). The reaction of donors to repression is heavily constrained by strategic considerations: Ethiopia is seen as a vital ally against terrorism in the unstable Horn of Africa, and as a buffer against Islamic extremism. Allegations that aid money is being used to fund repression are vehemently contested by the DAG (2010). Donors do proffer mild criticism, but these factors, in combination with China's growing role in the Ethiopian economy, give the government of Ethiopia more freedom of action than most aid recipients.

Some of the poverty alleviation of the past decade has been achieved with the help of the same *kebele* system that the party uses to restrict rural dissent. The intricate and extensive rural party infrastructure that allows the EPRDF to police its cadres is also used to increase access to basic services, mobilise the population and educate farmers on new technologies. Substantial investments have been made in agricultural extension services, leading to a vast rise in the quantity and levels of professionalisation of the extension officers available to each *kebele* (Davis *et al* 2010: 1). Primary school enrolment has increased from 33% in 1991 to 95% in 2007 (UNDP 2010: 108), and rural health posts and health workers both increased more than sixfold from 2003 to 2007 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009a: 24). This has led the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2010: 51) to the somewhat surprising admission that 'Even without fully competitive national elections, local mechanisms that increase access and thus the provision of public goods can operate effectively'.

The acknowledgement of these achievements is not to suggest that the EPRDF does not suffer from corruption or use its power to the advantage of its members. Although the government has privatised hundreds of firms and parastatals over the past few decades, many of these have been integrated into large conglomerates owned by members or relatives of the ruling party (Abbink 2006: 5). These 'party-associated enterprises' (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 76) still exercise a near-monopoly on certain supposedly liberalised sectors. Criticism that the culture of power pervades economic activities at even the lowest level is rife, and many observers of rural agricultural extension programmes note their top-down focus, vulnerability to corruption and lack of inclusivity (Segers *et al* 2009).

Nor does this assessment deny the huge economic challenges that face the country. Despite its advances, Ethiopia was still one of the countries with the lowest human development in 2010 (UNDP 2010: 145); in 2008, it was also one of the most gender-unequal (UNDP 2010: 144). The country remains overly dependent on food aid and rain-fed agriculture. Some of the country's current problems stem directly from the recent high growth: the economic boom in urban areas may have created an unsustainable construction bubble, and high inflation has led to fears that the economy is overheating (Ohashi quoted in Davison 2011a). Rapid urbanisation and rising inequality are both matters of concern. The scale-up in service delivery has strained existing systems, leading, for example, to overcrowding in schools (UNDP 2010: 108).

Despite these concerns, however, there is much in the EPRDF's recent economic policies and performance to demonstrate that the country's overall direction, post-*tehadiso* and post-2005 elections, is neither entirely determined by donor conditionalities nor driven entirely by the self-interest of the ruling elite. Despite a continued dependence on the DAG,

the government has acted semi-autonomously in a number of key economic areas: it has retained greater state control over the economy, and the same tool that has granted it tight political control—a quasi-socialist approach to rural development and mobilisation centred around the *kebele*—is also credited with bolstering some of its economic achievements.

At present, the available evidence suggests the following: the EPRDF's first phase of leadership was marked by ideological uncertainty and by a pace of political liberalisation that matched—or at times even outstripped—the pace of economic reform. The ideological tensions inherent in a socialist movement facing widespread global and domestic changes on coming to power in 1991 were partially 'settled' a decade later by the victory, in the form of Meles Zenawi, of a faction favouring Ethiopia's slow but steady transition to an export-led market economy. These developments were consolidated by the catastrophic 2005 general elections, which left the ruling party shocked at its loss of support and vowing a change of direction in the political sphere. The result, since 2005, has been a policy of gradual but noticeable economic liberalisation accompanied by an almost complete halt (or perhaps even a reverse) in measures to democratise the country. Rapid economic growth in Ethiopia has thus coincided with the EPRDF's consolidation of its hold on power and restriction of domestic dissent. As one international NGO summarises this disjuncture, although 'many Ethiopians have benefited from the economic modernisation of the past eighteen years' and the EPRDF 'has overseen sustained economic growth and advanced development, democratic rhetoric has not been matched by democratic practice' (ICG 2009: 1, 5). This is a trend that looks set to continue, given the raft of recent legislation and restrictive measures put in place since 2008.

A comprehensive understanding of the reasons for the EPRDF's moderate level of economic reform (by donor standards) and minimal attempts at democratisation would require a full look into the 'black box' of decision-making. While such a task is difficult enough in democracies and virtually impossible in authoritarian regimes, an interpretive analysis of elite and particularly official discourses can achieve the more modest goal of shedding light on aspects of the process. As this and future chapters will argue, the EPRDF's current policy approach is at least partially driven by emulation of East Asia, and particularly of those countries who themselves undertook economic reforms before political reforms. It is by using these countries as templates, I contend, that ruling elites wish to revive historical attempts at modernisation. While ruling elites from Meles Zenawi downwards have made the ideological decision to move the party and country from its communist history towards the free market system that donors demand, they draw lessons from Taiwan, South Korea and particularly China on how best to do so. This allows them to control a process that is often seen as potentially destabilising and invasive. It is to these arguments that the chapter now turns.

4.2 Findings: Ethiopian Elites and Emulation

4.2.1 A Government Searching for Lessons from Abroad

The first task of a study on Ethiopian elites' perceptions of China's potential as a model requires an examination of their attitudes to the very notion of emulation. On the whole, interviewees responded positively to the idea that their country should take lessons from

others, although different sectors exhibited varying degrees of enthusiasm. Most respondents viewed the process as both natural and desirable, and admitted to participating in a process of lesson-drawing:

> Best experiences, best lessons, experience-sharing, benchmarking...are wonderful. Especially for Ethiopia. We are developing, so it's very very important (EN17).[21]

> We want to develop, we want to struggle to fight poverty too, so we can from learn countries who attained development in a short period (EG3).

> I believe not only that it is important and useful, but that it is a must. Even if you wanted to, you could not do without it. Even if you want to be bad, you have to learn from the bad ones! If you don't want to learn—in Ethiopia will we start all over again from the industrial revolution? It would be stupid. The knowledge [belongs to] human beings—they should take it...Whether you like it or not, that is the rule of the game, and you do it as a human being (EN6).

It will be recalled that current theories on emulation and lesson-drawing have found the process to occur most often when countries find themselves in crisis, with previous policies and ideologies having been discredited. This proves to be particularly true in the case under consideration here: the devastation left by the Derg regime, coupled with the global decline of communism, left the EPRDF at a critical juncture in the early 1990s: the new ruling party could not simply continue the Marxist, isolationist policies of its predecessors, yet the way

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[21] The system used to code interviewees is explained in Appendix C.

forward was unclear. These crossroads spurred elites to begin their search for an exemplar—
to many, emulation became one of the consequences of Ethiopia's assimilation into the global
economic and political order, as well as one of the means by which Ethiopia can control the
content and speed of what is often perceived of as a threatening process:

> When you isolate yourself, you don't know those you've isolated yourself from. But, now that
> we've opened up, we've identified what it is that we lack, and how to defend ourselves, and
> therefore we're part of the world community once more (EG24).

> As far as economics is concerned, the world is currently 'one village' [due to] globalisation.
> Based on this, we are creating a market economy and assimilating with other countries
> (EN11).

Just under half of respondents (45%), corresponding to Rivera's 'pure voluntarists' (2004:
49), named one or two specific countries—or a specific region—when asked about models
Ethiopia might follow (see *Fig. 1*). Seen to be almost as important as learning, however,
were the countervailing principles of selectivity and indigenisation. Even pure voluntarists
paired most expressions of admiration for a country or region with the warning that it could
not be simply copied or imitated indiscriminately.

Fig. 1:

The Receptivity of Ethiopian Elites to Emulation

An additional 50% of respondents could be classed as 'quasi-voluntarists' (Rivera 2004: 50) —those who approved of emulation but felt that Ethiopia could learn from the best experiences of many countries rather than following a particular model.[22] These elites, in particular, continually emphasised the care and skill by which the experiences of others had been adapted for use in Ethiopia, and often mentioned the uniqueness of the Ethiopian situation. These were also more likely to name instances of sectoral learning and 'first-order

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[22] The distinction between 'voluntarists' and 'quasi-voluntarists' was not always clear-cut, calling for sensitive interpretation. My interviews were less structured than those of Rivera (2004: 47), and interviewees therefore tended to fall somewhere on a spectrum. For example, a subject who stated that Ethiopia could learn equally from many countries, but then went on to focus overwhelmingly on lessons from a single model when asked for details, was classed as a voluntarist. However, a subject choosing one model at national level, but using a variety of models equally within his own organisation, was classed as a quasi-voluntarist.

policy learning' (Hall 1993) than the previous group. Many of these respondents expressed the notion that many countries held lessons Ethiopia could adopt, depending on the sector or policy area under discussion:

> I don't have a country [in mind], really, because I can tell you of countries that have been successful in managing their environments, but their environments and ours are different. And, therefore, I would not like to imply that if we do everything that they did we would be like them. It's foolish, in my mind. You start where you are – you identify the specificities of your situation, the specificities of the change you want, and then you can then learn from the experiences of other countries and other people. But you can't copy what other countries have done (EG24).

> I think it is generally always useful to contextualise things rather than bringing them just from abroad, otherwise we will end up with some kind of cargo culture (EN18).

There were some significant differences between the two main sectors represented in interviews. Those working in government were more positive about emulation, overall, than were their peers in the non-governmental sector; there were an equal number of voluntarists and quasi-voluntarists in the governmental sector, whereas voluntarists were outnumbered in the non-governmental sector. In addition, whereas politicians and civil servants emphasised the utility of learning more than the need for selectivity, the opposite was true for business, civil society and the media. A look at elites' expressions of 'non-lessons'—the name I shall give to features from another model that respondents expressly did not wish to emulate—

confirms this: governmental elites listed four lessons for every non-lesson. For non-governmental elites, this same ratio was only two to one.

Another area of divergence was the extent to which emulation was portrayed as a rational process. Those charged with formulating and implementing policies were most keen to portray themselves as adhering to the 'rational shopper' model rejected by Jacoby (2001: 24), Westney (1987) and others. Almost all non-governmental subjects believed that the current government was indeed basing its actions on one or two specific foreign models, but several disapproved of this tactic altogether, whilst others were not opposed to emulation *per se*, but felt the EPRDF was copying in either a haphazard or overly literal manner. These interviewees were less likely to portray emulation as a rational, carefully thought-out process —perhaps largely because they were less likely to participate directly in the process themselves. According to one member of the opposition:

> Sometimes just copying models can also create problems. What we have been experiencing in the last thirty years...we are taking models, we are copying and seeking lessons, for example, from China. And it's unfortunate we are still in that vicious circle. We are not listening to our culture, to our history, going back to our roots (EN2).

Aside from being generally more positive about emulation, interviewees in government were also more likely to draw a sharp distinction between economic and political emulation, believing the former to be preferable to the latter. A common view was that economic modelling was essential if Ethiopia was to survive the competitive post-Cold War environment, but that political learning was more difficult due to several features that set the

country apart from others. In this respect, Ethiopia's unique history was seen as less important than its current 'objective reality'. One of the most commonly-cited of such features was Ethiopia's large rural population; almost 85% of the population is rural (FDRE 2008: 19), making Ethiopia one of the largest pre-industrial societies in the world. The other was Ethiopia's ethnic diversity; Ethiopia's 'more than 80 nations and nationalities' were mentioned in virtually every interview with government officials (e.g. EG7). Even those who viewed Ethiopia as possessing a unique model were, overall, more likely to cast Ethiopia in the role of pupil than teacher, as very few interviewees mentioned specific lessons Ethiopia could teach others at present.

Despite reservations and caveats, then, the benefits of learning were emphasised somewhat more, overall, than the benefits of selectivity—and even those who stressed the latter did not usually discount the importance of some form of limited emulation. The view that Ethiopia should create its own model without any policy emulation whatsoever was only very rarely expressed: only two interviewees, when asked whether Ethiopia should draw lessons from the broader development trajectories of others, answered largely in the negative. One of these 'traditionalists'—to return to Rivera's (2004) classification—was the country's Human Rights Commissioner, who felt that 'you cannot borrow from here or there, because our background is completely different from any other' (EN16). Traditionalists were vastly outnumbered, however, by those who, like one of Meles Zenawi's primary advisors, admitted to regularly taking part in 'a demand-led process of learning from models' (EG13).

The two most important written sources of EPRDF ideology are even more frank about the importance of lesson-drawing. It is difficult to overestimate the influence on party thinking of *African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings,* an unpublished

manuscript written by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (2006) in a personal capacity. One newspaper editor says simply that 'everything the government is doing you can find in this book...there are no other ideas' (EN8). In post-*tehadiso* Ethiopia, Meles is the 'unchallenged intellectual and ideological guide of the party and the government' (Tadesse and Young 2003: 401), and the ardour with which the most junior party cadres I met expressed their admiration of their party leader and his ideas spoke volumes about the extent to which he almost single-handedly drives party policy. It is therefore significant that almost half of this manuscript, the fullest expression of Meles' personal philosophy of African development, is devoted to lauding the development experiences of a handful of countries—the majority of them outside Africa. Nowhere is emulation explicitly mentioned, but the document as a whole is an exercise in the wielding of foreign models to alter indigenous policy frameworks.

A second central document is *Development, Democracy and Revolutionary Democracy* (EPRDF 2006). 'We believe in this, as Christians believe in the Bible', says one senior parliamentarian of this document (EG4). An unpublished training pamphlet widely seen as also having been written by Meles himself (LeFort 2010: 455), it is largely devoted to selectively emulating and improving on foreign models, and applies the lessons set out in *African Development* to the Ethiopian case. Negative lessons (Rose 1991: 19), containing pitfalls that other countries have fallen into and the EPRDF aims to avoid, are also explored in great detail.

The more official a document, however, the less frequently lesson-drawing is mentioned. Fleeting references to 'benchmarking', 'experience-sharing' and mutual learning can be found in five-year plans and speeches (MoFED 2010a: 35; Meles Zenawi 2010), but

official documents, particularly those created for the consumption of donors, tend to present Ethiopian policy as stemming from indigenous necessities in conjunction with donor consultation. It seems, then, that the stigma that Westney (1987: 9) and others refer to still attaches to the process of emulation, making elites uncomfortable to admit that too much of their policy is adapted from elsewhere. This is particularly true in the case of Ethiopia, given its dependency on donors who fear the dilution of their influence by other emerging actors in Africa.

Emulation thus helps to inform the thinking of Ethiopian elites, who view their country as emerging into the international community after a long period of isolation and 'backwardness'. The EPRDF, in particular, relies heavily on lessons drawn from abroad, although its elites are reluctant to declare this too openly and careful to emphasise the selectivity and rationality of their actions. This policy of emulation comes straight from the top, and is largely formulated by Meles Zenawi himself. Non-governmental elites are more circumspect. They too, value the experiences of others, but are also more cognisant of the dangers of faulty or overly hasty lesson-drawing; in their critique of government emulation, they subscribe to the view, prevalent in the literature, that emulation is a process of 'bounded rationality' (Weyland 2006) rather than 'selective shopping'.

4.2.2 China and East Asia as the Models of Choice

It will be recalled that just under half of Ethiopian interviewees showed a clear preference for a specific country or region as exemplar. The responses of these voluntarists can be further broken down into three categories: for roughly one in three, a 'Western' country or

sub-region was preferable: Scandinavia and Germany were most often mentioned, followed by the United States and Switzerland. Those who gave this response came primarily from the non-governmental sector—and specifically from the opposition. One member of Medrek, for instance, responded 'I lived 22 years in the United States, so I'm inclined toward that model, and some traditions that have been added through the years to that model' (EN5).

For roughly two out in three voluntarists, however, East Asia was the best model for Ethiopia to follow (no voluntarists identified India—or indeed any country outside North America, Europe or East Asia—as their model of choice). Although answers typically did not distinguish sharply between countries, speaking of 'the Asian Tigers' (EG16) or 'the East Asian countries' (EG7), interviewees often followed this general appraisal with one or two examples. In this regard, China was chosen most often as a 'first choice', followed by South Korea. Taiwan and Malaysia tied in a distant third place.[23] In contrast with the previous group, this group came overwhelmingly from the governmental sector. For one Deputy Minister, for example, the experiences of these countries contributed to him joining the EPRDF:

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[23] There is some debate both in the academic and policy spheres regarding the scope of the term 'East Asia', particularly as it applies to the notion of an 'East Asian Model'. Following the seminal World Bank (1993) study, this dissertation will take the region to refer to eight countries: Japan, China, the 'Four Tigers' (Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), and the three 'newly industrializing countries' in Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand). Because I am interested in the region only insofar as it is seen as a model for Africa, the term 'East Asia' will also be limited to these countries. Where interviewees have included other countries, such as the Philippines, in their conceptualisation of the East Asian model, this will be noted and discussed.

I must admit that I was sceptical at the beginning—I was a journalist. But I had to read [the party literature] and I had to go through it very critically, and eventually I got interested by its fascinating ideas, and I saw direct parallels in nations such as South Korea, Taiwan's development, and even the theory of China itself, to some extent...The success stories of these nations, and the Southeast Asian countries, has helped me to solidify my belief and my support for the revolutionary democracy ideology of the EPRDF. Eventually, I joined the party (EG12).

The first choice of voluntarists is not the only indication that China, South Korea and the other high-performing economies in East Asia are the most emulated countries among Ethiopian elites. Quasi-voluntarists, too, spoke more highly of these countries. Because these respondents drew from a broader range of models, a wider range of countries began to creep in here—primarily South Africa, India and a greater variety of Western countries. But despite quasi-voluntarists' claims that Ethiopia could learn equally from a wide range of countries (perhaps reflecting fears that emulation of one model could stigmatise their efforts), specifically-cited examples remained remarkably constrained to a single region. The most frequently-mentioned and most fervently-admired region, particularly among members of the EPRDF, remained East Asia.

One notable feature of nearly all respondents who mentioned the East Asian experience as holding important lessons for Ethiopia, was the reluctance to single out a specific country in this region. China and South Korea were again more often mentioned by name, but interviewees who focused on one country alone were very rare. The East Asian Model was thus overwhelmingly privileged over a specifically 'Chinese Model' or 'South Korean Model', with elites focusing more on the commonalities between these countries than

on the differences. Sometimes this seemed due to a desire to deflect criticism that Ethiopia was blindly copying from one country—particularly China. This is the most likely reason for the one very senior EPRDF member's assertion that 'We want to see the Asian Tigers as a general model, but not a specific country. We take some of the specific issues from different countries in different ways' (EG16).[24] At other times, however, especially outside the top echelons of the EPRDF, it appeared that a lack of knowledge about the intricacies of each country's development path blurred their differences and pronounced their similarities for elites. Thus, when asked whether the East Asian countries differed in the way they had developed, one respondent replied: 'Personally, I can't figure [it] out. I can only generalise and see that our experience comes from China, Korea and East Asia' (EG11).

Interviewees were also asked whether the Chinese and Indian models were examples of 'successful development', with responses coded as 'successful', 'successful with flaws' and 'largely unsuccessful' (see *Table 2*).[25] Once again, responses varied widely between the two sectors: half of government respondents viewed China as successful, and the other half viewed it as moderately successful—none viewed it as deeply flawed. In contrast, those outside the EPRDF overwhelmingly viewed China as moderately successful, with the remainder equally divided on either side of the spectrum. Both sets of elites saw India as moderately successful overall, but those in government either spoke more highly of China overall or did not express a preference one way or the other. For most, the comparison was implicit rather than explicit, but a few stated it bluntly:

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[24] This interviewee is now the country's Acting Prime Minister.

[25] It will be recalled that I was initially interested in comparing the influences of the Indian and Chinese models of development, hence the prominence of the former in this section of my findings.

Well, for example I can draw one great distinction between the Chinese and Indian approach – the biggest difference is in education...Secondly, in the case of China, the people that have benefited from the change are vastly different from India – they are much higher, much higher [in number]. So if one is attractive, it is the Chinese model, if I could put it that way...So looking from afar at what I see as a glaring difference between the two, the Chinese model has delivered a better result (EG5).

Table 2: Ethiopian Perceptions of China and India's Developmental 'Success'

		Governmental	Non-governmental	Total
Is China an example of successful development?	Yes	52%	21%	37%
	Qualified yes	48%	63%	55%
	No	0%	16%	8%
Is India an example of successful development?	Yes	33%	28%	31%
	Qualified yes	62%	66%	64%
	No	5%	6%	5%
Which country is a better model?*	China	48%	18%	35%
	India	9%	64%	32%
	Neither	43%	18%	33%

Source: primary interview data

* Where this question was not asked directly, interviewees' responses to the question 'Is China a good model for your country' were compared with responses to the question 'Is India a good model for your country?'

Those outside of government, on the other hand, were more likely to India's approach development as preferable to China's. One respondent, for instance, felt the Chinese model was 'infested with too much theory'. In India, on the other hand, people 'say "yes, we are

normal, Western, free market", but they are developing anyway. It is not so much about mottoes and slogans...I prefer that one. Just do it! Don't shout about theories, just do it' (EN6).

EPRDF representatives, therefore, most often named China—and the East Asian region more generally—as a potential model. They also saw China as either fairly or very successful. A third factor further demonstrates their preference for the East Asian Model of development: government elites were far more likely to cite specific lessons from China and South Korea than from any other countries. They were less likely to cite lessons from the West, or to list Western countries as exemplars. Those they did cite—Scandinavia, Germany, 'the early days of the West'—were often seen as providing similar lessons to East Asia, in sharp contrast to 'neo-liberal' countries such as the United States. An example of this is the use of Germany's technical and vocational training as an example for Ethiopia's own educational system. The German Embassy to Addis Ababa memorably explains Ethiopia's highly instrumental use of German expertise in educational and vocational reform as follows: 'Realizing that the advancements of the so-called education, and in quality infrastructure "Asian Tiger" economies over the past decades were based on an industrial development model from Germany, the Ethiopian government went to the source and secured the German Development Cooperation as a partner' (Embassy of the FRG in Ethiopia 2010: 7); this is a finding substantiated in interviews with EPRDF policymakers. A select group of Western countries are thus seen as supplementing lessons taken from East Asia.

African countries were also not very frequently mentioned. South Africa was sometimes mentioned as an exemplar, but usually in specific sectors rather than as a general model. Where cited, African states were often held up as negative examples:

We have discussed failed states [in our party]. We took so many countries, for example the Congo. The Congo has natural resources, everything, but you know the case in Congo—everybody's attention is there. Why? To get something from that conflict. So we concluded that natural resources are not a factor for development (EG4)

Non-governmental elites, on the other hand, cited specific lessons from China, India, South Korea, the West and others around the world at roughly equal rates, showing only a very slight preference for India. A coherent programme of emulation was thus more difficult to discern, and these respondents ultimately answered as one would expect from a group without a clear agenda for lesson-drawing. The fact that these actors did not share the government's strong desire to draw lessons from China, South Korea and their neighbours illustrates, however, that emulation of these countries is an emerging point of contention and political discord in Ethiopia.

An examination of EPRDF documents also demonstrates the ruling party's desire to learn from East Asia in particular. Both *African Development* (Meles 2006) and *Revolutionary Democracy* (EPRDF 2006) focus on two specific countries: South Korea and Taiwan. 'Above all', states the latter, 'the strategies devised by [the] EPRDF are more or less similar to that [*sic*] of Taiwan'. Given this documents' use as an EPRDF training manual, it is not surprising that even the most junior party official I met was well-versed in the need to emulate East Asia.[26] According to the former document, which demonstrates a thorough and

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[26] This informal supplementary meeting with a local government official (Addis Ababa, 18/12/2010) is not included in the list of interviews or sources.

formally-cited reading of the literature on the East Asian Model, 'Taiwan and Korea are without doubt the most successful of all developing countries in terms of achieving successful development over the past 50 years' (Meles 2006).

Surprisingly, neither document mentions China as a model, making interviewees from the governmental sector more positive about lesson-drawing from China than their party's documents would suggest. Government representatives have frequently used the media and academia to express their admiration of China, however. It is a quotation from an Ethiopian minister, for example, that spurs one author to remark that 'the admiration expressed by African presidents, government bureaucrats, business leaders, traders and journalists upon seeing the marvels of the New China for themselves produced a public euphoria rarely experienced in politics' (Alden 2007: 13).

Aside from being asked their own preferences regarding emulation, elites outside the government were also asked whether they perceived the government to be following any development models. On this question, the responses were clear and unambivalent: the majority singled out China as the primary template for Ethiopia's current development. This answer was particularly common among opponents or critics of the government, and all members of Medrek, for example, gave this response. These critics were united in their condemnation of this process, and rejected the EPRDF's assertion that Ethiopia was taking only economic (and not political) lessons from China. Most also viewed its talk of the East Asian model as a thinly-veiled attempt to make emulation of China more acceptable to donors:

Meles and his group are certainly idealising countries like China, and I see that. Although they don't state it and write it down, I think that is where they are really trying to use it as a model or something (EN3).

[T]he political model is going to be that of the Chinese model—they don't say that, but that's what we see (EN5).

If you talk to our Prime Minister, he talks about the South Korean model, the Taiwan model, but he is copying China (EN1).

Business leaders, civil society and editors were generally likely also to point to China as the EPRDF's primary model, but were—with a few notable exceptions—more forgiving of this fact. Some believed the government was applying lessons incorrectly despite its best intentions, while one or two were opposed to what they saw as overly narrow imitation of China by the EPRDF. Many, however, echoed the government's distinction between economic lessons (said to come from China) and political lessons (said to be home-grown or taken from other models):

On the developmental side, we look like the Chinese. On the democratic, we differ (EN6).

Economically, it uses China as a model, but politically it looks more to places such as South Korea and Scandinavia...I truly think Meles wants to be the Deng of Ethiopia. He would like history to look back on him as the person who finally pulled Ethiopia out of the poverty of the past 100 or 150 years (EN7).

Non-governmental elites were very prone to view China's political and economic relations with Ethiopia as inseparable from its status as exemplar. China's enormous stake in the Ethiopian construction industry is seen as both the catalyst and symptom of great Chinese influence in other areas of Ethiopia's development. In addition, the close relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the EPRDF—as evidenced by high-level study exchanges, mutual assistance in international fora and (according to some respondents) underhanded financial dealings—was often cited as reasons for China's role as model: 'They share experiences sending some officials there', one respondent said, 'and they are getting their money from the Chinese government, so the Chinese may influence the government to do such things' (EN9).

The second most-commonly cited model that non-governmental elites perceived the government to be following was that of East Asia as a whole. By specific country, South Korea was by far the most frequently-mentioned, followed by Singapore and Taiwan. Japan, Malaysia and Thailand also featured to a lesser extent. As in discussions of their own personal preferences for lesson-drawing, interviewees did not distinguish between China and other countries in the region when commenting on the government's attempts. Most responses in this category were simply relaying second-hand information from the government rather than offering their own interpretations: according to a representative from an NGO umbrella organisation, for example, 'They are referring to the experiences of certain countries or even certain regions...in the public speeches, or in their rationale, or in their thinking. Taiwan has come up, South Korea, China, to a certain degree Malaysia....I think these are the things I have heard.' (EN18). This was not always the case, however, as several

respondents did report concrete impacts of lessons drawn from East Asia which could not have been drawn with equal success from China (EN4; EN8). To a final group, countries such as Japan, Singapore or South Korea represented a slightly softer, less extreme version of China's authoritarian political system for the EPRDF to emulate (EN7; EN5).

In short, the EPRDF takes East Asia as an exemplar, and sees the experiences of the region as constituting a loose but nonetheless very real East Asia Model. This is due not merely to a conglomeration of individual preferences, but is a matter of party policy that originates from the highest echelons of power. However, the matter of the exact countries it focuses on is more complex. Publicly, the party claims to be drawing lessons from South Korea and Taiwan, but privately South Korea and *China* are the two countries it expresses the greatest desire to emulate.

What are we to make of this discrepancy? Three factors—in addition to interviewees' direct references to China—suggest that this country is indeed highly important as an exemplar, in conjunction with other countries in the region. Firstly, the EPRDF's perceived emulation of China constitutes a key weapon in the rhetorical arsenal of its opponents—the government may thus be sensitive to the notion that it is taking its political development from China and almost certainly downplays the extent of this emulation. Secondly, the majority of non-governmental elites who are somewhat sympathetic to the government also believe it to be taking lessons from China. Finally, government respondents were themselves often reluctant to distinguish between the development experiences of China and other East Asian countries, suggesting a belief that China was at the very least a crucial new incarnation of an older and broader model of developmental success.

In contrast to this fairly cohesive government outlook, non-governmental elites drew lessons from a wider variety of sources. Medrek tended to favour Europe and the United States, putting them in direct contrast to their opponents. Newspaper editors, business leaders and other civil society organisations were the most heterogeneous of all, suggesting the lack of an independent or cohesive lesson-drawing project on their part. Although they cited East Asia, India and the West in equal measure, those with favourable views of the government were more likely to agree with its choice of exemplar. Lesson-drawing is thus still a highly divisive, government-driven and politicised process in Ethiopia.

4.2.3 Cognitive Constraints on Elite Decision-making

The previous chapter discussed the significance of various biases, or 'cognitive shortcuts', that elites bring to their study of external models and that constrain the possible lessons open to them. In the case of Ethiopian respondents, one factor in particular—historical and 'social psychological' proximity—played an important role in elites' choice of exemplar. The single most important reason that elites cited for their choice of East Asia and China as exemplars was the fact that these countries were late developers, like Ethiopia; by contrast, the West's virtually unrecognisable and inscrutable past was seen as the biggest obstacle to its use as a model:

> Western countries which have developed for 300 or 400 years have reached a very high stage. We're not aiming to reach that stage. Those that have transformed their countries in the last 30, 40, 50 years are nearer to us than those that have transformed their countries hundreds of years before (EG14).

We can also take lessons from India and China. Like us, India is a democracy and a federal system. But it is not ethnic-based, like us. Like us, China was largely a feudal, peasant society, with a lot of ancient history and good leadership. But it is not a democracy. Both are only good for learning the importance of rapid development. We cannot learn much from the US, because its origins were so different from our own (EG2).

When we send economic and political cadres, we do send to Asia or Korea or...Singapore. And even political cadres—to China, India. So I think it is because Asia is developing or because Asia is probably nearer to us. Culturally and in development also (EN16).

Several factors play a role here: elites see late modernisers as facing challenges that early modernisers did not have to contend with, they see the experiences of these countries as easier to understand and study due to their recent nature, and they appreciate the sheer rapidity with which countries such as China have modernised.

Governmental elites were reluctant to mention China and Ethiopia's common communist past, but this theme nonetheless often emerged in subtle ways. Unlike Kenyan elites, who (as we shall see presently) often mentioned China's communist history as a major obstacle to emulation, few Ethiopian elites outside of Medrek did the same, suggesting a certain acceptance that one communist country could learn from another. Non-governmental observers who felt the government was emulating China also frequently pointed to this factor: 'It's natural that they should choose China—it is also a socialist country, and now for the first time, its system is paying off' (EN7). Finally, much of the discourse and policies used by the CCP and the EPRDF remain steeped in the influence of Marxism, and also echo

each other. To name just a few examples, the EPRDF (2011: 5) openly admits to following the Leninist principle of 'democratic centralism'; this is the 'basic organizational principle and mode of operation' of the CCP (PRC 2005a) also. Both parties describe themselves as 'vanguard' parties (CPC 2007; EPRDF 2006: 67), both came to power through rural-based revolutions, and both preside over mixed—but primarily socialist—economies. These past and present similarities stem from a shared history, and facilitate the transfer of lessons from the more developed to the less developed of the two.

In contrast to the historical and 'social psychological' proximity Ethiopia shares with East Asia and particularly China, cultural and geographical proximity were both seen to have little impact. Shared culture was rarely cited as a reason for lesson-drawing, and this is understandable given Ethiopia's conception of itself as having a culture unique in Africa and the world. Elites frequently cited lack of cultural similarity as an obstacle to wholesale emulation, but this was as much the case for other Western and even other African countries as it was for China and the rest of East Asia. As we shall see in a later chapter, less important than pre-existing cultural similarities were the ways in which East Asia could inspire Ethiopia to modernise its culture whilst retaining a distinct identity. On the one hand, 'we need a Cultural Revolution like China had' (EG23), while on the other, countries in East Asia —and particularly Japan—show that cultural homogenisation need not accompany modernisation (EG1; EG16). Even non-governmental elites who preferred other models such as Scandinavia and Germany did not do so on cultural grounds. Elites did not, thus, tend to look for countries with similar cultural or linguistic backgrounds when choosing an exemplar.

A second important constraint on a purely performance-based selection strategy was exposure to and familiarity with various foreign models. One important indicator in this regard was high-level government exchanges and study visits. The Chinese leadership has increasingly followed a strategy of bringing African elites to China for study visits and the like; by 2009, for example, 10,000 African professionals were receiving post-graduate training in China annually (Kurlantzick 2009: 9). This is even more true for Ethiopia than for others in the region, given the strong political ties between the two countries. Approximately 60% of governmental elites I spoke to had visited China, whereas only 33% had visited India, for example (for non-governmental elites these numbers were 43% and 35% respectively). The Chinese Embassy in Addis Ababa estimates that the number of Ethiopian ministers who visit China annually has doubled over the past decade, and views these exchanges as one of the most important mechanisms driving the 'sharing' of experiences (EA1). None of the interviewees with a primarily negative view of China's development had visited the country. More generally, most respondents had visited the country or region they most wished to emulate, and most had done so either specifically on a study visit or had lived there. Elites who wished to draw lessons from Western countries, particularly in Medrek, had virtually always either studied or worked in these countries, sometimes for decades at a time.

It is difficult to know conclusively whether study visits directly improved elites' perceptions of a country, or whether the causality ran in the opposite direction. On the one hand, a few very senior officials and heads of organisations may have had the freedom to act as initiators of visits to countries that interested them. On the other hand, many more interviewees spoke of having their heads turned only after having observed, first-hand, the

successes of another country. The interviewee I spoke to who was perhaps most enthusiastic about the Chinese model was a parliamentarian who had recently visited China as part of a larger delegation. When asked whether the trip had changed his view on development, he replied:

> Yes, definitely! I was in the rural area before I came to the parliament. When I saw [Chinese workers], I did not understand such men. When I went to China, my understanding—my view—totally changed. We can change our country, because they did. I've seen their bridges, their buildings, their dams. Therefore, why? Is there a special problem in Africa, in Ethiopia? And we ask ourselves—why? When I see the roads in China—all the roads are twice the size [of those] in Ethiopia. I see farmers' houses with ventilators, with TV, with telephone. I've seen it. And, really, my views are changed totally (EG8).

It is difficult to conclude that all admirers of China's development were won over through these means. Those who had visited China were just as likely to see its development as a qualified (rather than outright) success as those who had not visited. The choice of East Asia as a model also shows the limits of exposure—South Korea is far less active and visible in Ethiopia than India or the United States, for example, yet was more often seen as a model. However, formal study exchanges do appear to be an important factor in transforming mere curiosity into more focused attempts at emulation. Even an interviewee who embarked on a tour of Asia primarily to establish economic linkages came away with the desire to learn from one country—Malaysia—to a greater extent than the other countries he visited (EG22).

At the very least, it is clear that the boom of recent state-funded visits to China is not unconnected with Ethiopia's attempts at emulating this country in particular. Some who

went on such visits cited concrete lessons implemented on their return. A senior civil servant, for example, charged with improving school attendance, observed and drew on Chinese strategies of educating and mobilising recalcitrant families (EG19). Unsurprisingly, those who expressed admiration for East Asia's development, without being able to explain how this development came about, were also less likely to have visited countries in the region. Interviewees were less familiar, by contrast, to India. For those of certain generation, their primary exposure to the country stemmed from being taught by Indian teachers employed by the Haile-Selassie regime (e.g. EN11). This disposed them favourably to the country, but did not often translate to lesson-drawing beyond the area of education.

Aside from study exchanges, a host of other factors provide Ethiopian elites with a higher level of familiarity with China than with other potential models. Ethiopia's economic ties with China are burgeoning: China is Ethiopia's leading trading partner (Economist Intelligence Unit 2011), and Chinese investment in Africa has grown exponentially in the past five years. The granting of contracts totalling several billions of dollars to Chinese construction and engineering firms has brought thousands of Chinese workers to Ethiopia; in many parts of the country, all foreigners are now greeted with cries of 'China, China!' In April 2011, the two countries signed an agreement pledging Chinese provision of $12 million in grants and loans. Political ties between the two countries are also on the rise: the first ever Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) to take place in Africa was held in Addis Ababa in 2003. Bilateral meetings have taken place at the highest levels, and it is no exaggeration to say that China is Ethiopia's closest political and economic ally. This 'on-the-ground' familiarity was visible in interviews as well: several interviewees spoke of being

impressed by the speed of Chinese construction in Ethiopian cities, as well as the diligence of Chinese employees: 'Every Chinese I know is hard-working, very hard-working' (EN14).

China's strong ties with Ethiopia raise the issue, of course, of the extent to which dependency on economic and political support from Ethiopia might prompt Ethiopian leaders to profess a desire to learn from—or even to actively emulate—China for insincere and instrumental reasons. Although this may initially seem likely, particularly given the difficulties in determining this through an analysis of elite discourse alone, a close reading of the literature proves otherwise. One of the few points of near-agreement in the 'China in Africa' literature is the fact that the former largely follows a 'no-strings attached' approach in its dealings with Africa (Alden 2007: 102; Taylor 2007). As long as countries are stable, willing to trade with China, and adhere to the 'One China' principle that views Taiwan as a part of China, there is (at present) minimal pressure for China's African partners to follow particular economical and political programmes. As we have seen previously, China is still uncomfortable with the idea that it possesses a coherent model that can be exported outside its borders, and has only recently begun to respond to external demands for lesson-sharing. In addition, Ethiopia's dependency on Western ODA dwarfs its reliance on Chinese investment, and yet Ethiopia's elites still cite the latter as a more valuable model. Their frequent expressions of a desire to learn from Taiwan are a further indication of China's relative lack of concern regarding the models elites may or may not be following.

This is not to suggest that China's economic presence in Ethiopia may not influence elites' development strategies, of course. Sometimes the practical imperatives of dealing with China may sway Ethiopia towards emulation of China: in the case of infrastructure, for example, lesson-drawing and Chinese investment coalesce to bring about a new emphasis on

the rapid construction of roads, dams and railways. At other times, these two forces may actually conflict: there is evidence to suggest that certain African countries may be prevented from following China's emphasis on manufacturing by the very fact that Chinese goods are already penetrating their markets (Goldstein *et al* 2006: 66). The actions of external powers may well influence both Ethiopian development strategies and outcomes, then, but dependency alone has little impact on the models elites wish to emulate. This is in keeping with the emulation literature which, reader will recall, holds that countries are as likely to draw lessons from their rivals as from their allies. In short, exposure to and familiarity with China plays some role in 'converting' Ethiopian elites to that model, but interacts with other factors and stems more from the desires of elites themselves than may at first appear to be the case.

In the case of Ethiopia, then, perceived historical and 'social psychological' proximity play a significant role in conditioning elites' choice of model; exposure to and familiarity with the model also lead elites to consider certain models far more frequently than others. China, as a country that shares Ethiopia's communist past and has only relatively recently experienced rapid development, resonates with elites eager to learn how to follow a similar trajectory. The sheer visibility of the Chinese model, particularly for elites visiting the country on study trips and official visits, is an additional factor. Similarly, the choice of East Asia is partially determined by its 'late developer' status, which resonates with an Ethiopia that sees itself as the quintessential late developer. In neither case were emulating elites much deterred by the radical cultural differences that differentiate them from their exemplars.

These heuristic devices constrain the possibilities available, but do not alone determine them. The performance of exemplars, the perceived merit of the specific lessons they 'teach', and their instrumental utility to elites are all important determinants of the choices Ethiopian elites exercise when emulating others. Because these are so inextricably linked to the content of the models themselves, they shall be discussed in Section Three of this dissertation.

4.3 Conclusion

In June 2010, Ethiopia's leading English-language newspaper published an editorial entitled *'EPRDF Aims for Chinese Model Legitimacy not Democracy'* (*'EPRDF Aims'* 2010). In it, an unidentified commentator accused the ruling party of imitating the Chinese economic and political system and of thereby deriving its legitimacy from material prosperity and nationalism rather than from democracy. The EPRDF's blistering rebuttal (MoFA 2010) fervently rejected accusations of authoritarianism, but did not directly refute the notion that it was indeed adopting broad lessons from China, at least in the economic sphere.

Careful analysis of interview and documentary sources illustrates that governmental elites do indeed wish to emulate China, and that this notion has been so thoroughly transferred from its origin in the personal ideology of Meles Zenawi downwards throughout the EPRDF structure that it can be said to constitute official party policy. However, China's neighbours in the region—South Korea, Taiwan, and others—are also highly important as exemplars. Indeed, many in the party see the entire region as offering an essentially similar model, of which China is only the latest, and most prominent, incarnation. Countries seen as

occupying a similar, or slightly higher level of development are preferred, as are those to which respondents had had the greatest amount of exposure. Economic/political dependency and cultural similarity, in contrast, have a minimal impact on choice of exemplar. Despite growing suggestions in the global media and policy discourse that India can act as an alternative model to China, there is little evidence to suggest that Ethiopian elites feel the same way. As one economic planner summarises it, 'We are also learning from India on a sectoral level, although not on an aggregate level…[There] we place an emphasis on China' (EG20).

If the choices of the governmental sector could be said to adhere to a single broad regional model, this was not true for elites in other sections of society. Elites outside the EPRDF were both more critical of emulation, and more likely to choose from a wide range of exemplars. As the *Addis Fortune* debate illustrates, emulation of China and East Asia is one of the central pillars of ideological and political contestation in Ethiopia today. To admire China, in present-day Ethiopia, is to admire the EPRDF and its vision for the future of Ethiopia; voices calling for the taking of lessons from other countries—particularly in the West—have been marginalised and now fall outside the political pale.

Ethiopia's history of emulation and particularism has long led it to draw lessons from 'front-runner' countries inside and outside the West. The EPRDF's post-2005 strategy of retaining tight control over the political sphere whilst gradually acceding to economic liberalisation brings to mind much of the literature on the 'authoritarian growth' experienced by China and (as shall be shown later) East Asia; the evidence suggests that this resemblance is no coincidence, but rather the product of concerted lesson-drawing. This process

represents a continuation of Ethiopia's historical attempts to ensure modernisation and development whilst retaining control over its own destiny.

CHAPTER FIVE: KENYAN EMULATION OF SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA

In exploring the attitudes of Kenyan elites to the emulation of foreign models, this chapter takes a similar approach to the previous. This dissertation has established that Ethiopian elites are looking to East Asia—and particularly to China and South Korea—for models that will enable them to resolve the country's long-standing ambivalence towards modernisation and assimilation; it has also found this tendency to be most pronounced among members of the ruling EPRDF, which governs the country virtually unchallenged. In this chapter, I present the corresponding evidence from Kenyan elites: I begin by tracing the historical roots of the country's emulation of foreign models, before addressing general attitudes to lesson-drawing today. I then identify the specific models that Kenyan leaders wish to follow, and examine the reasons for these choices. I again conclude with some reflections on the relevance of the findings for the broader research question, setting the stage for a comparison between the content of lesson-drawing attempts in Ethiopia and Kenya. Once again, the precise lessons elites are drawing from others, as well as the implications of this trend for broader development discourses, are left to Section II.

5.1 The National Context

Before examining current trends towards—or perhaps away from—emulation in Kenya, it is important to briefly explore the role that various elites and development dogmas have played in the country's recent past. Kenya, one of the most studied countries in Africa, has been at

the centre of global and African development discussions since its independence in 1963. The country has been at once one of the most assiduous followers of modernisation theory and subsequent mainstream development orthodoxies, and one of the sites where alternative hypotheses to development has been most thoroughly debated. Its adherence to the capitalist path of development associated with the 'West' has, at times, been voluntary and, at other times, the result of conditionalities imposed from outside. It has also been shaped by alliances and rifts between the elites who have governed the country—with greatly varying degrees of success—since the ending of colonial rule.

Kenya is a unitary multi-party republic with a unicameral parliamentary system. Until the establishment by Britain of the East Africa Protectorate in 1895, the interior of the country was inhabited by various pastoralist and agrarian tribes, while the coast was dominated by the settlements of Arab and Persian traders. The territory was initially valued by the British as a corridor between the resource-rich Lake Victoria in Uganda and the East African coast; for many years, therefore, British control and investment extended only to the area traversed by the Uganda-Navaisha Railway. This changed with the influx of large numbers of European settlers and the concurrent establishment of large-scale, cash-crop farming in the fertile Rift Valley and central highlands. This dispossessed large numbers of Kikuyu—then, as now, Kenya's largest ethnic group—and Kalenjin of their means of livelihood. Tribal divisions and conflict had preceded colonialism, but were now exacerbated and formalised by the establishment of tribal reserves and boundaries (Maxon 2002: 339). Thousands of Indian labourers had been brought in to build the railway, further altering the protectorate's ethnic composition.

In 1920, the construction of a modern colonial state and capitalist economy further intensified with the British creation of the Colony of Kenya. Over the next few decades, a stratified economic system comprising a landed European ruling class, an Asian trading class, a small African 'petty bourgeoisie' and a large African peasantry was consolidated (Ochieng and Atieno-Odhiambo 1995). It was largely from the penultimate of these groups that black political mobilisation, spurred by political disenfranchisement, overtaxing and landlessness, initially originated. In 1944, this resulted in the establishment of the Kenya African Union (KAU), headed by the gradualist constitutionalist Johnstone Kamau (later to become Jomo Kenyatta). Before long, however, resistance grew more militant, and the famed Mau Mau rebellion—drawn largely from poor rural Kenyans—broke out, leading to the brutal deaths of an estimated 50 000 Kenyans (Blacker 2007)[27] and 100 Europeans (Berman 1990: 352) over a seven-year state of emergency.

The insurgency not only eventually helped to force the end of British rule over Kenya, but exemplified the tensions within the country's African—and particularly the dominant Kikuyu—population. Several thousand casualties of the conflict had been constitutional nationalists, as well as 'loyalists' who served the colonial administration. When the Kenya African National Union (KANU), successor organisation to KAU, came to power at independence, it represented a fragile and last-minute coalition of these three factions: loyalist, moderate and radical.

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[27] This is still a controversial number: official British figures (cited in Blacker 2007: 226) stand at 11 503, and the highest estimate at 300 000 (Elkins 2006), but both these numbers have been widely, and convincingly, discredited by Blacker and others.

This détente was short-lived, however, and post-independence Kenya—headed by Kenyatta—took a firm, unequivocal turn towards capitalism, modernisation and the retention of colonial institutions. Author after author has contrasted Kenyatta's status as cosmopolitan member of the Kenyan middle class with the socialist, often-illiterate former combatants who now found themselves politically sidelined (Tamarkin 1978: 314; Berman 1991: 201), and division has run through Kenyan political life ever since (Branch 2009).

 Very shortly after independence, then, Kenyatta and his inner circle emerged as the paradigmatic modernising elites envisioned by the modernisation theory of Parsons, Rostow and Shils. Resolving to keep in place the basic colonial administrative infrastructure and means of production, but to gradually place both in the hands of Africans, Kenyatta's government represented a union between those Kenyans who had served the British administration and those who had negotiated independence in London. As such, 'it is generally accepted that independent Kenya did not affect a major ideological or structural break with the colonial state' (Ochieng and Atieno-Odhiambo 1995: 259), favouring policies of capital accumulation over redistribution (Bates 1989: 147), agricultural export-promotion over smallholder agriculture, and urban over rural development. Many former colonial administrators stayed on as advisors, even as Kenya's new rulers sought to distance themselves discursively from the administration that had preceded them (Speich 2009: 453). Technology transfer, planning, social engineering, pragmatism, open markets and industrialisation were seen as the best guarantors of economic growth, and that economic growth in turn seen as the best means of ensuring the development of the country as a whole.

