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THEORIES OF DIVINE IDEAS:
FROM THE CHURCH FATHERS
TO THE EARLY FRANCISCAN MASTERS

edited by
Tommaso Manzon
Irene Zavattero

FLUMEN SAPIENTIAE

STUDI SUL PENSIERO MEDIEVALE

20

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La *sapientia* medievale, nella sua molteplicità, fluisce in un unico *flumen* ininterrotto dalla tarda Antichità al Rinascimento. Valorizzando la pluralità di temi e di tradizioni del sapere medievale, la collana contribuisce allo sviluppo degli studi di Storia della filosofia medievale, ospitando lavori monografici, collettivi ed edizioni critiche inerenti alla filosofia e alla teologia medievali.

Le pubblicazioni della collana sono sottoposte anonimamente alla valutazione di almeno due specialisti del settore.

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**Theories of Divine Ideas:
From the Church Fathers
to the Early Franciscan Masters**

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At the Origins of the Franciscan Exemplarism

Introductory Remarks

IRENE ZAVATTERO*

Four years after the publication of the volume *Divine Ideas in Franciscan Thought (XIIIth-XIVth century)*, edited by Jacopo F. Falà and me¹, the *Flumen Sapientiae* series releases another book devoted to the doctrine of divine ideas in the Middle Ages.

In the previous work, the thought of the early Parisian Franciscan masters and Bonaventure was the starting point of a survey primarily devoted to Franciscan reflection in the Late Middle Ages. In this volume, conversely, we go back to the origins of Franciscan exemplarism, focusing on the main theories of divine ideas formulated in Christian circles from the Church Fathers to the Franciscans active in Paris in the first half of the Thirteenth century and Bonaventure (who followed their teachings).

This volume aims at contributing to the reconstruction of the history of the theory of divine ideas in the Middle Ages, following the specific track of Christian reflection².

The Church Fathers were the main upholders of the long-standing process of “Christianizing” the Platonic theme of ideas. The

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1. J.F. FALÀ, I. ZAVATTERO (eds.), *Divine Ideas in Franciscan Thought (XIIIth-XIVth century)*, Aracne, Roma 2018 (*Flumen Sapientiae*. Studi sul pensiero medievale, 8).

2. Some of the authors of the essays collected in this volume also contributed to the conference “Le idee divine nella prima scuola francescana di Parigi. Un esame delle fonti greche e latine”, held on 28-29 September 2021 at the “Dipartimento di Lettere e Filosofia” of the University of Trento. Thanks to the efforts of Tommaso Manzoni and his invaluable collaboration, other specialists were subsequently invited, in order to explore the history of the doctrine of divine ideas from Augustine to Bonaventure as broadly as possible.

doctrines of Augustine of Hippo and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite constituted the two pillars on which later elaborations were based: while Maximus the Confessor and John Damascene heavily drew on Dionysian theory, Anselm of Aosta was predominantly inspired by Augustine. In the Ninth Century, the prominence of Augustine and Dionysius in the patristic tradition prompted John Scotus Eriugena to attempt a reconciliation of their teachings, although his synthesis regarding divine ideas did not enjoy great popularity. Three centuries later, the school of canons regular of St. Victor (whose main exponents were Hugh and Richard, together with Achard and Thomas Gallus) had a better fate and represented an important center for reworking the patristic tradition and the *Corpus Dionysiacum*, including the exemplarist doctrine. The turning point, however, only occurred with the widespread success of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*: from the first half of the thirteenth century, distinctions 35 and 36 of the first book became the privileged place where commentators used to discuss the issue of divine ideas. Within the chronological boundaries of this volume, this can be observed both in the *Glossa in librum Sententiarum* of Alexander of Hales (a master of theology who first institutionalized the teaching of Lombard's work) and in Bonaventure's well-known *Commentarius in Libros Sententiarum*. At the beginning of the Thirteenth century, theological thought also engaged in debating divine ideas on the basis of William of Auxerre's *Summa Aurea* and Philip the Chancellor's *Summa de bono*, forging the doctrinal background for the elaborations of the Franciscans active in Paris in the first half of the century (John of La Rochelle, Alexander of Hales, the compilers of the *Summa Halensis* and Odo Rigaldi). The most complete synthesis of this doctrinal season is undoubtedly achieved by Bonaventure, who not only establishes a comparison between Augustine's and Dionysius' theories of ideas, but also shows strong ties to the legacy of Damascene and the Victorines, as well as developing the teachings of the Franciscan masters of the previous generation.

As in the 2018 volume, considerable space has been devoted to Franciscan thought, which acted as a collector of the main sources – both patristic and medieval – on the subject of divine ideas. It is not by accident that almost all the doctrinal premises adopted

by Bonaventure, the fiercest defender of exemplarism, are already found, variously articulated, in the works of the early Franciscan masters.

In Late Antiquity, Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius are the two Christian thinkers most committed to the effort of overcoming Greek, Neoplatonic and Aristotelian thought, which denied divine science³. They must account for scriptural evidence that explicitly attributes wisdom and intelligence to God (Ps 7,10; 139,1-5; Dan 13,42) and that describes creation as presided over by divine Wisdom (Prv 8,22-32). Moreover, Christian theological thought must, on the one hand, defend divine omniscience (God not only knows Himself, but also what is other than Himself) and, on the other, maintain absolute divine simplicity (in God there is no differentiation between knowing-subject and known-object).

The most famous text in which Augustine deals with the topic of divine ideas is the *quaestio* 46 of *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*. To gain a comprehensive picture of the Augustinian position, however, it is also necessary to consider other works. In his essay *Augustine's Doctrine of Eternal Reasons: A Textual Dossier*, Giovanni Catapano cites and discusses all the passages in which Augustine uses the term *ratio* as an equivalent to the Platonic *idea*. Catapano compiles a textual dossier of 47 passages from 13 different works. From the analysis of these passages, a fundamentally consistent theory of divine ideas as "eternal reasons" emerges. According to this doctrine: (i) in the divine Word there are immutable reasons for all species of mutable things, both those created and those to be created; (ii) these reasons, eternal, uncreated, and divine, are the way God knows creatures before creation and through which He creates them; (iii) the human mind is inferior to the eternal reasons,

3. According to Plotinus, thinking is not an operation that belongs to the first principle, neither as self-understanding nor as knowledge of what is other than itself (*Enneads*, V,6,6). According to Aristotle, similarly, the first motor is too perfect to know a world that he does not create and which he moves only as a final cause, cf. J.-C. BARDOUT, O. BOULNOIS, *L'invention du monde*, in IID. (éds.), *Sur la science divine*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 2002, pp. 9-56: 10.

but connected to them by nature; (iv) the vision of the eternal reasons – in their being one and one thing with the Divine Word – represents the culmination of happiness attainable by man.

In the essay *La teoria delle idee nello pseudo-Dionigi Areopagita*, Ernesto Sergio Mainoldi highlights the efforts made by Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite to move from the pagan ontological paradigm toward an ontology adapted to Christian monotheism, focusing specifically on the theory of ideas. To maintain the uniqueness of the universal causal principle, Dionysius dismisses the conception of intelligible exemplars as intermediate causal models between God and creatures. Instead, he introduces the theory of *logoi* as divine wills under which all things will be brought into being. Thus according to Dionysius, the production of beings consists of the divine will producing its “pre-being” as uncreated *logos* in particular beings. The *logoi* of divine Wisdom are therefore transcendent models (or paradigms) that are anterior to being. This solution is consistent with the biblical principle of creation “from things that are not” (i.e., prior to being; cfr. 2Mach 7,27-29) and establishes an antinomian ontology in which being is grounded in divine non-being.

Dionysian exemplarism enjoyed great fortune in the Byzantine tradition thanks to the mediation of theological authorities such as Maximus the Confessor and John Damascene. The theory of the *logoi*, in particular, assumed special relevance in the theo-cosmological thought of Maximus the Confessor, in which we find both the conception of superessential *logoi* (through which everything was pre-created) and the theory of the continuous creation performed by God.

Torstein Theodor Tollefsen’s essay *Divine Ideas according to St. Maximus the Confessor* explores the peculiar doctrine of this Church Father. The cosmological system elaborated by Maximus is grounded in the idea that Christ is the origin and destination of the whole universe. From this first and fundamental assumption stems a specific doctrine of divine ideas. Christ is the one *Logos* (Word of God) that contains all the *logoi*; and these are, in turn, the principles according to which Christ, the *Logos*, creates and orders the entire cosmos. Through the *logoi* all creatures are connected with Christ

and are destined to convert to their divine origin so as to achieve deification.

Later on, Maximus the Confessor's doctrine of *logoi* is not taken up by John Damascene, perhaps due to its too Platonic flavor (decidedly at odds with the Aristotelian architecture of Damascene's thought). On the contrary, Damascene's dependence on Dionysius on the subject of divine ideas is beyond question, as Carlo Dell'Osso convincingly demonstrates in his essay *Le idee platoniche o predeterminazioni divine in Giovanni Damasceno*. On the basis of some passages from *Pro sacris imaginibus orationes* I and III and *De fide orthodoxa*, Dell'Osso highlights the presence of the Platonic theme of divine ideas (i.e., predeterminations) in John Damascene's reflection. The clear dependence on Dionysius is demonstrated by meager but unequivocal traces, which also witness a progressive evolution in Damascene's theory; while in *Oratio* I, 10 the Areopagite is quoted explicitly and the models of created entities are placed in the "eternal counsel" of God, in the later *De fide orthodoxa* I, 9 (as well as in *Oratio* III) the reference remains implicit in the description of a "volitional thought" in terms of predetermination, image, and model.

Along the same "Dionysian" line, John Scotus Eriugena not only composes a commentary on *De coelesti hierarchia*, but also incorporates within the *Periphyseon* several of the Areopagite's themes and ideas. Ernesto Sergio Mainoldi, in his second essay *La teoria delle idee in Giovanni Scoto Eriugena: da Dionigi e Agostino oltre Dionigi e Agostino*, analyzes the way Eriugena reconciles his sources in his masterpiece, elaborating a theory of divine ideas of considerable complexity. The theoretical sophistication of this doctrine is ultimately rooted in two fundamental tenets: 1) a combinatorial methodology based on *divisiones dialecticae* applied to the concepts of "created" and "uncreated"; 2) the use of patristic sources that differ from each other in their ontological assumptions: not only Dionysius and Augustine, but also Maximus the Confessor. Eriugena employs these sources as equally reliable *auctoritates*, but having to harmonize their different outcomes, he reaches completely original conclusions, such as the self-creation of God in creatures and the createdness in God of the primordial causes (theologically conceived as superessential). Ultimately, Eriugena succeeds in main-

taining a paradigmatic consistency with the dogmatic foundations of Christianity through the meontology of the Eastern Fathers and by observing the Augustinian principle of divine simplicity.

An original reworking of Augustine's doctrine is found, on the other hand, in the works of Anselm of Aosta, discussed in Bernd Goebel's essay *Anselm über göttliche Ideen und das göttliche Wort*. Unlike Augustine, Anselm never refers to the conceptions in the Creator's mind of the things to be made as "ideas". Nevertheless, Anselm relies on the theory of divine ideas when he theorizes about the supreme nature as a rational cause. Thus, he recognizes divine ideas of created universal substances and properties (to be distinguished from "perfections", which are uncreated). In the *Monologion*, he combines the doctrine of divine ideas with a speculation on the Trinity. The divine Word – the second person of the Trinity – is the speech act of the supreme nature. It is consubstantial with the supreme nature and encompasses all divine ideas. According to Anselm, this creative Word is nothing other than the reflexive Word through which the supreme nature eternally speaks itself. However, the identity of essence between the natures of the created things and their respective divine ideas (and ultimately with the mind of the Creator Himself) does not extend to their mode, or intensity, of being. The natures of created things exist to a lesser degree (and are less "true") than their ideas in the divine mind. To these two ontological levels or states of created essences is added a third and even weaker one, i.e., their existence in the mind of a rational creature. Our concepts are only images of the things in themselves, which in turn are only images of their divine ideas. This is not to be understood as a mere relativization of human knowledge, but also as a metaphysical and epistemological theory that explains the knowability of created entities for a rational creature.

A few decades later, at St. Victor's Abbey, Augustine's prominent exegetical influence was combined with a marked interest in the *Corpus Dionysiacum*. Dominique Poirel, in *La théorie des «causes primordiales» chez Hugues de Saint-Victor*, shows that Hugh dealt several times with divine ideas, which he alternately called "forms", "reasons", "ideas", "notions", "causes", and especially "primordial causes", following Augustine and Eriugena. The theme first ap-

pears around 1125 in the *Sententiae de divinitate* and *De sacramentis* in the form of a doctrinal digression. Between the sections on the creation of the world and the creation of man, Hugh inserts a reflection on causality in order to understand why God created man and the world for man. At the apex of the hierarchy of causes, the “primordial causes” (i.e., reasons or forms of all creatures) are themselves subject to divine power, wisdom, and goodness, which no longer belong by nature to causality. God did not create man for his own sake, but to donate himself to humankind as an end. Thus, the reflection on causality discloses a return to the origin, at the culmination of which an ultimate overcoming takes place: at the origin of everything is the gratuitous and uncaused initiative of God. Poirel points out how Hugh’s conception changed over time. At first, Hugh did not explicitly employ the notion of “divine ideas”, which probably seemed to him too dependent on pagan philosophy, particularly that of Plato. However, his renewed interest in Dionysius and his desire to give greater importance to the creation of man (as well as to the reasons of this creation), led him to enrich his Christian synthesis with novel philosophical material. In his mature thought, thus, anthropocentrism and Christocentrism go hand in hand and his doctrine of “primordial causes” provides a philosophical foundation for a decidedly humanistic Christian theology.

For both chronological and doctrinal reasons, the essay on Peter Lombard is placed within the group of articles devoted to the Augustinian canons regular of St. Victor. Thanks to the soliciting of Bernard of Clairvaux, Lombard was effectively guested in the abbey of St. Victor. Moreover, Peter can be considered, to a certain extent, a “Victorine” himself, given the enormous influence exerted on him by Hugh and especially by the *De sacramentis* (clearly discernible in the *Sentences*).

As mentioned above, the *Sentences* offered, from the first half of the Thirteenth century onward, the doctrinal basis from which divine ideas could be discussed. Marta Borgo’s essay, *Y a-t-il une doctrine des idées divines chez Pierre Lombard?* examines whether and to what extent Lombard himself was directly concerned with this issue. In distinctions 35 and 36 of the first book of the *Sentences*, he does not deal with divine ideas as such, nor with *rationes* in a tech-

nical sense. By analyzing a series of passages extracted from the *Sentences* and the *Collectanea* to the Pauline corpus, however, Borgo shows that many of the philosophical-theological implications later drawn by the commentators were already present – *in nuce* – in Lombard’s didactic remarks.

Although a systematic and well-developed doctrine of divine ideas is lacking in the *Sentences*, there are several theses related to divine science that constitute a solid (albeit loosely knit) network, upon which, in a later period, more articulate discussions arise. In this respect, the linchpin of Lombardian reflection is divine creation, which is connected to the issues of the passage from the one to the many, of the relationship between eternity and time, and of the extension and simplicity of divine science. Reflection on these matters leads Peter Lombard to elaborate the notion of the presence of things in God, with tones – and often words – that are clearly Augustinian (and, by this way, biblical). His originality – in this case as in others – lies in the peculiar accents he is able to put on certain aspects of widely debated questions and in the selection of themes and authorities he chooses to emphasize.

In the context of the St. Victor school, a less studied but very interesting author is Achard, who is at the center of Irena Lystopad’s essay *Les raisons éternelles, les formes et les idées: aux origines de la doctrine du De unitate et pluralitate creaturarum d’Achard de Saint-Victor*. In Achard’s doctrine, the concept of “divine idea” or “idea in the intellect of God” is actively present, but not so central. Lystopad shows that in *De unitate et pluralitate creaturarum* two important theses of Middle and Neo-Platonic metaphysics are recovered: (i) the existence of a single source, the divine Word, at the origin of all that exists; and (ii) the existence of a metaphysical hierarchy of beings originating from this single source. In the divine Word, in particular, there are three types of eternal reasons: *formales, finales et explicatrices*; ideas are part of the “formal” reasons (*formales*), which, in turn, are also hierarchically structured: the primary form, the created forms (the ideas) and the forms in things (*idos*). The origin of this doctrine can be traced back to late-antique metaphysics (Seneca and Calcidius), but – as Lystopad explains – Achard’s inspirers are most likely Augustine and Eriugena.

The section on the Victorines ends with Declan Lawell's essay on *Richard Of St. Victor and Thomas Gallus Of Vercelli: Victorine Thinking On The Divine Ideas*. The author examines the thinking of Richard of St. Victor and Thomas Gallus of Vercelli on divine ideas, and on the ways in which mind can attain their knowledge. At the center of the analysis are Richard's *De trinitate* and Thomas Gallus' *Explanations* to the works of Pseudo-Dionysius. As they specifically deal with the issue of divine contemplation, new "divine ideas" emerge in their texts. The divine ideas that particularly fascinate Richard are "love/goodness", "wisdom/knowledge", and "power", often used as correlates of the divine persons of the Trinity (respectively, Holy Spirit, Son, and Father). Thomas Gallus, as an expositor of Dionysius, has an even richer vocabulary, deploying terms such as "reasons", "archetypes", and "exemplars", as well as *spectacula* (as evident in his short treatise on divine ideas, *Spectacula contemplationis*). Lawell compares the theories of the two masters about the way in which the mind can gain the knowledge of divine ideas. According to Richard, this always occurs through the intellect, which is the highest human faculty. According to Thomas, it occurs through affection and synderesis, which disclose a kind of knowledge superior to intelligence and that allows full access to the divine.

Magdalena Bieniak's essay, *Only One Exemplary Form. The Summa de bono and Its Sources*, opens the section of the volume devoted to the masters of theology at the University of Paris. Philip the Chancellor and his *Summa de bono* strongly influenced later theological thought. Bieniak not only shows the consonances between this work and the *Summa Halensis*, but also highlights, through an analysis of Philip's sources, the way he distances himself from Augustine and other Christian thinkers. Both Philip the Chancellor and the Franciscan authors of the *Summa Halensis* discuss whether there are many eternal exemplary forms or just one. The debate was due to the tension between the *auctoritas* of Augustine, who spoke of the plurality of the primordial causes, and the conviction that the exemplary cause is identical to the divine essence, which is perfectly simple and one. Philip and the Franciscans argued in favor of the unicity of the eternal exemplary form by distinguishing the principal meaning of the term "idea" from the secondary one.

According to the primary sense of the term, “the exemplary form” was only one but pointed to many through its collateral meaning. The chapter highlights some noteworthy aspects of this discussion and traces them back to their Twelfth-century sources.

Stepping into the heart of Franciscan thought, Lydia Schumacher’s essay *The Divine Ideas in the Early Franciscan School at Paris (c. 1220-50)* ranges from Alexander of Hales to Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, via the *Summa Halensis* (which reflects the doctrinal positions of the earliest Franciscan school), and Odo Rigaldi (whose work serves as a bridge between the first and second generation of Franciscan masters). Schumacher illustrates how Alexander of Hales, in the *Quaestiones disputatae antequam esse frater*, modifies his doctrine of ideas by denying what he had previously asserted in the *Glossa in I Sententiarum*, and namely that there are as many divine ideas as creatures. In the *Quaestiones* he argues that there is only one divine idea, indirectly signified or co-signified by the different beings – a position which is also found in the *Summa Halensis*. Odo Rigaldi, on the other hand, in his commentary on the *Sentences* and in the *Quaestiones disputatae*, endorses a position more similar to that defended by Alexander in the *Glossa*. Bonaventure, on his part, employs slightly different language in expressing a similar opinion. While the divine ideas are one in God’s opinion, the likenesses to him are many, such that in the mode of understanding, the divine ideas are multiplied down to the level of singulars and indeed the infinite. There is not such a drastic difference between the views presented by these different authors: whether the ideas are multiplied in relation to creatures or nominally in God, a delicate balance is struck between the one and the many. The one point the various scholars do have in common is that they use Augustine to defend their differing positions. In light of the content of the debates and the variety of positions presented, Schumacher reflects on the common historiographical notion that the early Franciscan doctrine of divine ideas is fundamentally “Augustinian”, calling attention to more likely sources of inspiration behind early Franciscan thought, such as Avicenna.

After this overview of the early Franciscan school, two articles devoted to the theory of ideas in John de La Rochelle and Odo Rigaldi follow. The works of these two theologians, along with those

of Alexander of Hales, were crucial to the rise of a specifically Franciscan thought and exerted a profound influence on Bonaventure.

John de La Rochelle collaborated with Alexander of Hales on the compilation of the *Summa Halensis*, and was probably responsible for the first book, in which the material on divine ideas appears. Riccardo Saccenti's essay, *The Divine Ideas in John of La Rochelle's Theology*, focuses on John's unpublished commentary on the *Sentences* (*Glossa super Sententias*). This master did not devote a specific and organic treatment to the question of divine ideas. However, within his theological production he had the occasion to discuss this issue dealing with some key-passage from Peter Lombard's *Sentences* and from the Scripture. Through the analysis of these texts it is possible to understand the approach of this theologian to the topic and his peculiar arguing on the exemplarism, according to which the divine ideas are the model and cause of the existing things. Saccenti offers a careful analysis of the crucial passages of John's glosses to the *Sentences* and of his exegetical writings where he developed the crucial distinctions between "existence" / "possible existence" and between "infinite knowledge" / "knowledge of the existing beings *qua* existing". These arguments represent the very pillars of John of La Rochelle's reasoning on the nature of divine ideas, and deeply impacted on the doctrinal debate in the central decades of the Thirteenth century.

A further development is represented by the work of Odo Rigaldi, who may have collaborated on the last volume of the *Summa Halensis* and who was the successor of John and Alexander as master regent of the Parisian Franciscan school. His theory of ideas is investigated in Carlos M. Martínez Ruiz's essay *Ejemplaridad y modalidad en la Quaestio de modo existendi rerum in Deo de Odón Rigaud. Antecedentes y proyección*. Rigaldi, in a rather original way, narrows the scope of *scientia Dei* to what God can create or accomplish, establishing a fairly sound basis for an understanding of the "possibility *a parte rei*". Ruiz's main goal is to unveil the modal theory embedded in the Rigaldian doctrine *de scientia dei* and, more specifically, *de ideis*. For this reason, he focuses on *quaestio* 6 of Part II of the *Quaestio de existentia rerum in Deo*, where Odo asks "whether God possesses in general the ideas of all possible things". The notion of *possibilitas*

emerges as one of the pillars on which Odo bases his critique to the model of God-world relationship most prevalent among his contemporaries. The notion of *possibilitas per se* and, more importantly, its explanatory power, sharply differentiates Rigaldi's position from that of his fellow contemporaries (Alexander of Hales and Albertus Magnus) and his sources. According to him, the key-point is that the possibility of realization cannot be restricted either logically or ontologically. Thus, theologically, it is necessary to affirm that the extension of God's science is broader than that of his will. Ruiz analyzes Rigaldi's theory within the theoretical framework of distinctions 35, 36, 38 and 39 of the *Lectura in I Sententiarum*, as well as of the works of his main interlocutors: William of Auxerre, Alexander of Hales and Albertus Magnus.

This itinerary within the Christian tradition closes with Bonaventure. The Seraphic Doctor engages with almost all these sources, *in primis* attempting to reconcile the two main authoritative pillars (Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius); and secondly, profiting from the doctrinal developments of his own masters, namely the *magistri* active in Paris in the second quarter of the Thirteenth century.

Most significant for his theory of ideas are the *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, dating from the early years of his Parisian teaching. In this work Bonaventure deals systematically with divine ideas, relying on Pseudo-Dionysius to a much greater extent than in the earlier *Commentarius in Libros Sententiarum*. Tommaso Manzon's essay *According to the Blessed Dionysius: the Areopagitic Character of Bonaventure's Exemplarism, with Particular Reference to the Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, offers a re-examination of the Areopagite's influence on Bonaventure's exemplarism. In particular, the author illustrates that Dionysian expressions and concepts reach Bonaventure predominantly through the mediation of the *Explanaciones* of the Victorine monk Thomas Gallus, providing the basis for the elaboration of his doctrine of divine ideas. Manzon dwells particularly on the circular argumentation that characterizes the *Quaestiones*: beginning with the statement of the infinity of God's nature, power and knowledge, the argumentation concludes with an analysis of this same infinite mystery, which is also the destination of

man's spiritual journey. Creatures are created through eternal reasons in and through the Word, and – as Thomas Gallus already stated – through contemplation they return to the Word. Within this doctrinal framework (drawn from the *Corpus Dionysiacum*), Bonaventure creatively reinterprets terms and ideas derived from other sources, particularly Augustine. In light of Dionysius' decisive influence and of the synthesis operated with Augustinian theory, Manzoni discusses recent studies devoted to Bonaventure and early Franciscan authors, in which an increasing number of arguments are brought against the traditional understanding of these thinkers as indefectible Augustinians.

The essays collected in this volume and those published in *Divine Ideas in Franciscan Thought (XIIIth-XIVth centuries)* trace the stages of the medieval history of the theory of divine ideas within Christian thought, with a particular emphasis on the Franciscan tradition. It is only a single chapter of this long and tangled history, approached from the specific point of view of Christian and Franciscan reflection; many other texts and authors still remain to be investigated to achieve an overall picture. These two volumes, however, seem to confirm that historical-critical and lexicographical investigation, applied to the history of concepts, can offer a fruitful and interesting key to the fascinating intricacies of medieval thought.

Augustine's Doctrine of Eternal Reasons: A Textual Dossier

GIOVANNI CATAPANO*

It is well known that Augustine espouses a doctrine of divine ideas, understood as eternal reasons for the existence of all creatures¹. The main passages of his works in which he expounds this doctrine are also well known. To my knowledge, however, all the other passages in which he manifests his thoughts on this subject, even the most concise ones, have never been precisely identified and collected. The aim of this contribution is to provide as complete a textual dossier as possible, including both the most famous and the lesser-known passages in which Augustine speaks of eternal reasons. More specifically, all the passages in which he used the term *ratio* in a sense equivalent to the Platonic *idea* will be cited and briefly commented on.

These passages are only a minority among those that include the term *ratio* in Augustine's *Opera omnia* (around 2,800 occurrences)². This Latin term, in fact, has many meanings, which can be classified into three kinds: psychological (*reason* as a faculty of the soul),

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1. Cfr., e.g., O. LECHNER, *Idee und Zeit in der Metaphysik Augustins*, Pustet, München 1964; T. KONDOLEON, *Divine Exemplarism in Augustine*, «Augustinian Studies» 1 (1970), pp. 181-195; J. PÉPIN, *La doctrine augustinienne des rationes aeternae. Affinités, origines*, in M. FATTORI, M.L. BIANCHI (a cura di), *Ratio. VII Colloquio Internazionale*, Roma. Atti, Olschki, Firenze 1994, pp. 47-68; C. PIETSCH, *Idea*, in C. MAYER (Hrsg.), *Augustinus-Lexikon*, III, Schwabe, Basel 2004-2010, cols. 469-471.

2. Occurrences can be found by querying online databases *Corpus Augustinianum Gissense* <<https://www.augustinus.de/projekte-des-zaf/corpus-aug-gissense/cag-online/cag-online-english>> and *Library of Latin Texts* <<https://about.brepolis.net/library-of-latin-texts/>> (accessed: 31/05/2022).

epistemological (*reason* as a form of knowledge) and etiological (*reason* as a cause)³. In the etiological meanings, *ratio* can be synonymous with *causa* in general, often signifying the reason for performing a certain action, having a certain opinion, etc. Moreover, there are more specific etiological meanings, which we might call metaphysical. According to these, *ratio* (though most often the term is declined in the plural, *rationes*) means a cause, either transcendent or immanent, of changing realities. In the transcendent sense, the term is equivalent to *idea* (in the Platonic meaning); in the immanent sense, it has a meaning comparable to the Stoic “seminal reason” or the Plotinian *logos*. Here, we are only interested in the first of these specific senses, i.e., the transcendent one, which is in no way to be confused with the immanent one⁴.

For each Augustinian passage, I will quote the Latin text from the critical reference edition, highlighting in italics the occurrences of *ratio* in the etiological-metaphysical transcendent meaning. For ease of reference, I will indicate the passages with a progressive alphanumeric abbreviation (R1, R2, etc.).

1. The texts

1.1. *Quaestio de ideis*

A fundamental passage for the meaning of *ratio* as a transcendent cause (*idea*) is chapter 2 of the *Quaestio de ideis* (*Quaestio* 46), included in Augustine’s *De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*. This is a well-known text, which is worth quoting in full given its acknowledged importance for the doctrine of divine ideas in the Latin Middle Ages⁵.

3. I proposed this classification in G. CATAPANO, *Ratio*, in R. DODARO, C. MAYER, C. MÜLLER (Hrsg.), *Augustinus-Lexikon*, IV, Schwabe, Basel 2012-2018, cols. 1069-1084.

4. On Augustine’s doctrine of immanent causal reasons, cfr. E. MORO, *Il concetto di materia in Agostino*, Aracne, Roma 2017 (*Flumen sapientiae*. Studi sul pensiero medievale, 3), pp. 436-442.

5. Cfr. M. GRABMANN, *Des hl. Augustinus quaestio «De ideis» in ihrer inhaltlichen und geschichtlichen Bedeutung*, «Philosophisches Jahrbuch» 43 (1930), pp. 297-307 (reissued under the title *Des heiligen Augustinus Quaestio de ideis [De diuersis*

To facilitate the analysis of its content, I have divided the passage into numbered sections.

R1 = *De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, A. Mutzenbecher (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1975 (CCSL 44A), ch. 46, 2, pp. 71, 21-73, 73.

[1] Ideas igitur Latine possumus uel formas uel species dicere, ut uerbum e uerbo transferre uideamur. Si autem *rationes* eas uocemus, ab interpretandi quidem proprietate discedimus – rationes enim Graece *logoi* appellantur non *ideae* –, sed tamen quisquis hoc uocabulo uti uoluerit, a re ipsa non abhorrebit.

[2] Sunt namque *ideae* principales quaedam formae uel *rationes* rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae ipsae formatae non sunt ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo sese habentes,

[3] quae diuina intellegentia continentur.

[4] Et cum ipsae neque oriantur neque intereant, secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest et omne quod oritur et interit.

quaestionibus LXXXIII: Qu. 46] in ihrer inhaltlichen Bedeutung und mittelalterlichen Weiterwirkung, in L. OTT [Hrsg.], *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik*, II, Hueber, München 1936, pp. 25-34); H. MEYERHOFF, *On the Platonism of St. Augustine's quaestio «De ideis»*, «The New Scholasticism» 16 (1942), pp. 16-45; A. SOLIGNAC, *Analyse et sources de la Question «De ideis»*, in *Augustinus Magister. Congrès International Augustinien. Paris, 21-24 septembre 1954*, I: *Communications, Études Augustiniennes*, Paris 1954, pp. 307-315; L.M. DE RIJK, *Quaestio de Ideis. Some Notes on an Important Chapter of Platonism*, in J. MANSFELD, L.M. DE RIJK (eds.), *Kephalaion. Studies in Greek Philosophy and Its Continuation offered to Professor C.J. de Vogel*, Van Gorcum, Assen 1975, pp. 204-213; E. RIVERA DE VENTOSA, *Comentario a la breve cuestión «de ideis» de San Agustín*, «La Ciudad de Dios» 200 (1987), pp. 259-271; J. PÉPIN, *Augustin et Atticus. La quaestio «De ideis»*, in R. BRAGUE, J.-F. COURTINE (éds.), *Herméneutique et ontologie. Mélanges en hommage à Pierre Aubenque*, ΦΡΟΝΙΜΟΣ, P.U.F., Paris 1990, pp. 163-180; J. PÉPIN, *Augustin, Quaestio «De Ideis». Les affinités plotiniennes*, in H.J. WESTRA (ed.), *From Athens to Chartres: Neoplatonism and Medieval Thought. Studies in Honour of Édouard Jeuneau*, Brill, Leiden-New York-Köln 1992, pp. 117-134; A. PETIT, *Scot et Cudworth, la quaestio augustinienne de ideis*, «Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques» 83 (1999), pp. 73-84; G. MADEC, *Augustin, «Sur les idées (Quaestio de ideis)»*. Traduction et notes de lecture, in *La Question 46 De ideis de saint Augustin. Réception et interprétations* = «Revue thomiste» 103/3 (2003), pp. 358-362; J. PÉPIN, *La Quaestio de ideis de saint Augustin et la doxographie platonicienne*, in A. BRANCACCI (ed.), *Philosophy and Doxography in the Imperial Age*, Olschki, Firenze 2005, pp. 131-155.

[5] Anima uero negatur eas intueri posse nisi rationalis, ea sui parte qua excellit, id est ipsa mente atque ratione, quasi quadam facie uel oculo suo interiore atque intellegibili. Et ea quidem ipsa rationalis anima non omnis et quaelibet, sed quae sancta et pura fuerit, haec asseritur illi uisioni esse idonea, id et quae illum ipsum oculum, quo uidentur ista, sanum et sincerum et serenum et similem his rebus, quas uidere intendit, habuerit.

[4'] Quis autem religiosus et uera religione imbutus, quamuis nondum haec possit intueri, negare tamen audeat, immo non etiam profiteatur, omnia quae sunt, id est quaecumque in suo genere propria quadam natura continentur ut sint, auctore deo esse procreata, eoque auctore omnia quae uiuunt uiuere, atque uniuersalem rerum incolumitatem ordinemque ipsum, quo ea quae mutantur suos temporales cursus certo moderamine celebrant, summi dei legibus contineri et gubernari? Quo constituto atque concesso, quis audeat dicere deum inrationabiliter omnia condidisse? Quod si recte dici uel credi non potest, restat ut omnia *ratione* sint condita, nec eadem *ratione* homo qua equus; hoc enim absurdum est existimare. Singula igitur propriis sunt creata *rationibus*.

[3'] Has autem *rationes* ubi esse arbitrandum est nisi in ipsa mente creatoris? Non enim extra se quidquam positum intuebatur, ut secundum id constitueret quod constituebat; nam hoc opinari sacrilegum est.

[2'] Quod si hae rerum omnium creandarum creatarumue *rationes* diuina mente continentur, neque in diuina mente quidquam nisi aeternum atque incommutabile potest esse, atque has *rationes* rerum principales appellat ideas Plato, non solum sunt ideae, sed ipsae uerae sunt, quia aeternae sunt et eiusdem modi atque incommutabiles manent.

[4''] Quarum participatione fit ut sit quidquid est, quoquo modo est.

[5'] Sed anima rationalis inter eas res, quae sunt a deo conditae, omnia superat et deo proxima est, quando pura est; eique in quantum caritate cohaeserit, in tantum ab eo lumine illo intellegibili perfusa quodammodo et inlustrata cernit non per corporeos oculos, sed per ipsius sui principale quo excellit, id est per intellegentiam suam, istas *rationes*, quarum uisione fit beatissima.

[1'] Quas *rationes*, ut dictum est, siue ideas siue formas siue species siue *rationes* licet uocare, et multis conceditur appellare quod libet, sed paucissimis uidere quod uerum est.

First [1], Augustine explains that the Latin term *rationes* corresponds to the Greek *logoi*, not *ideae*; literally translated into Latin, *idea* could be rendered as *forma* or *species*. However, translating the term with *ratio*, although not proper, does not conflict with the very thing that the term *idea* means.

Ideas, in fact – and here we move from the terminological to the metaphysical level [2] – are a kind of primordial or principal (*principales*) forms, that is, stable and incommutable reasons (*rationes*) of things. They have not been formed, and that is why they are eternal and always identical (*semper eodem modo sese habentes*). [3] They are contained in the divine intelligence. [4] Everything that can come into existence and perish and everything that actually comes into existence and perishes is said to be formed according to them (*secundum eas*).

Turning then to the gnoseological level [5], Augustine states that only the «mind and reason» (*mens atque ratio*) proper to the reasonable soul can gaze at these *rationes*, and only if the soul is purified.

Augustine then [4'] proves their existence. Assuming that God created all things, it would be absurd to hold either that God created things unreasonably (*irrationabiliter*) or that the *ratio* with which a certain thing (a human being) was created is the same as that with which another thing (a horse) was created. «Every creature, therefore, is created with a reason of its own» (*Singula igitur propriis sunt creata rationibus*).

[3'] Such *rationes* are in the very mind of the Creator. Otherwise, God would have contemplated something outside of Himself in order to create⁶.

Having thus established that the *rationes* of things to be created and of actually created things are contained in the divine mind; that in the divine mind there can be nothing but something eternal and incommutable; and that Plato calls these *rationes* “ideas”, it follows [2'] that ideas not only exist but are also true, because they are eternal and remain identical and incommutable.

6. Cfr. J. PÉPIN, *Saint Augustin et l'inhabitation des idées en Dieu*, in J. DILLON, M. DIXSAUT (eds.), *Agonistes. Essays in Honour of Denis O'Brien*, Ashgate, Aldershot-Burlington 2005, pp. 243-257.

[4''] Everything that is, in whatever way it is, is by virtue of participation in ideas.

[5'] The last part of the passage returns to the relationship between the soul and these *rationes*. Of all created realities, the soul is closest to God; its greatest closeness to God occurs when it is pure. To the extent that it adheres to God with charity, the soul is illuminated by that intelligible light (which here seems to be identified with God himself) and then perceives, through its intelligence (*intellegentia*), these *rationes*, by the vision of which it is made blissful (*beatissima*)⁷.

Let us see how the other occurrences of the term *ratio* in the sense of a transcendent cause confirm the picture outlined in the *Quaestio de ideis*. I will quickly review all the occurrences to my knowledge, grouping them according to the work to which they belong and arranging them in the chronological order obtainable from Augustine's *Retractationes*.

1.2. *De immortalitate animae*

R2 = *De immortalitate animae*, W. Hörmann (ed.), Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky, Wien 1986 (CSEL 89), ch. 4, 6, p. 107, 16-26.

Sed cum uel nos ipsi nobiscum ratiocinantes uel ab alio bene interrogati de quibusdam liberalibus artibus ea, quae inuenimus, non alibi quam in animo nostro inuenimus – neque id est inuenire, quod facere aut gignere; alioquin aeterna gigneret animus inuentione temporali. Nam aeterna saepe inuenit. Quid enim tam aeternum quam circuli *ratio* uel si quid aliud in huiusmodi artibus? Nec non fuisse aliquando nec non fore comprehenditur –, manifestum est etiam inmortalem esse animum humanum et omnes ueras *rationes* in secretis eius esse, quamuis eas siue ignoratione siue obliuione aut non habere aut amisisse uideatur.

7. On Augustine's doctrine of divine illumination, cfr. T. ALESANCO, *Metafisica y gnoseología del mundo inteligible según San Agustín. En torno a la teoría agustiniana de la iluminación*, «Augustinus» 13 (1968), pp. 9-30; R.H. NASH, *The Light of the Mind: St. Augustine's Theory of Knowledge*, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington 1969 (repr. Academic Renewal, Lima, OH 2003); L. SCHUMACHER, *Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine's Theory of Knowledge*, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester 2011.

R3 = *De immortalitate animae*, ch. 14, 23, p. 125, 1-10.

Nam uerbi gratia si per somnium disputare sibi uisus fuerit uerasque *rationes* secutus in disputando didicerit aliquid, etiam expergefacto eadem incommutabiles manent, quamuis falsa reperiantur cetera, ueluti locus, ubi disputatio, et persona, cum qua disputatio fuisse uisa erat, et uerba ipsa, quod ad sonum adtinet, quibus disputari uidebatur, et alia huiuscemodi; quae etiam cum ipsis sensibus sentiuntur agunturque a uigilantibus, praetereunt tamen nec ulla ex parte sempiternam praesentiam uerarum *rationum* adsequuntur.

R4 = *De immortalitate animae*, ch. 15, 24, p. 125, 13-17.

Postremo, si quamuis locum occupanti corpori anima tamen non localiter iungitur, summis illis aeternisque *rationibus*, quae incommutabiliter manent nec utique continentur loco, prior adfcitur anima quam corpus, nec prior tantum, sed etiam magis.

R2 speaks of «true reasons» (*ueras rationes*), which are eternal and are found in our soul (e.g., the «reason of a circle», *circuli ratio*). R3 speaks again of «true reasons» (*uerasque rationes*), which one can follow during a dream discussion, and which have an eternal presence. R4 speaks of «highest and eternal reasons» (*summ[is] [...] aeternisque rationibus*), which persist incommutably and are not located in space, and states that the soul is affected by them earlier than the body.

1.3. *De libero arbitrio*

R5 = *De libero arbitrio*, W.M. Green (ed.), Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky, Wien 1956 (CSEL 74), III, ch. 5, 13, pp. 101, 22-102, 3.

Humana quippe anima naturaliter diuinis ex quibus pendet conexas *rationibus*, cum dicit: “Melius hoc fieret quam illud”, si uerum dicit et uidet quod dicit, in illis quibus conexas est *rationibus* uidet. Credat ergo deum fecisse quod uera ratione ab eo faciendum fuisse cognouit, etiamsi hoc in rebus factis non uidet, quia etiamsi caelum

oculis uidere non posset et tamen ratione uera aliquid faciendum fuisse colligeret, credere debuit factum esse, quamuis id oculis non uideret. Non enim cogitatione uideret fuisse faciendum, nisi in his *rationibus* quibus facta sunt omnia. Quod autem ibi non est, tam nemo potest ueraci cogitatione uidere quam non est uerum.

This seems to be an important passage on the relationship between the human soul and the reasons called “divine” (*diuinis*). To these reasons, with which all things were made, the human soul is «naturally linked» (*naturaliter [...] conexas*), and when it makes a judgement such as: “It would be better to make this rather than that”, if that judgement is true and if the soul sees what it says, then the soul sees *in* those reasons.

1.4. *Confessiones*

R6 = *Confessiones*, L. Verheijen (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1981 (CCSL 27), I, ch. 6, 9, pp. 4, 24-5, 42.

Tu autem, domine, qui et semper uiuis et nihil moritur in te, quoniam ante primordia saeculorum et ante omne, quod uel ante dici potest, tu es et deus es dominusque omnium, quae creasti, et apud te rerum omnium instabilium stant causae et rerum omnium mutabilium immutabiles manent origines et omnium inrationalium et temporalium sempiternae uiuunt *rationes*, dic mihi supplici tuo, deus, et misericors misero tuo, dic mihi, utrum alicui iam aetati meae mortuae successerit infantia mea.

R7 = *Confessiones*, XI, ch. 8, 10, p. 199, 1-6.

Vt cumque uideo, sed quomodo id eloquar nescio, nisi quia omne, quod esse incipit et esse desinit, tunc esse incipit et tunc desinit, quando debuisset incipere uel desinere in aeterna *ratione* cognoscitur, ubi nec incipit aliquid nec desinit. Ipsum est uerbum tuum, quod et principium est, quia et loquitur nobis.

R6 describes eternal reasons by contrast with the things of which they are causes. Augustine says that, with God, the causes of all

unstable things stand still (*stant*), the origins (*origines*) of all mutable things remain immutable, and the reasons of all irrational and temporal things live eternal.

R7 speaks in the singular of an «eternal reason» (*aeterna ratione*), which seems to be identified with the divine Word. In it, where nothing begins nor ends, one comes to know (*cognoscitur*) when a thing should begin or end.

That “*ratio*” can signify the Word also results from other passages. In *De immortalitate animae*, ch. 6, 10, the third possible meaning Augustine enunciates for the term *ratio* is «the truth itself which is contemplated» (*ipsam uerum, quod contemplatur*)⁸. Put in this way, *ratio* can mean any kind of truth, e.g., mathematical truths (incidentally, *ratio* takes on the meaning of mathematical ratio in several passages: «reason of numbers», *ratio numerorum*)⁹. In *De immortalitate animae*, ch. 6, 11, however, divine characteristics are attributed to this truth (*uerum*). The *ratio-uerum* is, in fact, described as something that «would not be lacking to any contemplator, even if all contemplated it»; as something of which nothing is more powerful because nothing is more incommutable; as a nature in which «there is no jealous refusal to offer itself to the enjoyment of the soul»; as something that confers being on the soul; as that which “is” to the highest degree¹⁰. In *De immortalitate animae*, ch. 7, 12, Augustine

8. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De immortalitate animae*, ch. 6, 10, p. 110, 9-11.

9. Id., *De immortalitate animae*, ch. 4, 5, p. 106, 7; *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum*, J.B. Bauer (ed.), Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky, Wien 1992 (CSEL 90), II, ch. 11, 24, p. 190, 7; *De libero arbitrio*, II, ch. 8, 24, p. 60, 6; II, ch. 10, 29, p. 67, 3; *De musica*, M. Jacobsson (ed.), De Gruyter, Berlin-Boston 2017 (CSEL 102), I, ch. 10, 17, p. 86, 22; II, ch. 3, 3, p. 99, 16; II, ch. 5, 8, p. 102, 24-25 and 30; II, ch. 6, 9, p. 103, 5; II, ch. 6, 10, p. 104, 14-15; II, ch. 6, 13, p. 105, 5; III, ch. 5, 12, p. 126, 20; III, ch. 7, 16, p. 129, 6-7; V, ch. 7, 13, p. 179, 5; *De doctrina christiana*, M. Simonetti (ed.), Fondazione Lorenzo Valla – Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, Milano 1994 (Scrittori greci e latini), II, ch. 39, 59, p. 160, 35; *Confessiones*, V, ch. 7, 12, p. 63, 7; *De trinitate*, W.J. Mountain, F. Glorie (edd.), Brepols, Turnhout 1968 (CCSL 50), IV, ch. 6, 10, p. 175, 49; *De ciuitate dei*, B. Dombart, A. Kalb (edd.), Brepols, Turnhout 1955 (CCSL 48), p. 375, 8; *Epistulae*, A. Goldbacher (ed.), Tempsky-Freytag, Wien-Leipzig 1894 (CSEL 44), 162, ch. 2, p. 513, 13; *Sermones*, J.-P. Migne (ed.), Migne, Paris 1845 (PL 38), 243, ch. 8, 7, col. 1146, 56.

10. Id., *De immortalitate animae*, ch. 6, 11, p. 112, 1-20.

goes on to say that foolishness takes possession of the soul because of its turning away (*auersio*) from that *ratio* and that the soul “is” to a greater degree when it is turned to that *ratio* and united to it, because that *ratio* is an incommutable reality, inasmuch as it is Truth, which “is” in both the highest and the first degree¹¹. Now, we know that “Truth” for Augustine is an attribute of God and, in particular, of the Word (according to Io 14,6)¹². Precisely revising *De immortalitate animae*, in *Retractationes*, I, ch. 5, 2, Augustine criticises his own statement that «life with reason» (*uita cum ratione*) belongs only to the soul: It also belongs to God, «for with Him is both the highest life and the highest reason» (*cum apud eum et summa uita et summa sit ratio*)¹³. It is significant that in *Epistulae*, 160, ch. 4, writing to Augustine, Evodius explicitly identifies *ratio* with the Son¹⁴.

1.5. *De trinitate*

R8 = *De trinitate*, W.J. Mountain, F. Glorie (edd.), Brepols, Turnhout 1968 (CCSL 50), IV, ch. 16, 21, p. 188, 6-25.

Numquid enim quia uerissime disputant et documentis certissimis persuadent aeternis *rationibus* omnia temporalia fieri, propterea potuerunt in ipsis *rationibus* perspicere uel ex ipsis colligere quot sint animalium genera, quae semina singulorum in exordiis, qui modus in incrementis, qui numeri per conceptus, per ortus, per aetates, per occasus, qui motus in appetendis quae secundum naturam sunt fugiendisque contrariis? [...] Nec isti philosophi ceteris meliores in illis summis aeternisque *rationibus* intellectu talia contemplati sunt; alioquin non eiusdem generis praeterita quae potuerunt historici inquirerent sed potius et futura praenoscerent.

11. *Ibidem*, ch. 7, 12, p. 113, 1-6.

12. Cfr. G. CATAPANO, *Veritas, uerum*, in R. DODARO, C. MAYER (†), C. MÜLLER (Hrsg.), *Augustinus-Lexikon*, V, Schwabe, Basel (forthcoming).

13. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *Retractationes*, A. Mutzenbecher (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1984, (CCSL 57), I, ch. 5, 2, p. 16, 17-19.

14. EUODIUS VZALIENSIS, in AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *Epistulae*, A. Goldbacher (ed.), Tempsky-Freytag, Wien-Leipzig 1894 (CSEL 44), 160, ch. 4, pp. 505, 24-506, 19.

R₉ = *De trinitate*, IX, ch. 6, 9, p. 301, 13-18.

Neque enim oculis corporeis multas mentes uidendo per similitudinem colligimus generalem uel specialem mentis humanae notitiam, sed intuemur inuiolabilem ueritatem ex qua perfecte quantum possumus definiamus non qualis sit uniuscuiusque hominis mens, sed qualis esse sempiternis *rationibus* debeat.

R₁₀ = *De trinitate*, X, ch. 1, 2, p. 313, 58-63.

Quid ergo amat nisi quia nouit atque intuetur in *rationibus* rerum quae sit pulchritudo doctrinae qua continentur notitiae signorum omnium; et quae sit utilitas in ea peritia qua inter se humana societas sensa communicat ne sibi hominum coetus deteriores sint quauis solitudine si cogitationes suas conloquendo non misceant?

R₁₁ = *De trinitate*, X, ch. 2, 4, p. 316, 15-19.

Aut in specie sempiternae *rationis* uidemus aliquid et ibi amamus, quod cum expressum in aliqua rei temporalis effigie illis qui experti sunt laudantibus credimus et amamus, non aliquid amamus incognitum unde iam supra satis disseruimus.

R₁₂ = *De trinitate*, X, ch. 2, 5, p. 317, 18-21.

An in *ratione* ueritatis aeternae uidet quam speciosum sit nosse se metipsam, et hoc amat quod uidet studetque in se fieri quia, quamuis sibi nota non sit, notum ei tamen est quam bonum sit ut sibi nota sit?

R₁₃ = *De trinitate*, XII, ch. 2, 2, p. 357, 16-22.

Sed sublimioris rationis est iudicare de istis corporalibus secundum *rationes* incorporeales et sempiternas quae nisi supra mentem humanam essent, incommutabiles profecto non essent, atque his nisi subiungeretur aliquid nostrum, non secundum eas possemus de corporalibus iudicare. Iudicamus autem de corporalibus ex *ratione* dimensionum atque figurarum quam incommutabiliter manere mens nouit.

R14 = *De trinitate*, XII, ch. 14, 23, pp. 376, 54-377, 71.

Non autem solum rerum sensibilium in locis positarum sine spatiis localibus manent intellegibiles incorporalesque *rationes*, uerum etiam motionum in temporibus transeuntium sine temporali transitu stant etiam ipsae utique intellegibiles, non sensibiles. Ad quas mentis acie peruenire paucorum est, et cum peruenitur quantum fieri potest, non in eis manet ipse peruentor, sed ueluti acies ipsa reuerberata repellitur et fit rei non transitoriae transitoria cogitatio. [...] Neque enim sicut manet uerbi gratia quadrati corporis incorporalis et immutabilis *ratio* sic in ea manet hominis cogitatio, si tamen ad eam sine phantasia spatii localis potuit peruenire.

R15 = *De trinitate*, W.J. Mountain, F. Glorie (edd.), Brepols, Turnhout 1968 (CCSL 50A), XV, ch. 9, 16, p. 483, 57-66.

Quandoquidem cogitatio uisio est animi quaedam siue adsint ea quae oculis quoque corporalibus uideantur uel ceteris sentiantur sensibus, siue non adsint et eorum similitudines cogitatione cernantur; siue nihil eorum sed ea cogitentur quae nec corporalia sunt nec corporalium similitudines sicut uirtutes et uitia, sicut ipsa denique cogitatio cogitatur; siue illa quae per disciplinas traduntur liberalesque doctrinas; siue omnium istorum causae superiores atque *rationes* in natura immutabili cogitentur; siue etiam mala et uana ac falsa cogitemus uel non consentiente sensu uel errante consensu.

R8 refers to philosophers who, despite being better than others, nevertheless blame Christians for believing in the resurrection of the flesh. They rightly assert that all temporal things happen / are made (*fieri*) according to eternal reasons, but they are unable to know the variety of living beings and the succession of events through an intellectual contemplation of these things in their supreme and eternal reasons, without recourse to historical knowledge¹⁵.

15. Cfr. G. CATAPANO, *Augustine's Criticism of Philosophers in De Trinitate 4, and Its Epistemological Implications*, in B. DAVID (ed.), *Passionate Mind. Essays in Honor of John M. Rist*, Academia Verlag, Berlin 2019, pp. 283-296.

R9 says that, in order to define how a certain thing (e.g., the mind) should be according to the eternal reasons, one must see it in the Truth itself.

R10 speaks of knowing and observing something *in* the reasons of things (and not of knowing the reasons themselves directly). The same observation can be made for R11 («we see something in the form of sempiternal reason», *in specie sempiternae rationis uidemus aliquid*) and R12 («the mind sees in the reason of eternal truth», *in ratione ueritatis aeternae uidet*); on the other hand, in these passages, *ratio* is used in the singular and may have a meaning like that of R7 (i.e., the divine Word).

In R13, the theme is the relationship between our reason and eternal reasons in judging corporeal things. Augustine says that it is proper to a higher reason to judge of corporeal things according to (*secundum*) incorporeal and sempiternal reasons: If the latter were not above the human mind, they would not be incommutable; on the other hand, if something of us were not linked to them from below, we could not judge of corporeal things according to eternal reasons.

R14 speaks of *rationes* that possess the following characteristics: They are eternal, in the sense that they have always had and always will have the very same being (*idipsum esse*); they are *rationes* not only of sensible things extended in space (e.g., a square body) but also of movements that develop over time (e.g., a sound produced according to the art of music); nevertheless, they are incorporeal, without spatial extensions, and immobile, without temporal becoming; they are intelligible, not sensible; to reach them with the gaze of the mind is for the few, and even in those who reach them, the gaze is as if repelled.

R15 speaks of «higher causes and reasons» (*causae superiores atque rationes*), which exist «in the unchangeable nature» (*in natura immutabili*).

1.6. *De Genesi ad litteram*

R16 = *De Genesi ad litteram*, J. Zycha (ed.), Tempsky-Freytag, Praha-Wien-Leipzig 1894 (CSEL 28/1), I, ch. 10, 20, pp. 14, 27-15, 2.

Huc accedit, quia uerbo sibi coaeterno, id est incommutabilis sapientiae internis aeternisque *rationibus*, non corporali uocis sono uocauit deus lucem diem et tenebras noctem [Gen 1,5].

R17 = *De Genesi ad litteram*, I, ch. 18, 36, p. 26, 20-25.

Sed ante omnia meminerimus, unde iam multa diximus, non temporalibus quasi animi sui aut corporis motibus operari deum, sicut operatur homo uel angelus, sed aeternis atque incommutabilibus et stabilibus *rationibus* coaeterni sibi uerbi sui et quodam, ut ita dixerim, fotu pariter coaeterni sancti spiritus sui.

R18 = *De Genesi ad litteram*, II, ch. 6, 12-13, p. 41, 10-25.

Quia ergo nihil creari posset siue ante tempora, quod quidem non est creatori coaeternum, siue ab exordio temporum siue in aliquo tempore, cuius creandi *ratio*, si tamen ratio recte dicitur, non in dei uerbo patri coaeterno coaeterna uita uiueret, propterea scriptura, priusquam insinuet unamquamque creaturam, ex ordine, quo conditam dicit, respicit ad dei uerbum, prius ponens: *et dixit deus: fiat illud*. Non enim inuenit ullam causam rei creandae, quam in uerbo dei non inuenit creari debuisse. Non ergo deus totiens dixit: “Fiat illa uel illa creatura”, quotiens in hoc libro repetitur: *et dixit deus*. Vnum quippe uerbum ille genuit, in quo dixit omnia, priusquam facta sunt singula; sed eloquium scripturae descendens ad paruulorum capacitatem dum insinuat singillatim genera creaturarum per singula respicit uniuscuiusque generis aeternam *rationem* in uerbo dei.

R19 = *De Genesi ad litteram*, II, ch. 8, 16, p. 43, 19-23.

Quapropter lucis conditio prius est in uerbo dei secundum *rationem*, qua condita est, hoc est in coaeterna patri sapientia, ac deinde in ipsa lucis conditione secundum naturam, quae condita est: illic non facta, sed genita, hic uero facta, quia ex informitate formata.

R20 = *De Genesi ad litteram*, II, ch. 8, 17, p. 44, 10-14.

Quemadmodum ergo *ratio*, qua creatura conditur, prior est in uerbo dei quam ipsa creatura, quae conditur, sic et eiusdem *rationis* cognitio prius fit in creatura intellectuali, quae peccato non tenebrata est, ac deinde ipsa conditio creaturae.

R21 = *De Genesi ad litteram*, II, ch. 8, 19, p. 45, 8-15.

Cum uero audimus: *et sic est factum*, intellegamus in creatura intellectuali factam cognitionem *rationis*, quae in uerbo dei est, condendae creaturae, ut in ea natura prius quodam modo facta sit, quae anteriore quodam motu in ipso dei uerbo prior faciendam esse cognouit, ut postremo, cum audimus repeti et dici, quod *fecit deus*, iam intellegamus in suo genere fieri ipsam creaturam.

R22 = *De Genesi ad litteram*, III, ch. 12, 18, p. 77, 2-9.

An genus eorum in superioribus *rationibus* intellegendum est, utique spiritalibus, secundum quas creantur inferius? Sed si ita esset, hoc de luce, hoc de caelo, hoc de aquis et terris, hoc de caeli luminaribus diceretur. Quid enim eorum est, cuius non aeterna et incommutabilis *ratio* in ipsa dei sapientia uigeat, quae adtingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter et disponit omnia suauius?

R23 = *De Genesi ad litteram*, IV, ch. 5, 11, p. 101, 20-24.

Quasi uero a creatore deo disposita in coloribus corpora, id est ita disposita, ut colorata essent, possit aliter intellegi, nisi aliqua *ratio* colorum singulis corporum generibus distribuendorum in ipsa disponentis sapientia non defuisse intellegatur, etsi color ibi non appellatur.

R24 = *De Genesi ad litteram*, IV, ch. 24, 41, pp. 123, 19-124, 5.

Quapropter, cum sancti angeli, quibus post resurrectionem coaequabimur, si uiam – quod nobis Christus factus est – usque in finem tenuerimus, semper uideant faciem dei uerboque eius unigenito filio, sicut patri aequalis est, perfruantur, in quibus prima omnium creata est sapientia, procul dubio uniuersam creaturam, in qua ipsi sunt principaliter conditi, in ipso uerbo dei prius nouerunt, in quo sunt omnium, etiam quae temporaliter facta sunt, aeternae *rationes*, tamquam in eo, per quod facta sunt omnia, ac deinde in ipsa creatura, quam sic nouerunt, tamquam infra despicientes eamque referentes ad illius laudem, in cuius incommutabili ueritate rationes, secundum quas facta est, principaliter uident.

R25 = *De Genesi ad litteram*, IV, ch. 25, 42, pp. 124, 26-125, 2.

Tunc enim nox ad diem pertinet, non dies ad noctem, cum sublimes et sancti angeli id, quod creaturam in ipsa creatura nouerunt, referunt ad illius honorem et amorem, in quo aeternas *rationes*, quibus creata est, contemplantur eaque concordissima contemplatione sunt unus dies, quem fecit dominus, cui coniungetur et ecclesia ex hac peregrinatione liberata, ut et nos exultemus et iucundemur in ea.

R26 = *De Genesi ad litteram*, IV, ch. 26, 43, p. 125, 10-23.

Non itaque iam forma ipsius operis dies et terminus uespera et alterius operis initium mane in hac rerum conditarum narratione debet intellegi, ne cogamur contra scripturam dicere praeter sex dies conditam diei septimi creaturam, aut ipsum diem septimum nullam esse creaturam; sed dies ille, quem fecit deus, per opera eius ipse repetitur non circuitu corporali, sed cognitione spiritali, cum illa beata societas angelorum et primitus contempletur in uerbo dei, quo dicit deus: *fiat*, atque ideo prius in eius cognitione fit, cum dicitur: *et sic est factum*, et postea rem ipsam factam in ea ipsa cognoscit – quod significatur facta uespera – et eam deinde cognitionem rei factae ad illius ueritatis laudem refert, ubi *rationem* uiderat faciendae, quod significatur facto mane.

R27 = *De Genesi ad litteram*, IV, ch. 28, 45, pp. 126, 19-127, 4.

Nec quisquam arbitretur illud, quod dixi de luce spiritali et condito die in spiritali et angelica creatura et de contemplatione, quam habet in uerbo dei, et de cognitione, qua in se ipsa creatura cognoscitur, eiusque relatione ad laudem incommutabilis ueritatis, ubi prius *ratio* uidebatur rei faciendae, quae cognita est facta, non iam proprie, sed quasi figurate atque allegorice conuenire ad intellegendum diem et uesperam et mane, sed aliter quidem, quam in hac consuetudine cotidiana lucis huius et corporalis, non tamen tamquam hic proprie, ibi figurate; ubi enim melior et certior lux, ibi uerior etiam dies.

R28 = *De Genesi ad litteram*, IV, ch. 32, 50, pp. 130, 26-131, 6.

Ac per hoc etiamsi nulla hic morarum temporalium sint interualla, praecessit tamen *ratio* condendae creaturae in uerbo dei, cum dixit: *fiat lux*, et secuta est ipsa lux, qua angelica mens formata est atque in sua natura facta est, non autem alibi sequebatur, ut fieret. Et ideo non prius dictum est: *et sic est factum*, et postea dictum est: "et fecit deus lucem", sed continuo post uerbum dei facta est lux adhaesitque creanti luci lux creata, uidens illam et se in illa, id est *rationem*, qua facta est.

R29 = *De Genesi ad litteram*, IV, ch. 34, 53, pp. 133, 20-134, 4.

Quomodo ergo dicimus septies repetitam lucis illius praesentiam per angelicam cognitionem a uespere ad mane, cum ipsa tria simul, id est et diem et uesperam et mane semel ei habere suffecerit, cum simul uniuersam creaturam, sicut simul facta est, et in primis atque incommutabilibus *rationibus*, per quas condita est, contempleretur propter diem et in eius ipsius natura cognosceret propter uesperam et creatorem ex ipsa etiam inferiore cognitione propter mane laudaret?

R30 = *De Genesi ad litteram*, V, ch. 12, 28, pp. 155, 25-156, 4.

Cum ergo aliter se habeant omnium creaturarum *rationes* incommutabiles in uerbo dei, aliter eius illa opera, a quibus in die septimo requieuit, aliter ista, quae ex illis usque nunc operatur, horum trium hoc, quod extremum posui, nobis utcumque notum est per corporis sensus et huius consuetudinem uitae.

R31 = *De Genesi ad litteram*, V, ch. 13, 29, p. 156, 9-22.

De primis ergo illis diuinis incommutabilibus aeternisque *rationibus*, quoniam ipsa dei sapientia, per quam facta sunt omnia, priusquam fierent, ea nouerat, sicut scriptura testatur: *In principio erat uerbum et uerbum erat apud deum et deus erat uerbum. Hoc erat in principio apud deum. Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil* [Io 1,1-3], quis ergo tam sit demens, ut dicat non ea deum fecisse, quae nouerat? Porro si nouerat, ubi nisi apud se ipsum, apud quem uerbum erat, per quod facta sunt omnia? Nam si

extra se ipsum ea nouerat, quis eum docuerat? *Quis enim cognouit sensum domini? Aut quis consiliarius eius fuit? Aut quis prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? Quoniam ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia* [Rom 11,34-36].

R32 = *De Genesi ad litteram*, V, ch. 16, 34, p. 159, 21-27.