The clearest expression of this emphasis was *Sessional Paper Number 10 of 1965*, the Kenyatta government's first macro-economic blueprint. This document laid out plans for a

mixed economy, or managed capitalism, which maintained the role of the inherited state apparatus but aimed to harness it to create rapid growth. 'Other immediate problems such as Africanization of the economy, education, unemployment, welfare services, and provincial policies must be handled in ways that will not jeopardize growth', stated the document. 'The only permanent solution to all of these problems rests on rapid growth' (Kenya 1965a: 18). This focus on growth-and-trickle-down was also reflected in the country's first and second development plans, launched in 1964 and 1970 respectively (Kenya 1965b; Kenya 1970).

If *Sessional Paper Number 10* was the written embodiment of Kenya's modernisation efforts, the man widely recognised as its author, Planning Minister and technocrat Tom Mboya, was its corporeal incarnation. As Daniel Speich puts it, 'independent Kenya shaped its self-image...in the style of Tom Mboya: a bright westernized young man full of confidence in the technical promises of modernity, who wore his traditional cap only rarely' (Speich 2009: 453). Mboya identified as a democratic socialist, and his desire to strengthen the capacity of the Kenyan state—coupled with often-sharp rebukes to the West (quoted in Goldsworthy 1982: 259)—belie the charges levelled at him by critics of the time that he was no more than an agent of the West. However, independence would be rushed only to the detriment of economic and social development, Mboya felt, making him 'East Africa's most effective advocate of...liberal capitalism' (Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo 2004: 182) and someone whose rejection of both Marxism and African traditionalism rendered his thinking 'basically pragmatic...in a thoroughly British mould' (Goldsworthy 1982: 54).

For several years, Mboya's thinking typified the policies of the Kenyatta government. Kenya had inherited a strong, well-organised and professional civil service, and the power of the country's ambitious bureaucrats often surpassed that of its politicians (Grindle 1996:

121).   Certainly there was an element of instrumentalism in this strategy, as the thriving African middle class that supported it had a considerable stake in the *status quo*. Political voices that drew on the grievances of Marxists and the rural poor, led by Vice President and Luo[28] elder Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, were forced out of the ruling coalition in 1966. Odinga's political rivals exaggerated his connections with China, the Soviet Union and India to portray him as a foreign-trained radical. In turn, charges of 'neo-colonialism' were frequently levelled at Kenya's rulers by critics inside (Odinga 1968: xv) and outside (Leys 1975) the country.

At the same time, several factors complicate the picture of a purely self-interested ruling *comprador* class that critics sought to paint. Firstly, insofar as Marxism also advocates state-led economic planning, national mobilisation and an emphasis on technology, Odinga and Mboya shared a degree of ideological overlap that is often overlooked. *Sessional Paper Number 10*'s alternative title, *On African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya*, may have been a misnomer, but the document did embody a desire to 'Africanise' the economy. In addition, Kenyan living standards rose during this time: per capita GDP went from $104 in 1963 to $447 in 1980, and GDP grew by an annual average of 7.1% from 1965 to 1978 (World Bank 2012). Although several deep-rooted economic problems remained, Kenya's middle class expanded. This gave the government 'a relatively wide and solid social basis' (Tamarkin 1978: 312) and garnered the country an international reputation for stability and prosperity.

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[28] The Luo, at 13% of the population, are the third-largest ethnic group in Kenya, after the Kikuyu (22%) and the Luhya (14%) (CIA 2012).

Within a few years after independence, however, two changes were working to erode the hold of Kenya's modernising elites. Firstly, the global tide was beginning to turn against modernisation theory, and the Kenyan experience was at the very heart of this debate. The University of Nairobi's influential Institute for Development Studies (IDS) had long been the academic nucleus of what Speich (2009: 449) calls Kenya's '"laboratory of development" in which key assumptions of Modernisation Theory were tested and refined'. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, leading global and Kenyan academics at IDS were beginning to seriously challenge 'trickle-down' theory. Public and intellectual opinion began to shift towards policies with a greater focus on policy alleviation, redistribution and rural development (Barkan 1994: 107); this would be reflected in the country's third and fourth five-year economic plans (Kenya 1974; 1979).[29]

Despite this, the IDS itself was beginning to lose standing, as succession struggles loomed and Kenyatta's inner circle consolidated its hold on the state's resources. In 1969, Mboya was assassinated and opposition parties banned. Six years later, prominent socialist Josiah Kariuki was also killed; the parliamentary investigation that followed implicated several senior government officials in the incident. The Office of the President became immensely powerful (Tamarkin 1978), and Kenya began to more closely resemble its neighbours in its reliance on factionalism.

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[29] In the early 1980s, the IDS would host a continuation of this discussion between capitalist- and socialist-oriented modes of development thinking, culminating in the fiercely-fought 'Kenya Debate' between Colin Leys and his detractors, Stephen Langdon and Raphael Kaplinsky. The most thorough overviews of the debate, which focused on the question of the existence of a pre-colonial Kikuyu proto-capitalist class, can be found in Kitching (1985) and Leys (1994).

The first half of Kenyatta's rule had been marked by ideological contestation and the emergence of a group of planners who strongly adhered to the assumptions of modernisation theory of the time. This soon gave way, however, to the politics of patronage; by violently eliminating opponents on both the left and right of the political spectrum, Kenyatta's administration had set the scene for a post-ideological struggle for the control of national resources by special interests. As Bates (1989: 91) puts it, 'the heroic period of Kenyan politics was over'. While this was happening, modernisation theory was falling from grace all across the developing world; in 1979, a senior Kenyan politician proclaimed in parliament 'Let us hope there will be no more of this modernisation. This modernisation can also kill us' (Shikuku 1979: 1457).

When Kenyatta's Vice President, Daniel Arap Moi, succeeded him upon his death in 1978, many of these trends were exacerbated. Moi amended the constitution to make Kenya a one-party state, mismanaged the economy, and appropriated national resources for his personal use. He also stoked Kenya's ethnic tensions and helped to create a culture of violence, arming groups of young men from his Kalenjin tribe against Kikuyus who threatened to make gains in elections (HRW 2002); this practice continues to this day (Hanson 2008). The average annual rate of economic growth during Moi's presidency fell to 3.4%, and per capita GDP was 37% lower in 1993 than it was in the year he took office (World Bank 2012). Most importantly, for our purposes, was the continuing marginalisation, shrinking and politicisation of Kenya's technocratic elite. Grindle (1996), in particular, has chronicled this separation of technical expertise and political power, and the gradual process by which Kenyan policy experts, particularly after 1987, lost presidential support and the ability to influence decision-making.

Moi's ineptitude was not the only factor in Kenya's development setbacks during the 1980s. Kenya's relatively liberal economy was vulnerable to external shocks, and therefore badly affected by the 1979 increase in oil prices and the global recession that followed. Droughts and price fluctuations of major imports added to Kenya's problems, and the government explicitly scaled down Kenya's development goals in *Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1980: Economic Prospects and Policies* (quoted in Maxon and Ndege 1995: 151). A balance of payments crisis in the mid-1980s forced the government to enact a programme of structural adjustment: foreign investment and export diversification were encouraged and the private sector was given a larger role in industry and commerce. At the same time, national development plans reflected a shift away from growth-led strategies towards 'basic needs', poverty alleviation, service delivery and the development of rural areas. Overall, official development policies diverged only partially from Kenyatta's already market-friendly strategies, but implementation 'was often lethargic and sometimes even completely contrary to the stated policies' (Swamy 1994: 1).

Kenya's chequered relationship with donors during Moi's rule pushed the country to liberalise further in the 1990s. Although assistance was suspended a number of times for corruption, non-compliance with conditionalities and a lack of political reform, this only made the country more dependent on donors. The vast majority of state-owned and partially state-owned ventures were privatised. Where Moi turned to policy experts, he preferred to use foreign advisors attached to international economic institutions (Grindle 1996: 126). These efforts saw limited success, however; among the many posthumous critics of Kenya's structural adjustment programmes (e.g. Dollar and Svensson 2000: 895) is the World Bank itself (Swamy 1994).

Since 2002, when Moi buckled under international pressure and was ousted in Kenya's first transparent multi-party elections, the country's development and leadership prospects have been more ambiguous. On the one hand, the country has seen an economic upturn under President Mwai Kibaki, whose *Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) for Wealth and Employment Creation 2003-2007* met many of its targets. From 2003 to 2010, Kenya's average annual GDP growth was 4.7%; its per capita GDP also increased substantially in this period (World Bank 2012).

In his macro-economic policy, Kibaki is advised primarily by the National Economic and Social Council (NESC), an advisory body established in 2004 and comprising selected government officials, business leaders, representatives of professional organisations and foreign advisors. NESC's flagship project is the highly ambitious *Vision 2030*, a long-term development plan that aims to produce annual growth rates of 10% and transform Kenya into a 'newly-industrialising, middle-income country' by 2030 (Kenya 2007a). *Vision 2030* retains an existing focus on foreign investment, but aims to bring about structural economic change away from the large agricultural sector and towards the secondary and tertiary sectors. Although *Vision 2030* explicitly seeks to address social, political and economic 'pillars' of development in equal measure, NESC has not, at the time of writing, contained any representatives from the NGO sector. By contrast, the business sector plays a dominant role in NESC/*Vision 2030*, with several entrepreneurs and business elites having held key positions from the conceptualisation to the implementation phases.

The economic growth of the Kibaki era has not yet translated into political stability, however. In December 2007, disputed election results led to violent clashes between supporters of Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement

(ODM), led by his rival, Raila Odinga. The violence killed over 600, mingled with existing land disputes between rival ethnic groups, and highlighted problems of youth unemployment and the marginalisation of the poor. The clashes shocked so many with their ferocity that they in many ways 'shattered the foundations of the Kenyan state' (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009b: 2). The international mediation effort that followed led to the formation of the current Grand Coalition government, under which an unprecedented 42 ministers from all the major parties govern in tandem and in which Odinga serves as Prime Minister. This political re-organisation seems to have done little to diminish the high levels of corruption, infighting and tribalism for which the Kenyan political process remains notorious (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012b; Wrong 2009; Economist 2010c).

One important final development has, however, altered the political landscape since the 2007 electoral debacle. In 2010, Kenyans voted overwhelmingly to accept a new constitution, putting an end to a lengthy and politically-fraught reform process that had begun almost a decade earlier. The document, which replaces the British-drafted document inherited at independence, has provisions for *inter alia* enhanced regional devolution and reduction of presidential powers. There is great hope among a great number of Kenyans that the birth of their 'Second Republic' may lead to greater accountability, transparency and governance (Kivuva 2011), but many sceptics also doubt the potential for successful implementation (Macharia 2011).

Kenya's political elites have traversed several distinct phases in their leadership of the country. Competing visions of development confronted each other during the transition to independence, culminating in the swift triumph of Western- and growth-oriented modernisers over their redistributionist rivals. These technocrats, led by planner Mboya, went on to

preside over a period of fairly rapid (if unequal) development, but were eventually sidelined when global development thinking shifted towards dependency theory and—even more significantly—the succession worries of Kenyatta's inner circle ushered in an era of tribal and factional politics. The government ceased to concern itself with emulation or development theories—a situation kept intact by Moi, whose mismanagement and dependence on Western aid resulted in policies driven by domestic special interests and donor-imposed conditionalities. There is less agreement about the dynamics that have driven elite politics since the Kibaki era began. As shall be demonstrated, an examination of elite attitudes towards the adoption of external models can help us to understand the evolution of Kenya's development strategy more generally; it can simultaneously shed light on the influence of a specific and currently highly-lauded such 'model'—namely that of China.

5.2 Kenya's Planners Leading Attempts at Emulation

My examination of Kenyan elites' attitudes to lesson-drawing revealed them, like their Ethiopian counterparts, to regard the process as an important component of policy-making. Kenya's economic stagnation during the Moi era, combined with the aftermath of the disastrous 2007 elections, has left elites of all persuasions with the feeling of having 'gone wrong somewhere'. Many interviewees thus saw lesson-drawing from countries that have 'overtaken' Kenya as the means by which the country could overcome this fall from grace and recapture its former promise. In addition, development was consequently largely seen as a process of 'catching up' with global trends, with very few viewing Kenya's development path as unique to the country:

So many of the study tours have gone to Japan, Singapore and Malaysia. And then we have moved on to South Africa to see what they have done. I can assure you, if we implement the outcomes of these study tours, what they are doing and we are not doing, we will be able to catch up (KN9).

I think I would not call it unique, in the sense that you cannot say there is a Kenyan path. We are now grappling to use other templates... (KG6)

You've really got to benchmark yourself with the best in the world. And Kenya, as a society, deserves nothing but the best. So even if you don't know what's the best, find it out. And find out how you can get there (KN15).

As in Ethiopia, the more senior the elites, the more eager they were to draw lessons from abroad; those at the helm of their ministry, business or organisation listed more lessons for every non-lesson, and were more likely to emphasise the importance of emulation over selectivity. This suggests, once again, that Rose (1988: 233) is correct when he surmises that 'particularly for people on top of an organization, looking outward offers the only prospect of learning about alternatives, since by looking within they see only what they already know', and that this facilitates what he calls 'crossnational lesson-drawing'.

Unlike in the previous case study, however, there was little overall difference in attitudes to emulation between the governmental and non-governmental sectors. In Ethiopia, governmental elites were less likely to emphasise the importance of selectivity than were non-governmental elites, but Kenyan interviewees from the two sectors viewed selectivity as important in roughly equal measure. More significant was the divide between those

respondents directly involved with NESC or *Vision 2030*, and those not closely engaged with either body. The former group were slightly more likely to speak favourably of the general need for lesson-drawing than the need for indigenisation, whereas the reverse was true for the latter group. Planners more freely and frequently reported using the experiences of other countries to inform day-to-day decision-making as well: 'Everywhere we go', said one, 'we actively go to learn lessons to see what's working, what's not working, and why' (KN10).

Other indicators corroborate this finding. Elites involved in NESC or *Vision 2030* listed 2.6 potential lessons for every 'non-lesson', compared to 2.2 lessons for other elites' every non-lesson. In other words, the former group were more likely to identify ways in which other countries' development experiences could be transferred to Kenya than they were to find obstacles to this transfer.

Readers will recall Rivera's (2004) typology, whereby elites are identified either as 'pure voluntarists' (those with a particular regional or historical model in mind for emulation), 'quasi-voluntarists' (those who wished to draw from several or many models) or 'voluntarists' (those who largely eschewed the use of models). In the case of Kenya, 55% of elites involved in *Vision 2030* and NESC could be classified as 'pure voluntarists'. In contrast, only 38% of elites not involved in these institutions were 'pure voluntarists', with many more falling into the category of 'quasi-voluntarists' (See *Fig. 2*). When these indicators are taken into account, it is clear that that group of business leaders, bureaucrats and economic advisors clustered around the creation and realisation of the Kibaki government's long-term development vision view emulation more favourably—and claim to be engaged in lesson-drawing—to a greater extent than do elites in both civil society and the various political parties.

Fig. 2:

The Receptivity of Kenyan Elites to Emulation

(Y-axis: Number of interviewees; categories: Voluntarists, Quasi-voluntarists, Traditionalists)

■ Planners (directly involved in Vision 2030/NESC)
■ Politicians and civil society (not directly involved in Vision 2030/NESC)

These differences, and others related to lesson-drawing, are such that Kenyan elites can be divided into three distinct groupings: planners, other political elites and civil society.:

a) Planners:

Because NESC and the Vision 2030 Secretariat are the main bodies tasked with the design and implementation of Kenya's long-term macro-economic strategy, members of the first grouping have all been heavily involved, in one way or another, with one of these two institutions. These include senior bureaucrats in key ministries such as the Ministry of Planning, National Development and Vision 2030 or the Ministry of Roads. They also comprise academics who act as economic advisors to the government, representatives from

influential think tanks, and that small number of elected political representatives whose previous positions as technocrats have established them, in Kenya, as authorities in the realm of planning.

Most notably, a substantial segment of this group is drawn from the private sector and the umbrella organisations that represent it in Kenya's political arena. The very large influence that Kenya's private sector has had on NESC and *Vision 2030* is admitted by politicians and business elites alike: according to one business leader, 'the private sector initiated it—the body called NESC. I also sit on NESC. *Vision 2030* was actually conceived by the private sector...the private sector was deeply involved in the whole mechanics – getting it through and pushing it through' (KN10). In 2010, the Chairman of the *Vision 2030* Delivery Board and the Director-General of the *Vision 2030* Secretariat were two of Kenya's most visible and well-known entrepreneurs.

b) Other political elites:

Kenya's planners stand in contrast to its other political elites, who tend to operate according to somewhat different dynamics. As career politicians, party advisors, bureaucrats in minor ministries or legal experts, their input into *Vision 2030* and NESC has been minimal, or (in the case of the first two) closely tied with their party political affiliation. Their views on these government projects have tended to be either critical, or (more usually) supportive but based on second-hand knowledge of the process. An example of the former is the ODM's senior advisor on coalition affairs, who forcefully distanced himself, and his party, from *Vision 2030* during our interview (KG20). Although the strategy comprises political, economic and social pillars—explicitly including, therefore, issues such as the rule of law,

human rights, societal cohesion and environmental protection—legal and societal actors generally felt a lesser level of involvement and had a lower stake in the plan.

c) Civil society:

The third and final group, namely *civil society*, comprises editors of broadcast and print media, leaders of religious organisations, trade union representatives and activists. These groups have an input into the political process in Kenya, are relatively independent, and can influence government decision-making; according to Freedom House (2010), Kenya possesses—exceptions notwithstanding—'one of the liveliest media environments on the continent' and a 'robust civil society'. This view was broadly corroborated by the civil society representatives I interviewed.

Of the three groups, therefore, Kenya's planners are most supportive of emulation. This is not to imply that they expressed support for the wholesale importation of foreign programmes into Kenya; themes of adaptation and pluralism also emerged in interviews with many of these elites. However, these themes were emphasised both to a lesser extent than was the case with other elites, and in a slightly different way. Civil society representatives and politicians usually took greater pains to emphasise the systematic, 'rational' nature of their own attempts at emulation. Lesson-drawing was seen as a process whereby elites— ideally, at least—examined all possible exemplars and skilfully combined the strengths of each, all the while grounding them firmly in local realities:

We have seen the entire array of issues and experiences that we have as a buffet of ideas, and we pick and choose as we deem fit and necessary' (KG17).

I'm not very much for copying systems – maybe we can learn from best practices, see the things that have worked in other economies. How can we tailor it to make it work for us? We should not copy blindly (KN2).

Unexpectedly, planners—those elites most frequently engaged in lesson-drawing—were in fact least likely to portray themselves as 'rational shoppers'. A large number were surprisingly willing to admit the influence of serendipity, language barriers, donor willingness, historical ties, personal experience and other factors unrelated to a model's performance or suitability. According to one, for example, Scandinavia was emulated in the area of land reform largely because 'they approached us and said "we can help you"' (KG6). Several others admitted that lesson-drawing initiatives with India and China were less prevalent than could be expected, yet were unable to give a reason. 'Somehow the framework of engagement with India seems not to fall into place', said the Secretary-General of NESC (KG15). 'I don't know [why]. I find this thing very confusing. But, if you ask me, it is not the country that will come first, despite the great things they're doing now in development.'

Those elites who emphasised pluralism in lesson-drawing without portraying the process as entirely systematic often simply pointed to the diverse and wide-ranging influences and models available to (and acting on) them, and the practical need to isolate the one or two that might be easiest to learn from. This pragmatic position recognised the need to assess and adapt external models before implementing them, but also acknowledged the

impact of time and resource constraints. One of the most striking articulations of this position came from the director of the *Vision 2030* Secretariat:

> I think sometimes you can study things to death. My focus is on execution, and as you're executing, you do what works for you. So therefore picking one country and then along the way, as you encounter different problems, asking 'who should we look to?' is a much more efficient way of doing things than sitting down and saying 'let's look at the 180 countries in the world and take the top 20 and then apply it'. We could spend 10 years doing that...I think as you go along, whether it is in agriculture or horticulture or shipping or retail markets, we end up in different places (KG16).

Kenyan elites were, in short, eager to draw lessons from the experiences of others, particularly at a time when Kenya was seen to be at a critical juncture in its development. The most enthusiastic group were those involved in the planning and implementation of the country's long-term development vision. Although many respondents cautioned strongly against the notion that a single model could be transplanted into Kenya from outside, this hesitancy was more prevalent among civil society leaders and political elites not involved in NESC and *Vision 2030*. Technocrats were also likely to place less emphasis on the rational customisation and indigenisation of certain models to the Kenyan situation. This lies in contrast with the Ethiopian case, where the great pains that emulators in the EPRDF took to demonstrate their evenhandedness and rationality instead helped to reveal the ideological nature of their lesson-drawing. In Kenya, the need to juggle the variety of different exemplars that currently exist, in a far more *ad hoc* way, emerged instead as a dominant theme.

5.3 East Asia—but not China—as the Source of Models

If Kenya's leaders, and especially its planners, look abroad for development lessons, which specific models do they prefer to draw from? When compared to Ethiopian elites, Kenyan elites cited a far broader range of countries and regions as influences. However, clear patterns and preferences could nonetheless be discerned. Kenyan respondents in all three groups listed East Asia—or specific countries in East Asia—as the model(s) from which they most wished to draw:

> But most all, the need to forge ahead, and the desire to get the same level as the Asian Tigers, is really moving us ahead (KN9).

> We also would like to be thinking about Malaysia and Singapore. That has been one of the areas that you find most people in Kenya looking at (KN20).

> The countries I think you have heard we admire here so much are Singapore and Malaysia...and probably South Korea. Those are the countries we have to emulate (KG13).

This trend was particularly pronounced among Rivera's 'pure voluntarists', a full 80% of whom singled out East Asia—or the region as a whole—as a model.[30] Unlike Ethiopia, however, where elites subsumed China and East Asia into a single category and focused on the similarities between the countries, Kenyan leaders viewed China as distinct from the rest

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[30] The remainder mentioned Canada, the Scandinavian countries and Cuba as their primary models.

of the region. Planners were particularly likely to distinguish between the two, and to point to concrete policy differences, but all three groups of elites viewed China as a generally unsuitable model. When countries were grouped into five models for coding purposes—East Asia, China, India, the West and 'Others'—China emerged as the least attractive model of the five, among all three groups of elites:

I don't think we have invested deliberately in what we want to learn from China. I don't think we have done that (KG8).

China is at the bottom, in terms of what we aspire to be (KG6).

I don't like China. The example it sets is so negative, I'd basically campaign against people adopting China as a model (KN13).

Five reasons were cited for this relative lack of attraction to the Chinese model. Firstly, elites raised questions regarding the model's *performance*, particularly in the areas of democratisation, pluralism and decentralisation. One newspaper editor, for example, complained that 'Development alone for the sake of the economy without freedom is foolhardy. I don't like the Chinese model where, yes, they work hard, but the people are in zoos. They can't talk about their government, they can't say things about the system' (KN3).

The most important factor inhibiting emulation—arguably even more important than performance itself—was the fact that China was seen as *fundamentally different* from Kenya in its culture, history, size and political and economic systems. Despite criticisms of Chinese authoritarianism, the majority of respondents viewed China as fairly successful on its own

terms (see *Table 3*). This was even more true of those elites involved in *Vision 2030* than of other elites, with a third seeing China as 'very successful' and the vast remainder viewing it as 'moderately successful'.

Table 3: Kenyan Perceptions of China and India's Developmental 'Success'

		Elites involved in *Vision 2030*	Elites not directly involved in *Vision 2030*	Total
Is China an example of successful development?	Yes	33%	9%	21%
	Qualified yes	57%	73%	65%
	No	10%	18%	14%
Is India an example of successful development?	Yes	38%	36%	37%
	Qualified yes	62%	46%	54%
	No	0%	18%	9%
Which country is a better model?	China	24%	18%	21%
	India	48%	59%	53%
	Neither	29%	23%	26%

Source: primary interview data

* Where this question was not asked directly, interviewees' responses to the question 'Is China a good model for your country' were compared with responses to the question 'Is India a good model for your country?'

Even these respondents, however, generally felt that few of the country's experiences could be transferred to a country such as Kenya. Few elites, whether involved in *Vision 2030* or not, preferred China to India as a model, for example (and even the latter country, as we shall see, is not widely emulated). Even the much-heralded Special Economic Zones (SEZs) (Davies 2008), which Kenya—like many other African countries—is planning on establishing according to a Chinese template, were deemed by a top planner in the Ministry

of Finance to be unfeasible and unnecessary in a market-oriented economy such as Kenya's (KG10).

A third factor that featured strongly in elites' rejection of the Chinese model was a *distrust of China and its actions* on the African continent. These sentiments were particularly strong among civil society and business elites, but were by no means limited to these groups. Several critics pointed to China's sponsorship of repressive regimes in Sudan and elsewhere (KN17), while others complained of the low standard of Chinese imported goods, and the threat that these posed to domestic industries (KG11). There existed the sentiment that emulation of China would further increase Kenya's dependence on a large, increasingly powerful country—the intentions of which were not yet entirely clear or to be trusted. As one official put it:

> I think Kenya is a very small economy...Even we as a country, when we try to engage with China—you are talking of a 10 000 GDP-per-capita economy of one billion people. Honestly, how do we engage with them? And that's why we are very vulnerable in dealing with China, in my view (KG8).

For the most part, these perceptions did not prevent elites from seeing current Chinese economic involvement in Kenya as generally positive—more interviewees saw China's activities in Kenya as beneficial than viewed the country's domestic and foreign policies as worthy of emulation. China's stake in the Kenyan economy centres overwhelmingly on its dominance of the construction industry; in the 2010-2011 fiscal year, Chinese firms were awarded over two-thirds of Kenyan contracts for construction projects, for example (Nijihia

2011). Despite concerns over slow skills transfer and untransparent bidding processes, even elites generally critical of government economic policy felt China-Kenya relations, on balance, to be mutually beneficial:

> If you look at whether they complete their projects on time, within budget, then yes, they are really efficient. If you look at whether it leads to long-term employment in that sector, and long-term technological transfer, it's up in the air, really. And I don't think we've had the sort of rights problems associated with extraction that you might have around Zambia around copper or around oil...So it's not been negative, I don't think....Well, everyone likes having good roads (KN12).

Elites were thus cautiously optimistic about China-Kenya economic relations overall, but more sceptical regarding the ethical compromises it felt that China had had to make—in both its foreign and domestic strategies—to get to its present position.

A fourth obstacle to learning from China stemmed from a lack of knowledge of and contact with the country, a factor that contributed to Kenyan suspicions. Despite the fact that a relatively large number of interviewees had visited China (83% of governmental elites and 40% of non-governmental elites), most felt that their visits had not given them sufficient insight in and understanding of the country. When planners were asked why NESC—which in 2010 and 2011 included advisors from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia—did not have any Chinese or Indian representatives, the most common answer resembled the following: 'Because the countries weren't interested! It was not that it was a deliberate choice at all. It's not that they weren't considered; they didn't consider themselves, is what I'm saying. They didn't come to ask' (KG21). Although the additional reasons mentioned

above revealed the truth to be more complex, *unfamiliarity and lack of contact* did emerge as a key factor inhibiting emulation. Chinese reluctance to export its model, a paucity of historical relations, a language barrier and the recent nature of China's development were all cited in this regard:

> Do the Chinese share [their experiences]? I think I don't know enough about them, and I haven't had enough of an encounter to know whether or not they do that (KN17).

> China is a new country for Kenya. China and Kenya used to deport each others' diplomats in the 1960s, and even by the late 1970s we were not sure about our feelings about China. Now I know we will do a lot with them, because they seem to have the money to invest in our economy. They will not, for example, I think, invest in or influence how we do education. I know our technical schools will probably get some technical equipment from them, but once you get that technical equipment, it is the other countries – like South Africa, the UK or the US – whose curriculum you are going to borrow (KG3).

> Well, China has just taken off in the last few years. There's also a huge problem with language in China (KG16).

> If you go to China, the language can be a burden on its own. When you go, you want to ask a lot of questions, and often there is only one person who can speak English. And sometime you don't know if the interpreter is translating correctly (KN8).

A fifth and final barrier to Kenya-China emulation arose from the sentiment that China,

despite developmental successes, *did not, in fact, possess a unique model* of development. In fact, China was lauded for its skilful and selective adaptation of other countries' technologies and policies. In many cases, this successful emulation of other models was itself a lesson for elites: 'If you look at how they got to where they did, there was a very acute awareness of what's happening elsewhere, and the good coming from that. And they pursued that relentlessly...they domesticated everything that they borrowed' (KG20). China's ability to draw foreign lessons spurred admiration, but also meant that elites often preferred to look to the original source of innovation when drawing on specific policy lessons or programmes:

I don't know what you copy from China, because the technology is not just Chinese. Building roads, that's engineering, and I don't think that's Chinese engineering. Building houses – that's not Chinese (KG20).

Everything that I like about China, Singapore has done (KG16).

A good chunk of the development of China recently was advised by Singapore. If one of the smallest countries can advise one of the biggest countries in the world – why can't we learn from it? (KG15)

This final factor may appear to give rise to a paradox. On the one hand, elites—particularly those involved in planning—made a clear distinction between China and its neighbours in the region, preferring strongly to learn from the latter. On the other hand, they felt the models to be similar in the sense that China's success stemmed largely from emulation of countries such as South Korea and Singapore. Elites resolved this tension by seeing smaller

East Asian countries as offering many of the same lessons as China, but in a clearer, less threatening package, and on a more manageable scale. As one planner summarised it, 'it's a story that's easier to tell' (KG8).

There was one important exception to this relative lack of interest in emulating China specifically. Kenyan elites from all sectors viewed China as a the single best example in the area of infrastructure, drawing not only specific, sectoral lessons, but also lessons on the broader importance and feasibility of large infrastructural programmes. Due to the impact of this specific lesson on development discourses in Kenya, it is further discussed in a subsequent chapter.

In short, the relative lack of interest in emulating Chinese policy programmes stems in part from purely performance-related factors, particularly in the areas of devolution, human rights and democratisation. However, an unfamiliarity with the country, a belief that China's approach to development—no matter how successful—is not unique, and a desire to maintain independence in the face of Chinese economic power were all factors that discouraged Kenyan elites from drawing broad lessons. Most importantly, China's history, culture, political system and economic institutions were seen as extremely different from Kenya's, inhibiting lesson-drawing. Although most elites cited sectoral, technical and even policy lessons from China, the vast majority could not be said to wish to emulate the Chinese model as a whole.

Interviewees' feelings on the potential of emulating India, the West and other developing countries were more ambivalent. All three groups of elites viewed India as a better model to follow than China. In one closely-related group of policy areas—democratisation, judicial reform and devolution—India was very often described as a

potential source of lessons. For this reason, legal experts and human rights activists were most likely to report having consciously emulated aspects of this country's development: the Chairman of the landmark 2003 Bomas Conference—where the first draft of the Kenyan constitution that was eventually passed in 2010 was drawn up—lists India and South Africa as the two countries that most inspired specific clauses in the draft (KN14). As former British colonies, Kenya and India have similar legal institutions, and many interviewees mentioned the very large number of Kenyan lawyers have been trained in India. This aspect of learning was corroborated by a senior Indian official, who pointed *inter alia* to Kenyan scholarship of the Indian *Panchyati Raj* system, by which revenues are allocated to regional governments, and held that 'there is a tremendous Indian stamp on many [Kenyan] institutions' (KA2). It is also in keeping with the literature on the 'Indian Model', which sees India's history of democratic institution-building as one of the most important lessons it holds for other developing countries (Friedman and Gilley 2008; Elliot 2009).

Several of the other lessons that elites most wished to draw from India corresponded to those purported aspects of the 'India Model' that lay in the realm of economic development (Bosworth and Collins 2008; Das 2006). One was the prioritisation, domestication and monetisation of technology, particularly in the fields of IT and medical services. According to one planner, 'Yes, we've taken lessons from India...They've given us the courage to go into IT, software development, etc. Science is really a focus in India. I think that's why you find a lot of engineers in India. That is a lesson' (KG7). Similarly, India was cited (KG5) as an important inspiration for *Vision 2030*'s focus on outsourcing and 'health tourism' (Kenya 2007a: 14, 18). Elites also admired India's rapid economic growth and industrialisation—on both the level of cottage industries and larger export-oriented enterprises.

Despite these indications of limited lesson-drawing from India, several counter-indications precluded the country's widespread use as a model. Elites cited numerous 'non-lessons'—features they felt were undesirable or untransferable—when asked about India. Certain of these were performance-based. Elites very frequently pointed to the inequality and poverty that remain rife in India, and objected particularly vehemently to the Indian caste system:

> The fact that the caste system is still there is troubling. You can't call a country developed where people are born into poverty and die into poverty because of design. And they have no chance of coming out of it unless they go into exile. That's not right (KG20).

> India is a complicated country. You go to India and the levels of poverty in some places in India are just as bad as Kenya, or worse (KG6).

> Maybe my views are biased by what I saw when I went there. I don't read much about India, but I went there about five years ago. I saw so much poverty there. So I would not call that a model of democracy if you still have so many people living on the street. I was in Bombay; I didn't like what I saw. Maybe that had shaped my view about how the economy is developing (KN2).

As the final quote above illustrates, India was a country that actually left a number of Kenyan elites with a lower opinion after having visited. Slightly fewer elites had visited India than China (of those polled, 44% of governmental elites and 62% of non-governmental elites for India, compared to 83% versus 40% for China), yet those who had visited were not

significantly more likely to regard India as successful than those who had not. Several planners, in particular, reported being somewhat taken aback by the disparity between media reports of India's booming economy, and the reality they witnessed during study visits. To one, India 'really doesn't come to mind very fast – it doesn't look very prestigious, for lack of a better word' (KN8). 'I've been to India only once, and it was very recently, actually', said another. 'I was shocked, because it's not as glamorous. I found it completely different [from what I had read]...I think what I was expecting was what I found in Singapore' (KN20). While some respondents (including the latter planner quoted above) took from this the positive lesson that a country could develop in a more modest, gradualist fashion than was often assumed, many others questioned the very notion that India was sufficiently developed for Kenya to emulate. These elites pointed to the recent and tentative nature of India's 'success'.

Exposure to India and its developmental experiences appeared to inhibit purposeful lesson-drawing in additional ways. There can be no doubt that the complex web of business, institutional and interpersonal ties stemming from Kenya's history of extensive contact with the Indian subcontinent facilitate the transfer of technologies, practices and institutional arrangements from India to Kenya. At the same time, this seems rarely to occur at the conscious or voluntary levels; as a result, broader policies and national plans retain little of the 'Indian stamp' the Indian embassy speaks of. When it comes to policy learning, 'it's not even on the radar' (KG21), and as a result there are far fewer formal, high-level arrangements to facilitate lesson-drawing from India than there are to spur emulation of Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea or even Japan. As the secretary of NESC explained, 'Our embassy for Singapore is in India. We don't have someone on the ground in Singapore...But then,

when it came to signing a government-to-government cooperation [accord], it was with Singapore – and nobody ever thought of India, even though we have a huge political representation in India. (KG15)'. One respondent declined to choose India as a model because 'India we will learn from anyway, whether we like it or not' (KN21), while for another 'India is not often considered really a foreign country to us' (KG3).

Most controversially, there was evidence to suggest that negative preconceptions stemming from historical tensions between Kenyans of African and Indian origin coloured decision-makers' view of India as a whole. Fully one-third of interviewees openly felt this to be the case—a high number, given the contentious nature of this admission. Even where elites were keen to distance themselves from prejudicial views, they frequently felt others might be influenced by such thinking. Indeed, attitudes towards Kenyans of Indian origin were sometimes undisguisedly negative:

The people from India here, they have not influenced [us] as much because most of the experience has been negative...They have not been good examples. I'm sorry to say, but they have been the worst examples of exploitation. They have never contributed much towards the development of the country (KG13).

I think it's also their business practices, especially the ones we have here. They had a tendency to maximise the benefits for the period they are here, and then they take off. They quickly became residents in London and Canada, and a burden here. Those kinds of experiences are also informative, in terms of how you engage (KG8).

How would I put it – is it their culture or their way of life? They are not open to others,

especially to Africans. Whether it is their homes, their shops or their industries, they are a closed community. So then it becomes a bit difficult to learn from them. They are not seen as part of us...It might not be true, but that is what we see (KN18).

Rather than aiding lesson-drawing, therefore, historical contact and familiarity with India appears to have had, if anything, the opposite effect. While the intricate web of institutional, legal and economic ties between the two countries may, at the same time, have spurred the unintentional transfer of policies and practices, these are unlikely to pertain to broad development models or to be implemented by high-level decision-makers.

Similar tensions marked elites' views on emulation of countries in 'the West'. Not surprisingly, Kenyan elites cited these countries more often than did Ethiopian elites. As with India, emulation was most pronounced in the areas of constitutionalism, democratisation, devolution and other legal aspects, and interviewees with legal backgrounds or professions were most likely to speak of these countries as models. Both the content and origin of lessons varied greatly, with Sweden, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom mentioned most frequently. Elites' high levels of exposure to these models, and the fact that a lesson-drawing infrastructure was already in place, played a role: many interviewees had completed post-graduate studies in Europe and North America, and these respondents were demonstrably more likely to approve of lesson-drawing from the West.

The United States came in for special attention; elites admired its 'work ethic' (KG18), system of education (KG2), 'democratic values and structures' (KG22) and systems of public accountability (KN2). A concrete lesson that appears to have emerged at

least partially from the American example is the choice of a presidential system of checks and balances in the 2010 Kenyan constitution, cited with frequency by those involved in last-minute political negotiations on the matter. One of the PNU's chief advisors in the run-up to the adoption of the constitution, for example, says that: 'We ended up literally adopting the American system – not only the Presidential system, but also the way it is structured...all the principles that define the American constitution...So in terms of political framework, we are looking to America as a country' (KG22). The result has been the creation of a Senate, a Supreme Court and a system of vetting senior judges.

Such attitudes notwithstanding, the transfer of policies and legal arrangements from Kenya's former colonial masters and current donors are better viewed as involuntary or semi-voluntary than as examples of true lesson-drawing. Colonial Kenya received English law by decree, and codifications first used in the British Raj were subsequently imposed on Kenya (Berkowitz *et al* 2003: 197). Wabwile (2003) has traced the deep influence that such colonial-era legal arrangements continue to have on Kenya's current legal order. Even those elites who did prove receptive to emulation from these countries were pragmatic about the level of genuine choice that this entailed:

> But our model is the British one, who were our rulers. Our laws, our language [come from the UK], so we are borrowing from that model (KN4).

> Also it's easy for us to look at Britain – we know the sources, we know where to go to look at something (KN14).

Our system of land law was basically inherited from England, so that linkage continues (KG6).

In fact, Kenya's record of dependency on Western countries, and particularly the UK, often propelled elites away from emulation of these models. This view is exemplified by a senior journalist's view that 'while we copied a lot from Britain, in my opinion maybe we should not have copied everything. We should have tried to find out...how best to implement what works for us, instead of just implanting the British system. To this day, we still use very archaic laws from the British system' (KN2). The Deputy Prime Minister, similarly, feels Western countries to be less suitable 'perhaps because those ones are not coming from a background of having been dominated by another government or another system' (KG5). This aspect is evident, also, in extent to which emancipation from Kenya's colonial-era constitution was portrayed in the political discourse as an essential step in Kenya's evolution as a fully mature, independent state (e.g. Mutiga 2010; Saturday Nation 2010).

The fact that the transfer of specific legislative arrangements stems more often from factors such as path-dependency and routine than from concerted attempts to emulate entire programmes enacted other countries is also reflected in the literature on lesson-drawing. An entire legal literature exists to describe the myriad ways in which legal precedents and institutions in one jurisdiction are transferred to another (Watson 1974; Miller 2003), but there is very little overt overlap between these writings and those that this dissertation has focused on. Instead, theories of lesson-drawing and emulation usually take it for granted that the successful importation of foreign societal programmes, institutions or policies will be accompanied by the necessary legal accommodations. The most exhaustive typology of

lesson-drawing (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 10) does not directly address legal emulation, whereas another seminal work views the creation of legal statutes primarily as the first step by which a borrowed political programme is implemented (Rose 1991: 6). Moreover, the most influential theory in the discipline of law (see, for an overview, Lalenis *et al* 2002: 33-38) has traditionally held that laws and statutes are primarily—and most easily—transferred to those in the same 'legal family', suggesting that elites have only a limited number of countries from which they can hope to draw lessons in this particular sector. Even in the few cases where the role of legal systems is directly discussed in the emulation literature, the balance of opinion mirrors this finding: accounts that view legal transfer as a possibility up to and including the constitutional level (Rose 2005: 1), are outnumbered by those which mention legal culture and constitutional arrangements primarily as constraints to lesson-drawing across polities (Radaelli 2004: 726; Robertson 1991: 68).

Kenya's use of the American constitutional model would seem to contradict this to a certain extent. Kenyan politicians' desire to look outside the 'legal family' of the Commonwealth strengthens the contending theory of 'legal transplant' (Watson 1974), which holds that new legislation is often fruitfully borrowed and domesticated from laws enacted in radically different legal and societal settings. This particular example shows that elites do, at least sometimes, opt for explicit and large-scale legal emulation (although judgement must in this case be withheld on the efficacy of such attempts).

Even here, however, a note of caution is warranted. The areas in which emulation of the United States is occurring are also those in which the influence of Kenya's turbulent internal political dynamics and power struggles are most apparent. The decision to adopt a US-style constitution was hammered out by the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) on

Constitutional Review, and only subsequently incorporated into the draft constitution by a Committee of Experts (CoE) set up to revise the draft the constitution before the referendum. The possibility of emulating the United States in this regard arose very suddenly: a tale of brinkmanship and horse-trading emerges from interviews with those involved in the Kenyan constitutional process, with both PNU and ODM parliamentarians rather unexpectedly agreeing on the arrangement for tactical reasons and to prevent the collapse of talks (KN14; KG20). Both a chief author of the country's first constitutional draft (KN14) and a non-Kenyan member of the CoE[31] feel that there was little evidence of a comparative focus on foreign constitutional arrangements in the deliberations of this body, and that such a focus would have benefited the final draft. This is borne out from an interview with the CoE's Chairman (KG19), who felt issues of lesson-drawing to fall largely outside his remit.

Finally, the COE's final report also supports these conclusions. In it, the body mentions its initial preference for a hybrid system of government that follows neither the American nor Westminster models; its ultimate capitulation in favour of a full presidential system in the American mould (in line with parliament's preference) is relegated to 'a political responsibility taken by the political leadership' (CoE 2010: 8).

The highly-politicised nature of Kenya's taking of this particular lesson does not invalidate its impact. As several theorists of lesson-drawing have pointed out, the process is as often used by decision-makers for the purposes of political leverage, or as a rhetorical weapon, as it is employed for problem-solving (Robertson 1991; Bennett 1991b). This does, however, make implementation of the American lesson highly contingent on current political

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[31] Supplementary interview, Nairobi, 21/10/2010.

power configurations, calling into question its durability as Kenya's extremely fragile political alliances undergo shifts in the future.

A final category of lessons cited by elites derived from other countries situated outside the 'West', East Asia and South Asia. Kenyan elites mentioned such lessons more frequently than did their Ethiopian counterparts, and this gap was particularly wide when lessons from other African countries were discussed. South Africa was mentioned most often as a model; individual respondents also mentioned Botswana, Dubai, Cuba, Tanzania, Brazil, Chile, Rwanda, Ghana and several others.

This fairly large range of countries demonstrates Kenya's relative eclecticism, but do not, on the whole, detract from its overall focus on East Asia. South Africa aside, few elites cited these countries as general models, but rather listed sectoral examples of learning: Israeli methods of irrigation were lauded, for example (KG22), and *Vision 2030* openly cites the creation of a free trade port as an attempt to 'bring Dubai to Kenya' (Kenya 2007a: 14). Although several elites viewed South Africa as a general model to emulate, most of these cited it in tandem with East Asia—and at least the same number rejected it as a model, pointing to its racial tensions, inequality and uncertain future.

African countries were the most frequently cited of the 'negative lessons' that elites gave as examples of failure from which they could learn. One such negative lesson, interestingly, was African countries' perceived dependence on Western models. Africa was not a good exemplar, certain leaders felt, because it had allowed itself to slavishly adopt the culture of its colonisers: 'Nigeria is a good example – it has not come out from that. So unless you break away from the umbilical cord which joins the colonial and post-colonial times, the country will not develop' (KG20), said one.

Here, again, there is evidence to suggest that the use of African lessons at times constitutes a rhetorical or political device rather than an attempt to identify the 'best' policies that can be transferred from abroad. Bennett's (1991b) distinction between symbolic attempts to assuage criticism and the more open-ended desire to identify models or external policies that might solve internal problems is of particular relevance here: because the identification of African models confounds those who may criticise elites for insufficient attention to local, indigenous solutions, these elites have an interest in 'playing up' their use of models from inside the continent. This may, at times, lead to the actual transfer of policies and programmes from African countries, but Bennett's (1991b: 37) analysis implies that foreign evidence, when used thus, does not generally alter the policy-making process in a meaningful way. One activist and lawyer admitted to using this rationale:

> Being someone who is both pan-Africanist and a feminist, often when we engage our brothers on issues pertaining to sexism, they avoid that engagement by claiming that we're Westernised. So one of the things I did deliberately was use African examples and models. Because it then shuts off that escape (KN17).

If all three groups of Kenyan elites cited China least frequently as a model, other East Asian countries most frequently, and other regions intermittently, these trends were magnified in the case of one group in particular—Kenya's coterie of national planners. Elites involved in NESC and *Vision 2030* were over twice as likely to express a desire to emulate aspects of East Asia's development trajectory than were other political and non-political elites. They also exhibited greater levels of knowledge of the models in question and were more likely to

mention concrete lessons their institution had recently drawn from these countries. They took greater care to distinguish between specific countries in the region, and, perhaps for this reason, were least likely of all to view China as a model. In their attempts to emulate East Asia, two countries emerged as particularly important models, namely Malaysia and Singapore. Other countries such as South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia were also cited, but not to nearly the same extent.

To conclude, Kenyan elites view East Asia as a model for Kenya, but look specifically to countries such as Malaysia and Singapore rather than China. Although this is true to a certain extent for political elites, non-governmental leaders and long-term planners, the last-mentioned group is clearly leading Kenya's emulation of the region. Despite the much-heralded influence of the Chinese Model in Africa, Kenyan leaders view China as a suitable exemplar only in the area of infrastructure, with a variety of performance and non-performance-based factors inhibiting broader emulation. India and the United Kingdom both emerged as very strong influences on Kenya's legal system, but this is more often due to the legacy of colonial institutions, to membership of the same commonwealth family and to path-dependency than to voluntary attempts to adapt a broader societal programme to the Kenyan context. In many cases, Kenya's history of prior contact with British and Indian influences actively deter leaders from drawing lessons; emancipation from the former was seen as a greater priority than its emulation, while historical tensions between 'Africans' and Kenya's minority of Indian origin similarly impede desires to learn from India. Kenya's adoption in 2010 of a constitution adapted from its American counterpart constitutes the clearest recent example of lesson-drawing from a country outside East Asia, but this lesson's role as political 'football' places its long-term survival and implementation in jeopardy.

5.4. Emulation of East Asia: What Other Sources of Elite Discourse Say

An examination of non-interview sources such as policy documents and media commentary largely corroborates the trends detailed above. Kenya's senior leaders are periodically quoted in the media as stating that Kenya can draw lessons from other countries' successes, and East Asia is one of the most frequently-mentioned models. Presidential candidates now use emulation of Malaysia and Singapore as planks of their electoral campaigns (Opiyo 2011), and politicians often return from study trips to these countries with effusive praise for their developmental achievements (Barasa 2011).

Although this evidence paints the broad picture of a political leadership attempting to emulate East Asia, an analysis of interviews and official documents clarifies certain key points. Firstly, senior politicians publicly cite a wide number of countries from which they wish to learn lessons; this often includes China, India, South Africa and other countries about which leaders were more lukewarm in interviews. Odinga, for example, listed South Africa, India, Malaysia and China as exemplars when speaking at the launch of *Vision 2030* (Odinga 2008).

The expression of such sentiments is particularly common during official visits to the countries in question, the purpose of which is often to garner Asian investment in Kenya. A 2005 presidential visit to China, with the aims of strengthening bilateral political cooperation and marketing Kenya as an investment destination, also saw China lauded by Kibaki as an example from which his country could learn (State House Kenya 2005). In interviews,

however, the disadvantages and obstacles to lesson-drawing from countries like China and India become clearer, and leaders are given the chance to compare the benefits of various models. This slight discrepancy between public pronouncements that all countries Kenyan leaders visit have something to teach the country, and private admissions that Singapore and Malaysia remain the most suitable models, is illuminating. High profile leaders thus often express their desire to learn from others for partly instrumental reasons, or because the opportunity presents itself and the full implications of emulation have not yet been considered.

Among this panoply of exemplars, senior politicians do maintain a slight emphasis on the East Asian model in their public statements. The narrative is essentially a simplified version of that found in documents by and interviews with bureaucrats and others involved in long-term plans such as *Vision 2030*, however, suggesting that politicians draw this discourse from planners. In fact, in no other publicly available document do Malaysia, Singapore and their neighbours emerge as clearly as models as in the plans jointly drawn up by Kenya's bureaucrats and business leaders. According to the very first paragraph of the 'popular version' of *Vision 2030*, the plan derives from two sources: stakeholder consultations, and 'suggestions by some of the leading local and international experts on how the newly industrialising countries around the world have made the leap from poverty to widely-shared prosperity and equity' (Kenya 2007a: 1). It directly uses the example of these countries to argue for the 'intensive application' of science, technology and innovation, as well as research and development, in order to 'raise productivity and efficiency levels' in Kenya (Kenya 2007a: 8). In a reference to emulation that is relatively unusual among national blueprints for its frankness, it states that its drafters:

learnt as much as they could from countries that have achieved rapid growth and also improved the lives of their people greatly in a span of 20-30 years, with particular reference to the South East Asian 'newly industrialising countries'. The standards achieved by those countries are ones Kenya should aim for, bearing in mind her own history and culture (Kenya 2007a: 3).

This emphasis extends beyond the *Vision 2030* document itself. At the official launch of the Public Service Commission Strategic Plan in 2009, the most senior bureaucrat in the Ministry of Planning cited Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and China as examples of successful human resource development (Sambili 2009). The mid-term review document of the ERS states that Kenya aims 'to function with effectiveness of the kind we have observed in East Asia' (Kenya 2007b: 32). An unpublished presentation delivered by planners to international donors in 2007 used the presence of similar plans in East Asia to make the case for the establishment of what was to become *Vision 2030* (Muia 2007). Prominent Kenyan intellectual, economic planner and ODM leader Peter Anyang' Nyong'o (2007) devotes two chapters to emulation of the East Asian model in his vision of a modern Kenya, entitled *A Leap into the Future*.[32]

The notion that Kenya should learn from East Asia is often debated in the Kenyan media; while most commentaries on the subject express a desire to emulate Malaysia, Singapore and others in the region, however, many are also sceptical that Kenya's current

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[32] As elected representative, intellectual and key economic planner under Kibaki, Anyang' Nyongo occupies several roles, and is arguably most aptly classified using Silva's (2008: 8) term of 'technopolitician' – one who straddles the divide between planner and politician.

leadership is capable of doing so successfully. For every editorial expressing the sentiment that 'Lessons from Malaysia are Key in Resuscitating our Ailing Economy' (Mwiria 2009), there are others who are disillusioned with the prospect:

> To the vice president and the other presidential aspirants though, I would say forget it. They might add a little here and there to our future prosperity, but they cannot match what Dr Mahathir and Mr Kuan Yee [*sic*] did. This is not to doubt their ability and vision for Kenya, but because under our current constitution they will not have both the authority and time to translate their visions into reality...We threw out the good with the bad. That is why we will never have a Dr Mahathir or a Kuan Yee (Wehliye 2011).

If the public pronouncements and writings of Kenya's senior political figures and opinion-makers are marked by a certain ambivalence regarding the best model for Kenya to follow, those of its long-term planners display little of this ambiguity, pointing, once again, to a strong desire on their part to learn from a few specific countries.

4.5. Kenyan Planners and the 'Fall from Grace' Narrative

The finding that Kenyan elites, and particularly its planners, are actively seeking to draw lessons from Singapore and Malaysia poses the obvious question of why this should be the case. Why are elites now focusing on emulation, and are they doing more so at present than in the past? In addition, what criteria do they use when evaluating and selecting potential models?

It will be recalled that my overview of the lesson-drawing literature raised the possibility that numerous cognitive or 'heuristic shortcuts' (Weyland 2004) play an important role in influencing those who borrow policy from abroad. Historical, cultural, linguistic or 'social psychological' affinities (Rose 1993: 107) can lead decision-makers to privilege certain countries or regions over others; elites are also said to prefer models that are geographically close at hand or to which they have had a large amount of exposure. A model's prestige and ease of use are additional factors that may affect the process.

In the case of Kenya, a particular narrative that combined several of these elements emerged as the chief motivating factor for elites looking to Malaysia and Singapore. This narrative, cited in virtually every interview I conducted, ran as follows:

Malaysia, Singapore and Kenya all gained independence from the United Kingdom within a few years of each other, at which stage all three possessed roughly similar levels of development. If anything, Kenya was the more advanced of the three countries, leading Malaysia and Singapore to draw lessons in areas such as agriculture, construction, transport infrastructure and tourism. Since then, something has gone dramatically awry, and Kenya's per capita GDP is now roughly one-third that of Malaysia and Singapore. If we can pinpoint the source of this divergence, we will be able to emulate these countries' trajectories and attain their levels of development and modernity.

This story contains several important elements of convergence and divergence. Historical and social-psychological linkages are writ large here: the three countries were seen as having suffered equally under British rule, having inherited common colonial institutions, and

lacking substantial natural resources. They are also viewed as having 'come of age' at a similar time (independence came in 1957 for Malaysia, 1963 for Kenya and 1965 for Singapore), and therefore having had to confront similar international environments. For one business leader, 'We have a similar historical background—colonisation by the British. Therefore our thought processes might not be that far apart' (KN7). To other respondents, the three countries were 'age mates':

> Even at a personal level, if you want to compare whether you are doing your PhD early enough, what you do is go to your age-mates, people who are born in the same day—have they reached [their] PhD yet? If you find they haven't, you can say 'I'm ahead'. If you find that they finished ten years ago, you'll know that you're lagging behind. So we have picked countries that started together with us. Malaysia, Singapore (KG11).

Most importantly, elites see Kenya as having begun on a similar developmental footing as did these two countries, and even as having acted as their model, in certain sectors, during the early decades of independence. Crucially, this allows Kenyan elites to feel that the lessons they are taking are not entirely new or alien to their society, but that they have merely been 'lost' and are now being re-appropriated.

> We are told, when we go to Singapore, that some of the processes that they used began in Kenya, so I would say we are following a road of modernisation processes that probably we discarded before – that's where we are starting (KG14).

> For example in 1978, Malaysia came to this country to study our national social and security

fund. They also came to study our sugar estates. And in the case of the national social and

security fund, when they went back...they created a provident fund and this became a major

source of capital for investment in buildings and things like that. So this was a major story

for us as a country. That there is something we can learn from them. Although they came to

learn from us, we must have fallen somewhere – we have to go back and learn from them

(KG8).

To Kenya's emulating elites, then, these similarities combine with the vast differences

between the countries' development levels today to produce a very distinct heuristic. The

differences are seen as just large enough to render countries such as Malaysia and Singapore

worthy of admiration, while not so large as to make lesson-drawing impossible; according to

one trade union leader, for example, 'Malaysia was a third world country. Of course we can't

compare ourselves to countries like Germany – those are just too far' (KN4). The speed and

the recent nature of East Asia's growth is also appealing, as elites feel that they can observe,

first-hand, the structural transformations taking place in these economies—and that they can

hope to see similar changes in their own countries within their own lifetimes. One admirer

of Scandinavian development, for example, nonetheless preferred East Asia as a model,

arguing that the former group of countries 'are not moving people out of poverty, they are

actually maintaining the status quo. And I was not there to see what they did or whether they

were very poor like Africa is, and whether they were able to move people out of

poverty' (KG9).

Numerous studies on lesson-drawing have remarked on the deep influence that

stories, symbols and analogies can have on uncertain decision-makers (Robertson 1991;

Stone 1988), and this Kenyan narrative is a very clear example. Certain East Asian countries

are identified and studied as 'laboratories' of development; with elites trying to isolate the independent variable that will account for the differences in outcome between their country and countries like Malaysia. This approach means that no country is too small to selectively learn lessons from: elites are not fazed by Singapore's status as a city-state, while India and China were consistently labelled too big and populous to act as models. The fact that Kenya is said to have acted as erstwhile mentor rather than disciple to these countries is, at the same time, deeply emotionally satisfying.

Despite lukewarm reactions to Western models, one notable aspect of planners' identification of potential models is the role that foreign experts—from East Asia as well as from the West—have played in facilitating the process in Kenya. *Vision 2003* was partially developed and drafted by international business consultants McKinsey and Company, and several planners credited this mechanism with having brought lessons from emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere to their attention. In addition, many of the relationships between senior Kenyan planners and East Asian advisors were brokered in the 1980s and 1990s by international donors seeking to use the Asian Tigers to illustrate the benefits of liberalisation. One planning veteran (KH10) dated his interest from the appearance of the World Bank's (1993) controversial *East Asian Miracle* study, while two others trace their interest to the attendance of lesson-sharing events arranged by Western donors. In addition, East Asian economic advisors to the Kenyan government echo the central narrative and help to construct it, using it as a motivational tool during study visits:

I have forgotten the name of the professor, but he came from South Korea and was identified by UNDP to help us. So he listened to us. And at the end of the workshop he told us – he

was brutally honest – he said '...I will only accept to be your consultant if the UNDP agrees to expose you to how South Korea transformed into a modern economy'...So we came back and I requested to the Permanent Secretary that we think that before we finalise the development plan, we need to visit the Southeast Asian tigers and the South American economies. So I led a team of seven to South Korean, to see how their economic planning and financial institutions functioned. The whole purpose was to appreciate South Korea's transformation – how it became one of the most modern economies in South East Asia (KG8).

It [would have been] very easy for Kenya to go the other direction, because at the time we got independence, we were at the same level as Singapore and Malaysia. Singaporeans remind us all the time that they used to learn from Kenya (KG6).

If these findings are combined with those that have explored Kenyan elites' attitudes towards other potential models such as China and India, it is clear that these decision-makers act on a wide variety of motives when emulating or rejecting models. Exposure to models encourages lesson-drawing to a certain extent; if there is very little history of contact with a country—as is the case with China—distrust, language barriers and the lack of an lesson-sharing infrastructure can discourage elites from emulation. On the other hand, exposure brings benefits only up to a certain point. Overexposure to a country and its people is often accompanied by a history of unequal relations or other historical baggage, as elites' attitudes to the United Kingdom or India as exemplar shows. Transfers that happen between such countries are more likely to be legal or routine rather than broadly policy-based. Familiarity, then, can be a double-edged sword, depending on how it comes about and how impressive foreign models appear when elites are able to witness them first-hand.

Two factors that were decidedly lacking in elite discourse were cultural and geographical proximity, with relatively few elites seeing Kenya's physical or cultural distance from East Asia as a stumbling block to emulation. Conversely, suggestions that Kenya should learn from other African countries due to these same factors were relatively rare; elites were more likely to feel that attempts to compare Kenya to other African countries constituted 'settling' for second best. Rose's (1991: 14) observation that 'subjective identification is more important than geographical propinquity in directing search' is thus strongly backed up by the Kenyan and the Ethiopian case studies.

Nor did dependence sway many respondents—at least not in the manner which might most commonly be supposed. Rather than instrumentally mentioning those countries on which Kenya is most dependent economically or politically, interviewees took care instead to cite models which they saw as engaging with Kenya on a more equal footing. The United Kingdom, Uganda and Tanzania are Kenya's largest trading partners (UN Comtrade 2012), and the UK is the biggest investor in Kenya (FCO 2011), yet these are by no means the countries or regions from which Kenya most wish to draw lessons. Elites feel that emulation holds benefits, but that it may also create indebtedness or dependence between countries. The fact that powerful and threatening countries have not automatically become Kenya's models contradicts not only those who feel that elites' expressions of admiration for certain countries are merely 'lip service', but also those emulation theorists who feel countries look to defensively emulate those countries they see as most advanced and, therefore, as the greatest threat to their survival.

The factors that have ultimately played the greatest role in steering elites, and particularly planners, towards Malaysia, Singapore and other East Asian countries, however,

are the historical and social-psychological backgrounds that elites feel Kenya shares with these former colonies. These factors were mentioned even more frequently than the economic or political performance of the models themselves. The notion that these countries had fulfilled their potential in exactly the same time period that Kenya had squandered its own—and that colonialism alone could thus not entirely be to blame—is an enormously powerful one, and provides a narrative or story that elites can use as a framework for action. That East Asian elites and Western institutions have assisted in the construction of this narrative does not overly concern the pragmatic planners at the heart of Kenya's lesson-drawing efforts.

This is not to imply that East Asia is the only region Kenya wishes to learn lessons from, or that other, more instrumental factors do not sometimes spur lesson-drawing. The almost total absence of references to Taiwan—'Taiwan is never mentioned because of the Chinese relationship', stated one interviewee (KG17)—illustrates this. So too does the last-minute agreement the major political coalitions reached in 2010 to emulate the American constitution in order to strengthen the post-election positions of their top presidential candidates. However, the evidence demonstrates the existence of a layer of emulative behaviour that lies beneath such rhetorical use of foreign evidence, and that this layer is built on narratives that are relatively stable and widely-shared—at least among planners.

If the perceived disparity between Kenya and its 'age-mates' determines planners' choice of model, it also, to a large extent, provides the main reason for these decision-makers' recent 'emulative turn' in the first place. It will be recalled that many studies have found elites to turn to foreign models in the face of recent and far-reaching policy failure (Goldsmith 2005), fears of external domination (Westney 1987), or internal dissent among

elites (Goldman 2006). An analysis of the Ethiopian case has shown each of these conditions to have been present after the fall of the Derg in 1991.

On the one hand, the process of coming to see East Asia as a model has been an incremental one. Interviewees often reported having admired the region for several decades prior to the creation of NESC and *Vision 2030*, variously mentioning 1981 (KN8), 'the early 1990s' (KG10), 1995 (KG6), and 1996 (KG8) as years in which their own professional capacities and exposure to these models began to pique their interest. Emulation of these countries, and others, may even have had a minimal input in government policy at that time. Even Moi, rightly viewed by scholars and interviewees alike as overwhelmingly driven by narrow self-interest, is said to have drawn on Canadian education policies in expanding the provision of technical training at tertiary level (KN13).

On the other hand, two particularly traumatic periods appear to have triggered a deep discontent with the status quo in Kenya, and resulted in a renewed search for external inspiration. Under Moi, the process of policy transfer was largely enacted by Western advisors employed in the Kenyan state machinery as a condition of international aid. Cohen (1992) has detailed the substantial remit of these 'donor constituency', 'gate-keeper' and 'condition precedent' advisors at the time. Implementation of policies—both indigenous and borrowed—was severely lacking, leading to the economic stagnation and disillusionment of the 1990s. It took a period of economic decline, combined with rapid development elsewhere, for Kenyan planners to begin their search for lessons from abroad in earnest; when they did so, they turned to those countries with whom they could draw historical parallels.

An overview of development statistics shows elites' claims regarding the erstwhile parity of Kenya and its models in East Asia to be somewhat exaggerated. At independence, World Bank (2012) figures show that Kenya scored at least slightly lower than Malaysia and Singapore on indicators relating to educational attainment, healthcare and income. To take just one example, one senior Kenyan bureaucrat, comparing his country to Singapore, held that 'in 1964, we were at the same level (if not even a bit better) in terms of GDP per capita' (KG15); in fact, Kenya's per capita income in 1964 was only a third of Malaysia's, and less than a quarter of Singapore's (World Bank 2012). Nonetheless, it is also true that the intervening decades have seen a drastic widening of this gap (see *Fig. 3*), and that the disparity was widest of all in 1992—at the height of the Moi era—when Singapore's per capita income was over 79 times that of Kenya's. Similarly, Kenya's score on the Human Development Index actually decreased from 1990 to 2000, in sharp contrast with its East Asian exemplars (World Bank 2012).

Kenya's disappointing development performance had led to a widespread sentiment of disillusionment and frustration by the end of the 1990s. Virtually all planners who reported viewing East Asian countries as models during Moi's rule held that they had only been able to implement this vision since his electoral defeat. According to one technocrat, 'for 24 years we were moving back...but there is leadership now...You can see a president that is not interfering with what we do – he doesn't come to the treasury and tell us to put money into this or that. He doesn't tell a minister to go and fire so-and-so. He doesn't get involved in that. He lets you do your job' (KG10). Another recalled receiving a stern phone call taking him to task for publicly unfavourably comparing Kenya to South Korea in 1997, 'because the government was headed for elections and I was giving us a bad image' (KG8).

By 2010, my interviewees showed no qualms in repeating the sentiment that East Asia had succeeded where Kenya had failed.

Fig. 3:

Source: World DataBank (2011)

The desire of significant sections of the Kibaki administration to emulate East Asia was visible in several early policy initiatives: in the regime's desire to 'Look East' as a central pillar of its foreign policy, in the explicit mentions to the lessons offered by East Asian economies found in its key policy documents, and in the high profile of Asian advisors such as high-profile Singaporean Victor Koh in NESC and other government bodies. Many of the policy lessons explored in subsequent chapters—such as the explicit modelling of NESC on Malaysia's first National Economic Advisory Council—emerged in the first five years of Kibaki's rule. Kenya has also substantially decreased its dependence on aid and increased its

domestic revenues since 2002 (Mwega 2010: 117), leading to a renewed emphasis on voluntary and mutual lesson-drawing as opposed to policy transfer linked to conditionalities.

At the same time, many interviewees credited a second, more recent trauma with intensifying their desire to learn from others' successes. This event was the disputed 2007 elections, viewed by many as delivering a profound shock to complacent elites accustomed to being lauded for presiding over one of Africa's most peaceful and stable countries:

> If we had gone through a successful election, with no violence, we would be in the same place that we were ten years ago. It was a blessing in disguise...that we were forced to go to a situation we had never been in, and to change systems (KG2).

> The National Accord might mean we had gone too far this time. The first 100 days of 2008 were just a study in how a country can just collapse...When the violence started in Navaisha (that's the holiday retreat for the elites), that's when they realised psychologically that it could come into the city, and Nairobi could become Mogadishu (KN13).

> You'll get limited success unless the country says 'we need to change as an economy and there's a burning platform for us to do so'...Our burning platform was the post-election violence in 2008, and out of that certain things are happening. And if you look at Kenya over the next five years and look at what the triggering event of development was in this country, you'd probably find that the post-election violence was that burning platform...We've taken the opportunity to form NESC – all these things are as a result of that. And that obviously at some stage, if my theory works, out of these ashes will rise the phoenix of a new Kenya' (KN5).

But for us I think maybe the damage was not so bad – and I think it was able to give us the impetus to pass the constitution. It helped for sure, because consensus used to be a bit difficult, but now people say 'we don't want to go back'. Because in Kenya nobody actually ever thought we could break into violence. (KN20).

The analysis above indicates that it is not entirely correct to state that Kenyan planners have only recently begun to desire the emulation of East Asia. Several senior planners who served under Moi had similar goals, but feel that this was previously impossible due to the ineptitude of Kenya's political leadership, the country's dependency on the Bretton Woods institutions, the closed nature of the Kenyan economy at the time and the overweening power of the Office of the President. Now that such factors have arguably diminished in impact, they feel, there is greater pressure—and freedom—to follow Malaysia and Singapore's success.

This is not to say that the influence of conditionalities has ceased, or that implementation of lessons is now running smoothly. The National Accord—the peace settlement that halted the violence in 2007—emerged from mediation efforts by an international team led by Kofi Annan. The inclusion of foreign experts in bodies such as the CoE and the Independent Review Commission of the 2007 Elections was mandated by the same body rather than the result of initiatives taken by lesson-drawers themselves (KAF 2009: 57, 59). As we have seen, non-governmental elites are often vociferous in their criticism of the government's perceived inability to transform its plans into reality. Nonetheless, even these critics, on the whole, express a cautious optimism that Kenya's

situation might be gradually improving, and link this improvement to the events of the post-2007 period. Although these elites may at times disagree with the lessons drawn by NESC and the *Vision 2030* planners, their greater concern is the lack of implementation of foreign lessons: more effective emulation—rather than more selective emulation—is generally advocated. Strikingly, the vast majority of elites equate successful lesson-drawing with general policy success.

According to Rose (1991: 10), 'policymakers are driven by the need to dissipate dissatisfaction. Instead of new knowledge, policymakers prefer the assurance of doing what has worked before, or been effective elsewhere'. In this case, Kenya's economic misfortunes in the 1990s created the widespread sense that existing policies had failed, which came to a head with the election of a new president in 2002. Although attempts to emulate East Asia and other models soon followed, elites feel that these began to pick up speed only when the devastating 2007 elections laid bare the policy failures of the first years of the Kibaki regime.

5.6 Conclusion

The Kenyan case adheres less comfortably than its Ethiopian counterpart to suggestions that China is increasingly acting as a model to African leaders. There is little evidence to suggest that the rise of China has so captivated Kenyan elites that they wish to study its development trajectory for lessons they can apply to their domestic situation. Nor do Indian, Western or African models have the impact that opponents of the Chinese Model would wish, although isolated lessons are drawn from some of these countries.

This does not mean, however, that the broader rise of non-Western models of development have not had an important influence on the development thinking of Kenyan policy, business and community leaders. A handful of countries in East Asia that initially appear to be unlikely models for Kenya are, in fact, emerging as the sources of many lessons. Foremost among these are Singapore and Malaysia, twin exemplars heralded by Kenyan elites for the economic and developmental achievements that they are said to have attained since 'coming of age' with Kenya in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The impulse to borrow from Singapore and Malaysia is particularly strong among those business and policy elites who are most heavily involved in the flagship *Vision 2030* development strategy, and in the National Economic and Social Council that advises the President on issues of broad, long-term national planning.

This desire to draw from Singapore and Malaysia cannot be fully understood without again returning to Kenya's own historical context. Kenya's first influential post-independence elites were also national planners who sought to emulate the 'successful' models of the day—in this case, the United States and Great Britain. Kenya's embrace of post-war modernisation theory under technocrats such as Tom Mboya saw substantial economic growth, but also the beginning of deep ideological rifts that would divide Kenyan academia and research for several decades. This short-lived era soon gave way to succession struggles and interest-based politics, however; Kenya's problems were compounded by exogenous shocks, aid dependency and economic stagnation in the 1980s and 1990s.

Kenya's emulating elites long for a return to what has been referred to as Kenya's 'golden age' (Maxon and Ndege 1995: 151), and have constructed a narrative that they feel will enable them to do so. Driven more by psychological and historical affinity than by

physical or cultural proximity, they look to Singapore and Malaysia as 'age mates' that took the path that Kenya missed. The power of this narrative is compounded by the fact that these East Asian countries engaged in a certain amount of emulation of Kenya shortly after independence, when all three countries were ostensibly equally developed; this parity is somewhat exaggerated, but contains at least a measure of veracity. Emulation of Malaysia and Singapore entails, by this thinking, the transplantation not of 'foreign' models, but simply home-grown strategies that Kenya has forgotten in its fall from grace.

This narrative could hardly be summed up more clearly than in an excerpt from senior planner Anyang' Nyongo's *Leap into the Future* (2007: 22). Anyang' Nyongo writes of speaking to Singapore's then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at a conference in 1995:

> During question time, I asked the Senior Minister one question, which was: 'Sir: you say that in 1969, when your GDP per capita was the same as ours in Kenya and Uganda then, you people made a deliberate choice to move rapidly with economic growth and achieve growth targets which led you to eradicate poverty, provide full employment and achieve a modern standard of living for your people. Why couldn't we do the same?' The Senior Minister looked calmly at me and replied: 'While we chose to go forward in Singapore, you in Kenya assassinated Tom Mboya.' The answer was pregnant with meaning.

There is much more talk of the 'Chinese Model' than of the 'East Asian Model' today, but the Kenyan case shows this move to be premature. As in Ethiopia, Kenyan elites adapt and select from the East Asian model to fit their historical and psychological needs. The next chapters will explore exactly which lessons they take in the process. Moving away from the question of whether elites draw models and which geographical area they focus on in their

efforts, the coming section uses theories of development to instead examine the substance of

elite emulation of East Asia.

PART III: AFRICAN ELITES AND LESSONS IN MODERNISATION

CHAPTER SIX: MODERNISATION AND ITS SUCCESSORS IN AFRICA

This dissertation seeks not only to understand whether China serves as a model to elites in Kenya and Ethiopia, but also to uncover the lessons that these elites are attempting to draw from their chosen models and to situate these within a broader theoretical framework. The processes of lesson-drawing that I examine here are in large part significant because they diverge from recent developmental practices and challenge the *status quo*. It thus important to provide an overview of the evolution of the development theories that have dominated in Africa since the post-colonial period, within which I will then embed my empirical analysis. This section does not seek to offer any substantial revisions to our current understanding of post-colonial paradigms, but simply to clarify how terms such as *modernisation theory, dependency theory* and the *Washington Consensus* are used in this work and in what ways they are seen to differ from one another. Because this dissertation argues that Ethiopia and Kenya's emulation of East Asia is repopularising many of the assumptions and principles of the modernisation theory that proved so central to African development thinking in the early post-colonial period, particular attention will be paid to this school of thought.

6.1 Modernisation Theory

Development theory, as the concept is thought of today, dates back to the period shortly after World War Two, when a series of international events radically altered the way policymakers and academics approached the amelioration of social, political and economic problems

around the world. Europe's former colonial territories were beginning to achieve independence, raising the question of which policies would best help these new countries to attain prosperity and modernity. The Cold War had begun to divide the world into competing spheres, giving the United States a stake in the direction the countries of the Third World would choose to follow. New institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) were radically altering the international economic environment and facilitating, for the first time, the creation of a global development agenda. In academia, comparative politics shifted its focus to political development outside the West, while a parallel development in economics saw the advent of the notion that 'backward' countries faced specialised challenges outside the purview of classical economic thought.

Out of this environment emerged modernisation theory, arguably thus the first theory of international development. At once a political programme for developing-country elites, a plank of US foreign policy and an interdisciplinary research agenda, modernisation theory was not a single, unified, unchanging body of work or practice. Many later critics who blamed modernisation theorists for uniformly caricaturing the divisions between the developed and developing world were themselves thus guilty of a similar lack of nuance. However, the theory's origins as an alternative to the historical materialism found in Marxism and at the time gaining popularity in parts of the developing world lent it a certain coherence that united proponents and followers alike. As such, certain recurring assumptions and prescriptions can be found in the writings of key proponents such as Talcott Parsons, Marion Levy, Neil Smelser, Walt Rostow, Seymour Lipset, Lucien Pye, Daniel Lerner and Gabriel Almond. Whilst the term 'modernisation' was itself rarely used in the early years of this approach, a set of common themes rapidly emerged, and these themes found a clear

expression in development policy. In focusing on the commonality of these themes rather than the differences between individual works and authors, I approach modernisation theory not as 'a mishmash of ideas' (Harrison 1988: 1) but rather, like Tipps (1973: 201), as a general 'value system' or 'theoretical orientation'.

Comprising political scientists and sociologists and originating mainly from the United States, modernisation theorists drew on the work of 19th century thinkers such as Max Weber and Emil Durkheim. They retained these original authors' focus on industrialisation, rationality and the cultural linkages between capitalism and culture, whilst at the same time adapting these to the optimistic and ideologically-divided post-war setting and thereby downplaying the disillusionment and ambivalence found, for example, in the *Entzauberung* (disillusionment) of Weber (1991 [1919]), the *anomie* of Durkheim (1997 [1893]) or the *Entfremdung* (alienation) of Marx (2007 [1857]).[33]

At the heart of modernisation theory lay the belief that the evolution of non-Western societies towards the modes of economic, societal and political organisation found in their Western counterparts was both inevitable and desirable. According to Moore, 'modernization is the total transformation of a traditional or pre-modern society into the types of technology and the associated social organization that characterise the '"advanced", economically prosperous and relatively politically stable nations of the western world' (1963: 89), while to

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[33] *Anomie* is a word without an uncontroversial English equivalent, but it has most often been defined as 'normlessness' or, in Merton's classic definition, 'a breakdown in the cultural structure, occurring particularly when there is an acute disjunction between the cultural norms and goals and the socially-structured capacities of members of the group to act in accord with them' (Merton 1968: 216). Limitations of scope unfortunately preclude a deeper discussion on these three classical theorists of modernity, as a fuller discussion would detract from the current focus on the influence of post-war modernization theory on African leaders.

Lerner (1964: ix), a model that first 'evolved in the West as a historical fact...reappears in virtually all modernizing societies on all continents of the world, regardless of variations in race, color, creed'. A 'Great Dichotomy' (Huntington 1971: 285) divided the societies of the world into the 'traditional' and the 'modern', but societies eventually could, and would, move from one category to the other through a series of roughly predictable stages of development. Movement along these 'stages of growth' would bring about convergence between societies, although each society would begin this process at a different point in history.

This notion of staged development along a single, irreversible trajectory was most unambiguously expressed in Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth,* subtitled *A Non-Communist Manifesto* (1990 [1960]). Rostow, a close advisor of the Kennedy administration in the area of international aid and the modernisation theorist who most consciously straddled the divide between Cold War policy-making and academia, posited the existence of five stages through which modernising nations would pass before reaching the stage of 'high mass consumption' witnessed in the West. The most important of these was 'take-off', when levels of investment were sufficiently high and political/societal institutions sufficiently developed as to make economic growth the 'normal condition' of society (Rostow 1990 [1960]). Similarly, Parsons (1971) viewed development in terms of biological evolution, with societies increasing in complexity as they passed through four stages from the 'primitive' to the 'modern'. Parsons placed Western Europe, the Soviet Union, Japan and the United States in the latter category, and designated the United States as the most modern of these (Parsons 1971: 114).

Not all modernisation theorists agreed on the factor or factors that would start a country on its journey along this trajectory, or the order in which they would occur. The

earliest tended to focus on a single 'critical variable' (Tipps 1973: 203) such as industrialisation or rationalisation. Even as this single-variable approach began to give way to broader accounts, theorists focused on roughly two groups of facilitating factors. To many, certain cultural and social preconditions had to exist before a country could begin to experience the rapid economic growth and industrialisation that was associated with development. McClelland (quoted in Gilman 2007: 98), for example, saw entrepreneurship and the 'need for achievement' as underpinning economic growth; where these do not exist, 'traditional norms *must* give way to new ones'.[34]   For Rostow, the most important precondition for 'take-off' was normative: 'above all, the concept must be spread that man need not regard his physical environment as virtually a factor given by nature and providence, but as an ordered world which, if rationally understood, can be manipulated in ways which yield productive change and...progress' (Rostow 1960: 19). According to this neo-Weberian approach, this change in values would bring about, *inter alia,* advances in education, an increase in entrepreneurial skills, and the creation of institutions that could mobilise the capital needed to bring about industrialisation.

Among this set of perspectives, Parsons (1991 [1951]; 1965) was perhaps most influential in his identification of five 'pattern variables'—dichotomous choices that individuals make in their relations with others and that thereby determine broader social structures and values. Individuals act *instrumentally* rather than *expressively* when they: apply universal standards to their actions, are oriented towards the well-being of the collectivity, are able to exercise emotional restraint in their dealings with others, evaluate others on the basis of their achievements rather than their inborn qualities, and act in a

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[34] Emphasis in the original.

context-specific manner (Parsons 1991 [1951]; 1965).[35]   Societies with higher levels of instrumental behaviour are more likely to develop 'evolutionary universals' such as money, bureaucracy and social stratification, and this, in turn, leads to greater societal complexity and modernity (Parsons 1964).

As important as Parson's variables were, it took another theorist, Marion Levy, to historicise these largely theoretical observations, and to attempt to adapt them to the developing world. According to Levy (1952: 118-119), traditional societies were marked by non-rational, functionally diffuse and particularistic values and role orientations. Modern societies, on the other hand, operate according to rational, functionally specific and universalistic values and role orientations.[36]

Another smaller set of theorists approached the relationship between culture and economics from the opposite direction, viewing the socio-cultural transformations they sought in the developing world as stemming primarily from industrialisation and the mechanisation of labour. For Inkeles and Smith (1974: 155) the factory was 'a school in modernity', where 'traditional man' learned the attitudes and behaviour of 'modern man'. These values included punctuality, openness to new experiences and to social change, an understanding of the need for long-term national and personal planning, a belief in science and technology, and an understanding of social issues outside one's immediate environment (Inkeles and Smith (1974: 21-24). With technological and scientific advances allowing for the greater accumulation of capital and mobilisation of natural resources, rapid increases in

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[35] The formal designations for these five dichotomies are: diffuseness versus specificity, affectivity versus affective neutrality, particularism versus universalism, ascription versus achievement and self-orientation versus collectivity-orientation. A useful discussion of these, and other, Parsonian concepts can be found in Trevino (2001: xxxviii-xli).

[36] The terms of a functionally specific relationship are expressly and precisely defined and delimited, whereas those in a functionally diffuse relationship are vaguely defined (Levy 1966: 144).

the incomes of large sections of the population were now possible. For this reason, a society 'is more or less modernized to the extent that its members use inanimate sources of power and/or use tools to multiply the effects of their efforts' (Levy 1966: 11).

These perspectives shared with Marx a view of 'technology as the prime mover of industrialization and social change' (Burns 1969: 35), but viewed the immediate changes it wrought as primarily positive and permanent in nature. With this emphasis on industrial development, two further themes emerged. One was a deep belief in human rationality, scientific progress and the perfectibility of society. Modernization allowed for humanity's 'rapidly-widening control over nature' (Rustow 1967: 3). It entailed the 'rationalisation' of society, first described by Weber (2003 [1905/1930]), whereby the criterion of rationality became increasingly central in different areas of collective decision-making (Habermas 1971: 81). Modernisation theory was thus an optimistic (and to its critics utopian) vision, whereby rationality was associated with 'progress' and social improvement. As the chairman of two of America's most potent symbols of modernity—the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and United States Atomic Energy Agency—wrote in 1949, 'this American experiment has fortified men's confidence that human beings need not be chained to the wheel of technology, but that man can use the machine in the interest of human welfare' (Lilienthal 1949: 49-50).

A second theme was rapid economic growth, seen to go hand in hand with industrialisation and cultural transformation. Whether cultural change led to industrialisation or vice versa, the overarching goal was the accumulation of capital and the raising of incomes. Rostow's (1990 [1960]) definition of development as a country's movement through five stages of economic growth is the clearest example of this emphasis, but the

assumption that this process underpinned development pervaded the literature as a whole. Critics and defenders alike label economic growth the '*ne plus ultra*' (Gilman 2007: 183) and 'core societal project' (Inglehart 1997: 77) of modernisation theory. This focus would not have been unusual among economists, but that it should have converged around a group of sociologists and political scientists was somewhat more surprising.

One of the reasons for this emphasis was the perceived relationship between economic growth and democracy. Beginning with the influential work of Seymour Lipset, modernisation theorists generally believed that an increase in a country's national wealth would set off a series of societal changes that were in turn likely to culminate in democratisation. National wealth would allow for the creation of a functional civil service, and the distribution of economic goods would tend to become more equitable as overall wealth increased (Lipset 1960: 64). More importantly, economic growth would lead to the emergence of an educated, politically-engaged middle class. Whereas traditional ruling classes might be loath to relinquish inherited power and wealth through political reform, and working classes prone to electing radical parties running on populist platforms, the middle classes produced by a free market would tend towards 'secular reformist gradualism' (Lipset 1960: 60) that would bring about the gradual widening of political participation. 'The more well-to-do a nation', wrote Lipset, 'the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy' (Lipset 1960: 48).

Observers will note the sheer range of societal sectors with which modernisation theorists were concerned. Whatever the relationship between industrialisation and cultural change, something in the interaction between these two variables was seen to bring about an array of additional, interlinked transformations in the political, cultural, religious, economic,

organisational and legal arenas. This stood in direct contrast (and opposition) to Marxist theories of historical materialism, 'that view of the course of history', in the words of Engels (2008 [1878]: 16),

> ...which seeks the ultimate cause and the great moving power of all important historic events in the economic development of society, in the changes in the modes of production and exchange, in the consequent division of society into distinct classes, and in the struggles of these classes against one another'.

Modernisation theory, on the other hand, viewed socio-cultural change as integral to the modernisation process, rather than solely reactive. This was largely due to the notion of structural functionalism, in many ways constituting the core of modernisation theory and stemming, once again, from the work of Parsons (1991 [1951]). Structural functionalism provided a 'grand narrative' of social change, seeking to subsume all global societies and historical periods under a unifying holistic narrative. It conceived of society as an organic, self-correcting whole, in which each component would adapt to maintain overall equilibrium:

> Societies are more or less self-sufficient, adaptive social systems, characterised by varying degrees of differentiation, and with roles and institutions, rather than concrete individuals, as their principal units. The balance of equilibrium of the various parts of the whole maintained for as long as certain functional prerequisites are satisfied and, generally speaking, an institution is 'explained' once the functions it fulfills are satisfied. Finally, the entire

system...is kept together through the operation of a central value system broadly embodying social consensus (Harrison 1988: 6).

Building on this theory that social norms worked to maintain societal functional equilibrium, numerous subsequent modernisation scholars identified the adjustments societies were said to make in the face of industrialisation. To Smelser (1959) and others, modernisation entailed structural differentiation, whereby a role previously filled by one social organisation or group splits into several roles or entities, in order to better cope with increasing social complexity. Modernisation is the 'universal social solvent' (Levy quoted in Gilman 2007: 125), which subsumes and transforms traditional modes of human organisation. Kinship loses its hitherto central importance, with the family ceding certain roles to other institutions such as schools, factories and trade unions. Many accounts built on the observations of 19th century sociologists who witnessed, first-hand, the effects of the Industrial Revolution. Urbanisation, greater social, occupational and geographical mobility (Sutton 1963: 67), the rise of mass media (Lerner 1964) and the rise of voluntary association were some of the trends seen to accompany—and hasten—this process. All these changes combined to move a society inexorably from the traditional to the modern.

A large group of theorists focused specifically on changes in political organisation. Ward and Rustow (1964: 6-7), for example, identified eight features of a 'modern' polity. These included a high level of popular identification with the history, territory and national identity of the state, the prevalence of rational and secular procedures of political decision-making and a high level of functional differentiation in government. The cultural changes brought about by modernisation would spill over into the political sphere as communal

identities began to give way to functionally-specific interest groups (Coleman 1960: 535). The most famous conceptualisation of political modernisation stemmed from the work of US Social Sciences Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics, led by Lucien Pye. It came to similar conclusions, finding an increase in political equality, government capacity and structural differentiation to be at the heart of this new 'development syndrome' (Pye 1972 [1966]: 33).

Modernisation theory's desire to subsume economic development under the broader banner of societal change often put it at odds with economists. On the one hand, theorists of modernisation viewed economic growth as the central prerequisite for developments such as rises in living standards, democratisation and personal self-fulfilment; on the other hand, authors such as Hoselitz (1960) charged purely economic analyses with neglecting the socio-cultural preconditions and effects of this fiscal growth.

Because the process of modernisation was viewed as so self-contained and yet comprising so many inter-related elements, the theory exhibited a distinct focus on internal causes of development. Although Parsons and others often used the term *society*, this tended to be assumed as corresponding to the nation-state—indeed, it was hoped that modernisation would create a 'nation' to fit the 'state'. Inkeles and Smith (1974), placed their 'modern' men firmly within this framework, for example. States were generally treated as closed and natural systems (Martinelli 2005: 30), a development encouraged both by structural functionalism and the growth of new states in the post-colonial era (Harrison 1988: 59). As a result, any obstacles to development—whether in the form of traditional values, elite intransigence or a lack of technological know-how—were overwhelmingly seen as internal and domestic in nature.

In modernisation theory, the state was more than merely the unit of analysis—it was both a primary agent and an outcome of modernisation. Contemporary critics who class modernisation with neo-liberalism as a manifestation of Western ideological hegemony (e.g. Dibua 2006: 5) overlook *inter alia* the central role that the former accorded to a strong and even coercive state. 'Strong, centralized government' would break traditional kinship ties and create wage relations; it would also accommodate the competing demands levelled at the new political unit (Smelser 1959: 60). Only the modern state could mobilise sufficient resources, and then make the investments in infrastructure, education and political institutions needed to bring about economic growth and industrialisation. To Reinhart Bendix, modernisation primarily entailed the creation of an authoritative, bureaucratic nation-state with revenue-raising powers and the extension of formal citizenship to all classes of society. 'The growth of the welfare state in the industrialised societies of the world, which in one way or another provides a pattern of accommodation among competing

groups', was 'a model to be emulated by the political and intellectual leaders of follower societies' (Bendix quoted in Gilman 2003: 16).[37]

Modernisation theorists were by no means alone in their advocacy of a strong state in the post-war period. In mainstream economics, the rise of Keynesianism overturned the *laissez-faire* capitalism of the interwar years and ushered in a new consensus on the importance of what came to be called 'managed capitalism' (Rapley 2007: 17). Development economists and comparative historians such as Alexander Gerschenkron (1965) argued that latecomer and 'backward' countries needed—and benefited from—higher levels of government intervention than did early industrialisers; what they lacked in private enterprise and capital, they would gain in readily adaptable technologies. Gerschenkron and Rostow disagreed on the extent to which the development trajectories of latecomers would diverge from the experience of the first modernisers, but both accorded the state an important role in

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[37] Due to his criticism of early modernisation theory and what he viewed as the overly simplistic dichotomies contained therein (Bendix 1967), Bendix is not always considered a modernisation theorist. Huntington (1971: 293), for example, labels him a proponent of 'modernization revisionism'. Other authoritative assessments, however, include Bendix in the former category (Harrison 1988: 47; Gilman 2003: 16). Harrison (1988: 47) points out that Bendix's critique operated within the parameters of modernisation theory rather than outside it. Despite Bendix's (1967: 307-309) often vociferous criticism of Parsonian approaches to 'tradition' and 'modernity', his work is a reconsideration of the processes by which countries modernise, industrialise and 'catch up' rather than a rejection of these notions. Bendix is also the originator of one of the most influential definitions of modernisation as 'a type of social change which originated in the industrial revolution of England…and in the political revolution in France'; ever since, he states, 'the world has been divided into advanced and follower societies' (Bendix 1967: 329-330). Even Huntington (1971: 293), therefore, views Bendix and other early revisionists as offering only 'a small-scale corrective reaction' to early modernisation theory. For these reasons, Bendix is here loosely classed as a modernisation theorist.

adapting the foreign technologies and mobilising the resources that would allow it to 'catch up' with 'firstcomers'. 'Only vigorous leadership from the central government', wrote Rostow (1990 [1960]: 31), 'can bring about those radical changes...whose quick achievement may also constitute a precondition for take-off'. Later writings on modernisation more explicitly took Gerschenkron's point on board; Levy, for example, felt that modernisation necessitated unprecedented levels of centralisation, control and planning—'usually under government auspices, but by no means confined to them' (Levy 1966: 529).

This control was to be partially economic in nature, as modernisation theory's faith in economic planning illustrated. The government should not control the means of production, it was felt, and a private economic realm operating on the principles of supply and demand was certainly viewed as essential to economic growth—these are, after all, the key factors distinguishing modernization theory from Marxism and the approaches the latter was to inspire after modernization theory's downfall. However, the scientific knowledge and rationality of governmental technical experts gave it an overview of the entire system that private capital lacked, giving the government a key steering role. Modernisation required 'planning and the employment of economists and statisticians, conducting surveys to control the rates of savings and investments, the construction of new factories, the building of roads and harbors, the development of railways, irrigation schemes, fertilizer production, agricultural research, forestry research, ceramics research, and research of fuel utilization' (Shils quoted in Gilman 2003: 2). The success of the Marshall Plan and the rapid industrialisation of the Soviet Union had demonstrated to American observers the potential of state-led technocratic planning, and the enormous government-led TVA project—intended to modernise the 'backward' areas of the United States during the 1930s—became, post-war,

an example for US-advised governments to implement as far afield as South Vietnam, Iran and Colombia (Ekhbladh 2002).

Modernisation theory's emphasis on technocratic planning and economic growth had political and socio-cultural implications, too. Formally, and in keeping with their firm allegiance to the Unites States and their liberal credentials, modernisation theorists supported the democratisation of all developing countries. At the same time, there was a parallel recognition, in keeping with Lipset, that full democracy might need to be delayed until the cultural transformation, stability, institutional development and economic growth necessary to sustain it had taken place. Exponents thus believed that apparent short-term dangers to democracy—such as monolithic and unchallenged ruling parties—could in fact sometimes go on to strengthen democracy (Eisenstadt 1966: 95). Lucien Pye (quoted in Berger 2004: 103) expressed the need for a 'grand ideological solution' and a 'greater sense of order' in transitional societies such as Burma. Mass education and a certain amount of social engineering were needed in order to train citizens for their roles in the new modern state. Of course, the practical application of modernisation theory through American foreign policy saw further sacrifices to democracy in the name of putative technological and economic progress, as attacks on the democratically-elected rulers of countries such as Chile, Zaire and Nicaragua showed. There existed, therefore, an 'authoritarian flavor' in large sections of the theory, particularly in later years as the Cold War wore on and developing countries failed to democratise as expected (Gilman 2007: 9). By 1972, one of the most fervent modernisation theorists was sufficiently disillusioned to state that 'whether the political procedures of latecomers will be properly described as "democratic" is highly questionable' (Levy 1972: 109).

Even where modernisation theorists and practitioners continued to emphasise democratic government, their conception of it remained fairly technocratic and elite-led. Levy, Almond, Pye and their cohorts may have been political liberals, but they were still men of their time—and American democracy in the 1950s looked very different from Western democracy today. Populism and mass rule were viewed as major causes of both fascism and communism (Lipset 1960: 137) and it was hoped that the politics of modernisation would be able to rise above this melee. Democracy was approached in minimalist, Schumpeterian terms, whereby democratic procedures, rather than outcomes, were used as criteria for evaluating democracy (Schumpeter 1976 [1950]). Democracy was a system of government in which citizens gave groups of political elites the right to rule in periodic elections, but these elites could not rely on the often unformed and uninformed opinions of citizens in day-to-day decision-making. It is for this reason that observers have often characterised modernisation theory as 'strangely apolitical' (Schech and Haggis 2000: 11).

One of the most pressing questions that modernisation theory had to answer was how modernisation would spread between—and within—latecomer societies. Although exponents generally believed the process to be inevitable, positive and unidirectional, several were also aware of its inherent tensions and problems. Lerner (1964) wrote of the crises of identity that could result from rapid modernisation, and Smelser (1959) catalogued the 'social disturbances' that accompanied it. Structural functionalism meant that the system would eventually correct itself, but the process was not always a smooth one. Most modernising societies contained one or several 'growth poles', where the cultural, economic and legal impact of modernisation originated, and from which these then radiated (Harrison 1988: 60). This could result in 'dual societies' where tradition and modernisation temporarily existed

side by side and competed for dominance. It was the role of political elites to gradually move modernisation beyond the growth pole towards the rest of society (Shils 1962: 60, Germani and Silvert 1961: 68-70) and the role of entrepreneurial elites to create the economic conditions for continued growth (Rostow 1990 [1960]).