In illo enim uiuimus et mouemur et sumus [Act 17,28]; istorum autem pleraque remota sunt a mente nostra propter dissimilitudinem sui generis, quoniam corporalia sunt, nec idonea est ipsa mens nostra, in ipsis *rationibus*, quibus facta sunt, ea uidere apud deum, ut per hoc sciamus, quot et quanta qualiaque sint, etiamsi non ea uideamus per corporis sensus.

R33 = *De Genesi ad litteram*, VIII, ch. 26, 48, p. 265, 3-20.

Quae cum ita sint, cum deus omnipotens et omnitenens, incommutabili aeternitate, ueritate, uoluntate semper idem, non per tempus nec per locum motus mouet per tempus creaturam spiritalem, mouet etiam per tempus et locum creaturam corporalem, ut eo motu naturas, quas intrinsecus substituit, etiam extrinsecus administret et per uoluntates sibi subditas, quas per tempus et per corpora sibi atque illis uoluntatibus subdita, quae per tempus et locum mouet, eo tempore ac loco, cuius *ratio* in ipso deo uita est sine tempore ac loco: cum ergo tale aliquid deus agit, non debemus opinari eius substantiam, qua deus est, temporibus locisque mutabilem aut per tempora et loca mobilem, sed in opere diuinae prouidentiae ista cognoscere non in illo opere, quo naturas creat, sed in illo, quo intrinsecus creatas etiam extrinsecus administrat, cum sit ipse nullo locorum uel interuallo uel spatio incommutabili excellentique potentia et interior omni re, quia in ipso sunt omnia, et exterior omni re, quia ipse est super omnia.

R34 = *De Genesi ad litteram*, IX, ch. 15, 28, p. 288, 10-15.

Voluntas uero angelica oboedienter deo subdita eiusque executata iussionem naturalibus motibus de rebus subiectis tamquam materiem ministrare, ut secundum illas principales in uerbo dei non creatas uel secundum illas in primis sex dierum operibus causaliter creatas *rationes* aliquid tempore creetur, more agricolandi uel mendi potest.

R16 says that God called light “day” and darkness “night” not with the sound of a bodily voice but with the Word coeternal with Him, «that is, with the internal and eternal reasons of incommutable Wisdom» (*id est incommutabilis sapientiae internis aeternisque rationibus*). It follows from this passage that the reasons are internal to the Word and indeed coincide with the Word. A similar concept is expressed in R17, namely that God does not work through bodily or psychic movements, as do human beings and angels, but rather «with the eternal, incommutable, stable reasons of the Word coeternal to Him» (*aeternis atque incommutabilibus et stabilibus rationibus coaeterni uerbi sui*), to which is added the warmth (*fotus*) of the Holy Spirit.

R18 is an interesting passage in which two statements are made. The first is that nothing could be created if the «reason for its creation» (*creandi ratio*, assuming that it can correctly be called *ratio*) did not live in the Word of God of a life coeternal with the Father. The second is that there is an «eternal reason for each kind [of creature] in the Word of God» (*uniuscuiusque generis [i.e., creaturarum] aeternam rationem in uerbo dei*). Both statements make it very clear that the creative *ratio* is found in the Word. The statement in R22 is similar, from which it follows that for every creature there is «an eternal and incommutable reason in the very wisdom of God» (*aeterna et incommutabilis ratio in ipsa dei sapientia*). The statements in R24 («in the very Word of God [...] there are the eternal reasons for all things, even for the things that have been made temporally», *in ipso uerbo dei [...] sunt omnium, etiam quae temporaliter facta sunt, aeternae rationes*) can also be approached, where it is also said that the holy angels primarily (*principaliter*) see, in the incommutable truth of God, the *ratio* according to (*secundum*) which a creature is (was) made (so also in R26).

R19, R20 and R21 say that the «reason with which» (*ratio qua*; cfr. R28: *rationem, qua facta est*) a thing is created is found in the Word and is generated, not created; moreover, it «exists in the Word of God before the creature itself» (*prior est in uerbo dei quam ipsa creatura*).

R23 says that in divine Wisdom there is a *ratio* of colours.

R26 and R27 speak of a «reason of the thing to be created» (*ratio faciendae*, i.e., *creaturae* or *rei*). R28 says that a «reason of the creature to be established» (*ratio condendae creaturae*) came first (*praecessit*) in the Word of God (*in uerbo dei*).

R29 uses not the preposition *secundum* (according to, in conformity with) but *per* (through, by means of)¹⁶: «in the primordial and incommutable reasons through which it [i.e., the angelic light] was established» (*in primis atque incommutabilibus rationibus, per quas condita est*).

R30 is an important passage, inaugurating an equally important section. Three types of realities are distinguished, of which the first are the incommutable *rationes* of all creatures in the Word of God, the second are the works (*opera*) of God from which he rested on the seventh day, and the third are «these, which starting from those» (*ista, quae ex illis*) God is working on until the present moment. The first two types of reality, unlike the third, are not knowable through the senses but must first be believed on divine authority and then known through the things we already know.

R31 and R32 speak of «those incommutable and eternal divine reasons» (*illis diuinis incommutabilibus aeternisque rationibus*; note the adjective *divine*) and of the mode of existence of creatures in the Word. The existence of such *rationes* is attested by both Io 1, 1-3 and the following reasoning: God could not create things that He did not know; and if He knew them before He created them, He could only know them by Himself, for otherwise who would have taught Him? (cfr. Rom 11, 34-36). In *De Genesi ad litteram*, V, ch. 13, 30, it is made very clear, with reference to Io 1, 4, that the light of the «rational minds» (*rationales mentes*) is the Word¹⁷. In V, ch. 14, 31, Io 1, 4 is interpreted as follows: «what was made, in that [i.e., in the Word] is life (*quod factum est, in illo uita est*)¹⁸; cfr. R33: «whose reason in God himself is life without time and space», *cuius ratio in ipso deo uita est*

16. Cfr. J. PÉPIN, *Le maniement des prépositions dans la théorie augustinienne de la création*, «Revue des Études augustinienes» 35 (1989), pp. 251-274.

17. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De Genesi ad litteram*, V, ch. 13, 30, pp. 156, 23-157, 2.

18. *Ibidem*, V, ch. 14, 31, p. 157, 3-24.

sine tempore ac loco; R45: «in Wisdom itself there is spiritually a certain reason with which the earth was made; this [reason] is life». *est autem in ipsa sapientia spiritaliter ratio quaedam qua terra facta est; haec [ratio] uita est*). The explanation is that the Word knew all things that were made through Him before they were made, so they were in Him not as creatures but as Himself. In V, ch. 14, 32, Augustine says that the «rational minds» (*mentes rationales*), purified by the grace of the Word, can attain to His vision, which is the summit of beatitude¹⁹. In V, ch. 15, 33, two other testimonies are adduced, from Iob 28,12-13 and Iob 28,22-25. Augustine reaffirms that it would be foolish to assume that God has made things that He did not know; and if they were known before they were made, then they were known to Him in the way in which they eternally and incommutably live and are life²⁰. In V, ch. 16, 34, he summarises his reasoning thus: «He would not have created them if He had not known them before He created them, and He would not have known them if He had not seen them, and He would not have seen them if He had not had them, and He would not have had them, they who had not yet been created, except in the same way in which He himself exists, uncreated» (*neque enim ea faceret, nisi ea nosset, antequam faceret, nec nosset, nisi uideret, nec uideret, nisi haberet, nec haberet ea, quae nondum facta erant, nisi quemadmodum est ipse non factus*)²¹. Finally, R32 says that, as far as corporeal things are concerned, our mind is not fit to see them with God «in the very reasons with which they were made» (*in ipsis rationibus, quibus facta sunt*).

R34 is also interesting because it reiterates the difference between uncreated and created reasons²²: «according to those primordial uncreated reasons in the Word of God or according to those reasons causally created in the works of the first six days» (*secundum illas principales in uerbo dei non creatas uel secundum illas in primis sex dierum operibus causaliter creatas rationes*; cfr. R39).

19. *Ibidem*, V, ch. 14, 32, p. 158, 6-8.

20. *Ibidem*, V, ch. 15, 33, pp. 158, 15-159, 6.

21. *Ibidem*, V, ch. 16, 34, p. 159, 13-16.

22. The uncreated reasons are the eternal, transcendent ones, while the created reasons are the immanent ones. See footnote 4 above.

1.7. *De ciuitate dei*

R35 = *De ciuitate dei*, B. Dombart, A. Kalb (edd.), Brepols, Turnhout 1955 (CCSL 48), XI, ch. 10, p. 332, 74-78.

Neque enim multae, sed una sapientia est, in qua sunt infiniti quidam eique finiti thesauri rerum intellegibilium, in quibus sunt omnes inuisibiles atque incommutabiles *rationes* rerum etiam uisibilium et mutabilium, quae per ipsam factae sunt.

R36 = *De ciuitate dei*, XI, ch. 29, p. 349, 13-32.

Multum enim differt, utrum in ea *ratione* cognoscatur aliquid, secundum quam factum est, an in se ipso; sicut aliter scitur rectitudo linearum seu ueritas figurarum, cum intellecta conspicitur, aliter cum in puluere scribitur; et aliter iustitia in ueritate incommutabili, aliter in anima iusti. [...] Omnia haec aliter in uerbo dei cognoscuntur ab angelis, ubi habent causas *rationesque* suas, id est secundum quas facta sunt, incommutabiliter permanentes, aliter in se ipsis; illa clariore, hac obscuriore cognitione, uelut artis atque operum; quae tamen opera cum ad ipsius creatoris laudem uenerationemque referuntur, tamquam mane lucescit in mentibus contemplantium.

R37 = *De ciuitate dei*, XII, ch. 18, pp. 373, 4-374, 26.

Neque ab hac fide me philosophorum argumenta deterrent, quorum acutissimum illud putatur, quod dicunt nulla infinita ulla scientia posse comprehendere; ac per hoc deus, inquiunt, rerum quas facit omnium finitarum omnes finitas apud se *rationes* habet; bonitas autem eius numquam uacua fuisse credenda est, ne sit temporalis eius operatio, cuius retro fuerit aeterna cessatio, quasi paenituerit eum prioris sine initio uacationis ac propterea sit operis adgressus initium; et ideo necesse est, inquiunt, eadem semper repeti eademque semper repetenda transcurrere, uel manente mundo mutabiliter, qui licet numquam non fuerit et sine initio temporis tamen factus est, uel eius quoque ortu et occasu semper illis circuitibus repetito semperque repetendo; ne uidelicet, si aliquando primum dei opera coepta dicuntur, priorem suam sine initio uacationem tamquam inertem ac desidiosam et ideo sibi displicentem damnasse quodam modo atque ob hoc

mutasse credatur; si autem semper quidem temporalia, sed alia atque alia perhibetur operatus ac sic aliquando etiam ad hominem faciendum, quem numquam antea fecerat, peruenisse, non scientia, qua putant non posse quaecumque infinita comprehendi, sed quasi ad horam, sicut ueniebat in mentem, fortuita quadam inconstantia uideatur fecisse quae fecit.

R38 = *De ciuitate dei*, XVI, ch. 6, p. 507, 22-26.

Dei quippe sublimior ante suum factum locutio ipsius sui facti est immutabilis *ratio*, quae non habet sonum strepentem atque transeuntem, sed uim sempiternae manentem et temporaliter operantem.

R35 says that among the treasures of intelligible things located in Wisdom are all the invisible and incommutable *rationes* of things also visible and changeable, which have been made through Wisdom.

R36 establishes a difference between the knowledge of things (e.g., justice) in the Word, i.e., in their *rationes*, or in themselves. The *rationes* are also called “causes” (*causae*), and things are said to have been made according to (*secundum*) them.

R37 ascribes to unspecified philosophers the view that God has with Himself the *rationes* of all the finite things that He makes and that these *rationes* are themselves finite.

R38 refers to an «immutable reason» (*inmutabilis ratio*) that is God's way of speaking (*locutio*) of what He creates, a *locutio* higher (*sublimior*) and earlier than the creature itself.

1.8. *Contra Priscillianistas*

R39 = *Contra Priscillianistas*, K.D. Daur (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1985 (CCSL 49), ch. 8, 9, p. 173, 220-222.

Sed in dei sapientia omnium faciendarum rerum *rationes* esse potuerunt, non tamen factae.

The reasons of all things to be created (*faciendarum*) are in the Wisdom of God but are not created (*non tamen factae*; cfr. R34).

1.9. *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali*

R40 = *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali*, K.F. Urba, J. Zycha (edd.), Tempsky-Freytag, Wien-Leipzig 1902 (CSEL 42), II, ch. 35, 40, p. 198, 25-28.

His enim deus ineffabilibus suis uerbis, id est diuinis *rationibus* in suae sapientiae per quam facta sunt omnia ueritate uiuentibus uim seminis indidit primis hominibus.

Augustine describes the «divine reasons» as God's words (*uerba*) and says that they live in the truth of God's Wisdom, through which all things were made.

1.10. *Retractationes*

R41 = *Retractationes*, A. Mutzenbecher (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1984 (CCSL 57), I, ch. 3, 2, pp. 12, 45-13, 54.

Nec Plato quidem in hoc errauit, quia esse mundum intellegibilem dixit, si non uocabulum quod ecclesiasticae consuetudini in re illa inusitatum est, sed ipsam rem uelimus adtendere. Mundum quippe ille intellegibilem nuncupauit ipsam *rationem* sempiternam atque incommutabilem, qua fecit deus mundum. Quam qui esse negat, sequitur, ut dicat inrationabiliter deum fecisse quod fecit, aut, cum faceret uel antequam faceret, nescisse, quid faceret, si apud eum *ratio* faciendi non erat. Si uero erat, sicut erat, ipsam uidetur Plato uocasse intellegibilem mundum.

R42 = *Retractationes*, I, ch. 4, 4, p. 15, 45-50.

Credibilius est enim propterea uera respondere de quibusdam disciplinis etiam imperitos earum, quando bene interrogantur, quia praesens est eis, quantum id capere possunt, lumen *rationis* aeternae, ubi haec immutabilia uera conspiciunt, non quia ea nouerant aliquando et obliui sunt, quod Platoni uel talibus uisum est.

R41 seems to be an important passage. It states that Plato called the “intelligible world” «the sempiternal and incommutable reason itself with which God made the world» (*ipsam rationem sempiternam atque incommutabilem, qua fecit deus mundum*). Augustine goes on to say that those who deny this *ratio* must consequently affirm that God made unreasonably (*irrationabiliter*) what He made, or that, when He was making it or before He made it, He did not know what He should make (*quid faceret*). Plato calls the “intelligible world” precisely this *ratio faciendi* that was with God. Here this *ratio* in the singular would seem to be identified with the Word.

R42 speaks of a «light of the eternal reason» (*lumen rationis aeternae*), whereby even the well-interrogated ignorant discern immutable truths; here the eternal reason seems to be the Word.

1.11. *Epistulae*

R43 = *Epistulae*, A. Goldbacher (ed.), Tempsky-Freytag, Praha-Wien-Leipzig 1895 (CSEL 34, 1), ch. 14, 4, pp. 34, 13-35, 10.

Item quaeris, utrum summa illa ueritas et summa sapientia, forma rerum, per quam facta sunt omnia, quem filium dei unicum sacra nostra profitentur, generaliter hominis, an etiam uniuscuiusque nostrum *rationem* contineat. Magna quaestio. Sed mihi uidetur, quod ad hominem faciendum adinet, hominis quidem tantum, non meam uel tuam ibi esse *rationem*; quod autem ad orbem temporis, uarias hominum *rationes* in illa sinceritate uiuere. Verum hoc cum obscurissimum sit, qua similitudine inlustrari possit, ignoro, nisi forte ad artes illas, quae insunt animo nostro, confugiendum est. Nam in disciplina metiendi una est anguli *ratio*, una quadrati. Itaque quotiens demonstrare angulum uolo, non nisi una *ratio* anguli mihi occurrit; sed quadratum nequaquam scriberem, nisi quattuor simul angulorum *rationem* intuerer. Ita quilibet homo una *ratione*, qua homo intellegitur, factus est; at ut populus fiat, quamuis et ipsa una *ratio*, non tamen hominis *ratio*, sed hominum. Si igitur pars huius uniuersi est Nebridius, sicut est, et omne uniuersum partibus confit, non potuit uniuersi conditor deus *rationem* partium non habere. Quam ob rem quod plurimorum hominum ibi *ratio* est non ad ipsum hominem pertinet, quamquam miris rursus modis ad unum omnia redigantur.

R44 = *Epistulae*, A. Goldbacher (ed.), Tempsky-Freytag, Wien-Leipzig 1894 (CSEL 44), 138, ch. 1, 7, pp. 131, 17-132, 4.

Nam ut nouerint, quos haec mouent, iam hoc fuisse in *ratione* diuina nec, cum ista noua constituerentur, subito priora displicuisse uelut mutabili uoluntate, sed iam hoc fixum et statutum fuisse in ipsa sapientia dei, cui de maioribus etiam rerum mutationibus eadem scriptura dicit: *mutabis ea et mutabuntur, tu autem idem ipse es* [Ps 102(101),28], insinuandum est eis mutationem istam sacramentorum testamenti ueteris et noui etiam praedictam fuisse propheticis uocibus.

R43 discusses the question of whether there is a *ratio* of each human being in the Word²³. More precisely, the problem – posed by Nebridius and judged by Augustine to be a *magna quaestio* – is formulated as follows: «whether that supreme truth and supreme wisdom and form of things, through which all things were made, He whom our sacred texts profess as the only-begotten Son of God, contains the reason of the human being in general or also the reason of each of us». Augustine’s response distinguishes two levels: «with regard to the creation of the human being» (*ad hominem faciendum*) and «with regard to the circle of time» (*ad orbem temporis*). His response is negative about the existence of a *ratio* «mine or yours» with respect to the first level, while it is positive with respect to the second. To illustrate this concept, Augustine resorts to a geometric example. Whenever I want to show (*demonstrare*) an angle, only one «reason of the angle» (*ratio anguli*) comes to my mind; if, however, I want to draw a square, I cannot do so without thinking of the *ratio* of four angles together. Similarly, any human being is made according to one and the same *ratio*, by virtue of which he/she is understood as a human being; if, however, a people is to be made, then its *ratio*, though unique, is not that of a human

23. Cfr. L. KARFIKOVÁ, *Augustine to Nebridius on the Ideas of Individuals* (ep. 14, 4), in M. VINZENT (ed.), *Studia Patristica, LXX, Papers presented at the Sixteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 2011*, XVIII: *St. Augustine and his Opponents*, Peeters, Leuven-Paris-Walpole, 2013, pp. 477-485; G. CATAPANO, *Augustine on the Existence of Ideals of Individuals in Letter 14*, «Medioevo» 47 (2022) (forthcoming).

being but that of several human beings. Therefore, if the individual Nebridius is part of this *uniuersum* (mankind? The universe in general?) and if every *uniuersum* is made up of its parts, then God, who is the creator of the *uniuersum*, could not but have the *ratio* of the parts. Augustine therefore admits that there is the *ratio* of very many (*plurimorum*) human beings up there but denies that this *ratio* concerns the human being as such.

In R44, *ratio diuina*, in the singular, seems synonymous with *ipsa sapientia dei*. Earlier, in the same letter (138, ch. 1, 2)²⁴ Augustine speaks of a *ratio* (plan?) of divine providence, a *ratio* that does not change and instead causes the things of the world to change (such as the seasons of the year and of life). Also in the same letter, in paragraph 8²⁵, he speaks of an «intelligible reason» (*intellegibilis ratio*), in which things that cannot happen simultaneously in time are timeless; this *ratio* contains an arrangement (*dispositio*).

1.12. *In Iohannis euangelium tractatus*

R45 = *In Iohannis euangelium tractatus*, R. Willems (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1954 (CCSL 36), 1, ch. 16, pp. 9, 22-10, 25.

Quid est hoc? Facta est terra, sed ipsa terra quae facta est, non est uita: est autem in ipsa sapientia spiritaliter *ratio* quaedam qua terra facta est; haec uita est.

Cfr. R33.

1.13. *Sermones*

R46 = *Sermones*, F. Dolbeau (ed.), «Revue bénédictine» 124 (2014), 117, ch. 10, 17, p. 252, 435-439.

Putabas forte dicturam sapientiam dei: “Discite quomodo caelos feci et astra: omnia in me, etiam antequam fierent, numerata erant,

24. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *Epistulae*, 138, ch. 1, 2, pp. 127, 19-128, 5.

25. *Ibidem*, ch. 1, 8, pp. 132, 23-133, 6.

quomodo in uirtute *rationum* incommutabilium etiam capilli uestri numerati sunt”.

R47 = *Sermones*, J.-P. Migne (ed.), Migne, Paris 1845 (PL 38), 141, ch. 1, 1, col. 776, 12-17.

Veritatem fixam, stabilem, indeclinabilem, ubi sunt omnes *rationes* rerum omnium creaturarum, uiderunt quidem, sed de longinquo; uiderunt, sed in errore positi: et idcirco ad eam tam magnam et ineffabilem et beatificam possessionem, qua uia perueniretur, non inuenerunt.

R46 says that, in the excellence (*uirtus*) of the incommutable reasons, even our hair is counted.

R47 states that all *rationes* of all creatures are in the Truth, which is «fixed, stable, inflexible»; the philosophers of this world did see this Truth, but from afar²⁶.

2. Doctrinal Summary and Interpretative Problems

From the analysis of all these occurrences, a basically coherent doctrine of eternal reasons seems to emerge, which can be summarised in the following propositions.

- 1) There are immutable reasons for all mutable things, both those to be created and those created.
- 2) These reasons are what Plato calls “ideas”.
- 3) They are eternal, uncreated and divine.
- 4) They are contained in the divine mind and more specifically in the Word²⁷.

26. On the conception of the “philosophers of this world” in Augustine and his evaluation of them, cfr. G. CATAPANO, *The Development of Augustine’s Metaphilosophy: Col 2:8 and the “Philosophers of this World”*, «Augustinian Studies» 38 (2007), pp. 233-254.

27. On the significance of the shift from the divine mind to the Word as the seat of eternal reasons, cfr. what is observed on page 91 of this volume by E.S. Mainoldi in his essay *La teoria delle idee in Giovanni Scoto Eriugena: da Dionigi e Agostino oltre Dionigi e Agostino*.

- 5) They are the way in which God knows creatures before He creates them.
- 6) Creatures are created according to eternal reasons (exemplary causality) and through them (efficient causality?).
- 7) Creatures are by virtue of their participation in eternal reasons.
- 8) There is an eternal reason for each species of individuals and for each collective entity of which individuals are a constituent part, but not for each individual as such.
- 9) The name of a thing cannot be predicated on the eternal reason of that thing (e.g., it cannot be said that the eternal reason of the human being is a human being).
- 10) Eternal reasons can only be seen by purified rational souls and holy angels.
- 11) The vision of eternal reasons as one with the Word represents the pinnacle of happiness.
- 12) The human mind is inferior to eternal reasons but connected to them by nature.
- 13) Human reason judges corporeal things with truth insofar as it sees the content of its judgements in eternal reasons, although it is unable to see corporeal things themselves in their eternal reasons.

These theses, which Augustine clearly states, can raise and, in fact, have raised various questions among readers and interpreters of Augustine's writings from the Middle Ages until today. I list just a few of such questions.

- 1) What exactly is the relationship between the eternal reasons and the Word? In what sense is there distinction between them and in what sense is there unity between them? How is the plurality of eternal reasons compatible with the simplicity of the divine nature?
- 2) To what extent is the causality of eternal reasons efficient as well as exemplary²⁸?

28. Cfr. É. GILSON, *Notes pour l'histoire de la cause efficiente*, «Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge» 29 (1962), pp. 7-31.

- 3) What does it mean for a creature to “participate” in eternal reasons?
- 4) What function do eternal reasons play in God’s knowledge of creatures once created?
- 5) Are there any eternal reasons other than those of each species of creature and those of collective entities?
- 6) How do eternal reasons and mathematical entities relate to each other?
- 7) Can purified rational souls see eternal reasons already in this life?
- 8) What does it mean to see something “in” its eternal reason?
- 9) What is the relationship between eternal reasons and illumination?
- 10) How original is Augustine’s doctrine, and what are its sources?

Contemporary research has focused on the last of these questions, especially with the studies of Jean Pépin²⁹, without however succeeding in providing definite answers. To the discussion of all the other questions, medieval thinkers gave a major contribution³⁰ – a contribution that, thanks to the papers collected in this volume, we can now learn more about.

29. See footnote 5 above. On the patristic context, cfr. J.C.M. VAN WINDEN, «Idee» en «materie» in de vroeg-christelijke uitleg van de beginwoorden van Genesis. Een hoofdstuk uit de ontmoeting tussen Griekse filosofie en christelijk denken, «Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks» 48/4 (1985), pp. 131-153; J. PÉPIN, *l’idée/idea dans la Patristique grecque et latine. Un dossier*, in M. FATTORI, M. BIANCHI (a cura di), *Idea. VI Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo (Roma, 5-7 gennaio 1989)*, Edizioni dell’Ateneo, Roma 1990, pp. 13-42.

30. Cfr. M.J.F.M. HOENEN, Propter dicta Augustini. *Die metaphysische Bedeutung der mittelalterlichen Ideenlehre*, «Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales» 64 (1997), pp. 245-262; I. ZAVATTERO, *In Augustine’s Footsteps. The Doctrine of Ideas in Franciscan Thought, Introductory Remarks*, in F. FALÀ, I. ZAVATTERO (eds.), *Divine Ideas in Franciscan Thought (XIIIth-XIVth century)*, Aracne, Roma 2018 (*Flumen sapientiae*. Studi sul pensiero medievale, 8), pp. XI-XXVII.

La teoria delle idee nello pseudo-Dionigi Areopagita

ERNESTO SERGIO MAINOLDI*

La teoria delle idee costituisce uno dei temi fondamentali della storia del pensiero filosofico, tanto per l'influenza esercitata a partire dai suoi natali platonici, quanto per le implicazioni avute nell'interpretazione di questioni centrali per la comprensione della realtà, dalla causalità alla relazione tra unità e molteplicità, al rapporto tra identità e differenza, per limitarsi soltanto alle più generali. In ragione di questi aspetti seminali, la teoria delle idee ha costituito un serbatoio dal cui potenziale speculativo sono derivate letture della realtà differenti e hanno preso le mosse ontologie sinanco contrastanti. Un esempio di tali divergenze può essere riconosciuto nella critica mossa da Aristotele alla teoria platonica delle idee, che ha costituito per lo Stagirita un passo decisivo verso l'elaborazione della propria ontologia¹.

Il problema posto dall'originaria impostazione platonica, per cui le idee costituiscono i modelli intelligibili trascendenti, ovvero le cause autosussistenti degli esseri, ha rappresentato il principale nodo speculativo della ricezione di questa teoria in ambito cristiano. Se da una parte le teorie della monocausalità e dell'ontologia creazionale implicate dalla teologia monoteista hanno portato all'esclusione di un ordine di causalità trascendente indipendente da Dio, concepito quale Causa di tutto, dall'altra la molteplicità insita nella realtà creata ha riproposto il quesito circa lo statuto ontologico dei modelli trascendenti degli esseri in relazione alla trascendenza divina.

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1. Cfr. E. BERTI, *Genesi e sviluppo della dottrina della potenza e dell'atto in Aristotele*, «Studia Patavina» 5 (1958), pp. 477-505: 480.

Lo pseudo-Dionigi Areopagita è un autore imprescindibile per lo studio della ricezione e dello sviluppo della teoria delle idee in ambito cristiano, sia perché la sua formazione intellettuale tradisce la sua vicinanza al tardo neoplatonismo ateniese, essendo la sua attività collocabile agli inizi del VI secolo, sia perché la sua influenza sugli sviluppi della teologia cristiana, sia in Oriente sia in Occidente, è stata di amplissime proporzioni. Per questi motivi l'opera di Dionigi costituisce uno dei principali terreni di indagine circa la ricezione e la rielaborazione del pensiero neoplatonico in ambito cristiano. Per quanto riguarda il primo punto è necessario comprendere come Dionigi utilizzi la terminologia ontologica neoplatonica e in che modo risolva le divergenze conseguenti alla distanza tra la visione del mondo pagana e quella cristiana: questa verifica risulta essenziale per collocare il pensiero di Dionigi nel rispetto dell'ontologia (neo)platonica e per verificarne i rapporti di continuità e discontinuità, onde approdare a un giudizio speculativamente fondato circa la sua identificazione storiografica come pensatore "neoplatonico cristiano". Per quanto riguarda il secondo punto, la grande fortuna di Dionigi come *auctoritas* patristica, la cui lettura ha costituito un passaggio imprescindibile per tutto il medioevo greco e latino, non deve necessariamente portare alla conclusione che la sua dottrina sia stata recepita *in toto* da ciascuno dei suoi lettori, onde, nella fattispecie dell'ontologia, sarà necessario verificare per ogni episodio della sua ricezione quanto in profondità sia stato accolto l'impianto teorico su cui riposano gli esiti a cui è pervenuta la sua teoria delle idee-esemplari.

La comprensione del rapporto tra Dionigi e il neoplatonismo è essenziale non tanto per poter verificare l'etichetta storiografica con cui questo autore viene usualmente presentato, quanto per comprendere in che modo la sua elaborazione della teoria degli esemplari degli esseri si rapporti con il modello causalistico platonico. Se da un lato i motivi apologetici anti-platonici sono evidenti nel *Corpus Dionysiacum* – e in alcuni casi espliciti, tanto che solo una storiografia preconcepita ha potuto ignorarli o derubricarli senza una approfondita comprensione della loro rilevanza teoretica per il pensiero dionisiano e per la sua collocazione in una linea

di continuità con il pensiero patristico ellenofono² –, dall'altro lato è altrettanto evidente che Dionigi abbia elaborato una dottrina della causalità trascendente con l'intenzione di risolvere il problema teorico posto dalla compatibilità tra la dottrina della creazione affermata dalla teologia cristiana e l'esistenza di modelli esemplari degli esseri che Dio ha creato dal non-essere.

A giudicare dall'insistenza con cui ritorna sul tema, Dionigi appare chiaramente consapevole che tale problematica costituiva un passo imprescindibile per giungere a una concezione della realtà e della sua origine coerente con il creazionismo biblico. Conseguentemente, come tutti i Padri della Chiesa prima di lui, non poteva altro che concepire la filosofia dei "greci" come una dottrina che, mancando di ricondurre la causalità universale all'unico Dio, era pervenuta a conclusioni erranee, come egli afferma esplicitamente nella sua settima epistola. Tuttavia, la ripresa della terminologia platonica e neoplatonica da parte di Dionigi – come degli altri Padri ellenofoni – per argomentare il problema dell'origine e della causalità mostra come i sistemi filosofici e religiosi dell'antichità e del medioevo, nella loro contiguità cronologica e culturale, avessero condiviso un terreno comune di riflessione ontologica, i cui esiti non erano indifferenti al fine di istanziare una giustificazione delle reciproche e contrastanti visioni del mondo. Il confronto teorico avvenuto tra filosofia antica e filosofia cristiana, che possiamo leggere come contrapposizione tra declinazioni del cosmismo antico e del creazionismo biblico, sullo sfondo dello scontro apologetico tra il paganesimo ellenico e il cristianesimo, oppure, internamente al cristianesimo, nello scontro con le interpretazioni gnostiche o ereticali (quali ad esempio l'arianesimo), non verté tanto sugli schemi generali, ammettendo entrambe il rapporto di causalità tra la trascendenza e l'immanenza, quanto sulle soluzioni opposte che sono state raggiunte nei diversi percorsi di riflessione ontologica.

Nell'insieme dei suoi scritti, Dionigi utilizza soltanto una volta il termine *ιδέα* in senso esemplaristico, in relazione al nome divino

2. Per il dibattito storiografico su Dionigi e sulle sue ascendenze culturali cfr. E.S. MAINOLDI, *Dietro 'Dionigi l'Areopagita'. La genesi e gli scopi del Corpus Dionysiacum*, Città Nuova, Roma 2018 (Institutiones, 6), pp. 467-477.

di “piccolo”, associando così l’idea della piccolezza all’agire di Dio e quindi evitando un’interpretazione platonica di ἰδέα come esemplare indipendente dall’unica causalità divina:

Eppure la piccolezza è anche causa elementare di tutto; infatti non si potrebbe trovare che l’idea del piccolo non sia stata partecipata in qualsivoglia caso. Così, dunque, bisogna accogliere il concetto di piccolo in Dio, ossia in quanto egli procede e opera per tutte le cose e attraverso tutte le cose senza ostacolo³.

Oltre a questo impiego, il termine ἰδέα compare nel *Corpus* in poche altre occorrenze, con il significato di “forma, aspetto”⁴. È pertanto il termine παράδειγμα (“esemplare”) a fare comparsa nel principale luogo di riflessione intorno ai principi trascendenti degli esseri, offerta nel quinto capitolo dei *Nomi divini*:

Noi diciamo che gli esemplari sono i *logoi* creatori delle essenze e preesistenti in maniera unitaria in Dio, chiamati anche dalla Sacra Scrittura predeterminazioni e volizioni divine e buone, le quali definiscono e creano gli esseri. In base a questi Dio sovressenziale ha predeterminato e ha portato ad essere tutte le cose che sono⁵.

3. DIONIGI AREOPAGITA, *Nomi divini*, in Id., *Tutte le opere*, trad. it. P. Scazzoso, Bompiani, Milano 2009, p. 495; DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De divinis nominibus*, IX, 3, in B.R. SUCHLA (ed.), *Corpus Dionysiacum* I, De Gruyter, Berlin 1990 (Patristische Texte und Studien, 33), pp. 208, 19-209, 3 (PG 3, 912A): «Καίτοι καὶ πάντων αἰτίον ἐστὶ τὸ σμικρὸν, οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ εὐρήσεις τὴν τοῦ σμικροῦ ἰδέαν ἀμέθεκτον. Οὕτως οὖν ἐπὶ θεοῦ τὸ σμικρὸν ἐκκληπτέον ὡς ἐπὶ πάντα καὶ διὰ πάντων».

4. Cfr. DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De coelesti hierarchia*, XV, 6, in G. HEIL, A.M. RITTER (edd.), *Corpus Dionysiacum* II, De Gruyter, Berlin 1991, 2012² (Patristische Texte und Studien, 36), p. 56, 7 (PG 3, 336A); *ibidem* XV, 7, p. 56, 20 (PG 3, 336C); Id., *De ecclesiastica hierarchia*, II, III, 7, in HEIL, RITTER (edd.), *Corpus Dionysiacum* II, p. 78, 4 (PG 3, 404B). Va tuttavia segnalato che una lezione attestata nella tradizione del *Corpus*, sebbene non accolta dai moderni editori critici, potrebbe costituire un secondo caso di occorrenza del termine in accezione esemplaristica, per cui cfr. *infra*, alla nota 14.

5. DIONIGI, *I Nomi divini*, p. 467 (con modifiche nostre); DIONYSIUS, *De divinis nominibus*, V, 8, p. 188, 6-10 (PG 3, 824C): «Παραδείγματα δὲ φαμεν εἶναι τοὺς ἐν θεῷ τῶν ὄντων οὐσιοποιούς καὶ ἐνιαίως προῦφεστῶτας λόγους, οὓς ἡ θεολογία προορισμούς καλεῖ καὶ θεῖα καὶ ἀγαθὰ θελήματα, τῶν ὄντων ἀφοριστικά καὶ ποιητικά, καθ’ οὓς ὁ ὑπερούσιος τὰ ὄντα πάντα καὶ προώρισε καὶ παρήγαγεν».

In questo passaggio, che segna l'esito della riflessione dionisiana nell'ambito dell'ontologia esemplaristica, le idee-esemplari non risultano essere altro che il molteplice esercizio della volontà divina nel creare gli esseri: le divine volizioni si distinguono tra loro in relazione agli effetti, ma di fatto costituiscono una non-molteplicità unitariamente disposta nella Sapienza divina. In questo modo Dionigi riporta l'ontologia esemplaristica alla monocalità creazionale del Dio biblico e la sottomette all'argomento paradigmaticamente dirimente della volontà divina, libera da ogni necessità, quale unico tramite della creazione.

Gli esemplari-volontà sono qui presentati come *logoi*, intendendo con questo termine le "parole" con cui Dio ha definito nella sua sapienza ogni creatura e ogni suo attributo prima ancora che questa venisse all'essere. Questa teoria, che costituisce un fondamentale contributo da parte di Dionigi alla definizione di un'ontologia rispondente al paradigma creazionistico, ricorre in diversi luoghi del *Corpus*, e il suo tratto più saliente consiste nello stabilire i *logoi* come principi degli esseri (ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὄντων)⁶, anteriori all'essere, unitariamente compresi nella semplicità della Sapienza divina, in-creata e sovressenziale⁷.

Questa crasi di concetti rivela nella sua terminologia il gioco delle fonti, tanto cristiane quanto neoplatoniche, di Dionigi, e la *reductio* concettuale al paradigma creazionistico asserito dal monoteismo cristiano: il termine λόγοι ha infatti un'ascendenza biblico-patristica⁸, mentre ἀρχαὶ è debitore piuttosto del retaggio neoplatonico⁹. Equi-

6. DIONYSIUS, *De divinis nominibus*, V, 5, p. 184, 6 (PG 3, 820B).

7. Cfr. E.S. MAINOLDI, *The Place of the Corpus Dionysiacum in the Development of the Byzantine Canon of Ontology*, in G. KAPRIEV (ed.), *The Dionysian Traditions*. 24th Annual Colloquium of the SIEPM, September 9-11, 2019, Varna, Bulgaria, Brepols, Turnhout 2021 (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale, 23), pp. 53-76: 63-72.

8. Cfr. D. BRADSHAW, *The Logoi of Beings in Greek Patristic Thought*, in B. FOLTZ, J. CHRYSAVGIS (eds.), *Toward an Ecology of Transfiguration. Orthodox Christian Perspectives on Environment, Nature, and Creation*, Fordham University Press, New York (NY) 2013, pp. 9-22.

9. Cfr. E.S. MAINOLDI, *The Transfiguration of Proclus' Legacy. Ps.-Dionysius and the Late Neoplatonic School of Athens*, in D.D. BUTORAC, D.A. LAYNE (eds.), *Proclus and his Legacy*, De Gruyter, Berlin-New York 2017 (Millenium Studies, 65), pp. 199-217: 205-210.

parando questi termini Dionigi trasporta la terminologia dell'ontologia neoplatonica all'interno del paradigma teologico cristiano, conferendole una valenza diversa, per cui è in Dio e nella sua volontà che va riconosciuta l'unica fonte della causalità trascendente.

La declinazione meontologica della teoria dei *logoi* è una chiara conseguenza dell'apofatismo dionisiano, che concepisce la natura divina come essenza superiore all'essere e all'intelletto:

Noi rammenteremo soltanto che lo scopo del nostro discorso non è quello di spiegare l'essenza sovressenziale in quanto sovressenziale, perché è una cosa che non si può conoscere ed è del tutto inesprimibile, superando la stessa unione, bensì di celebrare la processione creatrice dell'essenza da parte del principio tearchico dell'essenza verso tutte le cose che sono. Infatti, la denominazione di Dio come Bene, che spiega tutte le processioni della causa di tutte le cose, si estende alle cose che sono e a quelle che non sono, e sta al di sopra delle cose che sono e di quelle che non sono. Il nome dell'Essere si estende poi a tutte le cose che sono ed è al di sopra delle cose che sono¹⁰.

Il riferimento meontologico contenuto in questo passaggio viene spiegato in uno scolio, dovuto a Massimo il Confessore¹¹, in cui si riconducono le cose che non sono al nulla divino, cioè alla sovressenzialità della natura di Dio:

Il Bene si estende anche alle cose che non sono in quanto sono queste stesse che chiama all'essere, oppure perché, secondo quan-

10. DIONIGI, *I Nomi divini*, p. 467 (con modifiche nostre); DIONYSIUS, *De divinis nominibus*, V, 1, pp. 180, 10-181, 4 (PG 3, 816B): «Τοσοῦτον δὲ ὑπομνήσωμεν, ὅτι τῷ λόγῳ σκοπὸς οὐ τὴν ὑπερούσιον οὐσίαν, ἢ ὑπερούσιος, ἐκφαίνειν, ἄρρητον γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ ἄγνωστόν ἐστι καὶ παντελῶς ἀνέκφρατον καὶ αὐτὴν ὑπεραῖρον τὴν ἔνωσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν οὐσιοποιὸν εἰς τὰ ὄντα πάντα τῆς θεαρχικῆς οὐσιαρχίας πρόοδον ὑμῆσαι. Καὶ γὰρ ἡ τὰγαθοῦ θεωνυμία τὰς ὄλας τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου προόδου ἐκφαίνουσα καὶ εἰς τὰ ὄντα καὶ εἰς τὰ οὐκ ὄντα ἐκτείνεται καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ὄντα καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ οὐκ ὄντα ἔστιν. Ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὄντος εἰς πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐκτείνεται καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ὄντα ἔστιν».

11. Cfr. *Ioannis Scythopolitani prologus et scholia in Dionysii Areopagitae librum De divinis nominibus cum additamentis interpretum aliorum*, in B.R. SUCHLA (ed.), *Corpus Dionysiacum* IV/1, Berlin-Boston 2011 (Patristische Texte und Studien, 62), p. 589.

to ha detto questo stesso padre¹², lo stesso non essere è buono, dal momento che la sua sovressenzialità è contemplata in Dio¹³.

I *logoi*, che costituiscono in Dio gli esemplari di tutte le realtà create prima che queste vengano all'essere, possono dunque essere intesi tra quelle realtà che Dionigi definisce come «cose che non sono» (τὰ οὐκ ὄντα). Essi possono essere intesi come “distinzioni dell'unica causa”, “ragioni”, “esemplari meontologici” o “divine intellezioni”, secondo la conoscenza che Dio solo può avere delle cose prima di crearle e per questo fatto non può essere in alcun modo equiparata alla conoscenza intellettuale delle creature, che si pone sul piano dell'essere creato:

Infatti, per eccesso e non per difetto bisogna attribuire a Dio la privazione dell'intelletto e della sensazione, nel modo in cui noi attribuiamo anche l'irrazionalità a Colui che sta sopra alla ragione e l'imperfezione a Colui che è più che perfetto e ante-perfetto, nonché la caligine impalpabile e invisibile a Lui che è Luce inaccessibile, eccedendo la luce visibile. In questo modo l'intelletto divino comprende tutte le cose con una conoscenza separata da tutte le cose, comprendendo anticipatamente in sé la nozione di tutte le cose secondo la causa di tutte le cose, conoscendo e creando gli angeli prima che gli angeli venissero ad essere, e conoscendo tutte le altre cose internamente e dal loro stesso principio, per così dire, e poi producendole nell'essenza. Infatti l'intelletto divino non conosce apprendendo gli esseri dagli esseri stessi, bensì da se stesso e in se stesso in base alla causa egli contiene e raccoglie insieme la nozione, la conoscenza e l'essenza di tutte le cose non apprendendo ciascuna cosa in base alla conoscenza particolare di essa, ma in base a un'unica comprensione della causa avendo contemplato e abbracciando tutte le cose. [...] Allora, la Sapienza divina conoscendo se stessa conoscerà tutte le cose: senza materia le cose materiali, indivisibilmente le cose divisibili, unitariamente il molteplice, conoscendo e producendo tutte le cose a cagione di sé in quanto uno¹⁴.

12. Cfr. DIONYSIUS, *De divinis nominibus*, IV, 3, p. 146 (PG 3, 697A).

13. *Ibidem*, p. 314, 13-17 (PG 4, 309B): «Καὶ εἰς τὰ οὐκ ὄντα ἐκτείνεται το ἄγαθόν, ὡς εἰς τὸ εἶναι καλοῦν αὐτά, ἢ καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἰρημένον αὐτῶ τῷ πατρὶ, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ μὴ ὄν καλόν, ὅταν ἐν θεῷ διὰ τὸ ὑπερούσιον θεωρήται».

14. DIONIGI, *I Nomi divini*, p. 479 (con modifiche nostre); DIONYSIUS, *De divinis nominibus*, VII, 2, pp. 196, 8-21; 197, 3-5 (PG 3, 869A): «Ἄλλ' ὅπερ ἔρη»

La teoria dei *logoi* dionisiana costituisce un'alternativa tanto all'esemplarismo platonico e neoplatonico quanto all'ontologia aristotelica che, nella sua ricezione attraverso l'elaborazione porfiriana, riconosce l'esistenza dell'universale istanziato nell'immanenza e l'individualità come collezione di attributi. Per Dionigi sia gli attributi generali degli esseri sia la loro natura individuale trovano fondamento in un *logos* meontologicamente e unitariamente stabilito nella Sapienza divina:

Nell'intera natura di tutte le cose tutti i *logoi* della natura di ciascun essere sono riuniti secondo un'unione inconfusa, così come nell'anima sono presenti in maniera uniforme le facoltà di tutto il corpo che provvedono a ciascuna parte dell'intero corpo. Dunque, non vi è nulla di strano se, da pallide immagini risalendo all'autore di tutte le cose, contempliamo con occhi sovramondani tutte le cose,

πολλάκις, τὰ θεῖα θεοπροπῶς νοητέον. Τὸ γὰρ ἄνουν καὶ ἀναίσθητον καθ' ὑπεροχὴν, οὐ κατ' ἔλλειψιν ἐπὶ θεοῦ τακτέον ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον ἀνατίθεμεν τῷ ὑπὲρ λόγον καὶ τὴν ἀτέλειαν τῷ ὑπερτελεῖ καὶ προτελεῖ καὶ τὸν ἀναφῆ καὶ ἄορατον γνόφον τῷ φωτὶ τῷ ἀπροσίτῳ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ ὁρατοῦ φωτός. Ὡστε ὁ θεῖος νοῦς πάντα συνέχει τῇ πάντων ἐξηρημένη γνώσει κατὰ τὴν πάντων αἰτίαν ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν πάντων εἰδησιν προειληφώς, πρὶν ἀγγέλους γενέσθαι εἰδώς καὶ παράγων ἀγγέλους καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα ἔνδοθεν καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῆς, ἴν' οὕτως εἴπω, τῆς ἀρχῆς εἰδώς καὶ εἰς οὐσίαν ἄγων. Οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ὄντων τὰ ὄντα μανθάνων οἶδεν ὁ θεῖος νοῦς, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ κατ' αἰτίαν τὴν πάντων εἰδησιν καὶ γνώσιν καὶ οὐσίαν προέχει καὶ προσυνεῖληφεν οὐ κατ' ἰδίαν ἐκάστοις ἐπιβάλλον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μίαν τῆς αἰτίας περιοχὴν τὰ πάντα εἰδώς καὶ συνέχων [...]. Ἐαυτὴν οὖν ἡ θεῖα σοφία γινώσκουσα γινώσεται πάντα ἄλλως τὰ ὑλικά καὶ ἀμερίστως τὰ μεριστά καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ἐνιαίως αὐτῷ τῷ ἐνὶ τὰ πάντα καὶ γινώσκουσα καὶ παράγουσα». La lezione *ἰδίαν* è accolta nei *textus constituti* da Beate R. Suchla e da Salvatore Lilla; cfr. DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De divinis nominibus*, S. Lilla (ed.), C. Moreschini (a cura di), Edizioni dell'Orso, Alessandria 2018 (Hellenica, 719), p. 88, 33. Un certo numero di manoscritti del *Corpus* attesta invece *ιδέαν* (o *ειδέαν*), lezione che conferisce al passo un senso decisamente platonico. Tra questi testimoni anche il ms. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, gr. 437, su cui vennero realizzare le prime due versioni carolingie, dovute ad Ilduino di Saint-Denis e Giovanni Scoto Eriugena. Anche l'edizione di Guillaume Morel (1562), base di altre quattro versioni latine, riporta la lezione *ειδέαν*. Va infine menzionato che anche la traduzione in siriano di Sergio di Reš'aynā lascerebbe supporre la presenza della lezione *ιδέαν* nel manoscritto greco utilizzato; cfr. E. FIORI (a cura di), DIONIGI AREOPAGITA, *Nomi divini, Teologia mistica, Epistole. La versione siriana di Sergio di Reš'aynā (VI secolo)*, Peeters, Leuven 2014 (Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, 657), p. 106, n. 729.

in maniera uguale e unica, nella Causa unica di tutte (anche quelle che sono contrarie tra di loro). Egli è infatti il principio degli esseri, dal quale derivano l'essere in sé e tutti gli esseri possibili, ogni principio, ogni limite, ogni vita, ogni immortalità, ogni sapienza, ogni ordine, ogni armonia, ogni potenza, ogni conservazione, ogni stabilità, ogni distribuzione, ogni intellesione, ogni ragionamento, ogni sensazione, ogni abitudine, ogni stato, ogni moto, ogni unione, ogni mescolanza, ogni amicizia, ogni concordanza, ogni distinzione, ogni definizione e tutte le altre cose che essendo in virtù dell'Essere, caratterizzano tutte le cose che sono¹⁵.

Se nell'espressione «unione inconfusa» (ἀσύγχυτον ἔνωσιν) cogliamo l'intenzione di assicurare che i *logoi* non comportano alcuna molteplicità nella semplicità sovressenziale della natura divina, l'argomento dell'inconfusione, che richiama la formula di Calcedonia sull'unione delle nature di Cristo, rimanda tuttavia a una distinzione tra entità ontologicamente differenti: ora, nel caso dei *logoi*, che sono anteriori all'essere, la distinzione inconfusa non può altro che essere super-ontologica, divenendo accessibile alla conoscenza solo attraverso la potenza enunciativa del linguaggio, che si spinge laddove l'intelletto e la ragione non possono inoltrarsi. Se volessimo dunque cercare una formulazione che definisca la concezione dionisiana dei generi universali, parleremmo di *universalia ante esse*. Va inoltre aggiunto che le ragioni causali di ciascuna individualità creata sono costituite da un *logos* superessenziale particolare, per cui l'individualità di ogni essere risulta a sua volta essere un volere divino antecedente alla sua creazione.

15. DIONIGI, *I Nomi divini*, pp. 463-465 (con modifiche nostre); DIONYSIUS, *De divinis nominibus*, V, 7, p. 185, 12-25 (PG 3, 821A-C): «Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ τῶν ὅλων φύσει πάντες οἱ τῆς καθ' ἑκάστον φύσεως λόγοι συνειλημμένοι εἰσὶ κατὰ μίαν ἀσύγχυτον ἔνωσιν, καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ μονοειδῶς αἱ τῶν κατὰ μέρος πάντων προνοητικαὶ τοῦ ὅλου σώματος δυνάμεις. Οὐδὲν οὖν ἄτοπον ἐξ ἀμυδρῶν εἰκόνων ἐπὶ τὸ πάντων αἰτίον ἀναβάντας ὑπερκοσμίοις ὀφθαλμοῖς θεωρηῆσαι πάντα ἐν τῷ πάντων αἰτίῳ καὶ τὰ ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία μονοειδῶς καὶ ἠνωμένως, ἀρχὴ γάρ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων, ἀφ' ἧς καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι καὶ πάντα τὰ ὁποσοῦν ὄντα, πᾶσα ἀρχή, πᾶν πέρασ, πᾶσα ζωὴ, πᾶσα ἀθανασία, πᾶσα σοφία, πᾶσα τάξις, πᾶσα ἁρμονία, πᾶσα δύναμις, πᾶσα φρουρά, πᾶσα ἰδρυσις, πᾶσα διανομή, πᾶσα νόησις, πᾶς λόγος, πᾶσα αἴσθησις, πᾶσα ἔξις, πᾶσα στάσις, πᾶσα κίνησις, πᾶσα ἔνωσις, πᾶσα κρᾶσις, πᾶσα φιλία, πᾶσα ἐφαρμογή, πᾶσα διάκρισις, πᾶς ὄρος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα τῷ εἶναι ὄντα τὰ ὄντα πάντα χαρακτηρίζει».

La teoria della causalità divina, che Dionigi argomenta per corroborare il paradigma monoteistico cristiano contro quello politeista neoplatonico, comprende dunque la creazione degli esseri tanto nella loro natura generale quanto nella loro individualità particolare, e contempla nondimeno la loro condizione increata. Il paradigma monocausalistico viene così fondato da Dionigi su una teoria che trova la sua antinomica completezza nel rendere conto dell'ontologia universale attraverso la sua negazione meontologica. L'esemplarismo dionisiano può dunque essere definito come *realismo meontologico*.

Subito dopo aver introdotto l'argomento dei *logoi* come voleri divini e superontologici¹⁶, Dionigi aggiunge una nota polemica rivolta a un certo «filosofo Clemente», il quale, al di là della sua reale identità prosopografica – sulla quale sono state avanzate diverse ipotesi¹⁷ –, è chiaramente riconoscibile come un esponente del pensiero filosofico neoplatonico, dal momento che concepisce gli «esseri principali» come esemplari relativi, differenziandoli così dall'unica Causa-Dio:

Se poi il filosofo Clemente pensa che si debbano chiamare esemplari rispetto a qualche cosa (πρός τι παραδείγματα) i primi tra gli esseri, il suo discorso non procede con parole corrette perfette e semplici, ma concedendo che ciò sia detto in maniera esatta, bisogna ricordarsi della Scrittura che dice: «io non ti ho mostrato quelle cose perché doveste rimanere dietro di quelle»¹⁸, ma affinché, mediante una cognizione analogica di queste, per quanto possibile, ci elevassimo verso la causa di tutte le cose¹⁹.

16. Cfr. *supra*, alla nota 5.

17. Cfr. MAINOLDI, *Dietro 'Dionigi l'Areopagita'*, pp. 115-116.

18. Cfr. Os 13,4; Ex 25,40; Deut 4,19. Per il resto del passo cfr. Sap 13,5; Rom 1,20.

19. DIONIGI, *I Nomi divini*, p. 467; DIONYSIUS, *De divinis nominibus*, V, 9, pp. 188, 111-115 (PG 3, 824C-825 A): «Εἰ δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀξιοῖ Κλήμησ καὶ πρὸς τι παραδείγματα λέγεσθαι τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀρρηγικώτερα, πρόεισι μὲν οὐ διὰ κυρίων καὶ παντελῶν καὶ ἀπλῶν ὀνομάτων ὁ λόγος αὐτῶ. Συγχωροῦντας δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι τῆς θεολογίας μνημονευτέον φασκούσης ὅτι "Οὐ παρέδειξά σοι αὐτὰ τοῦ πορεύεσθαι ὀπίσω αὐτῶν", ἀλλ' ἵνα διὰ τῆς τούτων ἀναλογικῆς γνώσεως ἐπὶ τὴν πάντων αἰτίαν, ὡς οἱοί τε ἐσμεν, ἀναχθῶμεν».

Il contesto neoplatonico a cui Dionigi indirizza la sua critica, rivolgendosi con ogni probabilità a interlocutori reali, viene confermato dal concorso tra la terminologia platonica (*παραδείγματα*) e quella aristotelica, attestata dall'uso della categoria aristotelica della relazione (*πρός τι*). A possibile riprova dell'identificazione di tale retroterra culturale, va segnalato il ricorso a un'analogia combinazione terminologica nel *Commentario al Fedone* del filosofo neoplatonico Olimpiodoro di Alessandria, commentatore tanto di Platone quanto di Aristotele (in particolare delle *Categorie*), attivo nella prima metà del secolo VI:

Proclo precisa che il discorso riguarda ambedue le cose [le forme degli esseri animati e di quelli intellettuali]: dal momento che le forme intelleggibili degli esseri animati sono esemplari (*παραδείγματα*) e questi sono immagini di quelli, sia il modello sia l'immagine sono relativi (*πρός τι*), e siccome non è possibile conoscere i relativi (*πρός τι*) separatamente l'uno dall'altro, è di necessità che si sia discusso degli esemplari e si discuta delle immagini²⁰.

La polemica anti-politeista di Dionigi ritorna ancora nell'undicesimo capitolo dei *Nomi divini*, dedicato – tra gli altri – al nome divino di Essere-in-sé. Qui Dionigi torna a sottolineare l'unicità del principio causale universale:

Tu poi mi domandi che cosa diciamo che sia l'Essere-in sé o la Vita-in-sé, oppure tutte queste cose che noi ammettiamo che esistono assolutamente e principalmente e derivano per prime da Dio. Tutto ciò che diciamo non è contorto, ma facile, semplice e chiaro a spiegarsi. Infatti, noi non diciamo che l'Essere-in-sé sia una essenza divina o angelica che causa l'essere di tutte le cose: soltanto lo stesso Essere sovressenziale è il principio, l'essenza e la causa dell'essere di tutte le cose; e neppure diciamo che vi è qualche altra divinità che genera la vita tranne la vita superdivina, causa di tutti gli esseri che

20. OLYMPIODORUS, *In Platonis Phaedonem commentaria*, in L.G. WESTERINK (ed.), *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo*, I, North-Holland, Amsterdam 1976, 13, 5, 11-14: «καὶ ἐπικρίνει ὁ Πρόκλος ὅτι περὶ ἁμφοῖν ἔστιν αὐτῶ ὁ λόγος: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ καὶ *παραδείγματα* τὰ νοερά εἶδη τῶν ψυχικῶν καὶ εἰκόνες ταῦτα ἐκείνων, *πρός τι* δὲ τὸ παράδειγμα καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν, τὰ δὲ *πρός τι* δίχα ἀλλήλων οὐ γινώσκειται, ἀνάγκη περὶ τῶν παραδείγματων διαλεγόμενον καὶ περὶ εἰκόνων διαλέγεσθαι».

vivono e della vita-in-sé, né, per dirla in breve, diciamo che ci sono essenze e ipostasi principali che danno origine agli esseri – alcuni le hanno dichiarate inconsideratamente dèi e creatori degli esseri, dèi che, per dirla veramente ed esattamente, essi non conobbero e nemmeno i loro padri, in quanto non esistevano²¹ –, ma diciamo che l'Essere-in-sé o Vita-in-sé o Divinità-in-sé è principalmente e divinamente e causalmente l'unico principio e causa sovraprincipale e sovressenziale di tutte le cose; partecipabili lo sono le potenze provvidenziali date da Dio incomunicabile, cioè la possibilità di produrre l'essenza-in-sé, la vita-in-sé e la deificazione-in-sé, per cui gli esseri che ne partecipano in modo a loro proprio sono e si dicono esseri viventi e deificati, e così gli altri. Perciò si dice che il Bene è ciò che dà esistenza in primo luogo alle potenze, sia a quelle generali, sia a quelle particolari, sia a coloro che vi partecipano interamente, sia a quanti vi partecipano solo parzialmente²².

Se dunque gli esemplari non esistono come realtà create aventi sussistenza ontologica propria, le essenze e i loro attributi ontologici non possono essere considerati *universalia ante rem*, non avendo uno statuto di indipendenza ontologica rispetto agli esseri creati

21. L'obiettivo di questa polemica è identificabile, in ragione di allusioni testuali, in Giuliano l'Apostata; cfr. MAINOLDI, *Dietro 'Dionigi l'Areopagita'*, p. 425.

22. DIONIGI, *I Nomi divini*, pp. 515-517 (con modifiche nostre); DIONYSIUS, *De divinis nominibus*, XI, 6, pp. 222, 2-223, 3 (PG 3, 953C-956A): «Τί δὲ ὅλως, φῆς, τὸ αὐτοεῖναι λέγομεν ἢ τὴν αὐτοζωὴν ἢ ὅσα ἀπολύτως καὶ ἀρχηγικῶς εἶναι καὶ ἐκ θεοῦ πρώτως ὑφেষτηκέναι τιθέμεθα; Τοῦτο δέ, φαμέν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγκύλον, ἀλλ' εὐθὺ καὶ ἀπλῆν τὴν διασάφησιν ἔχον. Οὐ γὰρ οὐσίαν τινὰ θεῖαν ἢ ἀγγελικὴν εἶναί φαμεν τὸ αὐτοεῖναι τοῦ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα πάντα αἰτίαν, μόνον γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι πάντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι τὸ ὑπερούσιον ἀρχὴ καὶ οὐσία καὶ αἴτιον, οὐδὲ ζωογόνον ἄλλην θεότητα παρὰ τὴν ὑπέρθεον πάντων, ὅσα ζῆ, καὶ τῆς αὐτοζωῆς αἰτίαν ζοὴν οὔτε, συνελόντα εἰπεῖν, ἀρχικῶς τῶν ὄντων καὶ δημιουργικῶς οὐσίας καὶ ὑποστάσεις, ἅς τινες καὶ θεοὺς τῶν ὄντων καὶ δημιουργοὺς αὐτοσχεδιάσαντες ἄπεστομάτισαν, οὐς, ἀληθῶς καὶ κυριῶς εἰπεῖν, οὔτε αὐτοὶ "ἦδεισαν", ἄτε δὴ οὐκ ὄντας, οὔτε "οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν". Ἀλλ' αὐτοεῖναι καὶ αὐτοζωὴν καὶ αὐτοθεότητά φαμεν ἀρχικῶς μὲν καὶ θεϊκῶς καὶ αἰτιατικῶς τὴν μίαν πάντων ὑπεράρχιον καὶ ὑπερούσιον ἀρχὴν καὶ αἰτίαν, μεθεκτῶς δὲ τὰς ἐκδιδομένας ἐκ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀμεθέκτου προνοητικῶς δυνάμεις τὴν αὐτοουσίωσιν, αὐτοζώωσιν, αὐτοθέωσιν, ὧν τὰ ὄντα οικειῶς ἑαυτοῖς μετέχοντα καὶ ὄντα καὶ ζῶντα καὶ ἔνθεα καὶ ἔστι καὶ λέγεται καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως. Διὸ καὶ πρώτων αὐτῶν ὁ ἀγαθὸς ὑποστάτης λέγεται εἶναι, εἴτα τῶν ὄλων αὐτῶν, εἴτα τῶν μερικῶν αὐτῶν, εἴτα τῶν ὄλων αὐτῶν μετεχόντων, εἴτα τῶν μερικῶς αὐτῶν μετεχόντων».

che la volontà divina porta all'essere in base ai suoi *logoi* sovresenziali. Dobbiamo quindi concludere che gli universali, nell'universo dionisiano, trovano istanziazione solo nell'immanenza. L'ontologia di Dionigi, trasposta nell'ordine del creato, è infatti assimilabile al realismo dell'immanenza, in quanto essa non lascia altro spazio alla realizzazione degli *universalia* se non *in re*.

I fondamenti meontologici della teoria degli esemplari, porta del resto la concezione dionisiana della causalità – e dunque del rapporto tra Dio e il creato – a esiti antinomici:

Tutte queste formule rivelano a coloro che celebrano Dio in modo conveniente che egli, stando a non importa quale riflessione, esiste in modo sovresenziale ed è l'autore delle cose che dovunque esistono. Infatti, non è una cosa sì e l'altra no; né in un luogo e non in un altro, ma è tutte le cose in quanto causa di tutte e in quanto contiene in sé e possiede in precedenza tutti i principi e tutti i termini di tutte le cose che sono, ed è al di sopra tutte le cose in quanto esiste sovresenzialmente prima di tutte le cose. Così tutto si dice di lui in un medesimo tempo, però egli non si identifica con nessuna di tutte le cose che sono: ha ogni figura e ogni forma, egli che è oltre la forma e la bellezza; ha precedentemente in sé i principi, i mezzi, i termini delle cose che sono liberamente e assolutamente in maniera purissima, infondendo luminosamente a tutti l'essere secondo una causa sola e semplicissima²³.

In base a quanto emerge dall'affresco dionisiano la struttura stessa della realtà si configura come antinomica, dal momento che la sua ontologia affonda le radici nei suoi stessi archetipi meontolo-

23. DIONYSIUS, *De divinis nominibus*, V, 8, pp. 187, 6-16 (PG 3, 824A-824B): «Ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα τοῖς θεοπροπέως ὑμνοῦσι τὸ κατὰ πᾶσαν αὐτὸν ἐπίνοιαν ὑπερουσίως εἶναι σημαίνει καὶ τῶν πανταχῶς ὄντων αἴτιον. Καὶ γὰρ οὐ τὸδε μὲν ἔστι, τὸδε δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ πῆ μὲν ἔστι, πῆ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἔστιν ὡς πάντων αἴτιος καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ πάσας ἀρχάς, πάντα συμπεράσματα πάντων τῶν ὄντων συνέχων καὶ προέχων, καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ πάντα ἔστιν ὡς πρὸ πάντων ὑπερουσίως ὑπερών. Διὸ καὶ πάντα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἅμα κατηγορεῖται, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔστι τῶν πάντων· πάνσημιος, πανείδεος, ἄμορφος, ἀκαλλῆς, ἀρχάς καὶ μέσα καὶ τέλη τῶν ὄντων ἀσχέτως καὶ ἐξηρημένως ἐν ἑαυτῷ προειληφώς καὶ πᾶσι τὸ εἶναι κατὰ μίαν καὶ ὑπερηνωμένην αἰτίαν ἀχράντως ἐπιλάμπων», pp. 465-467.

gici, e dove la molteplicità degli esseri deriva dall'unità meontologica degli archetipi, distinti senza separazione e uniti senza confusione nel non-essere divino, che non è privazione bensì sovra-essere e da cui ha origine l'intera creazione: «l'essere di tutte le cose è la divinità che è al di sopra dell'essere»²⁴.

Entro tale quadro il linguaggio assume un ruolo decisivo in quanto unico strumento capace di affermare ciò che è logicamente contraddittorio e ontologicamente impossibile in quanto affermazione che afferma la sua stessa negazione: i *logoi* aprono uno squarcio sul rapporto tra Dio e la creazione circa lo statuto dell'origine increata di questa e della sua permanente radicale increatitudine, e siccome i *logoi* non cessano di non-essere – ovvero di sovra-essere – nella Sapienza divina una volta che sono stati portati all'essere, si conclude che la creazione sussiste in quanto increata nei *logoi* e la sua sussistenza ontologica non acquisisce indipendenza dalla volontà divina una volta creata, bensì sussiste in quanto prodotto delle divine operazioni, eterne e increate, che portano all'essere e mantengono nell'essere i *logoi* sovressenziali in un processo di creazione continua.

Il contributo dello pseudo-Dionigi alla fondazione speculativa del paradigma onto-cosmologico precedente dalla visione del mondo biblico-cristiana può essere riassunto nei seguenti punti:

1. l'ontologia della creazione trova il suo fondamento nella meontologia in quanto tutti gli esseri derivano da un "negativo" meontologico che è il proprio *logos* nella Sapienza di Dio. Questa concezione rende conto precisamente dell'espressione biblica della creazione «da cose che non sono» (2Mach 7,27-29). Il «nulla» biblico va dunque inteso come sovra-essere divino e le «cose che non sono» sono i *logoi* degli esseri anteriori alla creazione.

24. DIONIGI AREOPAGITA, *Gerarchia celeste*, in Id., *Tutte le opere*, p. 103; DIONYSIUS, *De coelesti hierarchia*, IV, I, p. 20, 16-17 (PG 3, 177D): «τὸ γὰρ εἶναι πάντων ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπὲρ τὸ εἶναι θεότης».

2. Attraverso il linguaggio è data la possibilità di “dire” dei *logoi* nella Sapienza divina, in quanto esemplari meontologici, increati e inessenti, delle creature.
3. Gli esemplari-*logoi-archai* coincidono con le divine volizioni: la produzione degli esseri consiste così nella volontà divina che produce il suo pre-essere in quanto *logos* increato in un essere particolare. La condizione di permanenza ontologica degli esseri non è quindi separabile dall’eterno agire della volontà divina.
4. Il dominio divino e increato e quello della creazione non sono concepiti come due ambiti opposti e incompatibili, come lo sarebbero se il discorso si muovesse soltanto entro l’ambito ontologico; essi trovano invece nella radice meontologica di ogni cosa creata, prima che questa venga all’essere, il “luogo” della loro unione sia per quanto riguarda l’origine sia per quanto riguarda la continuità dell’essere.
5. La continuità dell’essere consiste nella sussistenza degli esseri in virtù della creazione perpetua prodotta dalle divine volontà ed energie, ovvero, della continua affermazione nell’essere dei *logoi* superessenziali.

Il pensiero di Dionigi non deve attirare l’attenzione soltanto in virtù della sua levatura speculativa o della sua creatività – e in certi casi spregiudicatezza – terminologica, ma va anche preso in conto per il fatto che nessun autore nel medioevo greco e latino ha potuto sottrarsi al confronto con le sue opere, onde la ricezione o meno degli esiti della sua speculazione serve anche a comprendere la diversificazione dei paradigmi a cui la teologia cristiana ha dato vita nel corso del suo sviluppo storico.

L’esemplarismo dionisiano conobbe un *Fortleben* nel pensiero romeo-bizantino attraverso la ricezione da parte di alcuni dei suoi più importanti esponenti teologici, da Massimo il Confessore a Giovanni Damasceno fino a Gregorio Palamas²⁵. La teoria dei *logoi* in particolare andò a occupare una posizione centrale nel pensiero teo-cosmologico di Massimo il Confessore, dove ritroviamo

25. MAINOLDI, *The Place of the Corpus Dionysiacum in the Development of the Byzantine Canon of Ontology*, pp. 70-72.

i nodi centrali della sistemazione dionisiana, dalla concezione dei *logoi* sovressenziali nei quali tutto è stato precreato alla teoria della creazione continua da parte di Dio:

Poiché, infatti egli possiede, sussistenti prima dei secoli per effetto del suo buon volere, i *logoi* di ciò che è stato creato, conformemente ad essi egli fece sussistere dal non essere la creazione visibile e quella invisibile, avendo creato, e continuando a creare²⁶, mediante la sua parola e la sua sapienza, tutte le cose, quelle universali e quelle particolari, nel tempo opportuno. Noi, infatti, siamo certi che un *logos* abbia preceduto la creazione degli angeli, un *logos* abbia preceduto quella delle essenze e delle potenze²⁷ che riempiono il mondo superno, un *logos* quella degli uomini, un *logos* quella di tutto ciò che prende la propria esistenza da Dio²⁸.

La ricezione dell'impianto meontologico su cui riposa l'esemplarismo dionisiano ha avuto un'importanza decisiva nel garantire alla teologia bizantina un fondamento speculativo capace di inquadrare le questioni fondamentali dell'ontologia (causalità, molteplicità, ecc.) alla luce del principio biblico della creazione da «cose che non sono», nonché di offrire una soluzione alla concezione della salvezza come partecipazione alla vita divina, cioè come deificazione, senza mettere in discussione l'impartecipabilità della sovressenza divina. Questa soluzione ha reso la teologia bizantina indipendente dalle soluzioni della ontologia

26. Cfr. Sap 9,1-2.

27. Cfr. 1Pt 3,22.

28. MASSIMO IL CONFESSORE, *Ambigua. Problemi metafisici e teologici su testi di Gregorio di Nazianzo e Dionigi Areopagita*, C. Moreschini (a cura di), Bompiani, Milano 2003 (con modifiche nostre), pp. 221-223; MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, *Ambigua ad Iohannem*, 7, in MAXIMOS THE CONFESSOR, *On Difficulties in the Church Fathers. The Ambigua*, M. Constan (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA)-London 2014, 2 voll., I, pp. 95-97 (PG 91, 1080A): «Τοὺς γὰρ λόγους τῶν γεγονότων ἔχων πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων προὔφεστῶτα βουλήσει ἀγαθὴ κατ' αὐτοὺς τὴν τε ὀρατὴν καὶ ἀόρατον ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὑπεστήσατο κτίσιν, λόγῳ καὶ σοφίᾳ τὰ πάντα κατὰ τὸν δέοντα χρόνον ποιήσας τε καὶ ποιῶν, τὰ καθόλου τε καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον. Λόγον γὰρ ἀγγέλων δημιουργίας προκαθηγεῖσθαι πιστεύομεν, λόγον ἐκάστης τῶν συμπληρουσῶν τὸν ἄνω κόσμον οὐσιῶν καὶ δυνάμεων, λόγον ἀνθρώπων, λόγον παντὸς τῶν ἐκ Θεοῦ τὸ εἶναι λαβόντων».

antica, orientate da un differente paradigma teo-cosmologico, e ha evitato la riduzione della teologia al dominio dell'ontologia, stabilendo l'antinomia come elemento ineliminabile del discorso teologico.

Divine Ideas according to St. Maximus the Confessor

TORSTEIN THEODOR TOLLEFSEN*

St. Maximus the Confessor (580-662) was a major Greek-Christian thinker of late antiquity. He is known in the history of theology for his defence of the doctrine of two wills in Christ. He was present at the Lateran Council in Rome 649, which gathered under Pope Martin for the purpose of condemning imperial monotheletism¹. Maximus' critique of monotheletism, even if it took some time before he entered the scene of controversy, is not an isolated piece of theology; rather it grew out of the basic insights of what we may call his "system". While several Church Fathers have left us with exegetical, homiletical, and polemical writings addressed to contemporary concerns and issues, Maximus worked out a Christian metaphysical and cosmological system. In that regard he might remind one of the Scholastic theologians, but his genres and styles of writing differs from medieval philosophical culture. I say "styles" of writing since the Maximan *corpus* contains writings that are written in a relatively accessible style while other writings often have long sentences and intricate syntax so that the reader is confronted with almost a riddle. The meditative collections of short texts ("chapters") like *Capita de caritate*, mainly written for fellow monks, are of the first kind. Writings in the late antique question-and-answer

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1. For the history of the council, its acts, and the importance of Maximus' contribution, cfr. the highly interesting contribution of R. PRICE, *The Acts of the Lateran Synod of 649*, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool 2014 (Translated Text for Historians, 61).

genre, like the *Ambigua* and the *Quaestiones ad Thalassium*, are of the second kind².

The topic of the present paper is not the monothelete controversy, but a doctrine that we may say is the backbone of Maximus' metaphysics and cosmology, namely his doctrine of divine Ideas. This doctrine does not simply consist in a claim that there is a *paradigm* of the created world, an "intelligible cosmos", in the divine intellect, mirrored in what God has made. The doctrine rather describes the framework and basic structure of the interconnected, whole drama of creation and salvation. God is the beginning and end of all beings and the divine Ideas have a basic function in this scheme of *procession* and *conversion* to the divine source. To my knowledge Maximus' doctrine of this kind of metaphysics is the most elaborate such system in early Christian thought.

1. The terminology

A first feature of Maximus' doctrine is that he, as far as I can see, never uses any of the Greek terms for "Idea". He uses the Greek word *λόγος*. There are two reasons for this. One reason is that thinkers of the philosophical and theological tradition had already used the term *logos* with the plural of *logoi* to connote the divine Ideas³. Important among these is Origen (ca. 185-254), who in his *De principiis* says that Wisdom, that is the Son of God, contained within herself the «initia vel rationes vel species» of all things⁴. The

2. There are translations into English of the *Ambigua* (with Greek text) and the *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* in MAXIMOS CONFESSOR, *On Difficulties in the Church Fathers, The Ambigua*, M. Constat (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA)-London 2014 (Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library 28), and ID., *On Difficulties in Sacred Scripture: The Responses to Thalassios*, transl. by M. Constat, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington 2018 (Fathers of the Church Patristic Series).

3. Cfr. T.T. TOLLEFSEN, *The Christocentric Cosmology of St. Maximus the Confessor*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008, pp. 27-40.

4. ORIGENES, *Vier Bücher von den Prinzipien*, H. Görgemanns, H. Karpp (edd.), WBG Academic, Darmstadt 1976, p. 126. English translation ID., *On First Principles*, transl. J. Behr, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2019, p. 22.

original Greek in all probability had ἀρχαί, λόγοι, and εἶδη here. We have also an example in the later Aeneas of Gaza (end of fifth century), in his *Theophrastus*⁵. He uses the term «the *logoi* of the Ideas» (τοὺς περι τῶν εἰδῶν λόγους) and illustrates his point by telling how a painter uses a beautiful archetype when he produces many copies that may reflect the beauty of the original. We should also point to John Philoponus (ca. 490-after 567 or after 574), where the term *logoi* clearly denotes creative Ideas or principles in the mind of the Creator⁶. A lot more material could be mustered but let this suffice. On the one hand, therefore, it is clear that the terminology of *logos/logoi* is used in the philosophical tradition for what we may call divine Ideas.

The second reason for this terminology in Maximus is, however, more interesting. This background is Scriptural. The Scriptural background brings us both to the fourth gospel and to the letters of St. Paul. In Colossians, Paul says about Christ (Col 1,16-17):

For in Him (ἐν αὐτῷ) all things were created that are in heaven and that are on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or powers. All things were created through Him and for Him (δὲν αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν). And he is before all things, and in Him all things consist (τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκεν).

With these words Paul declares Christ to be the Creator of the world. Read in the context of late ancient philosophy, Paul may be interpreted to identify several causal moments, namely the paradigmatic («in Him»), efficient («through Him»), and final («for Him») cause. In addition, Christ is the sustaining cause of all things («in Him all things consist»). Maximus refers explicitly to these words

5. AENEAS GAZAEUS, *Theophrastus*, PG 85, 969A; translation in AENEAS OF GAZA, *Theophrastus* with ZACHARIAS OF MYTILENE, *Ammonius*, translated by S. Gertz, J. Dillon and D. Russell, Bristol Classical Press, London 2012, p. 42.

6. See the discussion in IOANNES PHILOPONUS, *De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum*, H. Rabe (ed.), Teubner Verlag, Leipzig 1963 (Bibliotheca Teubneriana), pp. 24-43, translated in JOHANNES PHILOPONUS, *Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World 1-5*, transl. by M. Share, Cornell University Press, London 2004 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), pp. 32-42.

in *Ambiguum* 7 in the context of his doctrine of divine Ideas.⁷ The three prepositions «in», «through», and «for» suggest for Maximus that the *Logos*, Christ, contains the paradigms of creation, and that created entities *proceed* from and *convert* to Him. It is, however, important to see how these Pauline notions are combined with what is said in the opening verses of John (1,1-3): «In the beginning was the *Logos*, and the *Logos* was with God, and the *Logos* was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things were made through Him, and without Him nothing was made that was made». I have kept the (transliterated) term «Logos», since that is crucial for the point I am going to make. As I said above, Maximus combines the causal notions from Paul with the doctrine of the *Logos* of God from John and develops a doctrine of the *Logos* containing or embracing all the *logoi*. This *Logos-logoi* structure is Maximus' version of a doctrine of divine Ideas. The Ideas are called *logoi* because they belong to the *Logos*, express aspects of Him, and somehow “transport” the *Logos* Himself into His creation. We shall see below that the *Logos* somehow expresses Himself in all creatures.

2. The divine *logoi* of beings

What ontological status does these *logoi* have? How do they function? In *Ambiguum* 7, Maximus says they are προορισμοὺς καὶ θεῖα θελήματα, «predeterminations and divine wills»⁸. Maximus here picks up what Dionysius the Aropagite says in *De divinis nominibus*⁹. The latter says the paradigms, meaning the paradigms of creation, in God are «essence-making» *logoi*, which theology calls «predeterminations and divine and good wills». The term «predeterminations» or «predefinitions» suggest that they are God's determinations of what beings should be according to essence, or that they, more specifically, are God's *definitions* of the essences He wants to

7. MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, *Ambigua ad Iohannem*, 7, PG 91, 1077C-1080A.

8. *Ibidem*, 1085A.

9. DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De divinis nominibus*, V, 8, B.R. Suchla (ed.), *Corpus Dionysiacum* I, De Gruyter, Berlin 1990 (Patristische Texte und Studien, 33), p. 188.

create. Maximus says that if we observe the *differences* among creatures, we are directed to the divine *logoi*¹⁰. The *logoi* are, therefore, institutive of the essential differences among beings. The predeterminations or divine wills are contemplated in God's eternal knowledge of beings¹¹.

It is possible that the terms «predeterminations» and «divine wills» connote two different functions of the *logoi*, respectively as «principles of knowledge» and «principles of making». This difference is known from John Philoponus:

And so, as has been shown, the creative *logoi* in God always possess actuality and perfection but God brings each thing into existence and gives it being when He so wishes, bringing all things into existence by just willing them; and He so wishes at the time when coming into existence is good for the things that come into existence; and what is in accordance with nature is in every way good, as was shown in chapter one¹².

There are three things here. First, the divine Ideas or the *logoi* are always actualized in God. Because this is the case, one should expect that the created world always existed. According to the Neoplatonist Proclus, this would be the case: God has eternally contemplated the Ideas and He is eternally good, therefore creation always exists¹³. This seems to be the case according to Dionysius the Areopagite as well¹⁴. However, for Philoponus it does not follow that what God eternally *knows* has eternal existence as a cre-

10. MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, *Ambigua ad Iohannem*, 7, PG 91, 1077C.

11. ID. *Capita de caritate*, 4, 4, PG 90, 1048D. For a translation, see MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR, *Selected Writings*, transl. by G.C. Berthold, Paulist Press, New York 1985 (The Classics of Western Spirituality).

12. JOHANNES PHILOPONUS, *De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum*, p. 79; translated in PHILOPONUS, *Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World 1-5*, p. 64.

13. Cfr. the discussion in T.T. TOLLEFSEN, *Proclus, Philoponus, and Maximus, The paradigm of the world and temporal beginning*, in P.G. PAVLOS, L.F. JANBY, E.K. EMILSON, T.T. TOLLEFSEN (eds.), *Platonism and Christianity in Late Antiquity*, Routledge, London-New York 2019, pp. 100-114.

14. See the discussion in T.T. TOLLEFSEN, *Activity and Participation in Late Antique and Early Christian Thought*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012, pp. 101-118.

ated world. The eternal actualization of the *logoi* in God is therefore a purely internal matter: God eternally thinks or contemplates His knowledge of potentially existent essences. On the one hand, therefore, the *logoi* are what we may call “principles of knowledge”. Secondly, the reference to the divine will also indicates that what God knows eternally, He eternally wants to be “principles of making”. Thirdly, this eternal will is to will creation with a temporal beginning «when coming into existence is good for the things that come into existence». This is a central motif in the whole of Philoponus’ *De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum*. I do not claim that Maximus had first-hand knowledge of Philoponus’ arguments. Even so, it seems that he was convinced of the same doctrine. God knew the *logoi* eternally but, at the same time, they are what God eternally wills to happen at the moment when it is suitable for each creature to emerge with a temporal beginning as created otherness¹⁵. God knows eternally His own mind and His plan for making entities other than Himself, but bringing creatures into existence is due to the *will* of God to actually make creatures with a temporal beginning of their being.

The same distinction turns up again in Thomas Aquinas. In *Summa theologiae* he says:

As an exemplar, therefore, it [namely the divine Idea] has respect to everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even though they never come to be in time [...]¹⁶.

On the one hand, this is very similar to Maximus’ doctrine. On the other hand, there seems to be an interesting difference between what Thomas says here and the doctrine of *logoi* in Maximus. It is of course a common opinion that the divine intellect is of infinite capacity. We might think, therefore, that God contemplates an in-

15. Cfr. MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, *Ambigua ad Iohannem*, 7, PG 91, 1081A.

16. THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 15, a. 3, quoted from ID., *Summa Theologica*, transl. by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, I, London 1981, p. 88

finite number of Ideas, most of which He never actualizes in any creative act. The quotation suggests this to be Thomas' view. Does Maximus think there is an infinite number of *logoi*? One should expect the answer to be yes but, in reality, Maximus denies it¹⁷. Philosophically speaking, this may look rather curious. However, it has a reasonable explanation. It is not that God does not *know* all that it is possible to know, that is an infinite number of possibilities, it is rather that the terminology of *logos/logoi* is reserved for a particular kind of divine thoughts or predeterminations, namely for those that are within the divine Economy and Providence. God conceives the created cosmos as a limited number of particulars, species, and genera. The number of principles or *logoi* is, therefore, finite.

3. The *Logos* and the *logoi*

The second person of the Trinity is called the "Logos". One aspect of this idea is His function as Revealer. In *Ambiguum* 33, Maximus says the *Logos* reveals or embodies Himself in three ways, namely in the *logoi* of beings, in the meanings embodied in Scripture, and in the historical person of Jesus Christ¹⁸. The Greek word *logos* may mean "word", "reason", etc. and indicates that there is some kind of *communication*, something is given that may be grasped by an intelligent creature. God communicates with His world through the *logoi* as manifestations of the *Logos*, and in nature we may therefore see the vestiges of the Creator. However, Maximus says that the *Logos* *conceals* Himself in creatures, which indicates that the divine footprint is not obvious for everybody. One needs a properly trained mind in order to achieve what Maximus calls "natural contemplation". In natural contemplation one "sees" the world from a divine vantage point as a well-ordered cosmos¹⁹.

17. Cfr. MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, *Ambigua ad Iohannem*, 42, PG 91, 1325D-1328B.

18. *Ibidem*, 1285B-1288A.

19. MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, *Quaestiones ad Thalassium I. Quaestiones I-LV una cum latina interpretatione Ioannis Scotti Eriugenaе iuxta posita*, C. Laga et C. Steel (edd.), Brepols, Turnhout 1980 (CCSG 7), *Introductio*, p. 37.

In *Ambiguum* 22, Maximus states that God is none of the things that exist, *is all things*, and is beyond them²⁰. The first and last are easy to grasp. God cannot be identified with creatures in a pantheistic way since He is radically transcendent. On the other hand, if God *is all things*, does not that suggest a pantheistic doctrine? According to Maximus God is all things because the *logoi* of all creatures are in Him. A *logos* is a *divine thought*, a divine thought of what God wants to make. Creatures, therefore, pre-exist in this foreknowledge.

Maximus explicitly denies that the world is eternal. The created order has a temporal beginning with the act of creation²¹. He describes this act as a *procession* (πρόοδος) in which the one *Logos* is many *logoi*²². How shall we understand this? There are texts in which Maximus uses the image of the circle, its centre, and radii, to show how creatures are related to their divine source²³. The centre is God, the *Logos*, the radii are the *logoi* of beings. The *logoi* manifest the *Logos* in His creative relatedness to each creature and binds each creature directly to Himself as the centre of the whole fabric of creation. This is why I have coined the term “Christocentric cosmology” to characterize Maximus world-view²⁴. In the act of creation, God the *Logos* *proceeds* to the totality of creatures universally and to each creature specifically. As directly related to the centre of the cosmos, each creature is so to say situated in this centre. In Maximus’ cosmology God’s providence reaches to all creatures, to angels, humans, animals, plants, and non-living things. The world is not created as a dispensable scene for the journeying of human beings towards God. There is nothing superfluous, no waste in Maximus’ cosmos. What is created and what is within the divine economy, is generally said to be “beings” and “everything”,

20. ID., *Ambigua ad Iohannem*, 22, PG 91, 1256C-1257C.

21. MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, *Capita de caritate*, 4, 3-5, PG 90, 1048C-D.

22. ID., *Ambigua ad Iohannem*, 7, PG 91, 1081B-C.

23. Cfr. MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, *Capita theologica et oeconomica*, 2, 4, PG 90, 1125D-1128A; ID., *Ambigua ad Iohannem*, 7, PG 91, 1081C; ID., *Mystagogia*, ch. 1, PG 91, 668A-B. For translations of *Capita theologica et oeconomica* and *Mystagogia*, see Maximus the Confessor, *Selected Writings*.

24. Cfr. TOLLEFSEN, *The Christocentric Cosmology of St. Maximus the Confessor*.

which clearly shows that God's providence embraces all kinds of entities, not just humans. However, here is a created *order* of being in accordance with which creatures are arranged. In *Ambiguum* 41, Maximus describes the universe as a system of genera, species, and particulars. We shall describe this a bit further.

4. The system of the cosmos

In *Ambiguum* 41, we find a sketch of the system of the cosmos based on its principles, the *logoi*²⁵. From this text we gather that there is a system of *logoi*. There are *logoi* of genera, of species, and of particulars. Christ, the Wisdom of God the Father, comprises this system in Himself; as Maximus says in *Ambiguum* 7, the one *Logos* is many *logoi*. There is obviously a system of principles in the divine mind, arranged like a Porphyrian tree: the highest *logos* of genus comprises *logoi* of species that again are *logoi* of genera of lower species, down to the particulars. In the act of creation, the *logoi* are principles of a cosmic system in which genera, species, and particulars are ontological features of the world. Genera and species, *qua* universals, are created structures²⁶. These universals are not, then, just mind-dependent classificatory categories, they are real features immanent in the created order. The point of all this is to stress the real interconnectedness of all beings. Particulars belong ontologically to their species, species belong to their genera, and eventually all things are gathered into the highest genus comprised in God's Wisdom. Human nature participates in all kinds of being, the intelligible and the sensible. Human nature can for this reason be both microcosm and mediator, a natural *bond* that ontologically interconnects all creatures²⁷. At this point, we can see how Maximus' metaphysics becomes a condition for his soteriology. When the *Logos* becomes incarnate in this human nature, God effects the

25. MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, *Ambigua ad Iohannem*, 41, PG 91, 1312B-1313B.

26. *Ibidem*, 1080A.

27. *Ibidem*, 1305B.

recapitulation of all levels of being in Christ²⁸. Maximus explicitly refers to St. Paul's words in Ephesians (1,10): «[...] that in the dispensation of the fullness of the times He might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are on earth – in Him». As we saw above, in the act of creation the *Logos proceeds* by the *logoi* into the establishment of all kinds of creatures. Eschatologically, however, there is also a *conversion* (ἐπιστροφή) back to the source. In this conversion the many *logoi* are one *Logos*.²⁹ The manifold is drawn back into its source without abolishing the essentially distinctive features of each. The manifold is destined for transformation into a new order of being.

According to Maximus, God contemplated both creation and salvation eternally³⁰. Creation and salvation are two steps in the divine "Economy". God eternally contemplated the *logoi* of creatures as principles of a system of the world arranged like a Porphyrian tree³¹. A Porphyrian tree is normally a system of classification in the mind of one who tries to map certain items that are interrelated. In the present case, the arrangement is first "in the mind" or Wisdom of God, then it is in the created system of the world. According to Maximus, as we have seen, this is also an *ontological* arrangement. The problem with Porphyrian trees is that they are usually rather simple and when one tries to develop them to include a wider scope, one often turns up against inconsistencies and incoherencies. However, Maximus idea that the *logoi* are principles of a created, taxonomic order does reckon with a divine, creative intellect of infinite capacity. It is probably rational to hold that such an intellect is able to contemplate a system of reality in which there are no inconsistencies or incoherencies.

28. *Ibidem*, 1308D.

29. *Ibidem*, 1081C.

30. MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, *Quaestiones ad Thalassium II. Quaestiones LVI-LXV una cum latina interpretatione Ioannis Scotti Eriugenaе iuxta posita*, C. Laga, C. Steel (edd.), Brepols-University Press, Turnhout-Leuven 1990 (Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca 22) q. 60, pp. 73-75.

31. *Id.*, *Ambigua ad Iohannem*, 41, PG 91, 1312b-1313b.

5. The eschatological condition

At the beginning of this article I said that the divine Ideas are not only a paradigm mirrored in the created world. Maximus develops his doctrine of the *logoi* into the triadic scheme in which each *logos* is patterned as a *logos* of being, of well-being, and of eternal well-being³². In this way the divine Ideas prescribe a scheme of development from a natural to a transformed condition. God eternally defines in His self-contemplation the essential nature of each creature. However, God also specifies a *development* for creatures, primarily for human beings, since this human development influences all creatures and eventually, in the incarnate Christ, effects the transformation or deification of all³³. The Son of God, the *Logos* and Wisdom of God, contains all the Ideas for the totality of beings. When He became incarnate, the purpose was that He should unify all that is scattered and all beings that are in opposition to one another. Human beings exist essentially in accordance with their *logos* of being. They should move in accordance with their *logos* of well-being and as members of Christ's body (the Church) they shall develop *virtues* and eventually arrive at so-called *natural contemplation*. The final step is when humans receive divine goodness in accordance with their *logos* of eternal well-being and enters into the condition of *deification*. Humans cannot achieve deification by themselves. They achieve it as a divine gift.

32. *Ibidem*, 1084A-D.

33. This is the topic of *Ambiguum* 41.

Le idee platoniche o predeterminazioni divine in Giovanni Damasceno

CARLO DELL'OSSO*

1. Introduzione: il retroterra patristico

Lo studio delle idee platoniche o predeterminazioni divine in Giovanni Damasceno si inserisce in un lungo processo di “cristianizzazione” di un tema platonico, che ebbe in Clemente Alessandrino, Origene, i Padri Cappadoci, Agostino e nelle opere attribuite a Dionigi l'Areopagita i principali artefici e sostenitori¹.

Premesso che la riflessione cristiana su questo tema ebbe un illustre precursore in Filone alessandrino, secondo il quale il *Logos* preesistente conteneva in sé il mondo intellegibile costituito dalle idee², nelle opere dei Padri della Chiesa ritroviamo tre diverse interpretazioni delle idee platoniche, la prima quella aristotelica, secondo cui le idee erano enti reali incorporei ed esistenti per sé stessi, di cui una, l'idea del Bene, andava identificata con Dio. La seconda

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1. H.A. WOLFSON, *La filosofia dei Padri della Chiesa*, Paideia, Brescia 1978 offre una sintetica panoramica sui testi dei Padri che trattano del mondo intellegibile o delle idee a partire da Giustino, Ireneo, Tertulliano, Clemente Alessandrino, Origene, Agostino, in particolare nel capitolo XIII del suo volume intitolato *Il Logos e le idee platoniche* pp. 231-255. Un'altra sintesi della questione si trova in C. MORESCHINI, *L'immanenza di Dio nel mondo: il Logos e i logoi delle cose nel platonismo cristiano*, «Études Platoniciennes» 5 (2008), pp. 101-116; per uno studio generale sul platonismo cristiano cfr. E. VON IVÁNKA, *Platonismo cristiano. Ricezione e trasformazione del platonismo nella patristica. Metafisica e storia della metafisica*, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1992; per uno sguardo sul Medio platonismo cfr. S. LILLA, *Introduzione al Medio platonismo*, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, Roma 1992.

2. Cfr. WOLFSON, *La filosofia dei Padri della Chiesa*, p. 231.

interpretazione, espressa per la prima volta da Albino, considerava le idee non come enti reali, bensì come semplici pensieri di Dio e la terza era quella di Filone, in base alla quale le idee costituiscono il mondo intellegibile ed hanno due fasi di esistenza, la prima come pensieri di Dio e la seconda come enti reali creati da Dio³. Attesa questa varietà di interpretazioni, ogni volta che nei testi dei Padri c'è un riferimento alle idee platoniche, è necessario valutare a quale tipo di interpretazione si stiano riferendo. A tal proposito è importante verificare anche il contesto in cui viene utilizzata la dottrina delle idee platoniche, se in ambito trinitario, cristologico, protologico, etico, ecc.

Applicando tale dottrina alla protologia cristiana, non possiamo non menzionare Clemente Alessandrino per l'apporto che egli diede alla riflessione successiva, infatti egli parla di Dio come intelletto e «luogo delle idee»⁴ e poi identifica il *Logos* con il Cristo preesistente nella sua funzione creatrice che si serve di modelli eterni, necessari per riconoscere le cose del mondo e confrontarle tra loro, recependo *de facto* la riflessione platonica⁵. Alla luce di queste riflessioni i Padri della Chiesa hanno attestato, a vario titolo, la presenza in Dio di *παρδείγματα* (idee/paradigmi) e di *προορισμοί* (predeterminazioni) degli enti del mondo, in base ai quali il mondo creato non è qualcosa di indipendente dal mondo divino, perché non ha il proprio fondamento in se stesso bensì nel mondo delle idee divine, che funge da prototipo a cui Dio guarda per creare. Queste idee sono poi anche la potenziale immagine in Dio dello svilupparsi storico della realtà, per cui precontengono non solo il prototipo di ciò che esiste nel mondo attualmente, ma anche, in potenza, di tutto ciò che sarà nel tempo a venire. In tal

3. Cfr. *ibidem*, p. 232.

4. Cfr. CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS, *Stromateis*, IV 25, 155,2, A. Van den Hoek (ed.), CLÉMENT D'ALEXANDRIE, *Les Stromates. Stromate IV*, Cerf, Paris 2001 (Sources Chrétiennes, 463), p. 317; ID., *Stromateis*, V 11, 73, A. Le Boulluec (ed.), *Stromate V*, I, Cerf, Paris 1981 (Sources Chrétiennes, 278), p. 147; cfr. S. LILLA, *Clement of Alexandria. A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1971, pp. 202-209.

5. Cfr. CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS, *Stromateis*, V 14, 93; V 14, 94, dove sono citati passi dal *Fedro*, *Timeo*, *Le leggi* e *la Repubblica* di Platone.

senso è fondamentale un testo tratto dai *Poemi Teologici* di Gregorio di Nazianzio che afferma:

La mente creatrice del mondo considerava nelle sue grandiose rappresentazioni poetiche le immagini del mondo, composte da lei stessa, mondo che in seguito è stato prodotto da Dio e che allora è diventato reale. Dio ha tutto davanti ai suoi occhi: ciò che era, ciò che sarà, ciò che è adesso⁶.

Il testo del Nazianzeno parla di una mente creatrice (κοσμογόνος νοῦς) che vede in sé le immagini del mondo (κόσμου τύποι), ossia i prototipi delle realtà create, e che contestualmente conosce il loro divenire dal momento in cui vengono pensate, create e finiscono⁷.

Le idee platoniche occupano un posto importante soprattutto nella riflessione dello pseudo-Dionigi l'Aeropagita⁸ che nel trattato *De divinis nominibus* collega i prototipi al concetto di προορισμοί, ovvero alle predeterminazioni presenti in Dio e secondo le quali si svilupperanno successivamente le realtà create, infatti scrive:

Noi diciamo che gli esemplari sono le ragioni che producono gli esseri in Dio e che in lui preesistono in maniera unitaria le ragioni che la Sacra Scrittura chiama predeterminazioni e voleri divini e buoni, che determinano e fanno gli esseri, secondo i quali Dio soprastanziale stabilì prima e portò alla luce tutte le cose che sono⁹.

6. GREGORIUS NAZIANZENUS, *Poemata dogmatica*, I, 4, PG 37, 422 (la traduzione è nostra).

7. Cfr. C. MORESCHINI, *Il platonismo cristiano di Gregorio Nazianzeno*, «Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa» s. III, IV, 4 (1974), pp. 1347-1392.

8. Circa il platonismo dello pseudo-Dionigi cfr. W. BEIERWALTES, *Platonismo nel Cristianesimo*, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2000, pp. 49-97, dove lo studioso evidenzia la dipendenza dello pseudo-Dionigi da Proclo; cfr. anche E.S. MAINOLDI, *The Transfiguration of Proclus' Legacy: Pseudo-Dionysius and the Late Neoplatonic School of Athens*, in D.D. BUTORAC, D.A. LAYNE (eds.), *Proclus and his Legacy*, De Gruyter, Berlin 2017, pp. 199-217. Una presentazione del pensiero dello pseudo-Dionigi si trova in S. LILLA, *Introduzione allo studio dello Ps. Dionigi l'Aeropagita*, «Augustinianum» 22 (1982), pp. 533-577, per la presenza dei logoi nella divinità p. 551; E. CORSINI, *Il trattato 'De divinis nominibus' dello Pseudo-Dionigi e i commenti neoplatonici al Parmenide*, Giappichelli, Torino 1962.

9. DIONIGI AREOPAGITA, *I nomi divini*, in ID., *Tutte le opere*, trad. P. Scazzoso, Bompiani, Milano 2009, V, 8, p. 467; DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De divinis nominibus*, V,

In questo passo è ben espresso il collegamento tra il concetto di παραδείγματα (esemplari)/λόγοι (ragioni) con quello di προορισμοί (predeterminazioni) che la Sacra Scrittura identifica con i θεῖα καὶ ἀγαθὰ θελήματα, i divini e buoni voleri, ossia la buona volontà di Dio. A tal proposito va notato il fatto che per lo pseudo-Dionigi le idee/ragioni eterne/predeterminazioni divine afferiscono all'ambito della volontà e non più semplicemente al νοῦς come meri πρωτότυποι, in altri termini i λόγοι non sono emanazioni alla maniera platonica, bensì opera della volontà di Dio, perché in Dio intelligenza e volontà coincidono¹⁰.

Massimo il Confessore rielabora ed approfondisce queste tematiche soprattutto nell'*Ambiguum* 7, in cui richiama evidentemente il passo dello pseudo-Dionigi¹¹, dicendo:

Questi λόγοι, di cui abbiamo parlato, il santo Dionigi l'Areopagita ci insegna che sono chiamati dalla Scrittura "predeterminazioni" (προορισμοί) e "voleri divini" (θεῖα θελήματα)¹².

Senza voler esporre la dottrina di Massimo, per i limiti del presente contributo, basta notare che per lui Dio è la causa di tutte le cose essendo dotato di una conoscenza e potenza infinita¹³, in cui come in una sorgente perenne si trovano i λόγοι di tutte le cose che

8, B.R. Suchla (ed.), in *Corpus Dionysiacum* I, De Gruyter, Berlin 1990 (Patristische Texte und Studien, 33), p. 188, 6-10 (PG 3, 824C).

10. Cfr. R. ROQUES, *L'universo dionisiano. Struttura gerarchica del mondo secondo ps. Dionigi Areopagita*, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1996.

11. Cfr. MORESCHINI, *L'immanenza di Dio nel mondo*, pp. 107ss.; per il rapporto con pseudo-Dionigi cfr. M. CONSTAS, *Maximus the Confessor, Dionysios the Areopagite and the Transformation of Christian Platonism*, «Analogia» 1, 2 (2017), pp. 1-12; J. BIELER, *Der Einheitsbegriff als Kohärenzprinzip bei Maximus Confessor. Eine Studie zu Ps-Dionysios Rezeption, triplex via und analogem Weltbild bei Maximus Confessor*, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2019.

12. MASSIMO IL CONFESSORE, *Ambigua. Problemi metafisici e teologici su testi di Gregorio di Nazianzo e Dionigi Areopagita*, C. Moreschini (a cura di), Bompiani, Milano 2003, p. 227; MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, *Ambigua ad Iohannem*, 7, in MAXIMOS CONFESSOR, *On Difficulties in the Church Fathers, The Ambigua*, M. Constas (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA-London 2014, 2 voll. (Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library 28), I, p. 107 (PG 91, 1085A).

13. Cfr. MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, *Ambigua ad Iohannem*, 7, PG 91, 1188B.

vengono all'esistenza grazie alla sua bontà¹⁴. A tal proposito negli *Ambigua* si potranno verificare tutte le dipendenze ed interconnessioni tra il pensiero di Massimo e quello dello pseudo-Dionigi.

Detto questo, non resta che verificare in che modo ricorrano queste concezioni relative alle idee divine negli scritti di Giovanni Damasceno, tenendo conto che le fonti del suo pensiero filosofico sono Aristotele (*Le categorie*), Porfirio (*Isagoge*) e Ammonio, mentre per la dottrina di Dio egli dipende da Gregorio Nazianzeno, pseudo-Dionigi e Massimo il Confessore¹⁵. Inoltre, non a torto, Damasceno è stato definito un aristotelico con delle venature di platonismo¹⁶, non dimenticando che egli si servì delle determinazioni concettuali della filosofia pagana soltanto nella misura in cui esse potevano essere utili al discorso sul Dio cristiano¹⁷.

2. *Pro sacris imaginibus orationes I e III*

Ai fini della nostra indagine sono fondamentali i tre *Discorsi in difesa delle immagini sacre*¹⁸, che si inseriscono nella lotta conosciuta come *iconoclasmo o iconoclastia*, iniziata dall'imperatore Leone III (717-

14. L'immagine di Dio come sorgente da cui scaturiscono tutte le realtà è ricorrente in Massimo come in pseudo-Dionigi, tra i diversi passi che si possono confrontare cfr. MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, *Ambigua ad Iohannem*, 7, PG 91, 1205C e DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De divinis nominibus*, XII, 4, pp. 225-226 (PG 4, 972A) e XIII, 1, pp. 226-227 (PG 4, 977B).

15. Cfr. A. LOUTH, *St. John Damascene. Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002, pp. 40-42; 89-90; C. DE VOGEL, *Platonismo e Cristianesimo. Antagonismo o comuni fondamenti?*, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1993, pp. 79-80; J. ZACHHUBER, *The Rise of Christian Theology and the End of Ancient Metaphysics. Patristic Philosophy from the Cappadocian Fathers to John of Damascus*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2020, pp. 288-290.

16. A. SICLARI, *Il pensiero filosofico di Giovanni di Damasco nella critica*, «Aevum» 51 (1977), pp. 349-383.

17. È questo il filo conduttore del volume pionieristico, ma a nostro avviso ancora valido, di B. STUDER, *Die theologische Arbeitsweise des Johannes von Damaskus*, Buch-Kunstverlag, Ettal 1956.

18. Cfr. IOHANNES DAMASCENUS, *Contra imaginum calumniatores orationes tres*, B. KOTTER (ed.), *Die Schriften des Iohannes von Damaskos* 3, (Patristische Texte una Studien 17), De Gruyter, Berlin 1975.

741) nell'anno 726 con la presunta rimozione dell'icona del Cristo, che sovrastava l'entrata principale del palazzo imperiale, la "porta di bronzo", sostituendola con una croce e poi con un editto, con cui impose la distruzione delle immagini sacre nell'impero¹⁹. Tale controversia si protrasse per circa un secolo, opponendo *iconofili/iconoduli* da una parte e *iconoclasti* dall'altra²⁰. I discorsi damascenici, dal titolo più esteso di *Discorsi apologetici contro coloro che caluniano le sante immagini*, appartengono certamente alla fase iniziale della disputa, poiché i primi due vennero scritti nell'anno 730 o, al più tardi, agli inizi dell'anno 731, mentre il terzo oscilla tra l'anno 730 e l'ultimo periodo della vita del Damasceno²¹.

19. Sull'episodio e sull'anno dell'inizio della disputa le fonti documentarie sono discordanti, circa la ricostruzione delle vicende e dei significati dell'iconoclasmo cfr. D. STEIN, *Der Beginn des byzantinischen Bilderstreits und seine Entwicklung bis in die vierziger Jahre des 8 Jahrhunderts*, Institut für Byzantinistik und Neugriechische Philologie, München 1980 (Miscellanea Byzantina Monacensia, 25); E. FOGLIADINI, *L'immagine negata. Il concilio di Hieria e la formalizzazione ecclesiale dell'iconoclasmo*, Jaca Book, Milano 2013, pp. 106-112; sull'episodio cfr. anche C. MANGO, *The Brazen House. A Study of the Vestibule of the Imperial Palace of Constantinople* Ejnar Munksgaard, København 1959, pp. 108-148. Anche sull'editto è stato scritto molto ed è stato anche messa in dubbio la sua reale esistenza cfr. T.F.X. NOBLE, *Images, Iconoclasm and the Carolingians*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2009, p. 58.

20. In merito a questa controversia segnaliamo, V. FAZZO, *La giustificazione delle immagini religiose*, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli 1977; CH. SCHÖNBORN, *L'Icone du Christ. Fondements théologiques*, Éditions du Cerf, Paris 1986 (di cui citeremo la traduzione italiana: ID., *L'icona di Cristo. Fondamenti teologici*, Edizioni Paoline, Ciniello Balsamo 1988); *Culto delle immagini e crisi iconoclasta* (Atti del convegno di studi, Catania 16-17 maggio 1984), Consoli, Palermo 1986; H.G. THÜMMEL, *Bilderlehre und Bilderstreit: Arbeiten zur Auseinandersetzung über die Ikone und ihre Begründung vornehmlich im 8. und 9. Jahrhundert*, Augustinus Verlag, Berlin 1991; E. KITZINGER, *Il culto delle immagini. L'arte bizantina dal cristianesimo delle origini all'iconoclastia*, Meltemi, Firenze 1992; L. RUSSO (a cura di), *Vedere l'invisibile. Nicea e lo statuto dell'immagine*, Aesthetica, Palermo 1997; L. BRUBAKER, J. HALDON, *Byzantium in the Iconoclast era c. 680-850 – A History*, Routledge, Cambridge 2011; E. FOGLIADINI, *L'invenzione dell'immagine sacra. La legittimazione ecclesiale dell'icona al secondo concilio di Nicea*, Jaca Book, Milano 2015; M. BETTETINI, *Contro le immagini. Le radici dell'iconoclastia*, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2016; N. DENYSENKO (ed.), *Icons and Liturgy, East and West. History, Theology and Culture*, Notre Dame University Press, Notre Dame IN, 2017.

21. Cfr. V. FAZZO, *I Padri e la difesa delle icone*, in *Complementi interdisciplinari di Patrologia*, Città Nuova, Roma 1989, 413-455 con bibliografia. A proposito di questi discorsi e degli inizi dell'iconoclasmo, cfr. B. FLUSIN, *I discorsi contro i detrattori delle*

Detto questo, tali *orationes* si articolano non semplicemente come un discorso esegetico-scritturistico in difesa delle immagini sacre, bensì come un ragionamento più ampio sui temi della fede cristiana, tra i quali affiora anche quello delle idee divine in due passi tratti uno dalla *Oratio I* e l'altro dalla *Oratio III*.

In *Oratio I*, 10 Damasceno così scrive:

In Dio vi sono anche immagini e modelli delle cose che da lui sono destinate ad essere, e cioè il suo consiglio eterno e sempre persistente nel medesimo modo. Infatti il divino è del tutto immutabile e in esso non c'è variazione né ombra di rivolgimento. E queste immagini e questi modelli sono detti predeterminazioni dal santo Dionigi, riccamente esperto di cose divine per aver scrutato con l'assistenza di Dio le cose a lui riguardanti. Infatti, nel suo consiglio erano impresse e raffigurate tutte le cose da lui predeterminate e stabilmente destinate ad essere prima della loro nascita, nello stesso modo in cui, se qualcuno vuole costruire una casa, dapprima egli nella mente ne delinea e raffigura il modello²².

In questo passo Damasceno riconosce l'esistenza in Dio di εἰκόνας e di παραδείγματα, che costituiscono il suo eterno consiglio (προαιώνιος βουλή) e vanno collocati nell'ambito della volontà eterna di Dio, e cioè nella βουλή e non nel νοῦς, proprio come aveva detto lo pseudo-Dionigi. Poi aggiunge che tali immagini sono state definite προορισμοί dallo pseudo-Dionigi, riferendosi ovviamente a *De divinis nominibus V* e, a nostro avviso, volendone delineare la natura, e cioè l'essere una «impressione e raffigurazione intellegibile» nella volontà divina; infatti ritroviamo nel testo il verbo χαρακτηρίζω, per cui il προορισμός è un χαρακτήρ. Questi elementi lessicali confermano che le predeterminazioni divine sono i modelli in base ai quali le cose sono state create da Dio. Secondo noi, va

immagini e l'esordio del primo iconoclasmo, in Giovanni Damasceno, un padre al sorgere dell'Islam, Qiqajon, Magnano 2006, pp. 53-86.

22. GIOVANNI DAMASCENO, *Difesa delle immagini sacre: discorsi apologetici contro coloro che calunniano le sante immagini*, trad. it. V. Fazzo, Città Nuova, Roma 1982, pp. 39-40; IOHANNES DAMASCENUS, *Oratio I*, 10, in ID., *Contra imaginum calumniatores orationes tres*, p. 84.

anche sottolineata l'importanza dell'espressione «stabilmente destinate ad essere», ἀπαραβάτως ἐσόμενα, là dove l'avverbio andrebbe tradotto meglio con l'italiano "inviolabilmente" oppure "inalterabilmente", volendo dire che quanto è prefigurato o predeterminato ad essere dalla volontà divina non può subire alcuna violazione o alterazione rispetto al modello, per cui ciò che esiste rispecchia il modello senza alcuna alterazione. In tal senso va compresa l'immutabilità dei παραδείγματα che beneficiano dell'immutabilità divina, come lo stesso Damasceno afferma nel medesimo passo dicendo: «Infatti il divino è del tutto immutabile e in esso non c'è variazione né ombra di rivolgimento»; di conseguenza anche i παραδείγματα sono immutabili in sé e in relazione alle creature; in sé poiché appartengono alla volontà divina, che è immutabile, ma anche in relazione agli enti o realtà create, in virtù dell'inalterabilità dell'ente creato rispetto al suo modello.

Veniamo ora ad un altro passo tratto dalla *Oratio* III, 19, dove Damasceno passando in rassegna i vari tipi di immagine, giunge al secondo tipo e così si esprime:

Il secondo tipo di immagine è il pensiero esistente in Dio delle cose che saranno prodotte da lui, e cioè il suo consiglio eterno, che è sempre allo stesso modo. Il divino è immutevole, e senza inizio è il suo consiglio, per il quale le cose decise avvengono nel tempo da lui stabilito così come furono volute eternamente. Immagini e modelli delle cose prodotte da lui sono il pensiero di ciascuna di esse, le quali sono anche dette predeterminazioni. Infatti le cose da lui prestabilite e inviolabilmente destinate ad essere erano impresse e raffigurate nella sua volontà prima della generazione²³.

Il passo precisa meglio la natura noetica della volontà eterna, infatti il consiglio eterno (προαιώνιος βουλή), ossia la volontà di Dio, in un certo senso viene a coincidere con il pensiero (ἔννοια) delle cose future. Tale pensiero contiene le immagini o i paradigmi (εἰκόνες o παραδείγματα) delle realtà create, che sono dette anche predeterminazioni (προορισμοί). In tal senso è chiaro che la volontà di Dio è costituita da tutte le predeterminazioni delle realtà create contenute

23. *Ibidem*, p. 127; *Id.*, *Oratio* III, 19, p. 127.

a modo di esemplarità nel suo divino consiglio. Inoltre nella volontà divina sono impresse, ovvero hanno il proprio χαρακτήρ ed εικόν, tutte le cose che saranno destinate ad essere in maniera inalterata rispetto al proprio modello (ἀπαραβάτως ἑσόμενα), così che quando esse verranno all'esistenza nel momento in cui Dio avrà stabilito, esse riprodurranno in maniera perfetta il modello eterno.

È evidente che questo passo richiama quello della *Oratio I* e ribadisce tutti gli elementi della dottrina sulle predeterminazioni divine precedentemente esposte; ciò nonostante, il passo della *Oratio III*, introducendo il termine di ἔννοια come sinonimo di εἰκόνες, παραδείγματα e προορισμοί, rivela che nel corso degli anni, e cioè dagli inizi della controversia iconoclasta (730) fino all'ultimo periodo della sua vita (740-750 ca.), quando presumibilmente l'*Oratio III* venne scritta, Damasceno aveva apportato qualche cambiamento o aveva approfondito meglio la sua riflessione sui paradigmi o predeterminazioni divine, tant'è vero il testo dell'*Oratio III* si può accostare a quello tratto da *De fide orthodoxa* I, 9, dove la θελητική ἔννοια è sinonimo degli stessi termini προορισμός, εἰκόν e παράδειγμα, come ora andremo a verificare.

3. *De fide orthodoxa*

L'opera *De fide orthodoxa*, come è noto, costituisce la terza parte del più ampio lavoro di Damasceno intitolato *Fons scientiae*, venne composta negli anni '40 dell'VIII secolo ed è probabilmente la sua opera più conosciuta e che esercitò un grande influsso anche al di fuori del mondo bizantino²⁴. Il libro I, da cui abbiamo tratto il primo brano utile per la nostra indagine, affronta la questione di Dio, della sua natura una e trina, del Verbo, dello Spirito e dell'intera Trinità²⁵. Al

24. JOHANNES DAMASCENUS, *Expositio fidei [sive De fide orthodoxa]*, B. KOTTER (ed.), *Johannes von Damaskos, Die Schriften*, 2 (Patristische Texte und Studien 12), De Gruyter, Berlin 1973; per le traduzioni in altre lingue cfr. LOUTH, *St. John Damascene*, pp. 84-89.

25. LOUTH, *St. John Damascene*, pp. 89-116 dedica un'ampia sezione a Dio e alla Trinità.

capitolo 9 il Damasceno introduce la questione sui predicati di Dio, là dove tentando di riconciliare la varietà degli attributi divini con la semplicità di Dio, afferma che il nome più appropriato per Dio è *Colui che è*, come Dio stesso aveva rivelato a Mosè sul monte²⁶; poi aggiunge un secondo nome che è θεός, che ha diverse radici verbali, tra cui θεᾶσθαι, e cioè “vedere tutte le cose”. All’interno della spiegazione di questo secondo nome, che rimanda all’attività/ operosità di Dio e non alla sua essenza, abbiamo un riferimento alle predeterminazioni divine, infatti così leggiamo:

Il secondo nome è *Theós* [...] da *theásthai* ossia vedere tutte le cose: infatti a lui nulla rimane nascosto ed egli vigila su tutto. In realtà “vede tutte le cose prima della loro nascita”²⁷, avendole pensate al di fuori del tempo, e ciascuna nasce nel tempo prestabilito secondo il suo intemporale pensiero volitivo, che è predeterminazione, immagine e modello²⁸.

Il testo evidentemente rimanda al *modus operandi* di Dio che nel suo pensiero eterno vede tutte le cose e poi in virtù della sua volontà divina le porta all’essere. Si tratta, in verità, dell’opera creatrice di Dio, che si serve del suo *pensiero volitivo* in quanto *predeterminazione, immagine e modello* per condurre all’essere tutte le realtà da lui pensate. Occorre a questo punto notare la sinonimia di θελητική ἔννοια, espressione tradotta con “pensiero volitivo”, con i termini προορισμός, εἰκόν e παράδειγμα, evidenziando l’intrinseco rapporto tra *actus rationis* e *actus voluntatis* in Dio. In altre parole, all’interno della mente di Dio ci sono i modelli e le predeterminazioni delle realtà create, che poi esisteranno per la volontà di Dio. È evidente che Damasceno si ispira alla riflessione dello pseudo-Dionigi che aveva riconosciuto l’esistenza di λόγοι, definiti appunto *predeterminazioni*, sulla base dei quali sono state fatte le creature²⁹, rigettando

26. Cfr. Ex 3,14.

27. Dan 13,42.

28. GIOVANNI DAMASCENO, *La fede ortodossa*, I, 9, pp. 75-76; JOHANNES DAMASCENUS, *De fide orthodoxa*, I, 9, pp. 31-32.

29. Cfr. DIONYSIUS, *De divinis nominibus* V, 8, p. 188.

l'opinione attribuita a Platone, secondo cui Dio ha prodotto le idee al di fuori di sé, ponendosi *de facto* in sintonia con la precedente tradizione patristica³⁰.

A corollario di quanto detto riportiamo un breve estratto da *De fide orthodoxa* II, 2 dove Damasceno tratta della creazione e scrive:

Egli [Dio] crea pensando, e il suo pensiero sussiste [come opera completata dal Verbo e portata a termine dallo Spirito]³¹.

Anche in questo passo Damasceno sottolinea l'importanza dell'έννοια a fini della creazione, infatti Dio crea pensando (κτίζει έννοῶν), perché evidentemente nel suo pensiero ha i modelli o le predeterminazioni delle realtà create. Notiamo, tuttavia, che Damasceno preferisce ribadire come la creazione sia opera dell'intera Trinità, tant'è vero che la sussistenza dell'oggetto pensato dal Padre è «completata» dall'opera del Verbo ed «è portata a termine» dallo Spirito Santo; mentre egli non tratta dei λόγοι della creazione, ossia quei principi inviolabili che sono alla base dell'ordine creato, il cui compimento realizza la divinizzazione dell'universo e di cui aveva trattato Massimo il Confessore³².

In definitiva, il testo del *De fide orthodoxa* è avaro di considerazioni sul tema delle idee o predeterminazioni divine soprattutto là dove, trattando della creazione, ci saremmo aspettati un più chiaro e più esteso riferimento ad un tema che rientrava pienamente nella riflessione sulla protologia cristiana. In realtà se si esclude il capitolo 9 del I libro nessun cenno si trova a questo tema; a nostro avviso la scelta di passare sotto silenzio tale dottrina si deve probabilmente al fatto che Damasceno preferisse presentare il miracolo della *creatio ex nihilo*, soffermandosi sui suoi diversi ambiti, e cioè il tempo, gli angeli, il diavolo, il cielo, i quattro elementi, i venti, le acque, il

30. Cfr. WOLFSON, *La filosofia dei Padri della Chiesa*, pp. 231-255; tra i diversi brani da confrontare, rimandiamo a GREGORIUS NAZIANZENSUS, *Oratio* 33; CIRILLUS ALEXANDRINUS, *Contra Iulianum* II e III, ecc.

31. GIOVANNI DAMASCENO, *La fede ortodossa*, II, 2, p. 90; JOHANNES DAMASCENUS, *De fide orthodoxa*, II, 2, p. 45.

32. Cfr. LOUTH, *St. John Damascene*, p. 118.

paradiso e l'uomo, preferendo in questo caso la narrazione scritturistica alla riflessione filosofica di matrice platonica.

4. Suggestioni conclusive

Al termine di questa breve indagine non resta che notare che sono davvero esigue le tracce della dottrina delle idee o predeterminazioni divine nelle opere di Giovanni Damasceno; a tal proposito è sintomatico il fatto che nella *Dialectica*, opera dedicata alle definizioni logico-filosofiche, non si trovi nessun cenno ai termini προορισμός, εικόν e παράδειγμα, né tanto meno a ιδέαι e a λόγοι. Dunque, i brani tratti dalle *Orationes pro sacris imaginibus* ed i cenni presenti nel *De fide orthodoxa* sono le uniche tracce di questa dottrina nella riflessione e nelle opere del nostro autore.

Inoltre, va tenuto presente che l'*Oratio I*, databile agli inizi della controversia iconoclasta, ossia il 730, precede cronologicamente la composizione del *De fide orthodoxa*, databile agli anni successivi al 740, ossia grosso modo agli stessi anni della composizione dell'*Oratio III*. Questa precisazione cronologica consente di verificare non solo la presenza della dottrina delle idee divine nella riflessione di Damasceno lungo l'arco della sua lunga esistenza, ma anche il suo eventuale sviluppo o chiarimento. In tal senso, il passo della *Oratio I*, 10 è la testimonianza più antica della presenza della dottrina delle idee in Damasceno e rivela una netta dipendenza dallo pseudo-Dionigi che viene citato *ex professo* nel brano, mentre nel passo tratto da *De fide orthodoxa I*, 9, sebbene la dottrina pseudo-dionisiana sia ben riscontrabile, tuttavia non troviamo un riferimento esplicito all'autore e lo stesso avviene nel brano della *Oratio III*. Inoltre, mentre nell'*Oratio I* Damasceno aveva parlato dell'eterno consiglio (προαιώνιος βουλή) di Dio in cui risiedono i modelli delle realtà create, nel *De fide orthodoxa*, quindi in epoca più matura, egli parla di un pensiero volitivo (θελητική ἔννοια), che è sinonimo di predeterminazione, immagine e modello ed anche nell'*Oratio III* ritroviamo la medesima sinonimia. Non possiamo, dunque, non notare che Damasceno istituisce nei brani citati due diverse sinonimie, infatti nell'*Oratio I* εικόν e παράδειγμα sono sinonimi di προαιώνιος

βουλή, mentre nel *De fide orthodoxa* i termini προορισμός, εικόν e παράδειγμα sono sinonimi di θελητική ἔννοια e nell'*Oratio III* i medesimi termini sono sinonimi di ἔννοια. A nostro avviso, questa differenza non va sottovalutata, perché potrebbe essere l'esito di uno sviluppo della riflessione del Damasceno che registra il passaggio delle idee o predeterminazioni divine dall'ambito della βουλή a quello dell'ἔννοια, ossia dall'ambito un po' più specificamente volitivo/operativo a quello noetico, come se Damasceno avesse voluto riportare sempre più all'interno della mente divina le idee o predeterminazioni delle realtà create. Tale nostra ipotesi, tuttavia, rimane nell'ambito delle pure supposizioni poiché necessiterebbe di un maggiore conforto di testimonianze rispetto a quelle che abbiamo a disposizione.

Detto questo, è fuori dubbio la dipendenza di Damasceno dallo pseudo-Dionigi, che ormai aveva fatto scuola su queste dottrine, mentre sembra non aver fatto breccia nella riflessione damascenica la dottrina dei λόγοι di Massimo il Confessore. Probabilmente il carattere un po' troppo platonico della dottrina dei λόγοι non trovava spazio nell'architettura aristotelica del pensiero damascenico.

Infine, per il Damasceno nella volontà di Dio, intesa come consiglio eterno e/o pensiero volitivo, esistono i modelli, le immagini e le predeterminazioni delle realtà create, che vengono all'essere quando Dio lo stabilisce. Tali modelli nella mente divina godono dell'immutabilità e dell'inalterabilità, che fa sì che la loro esemplarità sia perfetta; in tal senso, quanto è stato creato corrisponde perfettamente a quanto Dio aveva pensato e voluto creare.

In definitiva, la dottrina delle idee o predeterminazioni divine di Damasceno, ancorché fondata sull'esemplarismo di stampo platonico e pseudo-dionisiano, apriva la strada alle successive riflessioni sul rapporto tra *actus rationis* e *actus voluntatis* in Dio non solo per l'ambito teologico, là dove la ricerca verteva sulla protologia, ma anche e soprattutto sulla natura e sull'essere di Dio e degli enti creati, con ovvi riverberi in ambito metafisico.

La teoria delle idee in Giovanni Scoto Eriugena: da Dionigi e Agostino oltre Dionigi e Agostino

ERNESTO SERGIO MAINOLDI*

La comprensione del pensiero di Giovanni Scoto richiede che si presti particolare attenzione alla vocazione intellettuale e all'attività del pensatore irlandese quale *magister*, versato nelle arti liberali, in particolare in quelle del *trivium*, alle quali si rifà sistematicamente per sviluppare con gradualità metodica la sua indagine filosofica. L'Eriugena, indicato non a caso dalla storiografia come "maestro palatino", mostra non solo di sviluppare ma anche di concepire le sue opere attraverso l'applicazione di un metodo "scolastico" che prevede la presentazione dei problemi e il perseguimento delle loro soluzioni attraverso l'applicazione delle regole delle *artes*.

Alla retorica – oltre che per l'applicazione delle figure di linguaggio – possiamo ricondurre l'attitudine dell'Irlandese a prendere in considerazione il ventaglio più vasto delle posizioni teoriche che il suo repertorio di fonti gli metteva davanti, accettando il confronto con esse senza pregiudiziali paradigmatiche, bensì sottoponendole al vaglio dell'argomentazione razionale, senza peraltro perdere di vista il peso dell'*auctoritas*. La rivista sistematica delle opinioni filosofiche, nonché dei *tenet* scritturistici e dogmatici, riconducibile al procedimento retorico dell'*historia*, è un fattore imprescindibile dell'argomentare eriugeniano ed è ciò che conferisce al suo pensiero un carattere genealogico.

Alla dialettica invece – oltre che per l'applicazione delle regole dell'argomentazione –, l'Eriugena si rifà nell'adozione delle *divisiones*, ovvero degli schemi bi- o quadripartiti definiti dalla combinazione tra l'affermazione o la negazione di coppie di termini, dai

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quali egli ricava i modelli generali di rappresentazione della realtà sotto la specie dei concetti impiegati. Le diverse attestazioni di *divisiones dialecticae* e il ruolo da queste occupato nel *Periphyseon* mostrano quanto peso esse abbiano nella lettura filosofica della realtà perseguita da Giovanni Scoto, a partire dalle due principali *divisiones*, che vengono esposte nelle prime battute del dialogo eriugeniano e ne costituiscono il filo conduttore più generale, ovvero la «prima e somma divisione tra le cose che sono e le cose che non sono» e la quadripartizione della *natura*¹:

1. Saepe mihi cogitanti diligentiusque quantum uires suppetunt inquirenti rerum omnium quae uel animo percipi possunt uel intentionem eius superant primam summamque diuisionem esse in ea quae sunt et in ea quae non sunt horum omnium generale uocabulum occurrit quod graece ΦΥCIC, latine uero natura uocitatur².
2. Videtur mihi diuisio naturae per quattuor differentias quattuor species recipere, quarum prima est in eam quae creat et non creatur, secunda in eam quae et creatur et creat, tertia in eam quae creatur et non creat, quarta quae nec creat nec creatur³.