But if modernisation constituted 'the model of the West detached in some way from its geographical origins and locus' (Shils quoted in Gilman 2007: 2), how was this jump from one setting to another to be made initially? Although Marx, Durkheim and other early observers had held a primarily evolutionary view, believing that similar conditions would naturally unfold from country to country as industrialisation progressed, the majority of post-war theorists took a more interventionist line. Diffusion, not evolution, would provide the conditions for 'take-off'—conditions which had been endogenous to Britain but would be the result of 'external intrusion by more advanced societies elsewhere' (Rostow 1990 [1960]: 6). Similarly, to Parsons (1971: 137) these changes were extended by colonisation and through the example of 'lead societies' such as the United States.

In the Cold War context, this view manifested itself in an interventionist foreign policy aimed at actively bringing about the capitalist modernisation of post-colonial states around the world. Beginning with Truman's highly influential Point Four Programme, the United States made the provision of technical assistance and other forms of foreign assistance to developing countries a central plank of its foreign policy. These countries were at danger of attempting a dangerous short-cut to industrialisation—communism—but the United States itself could help them to 'leapfrog' to more advanced stages of development. As Truman announced in 1949:

We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery....Their economic life is primitive and stagnant....[while] our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible (Truman 1949).

Modernisation theorists were at the heart of this trend in American foreign policy, and volumes by Ekbladh (2011) and Engerman (2003) have detailed the immense influence that theorists such as Lerner and Millikan had in research and policy-making institutes such as the Center for Economic Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Rostow was particularly successful at straddling the divide between policy and practice, steering, in the early 1960s, Kennedy's dramatic moves towards higher levels of foreign aid to countries seen as at risk of falling under Soviet influence (Haefele 2003). Contemporary scholars have thus emphasised the domestic historical and ideological circumstances by which modernisation theory became legitimated as a central plank of American foreign policy (Latham 2000; Gilman 2003, 2007).

Although newly independent countries falling under the United States' sphere of influence were thus strongly encouraged to adhere to the precepts of modernisation theory, there is also substantial evidence to suggest that these ideas resonated with many of the leaders of these countries themselves. I have already explored the attraction of the Haile-Selassie and early Kenyatta regimes towards these ideas in 1960s Ethiopia and Kenya respectively, but these did not stand alone. Most developing countries attempted to implement aspects of modernisation theory before the popularity of dependency theory in the 1970s moved many in a more Marxist-oriented direction. In Indonesia, Suharto's New Order

regime was heavily influenced by Rostow and his peers (Tirtosudarmo 2005: 64), and in Turkey, a political-military coalition continued Attaturk's prewar Kemalist modernisation project. A host of other non-aligned countries such as India, Egypt and Tanzania distanced themselves from the West rhetorically, but undertook clear projects of modernisation, marked by an emphasis on nation- and state-building, secularisation, industrialisation and scientific advancement. The reaction of American policy-makers and intellectuals to the latter group was not always positive; in their desire for rapid transformation, Third World modernisers borrowed from the Soviet Union as well as from the West, and emphasised heavy industry and the role of the state to an even greater degree than advocated by modernisation theory. The equation of modernisation with industrialisation led to widespread import-substitution, for example. However, as Engerman (2003: 216) points out, the goal remained familiar: 'for many nations in the world, centrally planned industrialization was a route to modernity, not to communism. And if the quickest route to economic modernity mimicked aspects of the Soviet experience...so be it.' In the substance of policy, if not always in the explicit recognition of models, many of modernisation theory's optimistic, technocratic and evolutionary ideas appealed to national leaders inheriting multi-ethnic, post-colonial states.

Several authors have constructed lists of the main features of modernisation theory—some from the perspective of political science (Huntington 1971), some from development studies (Harrison 1988; Brohman 1996: 16) and some from sociology (Alexander 1994). Combining these disciplinary perspectives with the review given above, modernisation theory can be said to adhere to the following nine core beliefs:

1. Societies largely function as *self-contained and self-correcting units*, where changes in each subsystem brings about changes in the others. In the modern world, the borders of societies correspond with those of nation-states.

2. Development occurs in *discrete stages* that are similar for all countries, although the speed taken may vary. The world's most industrialised and wealthy countries occupy the final stage of development, and developing countries must do all they can to 'catch up'.

3. The primary means by which countries progress from one stage to another is through *rapid economic growth and industrialisation*, achieved within the framework of a capitalist economy. This brings about broad-based structural change, transforming the country from a primarily agricultural to a primarily industrial economy.

4. Possessing a culture that is predisposed to modernisation can help a country to develop more quickly. Failing that, however, modernisation can also bring about the necessary *shifts in cultural orientation* through education and the creation of a middle class. Traditional societal practices are more often hindrances than facilitators of modernisation.

5. The *harnessing of science and technology* can allow a country to gain control over its environment, mobilise resources and solve the most pressing problems of its people.

6. The state's immediate political task, in developing countries, is *nation-building rather than democratisation*. The desired end-point is a democratic welfare state, but the state's immediate role in planning, infrastructural development and capital accumulation is more important in the initial stages of modernisation.

7. Although the obstacles to modernisation are largely *endogenous*, modern countries can help traditional countries to develop by providing technical and financial assistance.

8. Technocrats and other *modernising elites* have the knowledge needed to make society's key decisions in a neutral, scientific manner, and also play an important role in spreading modern culture through society.

9. Development is at once a *revolutionary* and an *evolutionary* process. In the depth and scale of its change, it naturally transforms every facet of society, but an attempt to hurry the process through a literal overthrowing of the existing political or economic order is ill-advised.

Very few modernisation theorists would have agreed with every single point on the above list. Analyses ranged from the highly simplistic (arguably best embodied in Rostow) to the nuanced and sophisticated (particularly among later scholars such as Bendix and Eisenstadt). In addition, several development doctrines before or since have shared some of these beliefs. However, it is in the distinctive combination of these nine facets that this specific development doctrine resides. We are, at the very least, able to say the more of these beliefs a theorist or practitioner adheres to, the more he/she is a proponent of modernisation theory.

6.2 Dependency Theory and Marxist-Inspired Approaches

As the 1960s gave way to a new decade, modernisation theory became subjected to increasing criticism. Although it attempted to absorb and counter these attacks from within

—with each subsequent edition of its founding texts prefaced by a greater and greater emphasis on historical contingency and on the tensions inherent in the process of modernisation (Rostow 1990 [1960]: xxxix-xlvi; Pye 1972 [1966]: viii)—the theory soon began to crumble under the weight of attacks from both sides of the political spectrum. By 1976, Emmanuel Wallerstein (1976) had declared the paradigm 'dead', and modernisation theorists themselves, worried about their declining popularity in developing countries, found themselves fretting that 'our subject matter has turned its back on us' (Smelser 2010).

One of the most influential critiques of modernisation theory usefully distinguishes between the empirical, metatheoretical and ideological charges levelled at the paradigm (Tipps 1973). Within the first category, modernisation's allegedly teleological and automatic nature was questioned (Weinberg 1969: 12); rather than being a unilinear path to convergence, critics argued, modernisation could suffer setbacks and fragmentation. A related point of contention concerned what critics saw as a static and overly uniform understanding of preindustrial societies. In this vein, Huntington (1971: 293) challenged what he viewed as a false and simplistic dichotomy between tradition and modernity—a dichotomy more concerned with 'ideal types' than the often-messy realities of transitional societies. Sceptics also disagreed with what they saw as modernisation's technological determinism and elitism (Weinberg 1969: 9-10). By underplaying the role of historical factors, human agency and non-elite actors, they argued, modernisation theory was presenting a distorted view of reality.

The retreat of the modernisation paradigm was also coinciding with a metatheoretical revolution in the social sciences. Structural functionalism and grand systemic narratives of social change were beginning to be replaced by 'area studies' and a focus on specific, narrow

areas of study. The study of economics was increasingly treated as radically removed from rest of the social sciences, where behaviouralism was beginning to dominate (Guillen 2002: 2). As such, modernisation was accused of conceptual vagueness, theoretical overreaching and an overemphasis on abstract, untestable assumptions (Tipps 1969: 218).

It is, however, the ideological and normative criticisms that concern us most, and that ultimately did the most damage to modernisation theory—particularly in the developing world. By universalising the historical experiences of Western countries, the paradigm left itself open to charges of ethnocentricity (Weinberg 1969: 13). Developing countries would not necessarily replicate the path that the United Kingdom and the United States had taken, but instead faced unique challenges and opportunities. Even were such replication possible, argued critics, who was to say that the inhabitants of developing countries wished to emulate the lifestyles of their Western counterparts? Modernisation often involved tensions and even social breakdown, held critics. The replacement of 19th century ambivalence to modernisation with a utopian vision of unalloyed progress served to further American interests abroad, but did not reflect reality, they held. According to some, modernisation theory had thus become an instrument of 'cultural imperialism' (Tipps 1973: 210).

Given these allegations, it is fitting that the most powerful body of criticism emerged from scholars focusing on—and often originating from—countries outside the West. Opponents of the paradigm had long alleged an unwarranted neglect of external factors on development in the Third World. Now, a powerful new perspective emerged to argue that underdevelopment in poor countries was caused not by internal cultural factors, but rather by conscious attempts by the West to maintain economic and political dominance. This perspective, heavily influenced by Marxist theory and initially posited by scholars of Latin

America such as Andre Gunder Frank (1967) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (with Faletto 1979 [1971]), came to be known as the dependency approach. Rejecting the notion that industrialisation was spreading around the world and moving traditional societies into the modern age, these critics argued that the global capitalist structure had already penetrated all corners of the globe and created a system whereby the majority of the population in underdeveloped economies was being kept in a state of perpetual and deliberate dependence. These countries—dependency theorists focused primarily on Latin America but extrapolated to other regions—were poor due not to a static, ahistorical premodern past, but as a direct result of the same colonial and neo-colonial structures that had enabled the developed world to grow rich (Frank 1969). 'It may happen', wrote Cardoso (with Faletto 1979 [1971]: 10), 'that a society modernizes its patterns of consumption, education and so forth without a corresponding advance in development, if by development we understand less dependency and self-sustained growth'.

The implications this held for democracy were dire. Because the exploitative system was abetted by corrupt local elites, what little economic growth was possible would simply be appropriated. This pseudo-development would never, thus, lead to democracy, but rather to 'bureaucratic authoritarianism' (O'Donnell 1973). It was only through revolutionary action against this parasitic '*comprador*' class that the establishment of socialist structures and 'delinking' from the global economy that countries could free themselves from this vicious cycle. In practice, this necessitated the adoption of measures such as import substitution, the nationalisation of property and assets, protectionist policies and a focus on heavy industries such as steel and coal.

In Africa, this approach combined with other neo-Marxist perspectives to exercise an immense influence on the development thinking of decision-makers. The 1970s saw the adoption of a number of communist regimes in Africa, including Ethiopia. However, even avowedly non-aligned countries adopted policies heavily inspired by socialistic critiques of modernisation theory. A trio of African theorists *cum* statesmen were particularly important in relocating such critiques in Africa, and thereby bridging the divide between development theory and practice. In Ghana, then-president Kwame Nkrumah spearheaded a wholesale rejection of capitalism in an attempt to escape what he called the 'neo-colonialism' of the West (Nkrumah 1965). A state subject to neo-colonialism 'is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty', but 'in reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside' (Nkrumah 1965: ix). This dominance was particularly marked in relations between African countries and the Bretton-Woods institutions, which forced states to compromise their economic policies and allowed multi-national corporations access to primary commodities in exchange for manufactured goods. It was imperative for African countries to unite and to industrialise rapidly in order to free themselves from economic, political, ideological and cultural exploitation by their former colonisers.

Senegal's first president, Leopold Sedar Senghor, took a similar but more culturally-oriented approach in his advocacy of *negritude,* an approach which again found its greatest political expression in the 1970s. Desiring a uniquely African socialism born of *Une relecture africaine de Marx et Engels*[38] (Senghor 1976) and existing 'African' cultural strengths such as communalism and solidarity, Senghor combined early Marxist philosophy

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[38] *'An African Rereading of Marx and Engels'*

with what he saw as indigenous African models. Once again, anti-imperialism and self-sufficiency—from both the Soviet and Western blocs—was the goal (Senghor 1976).

Where Ghana sought emancipation from neo-colonialism, and Senegal the embracing of negritude, Tanzania, under its first post-independence president Julius Nyerere, wished for *ujamaa*, or 'African socialism'. For a time one of the strongest policy expressions of Marxism in Africa, *ujamaa* once again advocated a communitarian rejection of capitalism based on putative African cultural traits. The philosophy, as set out in the *Arusha Declaration* of 1967 (TANU 1967), formed the basis of rule by the Nyerere government. Its overarching goal was the adaptation of Tanzania's so-called 'economy of affection'—the network of non-capitalist ties that linked citizens to each other within families and communities—to the national arena. In order for this to occur, it was important that 'wherever possible the Government itself directly participates in the economic development of this country' (TANU 1967): all forms of local production were collectivised through a system of enforced 'villagisation', a one-party system was instituted and the country sought to cut itself off from all forms of Western aid and trade. In a move that openly emulated China, however, Tanzania prioritised rural development over industry, declaring agriculture 'the basis of development' (TANU 1967). Tanzania's extensive use of Chinese economic and technical assistance is well-documented, and there exists widespread agreement that villigisation in particular was drawn from the Chinese model of the time (Hyden 1980: 100).

On the one hand, these critiques of modernisation theory shared much with their nemesis. Both are ultimately theories of modernisation, although they differ somewhat in their estimation of how this process should come about in the Third World. Whatever names they took, dependency theory, neo-colonialism, *ujamaa* and *negritude* shared with their

predecessor a preoccupation with nation-building, rapid economic growth, the primitive accumulation of capital and the extension and consolidation of state power. Virtually all emphasised industrialisation and its allegedly liberating effects on the peasantry. Even rural-oriented *ujamaa* has been called 'modernization by traditionalization' (Mushi 1971) due to an emphasis on state-led planning that extended to the lowest reaches of social and cultural life. It should not, of course, be forgotten that Marx himself was first and foremost a theorist of modernisation, with a central focus on the essentially inevitable societal changes wrought by industrialisation. It is for this reason that many scholars emphasise the common roots of modernisation theory and the dependency approaches, particularly as they were applied in Africa (Speich 2009: 459; Omeje 2007: 473; Hyden 1980: 228-229). Sklar (1995: 19) calls the two approaches 'methodological mirror-images', and Harrison (1988: 28) points out that the development debates of the period tended to focus more on which Cold War bloc to emulate than on hard and fast principles removed from their points of origin. Dependency was thus *a* theory of modernisation, even if it was not what is called, in this work and others, 'modernisation theory'.

At the same time, certain important differences remain between these two perspectives, leading to a sharp polarisation of the development debate in the 1970s. The most basic of these is the fact that one advocated a capitalist, free-market path to economic growth, while the other preferred a state-run economy. Both thus accorded the state an important political role, but modernisation theory preferred a 'managed economy' founded on private capital and entrepreneurship. Another important difference concerned the perceived influence of exogenous versus endogenous factors on national development. Whereas dependency theory usually looked towards existing domestic norms and institutions for

inspiration, these primarily represented obstacles to modernisation theorists. Conversely, dependency theorists viewed foreign aid and trade as largely exploitative, whereas their rival theory saw these are the very means by which countries could be helped over the hump to 'take-off'. Both perspectives felt it important that governments safeguard what has since come to be called domestic 'policy space' (Gallagher 2005), but modernisation theorists felt that emulation of and engagement with the West would enable states to do just that. Dependency theory disagreed with many other aspects of its predecessor, including the latter's staged, evolutionary approach and faith in technocratic elites. Finally, dependency theory-inspired policies brought about a shift from economic growth and structural change to poverty reduction, the satisfaction of 'basic needs' and income distribution (Gore 2000: 791).

6.3 The (Augmented) Washington Consensus

If dependency theory differed substantially from modernisation theory, so too did the paradigm that replaced it in the 1980s. Just as dependency theory usurped in popularity a predecessor it regarded as empirically and theoretically unsound, it itself soon faced accusations of having actually worsened economic conditions in the countries it had sought to help. In Africa, those included Ghana and Tanzania, both which saw their economies brought to the brink of collapse at least partially due to dependency-inspired policies (Ahiakpor 1985; Blomstrom and Hettne 1984: 159). In the words of one African critic, 'it is hard to escape the conclusion that dependency theory can be and has been a misleading framework within which to design economic policies for LDCs' (Ahiakpor 1985: 551). At the same time, the successes of Asian countries such as Taiwan and Singapore—which had not followed a neo-Marxist approach—were beginning, to many, to illustrate the benefits of

economic liberalisation and to render the dependency approach 'obsolete' (Lim and Pang 1991: 180; Amsden 1979).

And thus the third and final major development paradigm of the post-war era emerged to transform, once again, the policy and practice of development in Africa. The content and impact of the 'Washington Consensus' and the 'neoliberalism' it has advocated for Africa has been detailed at extraordinary length, and only a short explanation of how it differs from modernisation theory is therefore needed here. The term *Washington Consensus* was first coined by John Williamson (1990), who used it to posit the existence of ten policy recommendations for developing countries on which economists from the World Bank, IMF and US Treasury Department were said to broadly agree. Briefly stated, these policies required a retreat of the state in developing countries: government-owned enterprises were to be privatised, public spending cut, trade liberalised and macro-economic stability and discipline prioritised (Williamson 1990). Corresponding with a more general disillusionment regarding the utility of state-led development and the collapse of communism, the Washington Consensus became, over the next two decades, short-hand for the package of reforms encouraged by the Bretton Woods institutions.

It is true that some analyses (e.g. Stiglitz 1998a) may have overemphasised the single-mindedness of the doctrine's faith in unregulated markets—what investor George Soros (2000: xii) has termed its 'market fundamentalism[39]; certainly, no advocate would ever state its precepts quite so boldly again, nor claim allegiance to the term itself. However, the

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[39] Both the terms 'neoliberalism' and 'market fundamentalism' are sometimes used as synonyms for what is most commonly called the 'Washington Consensus', but I shall hitherto use only the last-mentioned term due to its more neutral connotations and its prominence in development debates.

reforms demanded of developing countries by global economic institutions (often as conditionalities in exchange for financial assistance) did signal a significant departure from both the modernisation and dependency paradigms, most notably in its minimalist approach to the state. Gone was the notion of a strong political leadership engaged in a modernist project of nation-building and resource mobilisation; 'important developmentalist concerns such as constructing national unity and realizing national sovereignty are thus excluded' (Gore 2000: 791). Planning, even by enlightened technocrats, was inferior to the efficiency created by the decentralised workings of market forces. Indeed, the state's role in development is frequently viewed as the most important point of divergence between the content of modernisation theory and that of the Washington Consensus (Brohman 1996: 30; Pieterse 2004: 10).

Many other differences also exist, however. As Stiglitz (1998b: 11, 14) points out, the paradigm has traditionally overlooked the importance of technology transfer and investment in innovation; the World Bank went without a science advisor or a science policy for much of the 1980s and 1990s, implying that it believed science to be a priority only for wealthy countries (Sachs 2003: 131). Both paradigms viewed rapid economic growth as immensely important, but even here lay nuances: whereas modernisation theory had emphasised economic growth as a motor for broad structural and societal change, the Washington Consensus largely limited its analysis to macro-economic factors, treating growth as an *end* rather than a primary *means* of development. The World Bank's most influential early reports on Africa broadly took this route; development's main goal, for example, was to 'increase investments, diversify economies and raise productivities' (World Bank and UNDP 1989: iii). Structural transformation—a shift in the means of production

usually led by a decline in the overall importance of the agricultural sector—was replaced by 'structural adjustment'—'the introduction of more market-oriented policies' through the creation of a more flexible and globally competitive economy (World Bank 1981: 2). The envisaged sources of growth also differed from those found in modernisation theory: the latter had emphasised the development of domestic industries, whereas the Washington Consensus stressed the need for investment-intensive, large-scale agricultural exports. Value addition was viewed as less important than the exploitation of comparative advantage, and if Africa's advantage lay in the export of cash crops and other primary commodities, the intensification of productivity in these sectors was vital (World Bank and UNDP 1989: 21).

Of course, a focus on financial aspects is perhaps only natural—the World Bank and IMF are, after all, financial institutions. However, the enormous degree of influence these institutions had on the overall policy framework of developing countries was itself a component of the new paradigm, which assumed that sound financial policies were the main guarantor of overall national development—even if those policies came from outside the country itself. This claim, regardless of its veracity, contrasts markedly with the view of economic growth as a tool through which enlightened domestic elites could guide their citizens along the same historical path the West had taken. Local 'ownership' had become much less of a concern (Chandler 2010: 147), and international donors were cast, if not explicitly as the primary movers of development, then at least as equal in stature to local decision-makers (World Bank 1981: 121).

This brings up another important difference between the two paradigms: whereas modernisation theory was historicist and guided by a grand narrative, the Washington

Consensus relied on ahistorical performance assessment along a standardised set of developmental indicators. According to Gore (2000: 795):

> Before the shift, development agencies acted as handmaidens of 'progress,' 'modernization,' 'industrialisation,' or the emancipation of people from oppression, exploitation, disease and drudgery. After it most agencies re-oriented their work to monitor and seek to improve 'performance,' often through local problem-solving and local social engineering designed to make economic and social institutions ``work'' better. Adjustment also entailed the abandonment of grand long-term government-directed designs for whole societies and a shift to decentralized decision-making, *laissez-faire* and local social engineering....The vision of the liberation of people and peoples, which animated development practice in the 1950s and 1960s, has thus been replaced by the vision of the liberalization of economies.

In keeping with the formal prohibition on political involvement contained in the World Bank's mandate (World Bank 1989), the Washington Consensus did not initially place a significant emphasis on democracy. Numerous critics have accused it of promoting repressive practices (Harvey 2007: 66; Beckman 1992), particularly in countries such as Nigeria and Ghana where liberalisation has clashed violently with labour unions and other groups threatened by the rollback of the state. From the beginning, however, the approach assumed democracy, human rights and development to go hand in hand: it coincided with the ascendance of a broader belief that the collapse of the Soviet Union would lead to the global triumph of liberal democracy and capitalism, and contained few of the justifications for the delaying of full democracy found in the work of many modernisation theorists. The often-unspoken approach was one of 'democracy first' and of extensive political liberties,

even if economic reforms took precedence over widespread popular participation (Norgaard 2000: 61).

This policy of elision changed in the early 1990s, when the Washington Consensus, responding to a powerful backlash from developing countries, Western civil society and academia, adopted the 'good governance' agenda. The Netherlands, several Scandinavian countries and Canada had begun to add political conditionalities to their aid programmes in the previous decade, and by 1992 the World Bank had declared good governance 'synonymous with sound development management' (quoted in Leftwich 1993: 610).

A reference to this concept is now obligatory in virtually all World Bank reports, and constitutes a central plank of aid programmes around the world. Good governance is associated with a wide array of concepts: transparency, rule of law, participation, pluralism and the exercise of individual liberties. Individual governmental donors such as the United States Agency for International Development and the British Department for International Development (DFID) have tended to adopt a broad, political and rights-based approach, whereas the World Bank has taken a more managerial and administrative approach (Leftwich 1994: 606). There has been a particularly strong emphasis, from both sides, on the building of strong, accountable and transparent institutions—to the extent that some now accuse agencies of 'institutional fundamentalism' (Rodrick 2006: 979). This has by no means overturned the focus on a minimal state, however, but rather added to it the notion of a government with a small remit but a large capacity. The notion that traditional culture must be altered before democracy can take root is found far less frequently.

Most importantly, the adoption of this new, more political agenda signalled a fundamental change in thinking about development: now good governance, human rights

and democracy have come to be seen to be as conducive to—or even as *preconditions* of—development (Przeworski 2000; Sen 1999). As Leftwich (1993: 605) argues: 'In this respect the new orthodoxy turns on its head earlier claims of modernisation theory that stable democracy presupposed prior economic and social development, as had been the case in much (but not all) of the now developed world, where advancing industrialisation normally preceded democratisation'. The obstacles to democracy are held to be primarily institutional in nature, rather than cultural, economic or social. This new orthodoxy means that critiques that accuse the current development consensus of insufficient attention to participatory democracy are today joined by a number of others—particularly from within the developing world—which view it as subjecting poor countries to prematurely high or ethnocentric standards of transparency and 'good governance' (e.g. Mkandawire 2007; Mafeje 2002: 9).

Some of the most sustained criticism of the early Washington Consensus emerged from within the World Bank itself, and particularly from its erstwhile Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz. Stiglitz's (1998a; 1998b) calls for the expansion of the 'incomplete' Washington Consensus to include previously-neglected priorities such as poverty reduction, human capital, institutional capacity and environmental policy have had a profound impact on donor policy. The discourse of UN agencies and international NGOs has also played an important role; to Rapley (2007: 208, development theory today largely represents the inclusion of this non-governmental agenda into the discourse of the Washington Consensus. The Millennium Declaration of 2000 and the UNDP's 'sustainable human development' approach (Anand and Sen 1994) are the starting points of this perspective, which focuses on the attainment of basic needs, on poverty reduction and on development at the grassroots level. The influence on World Bank and IMF policy can be seen in the creation of measures

such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) that recipient countries have to submit every three to five years, but the new development discourse has now become significantly broader than the Bretton Woods institutions, to the extent that one commentator (Sumner 2008: 1406) has rechristened it the 'New York consensus' (in reference to the city's status as the UN's headquarters).

In fact, more radical voices have also found their way into the revised development agenda. The 'post-development', 'degrowth' and 'anti-globalisation' perspectives (Rahnema and Bawtree 2008; Latouche 2009; and Starr and Adams 2003 respectively) reject the notion of development in much the same way that the notion of modernisation was rejected 50 years ago. Spurning concepts such as the *nation-state*, *progress*, *development* and even *scarcity* (Rahnema 2008: 400), these critics view development not as a means of improving the wellbeing of populations, but rather as a means of establishing external control over their lives and retaining colonial patterns of domination (Rahnema and Bawtree 2008: 379). Tinkering with individual programmes or strategies will not address the underlying problems of the development project as a whole, which should be scrapped altogether in favour of entirely localised, indigenous solutions. According to these approaches, development initiatives, whether driven by national elites or exogenous actors, dissolve traditions of communal solidarity and subjugate local people to the needs of an impersonal and uncaring state machinery.

At first glance, a movement with the rallying cry of 'leave the poor alone' (unnamed quoted in Gras and translated in Latouche 2010: 61) would not appear to have much in common with the present efforts of the donor community. However, this set of approaches is increasingly influencing the mainstream Western development paradigm. Both desire

smaller, more flexible and more adaptive governments, and both emphasise decentralisation and local participation; 'out of this seemingly unlikely meeting of post-development thought and neoclassical economics, a new consensus is emerging' (Rapley 2007: 6). Another influential overview agrees, contending that alternative notions of development have largely been absorbed into the mainstream: stakeholder participation and NGO involvement now play a larger role, 'human development' has replaced GDP growth as a goal, and development has become more reflexive (Pieterse 1998: 344). 'Well-being' and subjective experiences of development are increasingly the focus of development projects that are today more programmatic, particularistic and *ad hoc*. In marked contrast with modernisation theory, such projects view structural change as possible only when local dynamics are fully understood and taken into account. As the World Bank's 'Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform'—a repudiation of many of the reforms advocated in that decade—puts it: 'We need to get away from formulae and the search for elusive 'best practices...The complexity and diversity of growth experiences are not amenable to simplistic policy prescriptions' (Zagha *et al* 2005: xiii). Successful development is taken to be a bottom-up rather than a top-down process, even if implementation of this perspective is often uneven and even if the discourse of the most radical 'post-development' thinkers remains outside the policy-making mainstream.

If the Washington Consensus has changed significantly since its heyday, what should the new perspective be called? Stiglitz (1998b) dubs it 'the post-Washington Consensus', while others, as we have seen, speak of a UN-inspired 'New York Consensus' (Sumner 2008: 1406). These labels, however, imply a complete transformation of development policy—a paradigm shift. Mainstream development practice has indeed undergone profound shifts in

recent decades, but not, many would argue, shifts that are deep enough to warrant consideration as a completely new paradigm (Pieterse 1998: 344, Maxwell 2005; Rodrik 2006). The new loose development consensus, to the extent that it can be said to exist, has flourished in the gaps left by the 'old' Washington Consensus, rather than overturning it entirely. The latter's assumption that democracy and the rule of law fuel economic growth has been made explicit, and blended with neoliberal economics in most areas where the two have clashed. Decentralisation and the creation of flexible, small and accountable state institutions have continued apace, albeit with a greater emphasis on the empowerment of local stakeholders and their participation. A market-led economy that is fully integrated into the global economy is still preferred, but poverty reduction, equity and wellbeing are now discursively privileged over wealth creation and GDP growth. The new approach represents a 'compromise' between the positions of the World Bank and its critics rather than a victory of the latter over the former.[40] For this reason, I prefer Rodrik's (2006) term, the 'Augmented Washington Consensus'. Its tenets (summarised in Rodrik 2006 and Maxwell 2005: 2), have taken the Washington Consensus even further away from modernisation theory, but will henceforth be treated as a variation on the earlier orthodoxy rather than an entirely new approach.

6.4 The 'East Asian Model'

The era of the Washington Consensus provided the setting for one final academic and policy debate that is of particular importance to the focus of this dissertation. The 1980s and 1990s

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[40] Maxwell uses the term 'meta-narrative' rather than 'Augmented Washington Consensus', but his conclusions are very similar to Rodrick's.

witnessed intense controversy surrounding the notion of an East Asian development model, as well as the associated concept of the 'developmental state'. This debate was particularly concerned with the extent to which the state had intervened in the economic growth of the 'Asian Tigers', the sustainability of such levels of intervention as did indeed exist, and the compatibility of such interventions with liberal democracy.

When these discussions emerged in the early 1980s, the Washington Consensus was firmly on the ascendant, and the state was therefore accorded a largely regulatory and facilitating role in the development literature. Early discussions by *inter alia* Friedman and Friedman (1980: 48), Chen (1979) and Balassa (1988) sought to fit the experience of East Asia into the same framework by positing that the region's economic success stemmed from the unfettering of long-repressed market forces. In 1993, the World Bank itself notoriously expressed its own support for this view in a report titled *The East Asian Miracle* (World Bank 1993), arguing that the Asian Tigers owed their success largely to its prescriptions.

By this time, however, an influential wave of revisionist literature had also begun to emerge. Wade (1990) found South Korea, Japan and Taiwan's development to accord to a 'governed market' approach, and dubbed the *East Asian Miracle* report an act of self-serving 'paradigm maintenance' on the part of the World Bank (Wade 1996). Johnson's (1982) 'capitalist developmental state', epitomised by but not limited to Japan, was dependent on the firm but business-friendly guiding hand of an elite bureaucracy of economic policy-makers. Amsden argued that development in Taiwan (Amsden 1985) and South Korea (Amsden 1992) could not be understood without giving credit to the powerful role played by public enterprises and other instruments of the state. This literature did not deny the benefits of integration into the global capitalist economy, particularly through the attraction of foreign

investment and the creation of strong export-oriented manufacturing industries; this integration, however, needed to be gradual and carefully sequenced. This strand of revisionist literature has ultimately been the most influential within this debate, and the East Asian Model is still regarded, where it is used, as referring to a selectively interventionist state that temporarily places rapid economic growth above political liberalisation and that relies on export-oriented manufacturing as the source of this growth.

Despite the wide literature generated by discussions on the East Asian Model, several factors prevented it from displacing the dominant neoliberal paradigm and bridging the policy divide, particularly in Africa. As an article by Amsden (1994) asked, 'Why isn't the Whole World Experimenting with the East Asian Model to Develop?'. Firstly, the aforementioned debates were confined largely to the West; the discourse emanating from East Asia, in contrast, tended to emphasise the uniqueness of the region's growth. Most significantly, Asian leaders such as Mahathir and Lee argued for the importance of distinctly 'Asian Values' such as social cohesiveness, filial piety, hard work and self-sacrifice (Lee quoted in McCarthy 1998; Mahathir 2000). This amounted to a *de facto* dismissal of the possibilities for emulation of the model from outside.

In addition, this was the era in which Africa was at its most dependent on foreign aid, and when the Western model of political and economic liberalism was at its highest ebb in the institutions granting this aid. This dissertation has shown how, in both Ethiopia and Kenya, the 1980s and 1990s were largely periods of adjustment to and negotiation with donor conditionalities. As Cullather (2009: 512) writes, 'it is hard to imagine the World Bank's African clients today asserting their entitlement to progress or fashioning an independent vision as assertively as Mboya did in 1961'. I would argue that this statement

no longer holds true, but certainly did until fairly recently. The question of East Asia as a model was thus subordinated, by both African elites and by donors, to other concerns. Finally, the East Asian Economic Crisis of 1997 led, in many quarters, to disillusionment with the region's economic model. Western observers who had lauded the Asian Tigers' market liberalisation two decades previously now accused these systems of 'crony capitalism' and of tolerating an overly close relationship between the business and state sectors (Krugman 1998),

This is not to suggest that either Western financial institutions or African development elites dismissed East Asia completely in this time. The reader will recall that several of my Kenyan interviewees spoke of the 1990s as the era in which they first became interested in emulating aspects of East Asian development, and that several even mentioned examples of said emulation. Since the mid-2000s, the World Bank has organised several study visits and published reports exploring the potential for Africa to learn from China's best practices (Dollar 2008; Ravallion 2008). However, discussions on an East Asian Model have in the past been overshadowed by deeper global economic and geopolitical considerations, and subject to dynamics that differ greatly from the present situation and that have prevented them from dislodging the Augmented Washington Consensus from its dominant position.

6.5 Conclusion

Thus far, I have detailed the three broad development paradigms that have shaped the development landscape in post-colonial Africa. While the East Asian model never coalesced into a distinctive and highly influential paradigm in its own right, the opposite is true for

modernisation theory. The latter constitutes a way of approaching development that remains distinct from its successors, although some overlap does exist. It shares with dependency theory a focus on nation-building and a strong role for the state, but differs radically on whether this state should preside over a capitalist or socialist economy. It shares with earlier versions of the Washington Consensus a predilection for economic growth, but diverges on the question of the size and functions of the state. It disagrees most vehemently with the move towards the 'bottom-up', participatory development and institution-building seen in the Augmented Washington Consensus, referring instead a technocratic and elite-led process that relies on a gradual incorporation of the working classes and peasantry as mass education and the accumulation of capital advance. Each of these three post-independence approaches to development has truly served as a distinct paradigm, both in Africa and abroad. As the next sections shall demonstrate, Ethiopian and Kenyan emulators are again returning to the oldest of these paradigms, seeing East Asia first and foremost as an example of successful—and at least partially replicable—modernisation.

CHAPTER SEVEN: HOW TO MODERNISE?
THE PROCESS & NATURE OF DEVELOPMENT

Believing it can be achieved is a lesson in itself.

- Senior economic planner, Ethiopia (EG20)

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Both Ethiopia and Kenya possess groups of elites who seek to emulate aspects of East Asia's broad development experiences. Ethiopia's EPRDF, as this study has demonstrated, cites China, Taiwan and South Korea as important models; in Kenya, on the other hand, planners and business elites look to Singapore and Malaysia for inspiration. Despite vast historical, political and economic differences between the two countries, it is East Asia as a region that holds the most appeal for both sets of emulators

This convergence may perhaps appear unusual, until the specific lessons—and their implications within the broader African development debate—are taken into account. Those policies, ideas and practices borrowed from East Asia penetrate to the very heart of what development itself means for elites, as well as how best to achieve it. This chapter is the first of two to explore the specific lessons that Ethiopian and Kenyan elites draw from their exemplars of choice. It looks at the process by which emulating elites wish to develop and seeks to understand how, in their eyes, development is said to occur. The subsequent chapter then addresses how elites see their own roles in this process. In other words, the former focuses on the 'what', 'how' and 'when' of development, while the latter looks primarily to the

'who'. Both combine analysis of the Ethiopian and Kenyan perspectives in order to situate these within the broader development paradigms explored in the previous chapter.[41]

7.1 Development as an Endogenous, Sequential Process

Early development theory viewed modernisation as a series of interrelated systemic changes that gradually transformed the entire fabric of a given society. This view had three implications: firstly, development was largely a national project exercised within the confines of the modern nation-state. The early post-colonial era witnessed the globalisation and naturalisation of the nation-state system, when even former empires were becoming nation-states (Berger 2003: 422). As the now-'organic' setting within which all development activities took place, 'the nation-state became the central and unquestioned unit of study for modernisation theorists' (Berger 2003: 422). Although modernisation theory was later used by American policymakers to advocate for change abroad, its theoretical assumptions thus remained 'endogenist' (Pieterse 2004: 47).

Secondly, development was seen to occurr in series of distinct, virtually unavoidable stages from the 'traditional' to the 'modern', although the transfer of technology from more 'advanced' countries could help to accelerate this process. Finally, modernisation theory's reliance on structural-functionalism implied the fundamental interconnectedness of the

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[41] As East Asia has been established as both the most prevalent and the most important exemplar in both countries under consideration, the following chapters address only the lessons that elites draw from this region. Although elites also draw other lessons from the West, fellow African countries and other models around the world, these dynamics are not explored in detail in this section. The 'elites' referred to in this chapter thus refer to those who have admitted to engaging in emulation of East Asia.

socio-cultural, economic, political and legal realms. Development was unified into a meta-narrative that applied to all facets of all societies at all points in time.

These beliefs are central to development thinking among both Ethiopian and Kenyan elites, and there is evidence to suggest that the East Asian example has compounded their importance. A newfound endogenism means, on the one hand, a strong emphasis on self-sufficiency and self-reliance. Traditional aid and the conditionalities that often accompany it are denigrated by even otherwise Western-friendly elites:

> In my view, the prescriptions by the World Bank do not help developing countries to grow. It's like they look at you as if you are a small baby – 'do this, do that'. Sometimes they are very wrong. And that's why I prefer private capital to borrowing from the World Bank (KG9).

> To succeed, you wait for World Bank and IMF consultants, you listen to the advice, and then you do the opposite (KG15).

African leaders may have been unhappy with Western prescriptions irrespective of East Asia's economic situation, but the latter has provided a vivid illustration not just of the desirability, but also of the importance and the *possibility* of greater self-reliance. Several discussions of the Chinese Model have emphasised China's ability to safeguard its domestic 'policy space' (Zhang 2006; Zhao 2010: 424), and the 'economic nationalism' with which East Asian models are so often associated (Wong 2004: 351) includes a desire to free one's country from dependence on foreign 'charity'. Parallel discussions emphasise the role that China's economic presence in Africa plays in giving African governments greater policy

freedom (Oya 2006). Freedom from aid and the dependency it brings has become almost a rite of passage, signifying a country's entrance into the 'club' of middle-income countries—a status both the Ethiopian and Kenyan leaderships have staked their futures on attaining. For this reason, the ability to set its one's own domestic policies, feed one's own population and choose the pace of one's own political and economic liberalisation was mentioned by elites in both countries as one of the foremost lessons drawn from East Asia:

> The lesson and the motivation that I personally derive is that you can still build...an economy that is...immune from external influence....you can build a national economy that is generally sovereign. This is the general lesson that I am taking (EG13).

> You wouldn't say the Chinese accepted Western help. They were even blocked and condemned. I have said there are parts of the Chinese model I don't like, but what it tells me is the internal policies are the decisive ones. This is what I learnt (EN6).

> But other countries that have 'made it' have actually organised themselves internally and forged development from inside, by starting industries, by pretending they need to produce what's already available elsewhere. It's not that there was a lack of goods when the famous Asian Tigers set out to build cars, washing machines, what everybody else was producing. It's not that they couldn't get them from Europe, it's just that they wanted to make them for themselves. And this has helped, that at the end of the day they have come up and are now talking to you and the rest of the developed world on equal terms (KN15)!

In the case of Ethiopia, the desire to lessen aid dependency has clearly not borne fruit in practice: Ethiopia was the country to receive the third-largest amount of official development aid in 2009, and this amount increased more than three-fold from 2001 to 2011 (GHA 2011); aid remains highly dependent on climactic conditions from one year to the next. Kenya, on the other hand, has managed to diversify its income and decrease levels of foreign assistance (Mwega 2010: 117). As has been pointed out in Chapter Four, however, even Ethiopia is often able to exercise a surprising level of freedom of action in its dealings with donors. Those who seek to emulate East Asia often do so with the medium-term goal of further increasing and maximising this freedom.

Increasing policy space should not be confused with political isolationism or economic 'delinking' in the dependency mould, however. Virtually no elites, even in Ethiopia, wished to retreat from participation in the global economy; instead, respondents wished to use policy freedom to affect gradual integration with the global economy—but on their own terms. If—in Ethiopia, at least—a certain level of import substitution is still a necessity, this (the reasoning goes) is merely the prelude to a greater international role than ever before. There was thus a grudging but almost universal recognition that Ethiopia's development would occur within the context of a globalised, free-market system. Globalisation was seen as an inevitable force that could either 'make' or 'break' a country, depending on the quality of its internal governance. Even (or perhaps especially) in an era of globalisation, in the words of one of Meles Zenawi's most senior advisors, 'development is basically a local act' (EG14).

A focus on endogenous routes to development had another, more surprising outcome. In both countries, the national context was seen to hold not merely the keys to future success,

but also to present failure. When asked to identify the main obstacles to development, the vast majority of respondents pointed to internal factors such as a lack of technology, capital and infrastructure. Ethiopian elites placed a particular emphasis on cultural and religious constraints to development (EN9, EN10, EG7), and to the legacy of isolationism and dictatorship (EG6, EN13), while Kenyan elites almost unanimously mentioned the lack of a national committed leadership (KG19, KG20, KN6). Relatively few focused on the legacies of foreign interference, structural adjustment or an unequal international economic order.

Those who mentioned East Asian countries as models were the most likely, of all groups, to emphasise domestic constraints. Countries such as South Korea and China, they argued, had demonstrated the possibility of succeeding in an international system that had appeared to be stacked against them. As a result, they felt, elites could no longer use external constraints to excuse their own poor performance:

So China has shown us that things that were considered not feasible, not do-able, for which there was no financing...have been made possible (EN18).

Look at Korea – Korea is a question of hard work, discipline, and really being a lot more relaxed about opening to investment. We didn't do this, because we came in to a situation of our own colonial structure, and then spent a great deal of time blaming the colonial structure rather than moving ahead with the work (KG3).

We overslept. When the whole world was embracing technology, where were we? (KN9).

While Kenyans have involved themselves in scandals, stealing money, that's the time that Shanghai in China was being built. So if you look at what's happened in China for 10 years, and where we are, it's shit. It's shit! (KN4).

Optimism is a difficult concept to address in the political sciences, as it is not easily operationalised. Nonetheless, there existed a tangible sense of possibility among those Kenyan technocrats and Ethiopian party members who most desired emulation of East Asia, while pessimism about the future was strongest amongst those who felt the East Asian experience to have little applicability to the African situation. It is no coincidence that modernisation theory is the most optimistic of development theories, envisioning, as it does, a future in which technological and scientific knowledge is harnessed towards 'progress' and the amelioration of humanity's problems.

The example of East Asia has also strengthened the notion of development as a staged process of transformation. One of the most striking ways in which many East Asian approaches to development have harked back to post-war development theory is in their focus on sequencing and historically-contingent development. Gore (2000: 794) contrasts the desire of modernisation theory to understand the 'rhythms, patterns and laws of development' with the 'ahistorical performance assessment' undertaken by the World Bank, and finds East Asian developmentalism partially responsible for the return to prominence of the former approach.

This stageist reading of development was one of the aspects of modernisation theory that critics most objected to, especially when it was accompanied by the belief that these stages were broadly similar for all countries. Yet elites in both country cases made frequent

use of Rostow's terms, speaking of the need for cultural, technological and industrial 'take-off', and expressing a desire for an 'industrial revolution'. Here, the view of one Ethiopian member of parliament is representative:

> I can say most of the countries actually started with agriculture. The role of agriculture changed, from agriculture to industry, from industry to services. Now in developed countries, services dominate in the economy, isn't it? That is a gradual process...Others have also proceeded, and they are in the mass consumption stage now, like in Japan, the US and others. We are following that path. Of course, all of us are following capitalist paths of development (EG22).

On the one hand, elites emphasised the importance of indigenous, locally-specific paths of development. Ethiopian respondents, when asked whether their country's development differed from or corresponded to that of other countries, primarily chose the former. In keeping with the exceptionalism and desire for independence on which many observers of Ethiopia's past and present have remarked (Clapham 1990: 229; Adejumobi 2007: 31), interviewees felt that 'the process of modernisation in Ethiopia is rather unique when we compare it with other countries' (EG18).

On the other hand, such claims were fraught with contradictions. When asked for examples of Ethiopia's uniqueness, elites were often unable to respond, or cited those factors that they had previously identified as the keys to China, South Korea and Taiwan's success. The prioritisation of agriculture and rural development, for example, was at once cited as an example of Ethiopia's divergence from international norms, and, very frequently, as a valuable lesson to be drawn from East Asia. Witness, for example, the sentiments of this

EPRDF parliamentarian, who stated:

> When we launched our agriculturally-led industrialisation, we were secure in the knowledge that countries like Taiwan, Korea, places like that, Malaysia, had done it. And China, much earlier. They did bring about a Green Revolution and that enabled them to transform to an industrial society where industry will then take over. So we had good examples of that (EG5).

Similarly, Ethiopia's alleged rejection of 'neoliberalism' and harnessing of state developmentalism was viewed as a rejection of the Washington Consensus' 'one-size-fits-all' model and proof of the need for home-grown solutions; it was also, however, the most frequently-mentioned aspect of the country's emulation of East Asia. *Dead Ends and New Beginnings* (Meles 2006) is almost entirely devoted to exploring the successes of the Taiwanese and South Korean 'developmental states'.

The fact that many Ethiopian elites accused the West of hypocrisy for glossing over its own early history of state intervention and agriculturally-led development provides a further indicator that Ethiopia's current discourse on the uniqueness of its development path stems more from a desire for independence rather than a genuine rejection of a stageist path towards modernisation. 'The importance of the state we learned from the East, and also from the early days of the West', said one of the architects of the GTP, for example; 'the state has a guiding, mobilizing role, and countries need it to progress' (EG20).

Perhaps the most revealing insight into this dynamic is the role that Bismarck's Germany is said to play in the ideology of the EPRDF. According to Ethiopia's former President, 19th century Germany has been cited in the party literature as an example of the

mobilisation, nation-building and capital accumulation 'stage' that the EPRDF believes Ethiopia to occupy at present (EN4); the German example, paired with that of East Asia, is allegedly used to defuse demands from the opposition for greater democracy. In short, many in the EPRDF thus do not mind developing broadly as the West has done, but feel that the East Asian Model reflects this trajectory more accurately than does the Washington Consensus. A poster on display in the Ethiopian Ministry of Trade and Industry states that 'No country has ever reached middle-income status without industrialization and urbanization'—a message presumably aimed as much at visiting donor representatives as at ministry staff.

Kenyan elites were less explicit in specifying the precise content of each developmental stage, but also more likely to agree that their country's development should follow a general global trajectory. This was partially due to an acknowledgement that Kenya's colonial legacy was shared by other countries, but also due to a sense of having fallen behind in a race for development. 'We were late. We are trailing. Because there are a lot of countries which have more modern things than we have', said one respondent (KN16). According to another:

> In my view, [development] has to be similar but the evaluation at different times will find people at different levels...All of us will have to take different paths, but the outcome might be the same...It takes time and effort for countries to develop to certain levels. If we say we are going to take 300 years to be where Europe is, it's not going to be right. It's a long time (KN7).