L'applicazione sistematica di questo approccio metodologico è quanto non solo conferisce al testo eriugeniano uno sviluppo "ad albero", in cui si rispecchia l'argomentare dialettico dal generale al particolare fino all'esaurimento delle combinazioni terminologiche o concettuali, ma anche quanto mette in moto il percorso ermeneutico e argomentativo che il maestro palatino segue per giungere alla soluzione delle aporie emergenti dalla combinazione delle sue fonti.

Questa premessa è necessaria per affrontare la teoria eriugeniana delle idee divine in tutta la sua complessità, ma anche per

1. Cfr. IOHANNES SCOTTUS ERIUGENA, *Periphyseon*, PL 122, É. Jeauneau (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1996-2003 (CCCM 161-165), I, pp. 3-4 (PL 122, 441A). Per la disamina di altre *divisiones* cfr. E.S. MAINOLDI, *Creation in Wisdom. Eriugena's Sophiology beyond Ontology and Meontology*, in W. OTTEN, M. ALLEN (eds.), *Eriugena and Creation*, Brepols, Turnhout 2014, pp. 183-222: 184-188.

2. Id., *Periphyseon*, I, p. 3 (PL 122, 441A).

3. *Ibidem*.

valutare l'originalità degli esiti a cui essa perviene. Giovanni Scoto ha infatti attinto tanto dalle sue fonti latine quanto dalle sue fonti greche le nozioni che riverserà nella sua riflessione intorno alle idee divine, ma è soprattutto l'esegesi di queste nozioni attraverso lo schema dialettico della *diuisio naturae per quattuor differentias* che le arricchisce di significati e di aporie che condurranno la riflessione eriugeniana attraverso percorsi argomentativi destinati a pervenire a risultati assenti dalle sue fonti.

La quadripartizione della natura, le cui *divisiones* (definite anche *species*, *partes* o *differentiae*) sono ricavate dal verbo *creo* predicato del soggetto *natura*, nelle sue coniugazioni affermativa e negativa, attiva e passiva (*quae creat et non creatur*, *quae et creatur et creat*, *quae creatur et non creat*, *quae nec creat nec creatur*), costituisce uno strumento rappresentativo polivalente, estendendosi a ogni realtà concepibile in considerazione della sua origine e del suo operare (significato correlato all'etimologia di *natura* > *nascor*, φύσις > φύω), ma allo stesso tempo può essere fonte di incomprensione in quanto le quattro *species* fanno riferimento non a realtà ontologicamente diverse, bensì alla stessa realtà, la *natura* che, in quanto nome del genere che comprende le due specie *quae sunt* e *quae non sunt*, si estende a tutte le cose che esistono e che ante-esistono, stabilendo una relazione "nurantesi-nurante" con l'insieme delle sue stesse possibilità di farsi realtà: essa è quindi compresa come Dio nel suo operare, se considerato come creatore (prima natura), e nel suo non-operare, se considerato nella sua trascendenza assoluta (quarta natura), è «causa omnium» in quanto Creatore ed è causa «in primordialibus causis» (seconda natura), per farsi infine effetto «nelle cose che esistono nello spazio e nel tempo» (terza natura)⁴.

L'espressione «causae primordiales» è ricavata dal *De Genesi ad litteram* di Agostino, opera che l'Eriugena cita proprio nell'entrare nel merito della teoria della causalità, da lui inquadrata secondo quella prospettiva gnoseologica che costituisce la principale pre-

4. *Ibidem*, p. 4 (PL 122, 442A): «Nam de aliis tribus nullo modo haesitare ausim, cum prima, ut arbitror, in causa omnium quae sunt, quae deus est, intelligatur; secunda uero in primordialibus causis; tertia in his quae in generatione temporibusque et locis cognoscuntur».

occupazione teoretica del suo filosofare, prima ancora di arrivare alla discussione dei portati ontologici di questa: le *causae* sono contemplate innanzitutto «in Dio», quindi «in sé stesse» e infine nelle «creature»⁵. Le cause sono anche assimilate al greco *πρωτότυπα*, termine che egli riprende dagli *Ambigua* di Massimo il Confessore⁶. Va peraltro notato che questo termine non compare nel *Corpus Dionysiacum*, opera che egli aveva pure tradotto pochi anni prima e che costituirà l'altra fondamentale fonte per l'elaborazione della sua concezione delle cause esemplari.

Nel prosieguo del discorso, facendo riferimento a due passi paolini riguardanti la superiorità di Dio rispetto alle capacità dell'intelletto⁷, l'Eriugena riafferma che le cause primordiali che sono in Dio sono Dio stesso, il quale sfugge a ogni comprensione e affermazione⁸. In questo modo il tema delle cause primordiali, introdotto nella quadripartizione della natura, viene ad intrecciarsi con il discorso meontologico, i cui contorni erano stati tratteggiati dall'Eriugena nel lungo inciso iniziale del suo capolavoro, dedicato ai cinque modi del non-essere, presentati come corollario della «prima e somma divisione» della *natura*⁹.

5. *Ibidem*, p. 8 (PL 122, 446A): «nisi me paulisper turbaret quod a sancto Augustino in examerio suo dictum uidetur, hoc est, angelicam naturam ante omnem creaturam dignitate non tempore conditam fuisse, ac per hoc et aliorum omnium praeter suimet primordiales causas, hoc est principalia exempla quae graeci ΠΡΩΤΟΤΥΠΑ nominant, prius in deo considerasse, deinde in se ipsa, deinde ipsas creaturas».

6. MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, *Ambigua ad Iohannem iuxta Iohannis Scotti Eriugena latinitam interpretationem*, ed. É. Jeauneau, Brepols, Turnhout 1988 (CCSG, 18), p. 259: «Ad ipsam siquidem proprie diuinarum rerum et ΠΡΩΤΟΤΥΠΩΝ (id est principalium exemplorum) ueritatem». Giovanni Scoto aveva tradotto in latino gli *Ambigua*, verosimilmente prima di intraprendere la scrittura del *Periphyseon*.

7. Cfr. Rom 11,34 e Phil 4,7. Il primo riferimento è verosimilmente desunto da Agostino, comparando in AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De Genesi ad litteram*, J. Zycha (ed.), Tempsky-Freytag, Praha-Wien-Leipzig 1894 (CSEL 28/1), II, viii, 19, p. 44, 23.

8. IOHANNES SCOTTUS ERIUGENA, *Periphyseon*, I, pp. 8-9 (PL 122, 446B): «[Apostolus] qui super omne quod dicitur et intelligitur ipsum deum et causas omnium in eo, quae non aliud sunt praeter quod ipse est, affirmat esse».

9. Cfr. D. MORAN, *Eriugena on the Five Modes of Being and Non-Being: Reflections on his Sources*, in I. RAMELLI (ed.), *Eriugena's Christian Neoplatonism and its Sources in Patristic and Ancient Philosophy*, Peeters, Leuven 2021 (*Studia Patristica*, 122, 19), pp. 73-98.

Questo tema viene accantonato nel prosieguo del primo libro per essere ripreso e approfondito nel secondo, dove le agostiniane *causae primordiales* vengono presentate come sinonimo delle pseudo-dionisiane «predeterminazioni» (προορισματα) e «divine e buone volontà» (θεϊὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ θελήματα), nonché dei massimiani πρωτότυπα, comparando inoltre per la prima volta nel dialogo eriugeniano il termine ἰδέα:

Ipsae autem primordiales rerum causae a graecis ΠΡΩΤΟΤΥΠΑ (hoc est primordialia exempla) uel ΠΡΟΟΠΙΣΜΑΤΑ (hoc est praedestinationes uel praediffinitiones) uocantur. Item ab eisdem ΘΕΙΑ ΘΕΛΕΣΜΑΤΑ (hoc est diuinae uoluntates) dicuntur. ΙΔΕΑ quoque (id est species uel forma in qua omnium rerum faciendarum, priusquam essent, incommutabiles rationes conditae sunt) solet uocari¹⁰.

Per quanto il passo sottenda questo ricco concorso di fonti, il principale ipotesto che l'Irlandese ha preso in considerazione e rielaborato va riconosciuto nel quinto libro del *De diuinis nominibus* dello pseudo-Dionigi, che qui riportiamo nella versione latina approntata dallo stesso Eriugena:

10. IOHANNES SCOTTUS ERIUGENA, *Periphyseon*, II, p. 8 (PL 122, 529A-B). Non essendo termine corrente dell'ontologia creazionale tanto dello pseudo-Dionigi quanto di Massimo il Confessore, è probabile che l'Eriugena abbia ripreso il termine ἰδέα direttamente dalla traduzione latina del *Timeo*, oppure da Agostino; Cfr. CALCIDIUS, *Commentarius in Platonis Timaeum*, J.H. Waszink (ed.), Warburg-Brill, London-Leiden 1975 (Plato latinus, 4), II, p. 32: «Hoc igitur quod deerat addebat opifex deus; atque ut mens, cuius uisus contemplatioque intellectus est, idearum genera contemplantur in intellegibili mundo, quae ideae sunt illic animalia, sic deus in hoc opere suo sensili diuersa animalium genera statuit esse debere constituitque quattuor, primum caeleste plenum diuinitatis, aliud deinde praepes aeriua-gum, tertium aquae liquoribus accommodatum, quartum quod terrena soliditas sustineret»; AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, A. Mutzenbecher (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1975 (CCSL 44A), q. 46, p. 73: «quas rationes, ut dictum est, siue ideas siue formas siue species siue rationes licet uocare, et multis conceditur appellare quod libet, sed paucissimis uidere quod uerum est»; ID., *De ciuitate Dei*, B. Dombart, A. Kalb (edd.), Brepols, Turnhout 1955 (CCSL 47), VII, 28, 23: «qua in re omitto dicere, quod plato illas ideas tantam uim habere dicit, ut secundum eas non caelum aliquid fecerit, sed etiam caelum factum sit».

Paradigmata autem dicimus esse ipsas in deo existentium substantificas et uniformiter praetextas rationes, quas theologia praedestinationes uocat, et diuinas et optimas uoluntates existentium discretiuias et factiuias, secundum quas ipse superessentialis existentia omnia praedestinauit et adduxit¹¹.

Questo stesso passo compare *verbatim* all'interno di una più corposa citazione dai *Nomi diuini* posta alla fine del secondo libro del *Periphyseon*, quasi a voler suggellare attraverso l'*auctoritas* patristica dell'Areopagita il percorso di riflessione sulle cause compiuto fin lì. Incidentalmente notiamo che nella ricapitolazione che precede immediatamente questa citazione, il maestro palatino aveva preferito all'originale dionisiano *paradigmata* il massimiano ΠΡΩΤΟΤΥΠΑ, dato che il grecismo *paradigma* è da lui utilizzato soprattutto con il senso di «esempio», come attestano diversi passi delle sue opere. Quello che è tuttavia importante rilevare è che l'Eriugena ha fatto suo il significato meontologico della teoria dionisiana dei *logoi*, e cioè che gli esemplari di tutte le cose sono diuinemente predisposti nel sovra-essere diuino prima di essere portati all'essere (*priusquam essent*) per volontà diuina. L'Irlandese è del tutto esplicito nel sottolineare che queste idee non appartengono al dominio dell'ontologia, bensì a quello della meontologia:

Quamuis enim uideantur rerum informitates medietatis locum obtinere inter esse et non esse, incipientes ex non esse esse – siquidem ex non esse processionem quandam ad esse inchoant, nondum tamen ad perfectionem formae atque essentiae intelliguntur peruenisse – plus appropinquare iudicantur ad non esse quam ad esse¹².

11. DIONYSIUS, *De diuinis nominibus iuxta Iohannis Scotti Eriugena latinam interpretationem*, in Ph. CHEVALLIER (éd.), *Dionysiaca. Recueil donnant l'ensemble des trad. latines des ouvrages attribués au Denys de l'Aréopage*, Desclée de Brouwer, Bruges, Paris 1937-1951, p. 360; Cf. DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De diuinis nominibus*, in B.R. SUCHLA (ed.), *Corpus Dionysiicum* I, De Gruyter, Berlin 1990 (Patristische Texte und Studien, 33), V, 8, 824C, p. 188, 6-10.

12. IOHANNES SCOTTUS ERIUGENA, *Periphyseon*, II, p. 30 (PL 122, 547B).

Possiamo dunque constatare come l'Eriugena comprenda le cause primordiali tra le cose che non sono (*ea quae non sunt*), sicché, attraverso la soluzione meontologica egli può affermare – come peraltro fa Dionigi prima di lui – la predisposizione delle cause primordiali in Dio, senza cadere in un'ontologia esemplaristica di stampo platonico. La stessa problematica viene ripresa alla fine del secondo libro, ma qui troviamo uno sviluppo diverso rispetto alla formulazione data in apertura del medesimo libro, che si discosta dalla posizione dionisiana condivisa in precedenza. Se infatti per il Padre greco i *logoi* (*rationes* nella traduzione eriugeniana) sono predisposti *in deo*, e nel primo riferimento Giovanni Scoto non aggiunge nulla rispetto a ciò, nella ricapitolazione dell'argomento alla fine del secondo libro, egli adotta una lettura trinitaria, per cui le cause primordiali sono dette essere fatte dal Padre nel Figlio e divise nei loro effetti dallo Spirito Santo:

Nutritor: Causae itaque primordiales sunt, [[quod et in praecedentibus dixeram]]¹³, quas Graeci ΙΔΕΑC uocant (hoc est species uel formas), aeternas et incommutabiles rationes, secundum quas, et in quibus uisibilis et inuisibilis mundus formatur et regitur. Ideoque a graecorum sapientibus ΠΡΩΤΟΤΥΠΑ appellari meruerunt (hoc est principalia exempla), quae pater in filio fecit et per spiritum sanctum in effectus suos diuidit atque multiplicat. ΠΙΠΟΟΠΙCΜΑΤΑ quoque uocantur (id est praedestinationes). In ipsis enim quaecunque diuina prudentia et fiunt et facta sunt et futura sunt simul et semel et incommutabiliter praedestinata sunt. Nil enim naturaliter in creatura uisibili et inuisibili oritur, praeter quod in eis ante omnia tempora et loca praedefinitum et praedeterminatum est. Item a philosophis ΘΕΙΑ ΘΕΛΗΜΑΤΑ (id est diuinae uoluntates) nominari solent, quoniam omnia quaecunque uoluit deus facere, in ipsis primordialiter et causaliter fecit, et quae futura sunt, in eis ante saecula facta sunt¹⁴.

L'Eriugena giunge così a identificare i *logoi* dionisiani (*aeternae et incommutabiles rationes*) con le agostiniane *causae primordiales*, le

13. Aggiunta al ms. Reims, Bibliothèque municipale, 875, f. 147r, della mano irlandese contrassegnata come *i'*, in cui è riconosciuta l'autografia di Giovanni Scoto.

14. IOHANNES SCOTTUS ERIUGENA, *Periphyseon*, II, p. 124 (Pl 122, 615D-616A).

quali sono a loro volta assimilate ai nomi divini dionisiani, che sono presentati come principi degli esseri costituiti *semel et simul* dal Padre nel Figlio:

Sunt igitur primordiales causae, quas rerum omnium principia diuini sapientes appellant, per se ipsam bonitas, per se ipsam essentia, per se ipsam uita, per se ipsam sapientia, per se ipsam ueritas, per se ipsam intellectus, per se ipsam ratio, per se ipsam uirtus, per se ipsam iustitia, per se ipsam salus, per se ipsam magnitudo, per se ipsam omnipotentia, per se ipsam aeternitas, per se ipsam pax, et omnes uirtutes et rationes, quas semel et simul pater fecit in filio, et secundum quas ordo omnium rerum a summo usque deorsum textitur, hoc est ab intellectuali creatura, quae deo post deum proxima est, usque ad extremum rerum omnium ordinem, quo corpora continentur¹⁵.

L'Eriugena non utilizza qui la locuzione “nomi divini”, ma altrove mostra di considerarli equivalenti alle cause primordiali, dal momento che la loro serie coincide essenzialmente con la serie dei nomi divini dionisiani¹⁶. Il motivo di questa omissione può essere un dettaglio, ma a nostro avviso non è estraneo al fatto che in tutto questo percorso il maestro palatino si richiama alle sue *auctoritates* solo in modo generico (*a graecorum sapientibus, a philosophis, diuini sapientes*), essendo sua intenzione quella di risolvere le aporie a cui è giunta l'elaborazione della teoria della causalità e dell'esemplarismo secondo le premesse stabilite dalle due *divisiones* iniziali del *Periphyseon*.

Rispetto a Dionigi, l'Eriugena si differenzia per la concezione dei nomi divini, che il Padre greco intende come energie divine, eterne nella natura divina e per le quali Dio opera la sua economia creazionale e deificante, concependo poi i *logoi* come modelli degli esseri, sia dei generi sia degli individui, prestabiliti da Dio nella sua sapienza prima che questi vengano all'essere. I *logoi* sono stabiliti

15. *Ibidem*, p. 125.

16. *Ibidem*, I, p. 17 (PL 122, 452B): «Quamuis enim multis nominibus diuina natura denominetur, ut est bonitas, essentia, ueritas, caeteraque huiusmodi, frequentissime tamen eo nomine diuina utitur scriptura».

dalle energie divine, sia nella loro condizione meontologica, sia nella processione nell'essere per volontà divina. Sebbene tanto le energie divine quanto i *logoi* siano superiori e anteriori all'essere e quindi facciano parte delle realtà che non sono, per Dionigi essi sono chiaramente distinti e non assimilabili, ammettendo l'Areopagita, come i Padri cappadoci prima di lui e la tradizione teologica bizantina dopo di lui, due ordini di distinzioni nella natura divina, quella tra le ipostasi trinitarie e quella tra l'essenza e le energie divine¹⁷.

L'Eriugena invece non accetta alcuna distinzione reale in Dio, fedele al principio agostiniano della *divina simplicitas*. Le cause primordiali sono Dio stesso¹⁸ e i *logoi-rationes* non sono altro che le cause, la cui pluralità è introdotta dalla *theoria* umana, ma che, nella realtà, non sono altro rispetto all'unica *causa omnium*, cioè Dio¹⁹. L'antinomia della *diákrisis*, che per i Padri greci, dai Cappadoci in poi, è concepita come distinzione reale benché superontologica nella natura divina, viene risolta da Giovanni Scoto esclusivamente sul piano gnoseologico, secondo quella che lui definisce *duplex theoria*, per cui lo stesso oggetto può essere visto in due modi diversi a seconda di come viene considerato²⁰. Rivolta alla quadripartizione della natura, la *duplex theoria* riconosce Dio in quanto tale sotto la specie della prima e della quarta natura, e Dio in quanto *causa omnium* nella prima e nella seconda natura: sebbene le *species naturae* differiscano nella *theoria*, il loro oggetto è lo stesso e identico:

17. Cfr. E.S. MAINOLDI, *La meontologia dello pseudo-Dionigi Areopagita e la sua collocazione nella tradizione patristica e filosofica*, in P. DE FEO (a cura di), *Il nihil nell'Alto Medioevo*. Atti di Convegno 28-29 maggio 2015, Pontificio Ateneo Sant'Anselmo, Aracne, Roma 2017 (Ragione plurale 3), pp. 71-131: 87-89.

18. Cfr. *supra*, alla nota 8.

19. Anche nella concezione della triade ontologica *essentia – virtus – operatio*, l'Eriugena si distanzia dalle sue fonti orientali, sostenendo l'indistinzione in Dio di ciò a cui rimandano i tre termini; cfr. R. DE FILIPPIS, E.S. MAINOLDI, *La formazione e le ricezioni della triade οὐσία – δύναμις – ἐνέργεια. Una presentazione del problema storico e storiografico*, in *Id.* (a cura di), *La triade dell'Essere. Essenza – Potenza – Atto nel pensiero tardo-antico, medievale e rinascimentale*, Brepols, Turnhout 2022, pp. 19-78: 66.

20. Cfr. MORAN, *Eriugena on the Five Modes of Being and Non-Being*, pp. 4-7.

Cuius prima species est quae naturam creatricem et non creatam, secunda quae naturam et creatam et creatricem, tertia quae creatam et non creatam, quarta quae neque creatam neque creatricem considerat atque discernit. Et prima quidem et quarta forma de deo solummodo praedicatur. Non quod ipsius natura, quae simplex et plusquam simplex est, diuidua sit, sed quod duplicis theoriae modum recipit. Dum enim ipsam esse rerum omnium principium et causam intueor, occurrit mihi uera ratio, quae fiducialiter suggerit diuinam essentiam uel substantiam, bonitatem, uirtutem, sapientiam, caeteraque quae de deo praedicantur a nullo creari, quia diuinam naturam nihil superius praecedit, omnia autem, quae sunt et quae non sunt, ab ea et per eam et in ea et ad eam creari²¹.

Significativo è il ricorso alla *duplex theoria* nel terzo libro del *Periphyseon*, in relazione alla principale aporia comportata dallo schema della quadripartizione della natura, ovvero l'aporia aperta dalla concezione delle cause primordiali come *natura creata* dal Padre nel Figlio, cosa che si traduce nell'affermazione che qualcosa di creato sussisterebbe nella natura divina:

Duplexque de creatura dabitur intellectus: Vnus quidem considerat aeternitatem ipsius in diuina cognitione, in qua omnia uere et substantialiter permanent, alter temporalem conditionem ipsius ueluti postmodum in se ipsa²².

Muovendosi entro il registro gnoseologico, Giovanni Scoto esclude che le *causae* siano entità ontologicamente autosussistenti e le presenta come il contenuto della potenza conoscitiva (*virtus gnostica*) dell'intelletto divino – che è Dio stesso – il quale conosce le cose prima di portarle all'essere²³. Comprendiamo dunque come

21. IOHANNES SCOTTUS ERIUGENA, *Periphyseon*, V, p. 222 (PL 122, 942B).

22. *Ibidem*, III, p. 83 (PL 122, 677B).

23. L'Eriugena ha ripreso la teoria della *gnostica virtus* dal *Trattato sulla creazione dell'uomo* di Gregorio di Nissa, da lui stesso tradotto in latino con il titolo di *De imagine*: qui l'espressione compare quattro volte nella forma *prognostica virtus*, cfr. GREGORIUS NYSSENUS, *Sermo de imagine*, M. Cappuyns (ed.), «Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales», 32 (1965), p. 235, 13, 34, 36; IOHANNES SCOTTUS

la predicazione del verbo *creo* (al passivo *creatur*) in riferimento alla seconda *species naturae*, cioè alle cause primordiali, vada compreso nel senso che le cause non sono entità effettivamente create nel Verbo divino – cosa che costituirebbe una contraddizione alla semplicità e increatitudine di questo –, bensì pre-essenzialmente create, onde la predicazione rispetto ad esse dell'essere creato non costituisce altro che la proiezione linguistica dagli effetti (le creature) alle cause (i prototipi delle creature nella loro condizione meontologica nel Verbo) attraverso cui l'intelletto umano può arrivare a concepire – per quanto impropriamente – la causalità divina e la creazione dal non-essere:

Summae siquidem ac trinae soliusque uerae bonitatis in se ipsa immutabilis motus et simplex multiplicatio et inexhausta a se ipsa in se ipsa ad se ipsam diffusio causa omnium, immo omnia sunt. Si enim intellectus omnium est omnia et ipsa sola intelligit omnia, ipsa igitur sola est omnia, quoniam sola gnostica uirtus est ipsa quae, priusquam essent omnia, cognouit omnia. Et extra se non cognouit omnia, quia extra eam nihil est, sed intra se habet omnia. Ambit enim omnia et nihil intra se est, in quantum uere est, nisi ipsa, quia sola uere est²⁴.

Se questa soluzione è valida sul piano meontologico e gnoseologico, dal punto di vista teologico l'antinomia connessa alla concezione delle cause primordiali create nel Verbo viene risolta invece introducendo una distinzione tra l'eternità (delle cause) e la co-eternità (delle persone trinitarie):

ERIUGENA, *De imagine*, G. Mandolino (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 2020 (CCCM 167), pp. 116, 117, 120, 150; cfr. Id., *Periphyseon*, IV, pp. 78, 79 (PL 122, 796D; 797B).

24. IOHANNES SCOTTUS ERIUGENA, *Periphyseon*, III, p. 22 (PL 122, 632D-633A). Incidentalmente rileviamo che anche la predicazione del verbo *creo* nella sua forma attiva in riferimento alle cause primordiali vada letta come la generazione nello spazio e nel tempo, per la quale le creature anti-esistenti nel Verbo vengono all'essere: «A. Vtrum rerum conditarum substantiae et essentiae et rationes ex primordialibus causis *per generationem* in locis temporibusque diuersorumque accidentium capacitatem procedunt atque descendunt» (*Ibidem*, V, p. 38 [PL 122, 885D]). Cfr. MAINOLDI, *Creation in Wisdom*, pp. 190-191.

Confectum est enim inter nos de primordialibus rerum omnium causis a patre in uerbo suo unigenito (hoc est in sua sapientia) simul et semel et aeternaliter facta esse, ita ut, quemadmodum ipsa sapientia patris aeterna est suoque patri coaeterna, ita etiam cuncta quae in ea facta sunt aeterna sint, eo excepto quod in ipso omnia facta sunt, quae non est facta sed genita et factrix. Siquidem in condenda uniuersali creatura sicut una eademque est patris et filii uoluntas, ita una eademque est operatio. In primordialibus itaque suis causis omnia in sapientia patris aeterna sunt, non tamen ei coaeterna²⁵.

Sulla base di queste premesse, attraverso le quali Giovanni Scoto ha assicurato il suo *alumnus*-lettore della sua fedeltà al dogma trinitario, e, avendolo avvertito della necessità di cogliere l'antinomicità delle sue conclusioni attraverso una *duplex theoria* applicata alla problematica esemplaristica nel suo insieme, il maestro palatino giunge all'esito finale del percorso argomentativo che ha preso le mosse dalle *divisiones naturae*, con l'affermare quanto di più ardito la sua speculazione lo ha portato a concepire, ovvero l'unità di Dio e della creazione e l'autocreazione del Creatore in ogni creatura:

N. Proinde non duo a se ipsis distantia debemus intelligere deum et creaturam, sed unum et id ipsum. Nam et creatura in deo est subsistens, et deus in creatura mirabili et ineffabili modo creatur, se ipsum manifestans, inuisibilis uisibilem se faciens, et incomprehensibilis comprehensibilem, et occultus apertum, et incognitus cognitum, et forma ac specie carens formosum ac speciosum, et superessentialis essentialem, et supernaturalis naturalem, et simplex compositum, et accidentibus liber accidentibus subiectum et accidens, et infinitus finitum, et incircumscriptus circumscriptum, et supertemporalis temporalem, et superlocalis localem, et omnia creans in omnibus creatum, et factor omnium factus in omnibus, et aeternus cepit esse, et immobilis mouetur in omnia et fit in omnibus omnia²⁶.

Lette al di fuori dell'antinomia meontologica, che l'Eriugena richiama a più riprese con le parole di Dionigi «*esse omnium est super*

25. *Ibidem*, III, p. 25 (PL 122, 635B-C).

26. *Ibidem*, III, p. 85 (PL 122, 678C-D).

esse diuinitas»²⁷, queste conclusioni avallerebbero la vetusta posizione storiografica che ha visto nel pensiero dell'Irlandese una forma di panteismo²⁸. Tutt'al contrario, l'esemplarismo eriugeniano può essere considerato, in ragione dello statuto super-essente delle cause primordiali, in linea con il *realismo meontologico* dionisiano, definito dalla concezione degli *universalia ante esse*²⁹, stante tuttavia la differenza dovuta 1) all'assimilazione delle *causae* alle *rationes*, 2) alla loro disposizione da parte del Padre nel Verbo e 3) al concepirlle su un grado inferiore rispetto all'eternità divina, quando in Dionigi 1) le energie divine (o nomi divini) sono distinte dai *logoi*, costituendo le ἐνέργειαι le processioni (πρόοδοι) ad extra della natura divina, realmente distinte rispetto alla sua οὐσία, mentre i λόγοι (ο προορισμοί ο παραδείγματα ο θεῖα καὶ ἀγαθὰ θελήματα) costituiscono le divine predisposizioni nella "sapienza" (che è un'energia divina) e non nella "Sapienza" (cioè nella Seconda persona della Divina Trinità – ed è verosimilmente equivocando il doppio significato di σοφία in Dionigi che l'Eriugena ha trovato una corroborazione alla teoria della predisposizione delle *rationes* nel Verbo – che, come vedremo, è di origine agostiniana), 2) le ἐνέργειαι (ο πρόοδοι ο θεῖα ὀνόματα) e i *logoi*, pur rientrando entrambi nel dominio del sovra-essere divino, stanno tra loro in un rapporto di causa ed effetto, 3) soltanto i *logoi* (in quanto ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὄντων³⁰) possono essere considerati *universalia ante esse*, in quanto essi costituiscono la matrice meontologica delle creature che vengono portate all'essere attraverso il concorso delle energie divine, in cui si attua la volontà divina, 4) l'argomento della coeternità (συναιδιος) rispetto a Dio viene trattato da Dionigi nel decimo capi-

27. DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De coelesti hierarchia secundum latinam interpretationem quam fecit Iohannes Scottus*, IV, 1, PL 122, 1046B-C; nel *Periphyseon* è citato tre volte, rispettivamente in I, 443B; III, 644AB; V, 903B.

28. Cfr. M. CAPPUYNS, *Jean Scot Erigène: sa vie, son œuvre, sa pensée*, Abbaye de Mont César, Louvain 1933, rist. Bruxelles, Culture et civilisation 1964, pp. 261, 268 (con riferimenti bibliografici).

29. Cfr. E.S. MAINOLDI, *The Place of the Corpus Dionysiacum in the Development of the Byzantine Canon of Ontology*, in G. KAPRIEV (ed.), *The Dionysian Traditions*. 24th Annual Colloquium of the SIEPM, September 9-11, 2019, Varna, Bulgaria, Brepols, Turnhout 2021 (Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale, 23), pp. 53-76: 63-72.

30. *Ibidem*, p. 67.

tolo dei *Nomi Divini*, dove si afferma che questa categoria può essere predicata delle energie-nomi, essendo distinzioni della stessa natura divina, mentre «gli esseri che sono detti eterni» (τὰ αἰώνια λεγόμενα) non sono coeterni a Dio, essendo Dio anteriore all'eternità³¹; se ci chiediamo che cosa intenda qui Dionigi con τὰ αἰώνια λεγόμενα e se sia possibile ascrivere gli esemplari meontologici degli esseri a un ordine inferiore di eternità, come in Giovanni Scoto, dovremmo constatare che, avendo fatto riferimento al raggiungimento dell'eternità da parte degli uomini e agli esseri propriamente eterni («κυριώτερον τὰ ὄντα τῷ αἰῶνι»³² – alludendo qui agli angeli), con τὰ αἰώνια λεγόμενα il Padre greco intende le creature che sono già nell'essere e non i loro *logoi* anteriori all'essere, onde ci sembra possibile escludere che in Dionigi la distinzione tra energie e *logoi* implichi anche una differenza di grado in relazione all'eternità e alla coeternità.

Per quanto ciò possa sembrare paradossale l'esemplarismo erigeniano si distanzia maggiormente dalla fonte che forse più di tutte ha influenzato la sua riflessione, cioè Dionigi Areopagita, proprio sul versante della meontologia – per la quale in particolare l'Eriugena è debitore verso l'Areopagita più che verso ogni altro autore –, piuttosto che non su quello dell'ontologia. Passando infatti ad indagare l'esemplarismo erigeniano entro il dominio dell'ontologia, ne possiamo cogliere la configurazione come realismo dell'immanenza, in quanto le *causae* non possono avere altra sussistenza ontologica che negli esseri stabiliti singolarmente nella loro individualità (che l'Eriugena definisce *substantiae*). Le *causae* non possono dunque esistere se non come *universalia in re*, giacché, qualora sussistessero in una condizione ontologica separata dagli individui, esse sarebbero uguali alle idee platoniche – soluzione questa che è apertamente scartata dal maestro palatino, in linea con la concezione degli esemplari espressa dalle sue fonti orientali, Dionigi, Gregorio di Nissa e Massimo il Confessore³³:

31. DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De divinis nominibus*, X, 3, p. 216, 16-17 (PG 3, 940A): «Χρή τοιγαροῦν οὐχ ἀπλῶς συναΐδια θεῷ τῷ πρὸ αἰῶνος οἶεσθαι τὰ αἰώνια λεγόμενα».

32. *Ibidem*, p. 216, 15.

33. Cfr. MAINOLDI, *The Place of the Corpus Dionysiacum in the Development of the Byzantine Canon of Ontology*, pp. 73-75; C. ERISMANN, *L'homme commun. La genèse*

Vt enim ipsae causae primordiales non deserunt sapientiam, sic ipsae substantiae non deserunt causas, sed in eis semper subsistunt; et quemadmodum causae extra substantias nesciunt esse, ita substantiae extra causas non possunt fluere³⁴.

L'arditezza a cui pervengono le conclusioni del discorso meontologico eriugeniano, approdando a esiti assenti in Dionigi, va ricondotta in larga misura all'applicazione rigorosa del metodo delle *divisiones dialecticae*, i cui risultati non vanno considerati come definizioni finalizzate a rendere conto del dogma teologico, bensì come un tentativo di dare un'esaustiva formulazione dell'antinomia che la creazione dal nulla comporta per il pensiero razionale. La complessità dell'esemplarismo eriugeniano va inoltre compresa tenendo in considerazione la volontà del maestro palatino di armonizzare le posizioni sostenute delle sue principali fonti, nella fattispecie quella di Dionigi con quella di Agostino³⁵. L'Eriugena ha infatti introdotto nella teoria dionisiana dei *logoi*, che costituisce indubbiamente il punto di partenza della sua riflessione meontologica sugli esemplari, diversi elementi della riflessione agostiniana sulla causalità divina, contando peraltro che tra l'Ipponate e Dionigi è possibile riscontrare una condivisione delle prospettive teologiche essenziali – e questo è il comune rispondere al generale paradigma creazionistico cristiano –, salvo poi adottare soluzioni diverse in ragione del diverso retroterra speculativo entro cui si sono mossi i due Padri – ed è qui che entrano in gioco le prospettive paradigmatiche specifiche della teologia latina e di quella greca.

L'opera agostiniana che ha maggiormente influenzato l'esemplarismo di Giovanni Scoto è il *De Genesi ad litteram*. Da qui l'Irlan-

du réalisme ontologique durant le haut Moyen Âge (Sic et Non), Vrin, Paris 2011, pp. 188-191; rimandiamo a quest'opera per una approfondita disamina del realismo dell'immanenza nell'Eriugena.

34. IOHANNES SCOTTUS ERIUGENA, *Periphyseon*, V, p. 39 (PL 122, 886C).

35. La *concordia Patrum* costituisce una cifra fondamentale del rapportarsi dell'Eriugena alle *auctoritates*, per cui Cfr. G. D'ONOFRIO, *The Concordia of Augustine and Dionysius: Toward a Hermeneutic of the Disagreement of Patristic Sources in John the Scot's Periphyseon*, in B. MCGINN, W. OTTEN (eds.), *Eriugena. East and West*, University of Notre-Dame, Notre Dame 1994, pp. 115-140.

dese ha infatti tratto l'espressione *causae primordiales*, che Agostino concepisce come gli esemplari eterni – ma non creati (*non facta*) – nel Verbo, in base ai quali ogni cosa viene creata nella dimensione temporale:

In illa enim prima conditione mundi, cum deus creauit omnis simul, homo factus est, qui esset futurus – ratio creandi hominis, non actio creati. Sed haec aliter in uerbo dei, ubi ista non facta, sed aeterna sunt, aliter in elementis mundi, ubi omnia simul facta futura sunt, aliter in rebus, quae secundum causas simul creatas non iam simul, sed suo quaeque tempore creantur: in quibus adam iam formatus ex limo et dei flatu animatus, sicut fenum exortum, aliter in seminibus, in quibus rursus quasi primordiales causae repetuntur de rebus ductae, quae secundum causas, quas primum condidit, extiterunt, uelut herba ex terra, semen ex herba³⁶.

Anche la 46-ma del *De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, composta dall'Ipponate alcuni anni prima del *De Genesi ad litteram*, potrebbe esser stata presa in considerazione dall'Eriugena³⁷, tanto per il tema delle *ideae principales*, intese come forme eterne nell'intelletto divino, quanto per l'equiparazione dei termini *rationes*, λόγοι, *formae*, *ideae*, significativa ai fini del raffronto con le fonti greche. È comunque certo che non fu quest'opera la fonte della teoria delle *causae primordiales*, dato che questa espressione non vi compare:

Ideas igitur latine possumus uel formas uel species dicere, ut uerbum e uerbo transferre uideamur. si autem rationes eas uocemus, ab interpretandi quidem proprietate discedimus – rationes enim graece λόγοι appellantur non ideae –, sed tamen quisquis hoc uocabulo uti uoluerit, a re ipsa non abhorrebit. Sunt namque ideae principales quaedam formae uel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae ipsae formatae non sunt ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quae diuina intelligentia continentur. Et cum

36. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De Genesi ad litteram*, 6, § 10, p. 182. Per una approfondita disamina della teoria delle idee in Agostino rimandiamo a G. Catapano, *Augustine's Doctrine of Eternal Reasons: A Textual Dossier*, in questo stesso volume.

37. Il *De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus* presenta diverse occorrenze negli Indici del *Periphyseon* dati nell'ed. Jeaneau.

ipsae neque oriantur neque intereant, secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest et omne quod oritur et interit³⁸.

Senza pretendere di entrare nel merito dell'esemplarismo agostiniano, ci limitiamo qui ad alcune considerazioni sui principali temi che l'Eriugena ha ripreso dall'Ipponate e incluso nella propria riflessione.

1) La disposizione delle cause nella natura divina: Agostino, nel *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, presenta le idee come eternamente contenute nella *divina intelligentia*, mentre nel *De Genesi* come eterne nel Verbo. Stante che per il vescovo di Ippona l'intelletto divino è Dio stesso, il passaggio alla formula trinitaria adottata nel *De Genesi* più che segnare un cambiamento nella concezione degli esemplari, appare come un passaggio da una terminologia debitrice verso le fonti filosofiche, e in particolare neoplatoniche, a una terminologia incentrata sulla verità teologica e sulla rivelazione biblica: che le *causae* siano dette *primordiales* costituisce infatti un richiamo al loro rientrare nel processo creazionale e quindi al passaggio dall'eternità divina alla creazione spazio-temporale, mentre l'espressione *ideae principales*, connotate semplicemente dagli attributi di eternità e di immutabilità, richiama maggiormente il linguaggio platonico piuttosto che quello biblico-creazionistico. Il pensiero dell'Eriugena conosce uno sviluppo analogo, affermando all'inizio del secondo libro la disposizione delle cause in Dio e, alla fine dello stesso libro, la disposizione delle cause nel Verbo, con la differenza che la prima concezione è tratta da Dionigi, la seconda da Agostino.

2) L'eternità delle cause: nel pensiero agostiniano la graduazione tra eternità e temporalità definisce in categorie filosofiche il divario che in categorie teologiche è detto tra il Creatore e la creazione. L'ontologia di Agostino ammette una gradazione dell'essere dall'Essenza suprema fino al *prope nihil* che è la materia³⁹, ma non

38. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, q. 46, 11.

39. Cfr. G. CATAPANO, *Aspetti del nihil agostiniano*, in DE FEO (a cura di), *Il nihil nell'Alto Medioevo*, pp. 19-44: 31-35.

conosce una distinzione tra l'essere e il sovra-essere, ovvero non ammette una iperontologia. L'argomento della non co-eternità è applicata da Agostino alla differenza tra Dio e gli angeli⁴⁰, analogamente a quanto abbiamo visto in Dionigi⁴¹, mentre l'Eriugena, ricorre all'argomento della co-eternità per distinguere le cause non-essenti nel Verbo dal Verbo stesso, introducendo una forma di graduazione laddove, trattandosi del dominio sovraontologico, egli non può ricorrere a categorie ontologiche in senso stretto. È indice dell'esigenza di non lasciare inutilizzato nessun argomento offertogli dalle sue fonti, quella per cui il maestro palatino, pur contando nel suo repertorio dottrinale l'iperontologia dionisiana, si senta chiamato a riprendere la questione alla luce dell'argomento para-ontologico dell'eternità, in considerazione dell'importanza che questa categoria ottiene nel pensiero di Agostino.

Per quanto riguarda invece le più macroscopiche differenze tra l'esemplarismo agostiniano e quello eriugeniano dobbiamo considerare in primo luogo i seguenti temi.

1) La meontologia: Agostino concepisce la realtà – tanto in-creata quanto creata – all'interno della sfera dell'essere, al quale si oppone logicamente il *nihil*, che per lui è privazione assoluta⁴². L'Eriugena, sulle scorte di Dionigi e dei Padri greci, concepisce invece la realtà come genere comprensivo della divisione tra essere e non-essere, per cui il *nihil* assurge a nome divino, in quanto non-essere *per excellentiam*⁴³.

40. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *Confessiones*, L. Verheijen (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1981 (CCSL 27), XI, 29: «qui ergo dicitur numquam fecisse, quid aliud dicitur nisi nullo tempore fecisse? uideant itaque nullum tempus esse posse sine creatura et desinant istam unitatem loqui. extendantur etiam in ea, quae ante sunt, et intellegant te ante omnia tempora aeternum creatorem omnium temporum neque ulla tempora tibi esse coaeterna nec ullam creaturam, etiamsi est aliqua supra tempora».

41. Cfr. *supra*, alla nota 32.

42. Cfr. CATAPANO, *Aspetti del nihil agostiniano*, p. 31.

43. Cfr. G. D'ONOFRIO, «Quel nome che (non) è nihil». *L'idea del nulla secondo Giovanni Scoto*, in DE FEO (a cura di), *Il nihil nell'Alto Medioevo*, pp. 171-199. Sulle differenze rispetto a Dionigi, cfr. MORAN, *Eriugena on the Five Modes of Being and Non-Being*, pp. 2-3.

2) Le cause non sono create nel Verbo: applicando in modo rigoroso la concezione dell'unità e semplicità divina, Agostino afferma che le *rationes* non sono create nel Verbo, bensì nelle opere dei sei giorni della creazione:

Voluntas uero angelica oboedienter deo subdita eiusque executata iussionem naturalibus motibus de rebus subiectis tamquam materiem ministrare, ut secundum illas principales in uerbo dei non creatas uel secundum illas in primis sex dierum operibus causaliter creatas rationes aliquid tempore creetur, more agricolandi uel mendendi potest⁴⁴.

Non godendo le *rationes* agostiniane di uno statuto di increatitudine meontologica nel Verbo – essendo cioè *non creatae* e non *increatae* – possiamo dedurre che per Agostino la posizione delle cause nel Verbo ha valore esclusivamente gnoseologico, in quanto frutto della valenza predicativa del linguaggio.

Il sistema esemplaristico eriugeniano si istanzia come *natura quae et creatur et creat*. In essa le *causae* sono comprese, attraverso una *duplex theoria* come create nel Verbo, al di fuori dell'essere, da una parte, e dall'altra come create nelle *substantiae* degli esseri che esistono nello spazio e nel tempo. Dal momento che la concezione di una realtà creata e creante è sconosciuta a Dionigi ed è esclusa esplicitamente da Agostino («in uerbo dei non creatas»), possiamo cogliere tutta l'originalità a cui è pervenuta la riflessione del maestro palatino attraverso l'applicazione sistematica delle *divisiones dialecticae*: ottenute le definizioni attraverso il metodo della *divisio*, egli ne segue gli sviluppi nelle molteplici direzioni possibili, scoprendo percorsi speculativi inediti, ma attenendosi pur sempre al rispetto dei limiti sanciti dalla verità teologica, dai cui dogmi il suo pensiero prende le mosse e alla cui illustrazione argomentativa egli sottomette la finalità del suo lavoro intellettuale – arrivando, di fatto e necessariamente, a metterne in luce le antinomie di fondo⁴⁵.

44. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De Genesi ad litteram*, IX, 15, p. 288.

45. Uno studio sistematico sulla ricezione di Dionigi da parte di Giovanni Scoto (focalizzato in particolare sui punti in cui l'Irlandese ha preso le distanze dalla

L'Eriugena peraltro non è stato il solo a trovarsi di fronte al problema di come conciliare l'insegnamento di Agostino con quello di Dionigi riguardo alle cause esemplari, problema imposto dalla preminenza di questi due Padri nella tradizione patristica. Su questo specifico tema, il più importante tentativo di stabilire un raffronto tra le due *auctoritates* dopo l'Eriugena appare esser stato quello compiuto da Bonaventura da Bagnoregio, il cui esito risulta di grande interesse ai fini della valutazione dei contorni e delle problematiche della recezione eriugeniana della dottrina esemplaristica dei due Padri. Il dottore francescano si misurò infatti con quegli stessi *loci* dionisiani e agostiniani già percorsi da Giovanni Scoto, prendendo le mosse, come l'Irlandese, dal tema gnoseologico per giungere a confrontarsi con la questione ontologica relativa allo statuto degli esemplari in Dio.

Nella seconda *quaestio* del *De scientia Christi*, ponendo il quesito sulla modalità della conoscenza divina («Utrum Deus cognoscat per similitudines rerum, an per eam essentiam»⁴⁶), Bonaventura giunge a concludere che «Deus cognoscit res per rationes aeternas quae sunt rerum similitudines exemplares et perfectissime repraesentativae ac expressivae atque idem essentialiter quod est ipse Deus»⁴⁷, adducendo a sostegno Dionigi (quinto libro dei *Nomi divini*) e Agostino (primo delle *Confessiones* e undicesimo del *De civitate Dei*)⁴⁸, e, sulle scorte dell'assimilazione tra gli *exempla-*

sua fonte) è ancora un *desideratum*, come del resto un'edizione critica della *Versio Dionysii* nelle sue diverse redazioni. Per quanto riguarda la ricezione di Agostino in Giovanni Scoto rimandiamo alla presentazione dello *status quaestionis* offerta, unitamente a nuove osservazioni, in E. MORO, *Falso d'auctoritas? Su un caso di eredità agostiniana in Eriugena (Periph., I, 446A-451C)*, in V. LIMONE, G. MASPERO (a cura di), *Agostino e la sua eredità. Teologia, filosofia e letteratura*, Morcelliana, Brescia 2021, pp. 111-128.

46. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, in PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas (edd.), *Opera omnia*, V, Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Firenze 1891, q. 2, p. 6.

47. *Ibidem*, p. 8.

48. *Ibidem*: «Respondeo: Dicendum quod secundum beatum Dionysium et secundum beatum Augustinum in pluribus locis Deus cognoscit res per rationes aeternas. Ait enim beatus Dionysius in libro de Divinis Nominibus capitulo quinto: "Exemplaria dicimus esse in Deo existentium rationes substantificatas

res e Dio stesso, arriva ad escludere che le *rationes* abbiano una valenza ontologica autonoma («non sunt rerum essentiae verae et quidditates»), interpretandole come delle *similitudines* per cui Dio conosce le essenze delle cose create⁴⁹.

Fedele alla concezione agostiniana dell'assoluta unità della natura divina, per cui le *rationes* non sono «aliud a Creatore», il *Doctor Seraphicus* si trova a dover giustificare il problema della molteplicità reale di queste, da cui la terza *quaestio*: «Utrum Deus res cognoscat per similitudines realiter differentes»⁵⁰. Passando in rassegna diverse fonti patristiche e filosofiche, il dottore francese torna sulla teoria dionisiana dei *logoi* esposta nel quinto capitolo dei *Nomi divini*, la quale presuppone la loro distinzione reale nella sapienza divina⁵¹: ad essa oppone l'argomento per cui

et singulariter praeexistentes quas theologia praedefinitiones vocat et divinas et bonas voluntates existentium determinativas et effectivas secundum quas supersubstantialis existentia omnia praedefinivit et produxit". Item Augustinus in primo Confessionum, circa principium, ad Deum loquens ait sic: "Deus et dominus omnium quae creasti, et apud te rerum omnium instabilium stant causae, et rerum omnium mutabilium immutabiles manent origines et omnium irrationabilium et temporalium sempiternae vivunt rationes". Item in undecimo de Civitate Dei, capitulo decimo, ait idem: "Non multae, sed una sapientia est, in qua sunt infinita quaedam ei que finiti thesauri rerum intelligibilium, in quibus sunt omnes invisibiles atque incommutabiles rationes rerum, etiam visibilium et mutabilium, quae per ipsam factae sunt, quoniam Deus non aliquid nesciens fecit", etc.».

49. *Ibidem*: «Hae autem sempiternae rationes non sunt rerum essentiae verae et quidditates, cum non sint aliud a Creatore; creatura autem et Creator necessario habent essentias differentes: et ideo necesse est, quod sint formae exemplares, ac per hoc ipsarum rerum similitudines repraesentativae; et ideo cognoscendi rationes sunt, quia cognitio, hoc ipso quod cognitio, assimilationem dicit et expressionem inter cognoscentem et cognoscibile. Et ideo ponendum est, secundum quod sancti dicunt et rationes ostendunt, Deum cognoscere res per earum similitudines». Sulla ricezione dell'esemplarismo dionisiano in Bonaventura cfr. T. MANZON, *According to the Blessed Dionysius: the Areopagitic Influence on Bonaventure's Exemplarism, with Particular Reference to the Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, in questo stesso volume.

50. *Ibidem*, q. 3, p. 10.

51. *Ibidem*, q. 3, p. 11: «Item Dionysius, de Divinis Nominibus, capitulo quinto: "Exemplaria in Deo esse dicimus existentium rationes substantificas et singulariter praeexistentes, quas theologia praedefinitiones vocat"; sed diversarum rerum

l'identità implica una essenza, onde, essendo la pluralità di essenze in Dio impossibile, arriva così ad escludere la reale distinzione delle *rationes* in Dio⁵².

Chiamati a misurarsi con il pensiero dionisiano – capace di tenere insieme antinomicamente l'unità e la molteplicità dei *logoi* nella sapienza divina – sia l'Eriugena sia Bonaventura si mostrano fedeli al principio agostiniano della *divina simplicitas*, onde escludono la molteplicità reale delle *rationes*, tuttavia l'Irlandese, accogliendo il discorso meontologico dionisiano, ammette che nel dominio del non-essere per eccellenza si possa concepire la distinzione tra gli esemplari, intesa come antinomia gnoseologica attraverso cui la *virtus gnostica* divina predispone la *simplex multiplicatio* delle cause da cui ogni realtà creata prende ad essere⁵³. Il Dottore francescano per contro, non dando alcuno spazio alla meontologia dionisiana nel suo discorso, riconduce le antinomie formulate dal Padre greco secondo i confini dell'onto-teologia latina e del suo fondamento logico.

La sintesi eriugeniana, comprendendo l'ontologia della creazione nel quadro della meontologia divina, si è mossa in direzione opposta rispetto al paradigma onto-teologico agostiniano, risultando di conseguenza poco utile ai lettori medievali che si sono mossi entro il medesimo paradigma ai fini della normalizzazione di Dionigi secondo i parametri della teologia occidentale. Al quesito se Bonaventura conoscesse la teoria esemplaristica eriugeniana è difficile dare una risposta. Di certo aveva familiarità con il lessico dionisiano nell'interpretazione di Giovanni Scoto in quanto, tra le traduzioni in latino del *Corpus Dionysiacum* disponibili al suo tempo, il dottore francescano utilizzò prevalentemente quella dovuta all'Irlandese, pur correggendola in diversi punti sul-

diversae sunt rationes substantificae: ergo cum res creatae realiter sint diversae necesse est rationes illas substantificas esse realiter distinctas.

52. *Ibidem*, q. 3, 8, pp. 12-13: «Item, ratio cognoscendi in divinis nominat quid essenziale, quia commune tribus personis; sed quae essentialia sunt in divinis, nullo modo plurificantur secundum rem, quia, si realiter plurificarentur, essent in divinis plures essentiae, sed hoc est impossibile: ergo impossibile est, rationes illas realiter differre».

53. Cfr. *supra*, alla nota 24.

la base delle versioni di Giovanni Saraceno e di Roberto Grossatesta⁵⁴; non abbiamo tuttavia evidenze testuali che provino la sua conoscenza delle opere e del pensiero dell'Eriugena.

Un indizio può essere però intravisto nella locuzione *producentes et productae*, riferita alle *rationes aeternae*, la quale potrebbe suonare come un riferimento indiretto all'erigeniana *natura quae et creatur et creat*. Al di là della similitudine formale, Bonaventura argomenta infatti che la predicazione simultanea di queste qualità attive e passive in riferimento alle *rationes* presupporrebbe la loro distinzione reale, e questo farebbe di loro qualcosa d'altro rispetto a Dio, quindi non *rationes aeternae*⁵⁵. Essendo per Bonaventura vero il contrario, ossia non essendoci distinzione tra le cause, giacché queste non sono altro rispetto al primo e unico Principio, il dottore francescano arriva così a sancire l'impossibilità che le *rationes* siano *producentes et productae*. Questo argomento costituisce in ogni caso una confutazione dell'erigeniana seconda *species naturae* – sia che questa fosse il suo effettivo obiettivo critico o una mera ipotesi teorica di cui andava esclusa la possibilità.

Attraverso gli argomenti sostenuti da Bonaventura, comprendiamo una volta di più come l'esemplarismo erigeniano possa essere funzionale alla concezione quadripartita della *natura* sostenuta dall'Irlandese, solo attraverso la concezione meontologica delle cause in Dio, passando cioè per la «prima summamque divisio» in «ea quae sunt et ea quae non sunt». Giovanni Scoto ci ap-

54. J.G. BOUGEROL, *Introduction à Saint Bonaventure*, Vrin, Paris 1988, pp. 63-77.

55. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, q. 3, 10, p. 13: «Item, rationes illae aeternae sunt rerum productivae; aut ergo producentes tantum, aut producentes et productae. Si producentes et productae: ergo cum producens et productum distinguantur realiter, rationes illae realiter a Deo distinguerentur, cum non sit dare aliquid aliud a quo producantur: ergo non essent ipse Deus, nec Deus se ipso cognosceret res; quod est impossibile. Si sunt producentes tantum: ergo tenent rationem principii solius; sed principium tale est principium primum, et principium primum non est nisi unice unum: ergo impossibile est, quod rationes illae realiter distinguantur»; *ibidem*, q. 3, 16, p. 13: «Item, omnis realis diversitas aut facit aliud et aliud, aut alium et alium, aut alterum et alterum; sed nullo istorum modorum est ponere circa illas aeternas rationes, quia nec est ibi essentialis diversitas nec personalis nec accidentalis: ergo nullo modo est distinctio vel differentia realis».

pare dunque come l'unico pensatore del Medioevo latino ad aver fatto proprio il realismo meontologico dionisiano racchiuso nella teoria dei *logoi*, portandolo per di più alle estreme conseguenze, laddove la speculazione ontologica espressa dal Medioevo latino ha seguito anodinamente Agostino sulla "via dell'essere".

Anselm über göttliche Ideen und das göttliche Wort

BERND GOEBEL*

1. Göttliche Ideen und göttliche Vollkommenheiten

Während Augustinus die gedanklichen Vorentwürfe der zu schaffenden Dinge im Geist des Schöpfers gelegentlich als Ideen bezeichnet, so vor allem in der Quaestio 46 *De ideis* seines Frühwerks *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, findet sich das Wort in diesem Zusammenhang bei Anselm nicht, vielleicht weil er durch Augustinus auf dessen griechisch-heidnischen Ursprung aufmerksam gemacht wurde¹. Der Sache nach schließt er sich in seiner Schöpfungslehre jedoch der augustinischen Lehre von den göttlichen Ideen an und verbindet diese in seinem *Monologion* mit einer trinitätstheologischen Spekulation über das mit der zweiten Person der Dreifaltigkeit identifizierte «Wort». Anselms Lehre von den göttlichen Ideen ist von seiner Theologie des schöpferischen Wortes als dem Inbegriff dieser Ideen nicht zu trennen. Dem hat auch diese Darstellung Rechnung zu tragen. In weiten Teilen ist sie ein analytischer Kommentar zu den für das Thema relevanten Kapiteln des *Monologion*, das man in mancher Hinsicht als Anselms *De trinitate* bezeichnen kann. In Anselms Ausführungen zum göttlichen «Sprechen» (*locutio*) wurde oft ein völlig origineller Beitrag oder sogar ein bewusstes Abweichen von einer auf Augustinus zurückgehenden traditionellen Lehre über die göttlichen

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1. Vgl. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, A. Mutzenbecher (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1975 (CCSL 44A), q. 46, 1, p. 70: «Ideas Plato primus appellasse perhibetur».

Ideen vermutet². Tatsächlich führt Anselm hier nur einen Ansatz des Kirchenvaters weiter – wie er in seinem Vorwort zum *Monologion* selbst bekundet, in dem er seine Leser ersucht, Augustins *De trinitate* gründlich zu studieren, bevor seiner eigenen Schrift ein allzu großer, nicht vorhandener Innovationsgehalt unterstellt wird, und wo er im Übrigen die generelle Vereinbarkeit seiner eigenen Lehre mit der des Augustinus unterstreicht³.

Es spricht auch keineswegs gegen eine Rezeption der Theorie von den göttlichen Ideen durch Anselm, dass er im Unterschied zu Augustinus den *Teilhabe*-Begriff nicht im Zusammenhang mit den göttlichen Ideen von Gattungen und Arten verwendet; denn er macht hinreichend klar, dass das Verhältnis jener Ideen zu den in Raum und/oder Zeit existierenden Gegenständen ein exemplarursächliches ist⁴. In den seltenen Fällen, in denen Anselm ausdrücklich von einer Teilhabe (*participatio*) redet, bezieht er sich auf zwei Eigenschaften, die zu

2. Siehe unten, pp. 110–111.

3. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologion, Prologus*, F.S. Schmitt (ed.), in *Opera Omnia*, I, Verlag der Benediktinerabtei in Seckau, Seckau 1938, Ndr. Stuttgart 2/1984, p. 8: «Quam ego saepe retractans nihil potui invenire me in ea dixisse, quod non catholicorum patrum et maxime beati Augustini scriptis cohaereat. Quapropter si cui videbitur, quod in eodem opusculo aliquid protulerim, quod aut nimis novum sit aut a veritate dissentiat: rogo, ne statim me aut praesumptorem novitatum aut falsitatis assertorem exclamet, sed prius libros praefati doctoris Augustini *De trinitate* diligenter perspiciat, deinde secundum eos opusculum meum diiudicet». Der geschichtliche Hintergrund für diese Äußerung ist der Umstand, dass das intellektuelle und publizistische Wirken des Mönchs Anselm auf dem Feld der philosophischen Theologie bei einem Teil der Kommunität von Le Bec auf Ablehnung und zumindest anfänglich auch bei seinem Lehrer Lanfranc auf Kritik stieß; zur Kontroverse zwischen Anselm und Lanfranc über das *Monologion* und dessen Methode vgl. T. HOLOPAINEN, *A Historical Study of Anselm's Prosligion. Argument, Devotion and Rhetoric*, Brill, Leiden 2020, pp. 140–163.

4. Dass «für Anselm die Teilhabe-Relation und die Form- oder Exemplarursächlichkeit nur zwei verschiedene Bezeichnungen desselben Begründungsverhältnisses sind», ist die Auffassung von M. ENDERS, *Wahrheit und Notwendigkeit. Die Theorie der Wahrheit bei Anselm von Canterbury im Gesamtzusammenhang seines Denkens und unter besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner antiken Quellen (Aristoteles, Cicero, Augustinus, Boethius)*, Brill, Leiden 1999, p. 480, Anm. 611. Zur Debatte um die Frage, inwieweit Anselm den Teilhabebegriff akzeptiert, vgl. K.A. ROGERS, *The Neoplatonic Metaphysics and Epistemology of Anselm of Canterbury*, Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston 1997, pp. 91–112.

den *Vollkommenheiten* zählen, nämlich das Wahrsein und das Gerechsein⁵. Bei den Vollkommenheiten handelt es sich um Eigenschaftsuniversalien und ihre Substantivierungen wie das Wahre, Schöne, Gute, Gerechte und überhaupt alles, was «in jeder Hinsicht besser ist als sein kontradiktorischer Gegensatz»⁶, also die Begriffe intrinsisch wertvoller Eigenschaften. Geschaffene Substanzen, allgemeine wie besondere, können wahr sein oder gerecht. Aber das Wahre und das Gerechte gehören als solche nicht dem Bereich des Kreatürlichen an, weil Gott selbst wahr und gerecht ist – was nach Anselm nichts anderes bedeutet, als dass er die Wahrheit und die Gerechtigkeit selber ist, die in ihm außerdem in eins fallen⁷. Daher ist es ratsam, im Falle der Vollkommenheiten nicht von göttlichen «Ideen» zu reden, insofern damit ein Vorentwurf eines zu erschaffenden, mit Gott nicht wesensgleichen Seienden in der göttlichen Vernunft gemeint ist, sondern besser von göttlichen Attributen oder Namen. So spricht Anselm davon, dass die höchste Natur «die Wahrheit» und «die Gerechtigkeit» ist, nicht aber davon, dass sie beispielsweise die «Menschheit» oder die «Weißheit» wäre. Umgekehrt, so ließe sich sagen, sind die Geschöpfe und ihre nicht-intrinsisch wertvollen Eigenschaften in einem schwächeren – einem *rein* schöpfungstheologischen – Sinne «göttlich» als ihre intrinsisch wertvollen Eigenschaften wie etwa ihr Gutsein⁸. Im fünfzehnten und sechzehnten Kapitel des *Monologion* und in weiten Teilen des *Proslogion* gibt Anselm Beispiele für solche Attribute, die Gott im höchsten Maße zukommen (und die eigentlich von seinem Wesen ausgesagt werden): Wahrheit, Schönheit, Güte, Gerechtigkeit, Glückseligkeit, Weisheit, Leben, Vernunft, Einheit, Unveränderlichkeit, Wesenheit usw.⁹.

5. Vgl. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologion*, 16, p. 30 (in einem negativen Zusammenhang); ID., *De veritate*, 2, F.S. Schmitt (ed.), in *Sancti Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia*, Bd. 3, p. 177 (nur der Schüler verwendet den Ausdruck).

6. *Ibidem*, 15, p. 29: „quidquid omnino melius est quam non ipsum“; vgl. dazu *Ibidem*, p. 28.

7. Vgl. *Ibidem*, 16-17, pp. 30-32.

8. «Wenn etwas gut ist, so ist es auch göttlich. Damit ist seltsamerweise meine Ethik zusammengefasst», schreibt L. WITTGENSTEIN, *Vermischte Bemerkungen*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1977, p. 15.