This notion of having to 'catch up or perish' pervaded the discourse of emulating elites in

both countries. The concept of 'catch-up growth', whereby countries use technology transfer to achieve a level of rapid growth that comes to rival the originator of the technology, has been theorised by Ozawa (2005) in reference to the Japanese example; as we have seen, it also echoes the writings of modernisation theorists such as Rostow. According to this notion, emulation and learning are said to constitute the primary mechanisms by which countries achieve 'catch-up' growth (Ozawa 2005: 8). The fact that many elites in both Kenya and Ethiopia look to East Asia in order to achieve catch-up growth and take-off is thus not unexpected, but instead consistent with the literature on emulative modernisation. 'We have no choice! If we don't industrialise we will be gobbled up!', said a senior environmental policy-maker (EG25). A metaphor derived from athletics was frequently used, and development was conceived of as a competition, or a race:

> It's like doing a pole vault – to catch up with [Western countries], they are very high – you need a pole vault. You need somebody who is just where you can catch up or learn lessons of transformation like industrialisation, where did they start, what are they doing (KG14).

> Of course it would be nice to be like the UK or US one day, but we have to be like a marathon runner. We need endurance, and to focus on achievable goals [such as reaching the level of China] first (EG2).

The notion that one's country is 'behind' has a particular resonance with Ethiopia's historical situation, and especially with the regimes of Tewedros and Haile-Selassie. Donham (1999), for example, has illustrated the ways in which Ethiopian elites—and the new middle class created by Haile Selassie's policies in particular—historically viewed Ethiopia as

'backwards' and longed for the prestige and prosperity that membership to the club of 'modern' nations would bring. Of the situation on the eve of the 1974 revolution, he writes: 'the grand scheme of modernization—the march of advanced nations, followed by backward ones, along a continuum defined by different groups' success in applying science and knowledge—had come to define reality for many of the new Ethiopian educated elite' (Donham 1999: 25).

Today, however, East Asia presents to emulating elites the tangible and visible example that such membership can be gained within the course of a generation; for the first time since the 'Japanisers' of the early 20th century, such emulation is linked not to Europe but to East Asia. It is in this spirit that Tesfaye Habisso (2007), former Ethiopian ambassador to South Africa and continuing supporter of the EPRDF, expressly links the aims of Meles Zenawi, 'the main revivalist of this ideology', with the aims of those elites who pressed for emulation of Japan nearly a century earlier.

Closely related to the issue of staged development are the notions of prioritisation and sequencing. Much of the literature on the East Asian and Chinese models emphasises the importance of pragmatism, sequencing and prioritisation (Peerenboom 2007: 31; Zhang 2006; Yusuf 2001: 7-8). A law, institution, policy or practice might be essential at a later stage of development but inadvisable at present, or vice versa.

This desire for sequenced development takes three forms in the case studies under consideration. Firstly, Ethiopian and Kenyan elites draw lessons regarding the importance of gradual economic and political liberalisation from the countries they cite as models in East Asia. Secondly, elites are particularly interested in the sequencing of product development, whereby countries begin by exporting crude products and later progress to higher-value

goods. In other words, decision-makers are particularly interested in gradually adding value to their exports, which at the moment are largely primary commodities. This, according to the theory of 'catch up growth' is how Japan developed—by rapidly emulating 'higher echelon' countries and thereby 'scaling up the ladder of industrial upgrading, rung by rung' (Ozawa 2005: 144).

In my case studies, this manifests itself in the prominence accorded to policies of value addition and agro-processing in key development strategies (Kenya 2007a: 14; MoFED 2010a: 26), but also in the broader beliefs exhibited in elite discourse. Numerous respondents took solace in the fact that countries like Taiwan and Japan had initially been discounted by the West as purveyors of cheap, low-quality products—only to use this experience to become global leaders in the export of sophisticated technological products:

> When I was at elementary school, Japanese commodities were of a lesser quality. They were very inferior, because people used to have European commodities in Ethiopia. Oh this is inferior, this is inferior' [they said]. And then the Japanese crossed that line, and now Japan is well respected throughout the whole world...So now Taiwan is also crossing that [line]. Korea has crossed that [line]. It's now China. So it's only a matter of time. Maybe after five or ten years, you will see that Chinese products are some of the best quality in the world—Chinese construction, Chinese products—that is inevitable, because history has shown us (EG15).

> There was a time when 'Made in Japan' was a bad thing. It's got to be 'Made in England'. Show me what's made in England today. Do I even care if it says 'made in China?' No. The quality has come to a level where it's acceptable, it's a brand name. So now most of the stuff

that we buy, even this computer. Samsung – OK, 'Made in China'. But does it worry you? No. Everything has gone up on a quality level (KN10).

The third facet of elites' desire to draw lessons in prioritisation and sequencing from East Asia concerned the role of agriculture in structural transformation. It is to this lesson that we now turn.

7.2 Structural Transformation Underpinned by Agricultural Development

Much of the writing on East Asian lessons for Africa has focused on the centrality of sequenced structural transformation in the development of the former region. More specifically, many analyses have focused on the role that agricultural growth and rural development played in providing capital, technology and labour to a labour-intensive manufacturing industry. One of the key works on this subject attributes China's rapid growth to its 'inspirational success in modernising its agriculture and transforming its rural economy' (Juma 2011: 9), while another views Taiwan's sequenced agricultural transformation to be one of the most important lessons Africa can take from the region (Gabre-Madhin and Johnson 2002).

The evidence that Kenyan decision-makers draw this lesson from the East Asian experience is far more ambiguous than in the Ethiopian case. It is true that in Kenya, lesson-drawers lament that 'we have not been brutal enough in prioritisation – we want to do so many things at once' (KN20). *Vision 2030* (Kenya 2007a: 23) also mentions the importance

of prioritisation, and selects six 'lead industries'—tourism, agriculture, wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing for the regional market, business process offshoring and financial services—on which to focus.

However, these constitute very broad industries; between them, they encompass virtually all of Kenya's economy. Kenya's economy has not, historically, developed in the sequential manner associated with much of East Asia. The Chinese, Korean, Taiwanese and Japanese FDI-driven, export-led economies were all preceded by variations on a process whereby the labour and knowledge first freed by rural reforms and agricultural development 'spilled over' into industrial development (Grabowski 2009; Ravallion 2008; Fan *et al* 2005).[42]

In contrast, Kenya's colonial and post-colonial development has traditionally been highly urbanist in practice and in policy. Although roughly 75% of the labour force is concentrated in agriculture, the sector accounts for less than a quarter of GDP (Bureau of African Affairs 2012). Much of this sector is employed either in subsistence farming or in the exporting of cash crops whose prices have remained relatively stable (and low) on the global market. In addition, the vast majority of infrastructural development has been concentrated in urban areas. Because the agricultural sector has seen very limited growth, there has been little surplus labour to drive a strong industrial sector. Revenues from Kenya's manufacturing and agricultural bases are dwarfed by income from its urban-based

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[42] The dynamics of this process have a potential importance for a comparative study of Kenyan, Ethiopian and East Asian economic development that go beyond the remit of this study. A further exploration of the ways in which agricultural growth did the real 'heavy lifting' (Ravallion 2008: 7) in China and its neighbours can be found in the three works cited above.

services sector, which comprises a very small segment of the workforce but generates almost 60% of GDP (Bureau of African Affairs 2012).

Given this uneven distribution between the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors, the Kenyan elites I interviewed were divided on questions of structural transformation. While virtually all agreed that the country had to decrease its reliance on agricultural exports and subsistence farming, not all felt that this should be achieved through a sequential focus first on rural development, then on manufacturing, and only eventually on a knowledge-based, services-led economy. For everyone who felt that 'you do have to have industrialisation, because the economy must move from a simple rudimentary crude agrarian [system] to some kind of modern, planned, mechanised, automated economy, and the population must also shift from an agrarian to a more industrialised population' (KG16), there was another who felt that all three sectors could be focused on simultaneously. No-one felt that the agricultural sector was unimportant, but some emphasised the expansion of high-intensity exports (horticultural products, for example) whereas others focused on food security, rural spending and smallholder agriculture.

It is likely that this lack of discursive agreement is at least partially underpinned by additional structural factors. Over 75% of Kenya's population resides on the 9.5% of the land that is arable (World Bank 2012), severely limiting Kenya's choices in this regard. In addition, several elites pointed out that the regional devolution mandated in the 2010 constitution would place such decisions within the hands of the 47 newly-created regional authorities; if implemented, this would preclude a uniform nation-wide policy. It is thus no surprise that Kenya's major East Asian models are Singapore and Malaysia—both countries with very small or non-existent agricultural sectors but very large and varied service sectors.

The Minister of Lands, when asked why he had cited Singapore as a model, answered that it was due to 'the service sector, the financial sector, the communications sector, being the hub of transport and communications...because when you look at Singapore...the focus is on the service sector' (KG6).

In short, Kenyan elites draw notions of progress and catching-up from East Asia, but their learning does not extend to the direct desire to undertake the kind of structural transformation that would initially focus primarily on agricultural development. Kenyan decision-makers believe that emulation of East Asia (countries 'further' than themselves along the path of development) could act as a 'stepping stone' to get them there. However, even *Vision 2030*—that document in which emulating technocrats have the greatest influence —addresses the development of all three sectors concurrently. As one businessman puts it, 'You also have to rank them – what is the prerequisite for the other? What comes first...I'm not sure I've seen the prioritisation [in *Vision 2030*]. I'm not so sure it says what should come first. It touches everything, but...it's got to be sequenced' (KN15).

As regards the lessons East Asia holds for sequenced structural transformation of the economy, elites from Ethiopia exhibited less ambivalence. In Ethiopia, China and South Korea's focus on rural development and agriculture was the second-most frequently-cited lesson by interviewees (after the importance of state intervention in the economy). Elites, particularly those in government, view the East Asian experience as a clear exemplar for the EPRDF's own flagship policy of 'agricultural development-led industrialisation (ADLI) (MoFED 1993: 8). ADLI centres around the concept of phased development, beginning with efforts to improve agricultural productivity and only later focusing on industrialisation. Investment first in new technology, then in rural infrastructure and finally in irrigation will,

the thinking goes, increase agricultural yields, which will in turn create labour for, inputs into and demand from the non-agricultural sector (Dercon and Zeitlin 2009: 4). It is only after sustained agricultural growth—and a gradual natural decline in the size and importance of the agricultural industry—that Ethiopia will have accumulated enough capital to shift to a strategy of industrialisation.

The EPRDF has held to this policy of ADLI since at least 1993, and it seems from interviews that the agricultural development of certain East Asian countries embodied many cadres' earliest interest in and emulation of the region. In the words of one senior EPRDF member, 'these nations have devised agricultural-led development. This is another most important, essential feature and the common denominator which you can get from these nations' (EG12).

As with the other lessons cited above, this aspect of emulation is also reflected in official government discourse. One example is the extensive and very high-level programme of dialogue between the Japan International Cooperation Agency and the top EPDRF leadership, created at the request of Meles Zenawi with the express purpose of learning from East Asian experiences of industrial development (GDF 2010). Many of the written outputs from the seven forums held by the time of writing have focused on lesson-drawing in the areas of agriculture, rural development and structural transformation (GRIPS 2011: 107-142; Ohno 2009). Government economic plans express a particular interest in eventually using surplus agricultural labour, technology and products to eventually transition to industrialisation (MoFED 2006: 151).

African Development (2006), *Revolutionary Democracy* (2006) and other documents then expressly link these ideas to the experiences of Taiwan and South Korea. The EPRDF's

'Ten Year Road Map' for agriculture defines development as 'a process of transforming an economy from largely agricultural to largely service and manufacturing', and calls Taiwan the 'poster child' for this process (Demese *et al* 2010: 147). Similarly, a Japanese advisor to the Ethiopian government, writing about ADLI, holds that 'the paradigmatic shift which Ethiopia envisages is largely inconsistent with the traditional political and economic conditionalities of the Western donors' and 'shares more commonalities with the traditional development strategies in East Asia' (Ohno 2009: 4). Indeed, so out-of-fashion is the structural approach with global financial institutions and donors that the hundreds of country indicators tracked by the World Bank do not include the proportion of a country's workforce employed by or the GDP contributed by each sector (World Bank 2012).

Although the EPRDF's desire to focus on smallholder agriculture and food security is clearly inspired by prominent East Asian examples, recent changes in agricultural policy illustrate the tensions between lesson-drawing and other determinants of policy. Ethiopia's emphasis on rural empowerment, peasant mobilisation and food security has been one of the primary justifications for the retention of the current system of land tenure, whereby all land remains the property of the government, which leases it primarily to smallholders. Not surprisingly, ADLI has been a central point of contention with donors and domestic civil society, who have criticised it for its technological optimism, neglect of the service and industrial sectors (Halderman 2004: 18) and especially for its reliance on a land tenure system that critics feel discourages farmer investment in land improvement (CRDA 2004: 19-20). At the same time, the rise of potential investors in Ethiopian agriculture, particularly India and Saudi Arabia, has created a lucrative incentive to depart from the smallholder model.

For this reason, Ethiopia's long-term development plans in the 21st century have begun to depart from the government's previous strict adherence to ADLI. PASDEP added an 'emphasis on greater commercialization of agriculture and enhancing private sector development, industry [and] urban development' (MoFED 2006: 1); the GTP (MoFED 2010b) has further emphasised large scale farming and industrial expansion. Ethiopia has offered over three million hectares of fertile land to foreign investors, often at very cheap prices (Vidal 2011). This move towards large-scale commercial farms and cash crops signals a real (and highly controversial) change of direction, and partially detracts from Ethiopia's emulation of East Asia. The vehemence with which many EPRDF interviewees defended East Asian-inspired ADLI illustrates a tension between two models that, in all likelihood, extends to the heart of the EPRDF leadership.

Regardless of which model eventually predominates, Ethiopia's development strategy remains centred around agricultural policy, which the government claims 'will still be playing the leading role' in growth (MOFED 2010a: 18). Creating industrial growth from agricultural inputs remains a prominent goal, also, while a focus on the services sector is seen as highly premature. Elites continue to cite East Asia as an example of the successful allocation of resources to programmes aimed at rural development and agricultural productivity, as well of the need for the intensive use of technology in order to achieve this. Much sectoral learning is also taking place in this regard: elites reported emulating specific aspects of agricultural extension programmes, land use and agricultural technology.

Most importantly, however, East Asia remains a major contributing factor to elites' perceptions that most countries go through similar stages of development—albeit at their own pace and time in history—and that careful prioritisation is needed in order to ensure

adherence to these stages. One respondent, describing China's transition to an industrial economy, put it thus: 'We are 20 years behind China, and we're trying to do what they did to get where they are. Maybe 20 years from now, we'll be following where China is [then], and so on!' (EG17). On the matter of prioritisation, a senior representative of the Ministry of Trade and Industry acknowledged that the selection of priority industries is 'based on the experience of the East Asian countries' (EG11).

As Alden and Large point out, there exists an interesting contradiction between the dual constructions of China as (on the one hand) a successful moderniser and (on the other hand) as a fellow developing country that understands African challenges in a way that developed countries cannot: 'it is hard...for Beijing to convincingly maintain that China is a developing country with lingering and pervasive poverty if African delegations are taken only to such places as the glimmering vision of modernity that is contemporary Shanghai' (Alden and Large 2001: 32). Although this divide may one day be stretched to the point of untenability, one way in which Ethiopian elites currently reconcile it is by emphasising the sequential nature of this modernity. China's present achievements may seem breathtakingly remote from its past, but are in fact, according to this reading, linked by a chain of agricultural and industrial achievements that can be replicated in Africa. A gradualist, step-by-step development trajectory underpinned by agricultural and rural development is thus one of the main lessons the EPRDF takes from East Asia, even if other policy inputs compete with lesson-drawing in practice.

If there is a clear but imperfect overlap between the East Asian Model and Ethiopia's own agricultural policy, this is also the one area of lesson-drawing where modernisation theory is only partially relevant. On the one hand, both modernisation theory and other

agricultural-led development models view the replacement of agriculture with industry as both the natural endpoint and the goal of development. Kuznet's (1966) dualist theory of 'modern economic growth' is the best-known example of this, but Rostow (1990 [1960]: 24), Johnston and Mellor (1961) and many others viewed structural transformation away from agriculture to industry as an essential precondition of development. Industrialisation was therefore viewed as both desirable and unavoidable, if living standards are to rise. A revolution in agricultural methods was also seen as indispensible: for Rostow (1956: 42), 'a requirement for take-off is, therefore, a class of farmers willing and able to respond to the possibilities opened up for them by new techniques, land- holding arrangements, transport facilities, and forms of market and credit organisation'.

On the other hand, modernisation theory more often targeted industry directly, usually prioritising industrial development at the expense of agriculture and seeing development more as a case of industrial 'demand' than of agricultural 'supply'. Brohman's (1996: 19) paraphrasing of this position is illuminating:

The traditional sector is non-dynamic; it does not represent a source of development, but is merely a reservoir from which the modern sector can extract labour and other resources. Basically, the modern sector acts as a 'pole of development' from which various socio-cultural and economic elements radiate.

In sum, it is in the area of agricultural policy where some of the greatest divergences between the case studies and development models arise, although it is also an arena where much learning takes place. Kenya's service-heavy economy precludes the sequencing of its three

constituent sectors, leading its elites to draw limited and often contradictory lessons from East Asia on this issue. Ethiopia, by contrast, draws heavily on China, Taiwan and other countries that have prioritised agricultural growth before turning to industry and services. Although this move can be said to constitute modernisation in the sense that it is undertaken for the purposes of subsequent industrial development, its immediate focus on the rural sector distinguishes it from those modernisation theorists, such as Levy (1966: 11), who treated modernisation and industrialisation as synonymous. Ethiopia's emulation of East Asian sectoral sequencing also competes with other factors which militate for a more commercial approach to agriculture.

7.3 The Importance of 'Catch-Up' Economic Growth

If development, according to emulating elites, is a process of phased, self-propelled structural transformation from agriculture to industry, the question remains as to how this transformation is to be achieved. Four themes, in particular, emerged to answer this question. Each was heavily associated, by elites, with the East Asian region, but each also shared much with the modernisation paradigm.

The first of these key 'ingredients' was rapid economic growth. Earlier chapters have discussed the central role that rapid economic growth has played in both modernisation theory and the literature on the Chinese Model. Other development paradigms, particularly the early Washington Consensus, have placed a similar level of emphasis on this aspect of development. Williamson's (1990) original 10 principles all had this overarching aim, for example. However, the moral critiques that have been incorporated into the Augmented

Washington Consensus over the past decade have largely focused on narrowing the perceived gap between countries' economic performance and their social development (Gore 2000: 796). International donor discourse has thus shifted towards an emphasis on sustainability, participation, decentralisation and inclusiveness, and current donor practice is wary of an overly growth-oriented approach to development. Dependency theorists, too, were primarily critical of that they saw as an unwarranted belief that a rise in GDP would lead to a concurrent improvement in the well-being of the poor.

One of the most frequent observations of both Ethiopian and Kenyan lesson-drawers concerned the importance and the possibility of achieving the level of sustained, double-digit economic growth that East Asian countries had exhibited:

They have grown rapidly and they are still growing rapidly, and that should motivate us. If Asia is able to do it, we should be able to do it (EG13)

When NARC [the National Rainbow Coalition] won the election in 2002, I was Minister of Planning and National Development. We more or less did what the Singaporeans and Malaysians did. We sat down and we said 'look at where we are today. How do we bring economic recovery? What are some of the things we must do to have economic recovery? And that is what led to the ERS – the key elements of it' (KG4).

It was not only the presence of rapid growth in these countries which impressed interviewees, but its sheer speed: several interviewees remarked that their countries could not afford to take several hundred years to develop, as the West had done. 'The pace at which the West developed and the East Asian countries developed is different. Theirs is faster. So

we're adapting a faster model', said one (EG11). Development was seen as a process of 'catching up' (KG10) and 'leapfrogging' (EG20). As 'latecomers' to an unavoidable and universal process, Ethiopia and Kenya could achieve this by aiming for double-digit growth. This is again reminiscent of Ozawa's 'catch-up growth', which was first applied to Japan and later to the Asian Tigers and China (Crafts 2004: 53). It has since, it appears, become a central plank of the thinking of Ethiopian and Kenyan emulators. As one Kenyan policymaker phrased it, 'when you are at the back, you have to put additional effort to get to the front of the pack. So we have to grow rapidly to be able to get there.' (KG9).

Outside of elite discourses, the need for double-digit growth also manifests itself in both countries' ambitious short- and medium-term development plans. In Ethiopia, PASDEP made 'a massive push to accelerate growth' the second of its central pillars, and aimed to achieve an annual average of 7 to 10% growth in real GDP from 2006 to 2010 (MoFED 2006: 165, 63). The lowest of these numbers is explicitly said to come directly from 'the best experiences of eastern and southern Asian countries that have registered accelerated growth' (MoFED 2006: 165). Its even more optimistic successor, the GTP, aimed to double the country's GDP from 2010 to 2015 (MoFED 2010b)[43]. Kenya's foremost economic goal, similarly, has been to 'maintain a sustained economic growth of 10% per annum over the next 25 years' (Kenya 2007a: 2).

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[43] Interestingly, Amharic-language documents and unofficial English translations (such as that cited above) quote these figures, which were also widely reported in the media with the launch of the GTP. However, the official English-language document for presentation to donors (MoFED 2010a) omits explicit mention of these aims, perhaps due to earlier criticism by IMF officials and others that the original figures were 'a bit inflated' (quoted in Kirubel 2010).

Decision-makers also view attainment of 'middle-income status' as a particular milestone in a country's coming of age. *Vision 2030* aims to 'transform Kenya into a rapidly industrialising, middle-income country' by 2030 (Kenya 2007a: 1); a Kenyan economic planner told me that the standards of living in Malaysia, Thailand and certain Latin American countries—rather than formal *per capita* income figures—had acted as yardsticks during formulation of this goal. Despite Ethiopia's vastly different economic background, its plan to reach 'middle-income status' by 2025 (MoFED 2010b) is strikingly similar. Once again, several interviewees made a clear link between this aim and the East Asian development experience; one stated that 'Ethiopia has a vision: within 20 to 25 years, her citizens will become middle-income. Like China and the Five Tigers' visions. So she is going to be there' (EG17).

The tensions between wealth creation, redistribution and poverty alleviation have run through over half a century of development debates, and these same tensions can be seen in the discourses of Ethiopian and Kenyan elites. Although both groups emphasised all three aspects of economic development, subtle differences illustrated the influence of the East Asian example. In each country, those who cited East Asia as a central model were more likely than their peers to accord paramount importance to growth, often arguing that wealth creation would lead to other desirable economic outcomes. Although these elites were careful to emphasise the importance of ensuring that this wealth was sustainable and equitably distributed, many were also candid about their prioritisation of growth over direct poverty reduction. In contrast, those who disapproved of emulation of these countries were more likely, also, to criticise what they saw as a narrow focus on growth alone.

In Kenya, the same top-level planner who drew direct parallels between East Asia's growth strategy and his own country's ERS, above, condemns the current 'pro-poor ideology' as 'very bankrupt' and describes the motivations of the drafters of ERS as follows: 'We needed a paradigm shift from PRSP [poverty reduction strategy papers] to economic recovery. The aim of the Kenyan government was not to reduce poverty but to create wealth and employment' (Anyang'Nyongo 2005). Another policymaker echoes this perspective, arguing that 'the leadership of the country decided that it wanted an economic strategy for wealth creation and employment generation', and that it wanted to move away 'from the traditional approach of doing poverty reduction strategies' (KG8). A business leader cites China directly as a lesson in 'never forget[ting] that we should not let the cost of wages affect investment and growth' (KN20).

It might be expected that opponents of the Kenyan government would view policymakers as continually preoccupied with wealth creation; for this reason, it is all the more significant that one of the government's fiercest critics views this as a relatively recent trend. When asked whether modernisation informed the thinking of Kenyan leadership, this respondent answered 'I guess it has come back in a different sense – really now the focus is on growth and the idea that growth will trickle down'. Although members of this leadership were generally loath to use the still-maligned term 'trickle-down', their continual expressions of admiration for the rapid economic growth experienced by Singapore, Malaysia and others in East Asia, as well as the focus accorded to wealth creation in their spoken and written discourse, indicate their clear commitment to this overall approach.

In Ethiopia, also, emulating elites felt rapid GDP growth to be the *sine qua non* of development, with many viewing the two concepts as virtually synonymous. Rapid

economic growth had not merely put more capital at the disposal of East Asian governments, but ensured that these governments disposed of the policy space and sovereignty to implement the development policies of their choosing (EG13). Even elites who claimed to eschew East Asian authoritarianism emphasised the region's role as an economic model:

> The model is incorporated into our policy because...especially, their growth is very fast. Since our country is very poor, we have to develop our economy, to improve the living standards of the people. How they improved their economy—we have to take that model (EG7).

Although Ethiopian policymakers were even more sensitive than their Kenyan counterparts to the suggestion that they were privileging macro-economic issues over social justice, this social justice was viewed as impossible without 'catch-up' growth. In the words of one senior policy-maker, 'without rapid economic growth, what will we distribute? Of course, things like equality are important, but the size of the cake must expand...We give first priority to growth' (EG20). According to another,

> Twenty years ago, I was of the opinion that we were going to build a system whereby priority is given to distribution, and we were more inclined to see distribution as justice taking place. Over time, we came to the conclusion that the first thing was to ensure rapid economic development (EG14).

If the example of East Asia is inspiring Ethiopian and Kenyan governmental elites to place double-digit growth at the forefront of their national development strategy, this would

certainly be consistent with much of the literature on the East Asian Model and the Beijing Consensus. The East Asian Model puts economic growth and the fulfilment of the material needs of the majority at the heart of government policy (Gore 2000: 796), often becoming the main source of governmental legitimacy (Peerenboom 2002: 245; Wade 1990: 246). In Suharto's Indonesia, for example, economic recovery and 'material expansion...became an ideology in the strongest sense of the term, describing the purpose of political activity, the methods used to achieve that goal, the attitudes which public figures should express, as well as serving as an effective ideological weapon against opponents of the regime or proponents of alternative visions' (Chalmers 1997: 3). The emphasis is on productivity and competitiveness rather than on welfare, provided that trickle-down alleviates the most severe manifestations of social inequality (Wong 2004: 351). In addition, other nations are consciously used as 'reference economies' which bureaucrats can emulate and use to measure their progress (Johnson 1982: 24). The strong parallels between Kenya's, Ethiopia's and East Asia's drives for economic growth are thus rooted, at least partially, in processes of emulation.

7.4 Scientific and Technological Optimism

A further key lesson that Ethiopian and Kenyan elites drew from East Asian models was an emphasis on the roles of science and technology in development. This manifested itself both in specific policies that sought to increase what Avila and Evenson (2009: 3779) call national 'technological capital', and in the broader belief that scientific and technological advancement could solve society's most pressing problems.

The importance that Ethiopian and Kenyan elites attach to scientific progress can hardly be overestimated:

There is no other worthwhile knowledge (EN8).

The basis of a country's development is the use of technology. We can talk of the best economic theories in the world, but if you are not able to have technological development, I don't think you will be able to achieve it. That's the basis of development, and that is where you start (KG13).

Good governance and education are strong candidates, but for me the single most versatile solution to Africa's development challenges...is science (Alemayehu 2009).

East Asia was not the only region from which Ethiopian and Kenyan elites drew this lesson. Ethiopia's Minister of Science cited attraction to the German model as one of his ministry's key reasons for increasing the prioritisation of technical education in Ethiopia (EG15). However, East Asian countries were most frequently referred to overall. 'To me', responded one Kenyan interviewee, 'those still remain the ultimate case studies in terms of benchmarking how you can infuse technological aspects into development' (KN15). An Ethiopian respondent felt 'Korea should be emulated' because it had 'invested a lot in science education, as opposed to the humanities – engineering, pure science' (EG24). According to Meles Zenawi himself, 'Taiwan and Korea are without doubt the most successful of all developing countries' in large part because 'they have had the most rapid and sustained accumulation of technological capability' (Meles 2007). Even the aforementioned science

minister frequently paired his expressions of admiration for German science policy with expressions of the desire to emulate South Korea's successful adoption of the German example:

> If Ethiopia does not learn from Germany like Korea did, like Taiwan did, then Ethiopia will not survive. So in about 15 years from now, by 2025, if Ethiopia does not export its own technology, then Ethiopia will not survive (EG15).

> In science and technology, I think 80% of what we learn comes from Germany and from Korea (EG15).

> The economy requires more technical knowledge than those unproductive people who just study certain things....the mentality was very bad. People don't want to get their hands dirty and do things and create things...so that mentality has to change. That is one of the things we learned from Germany. And not only us, Korea also learned from Germany (EG15).

The final quote illustrates an important facet of this aspect of learning. The emphasis that leaders placed on science and technology—and particularly on incorporating it into the educational system—did not consist solely of the usual assurances that this was one priority among many. After all, few governments today, or even in the past, would deny the importance of scientific innovation. Elites were actually willing, however, to argue for the replacement of other, arguably equally important priorities with a focus on science, and to re-engineer an entire culture to centre on the single-minded pursuit of innovation. In 2010, Kenya's then-Minister of Higher Education William Ruto announced tentative plans to halt

government funding of those university subjects deemed 'irrelevant' to the realisation of *Vision 2030* (quoted in Muindi 2010). Although Ruto did not specify the subjects he was referring to, these were widely regarded as comprising scientific and technical subjects such as agriculture, construction, architecture, engineering, medicine and information technology and excluding subjects such as on anthropology, philosophy, history, archaeology and the arts (Wanyama 2010; Muindi 2010). Such changes are already well on the way in Ethiopia. Ethiopia's Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) programme is one of the continent's most ambitious; it envisions a tertiary education system where 70% of graduates originate from scientific fields (EG15), and aims to build a number of dedicated Universities of Science and Technology over the course of a decade (Ohno *et al* 2009: 8).

Aside from the lesson that technical, technological and scientific training should replace other forms of education where at all possible, other concrete expressions of this theme have emerged. One is an emphasis on the use of technology in increasing crop yields and driving agricultural growth. The central argument of the influential *A New Harvest* (Juma 2011), written by a Kenyan academic, is that African countries should learn from East Asia—and especially from China—the importance of the application of science and technology with a view to increasing agricultural productivity.

Signs abound that a more technologically-intensive approach to agriculture is taking hold in both countries under consideration. In 2010, Kenya passed the Biosafety Act, allowing the commercial cultivation of genetically-modified crops. The mechanisation of agriculture is one of the most strenuously-emphasised priorities in Ethiopian agriculture, and the justification used to underpin Ethiopia's controversial plans to lease agricultural land to foreign investors (Berhanu 2011). The Kenyan government has also launched an ambitious

irrigation programme aimed at moving from rain-fed agriculture towards intensive irrigation in Kenya's arid and semi-arid areas; it aimed to triple agricultural output through irrigation from 2010 to 2020 (Kenya 2010a: 54).

Donors and NGOs have watched these developments with some trepidation; although Ethiopia's move towards cash crops corresponds with the recommendations of the World Bank and other Western institutions, some have also expressed reservations at what they view as an overweening faith in scientific progress. In the words of the Augmented Washington Consensus, 'this kind of emphasis on biotech and science as the way forward in Africa lacks understanding of how development is largely a political process and crucially depends on the effectiveness of institutions' (Bunting 2010). Kenyan and Ethiopian advocates of biotechnology have, in turn, accused Western critics of 'arrogance' and 'hypocrisy' (e.g. Mboyi quoted in Derbyshire 2011: 23).

As with the lessons surrounding TVET, not all moves towards technologically-intensive agriculture are drawn from East Asia. Israel and the United Arab Emirates, for example, were cited in Kenya as sources for the technology that would enable the country to farm or develop arid land (KN10, KN3). Once again, however, this was one of the lessons most often cited by elites wishing to emulate East Asia; as a corollary, East Asian countries remained among the most-mentioned in the realm of agricultural technology.

This chapter has analysed the influence of countries such as Taiwan, South Korea and China on Ethiopian and Kenyan approaches to development, arguing that these countries often present models of agriculturally-led structural transformation. This discussion dovetails with the role that science and technology plays in agriculture, as much of Ethiopia's

official discourse, in particular, makes clear. According to the 'Ten Year Road Map' of Ethiopia's Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development:

> Taiwan is the clearest example of a country that reduced [the] cost of production in agriculture through research-base technological change and used that success to accelerate growth in the non-agricultural sector...For Ethiopia, Taiwan illustrates how successful the ADLI strategy can be (Demese *et al* 2010).

There are also signs that emulation in the realm of science and technology is aided by growing practical cross-national linkages between Asian countries and the African cases under consideration here. The development and implementation of Ethiopia's TVET and Agricultural Technical and Vocational Education Training (ATVET) programmes has had substantial input from Chinese technical experts; the former brought 190 Chinese trainers to Ethiopia from 2001-2011, while the latter saw the influx of 290 trainers in a comparable time frame (King 2011: 101). While King (2011: 101) points out that many Western countries such as Germany play a larger role in advising Ethiopian ministries and universities, he also notes that the level of China's assistance in the specific realm of TVET is virtually unparalleled 'at a time when many Western donors have moved away from reliance on technical experts'.

For their part, Kenyan elites cite their membership of the Commonwealth Partnership for Technology Development as an important forum for lesson-drawing in this sector of science and technology. The forum, which aims 'to become a leading agent of change in harnessing technology for growth and wealth creation' (CPTM 2012), is chaired by its founder, Mahathir's erstwhile science advisor.

The use of science and technology to fuel rapid economic growth, nation-building and structural transformation is, therefore, a central priority for both Kenyan and Ethiopian elites; those outside examples that contribute to this emphasis are most likely to be East Asian countries (although they are not exclusively from this region).

This emphasis also shares much, however, with modernisation theory. A belief that technology transfer and the intensive use of science would lead to progress in all arenas of society was so central to the theory that modernisation itself has been viewed as virtually impossible without a corresponding increase in man's technological control over nature (Black 1966: 10-11; Levy 1966: 11; Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 30). The discourse of Ethiopia and Kenya's emulating elites is thus not far removed from the theory's view that 'the progress of the country rests on rational technology, and ultimately on scientific knowledge' (Shils quoted in Gilman 2007: 2).

7.5 The Return of Physical Infrastructure

The fifth key lesson that Kenyan and Ethiopian lesson-drawers take from East Asia centres around the immense priority currently accorded to the improvement of physical infrastructure in these African countries. As is the case with science and technology, it is virtually impossible to overplay the enthusiasm with which elites approach this policy area. At a 2010 infrastructure conference convened by the Ministry of Roads and attended by nearly every high-profile decision-maker in the Kenyan executive, Prime Minister Raila Odinga proclaimed that 'our priorities are: first, infrastructure; second, infrastructure; and third, infrastructure' (Odinga 2010). The budget of the Kenyan Ministry of Roads had already increased five-fold from 2003 to 2010 (KG14). Similarly, Ethiopia's

unprecedentedly large 2011 development budget was devoted primarily to road construction and electrification; the roads sector alone was due to receive over a third of total government expenditure on development (Maasho 2011). Key EPRDF and government documents exhibit an intense desire to prioritise infrastructure, particularly in rural areas (MoFED 2010a; MoFED 2006).

Elites' increased emphasis on the improvement of energy, transportation and other infrastructure networks does not occur in a vacuum: in each country, investment in infrastructure was viewed as one of the key means by which East Asia had prospered. Unlike with the other lessons analysed in this chapter, China was indisputably the primary exemplar in the region—although it was not the sole exemplar. This was the case even in Kenya, where smaller, more familiar countries were usually preferred as models. In the realm of infrastructure, however, China was the foremost example for both countries:

China is a huge country, with a huge population...However, they do their roads very well. We can learn a thing or two from them (KG3).

Without infrastructure you can do nothing. They just gave priority to infrastructural development (EG23).

I also saw fast growth – they concentrated on the development of basic infrastructure, which is a prerequisite for development (EG22).

The central role that China occupied as a model of infrastructural development is due to another anomaly in this area of learning: more than any other, this was a policy sector in

which elites preferred not to differentiate between international development cooperation, foreign investment and lesson-drawing. China is the external actor most directly involved in road construction in both Ethiopia and Kenya; conversely, road construction is one of the areas in which China is most involved in the cases under consideration. There is evidence that the visibility of Chinese construction—exemplified both by the presence of Chinese labourers and the rapid appearance of new roads funded or built by China—directly contributes towards lesson-drawing. One newspaper editor saw it in this way:

> There is something to see. Here the American Embassy is trying to give 50 000 books for the Kennedy Library, but these [Chinese] guys are coming and building roads. You can see it. And in Africa, where there is not literacy, which is not an educated society, where there is a 90% rural population, where nobody analyzes, the issue is 'don't tell me, *show* me'. What you see [with Chinese aid] is a road, what you see [with American aid] is a book (EN6).

Decision-makers drew from China, as well as from the rest of the region, the lesson that infrastructural development was not only important, but also that it was actually *possible*. This recognition may initially appear self-evident. However, such an assumption would underestimate the deleterious impact of longstanding donor conditionalities, corruption and local neglect on Ethiopia and Kenya's infrastructural networks. To elites (and, presumably, ordinary citizens) accustomed to viewing highways, dams and high-speed trains as unattainable luxuries found only in a handful of the most developed countries, East Asia's domestic infrastructure and current Chinese-led projects on their own soil are both sobering illustrations of their own countries' tardiness. This was particularly true in Kenya: one respondent viewed China as having 'demystified' infrastructure (KG1), and another pointed

out that 'in Thailand they have roads like in the US, so why not us?' (KG10). According to a Kenyan bureaucrat, the use of Chinese labour has alerted Kenyans to the fact that 'the actual cost of construction is actually quite low. And you wonder what was happening before?' (KN5).

In both country cases, there is an element of what Baruah (2008: 62), in reference to China, calls 'developmental monumentalism'. Countries engaging in developmental monumentalism undertake the construction of infrastructure for symbolic as well as for more practical reasons. To the Kenyan Minister of Roads (KG14), then, Kenya focuses on road construction as much for the 'feel good factor' as for transportation: 'It's like walking with a torn dress – if you find everybody walking with a torn dress, here in the streets, you go back and the image you have of Kenya is that people are very poor, they can't dress, they can't eat', he says. 'When you arrive at an airport, that's your first image, then you drive from the airport to a hotel—how does the road look?' (KG14). In 2011, construction began in Ethiopia on the tenth-largest hydro-electric power plant in the world. In a gesture laden with symbolism, Ethiopia has vowed to raise the substantial cost domestically through bonds rather than through foreign assistance. Ministers voted to name it 'The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam', expressing clearly their hopes that the dam would herald Ethiopia's long-awaited return to international prominence. Developmental monumentalism is, as Baruah (2008: 62) notes, 'a way for a country to announce to the world: we have arrived, we are modern'.

Dams are, in fact, a particularly potent symbol of modernity even among other infrastructural accomplishments. Highly-visible, large-scale attempts to harness technology and mobilise natural resources, they bring about industrialisation and control over the natural

environment, but have high social costs, at least initially. As such, national discourses on the building of dams are illustrative of broader prevailing attitudes towards modernisation.

Ethiopia's second-largest dam, Gibe III, has provoked vociferous criticism from Western INGOs that claim that it will disrupt the livelihood of up to one million rural Ethiopians and that accuse the EPRDF of 'eco-genocide' (Sharife 2010). The project was planned and executed very rapidly; a no-bid contract was awarded to Italian firm Salini Costruttori before funding or impact assessments had been carried out, leading the World Bank and other donors to decline involvement in the project (Greste 2009). For its part, the Ethiopian government holds that the dam is necessary in order to more than double Ethiopia's power generation capacity; Meles Zenawi (quoted in Moszynski 2011) accuses Western opponents of Ethiopia's Gibe III dam of wanting Ethiopians to remain 'undeveloped and backward to serve their tourists as a museum', and points to the West's own history of large-scale infrastructural development. Gibe III and the 'Ethiopian Renaissance Dam' are only two of six large dams under construction in Ethiopia as of 2011, and Meles' discourse pales in comparison to that contained in an article that appeared on the EPRDF-owned Walta Information Center news website in 2010.[44] Opponents, it held,

> ...want to preserve the tribal life styles of the Omotic and Turkana peoples intact and free from the threat of economic development. Secondly, they want to keep the whole...area for the local tribes only to be accessed by white tourists and photographers taking pictures of half naked African tribes for the consumption of their weird TV programmes under the

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[44] Walta Information Centre is officially a private entity, but is owned by the Mega Corporation, which is itself owned by the EPRDF (Stanbridge and Ljunggren 2003: 85) and headed by the wife of Meles Zenawi.

pretext of anthropological studies. In other wards [*sic*] they want to keep these Ethiopian tribes completely shielded from civilization and economic development...They worry that it will transformed [*sic*] the environmental area beyond recognition, instantly changing it from an area of backwardness to an area of modernity and development...This amount of additional electrical energy will enable Ethiopia to erect heavy industrial plants such as steel mills and iron smelting factories, enabling it to become an industrial giant of East Africa (Shumay 2010).

Kenya possesses its own controversial dam project, the proposed Magwagwa Multipurpose Dam to be built by Chinese corporation Sinohydro. Although the size and impact of the dam will be considerably smaller than Ethiopia's mega-dams, it will still involve the relocation of over 1000 families (Cherono 2010).

Such debates are reminiscent of two dams that have become icons of modernisation: one is China's Three Gorges Dam, the construction of which necessitated the relocated of an estimated 1.3 million rural residents from its inception in 1994 until its completion in 2012 (Reuters 2012). The other is the United States' Hoover Dam, constructed during the interwar period by labourers working under notoriously dangerous and difficult conditions (Steinberg 1993: 404) and still occupying a place in the historical imagination as the preeminent symbol of the New Deal era's desire to grant humanity control over nature in the service of progress and prosperity (Steinberg 1993: 402).

It is thus apt that Ethiopian and Kenyan elites look primarily to China as a model of infrastructure, and that the resulting policies and discourses resemble those of the United States during the early 20th century. Modernisation theory, which essentially sought to universalise the United States' own early processes of industrialisation, placed a central

emphasis on physical infrastructure. As Graham and Marvin (2001: 84) describe it, 'the assertion of an embryonic national identity in the form of airports, four-lane highways and power stations...would sweep away the divisions of colonialism and the barriers of traditionalism'. The government was often held to occupy a central role in the planning and execution of the 'big push' that such initiatives—and the broader programmes of industrialisation and modernisation of which they were a central part—necessarily entailed (Rosenstein-Rodan 1957).

Although the neo-Marxist paradigm of the 1970s began by placing considerable emphasis on the mobilisation of resources, it also marked the beginning of an era in which the provision of 'basic needs' was seen as more important than a focus on grand infrastructural projects (Gilman 2003: 70). Infrastructure became even more marginal with the Washington Consensus: although it was rare for donors to explicitly dismiss its importance, other priorities firmly supplanted it. Whereas the 'hardware' of development (capital, technology and infrastructure) had been important in the 1950s and 1960s, now the 'software' of development (institutions, management processes, human capital) began to be emphasised (Pieterse 2009: 189). The result was a sharp reduction in funding for physical infrastructure across Africa, and an increase in spending on the social sector (Ndulu and Chakraborti 2007: 159). In some cases, the new priorities did not merely replace infrastructural goals, but actively weakened their influence. Most notably, widespread privatisation saw many public utilities leave the hands of the government, decentralising development activities and making ambitious projects difficult to finance.

The discourse of my Ethiopian interviewees echoed this final point, with emulating elites tying a perceived need for greater attention to infrastructure with an argument for

government control over the process. One of the central planks of EPRDF policy is the argument that investment in rural roads and electrification is essential but initially uncompetitive on the open market; only a developmental state possesses, therefore, the means with which to achieve this goal (Meles 2006). According to one Ethiopian interviewee, for example, 'the government is investing very heavily in infrastructure, which China did and is still doing. So I think the [Ethiopian] model of development is very close to that of China' (EN12). An EPRDF training manual makes the same point in reference to policies enacted by South Korea and Taiwan during their 'developmental' phases (EPRDF 2006).

A focus on physical infrastructure—particularly in the areas of energy and transport —is therefore back on the agenda in both Kenya and Ethiopia, after several decades of relative neglect. China is a particularly influential model in this area, due in no small part to its direct involvement in the construction sectors of these countries. The example of East Asia demonstrates to elites not only the benefits, but also the sheer possibility of a rapid improvement in physical infrastructure; elites therefore see infrastructural development as a symbolic as well as a practical boon. In addition, Ethiopian elites cite the East Asian example as evidence of the need for strong state involvement in this area.

7.6 The Need for Cultural Transformation

The East Asian Model is prompting Kenyan and Ethiopian emulators to view development as a process that happens endogenously and in stages, in which 'catching up' with developed nations is important, as long as pace and policy are set by national leaders. They view

technology, rapid economic growth and large, ambitious infrastructural projects as essential elements of this process. In addition, Ethiopian policy-makers draw lessons from China, South Korea and Taiwan on the importance of structural change that begins with rural smallholder-based development and only later prioritises the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy.

The final lesson discussed in this chapter is arguably both the most controversial and the most intangible. Many of the discussions about the East Asian model have centred around the extent to which it is underpinned by particular cultural values, and thus replicable in vastly different cultural contexts such as Africa. Those whom Peter Berger (1988: 8) labels 'culturalists' offer the Weberian hypothesis that Confucian values have driven economic growth in East Asia, and that the model is thus very difficult—if not impossible— to transfer outside the region. 'Institutionalists', on the other hand, believe that economic success has largely stemmed from a set of specific economic policies and practices, and are thus more optimistic about the potential for cross-societal emulation (Berger 1988: 9). The debate on the Chinese Model has witnessed a similar divide (summarised in Friedman 2010) between those who see China as possessing an 'inimitable...Chineseness' and those who believe in China's ability to inspire other developing countries regardless of cultural and historical differences.

Although my group of Ethiopian and Kenyan respondents contained both culturalists and institutionalists, a surprising number of elites fell into a third category—those who believed that their cultures had to modernise in order for emulation, and development, to take place. Like the modernisation theorists who had preceded them, they sought to use education and mechanisation to create 'modern' citizens who used science and rationality to

order their affairs, and who could become entrepreneurs and informed political participants. This process of cultural transformation was tightly linked to economic growth—whether as cause, outcome or—very often—both.

A very common cultural lesson that both Ethiopian and Kenyan leaders testified to drawing from China and East Asia was the importance of discipline and hard work in bringing about economic growth. An influx of Chinese labourers to both countries has brought about an unprecedented level of contact between cultures that have hitherto had little interaction with each other. On this issue, the majority of Kenyans and Ethiopians may (or may not) have different opinions from their leaders.[45] However, a large number of elites in both countries expressed admiration for the diligence and determination of those Chinese migrants with which they had come into contact, as well as a desire to transfer some of these values to the local population:

> Every Chinese I know is hard-working, very hard-working. So somehow or another, they have managed to focus the people and have them work towards changing their country. And so, even though there are not as many people in this country as in China, we have a lot of people that we could teach, train and focus. We can change this country, I think (EN14).

> I appreciate their working culture—they work hard. I want to follow this working culture because to develop your country, you need to change your working culture, otherwise you cannot develop. Especially for Africans, it is good to change their working culture to get some experience from the Chinese (EN10).

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[45] This dissertation avoids this discussion, the outlines of which can be found in Horta (2009) and Sautman and Hairong (2009).

I think in terms of the work ethic that the Chinese have, the country is actually learning quite a lot. There are a lot of Chinese people coming in, and they are basically completely transforming the way infrastructure development is put in place, the work ethic of the people, the way we contract, and so on (KN5).

What we can learn from China is discipline – a work ethic. They do have a good work ethic, more than the West, in my view. And that is something we can learn. They work with commitment, they work with focus, they're not looking over their shoulder, they just work (KG20).

Tom Mboya is said to have driven a white Mercedes in the belief that such conspicuous consumption would inspire his fellow Kenyans to work harder in the pursuit of a similar lifestyle (Speich 2009: 459). Over half a century later, this attitude finds its strongest embodiment in the minds of elites who wish to use the East Asian—and especially Chinese —example to motivate and mobilise their populations. This is illustrated in a particularly striking pronouncement by one senior policy-maker:

We want the minds of Kenyans to awaken. It is good to be pained – it is good for people to feel pain when they see the Chinese contractors on all these jobs, and they can ask themselves 'why are we not succeeding?' If we use that...to excel and invest in the infrastructure, it can be the medicine or the catalyst we need. (KG14).

Many elites spoke of need for discipline and hard work in a rather abstract fashion, but a few elites proposed concrete changes to policy. One senior Kenyan bureaucrat, for example, citing the examples of Singapore, Japan, South Korea and Scandinavia, wished to impose a policy of universal military service in order to instil discipline in young Kenyans (KG9).

A second common thread united elites who believed that the example of East Asia militated not just for economic and political change, but also for cultural transformation. This was a desire to educate the population in the application of science and rationality to every aspect of their daily lives. To one Kenyan civil servant, South Korea's success lay in its ability to create an 'engineering culture' and a culture of innovation: 'and this is why...it is very difficult to talk of modernisation and exclude cultural change' (KG8). An Ethiopian member of the EPRDF focused on 'backwardness', a term she defined as 'a life devoid of science and technology' (EG2), while another defined modernisation as a state wherein 'all sorts of backward, unscientific views are reduced to the bare minimum, where people live on a scientific basis' (EG14).

In short, interviews were replete with expressions of elites' desire to introduce greater efficiency, productivity and rationality in the service of a 'new scientific way of reasoning' (KN11). This viewpoint, while not exclusive to those using East Asia as a model, was again more common among this group. Giving farmers access to fertilisers, better seeds, access to modern technology and specialised training will not only lead to an increase in output, the thinking runs, but will help them to appreciate the importance of planning, mechanisation and productivity.

Finally, elites in both Ethiopia and Kenya wished to draw a third common lesson from what they saw as the cultural underpinnings of East Asia's growth: a strong sense of

national identity among the population. The role of nation-building—and particularly of nation-builders—will be explored in full in the following chapter. Here, however, it is enough to note the importance that elites assigned to nationalism, conceptualised as a new and universal identification with the machinery and symbolism of the Westphalian state, as a mobilising, unifying and modernising force in East Asia.

The dynamics of elites' desire for cultural transformation varied somewhat between the two case studies. In Ethiopia, elites were more likely to use overtly civilisatory discourse and to place all societies on a continuum ranging from the 'backwards' to the modern. An EPRDF training manual for 'peasants', for example, lists the traits of a 'model individual' (EPRDF 2007: 5-8): he should 'struggle to replace backward traditions', 'strive and struggle to lessen traditional holidays and increase working hours' and thereby 'start to live a modern and better life'. He should also own a private toilet, refrain from keeping animals in his house, keep his money in a bank, use his time efficiently, embrace new technology and help his wife with housework.

Ethiopian discourse on this issue was certainly partially due to the simple reason of language; many English phrases and words with very negative connotations in Kenya and other former colonies do not have the same impact in Ethiopia. However, the latter country's vision of civilisatory progress is also intricately linked to its history; it is a vision which in turn greatly affects its choice to emulate China. Many elites viewed Ethiopia as a once-advanced civilisation that had been brought to its knees by an inability to modernise from within. According to Meles Zenawi (2010), Ethiopia under the EPRDF has only recently begun 'the long road back to the frontlines of world civilization'. A senior Ethiopian bureaucrat phrases it thus:

Modernisation is the order of the day, and everybody should run for it...but it takes a long time for the Ethiopian people to understand the use for modernisation, it comes gradually. Maybe it might be the last country to understand the benefit or the advantage of modernisation...One reason, as I told you, is that Ethiopia will not surrender to outsiders, and the other is that most Ethiopians love their traditional support networks (EG18).

Elites both inside and outside the ruling party frequently also used the purported lack of education and knowledge among Ethiopian 'peasants' to argue for a gradual approach to democratisation. Although few argued explicitly for any formal or institutional brakes on democracy, several expressed the sentiment that the logic and norms underpinning democracy were completely alien to those governing 'feudal' Ethiopian communities (and that this was the main reason for Ethiopia's 'imperfect' democracy). 'The understanding of democracy is very low. Because [people] do not know how to agree, how to negotiate, how to accept other opinions' (EN10), felt one non-governmental leader. A EPRDF member echoed this sentiment: 'We were not democratic at all 19 years back...it requires a lot of things, to change the mindset of all to bring them to that level. So we're in the process. We have not reached that high level, as such' (EG22). EPDRF publications, too, speak of Ethiopia's 'backward and undemocratic culture' (EPRDF 2005: 2). Even a critic of the government felt the problem lay more with African culture than with a lack of institutions:

We believe ideas which are typical of the Dark Ages and we use modern ideas...An election is a manifestation or a result, like a computer of technology, but at the base are ideas of liberty. We are not familiar with those ideas but we are trying to implement the external

manifestations of those ideas – which are elections. That's why it's not becoming successful in African countries, it's why it results in chaos, conflict and death' (EN8).

It was rare to find explicit references to China or East Asia in this aspect of Ethiopian 'lesson-drawing', but the content of these discourses is markedly similar to much of the Chinese discourse on modernisation. One example is the Chinese government's preoccupation with improving 'population quality' through manners classes, anti-spitting campaigns and other efforts at mass public education (Nyiri 2006). Even staunch critics of Ethiopia's electoral system have remarked on the fact that the EPRDF 'allows and even encourages the teaching of democratic values' (Pausewang *et al* 2002: 239) in schools, cadre trainings and *kebele* gatherings—as long as it is completely in control of the process.

Another area in which this civilisatory discourse is particularly prevalent in China is in its policy towards minorities. Modernisation has long been China's purported source of legitimacy in Tibet, especially, an area the *White Paper on Tibet* (PRC 2001) describes as having been 'backward', 'in decline', 'feudal', 'savage' and 'primitive' before the establishment of the Tibetan Autonomous Region in 1951. Under Chinese rule, however, Tibet is moving 'from darkness to brightness, from backwardness to progress, from poverty to prosperity and from isolation to openness, and...marching toward modernization'. Similarly, the White Paper entitled *Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China* (PRC 2005b) mentions the need for the preservation and protection of minority culture, but at the same time encourages ethnic minorities to adopt 'new, scientific, civilized and healthy customs in daily life'. Ethiopia's own desire to move rapidly from the traditional to the modern, due to the fact that 'you can't imagine modernity in a feudal setting' (EG16), mirrors this desire. It creates both

an affinity for and a lesson from the Chinese approach to development, suggesting that causality—in the case of this lesson in particular—runs in two directions.

There are echoes of this approach in Kenya, also, as well as indications that elites view cultural transformation as an important factor of Chinese and East Asian success. Kenyan discourse is less overtly civilisatory: elite discourse is more consistent with a broader international dislike of terms such as 'backwardness' and even 'modernisation'. As one governmental advisor put it, 'in Kenya we don't talk about modernisation, because it's pejorative. It connotes that we are natives' (KG22). There was also less overt evidence of such thinking in government documents.

Nonetheless, elites privately expressed a strong belief that 'there is no way you can begin to define a modern society without a change of the traditional culture (KG8). One example is a civil society representative who expressed admiration for Mao, who 'simply had to interfere with the whole of China, bring it to a standstill, redefine new values and push them out. We may not have agreed, but he got somewhere at the end of the day' (KN15). For this reason, this respondent argued, all other emulation would be impossible without equally far-reaching changes in Kenyan values:

> I've never seen adequate attention paid, in my view, to the social restructuring that makes for development...Yes, it should start with the social development, and once your society has developed a consciousness that enables people to do the right thing and understand that individual behaviour impacts on the whole society, then you accept the foundations of development. And then you can borrow (KN15).

A second example is a technocrat who listed Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia as the countries Kenya should most seek to emulate. On the afternoon of our interview, he had just come from a meeting with the World Bank on the subject of Kenya's policy towards its indigenous pastoralists. He recounted his government's position, one that the World Bank found problematic:

> We told them that our thinking is not to preserve the culture of the indigenous people as such, but we recognise them as marginalised, behind the rest of society in terms of development, which is now modernisation. So our policy is to bring them to our level, which is now modernisation. To bring them to—I don't want to say 'modern' ways of doing things, but— basically the Western ways of doing things (KG10).

There is an almost uncanny irony in a situation where Western donors are attempting to persuade African elites not to 'Westernise' their citizens, and African leaders are looking to East Asian countries to assist them in just this process. The term 'Westernise', as used above, should be interpreted somewhat cautiously. It would have been impossible to find a Kenyan or Ethiopian elite who felt that their citizens should—or would—ever precisely resemble those of other 'advanced' countries, whether in East Asia or the West. There was a lot of emphasis, in particular, in retaining visible local practices such as local dress and cuisine:

> If we take for example the way we dress, for example, we are very Westernised. If you go to West Africa, you'll find that inasmuch as they are modernising, you can still see it is West African...What we need to retain more are things to do with our own culture, to do with food, with practices, with things like that (KG12).

Most African countries, we see that they are just copying whatever the Western modernisation is doing, and they're losing everything. So I feel that modernisation is a modern way of thinking, a modern way of innovating, making life easy for the people, but still maintaining the best traditions you have...I just see it from my attachment with some friends from Japan and my visits to Tokyo. None of the Western youths will bow down for his boss. But in Japan a junior will bow down to a senior engineer (EG16).

What, then, is meant when many elites speak of 'modernising' or even 'Westernising' their citizens? As mentioned previously, much of this hinges on the fostering of certain values such as national pride, diligence, delayed gratification, civic responsibility, 'need for achievement' (to use a phrase from the modernisation theorists) and rationality. Ethiopian and Kenyan elites want to 'update' or 'modernise' their existing cultures, rather than replace them outright. As a senior Kenyan government official put it, 'That's why I say we need Version 2.0 of our culture, where people use scientific methods to determine their future...We have been stuck in Version 1.0 of our culture' (KG9). According to an Ethiopian parliamentarian, modernisation entails 'understanding our heritage in a new way' (EG2).

There is scope for a certain amount of cultural variation in such an approach, but less room for cultural relativity than might be expected. The last-mentioned Kenyan interviewee went on to express his dislike for South Africa's Jacob Zuma, who has 'never suppressed that Africanness – many wives, many children, out of wedlock. Which are symptoms of irresponsibility' (KG9). The above-mentioned Ethiopian interviewee, meanwhile, views traditional Ethiopian culture as highly patriarchal and oppressive of women (EG2).

Interestingly, the notion that Africa can look to East Asia for lessons in modernising yet retaining its culture can also found in the writings of academics from both country cases. Both Adem (2005) and Mazrui (2001) use Japan as an example of a country that has been able to develop a locally relevant modernisation whilst retaining the cultural promiscuity necessary to develop in the era of globalisation; both urge that this example be selectively emulated by African countries looking to do the same.

The elites I interviewed demonstrated a similar desire. Certainly, East Asia acts as a direct, conscious model in the areas of work ethics, nationalism and attitudes towards technology. The extent to which elites directly draw on East Asia as a model of broader cultural change is a slightly more nebulous question: although direct references are less frequent, there are numerous parallels particularly in Chinese and Ethiopian discourses towards cultural transformation. In both countries, those elites most concerned with drawing lessons from East Asia in other areas were also most likely to use the discourse of cultural transformation. This is not to imply that Ethiopian or Kenyan elites wish to transplant East Asian culture to local settings; instead, elites view East Asia as demonstrating the ability of all cultures—not merely those with Western cultural heritages—to 'modernise' themselves and thereby fuel economic growth. As one Ethiopian policymaker who viewed Japan as a model of indigenous modernisation phrased it, 'several factors affect the modernisation and development of one country. Among these, culture is one of most important, because it is the internal factor that mainly affects the development process, rather than the external factors' (EG1). As with modernisation theory, then, difficult but essential processes of internal societal transformation were viewed as the keys that would unlock other aspects of a nation's progress.

7.7 Conclusion

In analysing the nature of Ethiopian and Kenyan emulation of East Asia, this chapter has discussed several 'lessons' that arose from the interview and documentary data. Elites draw from East Asia the lesson that countries can develop endogenously and independently, and that development is a staged process that entails structural transformation of the economy. This process is driven by rapid 'catch-up' economic growth, the harnessing of science and technology and massive investment in physical infrastructure. Because emulators also view cultural transformation as an important ingredient of development, they wish to draw certain values and social practices from East Asian countries, whilst more generally 'modernising' their cultures in order to fuel economic growth. Ethiopia's civilisatory discourse and emphasis on gradual agricultural 'spillover' into industry make it particularly aligned to certain elements of the East Asian–and especially the Chinese—experience.

What prevents the above from constituting a mere 'laundry list' of lessons is the congruity between these aspects of elite emulation of East Asia and the modernisation paradigm. Most modernisation theorists viewed development in very similar terms, before ensuing theories replaced their views with foci on redistribution and institution-building, and with a post-modern scepticism of the potential of science to bring about development. Ethiopian and Kenyan lesson-drawing is not limited to discrete policies or technologies, but penetrates to the very foundation of thinking on development. Based on the evidence analysed in this chapter, Ethiopian and Kenyan emulation of East Asian models thus may not merely pull them closer to the experiences of countries such as China or Malaysia, but overturn many of the assumptions governing current development orthodoxy. If the next

chapter, which explores the ways in which emulating elites look to East Asian on questions of leadership and governance, reaches a similar conclusion, East Asian models may be at least partially responsible for bringing modernisation theory back to Africa.

CHAPTER EIGHT: WHO MODERNISES? THE FUNCTION AND FORM OF THE STATE

'We can learn from China how a developmental state should act'

– Deputy Prime Minister of Ethiopia (EG16)

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Previous chapters have examined the ways in which emulating elites in both Ethiopia and Kenya look to East Asia as a key source of lessons on development, drawing from the region a conceptualisation of the process as endogenous, technology-driven and occurring in roughly predictable stages. Rapid economic growth, cultural transformation and the linkages between these two facets of societal change are deemed particularly important in allowing countries to 'catch up' with others who had 'overtaken' them in recent decades.

This picture of the development process is incomplete, however, without examining and contextualising these elites' perceptions of their own roles and those of the institutions they represent. Some of the most striking and frequently-cited lessons related to questions of governmental intervention in the economy, and to the form of government most likely to ensure development along the lines cited above. In this final empirical chapter, I therefore examine each of these issues in turn. I also seek to situate these within the literature on the East Asian Model and on modernisation theory, where applicable, in order to understand how these lessons fit into broader debates on development. Finally, in order to further contribute to the robustness of my findings through triangulation, I explore the responses of elites to the term 'modernisation' itself.

8.1 Emulation of East Asia in the Area of State-Market Relations

The role that the state can most fruitfully play in national economic development lies at the heart of one of the most enduring debates in development theory and practice. It is thus not surprising that Ethiopian and Kenyan leaders regularly admitted to emulating East Asian models in this regard, although the precise content of this learning differed substantially between the case studies.

In the case of Ethiopia, the need for the government to retain substantial control over the economy was by far the single most important lesson cited from East Asia. In particular, emulating elites viewed East Asia as an alternative to the 'neo-liberalism' they so decried in the West, and particularly to the conditionalities it imposed on aid recipients:

> So intervention by the government has to be understood. Why, when it comes to Africa, is intervention by the government condemned? Why has Korea done this? Why has Taiwan's government done this? Even in Japan, at the early stages, the government was strongly involved in guiding the economy until certain market failures were satisfied (EG15).

> And I believe this is the way that Africa and developing nations have to go. Because the experience of South Korea, of Taiwan, of Japan, shows that market fundamentalism did not work at that time. Even now, some Asian countries like Malaysia, Singapore, do not follow the Western way of market fundamentalism - they follow others, and that makes development faster (EG16).

Elites were able to give many concrete examples of borrowing taking place in this regard: interviewees cited South Korea as a model for the creation and management of state enterprises, and Taiwan as an example of a 'developmental bureaucracy' (EG16). The Ethiopian Development Research Institute, a government-run development think tank (and the largest and most influential in the country), is explicitly modelled on the Korean Development Institute in both form and function (EG24). Import substitution policies, government-directed private sector development programmes and institutions established by the Ministry of Industry to promote exports in certain key sectors were all expressly named as being influenced by observation of East Asia.

In certain aspects of emulation—the perceived importance of economic growth, for example—Ethiopia's lesson-drawers isolated China as their primary example in the region. In the case of governmental intervention in the economy, however, countries such as South Korea and Taiwan were viewed as equally important models, and it was thus the region as a whole that was admired. This lesson was also drawn more frequently by governmental than by non-governmental respondents. However, several non-governmental elites, particularly in business and the media, were more accepting of the need for the government to 'build' a market economy, along East Asian lines, than would perhaps be expected:

It seems to me I hear the South Korean model very much talked about – a lot – in Ethiopia. The very, very strong, active hand of the government to start the private sector, which we're seeing now in Ethiopia...And I don't know, somehow I get the feeling that that might actually be the right approach for Ethiopia right now, in this time.' (EN13).

This lesson not only constituted a major way in which elites were learning from East Asia, but also one of the most cohesive and passionately-held ideological stances held by EPRDF respondents. To these interviewees, liberalism (and neo-liberalism, taken mainly as a synonym) was a dirty word. The state needed to intervene in Ethiopia, they felt, because market failures would make the development of rural areas unprofitable and unfeasible for the country's nascent private sector, particularly in the sector of physical infrastructure (EG22). It would also prevent 'rent-seekers' from taking advantage of Ethiopia's underdevelopment, whilst encouraging the 'right' investors (EG10). By this reasoning, all countries could be divided into three groups: 'developmental states' (found primarily in East Asia); 'failed states' (found in Africa); and developed, 'neoliberal' states (exemplified by the United States, and so far removed from Ethiopia's situation that their experience is all but irrelevant). Ethiopia, alongside perhaps South Africa, was seen as the only developmental state in Africa.

Once again, this stance comes directly from Meles Zenawi himself, and carries through to all levels of the party. One of the lessons that *Development, Democracy and Revolutionary Democracy* (EPRDF 2006) draws from South Korea and Taiwan is an alleged ability to free rural communities from rent-seeking private landlords and to build 'developmental structures' through selective governmental intervention. One of the key themes of *Dead Ends and New Beginnings* (Meles 2006) is the necessity of learning from the various means by which the Taiwanese and South Korean state machineries guided economic development:

Massive and comprehensive government intervention to address market failures combined with the appropriate set of incentives and disincentives provided to the private sector to elicit the desired response was how the Taiwanese and Korean miracles were achieved...The practices of the two most successful development experiences over the past half century are in direct and total opposition to the neo-liberal paradigm.

This thinking has carried over into policy as well, primarily by preventing the EPRDF from liberalising the economy at the speed that donors would prefer. The government continues to practice import substitution, impose controls on foreign exchange, and protect and promote key industries from outside competition. All land remains public, and key sectors such as banking and telecommunications are wholly government-owned. The *Bertelsmann Transformation Index* (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012a: 1), which assigns countries a score from 1 to 10 depending on extent of market liberalisation, accords Ethiopia a score of 3.96.[46]

A severe distrust of the market has, of course, pervaded the thinking of the party since its inception as a student-led socialist movement. In addition, Ethiopia's 'culture of power' and history of top-down governance predates socialism by several centuries. It is thus unlikely that the example of East Asia alone informs governmental elites' desire for a strong state. However, the East Asian Model plays an important role both in legitimating and modernising this desire. The EPRDF's vision of Ethiopia's future economy is, for all its reliance on state guidance, not a socialist one. A number of factors has pushed the country's leadership towards a cautious acceptance of capitalism since coming to power in the early 1990s: donor dependency, the collapse of communism following the Cold War (Tadesse and

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[46] This is up considerably, however, from its score of 1.7 in 2003, when these assessments began (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2003: 1).

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Young 2003: 393) and a desire for the TPLF to distance itself from the brutal Derg regime (Hughes 1992: 118) were all important factors discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four. Most centrally, the rise to power of a reformist faction within the TPLF, headed by Meles Zenawi, sidelined 'hardliners' who wished to continue along a socialist path. The resulting *tehadiso* or 'renewal' may also have been useful in purging the party of perceived enemies on both sides of the ideological divide, but certainly allowed the TPFL to begin limited privatisation and integration into the global economy.

In a country where this process is still being cautiously and ambivalently undertaken, East Asia plays a valuable role as exemplar. Between the extremes of donor-advocated liberalisation and the communist doctrines that failed Ethiopia, this region is seen as a moderate 'third way' which demonstrates to elites that they can grow without completely jettisoning the practices of the past. In a sense, this gives Ethiopia a theoretical framework within which to liberalise only in a very gradual and controlled way; as one elite phrased it, 'we have always followed our principles, but the experiences of others [in East Asia] have allowed us to view them in a comprehensive light' (EG20). This lesson is given a particular pungency in the light of the 2008 global financial crisis, which elites repeatedly pointed to as incontrovertible evidence that 'you cannot leave everything to the market to regulate and right itself"(EG5).

One of the most striking aspects of this facet of Ethiopian lesson-drawing is the extent to which it is couched in language consciously drawn from the literature on the East Asian Model and the 'developmental state'. Ethiopian elites referred time and again to Ethiopia as one of the few 'developmental states' in Africa, and made clear reference to this literature; the list of references accompanying *Dead Ends and New Beginnings* (Meles

2006) reads like a bibliography of the East Asian Model literature of the 1980s and 1990s. According to this document, policies such as ADLI 'resulted as a synthesis of the Neo-liberal Washington Consensus Model and a critical examination of the State-led developmental Model pursued by Taiwan and South Korean (*sic*)' (Meles 2006), indicating once again the fine line that Ethiopia wishes to walk between economic reform and state control.

The emphasis on South Korea exhibited by Ethiopian interviewees is also significant here: although most countries in East Asia experienced a degree of state intervention during their periods of rapid growth, South Korea's government under Park Chung Hee is often seen as having been the most interventionist of the Asian Tigers (Larrain and Vergara 1993: 257; Chang 1993): government banks fuelled the country's large corporations, strict import controls and export quotas existed, and the *Chaebol* conglomerates spurred growth by adhering to government-designed industrial blueprints. The fact that Singapore, the most economically liberal economy in the region (Larrain and Vergara 1993: 257), was mentioned so rarely by Ethiopian interviewees also indicates the selective nature of the country's emulation.

Given China's hybrid system and socialist history, the substantial degree of state control over this economy is even less disputed in the literature, and forms a central pillar in discussions of the Chinese Model. Indeed, a global move towards 'state capitalism' is one of the consequences that opponents of China's example most fear (Callick 2010; Halper 2010). In Ethiopia, however, China was mentioned less frequently in interviews and party publications as an exemplar of state-led growth than were the Asian Tigers—despite the fact that the Ethiopian economy in many ways resembles the former more closely. Whether due to recognition of this fact (Ethiopian elites I spoke to were certainly aware and dismissive of

such Western suspicions) or a genuine desire to move beyond a quasi-socialist system, China was not the first choice of exemplar in the area of state-market relations.

In few dimensions of development and emulation did my two country cases differ as widely as in the question of state involvement in the economy. Ethiopian emulators chose as models the two East Asian regimes with the greatest degrees of state involvement, and drew from them the clear lesson that economic liberalisation, as long as it is sufficiently gradual and overseen by the government, need not herald the loss of national autonomy.

Kenya's emulation, in this regard, is far more moderate. East Asia was still viewed as a source of alternative models of engagement between the state and the private sector, but the role that elites envisioned for the government differed vastly from the strict control that Ethiopian elites drew from China and South Korea. This is again largely to be expected given Kenya's historical circumstances: Kenya's economy is already largely export-based, and government ownership of parastatals and other public bodies had already been greatly rolled back during the structural adjustment programmes of the 1990s (Nellis 2005: 8). As the composition of the drivers of *Vision 2030* demonstrates, Kenya's business sector already often plays a powerful lobbying role; more so than, for example, its trade unions. Kenyan elites therefore chose countries that had experienced high levels of economic growth in situations where the state-market hierarchy was less pronounced than in countries such as South Korea.

On the one hand, then, it is significant that elites cited Singapore—which operates one of the most liberal trading regimes in the world—so widely as a model; the city-state is ranked by the libertarian Cato Institute as having had the second-highest level of 'economic freedom' in the world in 2009 (Gwartney *et al* 2011: 141). Accordingly, Kenyan elites

emphasised the establishment of export-oriented, FDI-dependent economies as one of the key factors behind East Asia's success. A number of interviewees pointed to East Asian countries as sources of lessons on areas such as outsourcing, investment promotion and export-led growth. One bureaucrat bemoaned the fact that Malaysia had used Kenya's sugar processing and cultivation industry as a model during the 1960s, only to subsequently move towards higher-value industries such as palm oil; Kenya, he felt, had been unable to do this due to powerful lobbies from the domestic sugar industry (KG8). Others echoed official documents pointing to China as a direct model for Kenya's own envisioned SEZs (KG16; Kenya 2007: 32), or identified Malaysia and Singapore as the inspiration behind initiatives such as the government's ambitious plans to spend $12 million on a 5000 acre 'technopolis' dedicated to Business Process Outsourcing (BPO). According to one business leader, for example:

> They're talking about retail and wholesale, and creating an infrastructure that allows that to happen...You're talking about having mega-cities where people can come in as tourists and so forth...You're talking about IT and BPO. Again, it's alien to Kenya, but you're bringing things in. You look at Singapore – what natural resources do they have? Zero. It's an island where they have to import water, almost everything. And yet they've become a world leader in terms of economic development. So that, I think, if you start looking at where *Vision 2030* was set...primarily I think Singapore has driven it and you can see the elements there (KN5).

Such examples notwithstanding, specific instances of lesson-drawing in the areas of industrial policy and trade were actually less common than the literature on the East Asian and the Chinese models would suggest, where these areas are said to constitute the greatest

source of potential emulation. As mentioned previously, Kenyan elites are as eager to invest in the services sector as in the industrial sector. More than one interviewee was highly sceptical of the feasibility of SEZs in Kenya, given the already liberal nature of Kenya's markets (KG10). More pertinently, the establishment of Kenya's SEZs had, at the time of writing, failed to progress in the face of opposition from local manufacturers. One business representative, for example, felt that these would 'kill the entire economic sector' (KN8).

The attitude of Kenyan decision-makers in the area of state-market relations is also reflected in the second main model cited by elites, namely Malaysia. Malaysia's growth has occurred under relatively liberal economic conditions; its economy is highly reliant on exports and, increasingly, on FDI (Sundaram 2007: 14-17). However, this has not happened without considerable strategic oversight on the part of Malaysia's leadership. During the 1980s and 1990s, Mahathir used economic nationalism to argue that Western-imposed neo-liberalism was aimed at subjugating a rising Malaysia (and, by extension, Asia) (Beeson 2000: 339). His leadership's use of currency controls and large state-supported industrial projects earned it the reputation for having trod a middle ground between national autonomy and globalisation, and for demonstrating the continuing agency available to national governments (Dent 2004: 84; Beeson 2000: 347). Post-Mahathir, Malaysia has continued to resist full economic liberalisation: in 2009, Malaysia's economy was classified by the Cato Institute as far 'less free' than Kenya's (Gwartney *et al* 2011: 95, 106).

This liberal yet 'defensive' national economic policy has both sustained and been sustained by a distinctive fusion of government and business interests. Whereas 'classic' developmental states such as Japan and South Korea were marked by a strong bureaucracy fostering and guiding private sector growth, these two sectors cannot be as easily separated

in Malaysia. Government incentives to advantage the country's indigenous 'Bumiputera' ethnic group and diffuse inter-ethnic tensions has led today to a sizeable middle class of Malay origin. According to Beeson (2000: 340), the interests of this domestic capitalist class are sufficiently intertwined with those of national policymakers to make Malaysia a special case in the region. This arrangement may diverge from pronounced bureaucratic developmentalism in several respects, but shares with the latter an intimate connection between the two sectors that is at odds with many of the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus.

The argument can be made that even economically liberal Singapore has been headed by a government that uses business-friendly policies for the purposes of economic nationalism and regime stability. 'Most importantly', argues one observer, Singapore's political leadership 'works in close developmental partnership with hosted foreign MNEs in ultimate accordance to state-determined interests and policy blueprints' (Dent 2001: 84). It uses tightly-controlled, directed credit to steer the economy to pre-determined governmental objectives, and has relied on increases in economic welfare as the main source of regime legitimacy.

The intimate relationship between the state and the private sector in Malaysia and Singapore resonates with Kenyan elites' choice of these two countries as primary models. It helps to explain, for example, why they cite these countries as the inspiration for Kenya's public-private-partnership (PPP) initiatives (KN10; KG21), despite the widespread existence of PPPs around the world.

This broader lesson also accounts for the fact that Kenyan elites used East Asia to argue for greater government intervention in the economy at least as often as they used the

region as an example of successful liberalisation. One key Kenyan economic planner had received academic supervision directly from Chalmers Johnson (the originator of the term 'developmental state'), and combined this knowledge with that gleaned from the literature on Southeast Asia to argue for a more prominent role for the state in the Kenyan economy (KG21). Some elites pointed to the social engineering that Malaysia had been able to accomplish through affirmative action, housing quotas and other mechanisms, and to the ways in which they felt this had enabled national integration and civic sentiment (KG7). Other lessons covered the government's role in banking, land management and other areas:

That is another thing we must learn from East Asia: to prevent banks from charging such high interest rates (KG13).

The other thing which is not very well known is that Singapore has state corporations established with the purpose of interacting with other countries. For instance, there is the Singapore Corporation Enterprise – which is what Singapore uses when governments approach Singapore for technical assistance. That's the one-stop-shop – it structures the engagement framework and sources the professionals from Singapore. (KG15).

And then you go to Singapore itself...Following the end of the Second World War, the Japanese came round and wanted to sort of compensate. They were very prudent in what aid they accepted. They refused monetary gifts, but accepted a kind of translocation of companies from Japan onto their territory. What they have done with the management of land, which is a finite resource, so that nobody owns private land. And then the public infrastructure and the public housing. And the way you have mortgages that cost next to

nothing, so cheap. And then if you are a senior citizen, you have a reverse mortgage - very exciting! So that the government can buy back your house from you. And if you die your wife takes over, and if she dies they sell it off. Very innovative ways of doing things (KN21).

Finally, the very fact that *Vision 2030* is centred on the promotion of six key sectors testifies to a desire for bureaucrats and other members of the executive to take a somewhat interventionist role in the make-up of Kenya's macroeconomic structure. In 2007, the erstwhile American ambassador to Kenya (quoted in Okulo 2011) remarked in a leaked cable that '*Vision 2030* often reads like a naïve call for a perfect society, smacking a bit of old-fashioned socialist central planning'. While this illustrates the unease with which many developed countries regard ambitious long-term visions such as these, it rests on a flawed understanding of the extent to which non-socialist countries in East Asia and elsewhere engaged in restrained but nonetheless significant intervention in their economies. Whether one labels this a 'market-planned economy' (KG21), 'managed progress' (KG7) or merely the building of capacity prior to greater liberalisation (KN6), it marks a reconceptualisation of the relationship between the private and public sectors at least partially drawn from a handful of key East Asian models.

8.2 The Democratic Question: Emulation in the Political Realm

Ethiopian and Kenyan lesson-drawers both use examples in East Asia to argue for a greater role for the state in national economic development; the baseline for comparison differed to such an extent between my cases, however, that each used rather different country examplars when making this argument.

The more difficult and controversial question concerns the extent to which emulation of East Asia affects leaders' thinking on political governance. One of the central points of contention in the debate on the East Asian and particularly the Chinese models is the extent to which these are said to encourage anti-democratic practices, political oppression and human rights abuses. Those who argue that China is setting a dangerous precedent by demonstrating that economic liberalisation can occur without political liberalisation (Halper 2010; Callick 2010) are countered by those who argue that China merely illustrates to African leaders the importance of gradualism (Zhang 2006) and those who claim that such charges are simply an indication of the West's 'hysterical and hypocritical' unease with China's growing influence on the continent (Zeleza 2008: 175). The literature on the East Asian model earlier witnessed a similar divide between those who viewed 'developmental states' as incompatible with Western-style liberal democracy (Chalmers 1999: 52) and those who approached the economic lessons of Singapore, South Korea and others in isolation from their political settings (World Bank 1993).

It is in this area of research where my choice of an interview methodology encountered its most significant challenge. Democracy is today still such a near-universal norm (discursively if not in practice) that this was a subject on which elites were often guarded. This was particularly true of Ethiopia, where the EPRDF is highly sensitive to accusations of authoritarianism and where retributions from the party leadership can be severely punitive for recalcitrant members and non-members alike. Some non-EPRDF members would only express concerns over what they saw as Ethiopia's diminishing democratic space while speaking off the record, while EPRDF members only rarely departed from the official 'party line' on this subject.

This official position is that Ethiopia wishes to draw economic lessons from countries such as China and South Korea, but that it seeks to depart from their political authoritarianism (or erstwhile authoritarianism, in the case of the latter). After detailing the myriad ways in which Ethiopia can learn from East Asia's structural transformation, *Development, Democracy and Rural Development* (EPRDF 2006) devotes considerable space to the specific historical and structural context that initially prevented democratic regimes from taking hold in these countries and that, by extension, does not apply to Ethiopia. As one member of the ruling party put it:

> China, Taiwan, South Korea and the like...their commitment to assure rapid economic development for their country has guaranteed their economic development and secured their sovereignty, and for all their commitment it is very interesting for Ethiopia to take them as a model. But their way of engagement in development is quite different from Ethiopia. Their way to approach the people was not, in my understanding, so democratic (EG3).

In isolating East Asia's economic lessons from their political context, the EPRDF claims to be constructing the world's first 'democratic developmental state' (EPRDF 2006). A quote from the party's chief whip[47] illustrates this point:

> We want to see the Asian Tigers as a general model, but not a specific country. We take some of the specific issues from different countries in different ways. If you take the [agricultural] extension services, for example, we take from the Taiwanese. If you go for state enterprises, we take the Koreans. So if you take the developmental bureaucracy, we take the Taiwanese.

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[47] This interviewee is now the country's Prime Minister.

If you see democracy, you cannot take the Chinese way. So there are different models you can take from different sectors of government. But we also say that we are a democratic developmental state, unlike the Asian tigers in the beginning (EG16).

In contrast to the Ethiopian discourse that primarily presents the country as a full (albeit 'immature') democracy – and that presents democracy as an unalloyed good – the Kenyan discourse is far more likely to admit to drawing political lessons from East Asia. Several Kenyan elites referred approvingly to Singapore and Malaysia's 'benevolent dictatorships', for example. This view was found almost exclusively among government planners and senior business leaders; not surprisingly, this was one of the greatest points of contention between emulating technocrats and their critics in civil society. One the one hand, many of those involved in *Vision 2030* argued that strong, developmental leadership sometimes necessitated the postponement or even the quiet but temporary suspension of Western-style liberal democracy:

[We need] that kind of leadership they had earlier in Malaysia...good governance and someone who is forceful – not really a full dictator, but somehow. At least we'd be able to do a lot of things, because a lot of things are not done...So you need someone who says 'we need to do it this year – no compromises' (KN8).

To me, I think the Asian tigers have got something to teach anybody, because places like Singapore and others took very very visionary leadership. And almost, in a way, I keep on saying that for us to make the initial push, we need a benign dictatorship (KN15).

I think one needs to go back and acknowledge one thing. Singapore, South Korea and Malaysia, if you just pulled out those three and went back to their first development plans – their first leaders were dictators. They were not democrats, but they had the society at heart. So their dictatorship...was for the development of those societies. In [a visit to] South Korea, we were amazed (KG8)!

Is it reasonable, on these grounds, to conclude that Kenyan elites are more amenable to the notion of East-Asian inspired authoritarian growth than their Ethiopian counterparts? A close analysis of the data, when viewed in conjunction with other sources, demonstrates that this is not the case. Below, I examine each country case in turn, in order to understand the ways in which Ethiopia and Kenya's political emulation of East Asian countries differ from each other, as well as the areas in which they converge.

8.2.1 Political Emulation in Ethiopia

As demonstrated in Chapter Four, Ethiopia cannot, by most international standards, be classed as a democracy.[48] None of the most commonly-recognised indices of democracy classify Ethiopia as such: in 2011, Ethiopia dropped from 'partly free' to 'not free' in Freedom

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[48] For the purposes of conceptual clarity and consistency, this work will not depart from the conceptualisation of democracy—often associated with the West—as multi-party, pluralist and politically liberal in nature. As such, it takes its working definition of democracy from Dahl's (1989) classic definition. A democratic political system must thus provide, *inter alia*, 'frequent, fair and free elections', an 'effectively enforced right to freedom of expression', freedom of association and 'access to alternative sources of information' (Dahl 1989: 221). This dissertation thus therefore purposefully narrows the scope of what can be labelled a 'democracy', but attempts to refrain from making a normative judgement on the desirability of such a system in various national contexts.

House's *State of the World* report (Freedom House 2011: 13). Similarly, the Economist's *Democracy Index* reclassified Ethiopia from a 'hybrid' to an 'authoritarian' regime in 2010, and notes that the country is a 'de facto one-party state' (EIU 2011: 18). The *Polity IV* index places Ethiopia into the intermediate category of anocracy (i.e. neither a democracy nor an autocracy) (Marshall and Cole 2010: 25). The *Bertelsmann Transformation Index* (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012a: 1) accords Ethiopia's political system a score of 3.63 out of 10 (where a higher score signifies a greater level of democracy).

In contrast, all major international indices class Kenya as significantly more democratic than Ethiopia; its classifications range from a 'hybrid regime' (EIU 2011: 6) and 'partly free' (Freedom House 2011: 14) to a full 'democracy' (Marshall 2010: 26). The *Bertelsmann Transformation Index* (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012b: 1) accords it a score of 6.35 out of 10. The country's 2010 constitution limits the power of the President, includes a 'Citizens' Bill of Rights' and devolves power to 47 newly-created local counties (Kenya 2010b). As detailed in Chapter Five, Kenya's ethnically-based politics, weak implementation of reforms, extra-judicial violence and high levels of corruption constitute severe limitations to democracy. However, its vigorous civil society, generally free media and lively political debates point to a society in which weak governance, rather than outright authoritarianism, is to blame.

This discrepancy between Ethiopia and Kenya still poses the question, then, as to why an authoritarian regime would claim to eschew the political example of East Asia, while many in a partial democracy would look to the very same region as a model of political leadership. The most obvious possibility, of course, is that Ethiopian interviewees were simply not being truthful when they claimed not to be emulating Chinese or South Korean

authoritarianism. Despite Western donors' reliance on Ethiopia as a strategic partner in a volatile geographic region, Ethiopia's economy remains highly dependent on Western aid: it will be recalled that ODA constitutes the vast majority of the Ethiopian government's total budget. Bilateral and multilateral aid partners therefore play a key consultative role in the drafting of all major new government policies. The notion that the EPRDF has brought democratic rule to Ethiopia for the first time in the country's history is a central element of the ruling party's discursive arsenal within the country as well. A regime that has spent much of the past decade battling domestic accusations of autocracy is, after all, unlikely to admit the perceived advantages of authoritarianism to an outsider.

My interviews contained several indications that democracy is indeed less highly-regarded within the EPRDF than its public face suggests. In a rare but revealing admission, one very senior EPRDF interviewee conceded that the argument for authoritarian growth was one he heard frequently in Ethiopia, including within his party:

> I find it almost everywhere—there are so many people with such views, [who say] 'now we have to focus on growth, we don't need this democracy.' In Ethiopia, I don't want to associate it with a certain group. But development is a critical agenda for us, we have to quickly develop. So when we discuss with friends, colleagues, there are people who publicly argue that we can't afford to conduct all these elections and to allow people to get organised—we need to focus on investment, on growth, and in some years we will come to political pluralism (EG13).

Many outside the ruling party also drew a direct link between the EPRDF's emulation of East Asia and an increase in domestic repression. To the party's opponents, China's example

strengthened the EPRDF's longstanding commitment to the communist doctrine of 'democratic centralism', whereby communal intra-party decision-making is more highly valued than plural representation and the internal dissent it often generates (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 119-120). These opposition members frequently reported such debates as happening away from the prying eyes of Western donors: one former member of the transitional government reports being frequently told by senior EPRDF leaders: 'Look, you're asking too much. What we need now is development [rather than democracy]' (EN3). These critics, who most often originated from Medrek, did not argue that emulation of the Chinese and East Asian models were solely responsible for anti-democratic practices in Ethiopia; most felt this to be one of several central factors preventing political liberalisation. According to one opposition politician, this lesson was also not a new one for the EPRDF:

> Really, Meles wants the Chinese model because staying in power is his sole, ultimate goal. He knew this multi-party democracy, this American music, one day has its own limitations. One day these Americans can turn against you, and he wanted to use the Chinese card all along...As far back as 1994, 1995, Meles sent a delegation to China, to look very closely at the way China is developing, and especially how to deal with diversity the Chinese way and how to effectively use democratic centralism...he sent the number two, number three [most senior] people to China. So all along, for staying in power the Chinese model is more attractive than other models (EN1).

Even those slightly more sympathetic to the thinking of the ruling party felt the EPRDF to be taking political lessons from East Asia. Two nongovernmental elites approved outright of what they viewed as Ethiopia's emulation of China's authoritarianism: 'Actually, I agree...If democracy comes first, then everything will be too fast. Everyone will exercise his

democracy and do everything...I think the government is using China as a model' (EN9). Most of these respondents, however, tended to view East Asia as a slightly softer, less extreme version of China's political system for the EPRDF to emulate. Variations on this could be either Japan's (formerly) one-party dominant but democratic model (EN7), Singapore's minimally representative system (EN8), or South Korea's delayed democratisation (EN5).

What links these seemingly disparate systems is a prioritisation of stability and national unity over the fractious, destabilising impact of party politics, enabling the kind of state-driven developmentalism seen as instrumental to transformative growth. The former President of Ethiopia (EN4) alleges that the EPRDF's 'reform' movement was highly motivated by internal comparisons of Ethiopia to Bismarck's Germany, and by Meles' belief that only countries such as South Korea and Taiwan had possessed ruling parties sufficiently strong to repeat that success a century later. To another subject, the ruling party emulates Singapore and South Korea because 'their intention is a one-party dominated democracy. Without the one-party dominance for 30 or 40 years, there will be no development' (EN8). There exists, thus, the possibility that the EPRDF is consciously emulating Chinese and East Asia's history of authoritarian growth, and that it realises any overt recognition of that fact to be detrimental to its domestic and international standing.

Another possibility is that lesson-drawing may not be a significant factor in this area at all. Both Ethiopia and East Asia may have passed through periods of authoritarian growth by chance, or perhaps even by historical necessity. If this is indeed the case, the political similarities between Ethiopia and countries such as China may be a *cause*, rather than an effect, of Ethiopia's choice of East Asian countries as models. In other words, Ethiopian

leaders may already have decided to impose heavy restrictions on democratic processes and rights in order to retain power or ensure development, and may look to China and South Korea as countries with similar political environments from which more specific economic lessons can be drawn. This would be consistent with earlier findings that elites draw from models with perceived historical or 'social psychological' similarity (Rose 1993: 107).

This study is unable to reach a definitive conclusion in this regard: if the EPRDF refuses to admit that its policy is one of gradual political liberalisation or authoritarian growth, it is virtually impossible to trace the roots of such a policy, however real its effects on the ground. However, although it is difficult to reach the definitive conclusion that Ethiopia's leaders wish to emulate China or South Korea's overall political models, it is still possible, based on the data gathered, to draw certain conclusions about more limited lessons that the EPRDF wishes to draw from East Asia's political development:

A. *An emphasis on economic performance as the primary source of governmental legitimacy:*

The literature on the Chinese and East Asian models has emphasised the role that economic growth has played not only in improving the material wellbeing of these countries' citizens, but also in providing the current government with the legitimacy and mandate necessary for the long-term retention of power. The basis of the CCP's rule in China has been ascribed to 'performance legitimacy' (Yao 2010; Zhao 2010: 435), whereby citizens have been content—at least temporarily—to sacrifice claims for political freedoms in exchange for material increases in their living standards.

This echoes earlier writings on East Asian 'developmental states' such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, where economic development has been for long periods of time the single overriding feature of government policy. The originator of the 'developmental state' concept describes these states as 'quasi-revolutionary' regimes where 'whatever legitimacy their rulers possessed did not come from external sanctification or some formal rules whereby they gained office but from the overarching social projects their societies endorsed and they carried out' (Johnson 1999: 53). Due to the use of propaganda and other mechanisms used to drive these social projects, such states are very rarely, if ever, classifiable as fully representative, liberal democracies (Johnson 1999: 53-54).

East Asia is not the only region in which 'alternative' sources of legitimacy have been proposed. Scholars sometimes view the increasingly regulatory and judicial nature of governance within the EU as an alternative to the widening of majoritorian representation at a national level (Majone 1998)—or, somewhat more frequently, decry this same 'regulatory legitimacy' as a poor substitute for true democratic governance (Scharpf 1999). Even European states, therefore, face questions surrounding the trade-off between technocratic and democratic pressures.

Several factors, however, distinguish the EU's 'regulatory legitimacy' with the 'performance legitimacy' purportedly found in developmental states, making for two very separate and distinct sets of literature (Levi-Faur 2012: 3). The developmental state has the clear, overarching goal of increasing the material wellbeing of its populace, and its legitimacy (almost by definition) is predicated on the extent to which it achieves this goal. A regulatory polity, however, 'concerns itself with the forms and procedures—the rules, if you will—of economic competition, but it does not concern itself with substantive

matters' (Johnson 1983: 19). The originator of the term 'regulatory legitimacy' himself echoes this delimiting of the EU's powers, arguing that regulatory legitimacy can only exist with a transparently and narrowly defined remit (Majone (1998: 299). Both forms of legitimacy privilege technical expertise and 'rationality' over representativeness; one, however, is said to exist in a post-Westphalian polity so complex that certain discrete functions of the state must be re-allocated to experts, while the other is viewed as contributing to the very foundations on which political legitimacy, nationhood and statehood can later be built. Finally, my reading of the literature suggests that performance legitimacy is seen as virtually inseparable from the developmental state in a way that does not hold true for regulatory legitimacy and the EU. Both concepts have numerous critics, but those who accept the concept of a developmental state usually accept that its style of governance must diverge from liberal democracy; this is not the case with the concept of the regulatory state or suprastate.

It is developmental legitimacy, rather than regulatory legitimacy, then, that Ethiopian elites refer to in their writings and interviews. The two most senior EPRDF leaders that I interviewed argued, for example, that the Chinese government was, in its own way, as legitimate and responsive to the needs of its citizens as were more formally democratic countries. According to Meles' chief spokesman:

It depends on your existing objective situation...Of course [the Chinese] lose some part of their rights, but there has not been a big complaint. Americans were supporting the Koreans during their undemocratic period, so it doesn't mean that that kind of governance was so bad,

compared with rent-seekers and patronage kind of networks. So as far as there is good governance, and as far as that state is a developmental state, for me that is possible (EG14).

Even Meles (2006) himself, in his discussion of East Asian developmental lessons for Africa, ties the notion of 'performance legitimacy' to the establishment of the Taiwanese and South Korean 'developmental states':

> Once a political leadership which felt its survival and legitimacy depended on shared growth took power in an environment where land reform had created a conservative mass of small farmers, the rest could be done by the leadership itself. The leadership was able to change the playing field and the rules of the economic game in favor of productive activities and developmentalism. Efforts at consensus-building reinforced by the success in achieving shared growth could be made with a high probability of success. The bureaucracy could be remodeled to fit the development agenda.