9. Vgl. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologion*, 16, p. 31: «Illa igitur est summa essentia, summa vita, summa ratio, summa salus, summa iustitia, summa sapientia,

2. Die höchste Natur als vernünftige Ursache

Eine Reflexion auf dasjenige, dem die einzelnen gerechten und «großen» – d.h. guten oder wertvollen – Dinge ihr Gerechtes und Gutsein verdanken, eröffnet laut Anselm einen möglichen Weg, sich von der Existenz einer höchsten Wesenheit (*summa essentia*) oder höchsten Natur (*summa natura*) zu überzeugen, «auch wenn man nicht von ihr gehört hat oder nicht an sie glaubt»¹⁰. Diese höchste Wesenheit lässt sich ferner als das Eine erweisen, von dem alles übrige Seiende hat, dass es ist – alles außer der höchsten Wesenheit «ist durch ein anderes», nämlich durch die höchste Wesenheit –¹¹, während allein die höchste Wesenheit ihr Sein nicht etwas anderem verdankt und in einer nicht leicht verständlichen Weise, die durch die üblicherweise unterschiedenen Arten von Kausalität nicht angemessen charakterisierbar ist, «durch und aus sich selbst ist»¹². Dass alle übrigen Seienden «durch die höchste Wesenheit sind» (*esse per*), ist zum einen so zu verstehen, dass die höchste Wesenheit deren Stoff aus nichts hervorgebracht hat; was dies betrifft, kann man laut Anselm alternativ sagen, dass die Geschöpfe «aus der höchsten Wesenheit» als ihrer Materialursache «sind» (*esse ex*)¹³. Zum anderen übt die höchste Wesenheit im Hinblick auf die Schöpfung eine Ursächlichkeit aus, die Anselm zwar terminologisch als «wirkende» (*efficiens*) bezeichnet, die aber gerade nicht aristotelisierend «im Sinne einer dem Verursachten stets äußerlich bleibenden wirkursächlichen Hervorbringung»

summa veritas, summa bonitas, summa magnitudo, summa pulchritudo, summa immortalitas, summa incorruptibilitas, summa immutabilitas, summa beatitudo, summa aeternitas, summa potestas, summa unitas, quod non est aliud quam summe ens, summe vivens, et alia similiter.

10. *Ibidem*, 1, p. 13.

11. *Ibidem*, 3, pp. 15-16. Anselm spricht im Verlauf des *Monologion* – abhängig vom Kontext – bald von der «höchsten Natur» (*summa natura*), bald von der «höchsten Wesenheit» (*summa essentia*), bald vom «höchsten Geist» (*summus spiritus*) und bald von der «höchsten Substanz» (*summa substantia*) – die Liste ließe sich fortsetzen; erst im letzten Kapitel des Werks werden diese mit «Gott» (*deus*) identifiziert. Dem folgen wir in unseren Analysen und Kommentaren größtenteils.

12. *Ibidem*, 6, pp. 18-20.

13. *Ibidem*, 5, p. 18.

verstanden werden darf¹⁴. So verursacht die höchste Wesenheit für Anselm die essentielle Bestimmtheit (das *id quod sunt*) der von ihr hervorgebrachten Dinge¹⁵, «was nur möglich ist, wenn sie als *causa formalis* bzw. *exemplaris* wirkt»¹⁶. Ja, es gilt nach Anselm ganz allgemein, dass eine jede Ursache «eine Hilfe für das Wesen» der Wirkung gewährt¹⁷.

Bei dem *vernünftigen* Bewirken von etwas – seinem absichtlichen Hervorbringen durch, wie man sagen könnte, eine Person – wird der exemplarursächliche Charakter der Kausalrelation besonders greifbar. Damit etwas auf vernünftige Weise bewirkt werden kann, so stellt Anselm in einem der kürzesten Kapitel des *Monologion* fest, ist es notwendig, dass dem zu Bewirkenden ein gedanklicher Vorentwurf in der Vernunft seines Schöpfers vorausgeht. Insofern ist die Rede von der göttlichen Schöpfung der Welt «aus nichts» zu relativieren. Sie bezieht sich nur auf ihren Stoff, nicht jedoch auf die Vernunft ihres Schöpfers:

Ich meine aber etwas zu sehen, was zwingt, sorgfältig zu unterscheiden, in welcher Hinsicht von dem, das bewirkt wurde, gesagt werden kann, dass es “nichts” war, bevor es bewirkt wurde. Denn keinesfalls kann etwas von jemandem auf vernünftige Weise bewirkt werden, wenn in der Vernunft des Bewirkenden nicht gewissermaßen irgendein Modell (*exemplum*) der zu bewirkenden Sache vorangeht, oder, wie man angemessener sagt, eine Form (*forma*), ein Gleichnis (*similitudo*) oder eine Regel (*regula*). Es ist somit offenbar, dass, bevor das All bewirkt wurde, in der Vernunft der höchsten Natur da war: was, wie beschaffen und auf welche Weise (*quid aut qualia aut quomodo*) es als zukünftig sein würde. Obwohl daher klar ist, dass das Bewirkte nichts war, bevor es be-

14. ENDERS, *Wahrheit und Notwendigkeit*, p. 470. Dies hatte auch K. FLASCH (*Der philosophische Ansatz des Anselm von Canterbury im Monologion und sein Verhältnis zum Augustinischen Neuplatonismus*, «Analecta Anselmiana» 2 [1970], pp. 1-44) gegen F.S. SCHMITT (*Anselm und der [Neu-]Platonismus*, «Analecta Anselmiana» 1 [1969], pp. 39-71) geltend gemacht; vgl. in diesem Sinne auch ROGERS, *The Neoplatonic Metaphysics*, pp. 96-98.

15. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologion*, 11, p. 26.

16. ENDERS, *Wahrheit und Notwendigkeit*, p. 474.

17. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologion*, 8, p. 22: «omnis causa necesse est aliquid ad essentiam effecti praebeat adiumentum».

wirkt wurde, insofern es nicht war, was es jetzt ist, und es auch nichts gab, woraus es bewirkt wurde, so war es doch nicht nichts im Hinblick auf die Vernunft des Bewirkenden, durch die und der gemäß es bewirkt wurde¹⁸.

Die von Anselm hier erwähnten Synonyma für die modellhaften Vorbilder des zu Erschaffenden im Geist des Schöpfers konnte er bei Augustinus finden, der die «Ideen» in *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus* auch *formae*, *species* sowie – dort und anderswo – insbesondere *rationes* nennt, und in *De vera religione* die Wahrheit als *regula*, *forma*, *exemplum* und *similitudo* bezeichnet¹⁹. Auch Anselm scheint die göttliche Idee als *ratio* zu bezeichnen, wenn er bemerkt, dass das Geschöpf «in sich selbst ein wandelbares Wesen» ist, das «gemäß einer unwandelbaren *ratio* erschaffen wurde»²⁰. Man wird in Anbetracht dieser Ausführungen eher vorsichtig sein, dem Urteil zuzustimmen, Anselm habe ein nur «geringes Interesse an einem explizit “exemplaristischen” Zugang zum Thema der Schöpfung» an den Tag gelegt²¹.

18. *Ibidem*, 9, p. 24: «Verum videor mihi videre quiddam, quod non negligenter discernere cogit, secundum quid ea quae facta sunt, antequam fierent, dici possint fuisse nihil. Nullo namque pacto fieri potest aliquid rationabiliter ab aliquo, nisi in facientis ratione praecedat aliquod rei faciendae quasi exemplum, sive aptius dicitur forma, vel similitudo, aut regula. Patet itaque, quoniam priusquam fierent universa, erat in ratione summae naturae, quid aut qualia aut quomodo futura essent. Quare cum ea quae facta sunt, clarum sit nihil fuisse, antequam fierent, quantum ad hoc quia non erant quod nun sunt, nec erat ex quo fierent: non tamen nihil erant quantum ad rationem facientis per quam et secundum quam fierent».

19. Vgl. AUGUSTINUS HIPONENSIS, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, 46, 1, p. 73: «Quas rationes, ut dictum est, sive ideas, sive formas, sive species, sive rationes licet vocare, et multis conceditur appellare quod libet, sed paucissimis videre quod verum est»; ID., *De vera religione*, 31, K.D. Daur (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1962 (CCSL 32), p. 225: «Omnia enim quae appetunt unitatem hanc habent regulam vel formam vel exemplum vel si quo alio verbo dici sinit, quoniam sola eius similitudinem a quo esse accepit implevit».

20. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologion*, 34, p. 53: «in seipsis sunt (sc. omnia quae facta sunt) essentia mutabilis secundum immutabilem rationem creata».

21. I. SCIUTO, *La ragione della fede. Il Monologion e il programma filosofico di Anselmo d'Aosta*, Marietti, Genova 1991, p. 250; in diesem Sinne auch P. GILBERT, *Dire l'Ineffable. Lecture du Monologion de S. Anselme*, P. Lethielleux, Paris 1984, p. 200.

Bemerkenswert ist ferner die Trias *quid – quale (qualia) – quomodo*, die in Anselms Quellen nicht belegt zu sein scheint und von Anselm nicht weiter erläutert wird. Sie ist wohl so zu verstehen, dass der Vorentwurf in der Vernunft des Schöpfers nicht nur eine Konzeption der zu erschaffenden Arten und Gattungen, sondern auch der Individuen mit ihren besonderen Eigenschaften und den durch sie exemplifizierten Eigenschaftsuniversalien umfasst. Anselms porphyrianischer Individuationstheorie zufolge ist ein Individuum (*individua substantia, hoc aliquid, individuum*) durch zweierlei konstituiert, durch sein allgemeines Wesen (*natura communis, essentia universalis*) und eine Zusammenstellung von Eigenschaften (*propriatum collectio*)²². Insofern ein Individuum danach als eine «Kreuzung einer einzigartigen Menge von Universalien» erscheint²³, lässt sich das an dieser Stelle implizit behauptete ewige Wissen Gottes hinsichtlich der Individuen erklären. Dass der Schöpfer die von ihm geschaffenen besonderen Entitäten kennt und für sie sorgt, ist ein fester Bestandteil der augustinischen Tradition; bei Anselm kommt diese Überzeugung etwa im sechsten Kapitel des *Proslogion* zum Ausdruck, wo er Gott trotz seiner Immaterialität die *Wahrnehmungsfähigkeit* zuspricht (*summe sensibilis es*) – in dem übertragenen Sinne, dass Gott «alle Dinge» – also auch die in Raum und/oder Zeit existierenden – in höchstem Maße erkennt²⁴.

22. Siehe dazu C. ERISMANN, *Proprietatum collectio. Anselme de Canterbury et le problème de l'individuation*, «Mediaevalia. Textos e estudos» 22 (2003), pp. 55-71; B. GOEBEL, *Anselm's Theory of Universals Reconsidered*, «Insights» 2 (2009), pp. 1-17: 12-13.

23. ROGERS, *The Neoplatonic Metaphysics*, p. 37.

24. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Proslogion*, 6, F.S. Schmitt (ed.), in *Sancti Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia*, Bd. 1, pp. 104-105. Wie Anselms Freund Gilbert Crispin, der Abt von Westminster, in einer Reflexion über das Verhältnis Gottes zu den Zahlen ausführt, sind dem Schöpfer die räumlichen Dimensionen und das Gewicht der von ihm geschaffenen Dinge – der größten wie der kleinsten – und deren Verhältnisse bekannt; vgl. GILBERTUS CRISPINUS, *De angelo perditto*, no. 79-80, A.S. ABULAFIA, G.R. EVANS (eds.), *The Works of Gilbert Crispin, Abbot of Westminster*, The British Academy, Oxford 1986 (Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi, 8), p. 115.

3. Das vernünftige Verursachen der höchsten Natur als schöpferischer Sprechakt

Die göttliche Idee als den denkerischen Entwurf eines Geschöpfes im Geist des Schöpfers, ohne den es kein vernünftiges Schaffen geben kann, kennzeichnet Anselm sodann im zehnten Kapitel des *Monologion* als einen, wie man sagen könnte, schöpferischen Sprechakt, nämlich «eine Art von Die-Dinge-Sprechen» (*quaedam rerum locutio*)²⁵. Seiner näheren Bestimmung dient ein Vergleich mit dem inneren «Sprechen» des menschlichen Geistes am Beispiel eines herstellenden Handwerkers – jenes vernünftigen Geistes (*mens rationalis*), der die Menschen mit den Engeln verbindet und den Anselm im weiteren Verlauf der Schrift als deutlichstes Abbild der göttlichen Trinität in der Schöpfung ausweisen wird²⁶. Dazu unterscheidet er im Anschluss an Augustinus drei bzw. vier Weisen²⁷, «ein Ding» – zum Beispiel einen Menschen – «zu sprechen»: (1) mit sinnlich wahrnehmbaren Zeichen, wie wenn ich das Wort «Mensch» gebrauche; (2) durch ein schweigendes (aber nicht wortloses) Denken derselben Zeichen, wie wenn ich das Wort «Mensch» im Stillen denke; oder durch (3) ein rein geistiges Sprechen, nicht der Zeichen, sondern der Sache selbst, d.h. durch das Bilden entweder (3-a) einer Vorstellung oder (3-b) ihres Begriffs, was Anselm beides als ein inneres «Schauen» der Sache charakterisiert, wie wenn ich mir (3-a) die Gestalt eines Menschen vorstelle oder (3-b) sein «allgemeines Wesen» (*universalis essentia*) denke, welches in der Definition des Menschen zum Aus-

25. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologion*, 10, p. 24.

26. Vgl. *Ibidem*, pp. 66-67, pp. 77-78.

27. Vgl. AUGUSTINUS HIPPOENSIS, *De trinitate*, WJ. Mountain, F. Glorie (eds.), Brepols, Turnhout 1968 (CCSL 50A), XV, 10, 18-19, pp. 484-486; XV, 11, 20, pp. 487-488; XV, 14, 24, p. 497. Siehe dazu S. MEIER-OESER, *Wort, inneres; Rede, innere*, in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, XII, Basel 2004, col. 1037-1038: «[...] Augustinus differenziert, unter Ausklammerung der Schrift als eines bloß sekundären Zeichenmediums, drei Formen des “verbum”. Neben dem gesprochenen Wort unterscheidet er [...] zwei Formen des i.W.: zum einen die in der “imaginatio” angesiedelten Lautvorstellungen oder Lautbilder (“imagines sonorum”) und zum anderen die “verba nullius linguae” (“Worte keiner Sprache”), in denen sich das eigentliche Denken in Form einer i.R. (“locutio interior”) vollzieht».

druck kommt²⁸. Dabei ist das rein geistige, denkerische, entweder imaginative oder rein begriffliche «Sprechen» sowohl die Bedingung der Möglichkeit alles sinnvollen Zeichengebrauchs als auch dessen Zweck; die zeichenhafte Sprache hat insofern nur einen instrumentellen Wert. Die nicht zeichenhaften, inneren «Wörter», «derentwegen» alle übrigen Wörter «erfunden» werden, bezeichnet Anselm auch als *verba naturalia*; sie seien bei allen Völkern dieselben²⁹. Von allen Wörtern sind sie die «wahrsten», weil sie der ihnen korrespondierenden Sache «am ähnlichsten» sind.³⁰ Mit dieser Abwertung der zeichenhaften Sprache, die paradoxerweise in linguistischer Begrifflichkeit vorgetragen wird (was gelegentlich zu Missverständnissen geführt hat)³¹, steht Anselm in der Tradition des platonischen *Kratylos* und von Augustins *De magistro*.

Die letztere Weise (3) des unzeichenhaften, inneren «Die-Dinge-Sprechens» vermittelt einer «geistigen Konzeption» (*mentis conceptio*) der zu schaffenden Sache kennzeichnet nach Anselm den Schaffensprozess eines Handwerkers, wenn von ihm «die Sachen selbst» vor ihrer Herstellung, aber auch danach, «mit der Schärfe des Denkens im Geist erblickt werden» (*acie cogitationis in mente conspiciuntur*)³². Und in diesem Sinne lässt sich auch vom Schöpfer des Alls sagen, dass er «die Dinge spricht»:

Wenn daher kein Sprechen einer beliebigen Sache der Sache so nahe kommt, wie jene, die aus Wörtern dieser Art besteht, und wenn nichts anderes in jemandes Vernunft einer künftigen oder schon existierenden Sache so ähnlich sein kann, mag es nicht zu Unrecht scheinen, dass bei der höchsten Substanz ein solches Die-Dinge-Sprechen

28. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologion*, 10, pp. 24-25.

29. *Ibidem*, p. 25.

30. *Ibidem*.

31. So glaubt J.S. McIntosh, Anselm habe «jegliche Unterscheidung zwischen Gottes Wissen und seinem Sprechen» und infolgedessen auch jede Möglichkeit einer «prä-linguistischen» Bedeutung «*ante vocem*» beseitigt – während Augustinus noch der «platonischen Illusion» zum Opfer gefallen sei, dass es unabhängig von einem Zeichensystem «für uns zugewogene Ideen oder Dinge» geben kann; J.S. MCINTOSH, *Speaking of Possibilities. The Theistic Actualism of Anselm's Divine Locutio*, «*Modern Theology*» 33, 2 (2017), pp. 213-234: 225.

32. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologion*, 10, p. 24.

sowohl gewesen ist, bevor diese da waren, damit sie durch dieses Sprechen bewirkt würden, als auch ist, nachdem diese bewirkt worden sind, damit sie durch dieses Sprechen gewusst werden³³.

Anselm relativiert seinen Vergleich im Folgenden, indem er auf die bei aller Ähnlichkeit bestehende «große Unähnlichkeit» zwischen dem Schaffen der höchsten Natur und jenem des Handwerkers hinweist. Letzterer ist für die Konzeption seines Opus auf Erfahrungen und für dessen Ausführung außerdem auf ein zuhandenes Material angewiesen, wogegen die höchste Natur die «erste und einzige» sowie die «hinreichende» Ursache (*prima et sola causa ... sufficiens*) ihres Schöpfungswerkes ist³⁴.

Im anschließenden zwölften Kapitel des *Monologion* lässt Anselm die Katze aus dem Sack. Er stellt eine These auf und gibt damit zugleich das Thema vor, das er, nach diversen vorbereitenden Vertiefungen der Gotteslehre, in den Kapiteln 29-36 entfalten wird: *die Identität des Die-Dinge-Sprechens der höchsten Natur* – sei es, wie er hier noch offen lässt, dass dieses in vielen einzelnen Worten, oder sei es, dass es vielmehr in einem einzigen vielsagendem Wort besteht – *mit der höchsten Natur selbst*³⁵.

4. Der Sprechakt der höchsten Natur als mit der höchsten Natur wesensgleiches Wort

Da Anselm an späterer Stelle auf das Motiv vom schöpferischen Sprechen der höchsten Natur (*locutio*) zurückkommt, *beweist* er in

33. *Ibidem*, p. 25: «Quapropter si nulla de qualibet re locutio tantum propinquat rei, quantum illa quae huiusmodi verbis constat, nec aliquid aliud tam simile rei vel futurae vel iam existentis in ratione alicuius potest esse: non immerito videri potest apud summam substantiam, talem rerum locutionem et fuisse antequam essent ut per eam fierent, et esse cum facta sunt ut per eam sciantur».

34. *Ibidem*, 11, p. 26.

35. *Ibidem*, 12, p. 26: «Sed cum [...] quidquid fecit, per suam intimam locutionem fecit, sive singula singulis verbis, sive potius uno verbo simul omnia dicendo: quid magis necessarium videri potest, quam hanc summae essentiae locutionem non esse aliud quam summam essentiam?»

einem ersten Schritt die bis dahin nur behauptete Identität – oder vielmehr „Konsubstantialität“ – des schöpferischen Sprechens (*locutio*) der höchsten Natur, die er zuvor als höchsten Geist (*summus spiritus*) bestimmt hat, mit der höchsten Natur selbst. Er tut dies in drei Anläufen, wobei er sich von der ersten Aussage des dritten Beweises abgesehen auf bereits durch ihn etablierte Prämissen stützt³⁶:

(1) Der höchste Geist bewirkt alles, was er bewirkt, durch sich selbst; der höchste Geist bewirkt alles, was er bewirkt, durch sein schöpferisches Sprechen; folglich sind der höchste Geist und sein schöpferisches Sprechen nicht verschieden. (2) Alles vom höchsten Geist Erschaffene ist durch sein Sprechen erschaffen worden; das Sprechen des höchsten Geistes kann sich nicht selbst erschaffen haben (kann nicht seinerseits durch das Sprechen des höchsten Geistes erschaffen worden sein), weil eine Selbstverursachung logisch unmöglich ist; also kann das Sprechen des höchsten Geistes nicht vom höchsten Geist erschaffen worden sein; aber nichts kann existieren außer dem höchsten Geist und dem von ihm Erschaffenen. Folglich muss das Sprechen des höchsten Geistes der höchste Geist selber sein. (3) Das Sprechen des höchsten Geistes ist nichts anderes als seine Erkenntnis (*intelligentia*); die höchste Natur aber ist einfach und daher mit ihrer Erkenntnis identisch, so wie sie beispielsweise mit ihrer Weisheit identisch ist; daher kann sie auch von ihrem Sprechen nicht verschieden sein³⁷.

In einem zweiten Schritt nutzt er diesen Identitätsbefund, um die im zwölften Kapitel formulierte Kontravalenz hinsichtlich des Sprechens der höchsten Natur – besteht dieses aus vielen Worten oder nur aus einem Wort? – zugunsten der zweiten Alternative aufzulösen: Das Sprechen der höchsten Natur ist mit der höchsten Natur identisch; die höchste Natur ist zuhöchst einfach; also ist auch das Sprechen der höchsten Natur zuhöchst einfach: Es besteht nicht aus einer Pluralität von Worten, sondern aus einem einzigen Schöpferwort³⁸.

36. Eine etwas eingehendere Analyse dieser Argumente findet sich bei SCIUTO, *La ragione della fede*, pp. 238-239, sowie bei S. VISSER, T. WILLIAMS, *Anselm*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, pp. 138-139.

37. *Ibidem*, 29, pp. 47-48.

38. *Ibidem*, 30, p. 48.

Aus der Wesensgleichheit der höchsten Natur mit diesem ihrem Wort folgert Anselm später, dass das *Schöpfersein* nicht nur der höchsten Natur, sondern auch ihrem Wort zugesprochen werden muss³⁹.

In dieser Zuspitzung des schöpferischen Sprechens der höchsten Natur auf ein einziges Wort und dessen Identifikation mit der höchsten Natur hat man bisweilen eine Art trinitätstheologische Kontamination oder Verwässerung einer angeblich traditionellen, auf Augustinus zurückgehenden «standard doctrine of divine ideas» erblickt, welche unter anderem eine Possibilenlehre enthalten hätte – trotz gewisser Zweifel daran, ob es eine solch traditionell-augustinische Lehre von den göttlichen Ideen zur Zeit Anselms wirklich gegeben habe⁴⁰. Die Zweifel scheinen berechtigt; denn weder enthalten die Ausführungen des Augustinus zu den göttlichen Ideen (und daraufhin jene Anselms) klarerweise eine Theorie unverwirklichter Möglichkeiten⁴¹, noch sind sie überhaupt von sei-

39. *Ibidem*, 37, p. 55.

40. VISSER, WILLIAMS, *Anselm*, p. 124: «But when Anselm returns to his discussion of God's utterance of creation, he develops the account in ways that modify the standard doctrine of divine ideas beyond recognition»; und *ibidem*: «Whether there really is a "standard doctrine of divine ideas" is not altogether clear. [...] It is probably best to read Anselm as taking his cue Augustine's occasional remarks on the divine ideas and developing them in ways suggested by Augustine's Trinitarian doctrine in general». Siehe auch, im Anschluss an Visser und Williams, MCINTOSH, *Speaking of possibilities*, p. 217, für den Anselm der "standard doctrine of divine ideas" eine Art impliziten modalen Voluntarismus entgegengesetzt, während S. KNUUTTILA (*Anselm on modality*, in B. DAVIES, B. LEFTOW [eds.], *The Cambridge Companion to Anselm*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004, p. 120, Anm. 30) lapidar bemerkt: «The question of alternative divine possibilities is not central in Anselm».

41. Nach Simo Knuuttila enthält Augustins Schöpfungslehre zwar «eine intuitive Vorstellung alternativer Welten, von denen nur eine verwirklicht wird», jedoch sei «nicht klar, ob Augustinus annahm, dass es leere Formen von Gattungen gebe, oder nicht», während er eindeutig davon ausgegangen sei, dass «die Anzahl der bloß möglichen Individuen viel größer ist als die der Individuen, die in der Geschichte der Welt vorkommen»; vgl. S. KNUUTTILA, *Time and Creation in Augustine*, in E. STUMP, N. KRETZMANN (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001, pp. 108-109. J.S. MCINTOSH (*Christ, the Power and Possibility of God in Anselm*, «Theologica» 3 [2019], p. 5) behauptet hingegen, freilich ohne ausreichende Belege, dass eine augustinisch geprägte «divine ideas tradition» zur Zeit Anselms die These enthalten habe, «that there must

ner Trinitätsspekulation zu trennen. Auch Augustinus scheint sich darüber im Klaren gewesen zu sein, dass es mit Gottes Einfachheit nicht vereinbar ist, Gott eine Pluralität ewiger, mit seinem Wesen nicht identischer Ideen zuzuschreiben, und greift diese Einsicht in seiner Trinitätstheologie auf⁴². So nennt er die mit dem «Wort, das Gott war bei Gott» identifizierte Wahrheit «die Form von allem, was ist»⁴³, und führt in *De trinitate* aus:

Weil also das Wort Gottes, durch das alles erschaffen wurde, eines ist und es die unveränderliche Wahrheit ist, ist dort ursprünglich und auf unveränderliche Weise alles zugleich – nicht nur die Dinge, die jetzt in diesem geschaffenen Universum existieren, sondern auch jene, die existiert haben und noch existieren werden. Dort aber waren sie nicht oder werden sein, sondern sind sie einfach; und alle sind Leben, alle sind eins, oder es ist dort vielmehr Eines und ein Leben⁴⁴.

5. Das Verhältnis des schöpferischen Wortes der höchsten Natur zu den geschaffenen Dingen

Nachdem Anselm so die Einfachheit des schöpferischen Wortes als des Inbegriffs aller göttlichen Ideen und dessen Identität, nämlich «Wesensgleichheit», mit der höchsten Natur bewiesen hat, wendet er sich einem Problem zu, das sich aus der Verwendung ein und derselben linguistischen Metapher sowohl für unser eigenes inne-

be in God an infinite and unrealized surplus of ideas of possible creatures that are known prior to and independently of those specific possibilities he chooses to actually realize or instantiate within creation».

42. Vgl. ROGERS, *The Neoplatonic Metaphysics*, pp. 46-47.

43. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De vera religione*, 36, 66, p. 231: «ea forma est omnium quae sunt quae summa similitudo principii et veritas est».

44. ID., *De trinitate*, IV, 1, 3, p. 162: «Quia igitur unum Verbum Dei est, per quod facta sunt omnia, quod est incommutabilis veritas, ibi principaliter atque incommutabiliter sunt omnia simul: non solum quae nunc sunt in hac universa creatura, verum etiam quae fuerunt et quae futura sunt. Ibi autem nec fuerunt, nec futura sunt, sed tantummodo sunt; et omnia vita sunt, et omnia unum sunt, et magis unum est et una vita est».

res «Die Dinge-Sprechen» als auch das schöpferische «Sprechen der Dinge» durch die höchste Natur ergibt. Den vielen «natürlichen Worten» des Menschen, also den Begriffen, steht das eine «Wort» Gottes gegenüber; und man könnte versucht sein, die Charakteristika der Ersteren auf das Letztere zu übertragen. So zeichnen sich unsere gedanklichen «Worte» nach Anselm dadurch aus, dass sie «Gleichnisse und Bilder» (*similitudines et imagines*) der durch sie bezeichneten Gegenstände und als solche umso «wahrer» sind, je besser sie diese «nachbilden» (*imitari*)⁴⁵.

Wie steht es in dieser Hinsicht mit dem Wort Gottes? Lässt sich auch das göttliche Wort als Gleichnis der durch es erschaffenen Dinge in ihrer Veränderlichkeit verstehen? Um dies zu klären, unterscheidet Anselm drei Fälle. Wäre das göttliche Wort ein wahres Gleichnis der veränderlichen Dinge, könnte es der unveränderlichen höchsten Natur nicht wesensgleich sein; wenn hingegen kein wahres, sondern nur «ein wie auch immer beschaffenes» (*qualiscumque*) Gleichnis der veränderlichen Dinge, könnte es nicht das Wort der höchsten Wahrheit, nämlich der höchsten Natur, sein; und besäße es schließlich gar keine Ähnlichkeit mit dem Geschaffenen, würde es nicht als Modell (*exemplum*) für dieses taugen. Damit sind alle Möglichkeiten ausgeschöpft⁴⁶. Anselm schließt aus dieser Ausweglosigkeit, dass das schöpferische Wort der höchsten Natur keinesfalls wie die Begriffe des menschlichen Geistes als ein Gleichnis (*similitudo*) der geschöpflichen Wesenheiten verstanden werden kann. Die Verhältnisse liegen in seinem Fall genau umgekehrt: Nicht das Ding ist hier die Norm für das Wort, sondern das Wort für das Ding. Nicht das Wort imitiert die Sache, um Wort zu sein, sondern die Sache imitiert das Wort, um zu sein und um wertvoll zu sein. Dabei zeichnet sich eine Hierarchie dreier ontologischer Ebenen ab: (a) die der göttlichen Ideen im Schöpferwort, deren Nachbildungen (b) die geschaffenen Dinge sind, deren Nachbildungen wiederum (c) unsere Begriffe sind, mit denen wir die Dinge erkennen⁴⁷.

45. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologion*, 31, p. 48.

46. Vgl. *Ibidem*.

47. Siehe dazu SCIUTO, *La ragione della fede*, pp. 243-244.

Anselm illustriert die Relation des schöpferischen Wortes zu den Geschöpfen durch eine Analogie: So wie sich ein lebendiger Mensch als die «Wahrheit des Menschen» zum Porträt eines Menschen als das Bild oder Gleichnis jener Wahrheit des Menschen verhält, so verhält sich das Wort der höchsten Natur als die «Seinswahrheit» (*existendi veritas*), «als die wahre und einfache Wesenheit» (*vera simplexque essentia*), als die «einfache und absolute Wesenheit» (*simplex absolutaque essentia*) zu dem durch es Geschaffenen als einer «Nachbildung» (*imitatio*) «jener höchsten Wesenheit»⁴⁸.

Diese Unterscheidung verbindet Anselm mit einem augustini-schen Gedanken, den er einige Kapitel zuvor entfaltet hat: In einem gewissen Sinne lässt sich das Sein nur und in einem gewissen Sinne beinahe nur vom höchsten Geist aussagen, im Vergleich zu dem alles Übrige nicht ist bzw. «fast nicht ist und kaum ist» (*ferè non esse et vix esse*)⁴⁹. Denn nur der höchste Geist hat das Sein durch sich und ist unwandelbar in seiner zeitlosen Ewigkeit, besitzt das Sein auf «einfache, vollkommene und absolute Weise» (*simpliciter et perfecte et absolute*). Alles Übrige ist nicht nur für sein Entstehen, sondern auch für seine Erhaltung von etwas Äußerem abhängig, nämlich vom höchsten Geist, ist veränderlich und dem ontologisch prekären Fluss der Zeit unterworfen⁵⁰. «Sein» ist für Anselm demzufolge in dem zweiten Sinne, in dem es fast nur (aber eben nicht nur) vom höchsten Geist und beinahe nicht (aber eben doch in geringem Maße) vom Geschöpf ausgesagt werden kann, kein Alles-oder-nichts-Begriff, sondern in Seinsgrade oder Seinsintensitäten gestuft: Etwas kann mehr oder weniger sein. Anselms Rede von der *existendi veritas* bezieht sich ausdrücklich auf jenen voll-

48. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologion*, 49, p. 50.

49. *Ibidem*, 28, p. 46. Streng genommen handelt es sich bei den Behauptungen, das Sein könne in einem bestimmten Sinne nur von der höchsten Natur und in einem bestimmten Sinne fast nur von der höchsten Natur ausgesagt werden, um zwei verschiedene ontologische Thesen, zu deren Begründung Anselm jeweils verschiedene Eigenschaften der höchsten Natur anführt; eine etwas eingehendere Analyse bietet ENDERS, *Wahrheit und Notwendigkeit*, pp. 20-21. Für diverse Belege dieser Gedanken bei Augustinus siehe die Anmerkungen des Herausgebers in ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologion*, pp. 46-47.

50. Vgl. *Ibidem*, 28, p. 46.

kommenen Seinsmodus der höchsten Wesenheit; jene vom nachbildenden Sein der geschaffenen Entitäten ausdrücklich auf deren im Vergleich zum Schöpfer problematische, gewissermaßen blasse Weise zu sein.

Weil die Imitation der höchsten Wesenheit unterschiedliche Grade zulässt, gibt es innerhalb des blassen Seins der Geschöpfe unterschiedliche Seinsintensitäten. Anselm skizziert eine Stufenordnung des geschöpflichen Seins, der zufolge eine Natur umso vorzüglicher ist und umso «mehr ist», d.h. einen umso höheren Seinsgrad besitzt, je «ähnlicher» ihr Wesen der höchsten Wesenheit ist. Deshalb besitzen die vernünftigen Wesen eine höhere Dignität und einen höheren Seinsgrad als die bloß empfindenden, die bloß empfindenden stehen über den bloß lebendigen und die bloß lebendigen über den «nicht-lebendigen», d.h. den bloß seienden⁵¹. Ähnliche Einteilungen konnte Anselm bei Boethius und Augustinus finden, bei denen die vernünftigen körperlichen bzw. «sterblichen» Wesen darüber hinaus von der Kategorie der vernünftigen immateriellen bzw. «unsterblichen» überragt werden.⁵²

6. Die Identität des schöpferischen mit dem reflexiven Wort der höchsten Natur

Noch einmal kommt Anselm auf die *Worthaftigkeit* des schöpferischen Wortes als des Inbegriffs der göttlichen Ideen zurück. Bislang hat er festgestellt, dass diese nicht auf der Ähnlichkeit zu den Geschöpfen beruht, sondern dass die Geschöpfe sich umgekehrt an ihrer Ähnlichkeit zur höchsten Natur und dem ihr gleichwesentlichen Schöpferwort messen lassen. Aber für das von Anselm maßgebliche Wortverständnis ist ein inneres Wort notwendiger

51. *Ibidem*, 31, pp. 49-50.

52. Vgl. ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS, *Contra Eutychem et Nestorium* 2, M. Elsässer (ed.), *Die Theologischen Traktate*, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 1988, pp. 72-75; AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De ciuitate dei*, B. Dombart, A. Kalb (edd.), Brepols, Turnhout 1955 (CCSL 48), XI, 16, p. 336; und siehe B. GOEBEL, *Anselm and His Students on Our Relation to Non-human Creatures*, «The Saint Anselm Journal» 17, 2 (2021), pp. 19-42: 30-31.

weise ein Wort von etwas («Jedes Wort ist das Wort von etwas»)⁵³ und ist ferner das Vorliegen einer Ähnlichkeit zu dem, wovon es ein Wort ist, wesentlich («Jedes Wort, mit dem etwas so mit dem Geist gesprochen wird, ist ein Gleichnis jener Sache»)⁵⁴. Wovon also ist das Wort der höchsten Wesenheit ein Wort, wenn nicht vom Geschöpf, und wovon ist es ein Gleichnis? Diese Frage klärt Anselm mit einem Gedankenexperiment. Angenommen, es gäbe nur den höchsten Geist und keine Schöpfung. Dann scheint es nichts zu geben, wovon das Wort der höchsten Natur ein Wort ist («Von dem, das weder war noch ist noch sein wird, kann es kein Wort geben»)⁵⁵, und es scheint folglich gar kein «Wort», d.h. keine innere Rede im höchsten Geist zu geben. Nachdem aber ein solches Etwas-bei-sich-Sagen, nämlich Denken, im Falle des höchsten Geistes nichts anderes bedeutet als ein Erkennen (*intelligere*)⁵⁶, liefe dies darauf hinaus, Gott die Erkenntnis und infolgedessen die Weisheit (*sapientia*) abzusprechen – obwohl feststeht, dass der höchsten Natur diese Vollkommenheiten zugesprochen werden müssen. Also ist es unmöglich, dass unabhängig von der Schöpfung kein Wort in der höchsten Natur ist. Um ein Wort wovon handelt es sich?

Hier behilft sich Anselm erneut mit einer Reflexion auf den vernünftigen Geist. Der vernünftige Geist ist selbstbewusst. Er ist in der Lage, sich «seiner selbst zu erinnern». Er ist in der Lage, sich selbst zu erkennen – was sich, sagt Anselm, an eben dieser meiner Reflexion über meinen Geist erweist, mit der ich, da ich dies denke und schreibe, gerade befasst bin. Er ist außerdem in der Lage, sich der höchsten Weisheit – der höchsten Natur – zu erinnern und sie zu erkennen⁵⁷. Diese Art von Selbstbewusstsein und Selbsterkenntnis und diese Art von Bewusstsein und Erkenntnis der höchsten

53. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologion*, 32, p. 50: «omne verbum alicuius rei verbum est».

54. *Ibidem*: «omne verbum quo aliqua res sic mente dicitur, similitudo sit rei eiusdem».

55. *Ibidem*: «Eius enim quod nec fuit nec est nec futurum est, nullum verbum esse potest».

56. Vgl. *Ibidem*, p. 51: «idem sit illi sic dicere aliquid quod est intelligere».

57. *Ibidem*: «rationalis mens possit non solum suimet sed et ipsius summae sapientiae reminisci, et illam et se intelligere».

Natur muss aber auch der höchsten Natur selbst zugeschrieben werden, ihr sogar zuvorderst (*principaliter*) und dem menschlichen Geist nur analog zu dieser (*ad eius similitudinem*). Die höchste Natur erkennt sich ewiglich, sie «spricht sich» ewiglich, und folglich ist bei ihr ewiglich ein Wort: nicht das Wort einer Kreatur, sondern das Wort *ihrer selbst*. Zur höchsten Natur gibt es ein gleichewiges, reflexives Wort, gleichgültig, ob sie alleine existiert oder ein von ihr erschaffenes Universum im Sein erhält⁵⁸. Das göttliche Wort ist als schöpferisches Wort der Inbegriff der göttlichen Ideen von den allgemeinen Substanzen und Eigenschaften; aber es ist nicht notwendig schöpferisches Wort und mithin auch nicht notwendig der Inbegriff der göttlichen Ideen.

Da Anselm die Existenz eines reflexiven Wortes in der höchsten Natur etabliert hat, welches auf deren Schöpferrolle nicht angewiesen ist und mit dem diese ewiglich «sich selbst sagt», nämlich erkennt und sich ihrer selbst erinnert, stellt sich sogleich die Frage nach dem Verhältnis dieses reflexiven Wortes der höchsten Natur (a) zur höchsten Natur selbst und (b) zu dem schöpferischen Wort, mit dem die höchste Natur «die Dinge sagt», nämlich erkennt und erschafft, und von dem bereits gezeigt wurde, dass es mit der höchsten Natur wesensgleich sein muss⁵⁹. Auch hier lautet die einzig mögliche Schlussfolgerung, dass das Wort, mit dem die höchste Natur sich notwendig selber sagt und selbst dann noch selber sagen würde, wenn nichts außer der höchsten Natur existierte, der höchsten Natur wesensgleich und daher wegen der Transitivität der Konsubstanzialitätsrelation – wesensgleich auch dem ihr wesensgleichen schöpferischen Wort ist (*una substantia est*)⁶⁰.

Statt daraus nun ohne weiteres zu schließen, dass es sich bei dem reflexiven und dem schöpferischen Wort der höchsten Natur schlicht um ein und dasselbe Wort handelt, formuliert Anselm zunächst den trinitätslogischen Vorbehalt, dass die Wesensgleichheit

58. Vgl. *Ibidem*: «Sive igitur ille cogitetur nulla alia existente essentia, sive aliis existentibus: necesse est verbum illius coaeternum ille esse cum illo».

59. Vgl. *Ibidem*, 33, p. 51: «An ergo alio verbo dicit se ipsum, et alio ea quae facit; aut potius eodem ipso verbo quo dicit se ipsum, dicit quaecumque facit?»

60. *Ibidem*, p. 52.

oder substantielle Identität des reflexiven und des schöpferischen Wortes der höchsten Natur möglicherweise keine numerische Identität (*unitas*) besagt, so wie die höchste Natur mit ihrem Wort zwar wesensgleich, aber doch nicht Wort, der Vater in der Trinität nicht der Sohn ist⁶¹. Dieser Vorbehalt ist für Anselm zwar hinsichtlich der Beziehung zwischen den göttlichen Personen, nicht aber im Hinblick auf die Relation zwischen den fraglichen Worten am Platz.

Um dies zu untermauern, betrachtet Anselm zunächst die objektive und dann die reflexive Einstellung unseres vernünftigen Geistes. In beiden Fällen bestehe Erkenntnis darin, ein «Bild» (*imago*) oder eine «Ähnlichkeit» (*similitudo*) des Objektes – Anselms Beispiel ist ein nicht anwesender Mensch – bzw. seiner selbst im Denken hervorzubringen; diese seien jeweils das «Wort» des intendierten Gegenstandes bzw. des Erkennenden selbst⁶². Dementsprechend wird auch bei der reflexiven Einstellung der höchsten Weisheit, d.h. der höchsten Natur, ein Bild oder eine Ähnlichkeit «gezeugt» (*gignere*), in denen sich die höchste Weisheit selbst erkennt; diese sind eben das «Wort» der höchsten Weisheit⁶³.

Im Unterschied dazu geht es beim schöpferischen Wort, dem Inbegriff der göttlichen Ideen, nicht um die Zeugung einer Ähnlichkeit zu den Geschöpfen, weil das schöpferische Wort den Kreaturen wie gesehen nicht ähnlich, sondern vielmehr deren Norm, weil es, wie Anselm sich hier ausdrückt, *principalis essentia* ist⁶⁴. Nicht das schöpferische Wort imitiert das durch es Geschaffene, sondern umgekehrt das Geschöpf das schöpferische Wort. Weil das schöpferische Wort mithin nicht in einem Bild oder einer Ähnlichkeit zum Geschaffenen besteht, ist es nicht dessen Wort. Wessen Wort ist das schöpferische Wort aber dann, wenn doch ein Wort

61. Vgl. *Ibidem*, 32, p. 52: «Sed forsitan non cogit identitas substantiae veri unitatem admittere. Nam idem ipse qui his verbis loquitur, eandem illis habet substantiam, et tamen verbum non est».

62. *Ibidem*: «Quae imago in cogitatione verbum est eiusdem hominis, quem cogitando dico. [...] Quae imago eius (sc. mentis rationalis) verbum eius est».

63. *Ibidem*, pp. 52-53: «quis neget summam sapientiam, cum se dicendo inteligit, gignere consubstantialem sibi similitudinem suam, id est verbum suum?»

64. *Ibidem*, p. 53, und vgl. oben, Anm. 47 zu *ibidem*, 31, wo Anselm das schöpferische Wort der höchsten Natur als *vera*, *simplex* und *absoluta essentia* bezeichnet.

notwendigerweise das Wort von etwas ist? Es bleibt nur, dass es das Wort der höchsten Weisheit selbst ist, so dass Anselm zu dem Ergebnis gelangt: «Mit ein und demselben Wort sagt sie [sc. die höchste Weisheit, i.e. die höchste Natur] sich selbst und was auch immer sie macht»⁶⁵. Das reflexive Wort und das schöpferische Wort der höchsten Natur sind nicht nur wesensgleich, sondern auch numerisch identisch.

Bei der Erforschung des Denkens Anselms ist die Frage aufgeworfen worden, ob sein Nachweis einer Identität des reflexiven Wortes der höchsten Natur, welches die höchste Natur nicht nicht-sprechen kann, mit dem schöpferischen Wort der höchsten Natur die Notwendigkeit der Schöpfung zur logischen Folge hat. So hat man vermutet, Gott hätte Anselm zufolge nicht nur nicht nicht-schaffen können, sondern hätte auch keine andere Welt erschaffen können als die wirkliche Welt⁶⁶. Nun mag es zutreffen, dass Anselm an anderer Stelle nicht nur kontrafaktische, sondern sogar unmögliche Szenarien beschreibt, um ein Argument zu befestigen⁶⁷; doch zumindest das betrachtete Gedankenexperiment Anselms im *Monologion*, mit dem er die Existenz eines ewigen reflexiven Wortes in Gott sichert (um über diesen Umweg die problematische Worthaftigkeit seines Schöpferworts zu klären), scheint die logische Möglichkeit des beschriebenen Szenarios «Gott ohne Welt» vorauszusetzen – eines Szenarios, das jedenfalls nicht in dem Sinne unmöglich zu sein scheint, dass es unvorstellbar wäre.

Anselm selbst sieht und diskutiert im Anschluss an seinen Identitätsnachweis ein anderes Problem. Wie ist es möglich, dass so Unterschiedliches wie die ewige höchste Natur und die nicht-ewige Schöpfung mit ein und demselben Wort «gesagt» wird? Zu seiner Lösung bemüht Anselm wiederum eine Analogie, die eines Kunstwerks, welches nicht nur, solange es besteht, sondern bereits vor

65. *Ibidem*: «Uno igitur eodemque verbo dicit seipsum et quaecumque fecit».

66. Vgl. ROGERS, *The Neoplatonic Metaphysics*, pp. 55-56; zwar scheinen, so Rogers, einige Texte Anselms in eine andere Richtung zu deuten, «aber es gibt keinen Grund, sie für besonders gewichtig anzusehen» (55); siehe dazu auch ähnlich, wenn auch zurückhaltender, SCIURO, *La ragione della fede*, p. 248.

67. Vgl. *Ibidem*, pp. 64-65.

seiner Erschaffung wie auch nach seiner Zerstörung in der jeweiligen Kunst «als die Kunst selbst» existiert. Auf eine solche Weise existiert alles Erschaffene im Schöpfer, nämlich in seiner «höchsten Weisheit und höchsten Vernunft»:

Denn sowohl bevor sie entstanden, als auch da sie gemacht wurden, als auch wenn sie zerstört oder in irgendeiner Weise verändert werden, sind sie immer in ihm [sc. dem höchsten Geist] selbst – nicht als das, was sie in sich selbst sind, sondern was dieser selbst ist. Und zwar sind sie in sich selbst eine gemäß einer unveränderlichen Idee (*ratio*) erschaffene veränderliche Wesenheit. In ihm selbst aber sind sie die erste Wesenheit selbst (*ipsa prima essentia*) und die erste Seinswahrheit (*prima existendi veritas*), und je mehr sie ihr nach Möglichkeit ähnlich sind, desto wahrer und vorzüglicher existieren sie⁶⁸.

Die Geschöpfe existieren in der höchsten Vernunft in erhabenerer Weise als in sich selbst. Sie teilen dort als mit der höchsten Natur identische göttliche Ideen die zeitlose Existenzweise der höchsten Natur. Insofern besteht das Problem einer Vermischung des Ewigen mit dem Zeitlichen nach Anselm nicht, wenn, wie es die Vernunft gebietet, das reflexive und das schöpferische Wort Gottes miteinander identifiziert werden; denn die «geschaffenen Entitäten» sind im höchsten Geist «in ideell-exemplarischer, nicht in kreatürlicher Seinsform als das von ihm bzw. seinem “Wort” “Gesprochene”, d.h. Gedachte, und damit als er selbst *existent*»⁶⁹. Als der Lehrer in Anselms Dialog *De veritate* die «Wahrheit im Wesen der Dinge» anspricht (die, wie er beklagt, nur von wenigen bedacht würde)⁷⁰, behauptet er, sie erstrecke sich auf alle geschaffenen Wesenheiten überhaupt und liege darin begründet, dass «alles, was ist», seinem

68. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologion*, 34, pp. 53-54 : «Nam et antequam fierent, et cum iam facta sunt, et cum corrumpuntur seu aliquo modo variantur: semper in ipso sunt, non quod sunt in seipsis, sed quod est idem ipse. Etenim in seipsis sunt essentia mutabilis secundum immutabilem rationem creata; in ipso vero sunt ipsa prima essentia et prima existendi veritas, cui prout magis utcumque illa similia sunt, ita verius et praestantius existunt» (eigene Hervorhebungen).

69. ENDERS, *Wahrheit und Notwendigkeit*, p. 23.

70. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *De veritate*, 9, p. 188.

Wesen nach «das ist, was es in der höchsten Wahrheit ist»⁷¹. Hier wird deutlich, dass die *Pluralität* der Wesenheiten und der ihnen zugeordneten göttlichen Ideen, wie sie für die raum-zeitliche Welt der Schöpfung kennzeichnend ist, in der *Einfachheit* des göttlichen Worts angelegt und aufgehoben ist, wie es Anselms Kunstanalogie im *Monologion* verständlich zu machen sucht.

Die hier von Anselm behauptete Wesensidentität der geschaffenen Naturen mit ihren jeweiligen göttlichen Ideen ist als eine «höchst problematische, weil die Differenz zwischen der geschaffenen außergöttlichen und der ungeschaffenen innergöttlichen, mit Gott selbst identischen Seinsweise der Geschöpfe aufhebende» Vorstellung gewertet worden⁷². Das scheint jedoch nicht ohne weiteres zuzutreffen; denn die besagte Identität ist tatsächlich eine solche «nur» des Wesens; sie erstreckt sich gerade nicht auf die *Seinsweisen* der geschaffenen Naturen und ihrer göttlichen Ideen: Zwar ist alles, was ist, «das, was es in der höchsten Wahrheit ist»; doch ist es nicht auf dieselbe «absolute, einfache, vollkommene Weise»⁷³ wie das, was es in der höchsten Wahrheit ist. Aus nichts erschaffen, dem Fluss der Zeit ausgesetzt und dank der höchsten Natur im Sein erhalten, ist das Geschöpf für Anselm wie gesehen vielmehr nicht bzw. «kaum und fast nicht»⁷⁴, hat bestenfalls ein prekäres Sein, einen weitaus geringeren Seinsgrad als seine göttliche Idee. Für Augustinus und Anselm gibt es zwischen zwei Entitäten nicht nur die Relationen der Identität und Verschiedenheit des Wesens, sondern auch die der Identität bzw. Verschiedenheit der Seinsweise, d.h. Seinsintensität; und in letzterer Hinsicht sind die geschaffenen Wesenheiten *nicht* mit den göttlichen Ideen identisch⁷⁵. «Die

71. *Ibidem*, 7, p. 185: «Est igitur veritas in omnium quae sunt essentia, quia hoc sunt quod in summa veritate sunt»; vgl. *ibidem*: «Quidquid igitur est, vere est, in quantum est hoc quod ibi est».

72. M. ENDERS, «Einleitung», in ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, Über die Wahrheit. Übersetzt, mit einer Einleitung und Anmerkungen hrsg. v. M. Enders, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 2001, p. XLIX.

73. Siehe oben, Anm. 50.

74. Siehe oben, Anm. 49.

75. Vgl. ENDERS, *Wahrheit und Notwendigkeit*, p. 18, der von «in ihrer Intensität verschiedenen Verwirklichungsstufen ein und desselben Seienden» spricht. Die

wirklichen Wesenheiten der Dinge sind in Gott, und doch bleibt die Schöpfung unendlich weit hinter dem Schöpfer zurück»⁷⁶. Dieses Paradox spiegelt sich auch in Anselms Lehre vom In-Sein oder Enthaltensein der Schöpfung im transzendenten Gott und ihrem Gegenstück wider, der These, dass der transzendente Gott in seiner Schöpfung überall anwesend ist⁷⁷.

7. Das Wissen der höchsten Natur und das menschliche Wissen von den Dingen

Zum Abschluss seiner Betrachtungen über das schöpferische Wort des höchsten Geistes als des Inbegriffs der göttlichen Ideen wendet sich Anselm der Frage nach dem göttlichen und menschlichen Wissen von den Dingen zu⁷⁸. Dabei vertieft er das Thema der drei ontologischen Ebenen oder, wie man auch sagen könnte, der drei Zustände der geschaffenen Wesen: im Schöpfergeist, in sich selbst und in unserer Erkenntnis⁷⁹. Ein und dieselbe geschaffene Natur hat auf den verschiedenen Ebenen mehr oder weniger Sein und mehr oder weniger Wahrsein. Im Geist des Schöpfers sind die geschaffe-

Rede von der Selbigkeit bezieht sich dabei auf das Wesen; es gibt aber auch eine Selbigkeit der Seinsweisen, und insofern besteht auch diesem Modell Anselms zufolge eine fundamentale Differenz zwischen der (mit dem Schöpfergeist identischen) Idee des Geschöpfs im Schöpfergeist und dem Geschöpf an sich. Siehe dazu GOEBEL, *Anselm's Theory of Universals*, pp. 9-10.

76. ROGERS, *The Neoplatonic Metaphysics*, p. 110.

77. Vgl. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologion*, 14, p. 27; 20-23, pp. 35-42, und siehe ENDERS, *Wahrheit und Notwendigkeit*, pp. 209-228. Nach Enders ist die Lehre Anselms von der Immanenz der Schöpfung in der höchsten Natur im *Monologion* vor allem Ausdruck der kausalen und konstitutiven Abhängigkeit der Schöpfung von Gott, impliziert aber zugleich die spätere Behauptung einer «essentiellen Identität alles raum-zeitlich Existierenden mit seinem Was-Sein, seiner Wesensbestimmung „in Gott“» (*ibidem*, p. 225), einer «Identität der geschaffenen Wesenheiten der raum-zeitlich existierenden Entitäten mit ihren innergöttlichen Wesensbestimmungen, „mit dem, was sie dort sind“» (*ibidem*, p. 228). Siehe zu dieser Thematik auch K. KREMER, *Gott und Welt in der klassischen Metaphysik. Vom Sein der „Dinge“ in Gott*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2006.

78. Vgl. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologion*, 35-36, pp. 54-55.

79. Siehe GOEBEL, *Anselm's Theory of Universals*, pp. 8-10.

nen Wesen gewissermaßen *at their best* – eins mit ihrem Schöpfer, die «erste Seinswahrheit» oder, wie Anselm nun sagt, offenbar im Anschluss an Augustinus, das «Leben und die Wahrheit selbst»⁸⁰. Für den höchsten Geist, für den es dasselbe ist, die «Dinge zu sprechen», sie zu erkennen und um sie zu wissen, bedeutet dies ein intimes und vollkommenes Wissen von den Geschöpfen. In sich selbst sind die Geschöpfe «durch ihr eigenes Wesen»⁸¹, das nur ein Bild oder Gleichnis jener «Wahrheit des Existierens» ist, welche sich allein in ihrer göttlichen Idee findet (die sich vom schöpferischen Wort nicht unterscheidet). Auf «sehr andere Weise» sind die Geschöpfe schließlich in unserem Wissen und begrifflichen Erkennen, nicht in Form ihrer Wesenheiten, sondern als deren Gleichnisse⁸².

Es besteht demnach ein doppeltes Gefälle zwischen dem Wissen der höchsten Natur von den Dingen und unserem Wissen von den Dingen. Wie die Dinge in sich selbst Gleichnisse ihrer göttlichen Ideen sind, so unsere Begriffe Gleichnisse der Dinge, nämlich ihrer Wesenheiten⁸³. Anselm schließt daraus, dass der Modus (das «quomodo») des göttlichen Sprechens der Dinge und des göttlichen Wissens von den Dingen für uns unbegreiflich bleiben muss⁸⁴.

Vielleicht liegt es an einer anachronistischen Erwartungshaltung, dass man daraufhin gleichwohl zu der Einschätzung gelangen konnte, Anselms Lehre des schöpferischen Wortes sei «kein Baustein in einer Theorie der metaphysischen und epistemologischen Beziehungen zwischen Gott und den Geschöpfen und war

80. ANSELMUS CANTUARIENSIS, *Monologion*, 35, p. 54: «Quidquid igitur factum est sive vivat sive non vivat [...]: in illo est ipsa vita et veritas». Zu einer möglichen Quelle für diese Begrifflichkeit bei Augustinus siehe oben, Anm. 44.

81. *Ibidem*, 36, pp. 54-55: «per ipsam suam essentiam».

82. *Ibidem*.

83. Vgl. SCIUTO, *La ragione della fede*, p. 251: «Se la conoscenza umana è inferiore all'essere in sé delle cose come lo è l'immagine rispetto alla realtà, a maggior ragione risulta inferiore nei confronti dell'essere nel Verbo. Il risultato conturbante sta dunque nel fatto che allora la nostra conoscenza non può essere in grado di comprendere, almeno direttamente, come lo Spirito sa e dice le cose».

84. *Monologion* 36, p. 54: «[...] comprehendi potest, quomodo dicat idem spiritus vel quomodo sciat ea quae facta sunt, ab humana scientia comprehendi non posse».

auch nicht als ein solcher beabsichtigt»⁸⁵. Denn genau das Gegenteil scheint der Fall. So ist auch die Erkenntniskritik, die am Ende von Anselms Ausführungen zu den göttlichen Ideen und dem mit diesen identischen Wort steht, nur die negative Seite einer durchaus positiven metaphysischen und epistemologischen Beziehung: Die von Anselm beschriebene Kluft zwischen der göttlichen und der menschlichen Erkenntnis der Geschöpfe wie auch die kleinere Kluft zwischen dem Sein der Geschöpfe in sich selbst und ihrem Sein in der menschlichen Erkenntnis betreffen die Seinsweise, den Grad des Seins und Wahrseins, der Dinge. Sie betreffen nicht deren Was-Sein, das auf allen drei Ebenen – in der göttlichen Idee, im Ding selbst und im begrifflichen Denken der geschaffenen Vernunft – dasselbe ist. Damit sind die Dinge für uns im Prinzip erkennbar, wie wenig wir auch die Art und Weise von Gottes vollkommenem Wissen der Geschöpfe begreifen mögen. Weil der vernünftige Geist unter den Geschöpfen den höchsten Grad an Ähnlichkeit zur dreieinigen höchsten Wesenheit aufweist und die geschaffene Vernunft im Lichte einer kreativen, absoluten Vernunft als ihr «Spiegel und Abbild»⁸⁶ operiert, sind für uns jedenfalls die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit wahrer Rede und sachgemäßer Erkenntnis erfüllt⁸⁷.

85. VISSER, WILLIAMS, *Anselm*, p. 132.

86. Siehe oben, Anm. 129.

87. Siehe dazu B. GOEBEL, *Rectitudo. Wahrheit und Freiheit bei Anselm von Canterbury. Eine philosophische Untersuchung seines Denkansatzes*, Aschendorff, Münster 2001, pp. 132-145 («Wahre Rede und sachgemäße Erkenntnis als Teilhabe am göttlichen Wort»).

La théorie des «causes primordiales» chez Hugues de Saint-Victor

DOMINIQUE POIREL*

Parmi les auteurs qui ont inspiré l'école franciscaine, une place particulière revient à Hugues de Saint-Victor, l'une des sources majeures de la *Summa Halensis* et de Bonaventure¹. Sur la question des idées divines, la pensée hugonienne présente plusieurs particularités. D'abord, plutôt que d'«idées» divines, il préfère parler de «causes primordiales», une expression rendue fameuse par l'Érigène, dont il nous faudra chercher le sens précis chez notre auteur².

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1. Sur la fortune des écrits et des idées d'Hugues de Saint-Victor, voir D. POIREL (éd.), *L'école de Saint-Victor. Influence et rayonnement du Moyen Âge à la Renaissance. Colloque international du C.N.R.S. pour le neuvième centenaire de la fondation (1108-2008)*, Brepols, Turnhout 2010 (Bibliotheca Victorina, 22), spécialement l'article de S. PIRON, «Franciscains et victorins. Tableau d'une réception», pp. 521-545. Voir aussi D. POIREL, M.J. JANECKI (eds.), «*Omnium expetendorum prima est sapientia*». *Studies on Victorine thought and influence*, avec la collab. de W. Bajor, M. Buraczewski, Brepols, Turnhout 2021 (Bibliotheca Victorina, 29) ; et encore C. BOLOGNA, C. ZACCHETTI (a cura di), *La cultura dei Vittorini e la letteratura medievale*, Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Pisa 2022.

2. Sur la doctrine érigénienne des causes primordiales, voir R.D. CROUSE, *Primordiales causae in Eriugena's Interpretation of Genesis: Sources and Significance*, in J.J. McEVoy, G. van Riel, C. Steel (eds.), *Johannes Scottus Eriugena. The Bible and hermeneutics. Proceedings of the Ninth International Colloquium of the Society for the Promotion of Eriugenan Studies held at Leuven and Louvain-la-Neuve, June 7-10, 1995*, Leuven University Press, Leuven 1996 (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, 1, 20), pp. 209-220; C. ERISMANN, *Essentialis causa. De la cause comme principe dans la métaphysique de Jean Scot Érigène*, «*Quaestio. Annuario di storia della metafisica*» 2 (2002), pp. 187-215; S. GERSCH, C. STEPHANY, *L'Ordo Naturalis des causes primordiales. La transformation érigénienne de la doctrine dionysienne des noms divins*, «*Les études philosophiques*» 104/1 (2013), pp. 57-78. Voir aussi, dans ce volume, la contribution d'Ernesto Sergio Mainoldi, pp. 75-98.

Ensuite, cet intérêt pour les « causes primordiales », absent des premières œuvres d'Hugues, prend ensuite un grand relief dans sa pensée, puisqu'il occupe une partie entière (presque en tête) de ses deux sommes théologiques, les *Sententiae de divinitate*, puis le *De sacramentis christianae fidei*³ ; il convient donc d'expliquer pourquoi le thème qui nous occupe a surgi dans ces deux œuvres de la maturité. Enfin, la question des causes primordiales est chez Hugues une sorte de carrefour doctrinal. Elle n'est pas liée seulement, comme on pourrait le penser, à sa réflexion sur la connaissance divine ou sur la causalité ; elle touche aussi à la création de l'homme et de l'ange, à la place de l'homme dans le monde, à la délicate question des appropriations trinitaires, et à bien d'autres encore. On cherchera donc à comprendre pourquoi cette question, si spécialisée en apparence, touche au cœur même de la doctrine hugonienne.

1. Les idées divines et leurs noms chez Hugues de Saint-Victor

Pour parler des idées divines, Hugues emploie les expressions les plus diverses, avec même une certaine désinvolture qui peut déconcerter les spécialistes des docteurs ultérieurs, si soucieux de définir leurs concepts ; mais cette indifférence lexicologique va de pair avec son refus explicite d'une langue technique en théologie : l'essentiel n'est pas dans les termes toujours approximatifs qu'on emploie, mais dans les réalités qu'on vise tant bien que mal à travers eux⁴.

3. HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *Sententiae de divinitate*. Pars II: *De primordialibus causis*, in A.M. PIAZZONI (ed.), *Ugo di San Vittore "auctor" delle "Sententiae de divinitate"*, «Studi medievali», 3^a serie, 23/2 (1982), pp. 861-955: 936-948; HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *Pars secunda. De causa creationis hominis, et de causis primordialibus rerum omnium*, in *De sacramentis christianae fidei*, liber I, PL 176, 205-216D. Bien qu'ancienne, l'édition de la *Patrologia latina* nous paraît plus commode et fiable que le «textus historicus» procuré par R. Berndt, qui transcrit des manuscrits de valeur inégale : *Hugonis de Sancto Victore De sacramentis Christianae fidei*, R. Berndt SJ (ed.), Aschendorff, Münster 2008 (Corpus Victorinum, Textus historici, 1).

4. Sur le refus par Hugues de Saint-Victor d'une langue technique en théologie, voir notre étude : Magis propria : la question du langage en théologie chez Hugues de Saint-Victor, in I. ROSIER-CATACH (éd.), *Les Glosulae super Priscianum, Guillaume de Champeaux, Abélard : arts du langage et théologie aux confins des XI^e-XII^e*

Dans les *Sententiae de divinitate*, on le voit ainsi énumérer, pour parler de la même réalité, les mots de «formes», de «raisons», «d'idées», de «notions» et de «causes» :

HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *Sententiae de divinitate*, Pars II : *De primordialibus causis*, ed. Piazzoni, p. 936, 20-30 :

Deus enim, antequam temporaliter operari inciperet, more periti artificis, ab aeterno in sapientia sua, quae sibi coaeterna est, formas omnium creaturarum conceperat. Quae quidem formae coaeternae sunt ipsi sapientiae et dicuntur «rationes» rerum in mente diuina, uel «ideae», uel «notiones»; et hae formae primordiales omnium rerum sunt. Quae sic possunt describi: primordiales causae sunt rationes rerum ab aeterno in mente diuina constitutae. Quae quidem 'causae' ideo dicuntur quia ab eis alia procedunt; 'primordiales' uero quia primae sunt et uniuersaliter primae, id est ita sunt causae quod ipsae nullas habuere causas, quia aeternae sunt.

Car, avant de se mettre temporairement à l'ouvrage comme un artisan expérimenté, Dieu avait conçu de toute éternité dans sa sagesse, qui lui est coéternelle, les formes de toutes les créatures. Ces formes sont coéternelles à la sagesse même et sont dites «raisons» des choses dans l'esprit divin, ou «idées» ou «notions» ; et ces formes de toutes choses sont primordiales. On peut ainsi les décrire⁵ : les causes primordiales sont les raisons des choses établies de toute éternité dans l'esprit divin. On les dit «causes» car tout procède d'elles, et «primordiales» car elles sont premières et uniuersellement premières, c'est-à-dire sont à tel point causes qu'elles-mêmes n'ont point eu de causes, étant éternelles.

siècles. *Textes, maîtres, débats*, Brepols, Turnhout 2011 (Studia Artistarum, 26), pp. 393-415. De même, on a récemment montré comment l'apparente polysémie du mot *ratio* chez Hugues de Saint-Victor n'est pas anarchique et discontinue, mais développe lucidement une conception forte, souple et cohérente : *La raison chez Hugues de Saint-Victor : du feuilleté des acceptions à la cohérence d'un sens, d'une pensée, d'un programme éducatif*, «Vivarium» 59 (2021), pp. 143-185.

5. Par «décrire» (*describe*) Hugues entend définir, mais d'une façon qui ne satisfasse pas les règles d'une définition rigoureuse selon les logiciens, c'est-à-dire telle qu'elle indique le genre et la différence spécifique.

Dans le *De sacramentis*, comparant la connaissance divine à celle de l'homme, il accumule de même les mots (au pluriel), de «raisons», de «causes», de «ressemblances», de «formes», de «dispositions» et de «prévoyances» :

HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De sacramentis christianae fidei*, I, v, 3, PL 176, 248BC :

Et inventa sunt in secundo quoque quae et in primo, secundum aemulationem et imitationem, et imaginem et similitudinem, rationes et causae et similitudines et formae, dispositiones et providentiae futurorum quae facienda fuerant.

Et se sont trouvées dans le second, selon l'émulation et l'imitation, l'image et la ressemblance, ce qu'il y avait aussi dans le premier : des raisons, des causes, des ressemblances, des formes, des dispositions et des prévoyances des réalités futures qui devaient être faites.

Cette diversité de termes n'est nullement gratuite ou imprécise : elle fait à dessein miroiter une réalité unique mais complexe, présentée selon la métaphore traditionnelle du dieu démiurge, mais envisagée sous les facettes diverses qui vont de sa prévision à sa production : il s'agit de cette pensée initiale qu'a l'artisan divin ou humain de l'œuvre qu'il s'apprête à réaliser, avant qu'ils ne la réalise et selon laquelle il la réalise. Ce dessein est donc dit une «forme» au sens de modèle ; une «cause» au sens de réalité antécédente d'où la chose tire son être ; une «raison» au triple sens de notion, de projet et d'explication⁶ ; une «disposition» au sens d'ordonnance suivant laquelle la chose doit être agencée ; une «prévoyance» ou «pourvoyance» par laquelle l'artisan la conçoit à l'avance et organise sa mise en œuvre.

Toutefois, l'expression de loin la plus fréquente est celle de «causes primordiales»⁷ : «causes», parce que notre auteur s'intéresse moins à la connaissance divine prise en elle-même qu'à son rôle actif dans le processus créateur ; et «primordiales», parce que ces

6. Sur le sens du mot *ratio* chez Hugues, voir ci-dessus, note 4.

7. L'expression *causa primordialis*, le plus souvent au pluriel, se lit 17 fois dans les *Sententiae de divinitate*, 9 fois dans le *De sacramentis christianae fidei*, 3 fois dans le *Didascalicon*.

causes lucides ou connaissances efficaces que sont les idées divines s'insèrent dans une succession de causes et d'effets, dont elles sont le point de départ absolu. C'est là une expression chargée d'histoire : d'origine platonicienne, elle se trouve chez Augustin, en particulier dans son *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim*⁸ ; ou encore chez Bède le Vénérable, dans son *De natura rerum liber*⁹. Mais c'est l'Érigène qui l'a popularisée, puisqu'on la lit 188 fois dans l'ensemble de son œuvre¹⁰. On verra que, tout en connaissant bien ces auteurs, Hugues la reprend librement à son compte, en s'écartant explicitement de la doctrine érigénienne : les causes primordiales ne sont nullement créées et incréées, mais exclusivement incréées¹¹.

Tout l'univers est en effet représenté par Hugues comme un immense enchaînement causal : les réalités qui le constituent s'unissent les unes aux autres par des relations de causes et d'effets. Les unes, tout en haut, sont des causes seulement ; d'autres, tout en bas, sont des effets seulement ; et toutes les autres, entre les deux, sont des réalités qui sont effets en même temps que causes¹².

8. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim*, VI, x, J. Zycha (ed.), Tempsky, Wien 1894, (CSEL 28, 1) p. 182: «Sed haec aliter in Verbo Dei, ubi ista non facta, sed aeterna sunt, aliter in elementis mundi, ubi omnia simul facta futura sunt, aliter in rebus, quae secundum causas simul creatas non iam simul, sed suo quaeque tempore creantur (in quibus Adam iam formatus ex limo et Dei flatu animatus, sicut fenum exortum), aliter in seminibus, in quibus rursus quasi primordiales causae repetuntur de rebus ductae, quae secundum causas, quas primum condidit, extiterunt, uelut herba ex terra, semen ex herba». Sur Augustin, voir la contribution de Giovanni Catapano dans ce volume, pp. 1-30.

9. BEDA VENERABILIS, *De natura rerum liber*, I, C.W. Jones (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1975 (CCSL 123A), p. 189, lin 12-15: «Quarto, quod eiusdem creaturae seminibus et primordialibus causis totius seculi tempus naturali cursu peragitur, ubi Pater usque nunc operatur et Filius, ubi etiam coruos pascit et lilia uestit Deus».

10. Voir ci-dessus, note 184.

11. On notera que l'expression de *causa primordialis*, présente en tout 29 fois chez Hugues, se lit aussi avec quelque fréquence sous la plume de trois autres auteurs du XII^e siècle : Pierre Abélard (8 occurrences), Pierre Lombard (5) et Géroh de Reichersberg (12). Parmi eux le Lombard et Géroh dépendent sûrement d'Hugues, peut-être aussi Pierre Abélard, mais la question mériterait un supplément d'enquête. Sur Pierre Lombard, voir dans ce volume la contribution de Marta Borgo, pp. 149-174.

12. HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *Sententiae de divinitate*, ed. Piazzoni, IV, p. 936, lin. 20-30: «Vt autem melius intelligatur quid sit primordialis causa, absolute quid

Dans cette cascade universelle de causes et d'effets, les causes qui ne sont que causes, ou causes «causalissimes» suivant une expression qu'Hugues emprunte au pseudo-Denys, sont des «causes premières»¹³. Toutefois, cette expression peut s'entendre en deux sens différents. En effet, certaines causes premières sont créées et ne sont «premières» qu'en un certain genre : ainsi Adam, cause première de tous les êtres humains, est lui-même causé. A l'inverse, d'autres causes premières sont créées et premières universellement, rien d'autre ne les cause, on les dit alors «causes primordiales» : telles sont les idées divines, causes absolues de tout ce qui existe.

causa sit in primis dicamus. Causa est ex quo aliquid procedit, effectus quod inde procedit. Et secundum hoc potest dici quia quicquid est uel est causa uel effectus. Sed eorum alia sunt causae tantum, alia et effectus et causae, sed ad aliud et aliud: causae scilicet subsequentium, effectus uero praecedentium. Causae tantum sunt quae generant et non generantur; effectus tantum, quae generantur et non generant; causae et effectus, quae et generantur et generant. Illa uero quae tantum causae sunt, "prima" dicuntur a Scripturis et "causalissima"; quae effectus tantum, "ultima" appellantur; quae utrumque, "media". Quae media quanto magis accedunt ad prima, tanto "causaliora" dicuntur, id est causae plurium effectuum. Et ita ea quae primo loco sunt post prima, primi effectus sunt; quae uero ultimo loco ante ultima, ultimae causae sunt.

Deus enim, antequam temporaliter operari inciperet, more periti artificis, ab eterno in sapientia sua, que sibi coeterna est, formas omnium creaturarum conceperat, que quidem forme coeterne sunt ipsi sapientie et dicuntur rationes rerum in mente diuina, uel idee, uel notiones; et he forme primordiales omnium rerum sunt que sic possunt describi, primordiales cause sunt, rationes rerum ab eterno in mente diuina constitute, que quidem "cause" ideo dicuntur quia ab eis alia procedunt, "primordiales" uero quia prime sunt et uniuersaliter prime, id est ita sunt cause quod ipse nullas habuere causas quia eterne sunt».

13. Il traduit le mot grec Πανάτιος, c'est-à-dire «qui est cause de tout» plutôt que «causal au plus haut point», voir par exemple DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De caelesti hierarchia*, IV: «Πάντα μὲν οὖν τὰ ὄντα μετέχει προνοίας ἐκ τῆς ὑπερουσίου καὶ πανατίου θεότητος ἐκβλυζομένης», G. HEIL (ed.), *Denys l'Aréopagite, La hiérarchie céleste*, Cerf, Paris 1958 (Sources chrétiennes, 58), p. 92, lin. 27-29, que l'Érigène a rendu en latin par: «Omnia igitur quae sunt participant prouidentiam ex superessentia et causalissima diuinitate manantem», D. POIREL (ed.), *Dionysii Theologi Ariopagitae De caelesti Ierarchia*, dans ID., *Hugonis de Sancto Victore opera*, III: *Super Ierarchiam beati Dionysii*, Brepols, Turnhout 2015 (CCCM 178), p. 369, lin. 14-15 = Ph. CHEVALLIER et alii, *Dionysiaca. Recueil donnant l'ensemble des traductions latines des ouvrages attribués au Denys de l'Aréopage*, II, Desclée de Brouwer et Cie, Bruges 1951, p. 801, col. 4.

Avant elles, cependant, il y a autre chose qui ne les cause pas à proprement parler, mais les fonde, ce sont ces trois attributs divins (sur lesquels on reviendra) qui récapitulent tous les autres : la puissance, la sagesse et la bonté ou volonté de Dieu¹⁴. Leur triple collaboration s'étend à toute action divine, donc à ces causes primordiales qui se tiennent en amont de tout processus créateur. Les trois attributs divins sont comme des facultés, les causes primordiales sont les mises en œuvre plurielles, dans l'acte divin de création. C'est dans les causes primordiales que la volonté décide, la sagesse organise et la puissance accomplit son œuvre créatrice :

HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De sacramentis christianae fidei*, I, II, 22, PL 176, 216C :

Cum sint ergo tria in Deo: sapientia, potentia, voluntas; primordiales causae a voluntate quidem divina quasi proficiscuntur, per sapientiam diriguntur, per potentiam producuntur. Voluntas enim movet, sapientia disponit, potentia explicat. Haec sunt aeterna fundamenta causarum omnium et principium primum quae ineffabilia et incomprehensibilia sunt omni creaturae.

Comme il y a trois choses en Dieu, la sagesse, la puissance, la volonté, les causes primordiales partent pour ainsi dire de la volonté, sont dirigées par la sagesse et sont produites par la puissance divines. Car la volonté meut, la sagesse dispose, la puissance déploie. Tels sont les fondements éternels et le principe premier de toutes les causes, ineffables et incompréhensibles à toute créature.

La doctrine du *De sacramentis*, qu'on vient de résumer, s'éclaire si on la rapproche des *Sententiae de divinitate*, enseignement oral d'Hugues de Saint-Victor, reporté par son élève Laurent de Durham puis révisé toutes les semaines par le maître¹⁵. Écrites par

14. Sur ces trois attributs divins et la question des «appropriations divines», présente à la fois chez Hugues de Saint-Victor et Pierre Abélard, voir notre ouvrage *Livre de la nature et débat trinitaire au XI^e s. Le De tribus diebus de Hugues de Saint-Victor*, Brepols, Turnhout 2002 (Bibliotheca Victorina, 14).

15. HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *Sententiae de divinitate*, pp. 861-855. Sur ce texte, probablement à la fois inachevé par l'auteur et mutilé par une transmission manuscrite plus maigre que pour les autres œuvres du Victorin, voir la riche introduction d'Ambrogio Piazzoni, pp. 861-911.

un autre que celui-ci, elles n'en consignent pas moins une doctrine authentiquement hugonienne. On y lit entre autres que les causes primordiales sont les idées divines, par lesquels Dieu, tel un artisan humain, prévoit dans son esprit ce qu'il va faire. Les choses ont en effet un double être, en raison, quand on les conçoit à l'avance, et en acte, quand on les produit ensuite.

HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *Sententiae de divinitate*, Pars II : *De primordialibus causis*, ed. Piazzoni, p. 937, 34-43¹⁶ :

Notandum <quod> omn<e>s res habent unum esse in actu, aliud in ratione. Esse in actu est quando aliqua res in opere et temporali dispositione completur. Esse in ratione est quando artifex aliquis, antequam manus ad operandum admoueat, ne inconsiderate accedat ad opus, preuidet in mente sua quid facturus sit, et quale, et quantum, et omnino cuiusmodi rem facturus sit; deinde ad operandum uenit ut, sicut in animo d<is>posuerat, sic in opere compleat. Et ita esse quod est in ratione precedit illud quod est in opere, quod satis perspicuum est. Vt si quis uel arcam uel domum fabricare intendat, antequam ad opus accedat, omnem formam rei quam facturus est in animo suo depingit. Eodem quoque modo in diuinis actibus contingit.

Il faut noter que toutes les choses ont un être en acte et un autre être dans la raison. L'être en acte a lieu quand la chose s'accomplit dans l'œuvre et la disposition temporelle. L'être dans la raison a lieu quand l'artisan, avant d'appliquer la main à l'ouvrage, pour ne pas se mettre à l'œuvre inconsiderément, prévoit dans son esprit ce qu'il va faire : la qualité, la quantité et tous les aspects de la chose qu'il va faire ; ensuite il passe à l'ouvrage pour accomplir dans son œuvre ce qu'il avait disposé dans son esprit. Et ainsi l'être qui est dans la raison précède celui qui est dans l'œuvre, ce qui est assez clair. Par exemple, si quelqu'un veut fabriquer un coffre ou une maison, avant de se mettre à l'ouvrage, il dépeint dans son esprit la forme de la chose qu'il va faire. Il en va de même pour les actions divines.

16. On nous pardonnera de corriger le texte et la ponctuation des *Sententiae de divinitate*. Nous sommes infiniment reconnaissants à Ambrogio Piazzoni de s'être risqué à l'*editio princeps* d'un texte difficile : c'est ce qui permet d'étudier celui-ci, d'en approfondir la doctrine et, ici ou là, d'en proposer quelques émendations.

Entre les artisans divin et humain il y a cependant cette différence que le premier prévoit de toute éternité ce qu'il accomplit dans le temps et que tout décalage temporel est aboli chez lui entre l'acte de la volonté, qui décide, celui de la sagesse, qui dispose, et celui de la puissance, qui accomplit : les trois puissances divines agissent sans succession ni durée.

HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *Sententiae de divinitate*, Pars II : *De primordialibus causis*, ed. Piazzoni, p. 938, 82-90 :

Sed tamen haec aliter in homine, aliter in Deo sunt. In homine enim haec successiue sibi proueniunt, ita quod uoluntas prior sit, deinde sapientia, postea potestas. Primo enim homo aliquid uult facere, deinde disponit, ad ultimum perficit. In Deo uero haec simul sunt, ita quod nichil ibi prius, ibi nichil posteriorius, quia, quam cito uult, tam cito disponit, tam cito potest; nec sunt haec in Deo diuersa, sed sapientia Dei, quae scilicet ipse Deus est, diuersis de causis his diuersis nominibus appellatur. Et quia tria quasi fundamenta primordialium causarum posuimus, de unoquoque eorum latius prosequamur, et primo de sapientia, deinde de potestate, ad ultimum de uoluntate.

Cependant, il en va autrement chez l'homme et chez Dieu. Chez l'homme, ces actes surviennent successivement, en sorte que la volonté vienne en premier, puis la sagesse, ensuite la puissance. Car l'homme veut d'abord faire quelque chose, ensuite l'organise, enfin le réalise. Chez Dieu cela est simultanément, en sorte que rien ne vienne avant ou après, car, aussitôt qu'il veut, il organise et peut ; et ces facultés ne sont pas diverses en Dieu, mais la sagesse de Dieu, qui est Dieu lui-même, est appelée de noms différents selon des causes différentes. Et puisque nous avons posé comme trois fondements des causes primordiales, poursuivons plus en détail sur chacun d'eux, et d'abord sur la sagesse, ensuite sur la puissance, enfin sur la volonté.

On lit aussi dans les *Sententiae* la réfutation par Hugues de cette thèse selon laquelle ces causes primordiales seraient des réalités intermédiaires entre Dieu et son œuvre, supérieures à celle-ci, inférieures à celui-là, en sorte qu'elles ne seraient en fin de compte ni le créateur ni

la création : «ce qui ne peut être». En effet, les causes primordiales sont bien au-dessus des créatures, dont elles se distinguent radicalement : elles demeurent éternellement dans la sagesse de Dieu et ne font qu'un avec elle. La cause primordiale de toutes choses est en effet la sagesse divine, autrement dit Dieu lui-même. Les causes primordiales ne sont donc inférieures à Dieu qu'en un certain sens, en ce que cette sagesse divine descend et s'humilie pour ainsi dire au-dessous d'elle-même, afin de disposer et gouverner les réalités inférieures et terrestres. Les causes primordiales sont Dieu lui-même, sortant en quelque sorte de son éternelle unité pour entrer, par sa volonté, sa sagesse et sa puissance, dans le détail de sa création multiple et temporelle.

HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *Sententiae de divinitate*, Pars II : *De primordialibus causis*, ed. Piazzoni, p. 937, 56-66 :

Ad quod dicimus quod primordiales causae qu<idem> super omnem creaturam sunt, nec sunt aliquae creaturae, et hoc qu<idem> omni modo uerum est, quia ab aeterno in sapientia Dei sunt et sunt idem cum ipsa, quae est primordialis causa omnium rerum, id est ipse Deus. Sed qualiter infra Deum sunt, uideamus. Primordialis causa omnium rerum, ut diximus, est ipsa Dei sapientia, quae omnia prouidet et dispensat. Quae sapientia, quando humiliat se <et> ab eminentia diuinitatis declinat ut inferiora, terrena scilicet, disponat et gubernet, uidetur quasi se ipsa inferior et infra diuinam naturam subsistere; et ita, licet formae illae quae in mente Dei primordiales causae dicuntur non sint aliud ab ipso Deo, tamen infra Deum dicuntur subsistere.

A quoi nous disons que les causes primordiales sont au-dessus de toute créature sans être des créatures et c'est totalement vrai, car elles sont de toute éternité dans la sagesse de Dieu et ne font qu'un avec elle, cause primordiale de toutes choses, c'est-à-dire Dieu lui-même. Mais voyons comment elles sont au-dessous de Dieu. La cause primordiale de toutes choses, avons-nous dit, est la sagesse même de Dieu, qui prévoit et organise tout. Cette sagesse, quand elle s'humilie et descend de la hauteur de la divinité pour disposer et gouverner les réalités inférieures, c'est-à-dire terrestres, paraît être comme inférieure à elle-même et subsister au-dessous de la nature divine ; et ainsi, bien que ces formes qui sont appelées «causes primordiales» dans l'esprit de Dieu ne soient pas autre chose que Dieu lui-même, cependant on dit qu'elles subsistent sous Dieu.

2. Pourquoi cette théorie des causes primordiales ?

La doctrine hugonienne ainsi exposée soulève deux questions : pourquoi y a-t-il recouru, et quelle place occupe-t-elle dans sa synthèse doctrinale ? Dans les *Sententiae de divinitate* et le *De sacramentis*, le développement sur les causes primordiales intervient au même endroit du plan général, c'est-à-dire dans la partie II du livre I. Même si les *Sententiae de divinitate* nous sont parvenues très incomplètes, ce qu'on lit suffit pour savoir qu'elles auraient dû, comme le *De sacramentis*, se composer de deux livres, le premier traitant des sacrements antérieurs à l'incarnation, le second abordant les sacrements du Christ et de l'Église¹⁷. Or, si l'on compare ce double plan à celui antérieur du *Dialogus de creatione*, et à celui qu'esquisse encore auparavant le *Didascalicon*, on voit qu'entre les quatre ouvrages une césure s'est produite. Entre le *Didascalicon* et le *Dialogus* d'un côté, les *Sententiae* et le *De sacramentis* de l'autre, Hugues a choisi d'intégrer dans sa synthèse de la foi chrétienne quatre sections nouvelles, qui à l'origine en étaient absentes. C'est ce que montrera plus clairement le schéma suivant :

17. Voir en particulier HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *Sententiae de divinitate*, Pars II: *De primordialibus causis*, ed. Piazzoni, l'annonce de plan des pages 926-927, ll. 459-461, 480-481, 490...510: «Restant nunc de illa materia seriatim tractare; ad cuius euidentiam hanc totius mundi in duo ponamus distinctionem, id est in id quod fuit ab initio usque ad Christum et in id quod est a Christo usque ad finem mundi [...]. Et quia sic totum mundum in duas partes distinximus, prius de sacramentis prioris partis, deinde de reliquis ordine tractemus [...]. Itaque primum capitulum huius tractatus creationem mundi continebit. [...] in secunda parte de primordialibus causis dicendum est. In tertia parte de sancta Trinitate [...]. In quarta parte de uoluntate Dei [...]. In quinta parte de creatione angelorum. In sexta parte de creatione hominis [...]. In octaua parte de reparatione hominis [...]. In nona parte de institutione sacramentorum. In decima parte de fide [...]. In undecima de sacramentis naturalis legis. In duodecima de sacramentis scripte legis usque ad Christum».

<i>Didascalicon</i>	<i>Dialogus de creatione</i>	<i>Sententiae de divinitate</i>	<i>De sacramentis christianae fidei</i>
		Livre I De la création à l'Incarnation	Livre I De la création à l'Incarnation
1. Trinité			
2. Création du monde	Création du monde	1. Création du monde	1. Création du monde
		2. Causes primordiales	2. Causes primordiales
		3. Trinité	3. Trinité
		4. Volonté de Dieu	4. Volonté de Dieu
		5. Création des anges	5. Création des anges
3. Création et chute de la créature rationnelle	Création de l'homme	6. Création de l'homme	6. Création de l'homme
	Chute de l'homme	7. Chute de l'homme	7. Chute de l'homme
4. Réparation de l'homme et sacrements de la loi naturelle	Réparation de l'homme	8. Réparation de l'homme	8. Réparation de l'homme
	Institution des sacrements	9. Institution des sacrements	9. Institution des sacrements
	Foi	10. Foi	10. Foi
	Sacrements de la loi naturelle	11. Sacrements de la loi naturelle	11. Sacrements de la loi naturelle
5. Sacrements de la loi <écrite>	Sacrements de la loi écrite	12. Sacrements de la loi écrite	12. Sacrements de la loi écrite
		Livre II De l'Incarnation à la fin du monde	Livre II De l'Incarnation à la fin du monde
6. Sacrement de l'Incarnation du Verbe			
7. Sacrements du Nouveau Testament			
8. Résurrection			

Alors que, dans le *Dialogus*, la création du monde débouchait immédiatement dans la création de l'homme – comme le sixième jour de l'*hexaemeron* conclut les cinq jours précédents –, dans les *Sententiae* et le *De sacramentis* un hiatus apparaît entre la création du monde et la création de l'homme, où quatre parties entières s'intercalent : d'abord les causes primordiales, qui nous occupent ; puis la Trinité ; puis la volonté de Dieu ; puis la création des anges. Il y a donc, dans la carrière littéraire d'Hugues de Saint-Victor, un tournant, qu'on peut dater de 1125 environ, et qui conduit notre auteur à s'intéresser à la théorie des causes primordiales, en lien avec la Trinité, la volonté divine et les anges¹⁸. Comme 1125 environ est aussi la date à laquelle Hugues se met à commenter la *Hiérarchie céleste* du pseudo-Denys l'Aréopagite, cet intérêt nouveau pour les causes primordiales pourrait recevoir là une explication partielle : la conception dionysienne d'un univers hiérarchique a pu influencer la vision hugonienne d'un enchaînement hiérarchique de causes et d'effets, par lesquels s'accomplit le projet divin sur la création¹⁹.

Quoi qu'il en soit, le tournant est encore plus marqué si l'on observe que, dans ses premiers ouvrages, non seulement Hugues accorde peu de place à la question des idées divines, mais de surcroît il la considère avec méfiance, comme une doctrine païenne.

18. Lorsqu'il est question d'assigner une date aux œuvres d'Hugues de Saint-Victor, on cite souvent l'ouvrage de DAMIEN VAN DEN EYNDE : *Essai sur la succession et la date des écrits de Hugues de Saint-Victor*, Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, Roma 1960 (Spicilegium Pontificii Athenaei Antoniani, 13). Toute stimulante que soit la lecture de l'ouvrage, j'ai plusieurs fois dit mes réserves sur sa méthode, à mon avis fondée sur des jugements littéraires et doctrinaux fragiles, en particulier lorsqu'ils comparent des passages parallèles d'écrits divers d'Hugues de Saint-Victor et tiennent pour acquis que ce qui est meilleur (aux yeux de qui ?) est par là même postérieur. Voir D. POIREL, *Livre de la nature et débat trinitaire au XII^e s. Le De tribus diebus de Hugues de Saint-Victor*, Brepols, Turnhout 2002 (Bibliotheca Victorina, 14), pp. 131-150; ID., *Des symboles et des anges. Hugues de Saint-Victor et le réveil dionysien du XII^e s.*, Brepols, Turnhout 2013 (Bibliotheca Victorina, 23), pp. 61-70. Il faut donc reprendre toute la question, en s'appuyant notamment sur les informations nouvelles apportées par les récentes éditions critiques.

19. Sur mes raisons d'étaler la rédaction du *Super Ierarchiam Dionisii* entre 1125 environ et la mort d'Hugues en 1141, voir D. POIREL, «Une rédaction longue», in ID., *Des symboles et des anges*, pp. 88-145.

Dans ses *Notes sur le Pentateuque*, la théorie des idées archétypes, en référence probable au *Timée* de Platon, est même donnée comme l'exemple d'une différence majeure entre «nos auteurs», dit-il, et les philosophes de l'Antiquité :

HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *Adnotationes in Pentateuchum*, 4, PL 175, 33B.

In hoc enim differunt auctores nostri a philosophis, quod philosophi Deum opificem tantum, et tria ponunt principia: Deum, materiam, et archetypas ideas; nostri vero unicum ponunt principium, et hoc Deum solum.

Nos auteurs diffèrent en ceci des philosophes que pour les philosophes Dieu n'est qu'un artisan et ils posent trois principes : Dieu, la matière et les idées archétypes ; tandis que les nôtres posent un principe unique, et c'est Dieu seul.

La théorie platonicienne des idées lui apparaît donc comme contradictoire avec la conception biblique et chrétienne d'une création proprement dite, c'est-à-dire *ex nihilo*, de l'univers tout entier, matière et formes comprises. Sans doute est-ce pour cette raison qu'il ne finit par accueillir plus tard la théorie des idées divines qu'en insistant sur l'identité de ces idées avec Dieu lui-même et en évitant presque toujours le mot d'«idées», trop lié à la tradition grecque ancienne.

Étant donné ces réticences, quel était aux yeux d'Hugues l'intérêt d'intercaler, entre la création du monde et celle de l'homme, un détour par la notion des idées divines, rebaptisées «causes primordiales» ? La réponse est à mon sens celle-ci : il s'agissait de rehausser la place de l'homme dans l'univers. La raison d'être des parties consacrées aux causes primordiales, mais aussi à la Trinité, à la volonté divine et aux anges, c'est en effet d'apporter graduellement des éléments d'explication à cette question unique : pourquoi Dieu a-t-il créé l'homme ?

Puisque les sommes hugoniennes portent explicitement «sur les sacrements de la foi chrétienne», c'est-à-dire sur l'Incarnation du Verbe et ses sacrements, il aurait dû suffire d'y traiter de l'œuvre divine de restauration, sans développer l'autre œuvre divine, l'œuvre

de création, supposée relever des sciences profanes. L'objet propre de la science sacrée, c'est en effet la grâce, bien plus que la nature ; le salut des hommes bien plus que l'exploration de l'univers.

HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De Scripturis et scriptoribus sacris*, II, PL 175, 11C :

In his itaque materiam divinarum Scripturarum considera, ut et in illo de quo tractant, et illo modo quo tractant, hoc est in materia et modo ab aliis eas scripturis distinguere possis. Aliarum enim scripturarum omnium materia est in operibus conditionis, divinarum Scripturarum materia in operibus restaurationis constat.

Considère sur ces points la matière des Écritures divines, pour pouvoir les distinguer des autres écritures, en ce dont elles traitent ainsi que dans la manière dont elles en traitent, c'est-à-dire dans la matière et dans le mode. Les autres écritures ont pour matière les œuvres de création ; les Écritures divines ont pour matière les œuvres de restauration.

HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De sacramentis christianae fidei*, I, Prol., 2, PL 176, 183A. 183C :

Materia divinarum Scripturarum omnium, sunt opera restaurationis humanae. [...] Mundanae sive saeculares scripturae materiam habent opera conditionis. Divina Scriptura materiam habet opera restaurationis.

La matière de toutes les Écritures divines, ce sont les œuvres de la restauration humaine. Les écritures profanes ou séculières ont pour matière l'œuvre de création ; les Écritures divines pour matière l'œuvre de restauration.

Toutefois la Bible, dont l'étude constitue cette science sacrée, commence par la création du monde et de l'homme. Il y a sûrement une bonne raison à cela. Cette raison, explique Hugues, c'est que pour comprendre la restauration de l'homme, il faut comprendre sa chute ; que pour comprendre sa chute, il faut connaître l'état dans lequel il a été créé ; et que pour comprendre l'état dans lequel il a été créé, il faut comprendre d'abord la création de l'homme, et

celle du monde qui l'environne et a été façonné pour lui. Étudier l'œuvre divine de création est donc requis pour étudier l'œuvre divine de restauration :

HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De sacramentis christianae fidei*, I, Prol., 3, PL 176, 184AB :

Quamvis autem principalis materia divinae Scripturae sint opera restorationis, tamen, ut competentius ad ea tractanda accedat, primum in ipso capite narrationis suae breviter secundum fidem rerum gestarum exordium et constitutionem narrat operum conditionis. Non enim convenienter ostendere posset qualiter homo reparatus sit, nisi prius demonstraret qualiter sit lapsus; neque vero lapsum ejus convenienter ostendere, nisi prius qualiter a Deo institutus fuerit explicaret. Ad ostendam autem primam institutionem hominis oportuit ut totius mundi conditio ac creatio panderetur, quia propter hominem factus est mundus

Bien que les œuvres de restauration soient la matière principale de l'Écriture divine, cependant, pour en traiter de façon plus adaptée, elle raconte d'abord brièvement en son début, selon la foi, le commencement des actions <divines> et l'établissement des œuvres de création. Elle ne pouvait en effet montrer convenablement comment l'homme a été réparé, si elle ne montrait d'abord comment il est tombé ; et elle ne pouvait non plus montrer convenablement sa chute sans expliquer d'abord comment il a été institué par Dieu. Or pour montrer comment Dieu a d'abord été institué, il a fallu manifester la fondation et création du monde entier, car c'est pour l'homme que le monde a été fait.

Toutefois, ce qui différencie la théologie de la physique, c'est que la nature n'y est pas étudiée pour elle-même, mais en vue de l'homme et de son salut. Une question principale domine donc toutes les sections sur l'œuvre de création : pourquoi Dieu a-t-il voulu créer l'homme, en vue duquel il a créé tout le reste²⁰ ? Quel

20. HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De sacramentis christianae fidei*, I, 1, 25, 176, col. 203AB: «Ergo factus est homo non quasi ornatus terrae, sed dominus et possessor, ut non ad terram referatur conditio ejus, propter quem facta est terra»; *ibidem.*, I,

était le projet initial de Dieu sur l'homme, et par conséquent sur toute la création, avant que n'intervinssent la chute de l'homme, puis sa restauration par les sacrements ? Ce projet initial, ce sont les causes primordiales, c'est-à-dire la façon dont Dieu, voulant se donner à participer à une créature rationnelle, a voulu, conçu et accompli cette créature rationnelle, et tout l'univers visible en fonction d'elle.

C'est cette question : «pourquoi» qui explique que les idées divines apparaissent moins comme des «raison» ou des «formes» que comme des causes, et des causes primordiales : tout tourne autour d'une réflexion sur la causalité, mais une causalité multiple, étagée, hiérarchisée. Dans le grand plan divin de création de l'univers, il y a ce que Dieu a conçu pour soi, et c'est la créature rationnelle, l'ange et l'homme, aimés et voulus pour eux-mêmes ; et il y a ce que Dieu a conçu, non pour soi, mais en vue de l'homme, et c'est tout le reste de l'univers visible.

3. Les causes primordiales au cœur de la synthèse hugonienne

C'est pour cela que le thème des causes primordiales, chez Hugues, mêle inextricablement la question qui nous occupe, celle des idées divines, à d'autres questions, que probablement nous n'aurions pas songé à lui associer : l'existence de Dieu, son unité de substance et sa trinité de personnes ; la puissance, la sagesse et la volonté divines ; la création de l'ange et de l'homme, dits tous deux «créatures rationnelles», enfin la place de l'homme dans l'univers. Le thème hugonien des causes primordiales occupe en effet une place, sinon centrale, du moins toute proche du centre de sa doctrine : entre ces parties diverses de la théologie, il exerce une fonction de lien, de jonction, de mise en ordre et en relation.

1, 26, col. 204D: «Novissime sexta die factus est homo Adam et Eva, propter quem facta sunt caetera omnia»; *ibidem*, I, II, 1, col. 205BC, etc.: «[...] nunc vero consequens est ut creationem hominis (propter quem mundus ipse factus est) sermone prosequamur [...]. Nam et homo factus est ut Deo serviret propter quem factus est; et mundus factus est ut serviret homini propter quem factus est».

Pour répondre à la question initiale : «pourquoi l'homme a-t-il été créé ?», Hugues fait un grand détour, d'abord par la notion de «causes primordiales», comme on l'a vu, mais ensuite par la place médiane de l'homme entre le monde et Dieu. En effet, le monde a été fait pour l'homme (*propter hominem*), l'homme a été fait pour Dieu (*propter Deum*) :

HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De sacramentis christianae fidei*, I, II, I, PL 176, 205BC :

Unde constat creationem hominis, rerum omnium visibilium conditione posteriorem quidem tempore, sed causa priorem fuisse: quia qui factus est post omnia, propter eum omnia facta sunt. Causa ergo conditionis humanae ante omnia est; et ipsam investigare oportet supra omnia et ante omnia quae tempore orta sunt, et ante tempora ordinata sunt. Si enim omnia Deus fecit propter hominem, causa omnium homo est et causaliter homo prior omnibus est; ipsum vero propter quod homo factus est prius homine est; et multo ante omnia quibus homo causaliter prior est. Id autem propter quod factus est homo, quid aliud erit nisi ipse a quo factus est homo? Si ergo causa mundi homo est (quia propter hominem factus est mundus) et causa hominis Deus est (quia propter Deum factus est homo), ergo Deus erat, et mundus non erat neque homo erat, et factus est propter Deum homo qui non erat, et mundus propter hominem qui necdum erat.

Aussi est-il clair que la création de l'homme vient après celle de toutes les choses visibles dans le temps, mais vient avant elle par la cause : car c'est pour lui, qui a été fait après tout, que tout a été fait. La cause de la création de l'homme précède donc tout ; et il faut l'examiner au-dessus de tout et avant tout ce qui est né dans le temps et ordonné avant les temps. Car si Dieu a tout fait pour l'homme, la cause de tout est l'homme et l'homme précède tout causalement ; mais ce pour quoi l'homme a été fait précède l'homme, et précède de beaucoup tout ce que l'homme précède causalement. Or ce qui a été fait pour l'homme, que sera-ce d'autre que celui par qui l'homme a été fait ? Si donc la cause du monde est l'homme (car le monde a été fait pour l'homme) et que la cause de l'homme est Dieu (car l'homme a été fait pour Dieu), il y avait donc Dieu, et il n'y avait pas le monde ni l'homme, et l'homme qui n'était pas a été fait pour Dieu, et le monde qui n'était pas encore a été fait pour l'homme.

Toutefois, dans un cas et l'autre la préposition *propter* n'a pas le même sens : le monde a été fait pour l'homme parce que l'homme a besoin du monde, pour son entretien, mais l'homme n'a pas été fait pour Dieu au sens où Dieu aurait besoin de l'homme, c'est au contraire l'homme, fait pour Dieu, qui a besoin de Dieu et ne trouve sa félicité qu'en Dieu. Il y a donc, dans l'échelle des causes, une rupture, presque un renversement, lorsqu'on arrive au sommet de cette échelle, c'est-à-dire à la création de l'homme. Tout le monde visible est fait en vue de l'homme d'une autre manière que l'homme est fait en vue Dieu :

HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De sacramentis christianae fidei*, I, II, I, PL 176, 205C. 205C. 206BC.

Et quasi eadem causa videbatur quod factus est homo propter Deum et quod propter hominem mundus factus est. [...] Et quasi idem erat et idem non erat; quia idem non erat propter quo<d> erat. Deus perfectus erat et plenus bono consummato; neque opus habuit aliunde juvari, quoniam nec minui potuit aeternus, nec immensus augeri. [...] Ergo totum bonum hominis erat: videlicet et quod factum est propter ipsum, et propter quod factus est ipse. Sed aliud bonum deorsum erat et de subtus sumebatur ad necessitatem, aliud bonum sursum erat, et desuper sumebatur ad felicitatem. Bonum quippe illud quod in creatura positum erat, bonum erat necessitatis; quod vero in Creatore erat bonum, bonum erat felicitatis. Et utrumque ad hominem ferebatur quia

Et ce semblait être presque la même cause : que l'homme a été fait pour Dieu et que le monde a été fait pour l'homme. [...] Et c'était presque la même chose et ce n'était pas la même chose, car ce n'était pas le même que chacun était. Dieu était parfait et rempli d'un bien complet, et il n'a pas eu besoin d'être aidé, car il n'a pu diminuer, étant éternel, ni augmenter, étant immense. [...] Donc tout était le bien de l'homme : et ce qui a été fait pour lui, et ce pour quoi il a été fait lui-même. Mais un bien était inférieur et on le prenait d'en bas pour la nécessité ; l'autre bien était supérieur et on le prenait d'en haut pour la félicité. Ce bien qui était placé dans la création était un bien de nécessité ; le bien placé dans le créateur était un bien de félicité. Et tous deux se rapportaient à l'homme car tous deux

utrumque homini debebatur; quia propter alterum factus est homo, ut illud possideret et frueretur; alterum propter hominem factum est ut illud acciperet et juvaretur.

l'avantageaient, car c'est pour l'un qu'a été fait l'homme, pour le posséder et en jouir, et l'autre a été fait pour l'homme, pour le recevoir et s'en aider.

Au sommet de l'échelle des causes, il y a en effet Dieu, cause première, qui agit *secundum se* et *propter se*. En créant l'homme, il ne le crée pas *secundum aliud*, d'après un modèle extérieur, mais il le crée *secundum se*, à sa ressemblance ; et il ne le crée pas *propter aliud*, en raison d'une cause antérieure et par nécessité, mais il le crée *propter se*, par amour et pour faire participer l'homme de sa propre nature. Toutes les créatures font donc l'objet, de la part de Dieu, de causes primordiales, selon lesquelles il les connaît et par lesquelles il les crée ; et ces causes primordiales s'enchaînent les unes aux autres pour former toutes ensemble un vaste et unique plan créateur. Au-delà de cet enchaînement de causes primordiales, il n'y a rien d'autre que la puissance, la sagesse et la bonté divines, qui sont les «fondements» des causes primordiales : la volonté meut, la sagesse dispose, la puissance opère, comme chez l'artisan humain, mais ici de façon indissoluble et simultanée.

HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De sacramentis christianae fidei*, I, II, 3, PL 176, 207D:

Haec prima causa rerum omnium secundum se et propter se operata est opus suum; secundum se, quoniam extrinsecus operis sui formam non accipit; propter se, quoniam aliunde causam operandi non habuit. Fecit enim ad similitudinem suam, quod disponebat ad participationem sui, ut ex ipsa eadem formam traheret, quod cum ipsa idem bonum possidere debuisset.

Cette cause première de toutes choses a accompli son œuvre selon soi et en vue de soi ; selon soi, puisqu'elle n'a pas reçu du dehors la forme (modèle) de son œuvre ; et en vue de soi, parce qu'elle n'a pas eu d'ailleurs une cause pour opérer. Elle a fait en effet à sa ressemblance ce qu'elle disposait à participer d'elle, pour que se transmitt d'elle la même forme à ce qui aurait dû posséder avec elle le même bien.

Or cette puissance, cette sagesse et cette volonté divines, tout en étant des attributs substantiels, communs aux trois personnes, sont souvent attribués dans les Écritures, chacune en propre, à l'une des trois personnes : la puissance au Père, la sagesse au Fils, la volonté ou bonté au Saint-Esprit. De la sorte, l'action créatrice introduit dans les créatures soit une image, dans les créatures rationnelles, anges ou hommes ; soit un «simulacre» ou vestige, dans les créatures irrationnelles. De là vient que la triade «mens, sagesse et amour», chez l'ange ou l'homme, et la triade «immensité, beauté, utilité», dans les créatures visibles, expriment à leur manière quelque chose du Dieu un et trine.

	Trinité des personnes	Père	Fils	Saint-Esprit
Dieu	attributs substantiels	Puissance	sagesse	bonté
	causes primordiales	<déployantes>	<formelles>	<finales>
Créature rationnelle	a) ange	<i>Mens</i>	sagesse	amour
	b) homme	<i>Mens</i>	sagesse	amour
Monde visible		Immensité	beauté	utilité

Autrement dit, les causes primordiales des créatures, c'est-à-dire les formes ou raisons en lesquelles Dieu les connaît et les crée, portent la ressemblance, chez l'ange ou l'homme, ou la trace en creux, chez les autres créatures, du Dieu un et trine, puisque ces causes primordiales ont pour fondements la puissance, la sagesse et la bonté divines, trois propriétés substantielles, mais qui sont comme l'écho de la pluralité des trois personnes divines. On sait que ce thème, maladroitement repris par Pierre Abélard, devait entraîner sa double condamnation, à Soissons en 1121, et à Sens, en 1141, avant de connaître, une fois corrigé, un grand succès en particulier dans l'école franciscaine²¹. C'est qu'il rapproche deux sections de la théologie, le traité *De Deo trino* et le traité *De Deo creatore* qui risqueraient sans cela de diverger. C'est

21. Voir notre enquête «Aux origines de la théorie des appropriations trinitaires», in D. POIREL, *Livre de la nature et débat trinitaire au XII^e s.*, pp. 261-420.

la raison pour laquelle, dans l'école de Saint-Victor, un successeur d'Hugues, maître Achard, devait distinguer les formes ou causes primordiales en raisons «déployantes», formelles ou exemplaires, et finales, à l'intérieur d'une enquête explicitement consacrée au mystère du Dieu un et trine²². La fonction théologique des causes primordiales, à Saint-Victor, est en effet de jeter un pont entre la Trinité et son œuvre créatrice, si bien que la création de l'homme et de l'ange, images de Dieu, et même la création des réalités visibles, simulacres du créateur, sont reliées au mystère trinitaire par l'intermédiaire des trois attributs divins, substantiels mais appropriés, et des causes primordiales, qui ne sont rien d'autre au fond que la volonté, la sagesse et la puissance divines, considérées dans leurs mises en œuvre multiples.

Pour conclure, voici comment on peut, à partir de ce qui vient d'être dit, résumer la conception hugonienne des idées divines et la façon dont cette conception a changé dans le temps. À l'origine, Hugues de Saint-Victor se méfie de la notion d'«idées divines», qui lui paraît trop dépendante d'une philosophie païenne,

22. Même si l'ouvrage d'Achard de Saint-Victor, transmis par un manuscrit unique, n'eut presque aucune postérité médiévale, en dehors de Jean de Ripa au xiv^e siècle, sa doctrine des formes divines est d'un grand intérêt car elle enrichit la doctrine d'Hugues de Saint-Victor d'une forte originalité métaphysique, appuyée sur la lecture des sources médio et néoplatoniciennes. On ne peut donc que se réjouir d'un réveil des études achardiennes, marqué notamment par ces deux ouvrages récents. Le premier, par I. LYSTOPAD, *Un platonisme original au xii^e siècle : métaphysique pluraliste et théologie trinitaire dans le De unitate et pluralitate creaturarum d'Achard de Saint-Victor*, Brepols, Turnhout 2021 (Bibliotheca Victorina, 28), explore les sources philosophiques d'Achard et dégage sa doctrine d'une pluralité des «formes» ou idées divines, en Dieu lui-même et dans les créatures. Le second ouvrage, G. OLIVO, V. CARRAUD, P. PORRO (éds), *Achard de Saint-Victor métaphysicien. Le De unitate Dei et pluralitate creaturarum*, Brepols, Turnhout 2020 (Ad argumenta, 2), réunit des contributions présentées les 9 et 10 avril 2015 au colloque «Le De unitate Dei et pluralitate creaturarum d'Achard de Saint-Victor», tenu à Avranches, dans l'abbaye de la Lucerne d'Outremer et à l'Université de Caen Normandie. Voir aussi la contribution dans ce volume d'Irena Lystopad, pp. 175-195.

en particulier celle de Platon. Selon celle-ci, tout ce qui existe n'a pas pour principe unique le Dieu créateur de la Bible, mais plutôt trois principes : le démiurge, les idées et la matière. Son intérêt renouvelé pour le pseudo-Denys, au milieu des années 1120, et sa volonté de donner plus d'importance à la création de l'homme, ainsi qu'aux raisons de cette création, le conduisent à enrichir le plan de sa synthèse chrétienne, d'abord dans l'enseignement oral dont proviennent les *Sententiae de divinitate*, puis dans sa somme *De sacramentis*. Il y intercale alors quatre parties supplémentaires, étroitement liées les unes aux autres : sur les causes primordiales ; sur la Trinité ; sur la volonté divine ; et sur la création des anges.

Après avoir débuté, comme fait du reste l'Écriture, par la création du monde visible, Hugues fait, avant même d'aborder la création de l'homme, ce qui est son but principal, un détour par le grand dessein de Dieu sur l'homme. Ce grand dessein se multiplie en effet dans les causes primordiales, hiérarchisées (pars II) ; il fait l'objet d'une participation de la Trinité tout entière, à l'image de laquelle l'homme a été créé (pars III) ; il a pour cause primordiale la volonté divine (pars IV) ; il associe l'homme à l'ange (pars V), son double spirituel, puisque tous deux sont ensemble des créatures rationnelles ; néanmoins, c'est dans l'homme que ce grand dessein s'accomplit le plus pleinement, puisque c'est pour l'homme seul qu'a été créé l'univers visible. Une fois donc exposé ce grand dessein de Dieu sur l'homme et le monde – l'homme pour lui-même et le monde en vue de l'homme –, Hugues peut alors revenir à son but principal et décrire la création de l'homme (pars VI). Le lecteur a tout ce qu'il faut pour bien comprendre le sens de celle-ci.

On a souvent observé que la doctrine hugonienne, dans le *De sacramentis*, est fortement christocentrique : c'est ce qui explique son plan en deux livres, l'un avant et l'autre depuis l'Incarnation du Verbe (pars II). Il nous faut à présent compléter cette affirmation et dire, grâce au thème des causes primordiales, que la doctrine hugonienne est aussi fortement anthropocentrique : ceci explique d'ailleurs cela. C'est parce que dès son œuvre de création Dieu avait tout organisé en vue de l'homme, qu'il a, pour son œuvre de restauration, choisi de sauver l'homme déchu en se

faisant homme lui-même en la personne du Christ. Anthropocentrisme et christocentrisme vont de pair. La doctrine hugonienne des idées divines, appelées par lui «causes primordiales», est donc au service d'une théologie chrétienne fortement humaniste.

Y a-t-il une doctrine des idées divines chez Pierre Lombard ?

MARTA BORGIO*

Au début des années 1250, à Paris, Bonaventure de Bagnoregio s'interroge sur les idées divines en commentant la d. 35 du premier livre des *Sentences* de Pierre Lombard, comme Eudes Rigaud une dizaine d'année plus tôt. Autour de 1250, à Oxford, Richard Rufus de Cornouaille abordait la question, mais plutôt dans son commentaire à la d. 36, comme déjà avait fait, bien avant lui, à Paris, le maître d'origine anglaise Alexandre de Halès¹. Si l'on se tient à ses seuls propos, Pierre Lombard n'en parle ni dans la d. 35 ni dans la d. 36². Quoiqu'Alexandre de Halès soit le premier à institutionnaliser la lec-

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1. Pour la datation de ces quatre commentaires aux *Sentences* et une comparaison, aussi par rapport au Lombard, sur d'autres thèmes, on pourra se référer à A. OLIVA, *Les débuts de l'enseignement de Thomas d'Aquin et sa conception de la sacra doctrina*. Avec l'édition du prologue de son commentaire des *Sentences*, Vrin, Paris 2006, pp. 257, 261, 266-267. Au sujet des idées divines, on lira avec profit R. WOOD, *Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solitude: Alexander of Hales, Richard Rufus, and Odo Rigaldus*, «Franciscan Studies» 53 (1993), pp. 7-31.

2. Sur la structure des *Sentences* de Pierre Lombard, qui n'étaient pas articulées en distinctions à proprement parler, voir Ph.W. ROSEMANN, *The Story of a Great Medieval Book: Peter Lombard's Sentences*, Broadview Press, Peterborough 2007, pp. 13-27; Id., *Peter Lombard*, Oxford University Press, New York 2004, pp. 54-70. Plus spécifiquement sur cette section du texte du Lombard, voir M.L. COLISH, *Peter Lombard*, 2 voll., Brill, Leiden 1993, I, pp. 268-302; cfr. ROSEMANN, *Peter Lombard*, pp. 78-82; R. SACCENTI, "Sic bonum cognoscitur et similiter lux". *Divine Ideas in the First Franciscan Masters (Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle)*, in J.F. FALÀ, I. ZAVATTERO (eds.), *Divine Ideas in Franciscan Thought (XIIIth-XIVth century)*, Aracne, Roma 2018 (*Flumen sapientiae*. Studi sul pensiero medievale, 8), pp. 1-24: 2-10; R. TKACHENKO, *Peter Lombard on God's Knowledge: Sententiae, Book I, Distinctions 35-39, as the Basis for Later Theological Discussions*, «Sententiae» 36 (2017), pp. 17-30.

ture des *Sentences* et que sa manière d'argumenter ne soit pas si différente de celle suivie par le Lombard, l'écart entre sa lecture de la d. 36 et le texte du Lombard est déjà considérable. Et avec les autres commentateurs qu'on vient de mentionner, il se fera de plus en plus considérable. D'ailleurs, si Alexandre est plus généralement parmi les premiers³ à aborder «à propos du texte du Lombard», comme le souligne Geiger, le «problème des idées divines, de leur nature et de leur multiplicité en Dieu», il est vrai que cette discussion est beaucoup plus ancienne que son «évocation» en ce contexte⁴. Rien d'étonnant donc s'il y puise au moment de lire en classe les *Sentences*. De fait, Alexandre de Halès assure au texte de Pierre une sorte de nouveau départ. Il y apporte, en effet, un bon nombre de nouvelles questions cruciales contribuant à l'inscrire dans un cadre qui s'avère différent de celui dans lequel il avait été conçu et qui va comporter, par rapport au débat en cours au milieu du XII^e siècle, de nouveaux enjeux philosophiques, issus par exemple de la discussion autour du livre Lambda de la *Métaphysique*. Bien évidemment, la réflexion, autant philosophique que théologique, sur les idées divines se situe en amont des *Sentences* elles-mêmes⁵. De ce débat le Lombard semble pourtant vouloir se tenir quelque peu en marge, comme on essaiera de le préciser par la suite.

Il est d'ailleurs intéressant de remarquer que l'approfondissement d'Alexandre de Halès dérive d'une relecture du Lombard s'inspirant d'une méthode profondément lombardienne et qui exploite notamment des outils qui n'étaient pas inconnus du Lombard lui-même. Dans la glose halésienne, la *littera* du maître des *Sentences*

3. Sur la première réception des *Sentences*, voir OLIVA, *Les débuts*, pp. 16-17; ROSEMAN, *The Story*, pp. 53-69; SACCENTI, "Sic bonum cognoscitur", pp. 10-17.

4. L.B. GEIGER, *Les idées divines dans l'œuvre de s. Thomas*, in *St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974. Commemorative Studies*, PIMS, Toronto 1974, pp. 175-209: 187, avec la n. 29.

5. Voir parmi d'autres J. HAMESSE, 'Idea' chez les auteurs philosophiques des 12^e et 13^e siècles, in M. FATTORI, M. BIANCHI (a cura di), *Idea. VI Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo* (Roma, 5-7 gennaio 1989), Edizioni dell'Ateneo, Roma 1990, pp. 99-135; R. PLEVANO, *Exemplarity and Essence in the Doctrine of the Divine Ideas: Some Observations on the Medieval Debate*, «Medioevo» 25 (1999-2000), pp. 653-711; I. CAIAZZO, *Sur la distinction sénéchiennne idea/idos au XIF siècle*, «Chora. Revue d'études anciennes et médiévales» 3-4 (2005-2006), pp. 91-116.

est en effet remise en question et expliquée d'un côté à l'aide de quelques passages cruciaux tirés d'Augustin, et notamment de sa *Quaestio de ideis*⁶, reformulée de l'autre par le biais d'une palette lexicale plus variée et plus technique, pour ainsi dire. Il devient ainsi question, en outre de *scientia/sapientia divina* et génériquement de *causae* et *rationes*, de *rationes stabiles*, d'*exemplaria* et notamment d'*ideae*, ce dernier terme ne venant jamais sous la plume du Lombard, ni dans ces deux distinctions ni ailleurs. Par conséquent, si les commentaires aux dd. 35-36 de *Sent.* I s'affirment dès les débuts comme le contexte par excellence où développer sa propre doctrine des idées divines – une ou plusieurs ? de quoi il y a-t-il idées ? notamment y en a-t-il de la matière ? des individus ? –, l'on peut bien se demander si le Lombard, qui n'aborde ouvertement aucune de ces questions, a jamais développé en fait quelque chose comme une doctrine des idées divines⁷. Loin d'être un paradoxe, ce dépassement de la *littera* lombardienne dès sa lecture par Alexandre de Halès et l'élargissement de ses implications philosophico-théologiques représentent moins une violence faite au texte des *Sentences* qu'une répercussion de la démarche didactique entreprise par Pierre Lombard, qui, avec son recueil raisonné d'autorités, entendait justement promouvoir une pratique de la théologie comme réflexion sur les Écritures au prisme de la tradition patristique, ni trop ancrée dans la narration biblique, ni trop confiante dans les capacités abstractives de la spéculation rationnelle⁸. D'où sa manière de procéder en colportant les autorités, en les comparant et en se limitant à quelques mots personnels pour articuler un tel dialogue et pour proposer

6. HAMESSE, *Idea*, spéc. p. 135; J.-G. BOUGEROL, *The Church Fathers and the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, in I. BACKUS (ed.), *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West: from the Carolingians to the Maurists*, 2 voll., Brill, Boston-Leiden 2001, pp. I, 113-164; 115-116 (sur la connaissance du *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus* d'Augustin, de la part de Pierre Lombard); cfr. D. DOUCET, *De Ideis : Éclipse ou dissémination ? Les Lectiones in Boethium de Trinitate attribuées à Thierry de Chartres* (II, 35-67), «Revue thomiste» 103 (2003), pp. 363-384; G. MADEC, *Notes de lecture*, «Revue thomiste» 103 (2003), pp. 360-361, n. 3.

7. GEIGER, *Les idées divines*, pp. 185-186 : «dans le texte le maître lui-même ne fait allusion ni aux idées, ni d'ailleurs à aucune théorie de la connaissance particulière».

8. ROSEMANN, *Peter Lombard*, pp. 58-59, 63.

quelques remarques au sujet des questions soulevées, sans jamais renfermer le matériel théologique dans un moule philosophique précis et préconçu⁹. Or, c'est exactement cette approche flexible, pour ainsi dire, à la matière théologique, qui permet au lecteur de jouer un rôle actif dans la lecture des *Sentences*. L'attitude très discrète de Pierre en tant qu'auteur non seulement laisse la place à toute élaboration et approfondissement ultérieurs de la part des maîtres, mais les suscite véritablement. Dans ce cadre, en effet, une discussion qui «se tient au niveau du sens commun», où «il n'est question ni d'idées, ni d'aucune donnée relevant d'un système philosophique déterminé»¹⁰, prend tout son intérêt pour l'amplitude des thèmes qu'elle arrive pourtant à effleurer, laissant le choix aux lecteurs d'en mettre certains plutôt que d'autres sur la table selon leurs intérêts personnels et les capacités d'analyse des étudiants auxquels ils s'adressent concrètement. L'absence même du terme *idea* dans ce contexte s'avère alors relativement significative, dans la mesure où, comme le remarque J. Hamesse¹¹, «ce n'est pas parce qu'un terme spécifique n'est pas ou est peu présent dans une œuvre que la théorie qu'il illustre est absente». Mon propos dans les pages qui suivent, propos très limité, sera d'étayer cette affirmation, notamment de mettre en relief que la doctrine des idées divines n'est pas indûment développée par les commentateurs des *Sentences* à partir du Lombard – presque plaquée sur son texte comme s'il n'était qu'un prétexte à en parler –, mais qu'elle se greffe au contraire sur son fond même, dans la mesure où des motifs utiles à la réflexion sur ces sujets parsèment le texte de Pierre, qui s'absentent cependant de pousser son lecteur à les articuler d'une manière plutôt que d'une autre. Il laisse ainsi la porte ouverte à divers développements possibles. C'est pourquoi je procéderai à l'analyse de quelques textes significatifs du corpus lombardien, dans le but de recueillir des traces de ce qu'on pourrait définir plus pertinemment comme une ébauche d'une doctrine lombardienne de la *ratio divina*. Ma perspective sera par conséquent interne, dans la mesure

9. *Ibidem*, pp. 63-64. L'expression est tirée de COLISH, *Peter Lombard*, I, p. 149.

10. GEIGER, *Les idées divines*, p. 186.

11. HAMESSE, *Idea*, p. 108.

où je n'entends pas recomposer la pensée de Pierre Lombard au prisme des commentateurs franciscains de la première moitié du XIII^e siècle évoqués auparavant, que ce soit sur la base de l'explication littérale qu'ils en ont donnée ou à partir des éléments d'origine lombardienne qu'ils ont effectivement exploités dans l'élaboration de leur propre doctrine des idées divines. L'accent portera davantage sur ce que ces commentateurs pouvaient concrètement y trouver et, comme on le verra, il s'agit essentiellement d'une réflexion non systématique sur un nombre restreint de passages bibliques, de textes et thèses augustinien touchant la connaissance que Dieu possède des créatures auxquelles il confère l'être.

Se référer, avec toute précaution nécessaire, à la *Quaestio de ideis* d'Augustin, citée en ce contexte dès Alexandre de Halès, me semble utile pour introduire cette revue de textes, qui ne prétend aucunement à l'exhaustivité. Quoiqu'il ne s'agisse certainement pas encore de la source par excellence sur ce sujet à l'époque du Lombard (que l'on sait pourtant avoir eu une connaissance de première main des *Réponses à 83 questions diverses* parmi lesquelles elle figure¹²), on y trouve une discussion explicite sur le vocabulaire de la matière qui nous concerne ici et qui s'est avérée précieuse pour orienter, en positif comme en négatif, notre sélection de passages lombardiens. Par ailleurs, dans ce même contexte, l'Hipponate souligne aussi qu'il ne faut pas s'arrêter à la terminologie employée par un auteur pour juger de la doctrine qu'il y aurait derrière¹³. En effet, si les textes dont on va discuter ne se caractérisent surtout pas par l'usage d'une ter-

12. Voir la bibliographie citée ci-dessus, n. 6.

13. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, A. Mutzenbecher (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1975 (CCSL 44A), 46, 2, p. 71, 21-32, trad. fr. G. Madec, «Revue Thomiste» 103 (2003), pp. 358-359 : 358 : «Nous pouvons appeler les « idées » (*ideae*) en latin *formae* ou *species*, pour paraître traduire mot à mot. Toutefois, si nous les appelons *rationes*, nous nous écartons assurément de la traduction littérale, car les *rationes* s'appellent en grec *logoi* et non "idées" ; mais quiconque aura voulu utiliser ce vocable ne détestera pas pour autant la réalité même. Car les "idées" sont de certaines formes principales ou des raisons des réalités, stables et immuables, qui ne sont pas elles-mêmes formées, et qui partant sont éternelles et se comportent toujours de la même manière ; elles sont contenues dans l'intelligence divine. Et [...] c'est selon elles qu'est formé tout ce qui peut naître et périr et tout ce qui naît et périt».

minologie philosophique sophistiquée, il n'en demeure pas moins qu'un certain nombre de points doctrinaux majeurs si bien condensés dans la question d'Augustin sont finalement discernables à l'arrière-fond du discours lombardien, dans les deux distinctions déjà évoquées ainsi qu'à d'autres endroits.

1. La sagesse ou science de Dieu

Les distinctions 35-48 de *Sent. I* sont consacrées aux attributs divins qui relèvent de l'essence divine en son rapport avec les créatures, tout particulièrement avec les créatures rationnelles. Alors qu'il sera question de la volonté divine à partir de la d. 42, les sections précédentes portent sur la connaissance divine, *sapientia* ou *scientia Dei* qui, tout en étant une et simple, peut pourtant être désignée par plusieurs noms différents en vertu de la diversité du statut des objets sur lesquels elle porte et des effets dont elle est la cause¹⁴. Dans la d. 35, Pierre commence par attribuer à Dieu une connaissance universelle et atemporelle, à laquelle rien n'échappe, que ce soit un objet bon ou mauvais, temporel – passé, présent ou futur – ou éternel. Une telle connaissance n'est pourtant pas autre que la connaissance parfaite que Dieu a de soi-même depuis l'éternité et qui ne dépend aucunement des choses qui en font l'objet¹⁵. Il s'agit donc d'une connaissance stable, qui n'admet aucune augmentation, ni du point de vue de l'intensité ni de l'extension¹⁶. Après avoir caractérisé cet attribut divin qu'est la

14. PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, I. Brady (ed.), Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Grottaferrata, 1971, I, 35, I-VI, 2, t. I, pars II, pp. 254, 24-255, 3: «sapientia vel scientia Dei, cum sit una et simplex, tamen propter varios status rerum et diversos effectus, plura ac diversa sortitur nomina. Dicitur enim non tantum scientia, sed etiam praescientia vel praeventia, dispositio, praedestinatio et providentia».

15. *Ibidem*, p. 255, 17-21: «Sapientia vero vel scientia de omnibus est: scilicet bonis et malis, et de praesentibus, praeteritis et futuris, et non tantum de temporalibus, sed etiam de aeternis. Non enim ita scit Deus ista temporalia ut se ipsum nesciat, sed ipse solus se ipsum perfecte novit [...]».