Senior EPRDF strategists often deny that they view this model of legitimacy as an example for their own country, but other evidence weakens this distinction between Ethiopia and the 'classic' developmental states. The very fact that Ethiopian leaders cite East Asia as their primary model of economic development implies emulation of the political sacrifices that often underpinned this model. If, for example, Ethiopian elites admire East Asian governments' abilities to 'drag all the players to focus on one result' (EG5)—ie. economic development—the mechanisms by which this 'dragging' occurred historically are pertinent to Ethiopia's own emulation. If the EPRDF wishes to emulate China, a country where 'everyone, instead of politics, actually concentrates on development' (EG22), the fractious

nature of liberal representative politics is clearly seen as at least a temporary impediment to growth. And if the literature (Kohli 2007: 84-123; Johnson 1999) broadly agrees that the 'consensus-building' processes cited by Meles above were so frequently accompanied by the political tools of what Winkler (1984) calls 'soft authoritarianism', these tools are also being used in Ethiopia. This is openly visible, of course, in Ethiopia's use of Chinese internet censorship software (O'Brien 2011), its silencing of journalists and a vast array of other methods that control national debates on issues of development. Combined with an understanding of the ruling party's choice of exemplars, it becomes highly probable that such tactics are used specifically to deflect attention from elites' political failings to their economic successes.

B. The need for incremental democratisation:

A second clear strand of political learning from East Asia centres around certain Ethiopian elites' conceptualisation of democracy as a process whereby a democratically immature populace is gradually prepared for greater and greater participation in the political system. The previous chapter has already explored elites' view of democratisation as the result of a wider project of cultural transformation, and of development as a process that occurs in distinct stages.

The notion of democracy as necessary but alien to Ethiopia's historical and cultural context also manifested itself when the EPRDF was challenged on its system of governance. The Prime Minister refers to Ethiopia as a 'fledgling' democracy, remarking that this form of government is 'a new experience for our old nation. Our institutions of democratic governance', therefore, 'need further consolidation. Our culture of democratic discourse

needs further refining' (Meles 2010). In *Dead Ends and New Beginnings*, he similarly argues that only a state willing to depart from neo-liberalism can create a political system capable of 'evolving over time into a mature, urban-based democracy' (Meles 2006).

African countries, elites therefore felt, were being judged by an impossibly high international standard of democracy—one to which East Asia and other rapidly-growing regions had not been subjected due to Cold War-era strategic considerations.[49] One senior EPRDF member's impassioned views on the subject are worth quoting at length for the insight they lend to the party's view on Ethiopia's readiness for democracy:

It's just something you exercise, you rephrase the thinking we have in a democratic way...and you grow a new culture. So Ethiopia has never been democratic before this government, for 3000 years of history. So for 3000 years, we have had a culture which is not democratic. If you want to shift from that 3000-year old undemocratic culture, now to a democratic culture, for 10 years, it cannot come [easily]. If you take our farmers, they are not educated. It is sometimes very problematic for them to choose which kind of party is proper to their thinking. They had to choose out of 63 parties in this last election. The farmer, when he gets the papers, will not know whether they are upside down. So if that's the case...how are you going to compare it with America, and say that democracy in Ethiopia should be like that? Impossible. So education, awareness, modernisation, growth and democratic change all go together, hand in hand. For example, I assume that in my children's time, we will have the best democratic culture in our country, because now we are teaching in the schools what democratic governance is all about. I have never taken such a course, because I was

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[49] It is rather ironic, then, that critics of the support that the EPRDF receives from Western donors make a similar point in regard to present-day Ethiopia (e.g. Borchgrevink 2008).

[educated] in the military junta era, where there has never been this kind of thinking. I only sometimes heard in the media about democratic elections in Europe or America or such things. So that is how democracy grows. You cannot compare it with affluent countries (EG16).[50]

Those in the ruling party were not the only group of Ethiopian elites to feel this way. Several of those business elites, entrepreneurs and members of civil society who were broadly supportive of the EPRDF constituted members of the diaspora who had received their education in the West and had recently returned to Ethiopia. Virtually all were willing to admit to severe flaws in the country's political system, but explained their cooperation with the ruling party by pointing to the ways in which economic development and the growth of a middle class had spurred gradual democratisation in East Asia. Citing South Korea and Japan, where 'development and democratisation went more or less hand in hand', one entrepreneur, for example, felt that 'that seems to be the model that we're following now, and I think that, at least for the present time, it seems to be delivering results' (EN13). Elites' view of development as a sequential process in which countries evolved through a series of discrete, historically-contingent stages thus also manifested itself in their views on democratisation and political lesson-drawing.

C. The need for a single political party to preside over a lengthy nation-building project

The dynamics surrounding Ethiopia's nation-building project are highly complex, with many falling outside the purview of this work. The issue is also highly contentious in Ethiopia due to its history. Tewodros, Menelik and Haile-Selassie each undertook nation-building projects

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[50] This interviewee is now the Acting Prime Minister.

in the 'classic' European mould: Amhara language and culture were accorded a dominant position, with other ethnicities brought into their purview and subdued through military force and the establishment of a national administration (Asafa 1998; Makki 2011: 272-280). The EPRDF, dominated by minority Tigrayans, has positioned itself in opposition to this notion, and has, since coming to power, followed a programme of ethnic nationalism which posits full cultural and political rights for Ethiopia's ethnic groups, or 'nationalities' (Young 1996: 100). Whether or not these rights are accorded in practice, this notion of 'multi-nationalism as an expression of nationalism', as Aadland (2002: 21) calls it, is not generally seen as an important characteristic of most East Asian models, nor of modernisation theory. This area, then, is an example where dynamics other than emulation play an important role in development discourse.

It is in the interplay between a dominant ruling party, economic development, and nation-building, however, that Ethiopia's emulation in this regard becomes clearer. In the high-performing East Asian economies, developmentalism and economic growth provided the basis for the widespread mobilisation of citizens towards a common goal, in turn leading to further development. Economic nationalism, based on a fear of being 'left behind' and the need to 'catch up' with developed countries, was often used to rally public opinion and to act as a 'binding agent for growth' (Woo-Cummings 2005: 116). In a sense, then, state-guided modernisation was itself a central plank of nation-building efforts, and nation-building a deliberate government policy. In states such as these, 'the state is viewed as representing the long-term interests of the whole nation, rather than short-term or particular interests, and goals are expressed in abstract terms such as 'industrialisation' and 'modernisation'' (Beresford 2008: 226).

To many authors, one-party dominance constituted one of the key means by which the stability needed to implement this nation-building and economic growth could be assured. The importance of stability is mentioned with particular frequency in discussions of the Chinese Model (Zhang 2006; Ramo 2006: 23). Halper (2010: 151), for example, sees in Chinese society a 'delicate social bargain' that sees the ruling party granted political monopoly in return for the provision of stability and growth. This political monopoly insulates policymakers from fractious political debates and allows for the implementation of long-term social and economic visions which might otherwise be overturned by regular elections. 'We do democracy', said one Ethiopian bureaucrat, 'but not anarchism' (EG15).

Ethiopian ruling elites openly express a desire to emulate those countries where a single party has been able to conduct a nation-building project over the space of several decades. They do emphasise that this party should remain in place through democratic means: Meles (2006) writes that 'the so-called dominant party democracies can point to one way out' of underdevelopment, citing Japan and parts of Scandinavia as examples. This longevity of the ruling party purportedly can transform a democratic state into a 'developmental democratic state' by providing the necessary 'continuity and stability of policy' (Meles 2006).

When this discourse is placed in the context of the EPRDF's broader desire to emulate Chinese, Taiwanese and South Korean growth—all of which occurred under the remit of one-party dominant systems—Meles' citing of Scandinavia seems more a rhetorical device aimed at assuaging fears than a sincere example of lesson-drawing. *Development, Democracy and Revolutionary Democracy* (EPRDF 2006), designed to translate Meles' vision of Ethiopia as a developmental state to EPRDF cadres, makes copious mention of

South Korea, China and Taiwan, but none of any Scandinavian countries. During my interview with him, the EPRDF's chief whip[51] cited China's 'party discipline'—and particularly its use of schools to instruct junior party members in the party's approach to development—as the most important lesson Ethiopia could draw from the country (EG2). This was echoed by a representative from the Chinese embassy in Addis Ababa, who stated that the EPRDF and the CCP exchanged lessons on a 'party-to-party' level that was distinct from learning occurring through the formal machinery of the state: 'Both parties are playing a great role in their national development and economic building, and there are a lot of occasions the two parties are exchanging views on nation-building, on economic development, on how to push forward a national strategy' (EA1).

Most significantly, East Asian governments' ability to mobilise their populations for growth and modernisation were very frequently cited as lessons by Ethiopian leaders themselves. One senior EPRDF member drew from China the lesson that 'if the leader of a country works strictly and mobilises people, the leader can make a difference' (EG4). A member of the opposition agreed, although he felt the EPRDF had failed to implement this lesson: 'People who can really create a nation—we need that type of elite. Any society needs that at one time or another...the Japanese, for example, the Meiji revolution. China, the Maoists' (EN1).

These parallels in governance style between Ethiopia and certain East Asian countries are not new. One of the clearest examples of Ethiopia's emulation of Japan in the Haile-Selassie era lies in the similarities between Ethiopia's 1931 constitution and its Meiji counterpart of 42 years earlier. The Ethiopian document retains, word for word, Japanese

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[51] He is now the country's Acting Prime Minister.

qualifiers such as 'within the limits provided for by the law' or 'except in cases provided for in the law' in order to limit the expression of civil liberties provided for in other sections of the constitution (Clarke 2004).

Many features of Ethiopian authoritarianism are also underpinned by common historical and ideological ties to China. The EPRDF inherited the TPLF's use of Maoist methods of mass rural mobilisation and democratic centralism (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 15). The EPRDF still identifies as adhering to democratic centralism, a system whereby dissent internal to the party structure is transformed into 'consensus' through *in camera* discussion and persuasion. 'Once consensus is achieved, however, the community speaks with one voice, and dissent is ruled out – or rather does not "objectively" emerge since decisions are not made until consensus is achieved' (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 117). The EPRDF's emphasis on consensus and national mobilisation, although partially borrowed from China, is thus not a new phenomenon. It is in its use for the purposes of economic growth within a global capitalist system, however, that this lesson's particularities are more recent, and inspired by a wider range of East Asian exemplars.

8.2.2 Political Emulation in Kenya

Decision-makers in Kenya, a more democratic state than Ethiopia by virtually all international indexes, nonetheless demonstrated a desire to draw political lessons from countries such as Singapore and Malaysia. It will be recalled, for example, that many emulating elites expressed an appreciation for a system of 'benevolent' or 'benign' dictatorship—at least until the country had begun to catch up with the world's more developed economies.

However, once again this discourse alone does not accurately represent the form that lesson-drawing takes in this area of policy. Just as Ethiopian elites' claims to borrow developmentalism without even soft authoritarianism conceal numerous tensions and subtle examples of political emulation, Kenyan planners' admiration for the Singaporean mode of governance should not be interpreted as heralding the implementation of an identical system in Kenya.

There are several reasons for this. Firstly, although Kenya's emulators expressed a desire to draw selectively from strong governments in East Asia, they revealed an almost universal distaste for one of the most authoritarian of these, namely China. One senior political leader, for example, viewed Singapore's leadership as 'inspirational' but saw China's political model as both impossible and undesirable to emulate: 'I think it can only happen in China, because I think you cannot mobilise a people in the way China has unless you have the authoritarian command structure that China has had historically' (KG6). According to another, 'in Singapore, it was not a completely autocratic leadership. It was strong leadership' (KG9). In making this distinction, Kenyan lesson-drawers echo the distinction between 'hard authoritarianism' and 'soft authoritarianism' drawn also by many observers of East Asian political systems. According to these observers, East Asian economies such as Taiwan, South Korea and even Japan are softly authoritarian in that they are marked by 'an extremely strong and comparatively unsupervised state administration, single-party rule for more than three decades, and a set of economic priorities that seems unattainable under true political pluralism' (Johnson 1987: 131). It is thus fitting that Malaysia and Singapore should both be regarded as archetypal modern 'soft authoritarian regimes' (Means 1998) and also constitute Kenya's primary sources of political lessons.

It is also highly likely that certain Kenyan leaders long for more political restrictions precisely due to the relative openness of their own political system. They therefore view selective emulation of Singapore and Malaysia as a means of counterbalancing what they perceive as increases in political freedoms and governmental guarantees that have outstripped increases in institutional and material resources. This was seen as particularly true after the promulgation of Kenya's 2010 constitution. One admirer of East Asian leadership, for example, criticised the new constitution for the financial costs that would come with decentralisation, as well as for pledging the fulfilment of certain positive human rights—to food, water, education and the like—that he felt the government might not be able to deliver:

> I believe part of the reason that [the post election-violence] happened is because of a lot of freedom, too much democratic space, without adequate strong institutions to enforce it...So there were several times I felt I wish we were able to crawl back a little bit on the democratic space so that we are able to focus more on development (KN20).

Time and again, these elites referred to democracy as a 'genie' that could not be put back into the bottle (e.g. KG3). Several expressed the wish that Kenya had taken advantage of its authoritarianism during the Moi regime in order to affect economic growth and efficient central planning, but most felt this opportunity to have passed. Elites were thus less likely to advocate a return to authoritarianism or the repeal of democratic legislation than they were to express a desire for the government to push the legal limits of its power and to delay further political reforms.

A final limitation on political emulation on East Asia is the fact that this strand of thinking is only one of many in Kenyan policy debates. Unlike in Ethiopia, where emulators comprise virtually the entire policy elite in a highly centralised context, Kenya's decision-making process is more diffuse and pluralistic. As detailed previously, Kenya's parliamentarians and civil society representatives were more likely to draw lessons from outside East Asia—or to look to no model at all—than were the county's planners. They were also less likely to view an increase in political restrictions as beneficial for Kenya's economic development. Given the vigorous and spirited national debate that existed, for example, before the adoption of the 2010 national constitution, it is likely that any lessons Kenyan elites draw from soft authoritarian regimes are likely to undergo processes of dilution and contestation. This precludes the close emulation of Singaporean-style restrictions (even were planners eager to effect wholesale imitation of these features). These caveats explain the divide between Kenyan planners' comparative enthusiasm for political learning from East Asia and the relative political openness that exists in the country.

As with Ethiopia, however, certain aspects of East Asian political systems were sufficiently prominent in elites' discourses as to constitute significant lessons. Although Kenyan lesson-drawers did not propose the legal or even practical imposition of authoritarianism, they did draw from their observation of East Asian models a conceptualisation of development as primarily a top-down process requiring the mobilisation of the country's citizens by a modernising and visionary leadership. In this process, Kenyans are 'soldiers in the army of development' (Bett 2010), and the quality of their leaders the key variable standing between developmental success and failure.

This emphasis on leadership cuts across sectoral lines: Kenya's poor record of governance is a national obsession. The average Kenyan interviewee mentioned the term 'leadership' 4.7 times, despite the term not occurring in the standard interview questions.[52] Whereas virtually every emulator felt that Kenyan and East Asian development had diverged primarily due to the former's corrupt, inefficient and self-interested political leaders, East Asia's leadership was seen, in contrast, to embody three interrelated features. First, it was held to be *visionary*, and able to enact policies that stretched beyond the current electoral cycle. It is for this reason that so many elites pointed to Singapore and Malaysia as direct models for NESC and *Vision 2030*, the most long-term-oriented development plan in Kenya's post-colonial history. According to one planner, therefore, 'the key thing was to actually call it 'Vision Something'—that's very Asian. To set it far into the future...If you look at the programmes in [East Asia], there has always been 'Vision this' and 'Vision that', but in other countries it is simply called a strategy (KN5).

Secondly, this leadership was *forceful* when necessary, knowing when to put an end to excessive public consultations if these threatened other developmental objectives. To domestic critics of this emulation, the East Asian model provides the private sector-allied Kibaki administration with a self-serving justification for cracking down on those engaged in labour disputes and strikes. To emulators, themselves, however, the intricate and lengthy consultation and conflict-resolution measures demanded by local civil society and western donors were seen as a barrier to the sustained yet rapid modernisation that 'catching up' demanded. One interviewee expressed it thusly:

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[52] In contrast, Ethiopian interviewees mentioned the term less than once on average.

The leaders are responsible at the end of the day to deliver the country to where it's supposed to go. I think that responsibility has to be there...People are beginning to realise acutely that we are spending a lot of our energy and time in developing countries arguing about policies, and it can take forever...It's going to be endless. You need a cut-off point where you say 'in this context, this is right and we are going to take it from this period.'…You can't review it on a daily basis, and that is what is hurting our countries (KN7).

The perception of economic development and nation-building as at least somewhat incompatible with political liberalisation was most prevalent among Kenyan elites who chose East Asian countries as development models. These elites emphasised the legitimising role that sound management of the economy and the creation of a functioning state infrastructure would have on governments that temporarily held back further democratisation (KN15) and accused civil society organisations of an inordinate focus on citizens' rights over their responsibilities (KG15). They were also more likely to prioritise stability and national unity over pluralism; Anyang Nyongo (2005), for example, feels that 'it is very difficult to pursue political democracy and economic reforms at the same time' due to the 'compensation culture' that accompanies the former. Attributing Singapore and Malaysia's success to leaders who were able to foster such qualities, one business leader bemoaned Kenya's lack of a similarly strong government:

Here our leadership says 'do what you want'. You need someone who is not really a dictator, but if he tells you 'do this', you have to do it. But you see now, if he tells you 'do this' and you say 'nah', then you do it only if you feel like it...[If] everybody is mobilised to put their efforts towards [*Vision 2030*], we will achieve it.' (KN8).

The final perceived facet of Singapore and Malaysia's leadership deserves special focus for its salience both to the East Asian Model and to the position that modernisation theory accorded to national elites. A third lesson drawn by certain Kenyan lesson-drawers was the importance of leaders who were *technocratic*—who were thus both technically knowledgeable and able to isolate themselves from political and societal pressures.[53] One example was the decision-maker who cited the growing importance of knowledge, GDP growth and investment in number of successful economies—among them Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan—as evidence that 'if you look into the future, maybe...the state will be an organ not for managing people, but for managing things' (KG3). Troublesome political forces were seen as stemming not only from below, but also sometimes from above, at the level of elected representatives. Another interviewee attributed the economic growth of East Asia, and later of the Kibaki regime, to the position each had accorded to technocrats:

> Political leadership is the one that gives leadership in all other spheres...It can provide a basis
> for the take-off. In Korea, we had Park Chung-Hee, the benevolent dictator. He set the path
> for growth in Korea. We had Mahathir in Malaysia, we had Lee in Singapore. So political
> leadership sets the target for the population to follow, allows growth. That is what has

[53] Collier (1980: 403) has influentially defined technocrats as 'individuals with a high level of specialized academic training which serves as a principal criterion on the basis of which they are selected to occupy key decision-making or advisory roles in large, complex organisations—both public and private'. This is the definition that will be used here, with one minor modification. A minority of elected (rather than appointed) politicians in ministerial positions are sufficiently trained and involved in technical planning to warrant their inclusion in the category. In Kenya, these 'technopoliticians', to use a term coined by Silva (2008: 8), have advanced degrees, have spent time in the civil service or academia and apply their technical expertise to the formulation of government policy; they can thus be included in this group.

happened in the Kibaki regime. Technocrats have been given free space to excel and do basically plan without much interference, and therefore you find now that gives room for growth, rather than being directed and being told what to do (KG14).

The influence of this line of thinking was most clearly visible in the existence and envisioned roles of *Vision 2030* and NESC. According to the Secretary of NESC, *Vision 2030* was specifically conceived as a national project able to transcend the politics of the 'government of the day' (Muia 2007). By establishing an exclusive advisory council of business and governmental experts and a written plan with a time-frame spanning a generation, elites hope to keep developmental decisions separate from Kenya's fractious political climate and from the composition of parliament at any one time. The fact that all foreign experts on NESC originated from East Asia at the time of writing is thus particularly pertinent. The mid-term review of the ERS formally announced the incipient *Vision 2030* in the following way:

> To function with the effectiveness of the kind we have observed in East Asia, national visions and strategic plans need the full backing from the country's political leadership, including the willingness to intervene whenever the implementation machinery gets bogged down in disagreements, detail, or bureaucratic inertia (Kenya 2007: 32).

To critics of the government's vision, this technocratic distancing that emulators desire is precisely the central flaw at the heart of NESC and *Vision 2030*. Accusations that ordinary Kenyans lacked ownership or knowledge of these 'elitist' initiatives—that *Vision 2030* 'dwells on the macro and forgets...the micro' (KN13)—were more frequently voiced than

charges that the leaders of these institutions were corrupt or self-interested (the most frequent accusation levelled at elected politicians).

For many technocrats themselves, on the other hand, Kenya's approach still stops short of that implemented by many of East Asia's high-performing economies. China's growth is frequently ascribed, in the literature, to the fact that its economic planners are not elected and have, for a time at least, been 'given a mandate insulated from political thinking' (Moss quoted in Polgreen 2006). Another solution is less dependent on the political system of the country in question: the role that Japan's Ministry of Trade and Industry took in driving economic growth from its establishment in 1949 until the early 1980s, for example, has assumed almost mythic proportions in the literature on the developmental state. To Johnson (1982: 319), an elite agency that coordinated all aspects of industrial policy and macroeconomic planning was the most important ingredient of Japan's post-war development. Japan's neighbours consciously emulated this development, setting up their own influential 'super-agencies': South Korea and Singapore both established Economic Planning Boards in 1961, Malaysia's Economic Planning Unit was born in the very same year, and Taiwan's Economic Planning Council came into existence in 1973. In each case, planning and implementation were concentrated in a single agency whose powers extended to areas as seemingly disparate as export promotion, technical training and the formulation of financial policy.

By separating NESC from the *Vision 2030* Delivery Secretariat, however, Kenya has taken a different, less cohesive approach; the former body is convened afresh each year, while the latter organisation is tasked primarily with project management rather than policy coordination. Several elites therefore called for even greater emulation on this front.

According to one economic advisor, for instance, 'I would go for an institution which you find in Malaysia, and even Singapore, where they have a planning unit that is very strong, has a lot of capacity and is chaired by the top political leadership, that is able to say 'this is how you prioritise things' (KN20).

The exact form that 'technocratic insulation' took in East Asia differed from country to country and from one developmental era to the next. In the South Korea of the 1950s and 1960s, for example, Park's government viewed it as essential that technocrats remained impervious to—and therefore in control of—business interests (Silva 2000). In Japan, by contrast, the relationship was less hierarchical, and government-business partnerships encouraged to a greater extent (Kuznets 1988: S33-S44). Most notable, given Kenya's interest in emulation of Malaysia, is the extent to which bureaucratic and business interests have solidified into entrenched, mutually-dependent coalitions in the latter country (Beeson 2000: 341). This diversity of approaches means that some observers of East Asia place an emphasis on insulation from business interests (Silva 2000: 57), others view insulation from rent-seeking politicians as key (Dent 2004: 81), while yet others emphasise independence of action *vis a vis* societal pressure groups (World Bank 1993: 167).

In Kenya, in keeping with the Malaysian approach, the latter two are most frequently taken as lessons. The emphasis placed on 'public-private partnerships', and the key role played by business elites in the formulation of *Vision 2030*—a feature that interviewees from all sectors agreed was present in Kenya—suggests a non-hierarchical relationship between the private and public sectors. The need for the bureaucratic capacity to push through a long-term agenda without societal, legislative or even judicial interference was, however, keenly felt by planners looking to emulate East Asia:

If you look at the way in which Singapore, for example, approached this issue, from the days of Lee Kuan Yew until now, there are lessons to be learned there. One, if you are going to leapfrog from underdevelopment into development, you really must have a very clean, efficient, focused state bureaucracy. Well-trained and focused and organised. Result-oriented (KG4).

I think the Asian tigers have got something to teach anybody, because places like Singapore and others took very very visionary leadership...You need a strong man or woman at the helm with the right vision, and they just push it through. There will be a lot of hurt, there will be some damage, there will be some sections of society which will be very unhappy but the end, in this case, justifies it (KN15).

To a certain extent, the fact that planners were most likely to draw these lessons is not unexpected; most elites involved in *Vision 2030* are, after all, technocrats who could reasonably be expected to desire an increase in their own influence. While such actors may long have believed in the need for an expansion of their role, it is still nonetheless significant that East Asian exemplars now inspire them to verbalise and more openly pursue this goal. In addition, non-technocratic elites in business, politics and even civil society were also more likely to draw this as a lesson if they were already admirers of East Asia. According to one business leader, for example, 'the countries of the East...could be very good models for Kenya'. India, according to this interviewee, was not suitable because 'there are a lot of politics there, and we feel we have enough of our own politics' (KN6). Finally, many lessons that technocrats drew from East Asia—the choice to emphasise collaboration with business

rather than with parliament, for example—were more complex than a desire to simply increase their scope of action.

The fact that technocrats are the group most likely to draw lessons from countries such as Singapore and Malaysia is, in itself, an interesting finding in light of the position that technocrats occupied in East Asian developmental states. This suggests that the degree to which the country as a whole is able to emulate East Asia is likely to correspond with the degree of influence and insulation that bureaucrats in Kenya are able to carve out for themselves. If this particular lesson were drawn and Kenya were to become, like Japan, a country where 'the politicians reign and the bureaucrats rule' (Johnson 1999: 50), the likelihood of other aspects of emulation taking shape would also increase.

8.3 Elite Learning and Modernisation

This chapter has shown that lesson-drawing in both Ethiopia and Kenya prompts leaders not only to adjust their policy priorities, but that it also reaches as deeply as the conceptualisations they have of their own functions and powers. On the question of the state's role in the economy, the influence of the East Asian model is clearly visible in both cases. This is particularly true in Ethiopia, where ruling elites view emulation of East Asia's 'developmental states' as a means to negotiate and steer recent processes of economic liberalisation. In Kenya, a somewhat gentler form of state intervention, centring around long-term bureaucratic planning and close partnerships with private sector interests, is envisioned by those who wish to draw lessons from East Asia. In both countries, however, elites desire a significantly greater economic role for the state than that mandated by the Washington Consensus, whilst retaining an essentially capitalist and free-market orientation.

It is more difficult to come to a clear conclusion regarding one of the central questions found in debates on the Chinese and East Asian development models, namely whether these models are (re)popularising authoritarianism. The EPRDF's insistence that it draws no direct lessons from East Asian political systems and Kenyan planners' claims that they wish for a Singaporean-style 'benevolent dictatorship' are at odds with the political situations in both case studies. Despite such difficulties, it is possible to discern several more limited examples of lesson-drawing in this regard. These include a reliance on economic growth as a major source of economic legitimacy, the perceived need for long-term single-party dominance and a heightened role for unelected technocrats; they also encompass a desire for strong, forceful leadership that places nation-building above the rights of individuals or specific societal interest groups.

These lessons correspond with much of the literature on East Asian development models, illustrating both the divergences and common threads in the development trajectories of countries as diverse as Singapore, China, Malaysia and South Korea. As this final section argues, however, even this use of an East Asian Model is nested inside a broader paradigm of modernisation. Even as old development paradigms appear to be giving way to new paradigms inspired by East Asia, these in fact correspond more closely to the views of Tom Mboya and Haile-Selassie than Lee Kuan Yew.

8.3.1 *East Asian Models as Route, Modernisation as Destination*

Given the overlap between the lessons that Ethiopian and Kenyan lesson-drawers take regarding the developmental role of the state and between the literature on the East Asian Model, it would seem that this model constitutes the backbone of any paradigm shifts

occurring in these countries. My research has demonstrated that the example of East Asia is indeed greatly responsible for moving Ethiopia and Kenya away from the Washington Consensus-era understanding of the functions and form of the state. This move, however, has also taken elites beyond the geographically-specific example they cite, and allowed for a return to a broader paradigm with domestic precedents. This paradigm is modernisation theory.

To begin with, virtually all of the lessons cited in this chapter correspond to the assumptions of the early development theorists and the policymakers they inspired. The universalisation and 'naturalisation' of the nation-state in the 1950s (Berger 2003: 422) presented those concerned with development with a dilemma: as legal-administrative boundaries did not, in fact, correspond with socio-cultural boundaries in most newly-independent former colonies, nation-states would need to be built. This process required the incorporation of the majority of the target population into a wide-ranging process of national development, but was best led by a modernising, technocratic bureaucracy which could guide the population past any initial stages of dislocation caused by the breakdown of traditional structures.

This view became particularly prevalent in the 1960s, when the 'political modernisation' and 'politics of order' approaches began to place a greater emphasis on order and stability than had earlier strains of modernisation theory. To one author, political leaders could 'increase their effectiveness by openly and vigorously committing themselves to utopian and xenophobic nationalism' (Smelser 1963: 114). As early as 1963, even Rostow's more organic approach had also given way to a belief, in the case of South Vietnam, that 'one must create at forced-draft the bone structure of a modern nation' (Rostow quoted in Gilman

2007: 155). Geertz called for an 'integrative revolution' whereby primordial loyalties could be subsumed into a national consciousness (quoted in Berger 2003: 98) and MacDougall (1976: 1168) praised Suharto's 'technocratic model of modernization' as a 'highly functional strategy of government' which he felt 'recommended itself to like-minded and organized elites confronting similar crises'.

Even accounts focusing more on the economic than political aspects of modernisation advocated a strong state that played a crucial guiding role in capitalist development, appearing as they did within the context of the Bretton Woods financial system that prevented capital from crossing frontiers without governmental approval and allowed governments to set exchange rates, influence commodity prices and to undertake a host of other macro-economic initiatives. As Leys (2005: 110) phrases it, in post-war development theory 'the agent of development was the state', with theorists predominantly concerned with 'the best way for colonial, and then ex-colonial states, to accelerate national economic growth'. Democracy was held to be inseparable from development, but this democracy was often Schumpeterian and minimalist in nature, and was viewed as developing in tandem with economic growth rather than acting as a precondition. Pointing to the facts that few consolidated democracies existed in Western Europe at the height of modernisation theory and that Parsons viewed the Soviet Union and the United States as equally modernised by the second half of the 20th century, Schmidt (2011: 308-312) therefore argues that modernisation theory did not view democracy as an essential prerequisite of political modernity. Even theorists who did view democracy as inseparable from modernisation tended to view it as contingent on a range of economic or cultural preconditions such as economic growth (Lipset 1960), the evolution of a 'civic culture' (Almond and Verba 1963),

the creation of 'modern' personalities (Lerner 1964; Inkeles and Smith 1974; Parsons 1991 [1951]).

In short, differences between the 'politics of order' and early modernisation theories did exist, but these were overshadowed by similarities. According to Berger (2003: 426), 'far more significant was the shift by the 1950s from overtly racially-based ideas about a civilising mission in the colonies to much more comprehensive ideas about government-mediated national development and an emphasis on the importance of the nation-state as the main object of nation-building and stability'. The various strands of modernisation theory that emerged from this shift may have differed in certain areas, but all felt the 'need for a "modernizing elite", willing and institutionally able, albeit through "strong government", to shake sleepy, ascriptive, non-rational Third World societies into the period of economic "take-off" and beyond' (Harrison 1988: 32). Latham (2003: 729) echoes this observation, pointing out that modernisation theory allowed the American state to mediate and control a world in flux by equating authority with stability—hence the close overlap between the American academic and policy worlds of the era, as well as the United States' support of the South Vietnamese regime.

As we have seen in previous chapters, this paradigm was not limited to American theorists and policymakers, but also found adherents in numerous developing countries. It was a view held by local modernisers in both newly-independent Ethiopia and Kenya, where both the regimes of Haile-Selassie and Tom Mboya sought to use the power of the state and its bureaucracy to undertake ambitious infrastructural projects and long-term economic plans.

Not only do many of the assumptions of modernisation theory and the literature on the East Asian Model coincide, many of my interviewees, particularly in Ethiopia, were themselves highly cognisant of the overlap between the West's historical trajectory and their vision of East Asia's more recent development. Decision-makers who cited East Asia as a model also explicitly included 'the early days of the West' (EG20), 19th century Germany (EG15) and even 'certain elements' of the 'colonial past' (KN15) as potential exemplars. The EPRDF's private use of the example of Germany under Bismarck has been discussed in an earlier chapter, and illustrates the linkages that many emulators make between early and later waves of modernisers.

This linkage is further evident in the frustration that interviewees expressed both when accusing donor conditionalities of historical short-sightedness and when dismissing Western fears of usurpation by a Chinese or East Asian model. In each case, elites tended to minimise the differences between European and Asian development, and argued that each was underpinned by a culturally-specific but essentially similar path to modernisation:

> The West always tends to pretend that it was never involved in the economy. But at the lower level of development, the state was also heavily involved in the economy. So perhaps we're not necessarily talking about two different models...There are a few eternal truths that hold for humanity in general (EN13).

An additional important indication that emulation of East Asia drives elites to a broader development paradigm rather than towards a specifically East Asian Model lies in the selective and heterogeneous nature of lesson-drawers' emulation of the region. Kenya and Ethiopia prefer very different models within East Asia; the former's choice of Malaysia and

Singapore correspond to its desire for modernisation in which the bureaucracy and business sectors work together intimately, whereas the latter's use of China and South Korea correspond with its desire for modernisation that is overwhelmingly by the state. The literature on the East Asian model has, to a certain extent, acknowledged the differences in the development trajectories of various East Asian countries; a particularly common distinction is made between 'first-tier' economies (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) versus second and 'second-tier' economies such as Malaysia and Thailand (Sundaram and Chen 1997). The World Bank itself distinguished between Northeast Asian and Southeast Asian development models and recommended that other developing countries adopt the latter over the former (World Bank 1993). However, these regional differences have been used more often to dismantle the notion of a single East Asian Model than to construct a paradigm of development broad enough to encompass the examples of these diverse countries. In an article entitled 'There are at Least Three Models of East Asian Development', for example, Perkins (1994) critiques the notion that the experiences of economically laissez-faire Singapore and Hong Kong can be grouped with those of interventionist countries such as South Korea or those of their resource-rich countries further to the South.

Other factors make the East Asian Model an imperfect fit with the elite emulation documented in this study. While many of the lessons cited by Ethiopian and Kenyan elites—particularly in this chapter—have parallels in writings on the East Asian Model, the reverse is not always true. Despite the continued debate surrounding the relative importance of selective state intervention *vis a vis* outward-oriented, export-led and manufacturing-heavy economic policies in accounting for East Asian growth, much of the literature on the subject

views *both* elements as important to any 'East Asian Model' that may be said to exist (e.g. Kuznets 1988: S17-S19; Bradford 1994: 9-11). The subjects of my research generally admired East Asia's use of FDI to build an export-oriented manufacturing base, but also very often felt the need to diverge temporarily from one or even several of these. Kenyan modernisers, for example, were as likely to focus on growing the services sector as on the manufacturing sector, and at the time of writing Ethiopia exhibits little willingness to liberalise its economy to the extent that SEZs would be economically viable. Because the East Asian Model is so often theorised in economic terms, it has been less able to explain political and especially socio-cultural learning. It is for this reason that the lessons outlined in the previous chapter—lessons such as technological optimism, developmental monumentalism, cultural 'modernisation' and development as staged and endogenous growth —find less resonance with this theory than with modernisation theory.

In short, where the intricacies of the various East Asian models are emphasised, it becomes clear that Ethiopian and Kenyan elites are following several models rather than a single model. Conversely, where the similarities between these countries are subsumed into a single East Asian Model of 'export-led growth guided by firm governmental policies' (Pye 1988: 82), this model does not express the range of lessons Ethiopian and Kenyan elites wish to learn from the region.

It will be recalled that *models* constitute mental constructs rooted in specific real-world examples but abstracted for the purposes of emulation, whereas *paradigms* refer to the entirety of beliefs that constitute an individual's worldview on a particular issue. In the case of Ethiopia and Kenya, powerful elites have certainly chosen to emulate certain important East Asian models—particularly those of China, South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore. This

lesson-drawing has a deeper impact on the way they view development, and the resulting development paradigm is not specific to East Asia. As Wong (2004: 348) points out, 'the core idea of the developmental state—that strategic state intervention into the market can facilitate industrial transformation and economic growth more generally—was in fact nothing especially new or distinctly Asian.' Modernisation theory also privileges the role of governments and their technocrats in the management of national economies, but situates this within a philosophy of development that is both older and more fundamental than the East Asian model and that has domestic precedents in both Ethiopia and Kenya.

8.3.2 Direct Views on Modernisation: A Method of Triangulation

In case any doubt remains as to the desire of Kenyan and Ethiopian emulators to modernise their countries, an analysis of their views on the concept of modernisation itself proves illuminating. Interviewees were asked to describe what the term 'modernisation' meant to them, whether they viewed it in a positive or negative light, and whether they felt it was occurring in their own national contexts. In both country cases, those who viewed modernisation as a broad phenomenon comprising economic, social, political and technological changes outnumbered those with a narrower, more technical definition of modernisation by almost four to one. Often, interviewees either equated modernisation with development, or felt the two to be tightly linked. Examples of such broad, holistic conceptualisations of modernisation included the following:

> Modernisation for me is dealing with the industrial culture, which has been going on for a long time but intensified in Western Europe in the last 500 years, and adapting to it (EG25).

It's a strange thing – Kenya is very, very interested in modernising. It's how we go about it—it's piecemeal, it's haphazard, it's not systematic, it's not holistic...You don't modernise piecemeal (KN15).

It's not possible for any country to develop without modernisation. Modernisation, as I have given it to you at the beginning, is all this dynamic development within values and economic development and science and agriculture, in everything...it's something that no country can do without' (KG1).

In contrast, those who viewed modernisation in a more limited sense, either as 'using the latest technology to achieve efficiency and effectiveness' (KG15) or as a theoretical term belonging to a specific school of thought (KN12), were both relatively rare. This indicates that interviewees in both countries broadly viewed modernisation as a suitable descriptor for large, interconnected changes in a society's political, economic, cultural and technological circumstances—changes that move a society from a 'traditional' to a new way of life. Most elites viewed technological progress as central to the definition of modernisation, but linked this to improved material well-being, cultural transformation, institutional development and structural transformation.

This stands in sharp contrast to the ways in which the term is generally used in contemporary scholarship and in donor discourse. In the former, modernisation is either heavily historicised and particularised (Gilman 2007; Engerman *et al* 2006) or used to signify the application of cutting-edge technologies and organisational modes to particular

institutions such as armed forces or bureaucracies. It is today hardly used by traditional donors.

Interviewees tended to view modernisation as a broad, interconnected process regardless of whether they attached a positive or negative normative value to this process and regardless of their views on emulation. There was, however, a clear link between emulation of East Asia and the view of modernisation as generally positive. Followers of East Asian models other than China were 3.5 times as likely to view modernisation as positive than they were to view it as either having a mixed or negative impact, while this gap was even larger for followers of China specifically. Those unwilling to isolate a particular country or region as a model, on the other hand, were 2.7 times as likely to view modernisation as positive than they were to have ambivalent or negative views, while those who viewed European or African countries as models were actually far *less* likely to see it as positive than as neutral or negative. In other words, there was a strong correlation between lesson-drawing from East Asia and a desire for modernisation within elites' own countries.

This correlation does not necessarily prove causality—those who view modernisation as an important goal might well seek to draw lessons from those countries they see as having achieved this goal within a short period of time and under similar constraints. However, these findings do demonstrate the important linkages between emulation of East Asia and the return of modernisation to African development discourses, whichever way the causality runs. They therefore illustrate the fact that modernising elites use the examples of South Korea, China, Malaysia and Singapore to bring about and justify domestic reforms and projects.

A significant portion of those who viewed modernisation in positive terms sought to redefine and reclaim the concept, simultaneously distancing themselves from the 'Western domination' they felt the term had implied in the past and affirming their adherence to 'true' modernisation. This was particularly true in Kenya, a country whose leaders were more in synch with shifting global discourses on development since the 1950s and thus more likely to remember the widespread criticism that the term was subject to in subsequent decades. As one respondent put it, 'historically…when I was growing up, a lot of times when the word modern was used it actually meant Western, and frankly it meant European' (KN17). Elites therefore objected to the way they felt the term 'modernisation' had sometimes been used, in its heyday, as a pretext for foreign interference and the continuation of colonial relations. The tools and outcomes of the process remained important, but now had to be enacted solely by domestic actors if modernisation was to regain its utility.

Earlier chapters identified a group of elites in each country case that were more likely to draw broad development lessons from other national contexts. In Ethiopia, this group largely belonged to the ruling EPRDF; in Kenya, on the other hand, these comprised a coalition of business leaders and government planners clustered around the government's chief planning institutions. In both cases, these elites wished to draw lessons primarily from East Asia, although the former group preferred government-led economies such as South Korea and China and the latter the somewhat more economically liberal countries of Malaysia and Singapore. Finally, the dissertation argued, these processes of emulation herald the return of many of the assumptions of post-war modernisation theory.

Given these findings, it is not surprising that definitions of modernisation were also split clearly along these lines in both countries studied. In Kenya, those closely involved

with *Vision 2030* and NESC were over three times more likely to view modernisation as a necessary and positive development than were other political and non-governmental actors. The gap was slightly narrower in Ethiopia, but EPRDF members were still over twice as likely to attach a positive connotation to modernisation than were non-EPRDF members.

These findings were mirrored in the extent to which elites felt their countries to be modernising. EPRDF and *Vision 2030* respondents were more likely to view modernisation as a process currently occurring in their own countries. Similarly, those viewing East Asia and China as models were far more likely to view their countries as modernising than those who wished to draw lessons from countries in other regions. This is not surprising, given the fact that these elites are responsible for implementing long-term development plans in their countries; in effect, these interviewees were claiming that such plans were proving successful and bringing about visible transformation on a national scale. It is significant, however, that emulating elites wished to associate themselves with the term 'modernisation', thereby claiming it for themselves and their institutions.

To all groups of elites, the extent to which modernisation must necessarily be equated with Westernisation was a central point of concern. The concept, far from being divorced from its putative origins, was still narrowly bound up with concerns over imperialism, globalisation and the replacement of tradition with Western values. However, the key difference between those with a positive view of modernisation and those who viewed it as detrimental to society centred on the ability of elites to 'de-Westernise' the concept, thereby rendering it both more universal and more locally-specific. On the one hand, thus, those who rejected the concept often viewed it as irredeemably alien:

We're a poor country, people have tough lives here, but we make their lives better. That's much more important for me than any kind of definition of modernisation. And in that sense, part of what's usually implied by saying modernisation is adapting Western things. And I don't necessarily think that is the solution (EN13).

There's a cultural dynamic to it, and a racial dynamic to it, because of the kind of relationship we African people have to the West in terms of our colonial encounter....It is not relating to people as humans, and the whole notion of empowerment...Museveni has this awful language where he refers to Uganda as being backwards, and the African people as backwards. I really can't stand it (KN17).

On the other hand, those who wished to modernise their countries tended to argue that this process was both unavoidable and universal. In Ethiopia, modernisation was linked to globalisation, and assimilating the country into a broader global system after years of feudalism and 'backwardness':

Modernisation is good – we have to be modern because we live in a globalised world and we have to compete. Modernisation is interconnected with development. We become modernised through development (EG21).

In Kenya, too, modernisation was most often seen as essential to 'catching up' with other modern and 'advanced' countries:

To me, modernisation is sustaining a country's level of development at the same level to where the whole world is going to. For example, when we talk about achieving what the global direction is...and what the whole world is focusing on (EG21).

In both cases, emulating elites spoke of re-interpreting modernisation in such a way as to divest it of its Western origins and the unequal power relations that were seen to stem from its erstwhile imposition; at the same time, modernisation was seen as encompassing certain 'core', universal elements that were perhaps first witnessed in the West but were now appearing in East Asia and globally:

> Modernisation for me is not, you know, the equivalent to what we call Western culture - dressing like Western people, speaking English, French and other Western languages. You know, for me, it's not equal to accepting Western culture. It's about development, it's about empowering people, people leading a decent life (EG13).

> Europe before the industrial revolution and the age of enlightenment is very different from Europe, post-industrial revolution. Africa never went through that, so that if you walk in Africa, if you go to Pokot, there are fellows who when you talk about things which we take for granted, they have no idea. Their society has meant that cattle-rustling is a traditional thing, and they do it as they have done it since before the birth of Christ...I know that that is what you want to deal with if you are to move this country forward (KG17).

In conducting this research, I did not expect emulating elites to adhere to a unified, strict definition of the term 'modernisation', nor for their conceptualisation to be consciously informed by the literature on the subject. Both of these expectations were borne out: other than a common emphasis on the term's roots in the West and on the use of technology and increased productivity to ameliorate the human condition, elites defined the term in a variety of ways. When asked directly, the majority of elites felt development to be impossible—or at least very difficult—without rapid economic growth, industrialisation and massive

investment in infrastructure: 'Economic growth is the basis of development', said one, for example; 'how can a country develop without rapid economic growth?' (KG13). Furthermore, these trends were once again particularly pronounced for those elites who wished to emulate East Asia.

Although this is a further direct indicator of the importance of key components of modernisation theory for Ethiopian and Kenyan elites, the intention was not, here, to base my conclusions about elites' policy preferences on their direct assessments of different developmental theories. The specific lessons that elites wish to draw from their exemplars still provide the primary evidence that emulation of East Asia is turning Ethiopian and Kenyan elites towards many of the assumptions of post-war development theory, as emulating elites could well reject the label of modernisation but retain its content. The fact that they embrace both the concept and its tenets serves primarily, thus, to 'triangulate' and add robustness to the findings presented elsewhere. It helps to demonstrate the powerful impact that the concept of modernisation, despite its widespread vilification in the 1970s and seeming obsolescence in the decades that followed, continues to have on the thinking of policy elites. These decision-makers—particularly those who look to East Asia for developmental lessons—view the concept as having relevance to virtually all spheres of policy and to currently bringing about largely positive societal outcomes.

8.4 Conclusion

Central to elite lesson-drawing in both Kenya and Ethiopia lies a vision not only of the key policy priorities that ensure development—wealth creation, physical infrastructure and the like—but also of the role that these emulating elites themselves play in the process. In

focusing on the latter aspect, this chapter has found that both groups of elites view the need for strong and modernising leadership by the state and its representatives as one of the key lessons to be drawn from East Asia's success. In Ethiopia, this combines with the country's history of centralising governments to manifest itself in a desire for a 'developmental state' that intervenes directly in the economy and allows for a level of gradual liberalisation that bridges Ethiopia's current situation and the 'ideal' presented to it by Western donors. Whereas this leads Ethiopia to choose interventionist models such as Park-era South Korea and present-day China, Kenya's lesson-drawers look to countries, such as Malaysia and Singapore, where leaders have harnessed business-friendly approaches in the service of overarching nationalist and 'developmentalist' objectives.

This discussion extends beyond the question of state intervention in the economy, however. Despite elites' not-uncommon assertions that East Asia's economic and political models can be separated, a range of closely-related political strategies and orientations have emerged as lessons. In authoritarian Ethiopia, where elites were reluctant to admit to emulating the repressive political systems of their economic exemplars, EPRDF representatives nonetheless view democratisation as a process by which a national civic identity is gradually inculcated by processes of modernisation and through the efforts of an educated elite. The desire for a strong ruling party that can preside over this process for several decades and whose legitimacy rests first and foremost on increases in material well-being are other areas in which East Asia was used as a key reference point.

Kenyan leaders, in contrast, explicitly drew from East Asia's 'benevolent dictatorships', which they viewed as sufficiently forceful, visionary and insulated to push a fractious and sometimes reluctant population to modernise. This perspective was

particularly prevalent among Kenya's technocrats, who admired their Malaysian and Singaporean counterparts' abilities at least partially insulate themselves from the demands of civil society, party politics and donors, whilst retaining a close partnership with the business sector. On both countries, these aspects of emulation also found expression in policy.

These decisions bear the unmistakable stamp of East Asian emulation, but cannot be reduced to this. Instead, they are part of a wider paradigm of modernisation, today brought once more to the fore by models such as China and Malaysia. East Asia is not the only region in which authoritarian but developmentalist leaderships have achieved rapid industrialisation, and even there they have done this in numerous ways. After all, both Kenya and Ethiopia have historical experiences of similar leaderships, although one has to return to the height of modernisation theory's influence in these countries to find them. Today's modernising elites may draw on East Asia in their efforts, but are in fact undergoing a larger paradigm shift towards views ultimately best expressed by Tom Mboya himself in 1969: 'politically speaking', he wrote, 'it can be argued that we are in such a state of crisis that authoritarian rule is justified. It is said that opposition is a luxury we cannot afford, since it will divert us from the progress whose general direction is widely agreed within the nation' (Mboya 1970: 9).