16. *Ibidem*, VIII, p. 257, 9-18: «[...] Et sua aeterna sapientia et immutabili scit ipse omnia quae sciuntur [...]».

connaissance dans une perspective pour ainsi dire noétique, le Lombard porte l'accent sur les implications ontologiques de ses propos, dans le but de préciser le rapport que les choses connues par Dieu entretiennent avec lui. Ce faisant il met notamment en relief le strict rapport qu'il y a entre connaissance divine et causalité créatrice. C'est à partir d'une série de questions soulevées par Augustin, et que Pierre fait siennes, que la difficulté est introduite au sujet des êtres sensibles dont Dieu a connaissance et qui viennent à l'existence par la création, après n'avoir pas été¹⁷. Dieu ne peut surtout pas en acquérir la connaissance au moment où ils viennent à l'être, après les avoir ignorés quand ils n'existaient pas encore, faute de quoi sa connaissance serait muable ; et il ne peut même pas les faire venir à l'être, sans en avoir une connaissance préalable, car Pierre assume que toute production demande la conception de l'objet de production de la part de l'artisan qui le produit, y compris Dieu en tant que créateur. Pour sortir de l'impasse, le Lombard admet, toujours à travers la voix d'Augustin, que même avant de venir à l'être, les créatures sont connues par Dieu, leur créateur, et c'est ce statut tout noétique de connues à leur conférer quelque forme d'existence, atemporelle et éternelle, notamment en Dieu lui-même : déjà existantes dans sa science, et depuis toujours, elles ne subsistent pourtant pas encore ici-bas en leur nature propre, c'est-à-dire comme créatures d'un certain type, distinctes de Dieu en tant que créateur¹⁸. Et pourtant elles ne subsistent pas non plus en tant qu'identiques à lui, indiscernables à quelque titre de l'essence divine¹⁹.

17. *Ibidem*, ix, pp. 257, 20-258, I : «[...] omnia dicuntur esse in Deo et fuisse ab aeterno. Unde Augustinus: "[...] Quomodo ergo Deo nota erant quae non erant? [...] Nota ergo fecit, non facta cognovit. Proinde antequam fierent, et erant, et non erant: erant in Dei scientia, non erant in sua natura"».

18. La citation est tirée du *De Genesi ad litteram* d'Augustin, V, xviii, 36, I. Zycha (ed.), Tempsky-Freytag, Wien-Leipzig 1894 (CSEL 28/1, 3-435), p. 161, 10; trad. fr. P. Agaësse, A. Solignac, Desclée De Brouwer, Paris 1972, pp. 424-425 : «elles étaient dans la science de Dieu, elle n'étaient pas en leur nature».

19. PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, I, 35, ix, p. 258, 6-7: «non ideo, quod creatura sit Creator, vel quod ista temporalia essentialiter sint in Deo, sed quia in eius scientia semper sunt». Le sens d'*essentialiter in Deo* n'est pas net, mais au vu du contexte où il figure, il semble que le Lombard établit déjà ici un lien entre la citation d'Augustin mentionnée à la note précédente et la citation qu'il explicitera plus loin, au début de la d. 36 (p. 259, 10-14) et qui est tirée du sermon

C'est donc le fait d'être constamment objet d'une connaissance pleine et inaltérable qui rend toute créature, indépendamment du moment où elle vient concrètement à l'existence, éternellement présente, en tant que présente à l'intelligence divine.

Les acquis de la d. 35 sont rappelés explicitement en ouverture de la d. 36, où le Lombard insiste ultérieurement sur les implications ontologiques de l'omniscience divine. La question prospectée est encore une fois celle de la relation entre les objets temporels d'une telle connaissance et Dieu en tant que sujet connaissant, mais sur de nouveaux frais. L'enjeu devient ici plus ouvertement celui du rapport entre l'essence divine et les objets de sa connaissance (ici *cognitio, praesentia, notitia*) alors que jusqu'à présent Pierre avait simplement exclu une présence *essentialiter* des êtres temporels en Dieu. La question semble s'imposer de manière d'autant plus urgente, au vu du lien entre connaissance et causalité créatrice qui avait été établi au cours de la distinction précédente, et qui rend nécessaire de repenser la valeur effective de *omnia* lorsqu'on dit que «toutes les choses sont dans la connaissance de Dieu», en sa présence, ou «en lui par sa connaissance». Y a-t-il une implication mutuelle entre les objets de sa science en tant que principe de connaissance et les effets qui en découlent en tant que principe productif ?

Pierre commence par se concentrer sur le premier aspect²⁰. Il entend notamment exclure qu'on puisse déduire que toute chose

26 sur l'Ancien Testament: AUGUSTINUS HIPONENSIS, *Sermones de vetere testamento* (1-50), C. Lambot (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1961 (CCSL 41), p. 351, 92-95: «Eliguntur qui non sunt. [...] Eligunt tamen, et habent electos, quos creaturus est eligendos. Habent autem apud se ipsum, non in natura sua, sed in praesentia sua».

20. PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, I, 36, I, p. 259, 4-18: «Dei cognitio eius utique essentia est, et eius praesentia, in qua sunt omnia, ipsius cognitio est; nec tamen omnia quae sunt in eius praesentia vel cognitione, in eius essentia esse dici debent. Si enim hoc diceretur, intelligerentur esse eiusdem cum eo essentiae. In Deo enim dicitur esse per essentiam, quod est divina essentia, quod est Deus. Habent ergo Deus apud se, in praesentia sua, quae non habent in sui natura. – Unde Augustinus [...]: “habent electos, quos creaturus est eligendos [...] apud semetipsum, non in natura sua, sed in praesentia sua” [...]. Ecce hic aperte dicit Deum apud semetipsum habere electos ante mundum, non in natura sua, sed in praesentia; cum tamen eius praesentia non sit aliud quam natura, quia ipsius praesentia est eius notitia».

finit par être identique à l'essence divine du fait qu'elle est présente à Dieu, voire qu'elle est en lui en tant que connue. À cette fin, il explicite la racine de la difficulté : l'identité entre tout attribut divin et l'essence divine elle-même, notamment de cette dernière avec la connaissance divine, d'où l'on semblerait pouvoir conclure que tout ce qui est présent à Dieu rentre, pour ainsi dire, aussi dans sa nature. Tout en revenant sur la distinction entre nature et connaissance divine, déjà évoquée auparavant mais dans une perspective différente, Pierre nie alors que ce soit le cas, admettant qu'il y a des choses qui sont auprès de Dieu, sous ses yeux pourrait-en dire métaphoriquement, sans pourtant qu'elles soient identiques à sa nature (ni présentes à lui comme réellement existantes en leur nature propre²¹). Cette thèse, qui semble finalement répéter les conclusions de la d. 35 davantage que donner une véritable clé pour résoudre le problème du rapport entre connaissance divine, essence divine et objets d'une telle connaissance, paraît prêter le flanc à une objection ultérieure, dans la mesure où l'universalité de la connaissance divine semblerait impliquer une responsabilité illimitée de Dieu à l'égard de tout objet de sa connaissance, Dieu étant cause productive de ce qu'il connaît déjà.

L'on vient ainsi à la deuxième difficulté évoquée, concernant notamment le rapport entre connaissance et causalité divines, que le Lombard saisit en s'appuyant sur l'apôtre Paul, qui affirme : «*ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia*» (Rom 11,36). Que faut-il inclure, se demande le Lombard, sous cet *omnia* ? Tout ce que Dieu connaît, est-il en lui et vient-il aussi de lui ? Le cas épineux est aux yeux de Pierre celui du péché, voire du mal, que Dieu est censé connaître pour en pouvoir juger, mais auquel il ne peut pas se rapporter comme au bien, dont il est véritablement la cause ultime. Après avoir passé en revue des autorités qui semblent faire allusion au mal comme à une réalité que Dieu n'entrevoit que de loin, sinon même qui lui reste cachée²², Pierre élabore une solution inter-

21. Sur cette interprétation de *in natura sua*, évoquée par Pierre comme alternative à celle qu'on vient d'examiner, voir SACCENTI, "Sic bonum cognoscitur", p. 7.

22. PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, I, 36, II, 3. Sur cette section, les suivantes et quelques passages parallèles, cfr. SACCENTI, "Sic bonum co-

médiaire pour ainsi dire, en introduisant une nouvelle distinction entre deux manières dont Dieu connaîtrait les créatures et leur agir. La connaissance «par la science» est ainsi disjointe de la connaissance «par approbation, par bon vouloir»²³ : alors qu'il suffit d'une connaissance du premier type pour qu'on puisse dire d'une chose qu'elle est connue par Dieu, ce n'est qu'avec la deuxième qu'on peut parler au sens strict d'une présence de la chose connue en Dieu. Et ce n'est que dans ce dernier cas, quand une chose non seulement est connue par Dieu mais qu'elle lui plaît aussi, de manière qu'il l'approuve, qu'on peut associer la connaissance à la causalité créatrice, car en tant que créateur Dieu n'est l'auteur que du bien²⁴. Revenant plus loin sur le verset paulinien «ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia» et s'appuyant sur Augustin, Pierre précise par conséquent que cet *omnia* n'embrace que les seules natures (*naturae*), c'est-à-dire les choses qui sont selon nature (*naturaliter*), et qui sont, en tant que telles, bonnes²⁵. Elles sont *ex ipso*, quoique non pas *de ipso*, à savoir elles sont faites par lui, mais sans être dérivées et composées de sa propre substance. Le péché n'est par contre aucunement *ex ipso*, car il dépend de la volonté de la créature et il ne fait que corrompre la nature. Si Dieu le connaît, ce n'est donc pas parce qu'il en est la cause – ce qui nous amène aussi à nier que le péché soit strictement en lui, quoiqu'il soit comme toute autre chose, naturelle ou pas, en sa connaissance sans approbation.

S'il est donc vrai que dans ces deux distinctions de *Sent. I* Pierre ne parle jamais des idées divines en tant que telles (ni finalement des *rationes* au sens technique), l'on peut y entrevoir les racines de quelques questions majeures les concernant, qui ne sont pas vraiment formulées par le Lombard, mais qui semblent s'imposer en ré-

gnoscur”, pp. 2-4, 7-10, quoique nos interprétations comportent quelques divergences.

23. PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, I, 36, II, 4-5 (avec la trad. fr. de M. Ozilou, *Les Quatre Livres des Sentences. Premier livre*, Paris, Cerf 2012, p. 452).

24. Cfr. *Ibidem*, 38, I, 8, p. 277, 24-30.

25. *Ibidem*, 36, III, p. 262, 4-11: «[...] in eo tamen non dicuntur esse nisi bona quorum auctor est [...]». Sur le terme *auctor*, voir M.-D. CHENU, *Auctor, Actor, Autor*, «Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi» 3 (1927), pp. 81-86.

action à la lecture de son texte²⁶. Tout d'abord, la question du rapport entre un Dieu unique et une connaissance plurielle et productive se profile, sa science s'avérant à la fois unique et immuable, mais aussi riche et variée : comment une essence simple et éternelle peut-elle se rapporter intentionnellement à une pluralité d'objets et de surcroît muables ? La thèse de la présence en Dieu formulée par Pierre sur des bases augustinienne invite ensuite à s'interroger ultérieurement sur le statut noétique des objets de la connaissance divine, car Dieu ne les connaît pas sans connaître sa propre essence, mais ils ne sont pas réductibles à une telle essence. Qu'est donc en lui une chose d'ici-bas en tant que connue, surtout si d'une telle connaissance dépend la possibilité et la réalité de l'existence d'une telle chose ? Dans quel genre de rapport ontologico-causal se concrétise cette présence intentionnelle du monde à l'intellect divin ? La production artisanale semble en effet être ici prise comme modèle de la création, mais comment cet exemplarisme se configure n'est pas clair, notamment ne l'est pas quelle conception de la participation il peut entraîner. On notera que, à la différence de ce que Pierre fait ailleurs, aucune référence n'est introduite en ce contexte aux Personnes de la Trinité, la question étant abordée dans la perspective de ce qui est commun aux Trois. Enfin le thème de l'extension de la connaissance divine est plus qu'effleurée par Pierre, qui pose ouvertement la question de la connaissance du mal, laissant entendre qu'on peut s'interroger sur la dignité, pour ainsi dire, propre à certains objets à l'exclusion d'autres, d'être pensés par Dieu.

2. La simplicité et l'immuabilité de l'intellect divin

Certains des aspects qu'on vient d'examiner sont abordés aussi dans d'autres distinctions de *Sent. I*, quoique la perspective d'observation change. Particulièrement pertinente nous semble entre autres la d. 8, qui porte globalement sur «la propriété, l'immuabilité

26. L'inspiration de ces textes étant largement augustinienne, on lira avec profit le questionnement proposé par E. MORO, *Il concetto di materia in Agostino*, Aracne, Roma 2017 (*Flumen Sapientiae. Studi sul pensiero medievale*, 3), pp. 163-170.

et la simplicité [...] de la nature ou de la substance ou encore de l'essence divine²⁷», et dont on se bornera à donner un bref aperçu. Si, encore une fois, la question des idées divines n'y est pas évoquée en tant que telle, certaines thèses émises dans ce contexte par le Lombard permettent d'enrichir avec fruit le tableau qu'on essaie d'esquisser. Un premier point important est touché par le Lombard dans le ch. 2, consacré à la question de l'immutabilité divine. En s'appuyant sur Augustin, Pierre y affirme que seule l'essence divine est à proprement parler immuable, dans sa capacité ineffable à fonder toute autre nature sans subir aucun changement en soi-même. Dieu, immuable, incorruptible et intemporel est en effet le créateur des choses assujetties au mouvement, à la corruption et au temps. L'attention est ainsi attirée sur le passage de l'un au multiple, du simple au complexe, de la stabilité au mouvement, l'évènement de la création constituant une fois de plus le nœud de la question.

Du rapport entre uni(cité) et multiplicité il est encore question dans les ch. 4-5 de cette d. 8, où l'on retrouve un motif déjà mentionné pour les dd. 35-36. La simplicité de Dieu y est en effet opposée à la multiplicité des prédicats qu'on lui attribue : grand, bon, sage (*sapiens*) par exemple. Il ne s'agit pas, explique Pierre, de décrire par cette multiplicité de noms une réalité complexe, mais de signifier la richesse d'une unique nature divine, car il n'y a aucun accident qui la rende telle ou telle, par exemple grande, distinct d'une autre détermination qui la rende davantage bonne²⁸. Rien qui ne soit applicable à tout autre attribut divin n'est dit de la sagesse, et l'on peut en déduire ainsi que, comme il n'y a rien d'autre que la nature divine qui nous fait dire de Dieu qu'il est grand ou bon, voire le plus grand et le meilleur, il n'y a rien d'autre que son essence à faire de lui le Dieu omniscient qu'il est, notamment l'intellect divin plein d'objets noétiques identiques à lui mais se rapportant à une

27. PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, I, 8, I, I (trad. fr. Ozilou, p. 205).

28. *Ibidem*, IV, 3, p. 99, 21-27: «[...] sed eadem magnitudo eius est quae sapientia: non enim mole magnus est, sed virtute; et eadem bonitas quae sapientia et magnitudo et veritas; et non est ibi aliud ipsum beatum esse, et aliud magnum aut sapientem [...] esse, aut omnino esse».

pluralité de choses réellement distinctes dans le monde (entre elles et de lui-même). Dans ce même sens semble aller ce que le Lombard ajoute au ch. 8, où il remarque qu'en Dieu il n'y a rien d'autre que son essence divine et qu'en vertu de cette simplicité et unité absolues, une telle essence et ce qui la possède sont identiques en lui²⁹. On notera que dans ce cadre, à la différence des dd. 35-36, le Lombard veille à faire place à la Trinité des personnes en l'unité de la nature. Si elle ne compromet aucunement la simplicité divine, elle fait pourtant partiellement exception au principe qu'on vient d'énoncer, le Père ayant un Fils qu'il n'est pourtant pas³⁰. Il n'est donc pas ce qu'il a. C'est ainsi que la question de l'identité et de la distinction est introduite aussi au niveau trinitaire, ce qui est intéressant de notre point de vue. En effet, le discours sur la science divine et la présence des choses en elle en tant que connues concerne non seulement Dieu considéré dans son unité et sa simplicité, mais touche plus spécifiquement la personne du Fils, comme nous le verrons mieux par la suite, la vérité et la sagesse étant appropriées au Verbe.

3. Art divin, raisons immuables et *invisibilia Dei*

Le thème de la connaissance divine est mis en lien avec des questions trinitaires au cœur de la d. 31 de *Sent. I*. Le Lombard y examine une sentence d'Hilaire de Poitiers au sujet des attributs propres des Personnes divines, selon laquelle «l'éternité est dans le Père, la forme dans l'Image, la jouissance dans le Don³¹». Pour expliquer le sens de cette autorité, dont la difficulté est relevée par Pierre dès le début, la parole est entièrement laissée à saint Augustin, dont le Lombard reproduit un long passage tiré du *De Trinitate*, qui contient pourtant à son tour «beaucoup de difficultés et d'ambiguïtés» et manque la cible : «ce n'est pas, en effet, suivant l'exposé précité [d'Augustin] qu'on distingue ici ces trois propriétés assignées plus haut [par

29. *Ibidem*, VIII, 1.

30. *Ibidem*, 2.

31. *Ibidem*, 31, II, 1, p. 225, 13-14 (trad. fr. Ozilou, p. 400).

Hilaire de Poitiers], mais ce qu'on montre, ce sont les hypostases elles-mêmes mutuellement distinctes³²». Le passage d'Augustin se focalise en effet davantage sur la notion d'image parfaite. L'Hipponate insiste notamment sur la «suprême égalité et la suprême ressemblance» du Fils par rapport au Père (leur nature étant une et identique) – ce qui ne l'empêche pourtant pas d'être une Personne distincte du Père.

Dans la citation du *De Trinitate* produite par Pierre, qui culmine dans l'affirmation de l'unité de l'image parfaite qu'est le Fils comme venant «de l'un avec lequel il ne fait qu'un», les notions d'identité, unité et perfection reviennent à plusieurs reprises. Y sont fournies en particulier trois caractérisations du Fils spécialement pertinentes pour notre propos³³. Par le biais d'Augustin Pierre parle en effet tout d'abord du Fils comme intellect premier et suprême pour lequel être, vivre et comprendre n'est qu'une seule et même chose. La notion de verbe parfait lui est ensuite associée, qui est définie par rapport à sa complétude noétique : rien ne lui manque. La notion d'art est enfin évoquée au sujet de l'Image : un art propre à «Dieu tout-puissant et sage», qui se distingue par sa richesse, car il est «rempli de toutes les raisons immuables des êtres vivants». Cette pluralité ne compromet pourtant pas l'unité divine, explique encore Pierre via Augustin, car ces raisons immuables ne sont en lui qu'une seule et unique chose. C'est par le moyen de cette raison finalement unitaire que Dieu connaît tout ce qu'il crée et notamment il crée tout ce qu'il connaît déjà.

Si ces dernières remarques nous rappellent de près des points déjà abordés, cet accent porté sur la perspective plus proprement noétique du rapport entre Dieu et ses créatures est assez neuf par

32. *Ibidem*, 3-4, p. 226, 30-227, 4 (trad. fr. Ozilou, p. 402-403).

33. *Ibidem*, 2, p. 226, 13-17: «primus ac summus intellectus [...], verbum perfectum cui non desit aliquid, et ars quaedam omnipotentis et sapientis Dei plena omnium rationum viventium incommutabilium [...]»; cfr. AUGUSTINUS HIPONENSIS, *De Trinitate*, VI, x, 11, W.J. Mountain, Fr. Glorie (edd.), Brepols, Turnhout 1968 (CCSL 50), p. 241, 10-24 (trad. fr. M. Mellet et alii, Paris, Études Augustiniennes, 1991, pp. 496-499). Ce même passage d'Augustin est encore plus largement cité dans PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Collectanea in Epistolas Pauli. In Epistolam ad Romanos*, XI, 36 (PL 191, 1495AB); cfr. SACCENTI, «*Sic bonum cognoscitur*», pp. 4-5.

rapport au cadre tracé jusqu'à là. Il y a ici en effet une référence plus explicite à une opération intellectuelle, à des objets qui sont pensés ainsi qu'au concept qui les représente (*verbum, rationes incommutabiles*). Comment les différents éléments en jeu s'articulent les uns aux autres, c'est une question que Pierre ne soulève guère, laissant un certain nombre d'aspects irrésolus, concernant par exemple le rapport entre l'unité de l'art et la multiplicité des raisons réductibles à l'unique essence, ou celui entre l'art et Dieu le Père, entre le verbe et l'art. Quant au domaine des êtres représentés par ces raisons immuables et produits par elles, il est circonscrit – ce sont les vivants –, mais pas de manière vraiment nette : leur agir y est-il concerné ou seulement leur être d'une telle ou telle espèce par exemple ? et l'objet concerné est-il chaque vivant considéré seulement par rapport à l'espèce dont il fait partie ou même en tant qu'individu ?

La notion d'art, utilisée ici pour indiquer le modèle productif, est employée ailleurs par le Lombard pour désigner plutôt le produit réalisé selon ce modèle, à savoir l'ensemble de la création, en observant laquelle le philosophe peut remonter jusqu'au Créateur, ou à l'Artiste³⁴. Comme il le précise³⁵, une telle connaissance de la cause à partir de ses effets ne porte pas directement sur l'essence divine en tant que telle, qui demeure inaccessible à l'intelligence humaine. On peut pourtant saisir quelque chose d'un tel Artiste à partir de ses œuvres : les *invisibilia Dei*, au pluriel, qui signifient non pas une multiplicité réelle d'aspects en Dieu, un et simple, mais le fait qu'on en saisisse la richesse et la perfection à partir d'une multiplicité de regards distincts portés sur les perfections des créatures. En d'autres termes, on a un accès rationnel fragmenté à Dieu, qui nous empêche de saisir l'ensemble, dans la mesure où on le connaît selon plusieurs perspectives diverses, toutes partielles pourtant. De cette remontée aux *invisibilia Dei* le Lombard traite aussi dans sa glose à l'Épître aux Hébreux³⁶, où il interprète les mots de l'Apôtre

34. PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *In Epistolam ad Romanos*, I, 19 (PL 191, 1326D), où il reprend de fait un passage tiré du sermon 141 d'Augustin (PL 38, 776).

35. *Ibidem*, I, 20 (PL 191, 1327AB).

36. PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Collectanea in Epistolas Pauli. In Epistolam ad Hebraeos*, XI, 3 (PL 192, 489D-490A).

– *ex invisibilibus visibilia* – s'appuyant, une fois de plus, sur Augustin. Pierre s'inspire ici notamment d'un texte de son commentaire à la Genèse où l'Hiéronymus traite de la connaissance angélique, qui, à la différence de celle des philosophes et plus généralement des hommes, se fonde sur les raisons archétypales de la création plutôt que sur les créatures elles-mêmes³⁷. Déjà cité dans la d. 35 plutôt dans la perspective des *visibilia*, ce passage est ici approfondi par le Lombard dans la perspective inverse, de l'invisible, de laquelle émergent des éléments utiles au sujet de l'intellect divin³⁸.

Après avoir examiné la possibilité que l'expression paulinienne *ex invisibilibus* se réfère à la matière informe en tant que contraposition à l'univers formé, signifié par le mot *visibilia*, Pierre Lombard fournit une interprétation alternative. Il suggère ainsi de prendre *invisibilia* comme désignant «le monde invisible qui était dans la sagesse de Dieu», à la similitude duquel a été créé le monde visible. Ce dernier était depuis toujours dans la science divine, notamment en sa *dispositio*, à savoir présent à lui en tant que connu et connu notamment en tant que chose à produire, avant même d'être concrètement faite ici-bas en tant que telle. Pour mieux expliquer la relation que le monde visible entretient au monde invisible, Pierre caractérise plus précisément ce dernier comme modèle (*exemplar*) invisible et il en fait, en résumant la doctrine typiquement augustinienne des idées divines mais avec ses propres mots, la pensée du Créateur, non pas un archétype séparé et incréé à la manière des Platoniciens³⁹. Il situe en effet cet archétype, unique semblerait-il, dans l'intellect divin (*in mente Dei*), s'abstenant cependant de donner d'autres détails à ce sujet. Le Lombard clarifie ainsi sa conception de la science divine, notamment de la *dispositio*, comme ayant un objet finalement unitaire, mais désignable aussi au pluriel (*invisibilia*) et portant de fait sur une pluralité indéterminée d'êtres

37. AUGUSTINUS, *De Genesi ad litteram*, V, xviii, 36, ed. Zycha, p. 161 (trad. fr. Agaësse, Solignac, pp. 424-425, avec p. 648-649).

38. PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *In Epistolam ad Hebraeos*, XI, 3 (PL 192, 490A): «Ideo ait, ut ex invisibilibus, id est ex intelligibili mundo qui erat in sapientia Dei; haec est Dei dispositio qua disposuit omnia, visibilia ista fierent, id est juxta invisibile exemplar quod erat in mente Dei, fierent haec».

39. Cfr. le texte cité dans la n. 13.

visibles, y compris – comme il ressort clairement du contexte – la matière, qu’avec Augustin Pierre décrit comme ce de quoi sont formées toutes les créatures matérielles, mais qu’en tant que telle Dieu tire du néant.

La dimension trinitaire n’est pas présente dans ces deux passages sur les *invisibilia*. On la retrouve ouvertement par contre dans un passage de la glose à l’Épître aux Colossiens⁴⁰, qui pour différentes raisons nous semble être liée aux textes qu’on vient d’examiner. Au début du ch. 2, en effet, l’apôtre Paul aborde la question de l’accès au «mystère de Dieu» et notamment il décrit le Christ comme celui «dans lequel se trouvent cachés (*absconditi*) tous les trésors (*thesauri*) de la sagesse et de la science». Il en vient ainsi à conjuguer la notion de richesse, voire de plénitude de contenus en Dieu, qu’on a effleurée en parlant de l’art, avec celle d’inaccessibilité à un tel contenu, qu’on a rencontrée en parlant d’*invisibilia Dei*. C’est moins le sens du verset en tant que tel qu’on retiendra ici que le fait que Pierre y trouve la science, au sujet des choses humaines, et la sagesse, s’agissant des réalités divines, rapportées directement à la Personne du Fils, décrite comme source de toute autre connaissance ; d’où la nécessité de s’unir au Christ pour l’acquérir. Est ainsi entrouverte, quoique très timidement, l’idée de la science divine comme principe non seulement productif de l’être, mais aussi d’intelligibilité et de vérité de la création elle-même, qui rappelle de près la double dimension conférée par Augustin à ses *rationes aeterne*⁴¹.

4. Dieu et le modèle de la création

On ne s’est pas attardé, au cours de la section précédant, sur l’utilisation de la part de Pierre Lombard du terme *exemplar*, relativement rare sous sa plume mais non moins saillant, comme le prouve

40. PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Collectanea in Epistolas Pauli. In Epistolam ad Colossenses*, II, 2-3 (PL 192, 269A-270A)

41. Cfr. G. CATAPANO, *Ragioni causali e ordine della natura in Agostino. A proposito di una tesi di R. Markus*, «Studia Patavina» 48 (2001), pp. 133-141; MORO, *Il concetto di materia*, pp. 436-441.

clairement l'ouverture de *Sent. II*, où ce même mot figure dans sa valeur technique, et spécifiquement philosophique de modèle formel⁴². Y est esquissée en quelques mots la cosmologie de Platon, mentionné explicitement en tant que partisan par excellence de la thèse hétérodoxe selon laquelle le monde dériverait de l'interaction entre trois principes également incréés et ultimes : Dieu, le modèle (*exemplar*) et la matière (*materia*), dont dépendrait l'existence de toute autre chose. Comme le souligne le Lombard, par l'expression *in principio* au début du Genèse l'on a voulu affirmer de manière nette que Dieu est le seul principe du monde, en tant que « créateur » et « commencement (*initium*) du temps ainsi que de toutes choses », qu'il produit « en un seul principe » à partir du néant⁴³. Comme l'évoque Pierre, la doctrine platonicienne des principes réduit par contre Dieu à un simple artisan (*artifex*), qui façonnerait le monde en s'inspirant d'un modèle extrinsèque et en se servant d'un suppôt déjà subsistant, sans rien créer au sens strict et à un moment donné. Quoiqu'il emploie le terme *exemplar* au singulier et qu'il ne donne aucun détail supplémentaire, il vise ici clairement la doctrine des idées séparées, sans le correctif augustinien qu'on a vu précédemment à l'œuvre et selon lequel de telles idées trouvent place dans l'intellect divin. D'où l'usage plus strict dans ce contexte qu'ailleurs du mot 'artisan' (*artifex*), ici rapproché de 'faiseur' (*factor*), mais nettement distingué de 'créateur' (*creator*), la différence concernant le rapport de chacun avec la production *ex nihilo*⁴⁴. Par la création Dieu devient en effet la cause d'être des choses qui n'existaient pas auparavant, qui commencent à être après n'avoir

42. PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, II, I, I, 2, p. 330, 4-6. Dans le corpus lombardien on relève une vingtaine d'occurrences des termes *exemplar/-ium*, qui sont utilisés dans les différents sens attestés pour ce mot à l'époque : modèle, préfiguration, copie.

43. *Ibidem*, I, I, p. 329, 9-330, 3 (cfr. trad. fr. Ozilou, *Les Quatre Livres des Sentences. Deuxième livre*, Cerf, Paris 2013, pp. 85-86): «[...] Deum esse creatorem initiumque temporis atque omnium [...]. Moyses [...] in uno principio a Deo creatore mundum factum refert».

44. *Ibidem*, I, 2-II, p. 330, 6; 10-17: «facere vero, non modo de nihilo aliquid operari, sed etiam de materia. Unde et homo [...] vocaturque factor sive artifex, sed non creator [...]». In Scriptura tamen saepe creator accipitur tanquam factor [...].».

pas été, sans pourtant apporter aucun changement en lui. La nouveauté n'a donc pas lieu en lui, mais dans les choses qui viennent à l'être, tout en ayant toujours existé dans sa science.

On notera que la formule *in principio* n'est pas interprétée dans ce contexte en référence à la deuxième personne de la Trinité. Pierre le fait pourtant ailleurs, par exemple dans la d. 13 – «*In principio, id est in Filio, creavit Deus caelum et terram*» –, où il relie de surcroît ce verset au verset 24 du Psaume 103, pareillement interprété à cette occasion en un sens trinitaire : «*Omnia in sapientia fecisti, Domine, id est in Filio*»⁴⁵. Au-delà de cette différence, toutefois, la terminologie adoptée par Pierre dans la d. 13 présente des points de contact importants avec le vocabulaire employé dans la d. 1. Non seulement le terme *artifex* y figure, mais comme synonyme d'*auctor*, terme crucial figurant déjà dans la d. 36 de *Sent. I*⁴⁶ ; on y trouve aussi deux autres substantifs-clés utilisés dans la d. 1, et caractérisant Dieu en tant que cause productrice : *opifex* et *factor*⁴⁷. S'inspirant de Jean Chrysostome, le Lombard précise en effet que si l'on dit selon la vérité que le Père opère dans ou par le Fils, c'est parce qu'il l'engendre en tant que fabricant (*opifex*) de toute chose ; et il en va de même pour l'affirmation que le Père, ou le Fils opère par l'Esprit-Saint, car l'Esprit-Saint, faiseur (*factor*) de toutes choses, procède des deux. Cela rappelle de près la d. 1, où Pierre explique que du fait que, à la différence d'un simple artisan, Dieu opère tantôt à partir de rien tantôt à partir de quelque chose, on peut le caractériser non seulement comme créateur, mais aussi comme fabriquant et faiseur. Dans ce cas, les termes *opifex* et *factor* sont pourtant utilisés en dehors de toute articulation trinitaire.

Il est également remarquable que dans ce début de *Sent. II*, Pierre ne se concentre pas spécifiquement sur la question du début temporel de la création. Il joue davantage sur l'ambiguïté du terme 'principe', le mettant à côté de 'commencement', laissant la

45. *Ibidem*, 13, VII, 1, p. 393, 21-23.

46. *Ibidem*, 2, p. 394, 4 (ici référé au Père seulement); cfr. note 25, ci-dessus.

47. *Ibidem*, 5, p. 394, 23-395, 7 (cfr. trad. fr. Ozilou, p. 186): «[...] Pater [...] eum genuit omnium opificem [...]. Ab utroque procedit Spiritus Sanctus factor omnium [...]».

dimension de l'(in)finitude temporelle – qu'il évoque peu après au sujet de l'erreur d'Aristote⁴⁸ – complètement noyée dans celle de la dépendance ontologique du monde à l'égard de Dieu. Cette deuxième dimension semble de fait la seule relevant aussi dans la section du commentaire au *Timée* de Calcidius qui est à l'arrière-plan de ce passage, sans que le vocabulaire y soit repris strictement⁴⁹. Une différence paraît plus intéressante que d'autres, à savoir l'usage par Pierre justement d'*exemplar*, non pas d'*exemplum*, ce qui semble être cohérent avec la définition qu'il donne ailleurs de ceux deux termes, notamment dans la d. 16 de *Sent. II*⁵⁰. Afin de préciser de quoi 'image' se dit de manière appropriée – non pas de «ce relativement à quoi une autre chose est produite», mais relativement à une chose qui, faite selon une autre, en «porte la ressemblance» et la représente –, le Lombard introduit en effet un parallèle avec *exemplum* et il précise qu'alors que ce dernier désigne «ce qui est tiré de quelque chose», le modèle (*exemplar*) est «ce dont quelque chose est tiré». Ce qui est frappant est ici la proximité de cette distinction terminologique avec celle, quoique beaucoup plus raffinée philosophiquement et lexicalement, entre *exemplar/idea* et *exemplum/idos* qu'on trouve chez d'autres auteurs du XII^e siècle dont la réflexion au sujet des formes exemplaires et des idées divines est bien plus poussée que chez le Lombard⁵¹. Sans en vouloir tirer des conclu-

48. *Ibidem*, I, III, 4.

49. CALCIDIUS, *Commentarius in Platonis Timaeum*, J.H. Waszink (ed.), Warburg Institute-Brill, London-Leiden 1975 (Plato latinus 4), cap. 307, p. 308, 14-309, 2; cfr. CALCIDIUS, *Commentaire au Timée de Platon. Tome I. Édition critique et traduction française par B. Bakhouché, Vrin, Paris 2011*, pp. 536-537: «[...] Sunt igitur initia deus et silua et exemplum, et est deus quidem origo primaria moliens et posita in actu, silua uero ex qua prima fit quod gignitur». On notera pourtant l'absence du terme *principium* dans ce texte, la notion de principe étant désigné par *initium* et *origo* (cfr. ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica*, V, 1, où ces sens sont mis à côté du sens plus ouvertement causal du terme). Voir aussi M. CLARK, *Peter Comestor and Peter Lombard: Brothers in Deed*, «Traditio», pp. 85-142: 90-95; G. DAHAN, *Éléments philosophiques dans l'Elementarium de Papias*, in H.J. WESTRA (éd.), *From Athens to Chartres: Neoplatonism and Medieval Thought. Studies in Honour of E. Jeuneau*, Brill, Leiden 1992, pp. 225-246: 229.

50. PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, II, 16, III, 1 (trad. fr. Ozilou, p. 208).

51. CAIAZZO, *Sur la distinction sénéchiennne*, pp. 93-94, 114-115.

sions indues, il semble plausible d'en déduire tout de même une certaine familiarité de Pierre avec un débat dont il choisit pourtant de se tenir à l'écart.

L'usage du singulier *exemplar* au début de *Sent. II* attire notre attention aussi dans une autre perspective, car même dans un contexte où le modèle est caractérisé en tant qu'extrinsèque par rapport à la *mens* de Dieu, Pierre se tient – tout en suivant sa source – à le décrire comme unitaire, quoique cause d'une multiplicité de choses. S'agit-il d'un indice de comment le Lombard conçoit le rôle du modèle éternel dans le passage de l'unité à la multiplicité, notamment sur le nombre des modèles qu'il serait éventuellement disposé à admettre ? Le contexte n'autorise à en tirer aucune conséquence. Par ailleurs, on ne trouve que de très rares indices à ce sujet dans les *Sentences* qui, comme on va le voir dans la section suivante, s'enracinent, une fois de plus, dans des textes clés d'Augustin portant sur la création.

5. Cause(s) primordiale(s)

C'est dans la section de *Sent. II* portant sur la création de la première femme que Pierre Lombard aborde de la manière la plus explicite la question qu'on vient de poser, dans une section plus largement consacrée aux causes qui sont en Dieu et qui déterminent la venue à l'être des choses d'ici-bas⁵². S'inspirant largement d'Augustin mais sans en citer des passages précis, Pierre essaie en effet de situer la formation d'Ève à partir d'une côte d'Adam par rapport aux événements naturels et miraculeux, ce qui lui donne l'occasion de réfléchir sur la question de l'universalité de la causalité divine dans une perspective quelque peu différente par rapport aux cas examinés auparavant. Le point de départ n'est pas neuf. L'affirmation selon laquelle les causes de toutes choses sont en Dieu, en effet, figure dans d'autres textes, dans lesquels pourtant Pierre ne donne pas un certain nombre de précisions qu'il fournit par contre à cet endroit.

52. PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, II, 18, v, 1-vi, 2 (tr. fr. Ozilou, pp. 226-228).

Parmi d'autres, il insiste notamment sur le fait que la causalité divine n'opère pas de manière immédiate et exclusive sur tout effet⁵³. Alors que les effets naturels jouissent d'une certaine autonomie, la causalité divine jouant un rôle fondateur par rapport à la nature et à son cours naturel au moment de la création, des événements temporels mais préternaturels la cause n'est qu'en Dieu, et depuis l'éternité⁵⁴.

On pourrait s'interroger à ce propos sur l'universalité effective de la connaissance divine, qui est une condition préalable, comme on l'a vu, de cette causalité, notamment au sujet des êtres naturels. S'il est en effet évident que Dieu est à l'origine de tout miracle particulier, de cette distinction il n'émerge pas de manière tout aussi claire ce qu'il en est de la connaissance divine des individus au-delà de leur espèce naturelle d'appartenance, que Dieu crée et munit dès le début de tout outil nécessaire à se perpétuer. Mais le souci de Pierre est certainement autre, comme le prouve le fait qu'il remarque que «la cause de chaque chose future a précédemment existé en Dieu» et depuis l'éternité⁵⁵, tout en insistant davantage sur la distinction entre l'éternité de la cause et la temporalité de l'effet, plutôt que sur des types différents d'effets. L'enjeu n'est donc pas tellement, et une fois de plus, d'énumérer les objets sur lesquels porte la connaissance divine, mais d'en préciser la dimension causale. La manière dont Pierre caractérise ultérieurement les causes qui sont en Dieu va dans cette même direction. Alors que leur supériorité les distingue (*causae superiores*) par rapport aux raisons séminales⁵⁶ – causes inférieures introduites par Dieu dans les créatures au moment de la création et qui confèrent aux processus d'ici-bas leur na-

53. *Ibidem*, p. 419, 19-23: «Omnium igitur rerum causae in Deo sunt; sed quarundam causae et in Deo sunt et in creaturis, quarundam vero causae in Deo tantum sunt. Et illarum rerum causae dicuntur absconditae in Deo, quia ita est in divina dispositione ut hoc vel illud fiat; quod non est in seminali creaturae ratione».

54. *Ibidem*, p. 419, 3-7: «In creaturis vero quarundam rerum, sed non omnium causae sunt [...], quia inseruit Deus seminales rationes rebus, secundum quas alia ex aliis proveniunt, ut de hoc semine tale granum, de hac arbore talis fructus, et huiusmodi.

55. *Ibidem*, p. 419, 2 et 418, 22.

56. *Ibidem*, p. 418, 14-15.

turalité⁵⁷–, leur primauté (*causae primordiales*) pourrait être improprement prise pour une propriété qu’elles partagent avec ces raisons séminales. En effet, ces dernières aussi se voient parfois accorder quelque primauté, en vertu de leur antériorité par rapport aux effets qui en dérivent (comme des graines, des arbres et des fruits d’une semence), ou même du fait que leur immission dans la nature remonte aux tout premiers instants de vie du monde⁵⁸. Cependant, ces causes inférieures admettent les causes divines comme causes antérieures et ultimes (*causae causarum*), ce qui n’est pas du tout le cas des causes non-causées qui sont en Dieu lui-même, en tant que principe éternel de la nature ainsi que des événements exceptionnels. C’est vraisemblablement à ces derniers que Pierre pense en contraposant l’immutabilité de la cause ultime à la mutabilité de toute autre cause inférieure. Dès le commencement, en effet, Dieu inscrit dans la nature la possibilité qu’on puisse même en suspendre momentanément le cours ordinaire, suspension qui comportera que, par intervention divine, une certaine raison séminale n’aboutisse pas à l’effet qu’elle produit couramment, mais à un autre⁵⁹.

On remarquera que le terme *ratio*, qui désigne normalement la sphère de l’intelligible, n’est ici utilisé que pour signifier la cause divine en tant que concrètement inscrite dans le monde créé et, donc, comme condition d’intelligibilité d’un tel monde. Autrement dit, le terme *ratio* porte ici sur les effets, à proprement parler, de la causalité divine dont il est plus précisément question. La notion autour de laquelle le Lombard développe entièrement son discours est en effet celle de *causa*, qui permet de focaliser l’attention sur la dimension productive de l’acte créateur, ouvertement comparé ici à l’opération d’un artisan qui, afin de fabriquer un coffre, conçoit au préalable le modèle qu’il va réaliser concrètement dans la matière⁶⁰. Il en va de même, souligne Pierre, pour l’homme, le

57. *Ibidem*, p. 419, 24-26.

58. *Ibidem*, p. 418, 24-25; 419, 9-16.

59. Sur l’arrière-plan augustinien de cette doctrine, voir MORO, *Il concetto di materia*, pp. 419-420.

60. PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, II, 18, v, 2, p. 418, 28-419, I.

cheval et tout autre être que Dieu crée et qu'il a dans sa puissance et sa disposition (*potentia et dispositio*) dès l'éternité⁶¹. S'il est vrai que la présence de ces deux exemples dans un texte qui à trois reprises renvoie ouvertement à Augustin rend tout à fait plausible la juxtaposition avec la *Quaestio de ideis*⁶², la presque totale absence d'occurrences du terme *ratio*, crucial par contre chez Augustin, semble affaiblir ce lien. Si par ailleurs l'insistance sur la dimension causale fait que la dimension plus strictement cognitive demeure finalement reléguée à l'arrière-plan, qu'elle représente le cadre dans lequel elle vient naturellement s'inscrire émerge de la présence en ce contexte du terme *dispositio*, qui figure parmi les noms évoqués à la d. 35 de *Sent. I* comme nécessaires pour caractériser les différentes façons dont se déploie l'unique science divine⁶³.

Comme déjà dans ce passage de *Sent. I* la question de l'unité et de la simplicité de la science divine au dépit de la pluralité des noms auxquels on a recours pour la décrire avait été mise au cœur de la discussion du Lombard, ce thème revient aussi dans la d. 18 de *Sent. II*. L'accent est alors porté sur le fait qu'il n'y a qu'une seule cause principale de toutes choses en Dieu, quoiqu'on la décrive comme multiple en vertu de la pluralité d'effets qui en dépendent⁶⁴. Ce motif de l'unité divine, que le Lombard n'hérite pas de l'Augustin de la *Quaestio de ideis*, se reconferme donc un nœud de sa réflexion sur la science divine. On notera aussi que la référence à la *dispositio* permet de voir dans ce contexte un développement cohérent avec celui du premier livre. D'un côté, il ressort clairement de ces considérations que les effets concernés ne sont que ceux dont Dieu est strictement l'auteur, non pas ceux dont il se limite à avoir une connaissance dépourvue d'approbation. De

61. *Ibidem*, p. 418, 22-24.

62. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, 46, 2, p. 72, 51-52: «[...] il reste que toutes choses ont été créées par raison (*ratione*) ; et l'homme par une raison différente de celle du cheval [...]» (trad. fr. Madec, p. 359).

63. Voir ci-dessus, pp. 154 et 164.

64. PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, II, 18, v, 2, p. 418, 25-28: «Cumque unum sit divina potentia, dispositio sive voluntas, et ideo una omnium principalis causa, tamen propter effectus diversos pluraliter dicit Augustinus causas primordiales omnium rerum in Deo esse [...]».

l'autre, Pierre ne montre aucun intérêt ici pour aller plus loin dans la question de détailler, pour ainsi dire, de quoi il y a une idée en Dieu, de quoi il n'y en a pas.

6. Remarques conclusives

Des textes qu'on a analysés, portant à différents titres sur la connaissance divine, il émerge qu'il manque chez Pierre Lombard une doctrine systématique et bien développée des idées divines. Néanmoins, qu'il soutient une série de thèses déjà bien soudées au sujet des raisons divines est un fait établi. Le fond et souvent les mots mêmes de ces thèses sont augustinien, et par ce biais, aussi bibliques. On pourrait donc décrire ce qu'il livre à la postérité au sujet des idées divines comme un développement pleinement théologique de la réflexion patristique sur ces sujets, dont l'originalité réside proprement dans les accents qu'il sait mettre sur certains aspects plutôt que sur d'autres et dans la sélection des thèmes et textes qu'il choisit de valoriser, sans les forcer par une application immodérée de l'analyse logico-métaphysique. Le véritable pivot de cette réflexion est la création, un événement autour duquel diverses questions se posent. Cause unique et incomplexe des réalités visibles et invisibles, Dieu porte à l'être une pluralité d'étants suivant un projet qu'il a depuis toujours. Pierre Lombard s'interroge sur ce passage de l'un au multiple dans différentes perspectives. Tout d'abord il insiste sur la relation entre temps et éternité que la création vient entraîner : existant sur terre pendant une période limitée, les créatures sont en Dieu depuis toujours en tant que connues. C'est ainsi que Dieu peut les créer sans qu'aucune modification n'intervienne en lui. Pierre précise ensuite ce que cet « être en Dieu » comporte, car il entrevoit le péril de quelque forme de panthéisme à l'horizon, si la distinction formelle entre le Principe et ses effets multiples n'est pas correctement établie. La notion de présence est ainsi utilisée par lui, pour signifier le statut d'objets noétiques que les créatures ont dans l'intellect divin. Cela ne résout pas complètement le conflit entre unité et multiplicité d'où on est parti, car bien évidemment, en quelque nombre que

soient les choses qu'on suppose présentes en Dieu, il y en aura de toute manière plus qu'une. Le Lombard n'ignore pas le problème, et il le contourne en appliquant à cette question noétique une solution tout à fait parallèle à celle élaborée à propos de la pluralité des attributs divins : ce qui est singulier en Dieu est signifié au pluriel en vertu de la multiplicité des effets dont Dieu est cause et à partir desquels on essaie de le connaître. Pierre pointe enfin du doigt le problème de l'extension de la connaissance divine au vu de sa dimension productive, car la réalité du mal impose de situer Dieu, qui en a connaissance, à son égard, sans en faire pourtant l'auteur et sans ouvrir la porte à quelque forme de dualisme.

Face à cette synthèse qui témoigne de manière objective de la connaissance et des intérêts théologiques des maîtres du XII^e siècle⁶⁵, les commentateurs des siècles suivants, immergés dans des contextes culturels sensiblement changés, ne pourront qu'enrichir la discussion sur ces thèmes à la lumière des leurs connaissances et intérêts, autres que ceux du *Magister Sententiarum*. Ce sera justement sur ce treillis à mailles très larges qu'on verra germer dès le début du siècle suivant des débats beaucoup plus articulés sur les idées divines qui, grâce notamment à Alexandre de Halès, resteront solidement ancrés sur la réflexion théologique du Lombard.

65. BOUGEROL, *The Church Fathers*, p. 160.

Les raisons éternelles, les formes et les idées : aux origines de la doctrine du *De unitate et pluralitate creaturarum* d'Achard de Saint-Victor

IRENA LYSTOPAD*

Achard de Saint-Victor (†1171) était successivement maître dans l'abbaye de Saint-Victor, abbé de Saint-Victor (1155) et évêque d'Avranches (1161). Aujourd'hui, nous connaissons trois œuvres principales d'Achard : les *Sermons*, le *De discretione animae, spiritus et mentis* et le *De unitate et pluralitate*. Achard développe la doctrine des raisons éternelles de choses dans le *De unitate et pluralitate creaturarum*¹.

Le *De unitate* y consiste en deux traités (qui sont désignés ici respectivement par I et II) dont le premier contient 50 chapitres et le deuxième 21. La division thématique ne correspond pas à la division formelle. Voici le plan thématique du *De unitate* :

1. I, 1-36 – la doctrine trinitaire ;
2. I, 37-II, 21 – la doctrine des trois sortes de raisons :
 - a. I, 37-42 – les trois sortes de raisons ;
 - b. I, 43-50 et II, 1-15 – la première sorte de raisons : formelles ;
 - c. II, 16-21 – la deuxième sorte : finales.

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1. Le manuscrit de cette œuvre a été retrouvé par Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny à Padova. Il contient le titre *De unitate et pluralitate creaturarum* dans l'explicit. Voir : Padova, Bibliotheca Antoniana, Scaff. V, 89, f. 188v. Emmanuel Martineau a ajouté <Dei> dans son édition du manuscrit : ACHARDUS DE SANCTO VICTORE [Achard de Saint-Victor], *L'unité <de Dieu> et la pluralité des créatures (De unitate <Dei> et pluralitate creaturarum)*, E. Martineau (éd.), Éditions du Franc-Dire (Authentica), Saint-Lambert-des-Bois 1987.

La troisième sorte de raisons – déployantes (*explicatrices*) – n’a jamais été exposée. Ensemble avec les autres indices (tels que l’absence d’introduction et de conclusion ou encore le découpage imparfait des chapitres), cela montre que le *De unitate* était probablement inachevé.

Achard développe la doctrine du Verbe de Dieu qui est la Sagesse, l’Intellect la deuxième personne de la Trinité. Les raisons éternelles des choses se trouvent à l’intérieur de ce Verbe. Il existe trois sortes de raisons pour chaque chose : formelles, finales et déployantes (lat. : *formales, finales et explicatrices*). Achard utilise différents concepts qui désignent ces raisons en tant qu’unités intelligibles : formes, intellects, idées, etc. Sa doctrine a décrit les entités intelligibles qui existent dans l’Intellect divin et selon lesquelles les choses sont créées avant que la doctrine des idées divines devienne généralement employée. Il est ainsi intéressant d’étudier Achard de Saint-Victor en tant que prédécesseur de la doctrine des idées divines.

Le centre de mon intérêt de recherche est l’appropriation de la doctrine platonicienne au XII^e siècle. Dans cet article, je veux montrer que le *De unitate* d’Achard contient deux éléments importants de la métaphysique médio- et néoplatonicienne :

- la source unique qui est à l’origine de tout ce qui existe ;
- une hiérarchie métaphysique des êtres qui proviennent de cette source.

Je voudrais également me concentrer sur les sources potentielles de cette métaphysique platonicienne dans les œuvres de penseurs tardo-antiques qui ont été transmis au XII^e siècle².

Ainsi, je me pose deux buts dans cet article :

- reconstruire les éléments néoplatoniciens du *De unitate* ;
- montrer les origines tardo-antiques de cette doctrine.

2. Voir plus à ce sujet dans ma monographie : I. LYSTOPAD, *Un platonisme original au XII^e siècle. Métaphysique pluraliste et théologie trinitaire dans le De unitate et pluralitate creaturarum d’Achard de Saint-Victor*, Brepols, Turnhout 2021 (Biblioteca Victorina, 28).

1. Le Verbe incarné interprété comme source unique des êtres intelligibles

L'œuvre d'Achard que je suis en train d'étudier s'appelle *De unitate et pluralitate creaturarum*. Le but d'Achard est d'expliquer la relation entre l'unité et la pluralité. Il en parle dès le premier chapitre : «elle [la pluralité] ne peut exister que là où existe l'unité vraie, et il n'y a d'unité vraie qu'en Dieu. C'est là, donc, que doit résider et la pluralité vraie et l'unité vraie, mais non pas du même point de vue»³.

Dans la deuxième partie du *De unitate* (I, 37-II, 20), Achard explique la relation entre l'unité et la pluralité dans les raisons éternelles. En I, 38, Achard souligne que les raisons sont une Raison «selon la substance et la personne»⁴ de Dieu. En I, 40, il précise que «ces trois mêmes genres de raisons se trouvent dans la Sagesse de Dieu»⁵. De cette façon, les raisons éternelles se trouvent dans la source unique : Une Raison qui est la Sagesse de Dieu.

Dans le Prologue de l'*Évangile selon Jean* (I, 1-14), le Verbe (*Logos* en grec) est le Fils de Dieu qui est venu en ce monde et est devenu chair. Ce texte a été influencé par la doctrine du *logos spermatikos* de stoïciens⁶ et interprété dans les premiers siècles du christianisme à l'aide de la doctrine néoplatonicienne⁷. Achard utilise ce même texte dans le *De unitate*, I, 40, II, 1 et 13-14 pour développer la doctrine des raisons éternelles et, notamment, des formes.

3. ACHARDUS DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De unitate*, part. I, ch. 1, pp. 70-71: «Ipsa igitur est; esse autem non potest nisi ubi et unitas vera, nec unitas vera nisi in Deo. Ibi ergo et veram consistere oportet et pluralitatem et unitatem, sed non secundum idem».

4. *Ibidem*, part. I, ch. 38, pp. 108-109: «Quia et ipsae eorum rationes ratio sunt secundum substantiam et personam, ut ostendemus, una».

5. *Ibidem*, part. I, ch. 40, pp. 110-111: «<Quod> autem in Dei sapientia haec eadem sunt tria rationum genera, negare insaniae est».

6. J. LEBRETON, *Les Origines du dogme de la Trinité*, Beauchesne, Paris 1910, pp. 49-50; R. HOLTE, *Logos Spermatikos: Christianity and Ancient philosophy according to St. Justin's Apologies*, «Studia theologica» 12, (1958), pp. 109-168: 120.

7. H. DÖRRIE, *Une exégèse néoplatonicienne du Prologue de l'Évangile de saint Jean [Amélius chez Eusèbe, Prép. év. II, 19, 1-4]*, in J. FONTAINE, CH. KANNENGIESSER (éds.), *Epektasis. Mélanges patristiques offerts au cardinal Jean Daniélou*, Beauchesne, Paris 1971, pp. 76-87.

Dans les chapitres I, 46 et 47, Achard opère par la notion du Verbe. Les choses sont déjà faites dans le Verbe comme les formes avant d'être faites dans le monde. Il explique, dans cet état, elles sont «dans la connaissance», ou «dans le Verbe» ou «dans l'intellect de Dieu»⁸, ce qui est différent de leur existence dans le monde créé.

En II, 1 Achard reprend le prologue de l'*Évangile selon Jean* (Jean I, 1-14). Il précise qu'en parlant du Verbe Jean fait référence «à l'intellect du Fils»⁹. Les versets «elle luit dans les ténèbres, et les ténèbres ne l'ont pas comprise» et «elle était la lumière véritable qui illumine tout homme venant en ce monde» (Jean I, 5 et 9), pour Achard, servent à prouver que la lumière désigne plutôt la lumière grâce à laquelle nous intelligeons les choses¹⁰, à savoir l'intellect même du Fils. Le Verbe est le Fils de Dieu et la forme première dans laquelle les formes ont été faites.

Il continue à exposer la doctrine de la forme première et des formes qui proviennent d'elle en II, 2 :

Elle est donc elle-même le modèle premier de tout et la forme première en laquelle s'accomplit la formation intellectuelle éternelle des choses. Quant à <la forme> qui provient d'elle, <elle se trouve> actuellement dans ces choses mêmes faites dans le temps, et par conséquent elle est aussi elle-même faite temporelle ici-bas¹¹.

8. ACHARDUS DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De unitate*, part. I, ch. 47, pp. 122-123: «Unde et secundum istud prima a nobis facta est impositio nominum quibus, cum de illo agimus esse, non tam proprie utimur quam translative. Ipsum quoque "est" propter hoc notandum videtur institutum ut hic significet quid <per> se, illud vero non nisi ex determinatione aliqua et per adjunctum: notitia, vel verbo sive intellectu Dei, vel aliquid hujusmodi».

9. *Ibidem*, part. II, ch. 1, pp. 136-137: «Non ad ipsum lucis vel verbi vocabulum sed ad intellectum Filii qui et Verbum et lux est».

10. *Ibidem*, part. II, ch. 1, p. 136: «It, ne quis ipsum hoc aliter exponeret, lucem vocans in Verbo Dei quod hic factum est, eo solum quod illuminamur per rerum intelligentiam, praecipue cum eas intelligimus prout ibi sunt, ideo de luce ista diligentius prosequitur, dicens eam lucere in tenebris, nec tamen a tenebris comprehendi, nominans eam: lucem veram quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum».

11. *Ibidem*, part. II, ch. 2, pp. 140-141: «Ipsa ergo primum est exemplar omnium formaque prima in qua est intellectualis rerum formatio aeterna; quae ex ipsa est actualiter in rebus ipsis temporaliter factis, et ideo ipsa quoque hic facta temporalis».

Par conséquent, les raisons éternelles des choses sont dans le Verbe. Une de trois sortes de raisons – les formes – sont dans la Forme première qui est aussi le Verbe, le Fils de Dieu et l'Intellect. De cette façon, la doctrine de Verbe en tant qu'une source des êtres intelligibles fait une partie importante du *De unitate*. Voyons les sources potentielles de cette doctrine.

Sénèque est un des plus anciens auteurs qui articule la doctrine de la source unique. D'après lui, Dieu contient les exemplaires des toutes les choses et «embrasse dans leurs rapports numériques et leurs différents modes, la totalité des choses à créer. Il est plein de ces figures que Platon nomme les idées immortelles, immuables, infatigables»¹². De cette manière, Sénèque donne une nouvelle interprétation de la doctrine platonicienne des idées. Ce sont les prototypes des choses dans le monde, contenues en Dieu.

Calcidius traduit une partie de *Timée* et fait le *Commentaire*. Voici ce qu'il dit à propos de la doctrine de la source unique (*Commentaire au Timée*, II, 272) :

Platon n'aborde pas la question pour l'instant et ne cherche pas à savoir s'il y a une seule espèce "archétypale" commune à tout ce qui est, ou si elles sont innombrables et fonction du nombre d'objets existants, dont la réunion et l'assemblage constituerait la masse de l'univers. Mais peut-être la même <forme> est-elle une et multiple, comme Platon l'enseigne dans le *Parménide*¹³.

12. SÉNÈQUE [LUCIUS ANNEUS SENECA], *Lettres à Lucilius [Epistulae morales]*, texte établi par F. Préchac, trad. par H. Noblot, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1947, t. II, ep. LXV, p. 108: «Haec exemplaria rerum omnium deus intra se habet numerosque uniuersorum, quae agenda sunt, et modos mente conexus est: plenus his figuris est, quas Plato ideas appellat, immortales, inmutabiles, infatigabiles».

13. CALCIDIUS, *Commentaire au Timée de Platon. Tome II. Notes sur la traduction et le Commentaire de Calcidius et Annexes*, trad. fr. B. Bakhouché, Vrin, Paris 2011, part. II, ch. 272, pp. 500-501: «Quarum ad praesens differt examinationem nec quaerit unane sit archetypha species eorum quae sunt communis omnium, an innumerabiles et pro rerum existentium numero, quarum coetu et congregatione concreuerit uniuersa moles, an uero idem unum pariter et multa sint, ut docet in *Parmenide*».

Calcidius décrit l'espèce principale en tant qu'idée et intellect de Dieu, elle est le modèle de toutes les choses engendrées (II, 339). En même temps, elle n'est ni privée, ni douée de qualité (338). Elle n'a pas des qualités elle-même, mais elle les donne aux espèces qui proviennent d'elle. Et pourtant Calcidius dit auparavant que les idées, qui sont les produits de l'intellect de Dieu, sont l'origine des choses (II, 304). De cette façon, cette espèce primordiale est une et multiple. Elle a une nature supérieure aux idées et elle est ces idées.

En définitive, Calcidius développe une notion de l'espèce première qui est une et multiple. Elle a un caractère intelligible, semblable aux espèces secondes et, en même temps, elle leur est supérieure et différente. De cette façon, la multiplication apparaît chez Calcidius quand des espèces secondes apparaissent dans une espèce première. En même temps, elle est transcendante à ces espèces, ce qui peut être lié au fait qu'elle est l'intellect parfait de Dieu.

Le Prologue de l'*Évangile selon Jean* (I, 1-14) et la présentation biblique du Verbe est devenu la source de l'inspiration pour les philosophes chrétiens latins Augustin et Erigène.

Augustin cite plusieurs fois le prologue de Jean (I, 1-4) afin d'illustrer la doctrine de l'incarnation. Dans le *De Verbo (De diversis quaestionibus 83, q. 48)*, le Verbe est expliqué en tant que raison (*ratio*) ou que puissance opérationnelle (*operativa potentia*)¹⁴. Dans l'*In Iohannis Euangelium tractatus I, 16*, Augustin dit que la raison de tout ce qui a été créé est dans la Sagesse¹⁵.

Une autre illustration de la présence des raisons dans le Verbe incarné chez Augustin se trouve dans le *De Genesi ad litteram* où l'auteur décrit les niveaux d'existence des raisons (V, XII, 28) :

14. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, A. Mutzenbecher (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1975 (CCSL 44A), q. 46, p. 136: «Quod graece logos dicitur latine et rationem et uerbum significat. Sed hoc loco melius uerbum interpretamur, ut significetur non solum ad patrem respectus, sed ad illa etiam quae per uerbum facta sunt operatiua potentia. Ratio autem, et si nihil per illam fiat, recte ratio dicitur».

15. Id., *Tractatus in Iohannis euangelium I-XVI*, J.R. Willems (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1954 (CCSL 36), pp. 9-10. «Quid est hoc? Facta est terra, sed ipsa terra quae facta est, non est uita: est autem in ipsa sapientia spiritaliter ratio quaedam quae facta est; haec uita est».

Autres sont donc les raisons immuables de toutes les créatures dans le Verbe de Dieu ; autres, les œuvres dont il se reposa le septième jour ; autres, celle que, à partir de cette première création, il continue de faire jusqu'à maintenant. De ces trois modes d'être, le dernier nous est quelque peu connu, à l'aide des sens corporels et de notre expérience coutumière¹⁶.

Ainsi, les raisons sont dans le Verbe de Dieu qui est le Christ. Dieu agit par ces «raisons éternelles, immuable et stables, de son Verbe qui lui est coéternel»¹⁷.

Augustin développe cette doctrine davantage en postulant que les raisons multiples sont les idées dans l'intellection de Dieu (*De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 46, 2). Il enseigne qu'il existe un Verbe (Sagesse, art de Dieu, son intellection) qui contient de multiples raisons. Voici son témoignage (*De civitate Dei*, XI, X, 3) :

La Sagesse n'est pas multiple mais une, et en elle sont des trésors infinis – finis pour elle – des choses intelligibles contenant toutes les raisons invisibles et immuables des êtres, même visibles et changeants qui par elle ont été faits. Car Dieu n'a rien créé sans connaissance, ce qu'on ne peut vraiment dire d'aucun artisan humain. Or s'il a tout fait par connaissance, il n'a évidemment fait que ce qu'il avait d'abord connu. [...] pour nous, ce monde ne pourrait être connu, s'il n'existait ; pour Dieu s'il n'était connu, il ne pourrait exister¹⁸.

16. SAINT AUGUSTIN [AUGUSTINUS HIPONENSIS], *La Genèse au sens littéral en douze livres. Livres I-VII* [De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim], J. Zycha (ed.), trad. fr. P. Agaësse, A. Solignac, Desclée De Brouwer, Paris 2000 (Bibliothèque Augustinienne, 48), pp. 412-414: «Cum ergo aliter se habeant omnium creaturarum rationes incommutabiles in uerbo dei, aliter eius illa opera, a quibus in die septimo requieuit, aliter ista, quae ex illis usque nunc operatur, horum trium hoc, quod extremum posui, nobis utcumque notum est per corporis sensus et huius consuetudinem uitae».