PART IV: CONCLUSION

CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

This dissertation has sought to understand the extent to which China serves as a model of development to elites in two emblematic but very different African countries. My research took as its point of departure the 'Chinese Model' and 'Beijing Consensus' debates that in the first decade of the 21st century began to make their way from policy and media fora into the academic literature, but aimed at providing these with a more robust theoretical framework and more empirical data than had hitherto been applied. Using a constructivist ontology and hermeneutic epistemology, I argued that the key questions encapsulated in this debate could be best understood by examining the ideational frameworks of those elites who contribute to the discourse and practice of development in my country cases. The cases of Ethiopia and Kenya were chosen so to be both intrinsically significant but also representative enough of key post-colonial development trends on the continent as to allow for a certain level of cautious analytical generalisability. This concluding chapter summarises the findings obtained from this research, before briefly analysing their broader theoretical and empirical implications.

9.1 Ethiopian and Kenyan Emulation: What We Know Now

One of the earliest and most important findings to emerge from this study both detracted from and supported assertions that African elites were increasingly following a 'Chinese Model' of development. Drawing on the literature and conceptual framework of lesson-drawing and cross-societal emulation, I found that key groups of Ethiopian and Kenyan elites do indeed seek to emulate East Asia's development experiences—in fact, no other model is

as influential. However, these elites do not view China as an isolated or especially unique case. In Ethiopia, a shared legacy of communism predisposes elites towards emulation of China, but this model is nested within a broader set of East Asian models that all accord a prominent role to classic 'developmental states' such as South Korea and Taiwan. In an echo of earlier modernisers' attempts to balance the perceived imperatives of globalisation with the need to maintain Ethiopia's historical independence, the EPRDF has come to be committed to a certain level of economic liberalism. It sees emulation of East Asian developmentalism, however, as a way to temper, slow and gain ownership over the demands of globalisation and the donor community.

In Kenya, elites also wish to emulate the East Asian region as a whole; here, however, a long-standing distrust of China and communism means that elites instead look to countries such as Singapore and Malaysia for comparable lessons. Guiding Kenyan elites' desire for emulation is a narrative that contrasts the meagre post-independence progress of their own country with the allegedly more substantial gains made by East Asian countries that gained independence from the UK at a similar point in their history.

The dynamics governing elites' choice of model sometimes overlap from country case to country case, and sometimes diverge. India, a country whose potential as an alternative model I was initially interested in exploring, plays some role in determining legal and constitutional arrangements in Kenya and is even viewed there as a better source of lessons than is China. However, India does not begin to rival East Asia as an overarching model in either country, and its 'successes' are viewed with much scepticism. Another point of difference concerns the identities of emulating elites themselves: in Ethiopia, emulation is led by the senior leadership of the ruling EPRDF; those with a more negative view of the

East Asian or Chinese models are also those whose influence is being increasingly marginalised and suppressed. In Kenya, emulators also occupy important positions. In this case, however, they comprise that coalition of business elites and technocrats tightly clustered around the government's flagship *Vision 2030* development plan (itself a key outcome of emulation).

After determining whether any specific countries or regions serve as exemplars for Ethiopian and Kenyan elites, a second key aim of this study was to understand the content of these lessons, as well as their impact—if any—on development paradigms in these countries. Here, again, the country cases showed both a significant degree of similarity and some key differences, with eight lessons emerging as central to elite emulation of East Asia. These were:

1. a conceptualisation of development as an endogenous, staged process whereby countries pass through a series of distinct developmental phases by mobilising their domestic resources and securing their own domestic policy spaces.

2. a desire to undergo deep-seated structural transformation that would free their country from a dependence on primary commodities and subsistence farming, and that would facilitate industrialisation by initially focusing on rural development. In both countries, this lesson is challenged by extrinsic factors: in the case of Kenya, by the existence of a services-heavy economy; and in the case of Ethiopia, by a contending urge within the party, backed by donors, to open the agricultural sector to intensive export-based foreign investment.

3. an emphasis on rapid, double-digit economic growth as the first condition of development, with wealth creation privileged over wealth distribution.

4. a belief that the vast majority of development challenges can be solved through the harnessing of science and technology. This manifests itself most visibly in a privileging of technical and scientific subjects within the educational system and in the use of a technologically-intensive approach to agriculture.

5. an emphasis on physical infrastructure as one of the key factors underpinning development. The mobilisation of natural resources in the service of creating large projects such as dams, bridges and roads is valued. This is the only lesson that Kenyan elites associate specifically with China.

6. a belief that widespread 'cultural modernisation' is needed in order for countries to develop; this transformation is associated with the fostering of an increase in rationality, a stronger work ethic and a national identity.

7. an emphasis on the need for the state to play a larger role in the national economy than currently preferred by traditional donors (but a smaller role than that mandated by the dependency approach). In Kenya, the role envisioned for the state is moderate, with a liberal but 'defensive' state partnering with a vibrant private sector.

Ethiopian leaders, however, envision a full-fledged 'developmental state' possessing a strict government-business hierarchy.

8. a belief that development, at least in its initial phases, is best led by forceful, technocratic leaders who are willing, at times, to judiciously suspend certain political freedoms in service of the material wellbeing of the majority. In Ethiopia, EPRDF elites view democratisation as an ethos to be gradually instilled in citizens by economic growth and by the modernising efforts of a dominant, long-lived ruling party. In Kenya, elites are more open about the need for modernising elites to act as 'benevolent dictators' at times and thereby to achieve the 'bureaucratic insulation' necessary to drive development.

Several of these lessons—and particularly the latter two—coincide with much of the literature on the East Asian Model and the 'developmental state' that has existed since the 1980s and 1990s. This illustrates the importance of contextualising the Chinese Model within a broader regional context and thereby avoiding the notion that its lessons are unique. However, my findings suggested a need for even the East Asian Model to be situated within the broader paradigms that have marked development discourses and practices in Africa. As real-world examples that are abstracted for the purposes of emulation, models are inextricably linked to a specific time and place of origin. The lessons referred to above, however, are sufficiently abstract and foundational as to alter those sets of beliefs that constitute elites' developmental worldviews; as such, they alter paradigms. The less than central role that other key aspects of the East Asian and Chinese experiences—the aggressive

promotion of a FDI-led export sector, for example—played in the discourses of interviewees strengthens this argument. Elites' adherence to the notion that East Asia's development acts as a more easily-observable and achievable but essentially similar counterpart to earlier development of the West similarly suggests that the East Asian Model is, here, a tool serving a larger purpose than itself.

The most important indicator of this, however, is the resemblance that these lessons hold to the earliest of development paradigms that dominated post-colonial Africa. Before they turned to revolutionary communism and the politics of 'special interests' respectively, Ethiopia and Kenya were both ruled by indigenous modernisers in the figures of Haile-Selassie and Tom Mboya. These highly influential individuals adhered to the modernisation theory of the day—a paradigm that sought to apply an idealised version of the Western developmental experience to 'traditional' societies around the world.

The lessons listed above resemble the doctrines of modernisation theorists such as Levy, Parsons and Rostow, and diverge substantially from the theories that supplanted these authors in subsequent decades. The Augmented Washington Consensus that dominates global development discourses today and focuses on participatory, rights-based and decentralised development is a particularly far cry from the lessons that Ethiopian and Kenyan elites draw from East Asia. The overlap is not perfect, and there do exist certain areas of divergence between current elites' vision of East Asian development and modernisation theory. The former's emphasis on agricultural and rural development, for example, is not mirrored in the latter's preoccupation with rapid industrialisation. The vast majority of evidence, however, points to the return of a variety of development thinking deeply rooted in modernisation theory's teleological and transformational worldview.

This dissertation has not, thus far, sought to ascertain the 'root causes' of this recent trend. To a large extent, this has been a function of the methodology and ontology used here: interviews and other elite discourses may uncover the reasons elites attach to their choices and actions, but find it more difficult to understand the unverbalised 'reasons behind these reasons', as it were. As discussed in the chapter on methodology, hermeneutic approaches also expressly avoid constructing universal covering laws of cause and effect and prefer multicausality to the isolation of one or two key variables; conditional links, however, can still be established through narrative and imputation.

In my case, the evidence suggests that elite emulation of East Asia is an important factor driving an empirically observable paradigm shift towards modernisation theory in Ethiopia and Kenya. It has also shown that elites choose to emulate those countries they view as peers who have successfully overcome challenges similar to their own. What is less immediately clear is why this trend should be particularly pronounced today, to the extent that elites in two very different African countries happen to choose similar models, and even more similar lessons. Is it merely coincidence, for example, that decision-makers in Ethiopia and Kenya should both, in the past decade or so, have found an emphasis on technical education to be a hallmark of their peers' successes?

In fully answering this question, I would speculate, an understanding of structural factors becomes a necessary addition to the agent-centred approach this dissertation has taken. My research has harnessed a hermeneutic epistemology in order to understand the subjective frameworks used by elites in their decision-making; it has also demonstrated that African elites have more agency than recent development debates have generally accorded them. However, constructivism accords co-constitutive roles to agency and structure, and

future research would do well to explore in greater detail the structural reasons for this emulation. For my part, I would argue that Ethiopian and Kenyan elites are looking to their industrialising or newly-industrialised peers largely because these peers exist today in greater numbers and to greater affect than ever before. East Asian industrialisation is not new, but the vast scale and regional spread of this transformation is unprecedented and this, to these emulators, magnifies the differences between that region and their own. Malaysia and China, two of the most influential models in Kenya and Ethiopia respectively due to perceived similarities in historical legacy, both experienced vast upturns in their domestic fortunes and international standings only relatively recently.

East Asia's transformation has broken down the binary distinctions of the post-Cold War era that largely divided the world into developed and undeveloped countries. It has allowed for an unprecedented level of direct engagement between Asian and African governments. And, crucially, it has coincided with a financial crisis that has discredited those models perceived as 'Western' in much the same way that East Asia was discounted as a model in 1997.

Emulation of East Asia was not completely non-existent in the 21st century, of course: as we have seen, the EPRDF's ADLI has drawn on the Taiwanese and South Korean experiences since the early 1990s, and Kenyan policymakers began to speak of an 'East Asian Model' during the term's resurgence at a similar time. These precursors to today's emulation serve, in fact, as a warning against viewing the Chinese Model in a historical or geographical vacuum. Nonetheless, several international and domestic structural constraints have lessened since this emulation began—each of my country cases has, in its own way, seen a diminution of donor conditionalities. Each has also, until the early 2000s, witnessed

several decades of economic stagnation and political upheaval at a time when the countries they now hold as models were growing rapidly. One senior Kenyan policymaker reported receiving an irate phone call from his political superiors in the early 1990s for publicly making an unfavourable comparison between Kenya and Malaysia (KG8)—now public and private admissions such as these constitute one of the main planks of technocratic discourse in the country.

This brings us to a final and particularly contentious question: why do both Ethiopian and Kenyan emulators draw from their models the lessons of modernisation theory rather than, say, the lessons that the World Bank exhorted them to draw in its *East Asian Miracle* report? It is tempting to conclude that East Asia's actual post-colonial development experience most closely 'fits' the arguments and assumptions of modernisation theory, and that African elites are to some extent responding to this fact. I would not completely dispute this notion, particularly given the extent to which the contemporary literatures on the East Asian and Chinese Models have contrasted their subject matter with more recent development paradigms such as the Washington Consensus whilst failing to transform the model into a theoretically distinctive new global development paradigm. It could even be that newly-independent countries do indeed respond best to strong, visionary leaderships who devote national resources to economic growth and industrialisation, and that priorities such as the distribution of wealth and the creation of pluralistic political systems follow only once these have been achieved.

These considerations notwithstanding, we also know that emulation is inherently selective, premised as it is on the subjective mental frameworks of individual lesson-drawers: witness, for example, how much likelier Ethiopian elites were, in speaking of

China's 'gradual economic liberalisation', to emphasise the first word of this phrase rather than the third. Perhaps it is precisely the contrasts between East Asia and the still-reigning Augmented Washington Consensus that allow elites to explore the differences, rather than the similarities, between those approaches. If an African government wishes to look beyond its borders to learn about democratic institution-building, for example, it can turn to any number of Western donors. In exploring practical strategies of bureaucratic insulation, however, it would have to look beyond traditional donors. In this way, then, Kenyan and Ethiopian policymakers may, in the face of similar global structural constraints, choose similar variants of modernisation theory as a solution.

9.2 Theoretical Implications

My findings have implications for several strands of the literature. Most significantly, for the purposes of the overall research question, they contribute to the contemporary debate on the nature and existence of the Chinese Model. My review of this body of writing differentiated between advocates, opponents and sceptics of the notion that China's development experiences constitute a model for emulation by others in the developing world. My findings demonstrate that each of these three 'schools' understands certain aspects of China's development model but misunderstands other aspects. *Advocates* deserve credit for being among the first to suggest that China's new influence on the development efforts of poor countries extends beyond the material realm; as my dissertation makes clear, certain African countries indeed wish to emulate China's domestic trajectory. Advocates also correctly identify several lessons that underpin this emulation, such as the sequencing of development

initiatives, the harnessing of science and technology and an increased role for the state in the economic sphere.

This group is mistaken, however, in viewing developing countries as a homogenous group that uniformly looks to China as a model. In Kenya—and possibly in other countries without a history of close ties to the China—the country is viewed as potentially threatening. Instead, China's smaller but more culturally familiar neighbours are preferred as an alternative source of lessons. There is therefore a need for future research regarding the geographical, cultural, historical and political 'faultlines' along which emulation of China occurs.

Neither are China's lessons as unique as advocates suppose: those in Ethiopia who do see the country as an exemplar situate it within a broader regional model, while Kenyan elites view this same regional model as offering similar—but safer—lessons to China. As my analysis of modernisation theory has shown, even this East Asian regional model is not, itself, unique, particularly given the eclectic and abstract ways in which it is used by emulating elites. In short, then, advocates of a Chinese Model have wrongly treated the phenomenon as isolated, unprecedented and near-universal when in fact China provides only one model contributing to a larger return of modernisation theory.

Opponents view the Chinese Model as pernicious primarily because they view it as inexorably tied to a decline of 'Western' values and other forms of Western influence in the developing world. Some of these suspicions are borne out by my findings: the overall result of China's example is indeed to overturn many of the assumptions of both the Washington Consensus and its augmented, more participatory counterpart. The effects of this emulation are not limited to the economic sphere but, as opponents point out, hold important

implications for governance and the recognition of human rights in countries where the model holds sway. Often, this emulation does serve to weaken attraction to contemporary European and American paradigms of liberal democracy.

Opponents are mistaken on three counts, however. Firstly, they are as wrong as advocates of a Chinese Model in assuming that the 'new', Asian-inspired paradigm is uniquely or even primarily Chinese, and thereby conveniently forget the many similarities between the Chinese Model, the East Asian models that came before it and the model that the West was itself promoting immediately following decolonisation. Their neglect of historical factors also leads them to underestimate the role that former colonial powers and other countries within the same 'social psychological' space continue to play both in determining elites' choice of exemplar and in providing legal-institutional constraints to development. For all China's 'wooing' of elites through study visits and the like, Commonwealth countries continue to inform Kenya's legal system. Countries like Malaysia and Singapore who are both in Asia and share a common colonial history with Kenya are most influential of all. Opponents and advocates are thus both mistaken in portraying the Chinese Model as a phenomenon sweeping indiscriminately across the African continent and the developing world. Thirdly, it is overly simplistic to reduce China's lessons to the twin threats of 'state capitalism' and authoritarianism, as Halper (2010) does. This ignores the numerous other lessons—the importance of agricultural development and the need for cultural 'modernisation', to name only two—that developing country elites draw from China.

The third and final group of observers, the *sceptics*, has argued that China's experience is neither singular, comprehensible nor influential enough to warrant the label of 'model'. Some of these authors have begun to disentangle the normative and empirical

threads of emulation and begun to differentiate between those models, discourses and paradigms that are influential and those that are actually transferable. They have thereby come closest to exploring what is actually meant when others speak of a 'development model'. My findings have also validated their scepticism towards the notion that the popularity of China's development model stems from radical departures from the development trajectories of other eras and countries.

Despite these important strengths, the criticism of sceptics often embodies one of the literature's key flaws. By focusing on the merits of the models they dismiss, they still undervalue the role of subjective perceptions in shaping lesson-drawing and emulation. Thus Kennedy (2010: 477) writes that 'some countries are deeply interested in learning from China's success' while still dismissing the 'Beijing Consensus' (and with it the Chinese Model) as a 'myth'. As my conceptual and methodological discussions have shown, however, the development experience of China need not be unique, coherent or even fully transferable in order to constitute a model. Interestingly, also, China's current combination of economic liberalisation and political restriction need not remain in place indefinitely for the country to remain a model. Barring a situation of Chinese economic or political catastrophe, African elites are more likely to judge China by its overall development trajectory than by the policies that happen to be in place at the time of emulation. Political reform need not spell, as Yao (2010) contends, 'the end of the Beijing Consensus'. As elites' desire to draw lessons of authoritarian growth from countries such as South Korea and Taiwan make clear, Chinese reform may actually strengthen modernisers' beliefs that democratisation is best undertaken only after a lengthy period of economic and political maturation.

Collectively, these strands of the literature on the Chinese Model have all served to highlight an issue of growing importance in international development debates. By recognising the global transferability of ideas on how to 'do' international development and the agency that local development actors play in implementing these ideas, they have also served to bring emulative dynamics to the forefront in a rare and important way. Their shortcomings stem largely from their failure hitherto to contextualise this debate within historical theoretical paradigms and discussions and from a lack of empirical data. This leads them, most importantly, to ignore the crucial role that other East Asian models and the theory of modernisation play in contextualising the very real—but hardly unprecedented or all-encompassing—Chinese Model.

The findings of this dissertation extend beyond the immediate literature on the Chinese Model. My research has taken neither a theory-testing nor a theory-building approach, preferring instead to offer interpretations that remain spatially and temporally contingent and therefore generalisable only by subjective observers. Nevertheless, certain anomalies and points of interest emerged in the course of my research; these suggest future research agendas or potential adjustments to the existing bodies of theoretical work.

Two broad theoretical frameworks were of interest in the current study. The first concerned emulation and lesson-drawing, namely the voluntary transfer of development policies and programmes from one geographical setting to another. The second, modernisation theory, had long fallen from favour in academic circles, to be replaced by successive paradigms such as dependency theory and the Washington Consensus. The single most important contribution that my own study brings to these theories is the recognition that *each still matters*. Both are large bodies of literature that nonetheless occupy marginal

positions in contemporary international relations and development studies. Yet my findings show both to have immense relevance in determining Ethiopian and Kenyan development paradigms—emulation in partially determining the mechanisms by which elites formulate these paradigms, and modernisation theory in describing their content.

It should not come as a surprise that emulation of China and its neighbours is at least partially responsible for bringing modernisation theory back to Africa. The most prominent contemporary historian of modernisation theory sees much in common with China's current approach to development and the earlier American projects he chronicles; 'the contemporary Chinese Communist regime is the last of the classic authoritarian high modernist regimes', he writes, citing inter alia the monumentalism of the Three Gorges Dam (Gilman 2003: 311). To be clear, I am not arguing that the assumptions of modernisation theory have been validated, nor that they exactly describe the Chinese or East Asian development experiences. I am also not arguing that Kenyan and Ethiopian leaders wish to precisely imitate either the policies of their earlier modernisers or of authors such as Parsons and Rostow; as the emphasis on agricultural development demonstrates, significant re-imaginings of this theory may still occur as elites reconceptualise modernisation and their role within it.

My argument, rather, is both *that those lessons that Ethiopian and Kenyan elites draw from China, Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore and others are a far closer fit with modernisation theory than with those development paradigms that followed it, and that these lessons lack the coherence and breadth to constitute an entirely new paradigm.* It is this finding that leads me to argue that modernisation theory—or at least a close variation on it— is gaining new adherents in Africa. Moreover, it is this finding that demonstrates the importance of a continued engagement with the ideas, assumptions and practical impact of

this theory—not, as some have lately begun to do, as primarily a matter for the historical record, but as a current, lived development project.

Thomas' (2011: 6) argument that 'the enduring purchase of the modern and traditional as explanatory concepts in Africa…makes the study of modernity an analytical imperative' applies equally, I contend, to that specific expression of modernity contained in modernisation theory. She rightly holds both that African elites have long used visions and discourses of modernity in order to imagine alternative, 'better' modes of societal organisation, and that this tendency was particularly pronounced among post-independence leaders such as Sengor and Kenyatta (Thomas 2011: 8). The role of the East Asian example in informing and updating such visions in Africa illustrates a need to return to the study of modernity and modernisation on the continent.

This dissertation has shown the important role that emulation and lesson-drawing play in disseminating models and paradigms of development, where so much contemporary scholarship has constructed a dichotomy pitting only unwelcome and intrusive foreign influences against indigenous and voluntary practices. In the cases taken into consideration here, emulation is an underlying force behind many policy decisions. This suggests the need for future research into evolving development paradigms and policies to give greater attention to emulative dynamics, and encourages a research agenda that grants greater deliberative and discursive agency to developing country decision-makers.

Specific aspects of lesson-drawing theory were also illuminated by my research. Theorists have posited that lesson-drawing is most likely to occur when policy-makers perceive themselves or their predecessors as having failed in some fundamental way. This

proved true where both Ethiopia's 'defensive modernisation'—designed to temper external imposition through imitation—and Kenya's 'fall from grace' narrative were concerned.

One of the key debates in this literature concerns the determinants of emulators' choice of model; even assuming, as I and others do, that these choices are cognitively bound in some way, this still leaves numerous possibilities. Are they bound by a model's prestige, its familiarity or its geographical, cultural or historical proximity? Both Kenyan elites' suspicion towards a Chinese Model and Ethiopian elites' eagerness to situate this model within a broader and less celebrated regional model demonstrated prestige to be a relatively unimportant factor. The East Asian Model is a relatively outmoded concept, and yet these elites find more utility in it than they do in the concept of a solely Chinese Model. This suggests that emulators do not merely jump on the most recent 'bandwagon' or the latest model at hand, and that they are more patient and systematic in their selection than might be expected. Cultural and geographical proximity were also relatively unimportant, with most African countries seen as sources of negative lessons and the most popular model on the continent—South Africa—heavily subordinated to East Asian countries.

A model's availability and ease of use, on the other hand, played a mixed role in conditioning elites' choices. As my data demonstrated, the study visits and high-level exchanges that China now so regularly engage African elites in seems, in this case, to facilitate a greater desire to draw lessons from the country. Similarly, language issues hampers Kenya's lesson-drawing from China while assisting emulation of Anglophone Singapore. Western donors even played some role in facilitating initial lesson-drawing between Kenya and East Asia, although the content of these lessons was not always under their control. At the same time, familiarity could also hamper lesson-drawing, as Kenyan

elites' frequently-negative attitudes towards Kenyans of Indian origin and often-critical testimonies of visiting India illustrated.

What emerged as the central consideration bounding elites' choice of country, however, was *the perceived historical and social-psychological similarity between their own country and potential exemplars*. A determination to learn from countries with a similar colonial heritage (in Kenya) or economic and political legacy (in Ethiopia) was clearly visible, and elites from both countries drew primarily from those they viewed as having inhabited a roughly similar 'stage' of development in the recent past. This precluded countries who had only recently begun to show promise, as well as those who had developed in the distant past.

Interestingly although historical background played a large role in determining elites' choice of model, it played a less important part in determining the actual lessons elites drew from these models. Thus Kenya could emulate Malaysia and Ethiopia draw lessons from China, but these lessons often overlapped and converged. Elites from both country cases appear to admire the region's modernisation as a whole; these emulators then chose specific countries in the region from which to draw policy programmes that would contribute to making the development vision contained in this new paradigm a reality.

9.3 Empirical Implications

This dissertation has focused on the influence of East Asian models on the development paradigms of Ethiopian and Kenyan leaders, and has only discussed the practical policy outcomes of these paradigm shifts where a clear link between the two could be traced. For this reason, it is more difficult to understand definitively the extent to which the lessons that

emulators take from East Asia are being implemented 'on the ground' – and particularly the extent to which they will be implemented in future. This holds true particularly in regard to abstract lessons such as the promotion of cultural modernisation, but applies even to more concrete aspects of emulation where other factors may step in to help or hinder the practical development of policy.

This is particularly the case in Kenya, where the transformation of any policy from theory to reality remains an enormous problem. On the one hand, the existence and content of *Vision 2030* demonstrates that lesson-drawing from East Asia has already migrated from the minds of elites to become written policy. Other concrete lessons—the massive increase in funding available for the construction of roads or the investment in agro-processing that is to move Kenya up the global commodity chain, for example—are also in evidence. The diversification of external sources of funding and the entry of new 'development partners' into Kenya have diminished the impact of the conditionalities that so influenced policy in the 1980s and 1990s and thereby removed a further constraint on emulation of East Asia.

At the same time, indications abound that lesson-drawing from East Asia will suffer the same problems of corruption and government inefficiency that bedevil other aspects of national development. In Kenya, those elites with the desire and necessary knowledge to draw lessons from East Asia are still a minority, albeit one with inordinate influence over macro-economic planning. Other branches of government evince far greater ambivalence towards East Asian models, as does Kenya's energetic civil society.

Even those involved in lesson-drawing voiced criticism towards Kenya's current approach to this activity. Business leaders accused the government of overloading delegations to countries such as Malaysia and Singapore with official figureheads (KN20)

and of failing to lend continuity and focus to the process by neglecting to send those policymakers and nongovernmental actors who would later be involved in the implementation of any 'lessons learned' (KN8). One business elite, for example, reported being told by Malaysian bureaucrats that 'we're tired of getting so many delegations from Africa. Everyone wants to look at our model and check it out, but nobody goes back and does anything. They go back to NATO – No Action, Talk Only' (KN10). The anecdote that perhaps illustrates the potential pitfalls of study trips most starkly was recounted by a senior policymaker:

> I remember being taken to the Proton car factory, and looking at that, the Malaysians thinking we shall start buying cars from them, and we thinking we would like to produce the same cars that they are making. So they want to sell us cars, we want to produce the car…The intentions were never the same (KG3).

The need for a bureaucracy that is relatively insulated from and powerful in comparison with elected politicians and the judiciary was one of the key lessons that Kenyan emulators drew from the East Asian experience; the current lack thereof is, conversely, likely to hamper the implementation of other lessons from the region. A very senior Kenyan bureaucrat who wished to emulate South Korea felt unable to implement his vision due to his lack of access to political power: 'People like us who are practical thinkers never get elected. I cannot be elected President of this country' (KG9). Of course, those who view a less pluralistic and transparent political process as too high a price to pay for the attainment of East Asia's economic successes will not bemoan the current situation. In the practical political arena,

Kenya's emulating technocrats currently provide at most a counterbalance both to those non-ideological politicians competing to divert natural resources to their ethnic groups and to those in the judiciary grappling with an ever-widening scope of citizen rights enacted within a primarily British-influenced legal system. The paradigms held by followers of East Asia are important both for their influence on written government policy, their more limited impact on its implementation and the ways in which they inform broader African and global development discourses. One should, however, be realistic about the limits of their power. As one journalist wryly put it, 'the reason we don't prosper in Kenya is not through a lack of brilliant plans' (KN2).

The tangible evidence of Ethiopian emulation is already far more extensive, as is the probability that Ethiopian lesson-drawers will continue to apply policies and practices inspired by East Asia to virtually every arena of national development. Unlike in Kenya, admirers of East Asian models have a virtual monopoly on political power and domestic development discourse; critical discourses do exist, but are being increasingly marginalised. While it is still difficult to empirically trace the roots of many existing Ethiopian policies to emulation, it is less difficult to conclude that many of the lessons cited by policymakers do indeed make their way into practice.

The EPRDF's ability to bring its vision of East Asian-inspired modernisation to bear on Ethiopia does not necessarily correspond to its ability or intention to bring lasting and equitable development to the country, however. Just as the EPRDF's power allows for the almost unilateral application of its policies, it also permits the greater abuse of this power. Here is not an insulated bureaucracy in the South Korean or Taiwanese style, but rather an erasure of the distinction between politics and the machinery of government in the Chinese

mould. But whereas China freely admits that it is not a representative democracy and is therefore able to afford legislation explicitly restricting civil and political liberties, Ethiopia claims to be fully democratic and now possesses much of the legislation demanded by such a status. Ethiopia must rely largely on patronage and intimidation to achieve Chinese 'results'; China, on the other hand, is able to make use of a limited but real rule of law. Ethiopia is poised to enact the relatively self-restrained and 'benign dictatorship' associated with Chinese and other East Asian development models, but is equally poised to bring about the kind of unbridled authoritarianism more frequently witnessed on the African continent. As Harrison (1988: 25) points out, '"strong, centralized government" is a term that can cover a multitude of sins'.

That being said, it would be mistaken to assume that the latter situation will undoubtedly occur. This dissertation has refrained from taking a position on the desirability or likelihood of success of Ethiopian and Kenyan emulation of East Asia. I will cautiously break with this principle here to say only this: we know that modernising developmentalist states have existed throughout history, and we also know that these states have not always been democratic. To deny the possibility that an authoritarian developmental state can exist in contemporary Africa is therefore to do the continent a disservice, regardless of one's views on the value of economic development without democracy. At the same time, those who believe that African countries can attain only the economic successes of East Asia and bypass the political constraints and social upheaval—to emulate 'the results, not so much to copy the political shell' (KG4)—are also mistaken. There is no reason, in the abstract, to doubt the ability of African countries to emulate China, Singapore, or even Bismarck's Germany;

this emulation, however, will inevitably entail the inclusion of many of those elements of modernisation that made the theory so unpopular in the 1950s.

The practical implications of these findings have a potential reach beyond the domestic situations of individual African countries. Ethiopia and Kenya were chosen as case studies partially due to their prominence and their longstanding status as 'testing grounds' of development theories. This alone implies that a move towards East Asian-driven modernisation in these countries is likely to influence broader African and global development paradigms. The fact that elites in these two very different countries—each hitherto exemplifying one of the major development ideologies of the Cold War era in Africa—are both now looking to the same region for exemplars also indicates that similar dynamics are, in all probability, occurring in other settings on the continent. The prominent role of what the Chinese government calls 'mutual learning' in the triennial FOCAC conference—currently the major venue for bilateral cooperation between these two blocs—is one formal indication of this dynamic. Virtually every key speech or document to emerge from the forum remarks on this aspect of China-Africa collaboration (e.g. Zhai 2012), which is also underpinned by an increasingly vast network of formal 'lesson-sharing' mechanisms.

Evidence also abounds that the content of such lesson-drawing is not confined to my country cases but instead can be found across the continent. To name just one example of many, a 2007 report by the African Union's High Level African Panel on Modern Biotechnology and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) placed a virtually-unprecedented emphasis on the application of science and technology in African agriculture and economic transformation (Juma 2011; Juma and Serageldin 2007).

Just as emulative dynamics compete with other influences on domestic policy in Ethiopia and Kenya, so too this input into African and global development discourses and paradigms is likely to be tempered by a range of factors: the demands of Western and non-Western development partners, natural resource constraints and the future of the global financial system will all have an impact that may be at odds with resurgent ideas on rapid modernisation and East Asian-inspired growth. As the EPRDF's strenuous discursive emphasis on democracy and human rights makes clear, the West still maintains a strong stamp on discourses and legal-institutional frameworks in Africa, even when actual practice at times diverges radically. As has been pointed out in previous chapters, the growing role of alternative development and trading partners 'on the ground' in Africa may even, at times, act contrary to emulative dynamics if, for example, an influx of Chinese textiles into South African markets is as damaging to local manufacturing and thereby detrimental to local industrialisation as commonly supposed (Lyman 2005; Le Roux 2006).

Nevertheless, indications abound that Western donors are reacting to shifts in the development paradigms of African leaders. For the first time in decades, governmental and non-governmental development donors in the West are training their attention on the dimensions of development that were neglected in previous decades. One of the six 'structural reform priorities' that the UK's DFID aimed to implement before 2015 was to 'make British international development policy more focussed on boosting economic growth and wealth creation' (DFID 2010: 2). Several of the nine 'key pillars' articulated in the 2009 Seoul Development Consensus also reflect these shifts; in what constituted the first ever formal inclusion of development challenges in the G20's biannual policy agenda, nations

pledged greater attention to *inter alia* physical infrastructure, domestic resource mobilisation, economic growth and food security (G20 2010).

There is also a greater global emphasis on South-South learning. The World Bank-funded 'Scaling Up Poverty Reduction' conference—which is mentioned at the very beginning of this dissertation and focuses specifically on facilitating the transfer of lessons between developing countries—is only one example; the conference was launched in Shanghai and has exhibited a considerable focus on China especially as a source of lessons for others in the developing world (World Bank 2006; Wang 2005). Publications by the G20 echo this trend: 'While North-South knowledge sharing has been the norm, the growth of South-South sharing of knowledge has exponentially grown, or come to the surface, particularly over the past several years', holds one report, tracing the source of this trend to 'the growing interest among many middle-income and some low-income countries to share their accumulated development experiences' (G20 Development Working Group 2011: 5). Knowledge-sharing, incidentally, is also one of the nine Seoul Development Consensus pillars (G20 2010: 3).

Based on my research, the strongest sources of this discourse remain, however, in Africa. It is here where the rapid and fairly recent rise of an entire region of modernising states has had the greatest impact on the thinking of local decision-makers. When the Nigerian *Chef de Cabinet* of the African-Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States calls Lee Kuan Yew 'an African folk hero' and urges lesson-drawing from countries in East Asia who 'understand our shared experience of humiliation' (Mailafia 2012), it demonstrates that emulation has stretched beyond the importation of discrete lessons and has, instead, begun to impact the very ways in which elites conceptualise the possibilities, limitations and goals of

development. And when the South African Minister for Trade and Industry holds that 'for the first time, there are centers of power that understand our development challenges' (quoted in Beri 2007: 306), this reflects a widespread belief that the gulf between developing and developed countries has until recently been too wide to make emulation a possibility. By appearing to step into and bridge this gulf, East Asia has brought both emulation and hitherto historically-defunct development doctrines firmly into the African and global development agendas. It has, indeed, encouraged Africa's new modernisers to seek out 'roadmaps' that differ substantially from those used in recent decades—even if these maps cannot be said to be entirely new and if their accuracy remains, once more, an open question.

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APPENDIX A: SELECTED ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific (Group of States)
ADLI	agricultural development-led industrialisation
ATVET	Agricultural Technical and Vocational Education Training
BPO	Business Process Outsourcing
CAQDAS	computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CoE	Committee of Experts
CUD	Coalition for Unity and Democracy
DFID	British Department for International Development
EFFORT	Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigrai
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Democratic Revolutionary Front
ERS	Economic Recovery Strategy
FDI	foreign direct investment
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GDP	gross domestic product
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
HDI	Human Development Index
IDS	Institute for Development Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	international relations

IT	information technology
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KAU	Kenya African Union
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NESC	National Economic and Social Council
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PASDEP	Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty
PNU	Party of National Unity
PPP	public-private partnership
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
SEZ	special economic zone
TPLF	Tigrayan People's Liberation Front
TVA	Tennessee Valley Authority
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UEDF	United Ethiopian Democratic Forces
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW SCRIPT[54]

A. General questions about development:

⚔ <u>What does the term modernisation mean to you? What is its relationship to the term development? Does it have a positive or negative connotation for you?</u>

⚔ Can you have development without rapid economic growth? Can you have development without industrialisation?

⚔ Are there any obstacles towards development in your country? If so, what are they?

⚔ What group of people or institution do you think is the most important driver of development? Do you agree with the current role the government is taking?

⚔ Is there a relationship between economic growth and development? If so, what is it? Do you feel it is best to work on both at the same time, or to focus only on one for the time being?

⚔ Have your views on development changed in the past five years? If so, how have they changed and what has been the reason?

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[54] As befits a semi-structured interview, not every question was posed to every interviewee. Questions that were deemed important enough to put to each respondent are underlined. Often, omitted questions were replaced by questions specific to the interviewee's institution and its policies. The order of questions also varied considerably, although I took care to always pose the key question 'do you think your country should emulate any other country or region and, if so, which one?' before asking interviewees' opinions on a specific model.

B. General questions about emulation

- Do you think it is generally a good idea for countries to use others as models?

- <u>Are there any countries or regions that you feel decision-makers in your own country should take as a model?</u>

- (*If a country or region is mentioned*): <u>What is the main reason for you to choose that specific country/region? What do you think is the most important lesson that this country/region can teach your own?</u> Have you seen this reflected in policy?

- (*If a region*): Are there any particular countries in this region that you prefer your country to learn from, or do you wish to learn from the region as a whole?

- (*If a non-governmental respondent*): Do you think your government is taking any country or region as a model? Why do you say this? Do you agree with their decision in this regard?

C: Questions about China

- <u>Do you regard China as an example of successful development? Why/why not?</u>

- (*If yes*): How did China achieve this?

- (*If respondent views China as a success*): Are there any policies or development strategies implemented by China that you feel your own country should adopt? Has it already adopted or been inspired by any of them?

- Where do you receive most of your information on China?

- Do you think China's current relations with your country are mainly beneficial to your country?

D: Questions about India

- ⚐ Do you regard India as an example of successful development? Why/why not?

- ⚐ (*If yes*): How did India achieve this?

- ⚐ (*If respondent views India as a success*): Are there any policies or development strategies implemented by India that you feel your own country should adopt? Has it already adopted or been inspired by any of them?

- ⚐ Where do you receive most of your information on India?

- ⚐ (*In Kenya only*): Do you think the presence of an ethnic minority of Indian origin in Kenya affects lesson-drawing in any way? Why/why not?

E: A closing question for comparative purposes

To what extent should the following countries be models for your own country:

a) Botswana b) Brazil c) Singapore d) the United States e) South Africa f) Sweden g) South Korea

APPENDIX C: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

In order to facilitate citation, interviews are cited in the text according to the following code: 'E' signifies an interview undertaken in Ethiopia, and 'K' signifies an interview undertaken in Kenya; 'G' signifies a interviewee from the governmental sector, 'N' signifies an interviewee formally (if not necessarily in practice) from outside the government, and 'A' signifies an interviewee from an embassy. Interviewees are further randomly ordered within their sub-sector. Interviewees EG1 to EG10, for example, are all Ethiopian members of parliament, ordered at random. In cases where subjects' positions have changed since being interviewed, the position held at the time of interviews is listed, as well as the current position (where relevant and permissible). Interviewees' exact name and title are not necessarily obscured in the text of the dissertation where permission was given to cite them as such.

Ethiopia

EG1:   Chair of Standing Committee on Trade and Industry, Ethiopian House of People's Representatives (EPRDF). Addis Ababa, 13/07/2010.

EG2:   Deputy Whip with the rank of State Minister, Ethiopian House of People's Representatives (EPRDF). Addis Ababa, 17/08/2010.

EG3:   Chair of Standing Committee on Rural Development Affairs, Ethiopian House of People's Representatives (EPRDF).   Addis Ababa, 13/07/2010.

EG4:   Chair of Standing Committee on Infrastructure, Ethiopian House of People's Representatives (EPRDF). Addis Ababa, 01/07/2010.

EG5:   Deputy Chair of Standing Committee on Information and Cultural Affairs, Ethiopian House of People's Representatives (EPRDF). Addis Ababa, 23/07/2010.

EG6:   Chair of Standing Committee on Women's Affairs, Ethiopian House of People's Representatives (EPRDF). Addis Ababa, 08/07/2010.

EG7:   Senior parliamentarian (EPRDF), Ethiopian House of People's Representatives. Addis Ababa, 29/06/2010.

EG8:   Parliamentarian (EPRDF), Ethiopian House of People's Representatives. Addis Ababa, 23/07/2010.

EG9:   Chair, Standing Committee on Natural Resources and Environmental Protection (EPRDF). Addis Ababa, 05/07/2010.

EG10:   Speaker, Ethiopian House of Federations, Addis Ababa, 12/12/2010.

EG11:   State Minister for Industry, Ministry of Trade and Industry. Addis Ababa, 16/08/2010.

EG12:   State Minister, Office of the Government Communication Affairs. Addis Ababa, 05/08/2010.

EG13:   Director of Policy-Planning Bureau, Ministry of Works and Urban Planning (Currently State Minister, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs). Addis Ababa, 15/08/2010.

EG14:   Head, Office of the Government Communication Affairs with the rank of Minister; Special Advisor to the Prime Minister. Addis Ababa, 05/07/2010.

EG15:   Minister, Ministry of Science and Technology. (Currently Minister, Ministry of Civil Service). Addis Ababa, 12/08/2010.

EG16:   Chief Whip, Ethiopian House of People's Representatives (Currently Acting Prime Minister). Addis Ababa, 23/07/2010.

EG17:   Coordinator of Justice Reform Programmes, Ministry of Justice. Addis Ababa, 31/08/2010.

EG18:   Senior civil servant, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. Addis Ababa, 02/09/2010.

EG19:   Senior civil servant, Ministry for Capacity Building. Addis Ababa, 19/07/2010.

EG20:   State Minister, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. Addis Ababa, 13/09/2010.

EG21:   Senior civil servant, Ministry of Works and Urban Planning. Addis Ababa, 13/08/2010.

EG22:   Senior official, Ethiopian Investment Agency. Addis Ababa, 19/08/2010.

EG23:   Senior official, Development Bank of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa, 13/12/2010.

EG24:   Senior representative, Ethiopian Development Research Institute. Addis Ababa, 05/07/2010.

EG25:   Director, Environmental Protection Authority of the Government of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa, 31/08/2010.

EN1:   Chair of Oromo People's Congress, senior representative of Medrek. Addis Ababa, 05/07/2010.

EN2:   Deputy Chair of Unity for Democracy and Justice, senior representative of Medrek and former Minister of Defence. Addis Ababa, 25/08/2010.

EN3:   Chair of United Ethiopian Democratic Forces, senior representative of Medrek. Addis Ababa, 26/07/2010.

EN4:   Deputy Chair of Unity for Democracy and Justice, senior member of Medrek and former President of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa, 22/7/2010.

EN5:   Deputy Chair of Unity for Democracy and Justice, senior member of Medrek. Addis Ababa, 07/07/2010.

EN6:   Managing Editor, *Reporter* newspaper. Addis Ababa, 02/06/2010.

EN7:   Editor-in-Chief, *Addis Fortune* newspaper. Addis Ababa, 28/06/2010.

EN8:   Senior editor, *Addis Admas* newspaper. Addis Ababa, 05/08/2010.

EN9:   Editor, *Capital* newspaper. Addis Ababa, 10/08/2010.

EN10:   President, Congress of Ethiopian Trade Unions. Addis Ababa, 30/06/2010.

EN11:   Senior official, Congress of Ethiopian Trade Unions. Addis Ababa, 30/06/2010.

EN12:   Senior Official, Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce. Addis Ababa, 21/07/2010.

EN13:   Board member, private sector umbrella association; investor from the diaspora, Addis Ababa, 28/08/2010

EN14:   Senior executive, Ethiopian Airlines. Addis Ababa, 13/09/2010.

EN15:   Senior representative, Ethiopian Employers' Federation. Addis Ababa, 01/09/2010.

EN16:   Chief Commissioner, Ethiopian Human Rights Commission. Addis Ababa, 13/07/2010.

EN17:   Director, Ethiopian Business Coalition Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Addis Ababa, 06/07/2010

EN18:   Senior representative, national NGO umbrella organisation. Addis Ababa, 19/08/2010.

EN20:   Patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church. Addis Ababa, 28/08/2010.

EA1:   Senior representative, Embassy of the People's Republic of China. Addis Ababa, 01/09/2010.

EA2 :   Senior official of the Republic of India. Addis Ababa, 23/07/2010.

Kenya

KG1:   Deputy Speaker, National Assembly of Kenya. Nairobi, 29/11/2010.

KG2:   PNU (KANU) Representative, National Assembly of Kenya. Nairobi, 22/11/2010.

KG3:   Minister of Agriculture; ODM Representative, National Assembly of Kenya. Nairobi, 19/10/2011.

KG4:   Minister of Medical Services; Secretary-General of ODM. Nairobi, 30/11/2011.

KG5:   Deputy Prime Minister; Minister of Local Development; ODM Representative, National Assembly of Kenya. Nairobi, 28/11/2011.

KG6:   Minister of Lands; ODM Representative, National Assembly of Kenya. Nairobi, 08/12/2010.

KG7:   Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Planning. Nairobi, 12/11/2010.

KG8:   Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Regional Integration. Nairobi, 01/12/2010.

KG9:   Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Information. Nairobi, 20/10/2010.

KG10:   Economic Secretary, Ministry of Finance. Nairobi, 15/11/2010.

KG11:   Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Industrialisation. Nairobi, 25/10/2010.

KG12:   Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development.
              Nairobi, 12/12/2010.

KG13:   Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Regional Development Authorities.
              Nairobi, 10/12/2010.

KG14:   Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Roads. Nairobi, 23/10/2010.

KG15:   Secretary, National Economic and Social Council (NESC). Nairobi,
              01/11/2010.

KG16:   CEO, *Vision 2030* Secretariat. Nairobi, 17/11/2010.

KG17:   Director, Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC). Nairobi, 24/09/2010.

KG18:   Chair, Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC). Nairobi,
              6/10/2010.

KG19:   Chair, Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review. Nairobi, 23/09/2010.

KG20:   Advisor to the Prime Minister on Constitutional Affairs, ODM. Nairobi,
              28/09/2010.

KG21:   Advisor to the President on International Development. Nairobi, 23/10/2010.

KG22:   Advisor to the Office of the President, Co-chair of the Constitutional
              Campaign Secretariat. Nairobi, 13/11/2010.

KN1:   Senior Editor, *The Daily Nation*. Nairobi, 15/10/2010.

KN2:   Editorial Director, Royal Media Group. Nairobi, 10/11/2010.

KN3:   Managing Editor, *The Standard*. Nairobi, 08/10/2010.

KN4:   Secretary-General, Central Organisation of Trade Unions. Nairobi,
              15/10/2010.

KN5:   Chairman, Kenya Private Sector Alliance. Nairobi, 26/09/2010.

KN6:   CEO, Institute for Economic Affairs. Nairobi,   12/10/2010.

KN7:   Chairman, Kenya Employers' Federation. Nairobi, 22/09/2010.

KN8:   Senior representative, Kenyan Association of Manufacturers. Nairobi,
            08/12/2010.

KN9:   Acting Director, Kenya Private Sector Alliance. Nairobi, 09/11/2010.

KN10:   Director, Kenya Private Sector Alliance. Nairobi, 13/10/2010.

KN11:   National Chair, *Maendaleo Ya Wanawaka*. Nairobi, 24/11/2010.

KN12:   Director, Kenyan Human Rights Commission. Nairobi, 07/11/2010.

KN13:   Director, Mars Group. Nairobi, 10/11/2010.

KN14:   Anti-corruption campaigner; former Chair of the Constitution of Kenya
            Review Commission. Nairobi, 4/12/2010

KN15:   Senior manager, Community Development Trust Fund. Nairobi, 27/11/2010.

KN16:   Director, National Council of NGOs. Nairobi, 10/11/2010.

KN17:   Women's rights activist; Vice-Chair, Committee of Experts on Constitutional
            Review. Nairobi, 15/10/2010.

KN18:   Senior representative, National Council of Churches. Nairobi, 09/10/2010.

KN19:   Chair, Evangelical Alliance of Kenya. Nairobi, 20/10/2010.

KN20:   Director, Kenya Institute for Public Policy Analysis. Nairobi, 8/10/2010.

KN21:   Chair, Association of Professional Societies in East Africa. Nairobi,
            7/11/2010.