17. *Ibidem*, I, 18, pp. 130-133: «Sed aeternis atque incommutabilibus et stabilibus rationibus coaeterni sibi uerbi sui».

18. SAINT AUGUSTIN [AUGUSTINUS HIPONENSIS], *La Cité de Dieu* [De civitate Dei], B. Dombart, A. Kalb (edd.), trad. fr. G. Combès, F.-J. Thonnard, M.A. Devynck, Desclée de Brouwer, Paris 1959 (Bibliothèque Augustinienne, 35), pp. 68-69: «Neque enim multae, sed una sapientia est, in qua sunt infiniti quidam eique finiti thesauri rerum intellegibilium, in quibus sunt omnes invisibiles atque incommutabiles rationes rerum etiam visibilium et mutabilium, quae per ipsam factae sunt. Quoniam

Le Verbe ou la Sagesse de Dieu est l'intellect qui connaît (*novit*) les choses. La multiplication apparaît quand Dieu conçoit le monde dans sa Sagesse.

Gerard O'Daly démontre qu'Augustin a été influencé par la doctrine du médioplatonisme qui pose un intermédiaire entre le principe supérieur (Dieu) et l'univers (par exemple, le *Logos* dans les écrits de Philon et de Plutarque)¹⁹.

Jean Scot Érigène dans son *Homélie sur le prologue de Jean* développe la doctrine du Fils en tant que Verbe : «Trois choses s'imposent donc à notre foi et à notre intelligence : le Père qui parle, le Verbe qui est prononcé, les choses qui sont produites par le Verbe. Le Père parle, le Verbe est engendré, toutes choses sont produites»²⁰.

Dans le passage suivant, Érigène explique la création selon saint Jean I, 3-4 : «Toutes les choses qui ont été faites par lui, en lui sont vie et en lui sont un. Car elles étaient – c'est-à-dire subsistent – en lui en tant que causes, avant d'exister en elles-mêmes en tant qu'effets»²¹.

Cette doctrine est également développée dans le *Periphyseon*, III. Le Fils de Dieu est le Verbe, la raison et la cause. Le verbe contient en lui toutes les choses (*rerum omnium universitas*).

Le Verbe de Dieu, qui est à la fois absolument simple et infiniment multiple en soi, est la Raison et la Cause créatrice de l'univers créé. Le Verbe de Dieu est simple, car la totalité des existants forme en Lui une unité indivisible et indissociable ; ou plutôt, le Verbe de Dieu est Lui-même l'unité indivisible et indissociable de tous les existants, car il est Lui-même tous les existants. Mais c'est à juste titre que nous

Deus non aliquid nesciens fecit, quod nec de quolibet homine artifice recte dici potest; porro si sciens fecit omnia, ea utique fecit quae noverat. [...] quod iste mundus nobis notus esse non posset, nisi esset; Deo autem nisi notus esset, esse non posset».

19. G. O'DALY, *Hierarchies in Augustine's thought*, in F.X. MARTIN, J.A. RICHMOND (eds.), *From Augustine to Eriugena. Essays on Neoplatonism and Christianity in honor of John O'Meara*, Catholic University Press, Washington 1991, p. 150.

20. JEAN SCOT ERIGÈNE [IOHANNES SCOTTUS ERIUGENA], *Homélie sur le prologue de Jean*, É. Jeaneau (ed.), Cerf, Paris 1969, pp. 237-239: «Tria itaque credere et intelligere debemus: loquentem patrem, pronuntiatum uerbum, ea quae efficiuntur per uerbum. Pater loquitur, uerbum gignitur, omnia efficiuntur».

21. *Ibidem*, p. 245: «Omnia quae per ipsum facta sunt, in ipso uita sunt et unum sunt. Erant enim (hoc est subsistunt) in ipso causaliter, priusquam sint in semet ipsis effectiue».

pouvons considérer le Verbe de Dieu comme multiple, parce que le Verbe de Dieu se diffuse à l'infini à travers tous les existants, et parce que c'est cette diffusion même qui fait subsister tous les existants²².

Le Verbe est la cause qui contient une image intelligible du monde. Les êtres existent dans le Verbe, étant éternels et immuables. Ils sont ensemble dans le Verbe et le Verbe est tous les êtres. Érigène dit également que l'essence véritable et éternelle de tous les existants (*omnia*) a été dans la Sagesse créatrice avant même que ces existants fussent créés. Cette essence existe car elle est vue par la Sagesse (*Periphyseon*, IV)²³.

Ainsi Augustin et Érigène s'inspirent-ils de la doctrine métaphysique de Jean I, 1-14. L'influence du médioplatonisme est visible chez ces deux penseurs. Tous deux développent une doctrine selon laquelle Dieu ou le Fils contient les unités intelligibles (les raisons dans le cas d'Augustin ou les causes dans le cas d'Érigène) qui causent l'existence des êtres dans le monde. Lambert Maria de Rijk trouve que cette doctrine correspond à la doctrine médioplatonicienne des idées, qui sont les pensées dans l'intellect de Dieu (en particulier chez Philon d'Alexandrie et Augustin)²⁴.

22. JEAN SCOT ÉRIGÈNE, *De la division de la nature (Peryphyseon)*, trad. fr. F. Bertin, PUF, Paris 1998, t. III, p. 104; IOHANNES SCOTTUS ERIUGENA, *Periphyseon*, É. Jeaneau (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1999 (CCCM 163), III, p. 36: «Dei uerbum est simplex et in se infinite multiplex creatrix uniuersitatis conditae ratio et causa. Simplex quidem, quia rerum omnium uniuersitas in ipso unum indiuiduum et inseparabile est; uel certe indiuidua et inseparabilis unitas omnium dei uerbum est, quoniam ipsum omnia est. Multiplex uero non immerito intelligitur esse, quoniam per omnia in infinitum diffunditur, et ipsa diffusio subsistentia omnium est».

23. IOHANNES SCOTTUS ERIUGENA, *Periphyseon*, É. Jeaneau (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 2000 (CCCM 164), IV, p. 55: «Vt enim sapientia creatrix (quod est uerbum dei) omnia quae in ea facta sunt, priusquam fierent, uidit, ipsa que uisio eorum quae priusquam fierent uisa sunt uera et incommutabilis aeterna que essentia est, ita creata sapientia (quae est humana natura) omnia quae in se facta sunt, priusquam fierent, cognouit, ipsa que cognitio eorum quae priusquam fierent cognita sunt uera essentia et inconcussa est».

24. L.M. DE RIJK, *Quaestio De Ideis. Some Notes on an Important Chapter of Platonism*, in J. MANSFELD, L.M. DE RIJK (eds.), Kephalaion. *Studies in Greek Philosophy and its Continuation Offered to Professor C.J. De Vogel*, Van Gorcum & Comp, Assen 1975, pp. 204-213: 206-208.

De cette façon, Achard développe la doctrine du Verbe qui contient la pluralité des raisons éternelles. Il l'introduit en parlant de trois sortes de raisons et reprend en décrivant les formes en particulier. Le Verbe est une source unique des raisons multiples, notamment des formes. Les formes sont intelligibles dans le Verbe car elles sont conçues là par Dieu. Le Verbe est donc la Sagesse et l'intellect de Dieu.

La doctrine de la source unique est transmise au Moyen Âge via des sources différentes, notamment Sénèque et Calcidius. Le dernier propose une doctrine de l'espèce première qui est l'intellect de Dieu et modèle et qui contient des idées. Augustin et Erigène s'adressent au Prologue de l'*Évangile selon Jean*. Ils décrivent le Verbe comme une source des raisons, un lieu où les prototypes des choses résident. Le Verbe est La Sagesse qui est un et multiple car elle contient les modèles des choses (les idées).

Achard reprend ces éléments pour sa doctrine des raisons éternelles et les formes des choses.

2. Hiérarchie des êtres

La hiérarchie métaphysique apparaît aux différents endroits du *De Unitate*. Par hiérarchie, nous comprenons une série des êtres, telle que chacun de ses éléments se trouve subordonné à celui qu'il suit. Déjà en parlant des raisons éternelles, Achard distingue le Verbe qui contient les raisons et les raisons mêmes. Même si les raisons existent éternellement dans le Verbe, ce Verbe leur est vu comme une source. Il s'agit donc d'une hiérarchie métaphysique à deux niveaux. Les autres hiérarchies apparaissent dans la doctrine des formes.

La formation des formes s'accomplit dans la forme première et d'après elle. C'est la Sagesse qui est la raison éternelle et divine, le Verbe de Dieu et son intellect (II, 2). La création des formes se passe de la manière suivante : elles sont faites de rien (*ex nihilo*), créées dans elles-mêmes et formées intellectuellement (II, 2). Ce processus est comparé à la génération du Fils²⁵.

25. ACHARDUS DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De unitate*, part. II, ch.. 2, p. 140: «Si quis autem quaerat utrum ibi sint per creationem, numquid hoc verius per solam Filii

Dans le chapitre II, 13, Achard énumère les trois types de formes : la forme première (qui est le Verbe même), les formes (qui sont formées dans la forme première) et les formes qui sont dans les choses (II, 13). L'idée ou la forme du deuxième type est, selon Achard, «la forme de la chose à faire» (*forma faciendae rei*), c'est-à-dire la forme qui sert de modèle de la chose, tandis que l'*idos* où la forme du troisième type est «la forme de chaque chose» (*forma quidem cujusque rei*), c'est-à-dire la forme réalisée dans la chose²⁶.

Or la forme *première* est véritablement et absolument coéternelle, immuable et, comme on l'a dit, elle est non seulement dans le Verbe de Dieu, mais le Verbe de Dieu lui-même. Pour la forme *seconde*, en revanche, si elle est qualifiée d'éternelle et d'immuable, comme on l'a montré plus haut, ce n'est pourtant pas à cause de sa substance, mais uniquement à cause de son mode d'exister, c'est-à-dire d'être intelligée, là ; <dès lors>, elle n'est point le Verbe lui-même, mais elle est à partir du Verbe, quoique non encore en acte. Quant à la forme *troisième*, elle n'est absolument pas dans le Verbe, et elle est temporelle et variable : elle est telle selon sa substance, ce que n'est pas la première, et selon son mode d'existence, ce que ne sont ni la première, ni la seconde. La première, cependant, convient avec la seconde dans un certain mode d'existence, mais elle diffère de la troisième et dans la substance et dans le mode de subsistance. La seconde, quant à elle, convient avec la première, comme on l'a dit, dans le mode, mais elle en diffère dans la substance, tandis qu'elle convient avec la troisième dans la substance, mais en diffère dans le mode. La seconde, en effet, n'est rien d'autre que la forme telle dans l'intellect qu'elle est en acte, mais non pas dans le même état²⁷.

generationem per quam et hic quoque sunt: ibi sunt per ipsam creationem, <nendum> tamen ibi facta sunt, sed et dici possunt ibi antequam in seipsis creata et de nihilo facta et intellectualiter prorsus formata».

26. *Ibidem*, part. II, ch. 13, pp. 172-173: «In arte rem faciendi videtur et forma faciendae rei et forma quidem cujusque rei».

27. *Ibidem*: «Et est prima vere prorsus coaeterna, non mutabilis, et, ut dictum est, non modo in Dei verbo, sed et ipsum Dei verbum. Secunda autem, si nominatur aeterna et immutabilis, ut supra ostendimus, non tamen propter substantiam, sed solum propter ibi existendi, id est intelligendi, modum, nec est verbum ipsum, sed ex verbo, quamvis nondum <in actu>. Tertia vero omnino est <non> in verbo, et est temporalis et variabilis, id est secundum substantiam, quemadmodum

Ainsi, la forme première et la forme seconde ont le même mode d'existence, qui est différent de celui de la troisième. Il s'agit des modes d'existence *in intellectu* (la forme première et seconde) et *in actu* (la forme troisième). La substance de la forme première n'est pas la même que la seconde et la troisième. La forme première est le Verbe de Dieu, donc sa substance est divine. La seconde et la troisième forme ont la substance matérielle.

Pour comprendre la distinction entre la deuxième et la troisième forme, il faut prendre en compte la distinction *in intellectu/in actu*. Selon le *De unitate*, l'expression *in intellectu* signifie que c'est Dieu qui a intelligé de toute éternité absolument tout ce qu'il ferait dans le temps²⁸. Ainsi les formes existent comme intelligées par Dieu éternellement *in intellectu*. Et, dès leur création, elles existent *in actu*. D'un point de vue cognitif, les formes *in intellectu* sont conçues par Dieu, tandis que les formes *in actu* sont créées par lui. D'un point de vue temporel, les formes *in intellectu* existent depuis toujours, tandis qu'elles n'existent *in actu* qu'à partir du moment où elles ont été faites dans le monde créé. Les formes secondes (idées) sont *in intellectu* et les formes troisièmes (*idos*) *in actu*.

De cette façon, les raisons formelles ont leur hiérarchie des trois niveaux : la forme première (la Sagesse ou le Verbe), les formes créées et les formes imprimées dans la matière. La première forme qui a une substance divine et est intelligible. Les formes créent (les idées) sont *in intellectu*, mais ont la substance sensible (la matière). Les formes troisièmes (*idos*) sont créées *in actu* dans la matière.

non prima, et secundum existendi modum, quod nec prima, nec secunda. Tamen <con>venit prima cum secunda in quodam existendi modo, a tertia autem differt et in substantia et in modo subsistendi. Secunda vero cum prima convenit, ut dictum est, dans modo, sed differt in substantia, e converso autem cum tertia convenit in substantia sed in modo differt. Secunda namque non est aliud nisi forma talis in intellectu qualis in actu, sed non taliter».

28. Cfr. *ibidem*, part. I, ch. 43, pp. 112-115: «<Quod> enim omnia quae hic sunt et ibi ab aeterno fuerunt, quoquo ibi intelligantur fuisse modo, contradici non potest. Non enim hic est aliquid quod Deus non fecerit, nec Deus nesciens aliquid fecit, nec aliquid unquam scivit vel scire poterit quod non ab aeterno scierit et in aeternum sciturus sit: alioquin enim variatio aliqua in eum cadere posset. Intellexit igitur ab aeterno omnia quaecumque cum tempore vel in tempore facturus erat».

Achard décrit une variété des formes (I, 46-II, 14) : celles dans lesquelles les choses sont vues (les catégories), celles à partir desquelles les choses sont vues (les objets mathématiques), les universaux, les énoncés vrais à propos de Dieu et à propos des créatures. Les formes des choses singulières sont également parmi les formes ce qui permet de poser la question des identités numériques de choses et des formes (est-ce qu'il y a le même nombre des choses et de formes ? *De unitate* I, 43 et 46). J'étudie cette question davantage dans ma monographie.

En outre, Achard introduit la doctrine de la hiérarchie des formes lors de la description des sortes différentes des formes. Voici sa description des vertus et des béatitudes qui sont également parmi les formes des choses :

Or les vertus des créatures que les saints reçoivent par grâce sont des participations de ces vertus premières et suprêmes qui sont toutes en Dieu et tout entières et en même temps et toujours, et toutes ne sont substantiellement là qu'une seule vertu, et elle-même n'est rien d'autre que Dieu même ; de même les béatitudes des créatures ne sont rien sinon des dérivations de la béatitude suprême qui est en Dieu et qui est Dieu, et les unes et les autres ne sont rien d'autre que des connexions de la créature rationnelle au Créateur, comme de l'image à l'Unité, qui elles-mêmes paraissent être des images de cette connexion suprême qui est entre les personnes de la Trinité²⁹.

Ainsi, les vertus ont le même ordre hiérarchique que les formes : la Vertu – la forme première, les formes créées – les vertus premières et suprêmes, les vertus acceptées des créatures – les formes dans les choses. Les vertus des saints participent aux vertus premières, et les vertus premières sont substantiellement une Vertu.

29. *Ibidem*, part. II, ch. 3, pp. 144-145: «Virtutes autem creaturarum quas per gratiam accipiunt <sancti>, quaedam sunt illarum quae in Deo omnes et totae et simul et semper sunt virtutum primarum et summarui participationes, quae omnes substantialiter ibi una sunt virtus, nec ipsa aliud nisi ipse Deus. Item creaturarum beatitudines non nisi beatitudinis summae quae in Deo et Deus est quaedam sunt derivationes, et utraeque non aliud sunt nisi creaturae rationalis ad creatorem suum tanquam imaginis ad unitatem connexiones».

Les béatitudes, en revanche, n'ont que deux niveaux exprimés : la béatitude suprême et les béatitudes des créatures. Les dernières dérivent directement de la première.

La hiérarchie est présente dans la doctrine des formes d'Achard (forme première, formes intelligibles et formes créées), ainsi que dans la doctrine des vertus et de béatitudes. Dans tous les cas, il y a une relation causale entre la source des êtres (forme première) et les êtres de niveaux différents (formes deuxième et troisième). Regardons maintenant l'origine de cet élément métaphysique dans les sources potentielles d'Achard.

Certains éléments de la doctrine de Platon sont connus à travers la traduction latine du *Timée* faite par Calcidius :

Il existe une première espèce, que ne perçoivent pas les sens, et qui reste en elle-même, à l'abri de la naissance et de la mort, une espèce qui n'admet en elle aucun élément venu d'ailleurs, et qui n'apparaît en rien d'autre, une espèce qui échappe à la vue et à la sensation et qui n'est perceptible qu'à la contemplation attentive de l'intellect. Il y a ensuite une seconde espèce qui est soumise à la naissance et aux sens ; cette espèce doit avoir un substrat, elle s'établit en un endroit qu'elle quitte lorsqu'elle change ou est détruite. On peut la connaître par l'opinion qui accompagne la sensation. La troisième espèce est celle du lieu, qui n'est pas lui non plus concerné par la destruction. Il fournit un emplacement à ce qui naît, mais il est perçu sans que celui qui le perçoit n'en ait une expérience sensible, et on ne peut s'en faire une idée que par le moyen d'un raisonnement bâtard³⁰.

30. CALCIDIUS, *Commentaire au Timée de Platon*, pp. 198-199: «Esse eius modi speciem semotam a sensibus in semet locatam sine ortu, sine occasu, quae neque in se recipit quicquam aliunde neque ipsa procedit ad aliud quicquam, inuisibilem, insensibilem, soli mentis intentioni animaduersionique perspicuam; porro quod ab hoc secundum est, natiuum, sensibile, sustentabile, consistens aliquo in loco et rursum cum immutatione et interitu recedens, sensibus et opinione noscendum. Tertium genus est loci, quod ne ad interitum quidem pertinet; sedem porro praebet his quae generantur, sed ipsum sine sensu tangentis tangitur, adulterina quadam ratione opinabile».

Dans ce passage, Platon parle de trois espèces : imperceptible, perceptible et le lieu. Ces trois espèces correspondent aux idées (formes), aux *idos* (formes composées avec la matière) et à la matière³¹. En parlant de la cause, Platon parle de l'*opifex* : le demiurge de l'univers. Cet artisan crée l'univers d'après un modèle (28AB). La première espèce (les idées) est ce modèle (48E). Ainsi, dans le *Timée*, Platon décrit quatre éléments : Dieu, les idées, les *idos* et la matière. Parmi eux, la relation causale existe seulement entre les idées et les *idos*, les deux autres éléments participent chacun indépendamment de trois autres à la production du monde.

Les notions *idea* et *idos* sont connues au Moyen Âge au travers Sénèque³².

Le développement du platonisme mène à l'élaboration d'une sorte de hiérarchie des principes qui expliquent la diversité des êtres dans le monde par leur relation à la source de leur existence. Le médioplatonisme apporte la doctrine que les idées sont les pensées de Dieu. Les origines de cette doctrine se trouvent chez Platon et Aristote³³. Les deux niveaux, Dieu et les idées, sont distingués. Cette doctrine se transforme en une doctrine du *Logos*-Fils de Dieu qui contient des *logoi*.

Un exemple de la hiérarchie médioplatonicienne est connu à travers Apulée (*Platon et sa doctrine*, V, 190) : «Platon estime qu'il y a trois principes des choses : Dieu, la matière – inachevée, non façonnée et que ne distingue ni forme, ni marque de qualité – et les formes des choses, qu'il appelle encore des "idées"»³⁴.

31. P.V. SPADE, *The Warp and Woof of Metaphysics: How to Get Started on some Big Themes*, <<http://pvspade.com/Logic/docs/WarpWoof.pdf>> (accessed 3/10/2022), p. 6.

32. SÉNÈQUE, *Lettres à Lucilius*, t. II, ep. LXV, p. 107: «Stoicis placet unam causam esse, id quod facit. Aristoteles putat causam tribus modis dici: "prima, inquit, causa est ipsa materia, sine qua nihil potest effici: secunda opifex: tertia est forma, quae unicuique operi imponitur tamquam statuae": nam hanc Aristoteles idos uocat. "Quarta quoque, inquit, his accedit, propositum totius operis». À ce propos, voir I. CAIAZZO, *Sur la distinction sénéchiennne idea/idos au xii^e siècle*, «Chora. Revue d'études anciennes et médiévales» 3-4 (2005-2006), pp. 91-116: 99-100 et 104.

33. R.M. JONES, *The Ideas as the Thoughts of God*, «Classical Philology» 214 (1926), pp. 317-326: 324-326.

34. APULÉE, *Opusculs philosophiques*, trad. fr. J. Beaujeu, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1973, p. 63; LUCIUS APULEIUS MADAURENSIS, *De Platone et eius dogmata*, C.

Ces trois principes ont des caractéristiques différentes et sont subordonnés. Dieu opère par les idées, et les idées sont imprimées dans la matière.

Calcidius reprend la doctrine de Platon dans son *Commentaire sur le Timée*. Tullio Gregory décrit trois principes qui ont été pris par Calcidius de la philosophie médioplatonicienne : Dieu suprême, l'intellect de Dieu et l'âme du monde³⁵. Nous allons définir la place des unités intelligibles dans ce schéma.

D'après Calcidius, Il existe une espèce primaire qui est formée et non formée en même temps. Elle n'est pas formée car elle n'est pas composée. Elle est formée car c'est à travers elle que les choses sont formées de l'espèce et de la matière³⁶. Calcidius décrit également la seconde espèce (*secunda species*, II, 344). Voici comment il introduit la distinction entre les espèces première et deuxième (II, 337) :

Il faut faire une distinction, en ce qui concerne le modèle des choses, entre deux espèces : il y a celle qui sert à ordonner la matière, et il y en a une autre à l'image de laquelle a été produite l'espèce attribuée à la matière. De fait l'espèce assignée à la matière est seconde, tandis que la première est celle à l'image de laquelle a été produite la seconde [...] ; de même aussi l'espèce qui a ordonné la matière, est de second rang, tandis que l'autre, celle selon laquelle l'espèce seconde a été achevée, est l'espèce principale, sur laquelle porte notre propos à présent³⁷.

Moreschini (ed.), in *Apuleius Platonicus Madaurensis opera quae supersunt*. III: *De philosophia libri*, Teubner, Stuttgart-Leipzig 1991, lib. I, cap. V, p. 92: «Initia rerum tria esse arbitrat Plato: deum et materiam inabsolutam, informem, nulla specie nec qualitatis significatione distinctam, rerum que formas, quas *ιδέαις* idem vocat».

35. T. GREGORY, *The Platonic Inheritance*, in P. DRONKE (ed.), *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, New York 1988, pp. 54-80: 55.

36. CALCIDIUS, *Commentaire au Timée de Platon*, part. II, ch. 338, p. 564: «Rursum silua dicebatur informis; <dicetur etiam principalis species non formata> sed nec informis; formatum enim quidque compositum sit necesse est ex participante et ex participabili, ut statua, in qua participat quidem aes, participatur uero impressa forma, sed species est simplex et incomposita. Propterea igitur species negatur esse formata; nec uero minime est formata, nam propter hanc alia quoque omnia quae sunt formata in possessione uultus sunt».

37. *Ibidem*, part. II, ch. 337, pp. 562-565: «Eodem igitur modo etiam in exemplo rerum gemina species consideratur: illa, qua exornata silua est, nihiloque minus

De cette façon, la distinction entre la première et la seconde espèce correspond à la distinction platonicienne entre *idea* et *idos*.

Calcidius parle aussi du troisième genre qui, selon son interprétation des textes platoniciens, serait la matière (*silva*). La matière est le «lieu» des espèces incorporelles ou le réceptacle des espèces corporelles³⁸. L'espèce principale (*species principalis* ou *primaria*), l'espèce seconde (*species nativa*) et la matière constituent les trois «rayons» constitutifs du monde d'après Calcidius.

Ainsi, bien que Calcidius utilise une terminologie différente des autres auteurs tardo-antiques, il propose une hiérarchie consistant en trois éléments : l'espèce principale, les espèces *nativae* et la matière.

Dans ses œuvres différentes, Augustin développe la doctrine du Verbe qui est la Sagesse et l'intellect de Dieu qui contient les raisons intelligibles des choses. Dans la *Quaestio de ideis* (*De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 46), Augustin explique que les raisons sont dans l'intellect de Dieu. Il précise également que la traduction littéraire du mot *idea* serait *forma*, bien qu'il préfère le terme *ratio*. Les idées, d'après lui, sont les «formes principales» des choses³⁹.

Dans le *De libero arbitrio*, Augustin expose la hiérarchie des formes :

alia species ad cuius similitudinem illa species facta est quae siluae tributa est. Et est imposita quidem siluae species secunda, prima uero illa, ad cuius haec secunda similitudinem facta est. [...], sic etiam species quae siluam exornauit secundae dignitatis est, illa uero alia iuxta quam secunda species absoluta est, principalis est species, de qua sermo habetur ad praesens».

38. *Ibidem*, part. II, ch. 344, p. 570: «Puto eum dignitatis respectu tertium genus dixisse siluam [...]. At uero locum uocat eam uelut regionem quandam suscipientem specierum incorporearum intellegibilium que simulacra, semper eandem, uel quia sine generatione est et interitu uel quia necesse est eam locum stationem que esse et uelut receptaculum corporearum specierum, quae sunt membra mundi».

39. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, q. 46, p. 71: «Ideas igitur Latine possumus vel formas vel species dicere, ut uerbum e uerbo transferre uideamur. Si autem rationes eas uocemus, ab interpretandi quidem proprietate discedimus – rationes enim Graece *logoi* appellantur non *ideae* –, sed tamen quisquis hoc uocabulo uti uoluerit, a re ipsa non abhorrebit. Sunt namque *ideae* principales quaedam formae vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae ipsae formatae non sunt ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quae divina intellegentia continentur».

Pour que ces êtres muables ne s'arrêtent pas, mais continuent, par leurs mouvements calculés et la variété distincte de leurs formes, à parcourir, pour ainsi dire, le cours des temps, il doit exister une forme éternelle et immuable, telle qu'elle n'est ni contenue et comme répandue dans l'espace, ni étendue et diversifiée dans le temps⁴⁰.

Augustin discerne la forme unique des formes et les formes qui proviennent à partir de cette forme unique. Plus loin, il ajoute qu'une forme éternelle et immuable existe pour que les corps et les esprits soient formés⁴¹.

Ainsi, Augustin décrit et la hiérarchie des raisons (les raisons des choses dans le Verbe) et la hiérarchie des formes (la forme unique, les formes). On voit qu'Augustin utilise ces deux notions (*forma* et *ratio*) comme synonymes. Il parle aussi des «formes de choses», donc les choses font aussi partie de sa système métaphysique.

Un autre exemple fameux de hiérarchisation se trouve dans le *Periphyseon* d'Érigène. Il s'agit de quatre natures. Voici l'explication fournie par Édouard Jeuneau :

1. nature qui crée et n'est pas créée (Dieu en tant que cause suprême de toutes choses) ;
2. nature qui est créée et qui crée (les idées-archétypes, causes primordiales de toutes choses) ;
3. nature qui est créée et qui ne crée pas (les êtres soumis à la génération dans le temps et dans le lieu) ;

40. AUGUSTIN, *Dialogues philosophiques III*, trad. fr. G. Madec, Desclée De Brouwer, Paris 1976, p. 359; AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De libero arbitrio*, W.M. Green (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1970 (CCSL 29), lib. II, ch. XVI, 44, p. 257: «Ut ista mutabilia non intercipientur, sed dimensis motibus et distincta uarietate formarum quasi quosdam uersus temporum peragant, esse aliquam formam aeternam et incommutabilem, quae neque contineatur et quasi diffundatur locis neque protendatur atque uarietur temporibus».

41. Id., *De libero arbitrio*, lib. II, ch. XVII, p. 267: «Quid autem amplius de mutabilitate corporis et animi dicamus? Superius enim satis dictum est. Conficitur itaque, ut corpus et animus forma quadam incommutabili et semper manente formentur. Cui formae dictum est: mutabis ea et mutabuntur; tu autem idem es et anni tui non deficient. Annos sine defectu pro aeternitate posuit prophetica locutio. De hac item forma dictum est quod in se ipsa manens innouet omnia».

4. nature qui ne crée pas et qui n'est pas créée (Dieu en tant que fin ultime de toutes choses)⁴².

En effet, la première et la quatrième natures désignent Dieu dans ses différentes fonctions : en tant que source et en tant que but. De cette façon, la division d'Érigène peut être réduite aux trois niveaux : Dieu, les idées et les êtres changeants du monde (bien que cette explication exclue du système érigénien le mouvement de retour).

Érigène est le premier à utiliser l'expression «*forma prima*» qui apparaît plus tard chez Achard. D'après Érigène, cette première forme de la nature est la Cause première, «le principe sans forme de toutes les formes et de toutes les espèces»⁴³.

En outre, Érigène propose aussi la doctrine de «la Forme unique de toutes les formes» qui est le Verbe du Père. Les causes primordiales sont formées grâce à la conversion perpétuelle vers cette forme⁴⁴. Les causes sont à la fois éternelles (car elles participent à la

42. É. JEAUNEAU, *L'homme et l'œuvre*, in JEAN SCOT ERIGÈNE, *Homélie sur le prologue de Jean*, p. 44.

43. JEAN SCOT ERIGÈNE, *De la division de la nature*, t. I-II, p. 282; IOHANNES SCOTUS ERIUGENA, *Periphyseon*, É. Jeauneau (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1997 (CCCM 162), II, p. 3: «Prima omnium causa [...] dum sit formarum et specierum omnium informe principium».

44. *Ibidem*, p. 30: «Semper enim ad unam rerum omnium formam quam omnia appetunt, uerbum patris dico, conuersae formantur et formationem suam nusquam nunquam deserunt. Quae uero sub ipsis sunt in inferioribus rerum ordinibus ita ab eis creantur, ut ad se ipsas ea attrahant omnium que rerum unum principium appetant; et nullo modo ad ea quae sub eis sunt respiciunt, sed suam formam superiorem se semper intuentur, ut semper ab ea formari non desinant. Nam per se ipsas informes sunt et in ea uniuersali sua forma, in uerbo dico, semet ipsas perfecte conditas cognoscunt. Quis autem recte intelligentium haec quae de primordialibus causis dici possunt de informitate rerum dicere audebit? Praesertim cum et informis rerum materia non aliunde credatur manare, nisi ex primordialibus causis. Si enim primordiales causae ideo primordiales appellantur quia primitus ab una creatrice omnium causa creantur et ea quae sub ipsis sunt creant – nam primordiales causas et creari et creare praediximus – quid mirum si, quemadmodum in numero eorum quae post et per primordiales causas condita sunt informem materiem esse credimus certis que rationibus firmamus, eam quoque a primordialibus causis creari fateamur?».

forme éternelle) et créées (car elles se séparent à un moment donné du Verbe pour créer de choses). Il décrit la hiérarchie qui contient la forme première, les causes primordiales, les choses et la matière.

En définitive, la hiérarchie cognitive tripartite est souvent présente dans la philosophie tardo-antique. Dans le cas de Platon (le *Timée*) et de Calcidius, cette hiérarchie consiste en l'espèce première (l'idée), les espèces secondes (les *eidei*) et la matière. Dieu est le principe séparé des idées. Apulée désigne trois principes : Dieu, idées et matière. Dans le cas d'Augustin, et d'Érigène, la hiérarchie consiste en Dieu (le Verbe, la forme première), les formes, qui sont dans la forme première (les idées), et les choses. Dans le cas de ces derniers, le troisième élément de la hiérarchie (choses) est lié au premier élément (Dieu). Il ne s'agit plus de la matière qui a une nature différente de Dieu, mais de choses créées d'après les formes qui sont en Dieu.

La doctrine d'Achard contient également les trois niveaux : la forme première, les formes créées et les formes dans les choses. Les deux dernières sont désignées comme *idea* et *idos* – la distinction connue de Sénèque. Cette hiérarchie ressemble à celle d'Augustin et d'Érigène.

3. Conclusion

J'ai montré que le *De unitate* contient les deux éléments principaux de la métaphysique médio- et néoplatonicienne : la source unique et une hiérarchie métaphysique des êtres. Le Verbe de Dieu qui est son Fils, l'Intellect et la Sagesse est cette source. Les raisons qui sont dans cette source et qui proviennent de lui créent la première multiplicité. Les formes – un de trois sortes de raisons – ont une hiérarchie : la forme première, les formes créées (idées) et les formes dans les choses (*idos*).

J'ai également trouvé l'origine de cette doctrine dans la métaphysique tardo-antique. La doctrine de la source unique des êtres apparaît, pour la première fois, dans les auteurs qui transmettent la doctrine de Platon : Sénèque et Calcidius. Mais ce sont les textes

d'Augustin et d'Erigène qui ont probablement inspiré la doctrine d'Achard. Ces auteurs adaptent la doctrine de la source première au christianisme en se servant du Prologue de l'*Évangile selon Jean* (I, 1-14). C'est ainsi que la doctrine du Verbe qui contient les raisons a été transmise au deuxième siècle.

Pour être plus précise, il faut noter qu'une hiérarchie de trois éléments : Dieu, idée, matière est souvent considéré comme médioplatonicienne⁴⁵. Achard introduit la forme première comme le Fils et l'Intellect de Dieu, les formes créées sont intelligibles donc elles sont dans l'intellect, les *idos* sont dans la matière. Les êtres, selon Achard, ne proviennent pas de la source première, mais y restent et servent comme modèles pour les êtres créés dans la matière. Achard reprend une version plus avancée de cette métaphysique qui a été développée par Augustin et Erigène.

En effet, je ne considère pas Achard comme médioplatonicienne, mais comme un philosophe du XII^e siècle qui a créé sa propre doctrine sous influence des penseurs tardo-antiques, notamment Augustin et Erigène, qui ont transmis les doctrines médioplatoniciennes au Moyen Âge tardif. En tout cas, Achard a introduit une doctrine proche des idées divines. Ses formes sont des idées dans l'Intellect de Dieu et les prototype des choses sensibles. Et j'espère que mon article permettra de mettre en valeur la contribution des auteurs tardo-antiques dans le développement de la doctrine des idées divines.

45. Voir M. ZAMBON, *Porphyre et le moyen-platonisme*, Vrin, Paris 2002, p. 30.

Richard of St. Victor and Thomas Gallus of Vercelli: Victorine thinking on the divine ideas

DECLAN LAWELL*

Writing in his *Commentary on Isaiah* in 1218, Thomas Gallus of Vercelli stated:

The philosophical intellect has not been able to demonstrate or discover the Trinity of the unity as the Church holds this view, but rather it learnt it. In time, however, someone was found who, faithfully multiplying the talent of the intellect, established a new science on the basis of the experience of the affect, and with sufficiently necessary reasons cried out through his Seraph: HOLY, HOLY, HOLY, that is, Prior Richard in his book which is called, *My Righteous One (On the Trinity)*¹.

Thomas Gallus, abbot of Vercelli in northern Italy, in this passage proclaims that his former Prior from the Abbey of St. Victor in Paris, Richard, established a new skill or science of analysing theology, including the divine ideas, based on the internal experience humans encounter in their affect or emotions. Certainly, says Thomas, Richard used the talents of his intellect to arrive at this conclusion, but the end goal was a new practice in theology based on affective experience. After (1) introducing the two figures at the heart of this article, I wish to examine (2) what these two thinkers have to say about the divine ideas, and how they claim theologians can gain

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1. All translations are my own unless stated. The *Commentary on Isaiah* is actually lost, but Thomas reproduced a portion of it in his *Explanation of the Angelic Hierarchy*, chapter 10: see THOMAS GALLUS, *Explanatio in libros Dionysii*, D. Lawell (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 2011 (CCCM, 223).

access to a knowledge of what the divine ideas are. Richard's *De Trinitate*, which Thomas especially signals here, and Thomas' *Explanations* of the works of Dionysius, shall form a central part of understanding their views on the divine ideas. (3) Differences and similarities in the two thinkers will be highlighted. I then wish to examine what Thomas means by saying that Richard of St. Victor founded a new art or science which was established on the foundation of the affect. In examining how we gain access to such knowledge, I shall also determine whether Thomas, in this introductory quotation, has faithfully interpreted Prior Richard or not.

1. Two Victorine thinkers: Richard and Thomas

1.1. *The Abbey of St. Victor, Paris*

Richard and Thomas are both known as Victorines, an appellation derived from the fact that they were canons regular in the Abbey of St. Victor in Paris. The abbey was set up by William of Champeaux when he retired from the University of Paris in 1108. William wanted a house which championed reform of religious life under the Rule of St. Augustine while at the same time being open to and engaged in the intellectual developments taking place in the university. This combination of religious fervour and academic intensity is evident in the writings of the Victorines under discussion, Richard and Thomas².

1.2. *Richard of St. Victor*

Little is known about the life of Richard (died 1173) whereas we have substantial knowledge about Thomas (above all for the years

2. See D. POIREL (éd.), *L'école de Saint-Victor de Paris. Influence et rayonnement du Moyen Âge à Époque moderne*, Brepols, Turnhout 2010 (Bibliotheca Victorina, 22), and F. BONNARD, *Histoire de l'abbaye royale et d'ordre des chanoines réguliers de Saint-Victor de Paris*, A. Savaète, Paris 1904-1907 for further details about the development of the Victorine order.

of his life in Vercelli)³. The date of Richard's birth is unknown, but we do know from the Victorine chronicler, Jean of Toulouse, that he came from the British Isles. Jean designates Richard as *Scotus*, which may in particular locate his birthplace to Ireland or Scotland. Indeed, in a letter addressed to Robert of Melun, Bishop of Hereford, England, Richard remarked that he had a special and natural affection for the *ecclesiam Anglorum* (the church of the Angles/English), again showing his close connections with the British Isles. It appears Richard knew Hugh of St. Victor, who died on 11 February 1141, thus making it probable that Richard arrived in Paris before this date. It is likely that he made his profession under abbot Gilduin who succeeded William. By 1159, Richard became sub-prior, and then succeeded as prior in 1162, a role in which he continued up until his death on 10 March 1173. His time as prior was marked by the difficulties of the period when Ernisius was abbot. It must have been challenging for the scholarly contemplative, Richard, to work under an abbot who was accused of being 'another Caesar' on account of his authoritarian rule and squandering of resources. For Dante, Richard was someone to be considered as more than human given his power of contemplation⁴.

Richard's writings⁵ were varied (scriptural, exegetical, mystical, sermons) but in a certain sense can be unified by his continuous goal of trying to get the students of St. Victor, and indeed the other acquaintances he wrote to, to engage in a contemplation of the Christian faith which was truly rooted in personal experience and intellectual understanding. His most notable works include: the treatise *On the Trinity* which seeks to explain, as far as possible, the doctrine

3. For details on Richard's life, see J. CHÂTILLON, *Richard de Saint-Victor*, in *Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique* 13 (1988), pp. 652-654; RICHARDUS DE SANCTO VICTORE, *Les douze patriarches ou Benjamin minor*, J. Châtillon, M. Duchet-Suclaux (eds.), Cerf, Paris 1997 (Sources Chrétiennes 419), pp. 7-12.

4. Cfr. DANTE, *Divine Comedy: Paradise*, canto 10, 130-132.

5. A comprehensive survey of Richard's writings and the secondary literature can be found in C. NÉMETH, *Quasi aurora consurgens: The Victorine Theological Anthropology and its Decline*, Brepols, Turnhout 2021 (Bibliotheca Victorina, 27), in part two, chapter two. See also G. DUMEIGE, *Richard de Saint-Victor et l'idée chrétienne de l'amour*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1952.

of the Trinity using sufficiently valid reasons and by using personal experience as a foundation for data about the three members of the Trinity; *Benjamin Minor*, or *The Twelve Patriarchs*, which is an allegorical interpretation of the meaning of the twelve sons of Jacob, as well as Rachel and Lia and their servants, which was intended as a preparation for contemplation; *Benjamin Major*, or *The Mystical Ark*, which is a more systematic study of contemplation using the ark of the covenant as an allegory for the journey of contemplation; and *De IV gradibus violentae charitatis*, or *On the Four Degrees of Violent Love*. What is notable from these writings is how Richard is insistent on trying to find demonstrations of articles of faith rather than simply relying on authoritative statements from scripture or tradition, as well as his experiential approach to investigating theology: belief is the flowering and culmination of what experience manifests rather than simply faith being the mechanism from which understanding consequently ensues. His teaching on the concept of what it means to be a person is also particularly salient.

1.3. *Thomas Gallus of Vercelli*

For Thomas Gallus (died 1246), evidence for his life is more abundant⁶. Despite the surname “Gallus” suggesting France, the place of his birth is not known, and indeed there are some arguments to suggest that he too came from the British Isles. The first certain date in connection with Thomas is the dating of his *Commentary*

6. A general introduction to Thomas Gallus can be found in D. LAWELL, *Thomas Gallus: Affective Dionysianism*, in M. EDWARDS, D. PALLIS, G. STEIRIS (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Dionysius the Areopagite*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2022, pp. 379-393. See also the introduction in D. LAWELL, *Commentaries on the Angelic Hierarchy*, Brepols, Turnhout 2022 (Corpus Christianorum in Translation, 40); D. LAWELL, *Thomas Gallus, abate di Vercelli: il suo pensiero e carattere*, in *Atti del convegno internazionale (Vercelli, 29 maggio – 01 giugno 2019): Sant’Andrea di Vercelli e il Gotico europeo agli inizi del Duecento* (forthcoming). An overview of Thomas’ thought is also found in D. LAWELL, *Affective Excess: Ontology and Knowledge in the Thought of Thomas Gallus*, «Dionysius» 26 (2008), pp. 139-74, and C. NÉMETH, *Dionysian Elements, Structures, and Limits: Thomas Gallus, Interpreter and Spiritual Author*, in R. PORWOLL, D. ORSBON (eds.), *Victorine Restoration Essays on Hugh of St. Victor, Richard of St. Victor, and Thomas Gallus*, Brepols, Turnhout 2021.

on *Isaiah* which was finished in 1218. At this time, Thomas was lecturing in the university of Paris while residing in the Abbey of St. Victor, but there is no evidence for dates and activity before this time. At some point, Thomas was selected by Cardinal Guala Bicchieri (papal legate who was returning from England after dealing with the disputes between the king and barons which eventually led to the signing of the Magna Charta) to establish a new abbey and hospital in Bicchieri's hometown of Vercelli in the north of Italy. Thomas travelled with three other Victorines to establish the new foundation on which work began in February 1219. In 1224 we know that Thomas was the prior and by 1225 at the latest he begins to be called the abbot. Thomas led a busy administrative and academic life in the abbey of St. Andrew of Vercelli. Indeed, the transfer of the Franciscan university from Padua to Vercelli in 1228, with the first chair of theology in any Italian university, may have been in some part due to the presence in Vercelli of Thomas, a former lecturer from the University of Paris. Thomas' influence on the nascent Franciscan order must thus have been of a high order. After being involved in the Guelf (pro-papal) and Ghibelline (pro-imperial) controversy of the period, Thomas was deposed as abbot, seemingly excommunicated, and forced to take refuge in the nearby town of Ivrea. There is evidence however to suggest he returned to Vercelli where his death is recorded in the necrology as 5 December 1246. His funerary monument can still be viewed in the church of Sant'Andrea, Vercelli.

Thomas of Vercelli's writings were mostly commentaries on the Bible or on Dionysius the Areopagite. He wrote three commentaries on the *Canticle of Canticles* (the third is lost), as well as a *Commentary on Isaiah*, or at least a portion of *Isaiah*. Only a fragment of this commentary survives. He wrote a series of glosses on the *Celestial Hierarchy* of Dionysius in 1224, as well as another set of glosses on Dionysius' *Mystical Theology* (lost). In 1238, he published an *Extract* of Dionysius' writings which was a sort of paraphrase of the dense writings of the Areopagite written in a popular style. This *Extract* was widely circulated in the University of Paris at the time. Thomas then wrote between 1241-44 a major commentary on the works of Dionysius called the *Explanation*.

2. The divine ideas

2.1. Linguistic considerations

Neither Richard nor Thomas sets out to deal with the divine ideas in a separate and discrete treatise or question. The nearest Thomas comes to a systematic treatment is in his *Explanation* of Dionysius' *Divine Names*, given that Dionysius himself has separate chapters dealing with being, goodness, beauty, etc.

Furthermore, on a linguistic level, it is necessary to make precise the words used by Richard and Thomas to describe the divine ideas. Richard's lexis is rather limited in this domain, and to gain access to what he thinks about the divine ideas, one needs to consider what he says about the *invisibilia* of God – the “invisible things”, or invisible ideas in the divinity⁷. Closely related is the word *similitudo* or likeness: the world and the things made in the world are similitudes of what is invisible⁸. Thomas, on the other hand, has a wide range of words which he uses almost interchangeably. He does refer to the Latin words for ideas (*idee*), but rarely and usually in reference to Plato or the philosophers. Other words he uses are heavily influenced by the Dionysian texts he comments upon, and therefore by the Latin translators of Dionysius' texts: Eriugena in the old translation and John Sarracenus in the new translation. Thomas' lexis ranges across words such as *theorie* (theories or things contemplated) or (what seems to be the Latin rendering of the Greek) *spectacula* or spectacles, archetypes (*archetypie*), exemplars (*exemplaria*), reasons (the *rationes* or ideas behind visible things), images (*imagines*), and like Richard, the *invisibilia* of God.

For both Richard and Thomas, therefore, the verse from Romans 1, 20, which refers to these *invisibilia*, served as almost a programmatic statement of how both authors approached the topic of the divine ideas. As St. Paul writes: «For the invisible things of him (*invisibilia*

7. Cfr. D. COULTER, *Per Visibilia ad Invisibilia. Theological Method in Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173)*, Brepols, Turnhout 2006 (Bibliotheca Victorina, 18).

8. For further discussion of these *similitudines*, see C. NÉMETH, *Dionysian Elements*.

ipsius) from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made». Richard quotes the text 6 times in *De Trinitate*, 3 times in *Benjamin Major*, and 3 times in *Benjamin Minor*. Thomas cites the same verse 33 times across his various *Explanations* and his *Glosses on the Angelic Hierarchy*⁹. The biblical verse, for Richard and Thomas, gives legitimacy to the idea that the divine ideas can be known from the creation of the world. The world is a mirror which reflects the pre-existing ideas in the divine mind before they emerged into creation. There is a very *a posteriori* emphasis in this approach which is developed in a programmatic way by Richard and inherited by Thomas from his fellow Victorine.

Of course, neither Richard nor Thomas was the first to use this scriptural reference to show how creation can reveal knowledge of the divine ideas. It is instructive to compare how it was used by the Cistercian, Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153). In Book 5, 1, 1 of *De consideratione*, Bernard writes:

Therefore, my most wise and holy Father, I would have thee to understand clearly that as often as thy consideration descends from such high and heavenly things to those that are earthly and visible, whether to study them as sources of knowledge, or to desire them as useful, or to compose and regulate them as thy duty demands: so often does it enter into a land of exile¹⁰.

It is interesting to note that Bernard describes this focus on the material objects of creation in a more negative way, pessimistically characterising such consideration as an exile. Bernard does however consider that if one uses the visible things as a means of leading oneself towards the invisible things, one does not wander in exile too far (*haud procul exsulat*). Nevertheless, one is still in exile. Bernard then proceeds to quote Romans as a support for this procedure:

9. Thomas' *Glosses* are found in THOMAS GALLUS, *Glose super angelica ierarchia. Accedunt indices ad Thomae Galli Opera*, D. Lawell (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 2011 (CCCM, 223A). See the index on p. 206 for Thomas' citations of Romans 1, 20.

10. BERNARDUS CLARAVALLENSIS, *De Consideratione*, PL 182, p. 787D. The translation is from *St. Bernard's Treatise On Consideration*, anonymous translator, Browne and Nolan, Dublin 1921, p. 145.

For this is the most sublime and worthy use to which earthly creatures can be put, when, as St. Paul of his wisdom tells us, “the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made” (Rom 1,20)¹¹.

Bernard describes the visible things as a ladder (*scala*) reaching from the visible things to the invisible and spiritual ideas, a metaphor which suggests the usefulness of the visible world. Richard himself uses the same image of the *scala*, as we shall see later. However, Bernard then goes on to say that it is only exiles, not citizens, who need this ladder. He makes a comparison with angels who see the Word of God, and in the Word, they see the things made in the Word itself, having no need to beg (*mendicare*) for a knowledge of the Word from the visible creation¹². Speaking of begging again suggests a certain belittlement of this mode of knowing. Indeed, Bernard views it as «preposterous and unworthy» of a human to use the material world (which is subordinate to humans) as a means of ascending to contemplate the ideas in the immaterial Word (*nonne praeposterum hoc et indignum?*)¹³. As we explore Richard and Thomas’ views on the use of the visible world, it is arguably the case that we see a much more positive and receptive attitude towards the use of the visible world in the ascent towards knowing God, even if ultimately neither Richard nor Thomas would deny that any kind of vision *in patria* would be superior to any mediate vision *in via*.

2.2. Richard of St. Victor on the divine ideas

Discovering Richard’s views on the divine ideas is equivalent to discovering what he says about the divine *invisibilia*. For Richard, this is an evidential approach. While much of the tradition up to Richard laid emphasis on belief as a means of discovering knowledge about

11. *St. Bernard’s Treatise On Consideration*, p. 146; BERNARDUS CLARAVALLENSIS, *De Consideratione*, PL 182, 788C-D.

12. *Ibidem*, 788D.

13. *Ibidem*, 789A.

God, from Tertullian's *credo quia absurdum* through Anselm's *credo ut intelligam*, for Richard knowledge of God is given in a privileged way from the evidence of the senses and the world. Evidence can be derived not just from the traces of God visible in the material world, but also from the evidence of the human mind and internal psychological observation. It is this latter angle on evidence which makes Richard stand out and why his writings had such influence on later thinkers (even on St. Teresa of Avila via Bernardino de Laredo¹⁴).

The evidence of physical and psychological observation is a ladder (*scala*) for Richard. The image of the ladder certainly had a venerable use in the tradition so far, from Johannes Climacus through the twelfth-century Carthusian Guigo II who wrote his *Scala Claustralium* (*The Ladder of Monks*), sometimes known as the *Scala Paradisi* (*Ladder of Paradise*)¹⁵. Richard outlines the ladder metaphor in *De Trinitate* 5, 6:

Those realities which we know by experience indicate to us that which we are to look for regarding the non-experienced, divine realities, since *the invisible realities which concern God are contemplated by the intellect through created objects*. When we want to climb we generally use a ladder, because we are humans and we cannot fly. Let us use, then, the resemblance [offered by] the visible realities as our ladder. In this way, from such an observation point, we will be able to discern as in a mirror that which we are not able to perceive *in se* as it is¹⁶.

Of note here are many of the customary doctrines of Richard. The emphasis on experience is central – we gain access to things we cannot experience (*inexperta*) through what we can experience (*per*

14. See the introduction in RICHARDUS DE SANCTO VICTORE, *The Twelve Patriarchs. The Mystical Ark. Book Three of The Trinity*, trans. G. Zinn, Paulist Press, New York 1970.

15. For an English translation see GUIGO CARTUSIANUS, *The Ladder of Monks and Twelve Meditations: A Letter on the Contemplative Life*, trans. E. Colledge, J. Walsh, Mowbray, London 1978; reprinted Cistercian Publications, Kalamazoo 1981.

16. The translation is from R. Angelici, RICHARD OF SAINT VICTOR, *On the Trinity. English Translation and Commentary*, Cascade, Eugene 2011, p. 177; RICHARDUS DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De Trinitate*, J. Ribailier (ed.), Vrin, Paris 1958, p. 201.

experientiam). Rom 1,20 is cited once again, the bedrock on which his teachings are established. As humans cannot fly, so too the human mind cannot fly immediately to grasp divine truths and ideas: a ladder is needed to mediate and facilitate the ascent. What is the ladder the human mind can use? It is the resemblance (*similitudine pro scala*) of visible things which permit one to climb on a ladder towards the invisible. For Richard, these similitudes from the visible world are crucial for facilitating knowledge of the divine ideas. On reaching the top of the ladder, we gain a viewpoint or watchtower (*specula*) from which to catch sight of the divine ideas, but only through a mirror (*per speculum*), in a pleasing pun on the words *specula* and *speculum*.

The same idea is developed in *De Trinitate* 6, 23 when Richard states that those who do not yet have the wings of contemplation with which to fly, willingly use a ladder of similitudes (*scala similitudinum*) to investigate and indeed to demonstrate the sublime yet invisible mysteries (in this case, of the persons of the Trinity)¹⁷. Richard used the same teaching in his other works in a very consistent way, often using exactly the same language to describe this mode of ascending. For example, in *Benjamin Major* 2, 12, he writes:

This type of contemplation [the third kind: in reason according to the imagination] rightly supports itself on the crutch of corporeal similitudes in order to ascend to the invisible realities, and raises itself to the heights with a kind of, so to speak, ladder of corporeal properties [...]¹⁸.

As well as again referring to the ladder of corporeal properties which enables the mind to rise up to contemplate incorporeal realities, Richard suggestively talks of the walking-stick or crutch of corporeal similitudes (*baculo corporee similitudinis*). Similitudes and resemblances from the material world are thus an aid and support

17. RICHARDUS DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De Trinitate*, p. 261; RICHARD OF SAINT VICTOR, *On the Trinity*, p. 234.

18. ID., *De contemplatione (Benjamin major)*, J. Grosfillier (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 2013, p. 182.

to human weakness, just as an infirm person may need a staff or crutch to walk with.

The divine ideas, therefore, need to be situated at the summit of this ladder. Richard taught a doctrine of ascending knowledge which rose from considering the sensible world all the way up (through the use of imagination, reason, and intelligence) to the highest mysteries of the Trinity. There are six levels of contemplation which are summarily outlined in *Benjamin Major* 1, 6. The main levels or types (*genera*) are in the imagination, in reason, and in the intelligence.

Each of these is sub-divided in two as follows: the first type is based in the imagination and operates in accordance with the imagination. Here, the soul marvels at the created world and all the phenomena which can be observed in creation. The second kind of contemplation is in the imagination in accordance with reason, when reason itself examines the observed realities and tries to understand causes, reasons, connections, etc. in the phenomena of the imagination. The third class of contemplation is based in reason but in accordance with the imagination. Here, reason tries to find similitudes for invisible realities based on the visible realities offered by the imagination. In the fourth kind, in reason in accordance with reason, the faculty of reason is solely concerned with what can be experienced in the soul, for example, how the operations of the soul can be used as a way of understanding how purely intellectual beings (e.g. angels) may exist. The fifth kind of contemplation is in the intelligence above reason. The realities contemplated in this level are above the powers of reason (*supra rationem*) to discover and hence need the support of revelation e.g. concerning the nature of God and his essential unity. However, these facts are not contrary to reason or beyond the soul's ability to understand them (*preter rationem*). In the sixth level of contemplation, however, information is contemplated which is in the intelligence and is not just beyond reason's power of discovery, but indeed seems to be contrary to reason, such as the doctrine of the Trinity and how there can be three persons in one substance¹⁹.

19. See *ibidem*, pp. 103-108.

These levels are aligned with the three faculties of the human soul as Richard depicts them: imagination, reason (speculative, discursive), and intelligence/intellect (contemplative). Imagination is the remembered data collected from sense perception. A good way to understand the difference between reason and intelligence is to consider what Richard says about the difference between speculation and contemplation in *Benjamin Major* 5, 15:

For although contemplation and speculation are customarily used in an interchangeable way, and by this very fact, the views expressed in the Scriptures often obscure their properties, nevertheless in a more appropriate and more precise way we speak of speculation when we see through the mirror, but of contemplation when we see the truth in its purity, without any exterior wrapping or the veils arising from the shadows²⁰.

Reason is thus discursive, and operates by deduction and the logical processes of the mind. Contemplation is more like seeing and beholding in awe. Indeed, Richard's definition of contemplation itself is worth recalling in *Benjamin Major* 1, 4: «Contemplation is the free sharp-sightedness of the mind hung poised with admiration over the spectacles of wisdom» («contemplatio est libera mentis perspicacia in sapientiae spectacula cum admiratione suspensa»)²¹. Richard suggests that contemplation exercises itself on the divine ideas or spectacles with great clarity or clearness of sight. The idea of suspension seems to imply notions of freedom, of flight, of not being bound to sense, imagination, or indeed reason if necessary; such faculties are thus suspended or abrogated. For Richard, the highest acts of contemplation are always an exercise of the human intelligence, even if such contemplation is focussed on objects (e.g. the ideas of the Trinity) which cannot be proven by reason and indeed which seem repugnant to rational thought.

Despite this focus on the human intelligence as the locus for contemplation, Richard is not averse to talking about love and ec-

20. *Ibidem*, p. 558.

21. *Ibidem*, p. 96.

stasy. One need only read *On the Four Degrees of Violent Love*²² to consider his luscious language in praise of the love which wounds, binds, grows languid, then faints. Richard is comfortable with the language of love as being fiery, boiling, sharp, and causing the soul to desire and yearn. Nonetheless, when Richard speaks of ecstasy in the *Benjamin Major*, he links it not with any privileged knowledge acquired through love or desire, but rather with the intelligence which is superior to discursive reason. In book 4, chapter 23 he writes, when discussing the tabernacles of the mind:

Indeed, by that first tabernacle we understand the common state of the soul that we all know; but by the second tabernacle we understand that state of soul which is by ecstasy of mind and which few know as yet. To the former especially pertains the rational sense; but to the latter, the intellectual sense. In the former surely we gaze at the invisible things of ourselves; in the latter we contemplate invisible divine things²³.

The divine ideas which particularly fascinate Richard are those of love/goodness, wisdom/knowledge, and power, given that he often uses these as correlates for the divine persons of the Trinity (Holy Spirit, Son, and Father). The following from his treatise *De tribus personis appropriatis*, chapter 2, gives an insight into how Richard thought about these divine ideas:

We all have a common knowledge of, and can prove by daily experience, what is power, what is wisdom, what is love or goodness. Therefore, in these things which are clear and known to us, if I am not mistaken, we are instructed in the knowledge of those things which surpass the limits of human capacity. For in these three attributes a kind of form and image of the highest Trinity is expressed, and a kind of mirror is presented to us so that *the*

22. See RICHARD OF SAINT VICTOR, *On the Four Degrees of Violent Love*, trans. A. Kraebel in *On Love: A Selection of Works of Hugh, Adam, Achard, Richard, and Godfrey of St. Victor*, ed. by H. Feiss, Brepols, Turnhout 2011, pp. 263-300; RICHARDUS DE SANCTO VICTORE, *Les quatre degrés de la violente charité*, G. Dumeige (ed.), Vrin, Paris 1955 (Textes philosophiques du Moyen Âge 3); cfr. PL 196, 1207-1224.

23. RICHARDUS DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De contemplatione (Benjamin major)*, p. 468 (trans. Zinn, in *The Twelve Patriarchs*, p. 306).

*invisible things of God may be seen and understood through those things which have been created*²⁴.

By examining the data arising from internal, psychological experience, Richard extrapolates to provide similitudes about what the intra-Trinitarian life is like. Book 2, chapter 2 of Richard's *Liber exceptionum* proceeds in the same way. Here, Richard seeks to show how three visible properties arising from the world demonstrate three invisible properties in God. After quoting once again Rom 1,20, Richard writes:

However, these three properties [power, wisdom, goodness], just as they are ineffably one in God, so too they cannot be separated in their operations. For power creates wisely through goodness, wisdom governs in a good way through power, goodness powerfully conserves things through wisdom²⁵.

In other words, just as the three faculties of the human soul co-operate together and are united in the one soul, so too the three persons of the Trinity are essentially united and co-operate together, the Father acting with power, the Son as wisdom, the Holy Spirit as goodness.

Richard had great faith in the power of human experience to understand the divine ideas. In *De Trinitate* 3, 2, Richard has been arguing that – based on the human experience of love – perfect love requires a person whom one can equally love, and a third person in whom that love can be shared. For Richard, this equates to the equality of love between the three persons of the Trinity who must equally be divine (if the love is to be equal), and who must be three in number (if the love is to be properly shared). In conclusion, Richard writes with boisterous confidence: «See how easily reason convinces us that in the true divinity a plurality of persons could not be lacking»²⁶.

24. RICHARDUS DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De tribus personis appropriatis*, in *Opuscules théologiques*, J. Ribaillier (ed.), Vrin, Paris 1967, p. 186.

25. ID., *Liber exceptionum*, J. Châtillon (ed.), Vrin, Paris 1958, p. 115.

26. RICHARDUS DE SANCTO VICTORE, *De Trinitate*, p. 137.

2.3. Thomas Gallus of Vercelli on the divine ideas

Thomas adopts much of the same fundamental framework as Richard, and indeed often indicates explicitly by name and title the work of Richard which he draws upon. Furthermore, Thomas wrote (towards the end of his life) a short treatise on the divine ideas, called *Spectacula contemplationis* (*The Spectacles of Contemplation*), spectacles being a synonym for the divine ideas or exemplars²⁷.

This dependence on Richard is especially evident in the Prologue of the *Explanation of Dionysius' Mystical Theology*²⁸. Thomas begins the *Explanation of the Mystical Theology* by explaining that there are two ways to arrive at a knowledge of God:

We reach the knowledge of God in two ways. One is intellectual and enigmatic, and is obtained by the comparison and contemplation of creatures, or through human teaching and one's own research²⁹.

This is the domain of human philosophy, Thomas continues, and is best exemplified by the works of Aristotle. Thomas then immediately signals his debt to Richard by summarising the six grades of contemplation which is a central part of Richard's teaching. Thomas gives a very concise summary of the six levels (which are developed in greater detail in his treatise *Spectacula contemplationis*). It is worth reading in full Thomas' synopsis of his own Victorine teacher:

For as Prior Richard teaches in his distinguishing of the levels of contemplation, the first and second and third are concerned with the perceptible and invisible properties and the invisible natures,

27. See D. LAWELL, *Spectacula contemplationis. A Treatise (1244–1246) by Thomas Gallus*, «Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales» 76, 2 (2009), pp. 249–85.

28. Interestingly, Thomas rarely uses the ladder metaphor to explain the upward ascent towards the knowledge of God. The word *scalam* appears once in the *Explanation of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, 3L (where Thomas refers to the mysteries of the incarnation as preparing a ladder to contemplate the unseen divinity).

29. THOMAS GALLUS, *Explanatio in libros Dionysii*, p. 3.

reasons, causes, etc. of the visible realities, and those three are immersed in the imagination and do not reach the pure intelligence. The fourth level, after removing the faculty of the imagination, focusses only on those objects which the imagination does not reach, that is, the invisible natures, properties, virtues, powers, arrangements, etc., such as we can both experience in our own minds and can understand through the common intelligence. This level is practised especially in the rational nature. The fifth level rises up to the divine and eternal spectacles which can only be grasped by the intellect and are in accord with human reason. Earthly philosophy is ignorant of the sixth level³⁰.

So much for the first way of knowing God. In this, Thomas is faithful to his fellow Victorine's teaching, publicly acknowledging his use of Richard's schema of contemplation. It is, however, in what Thomas says about the second way of knowing God (what he calls mystical theology) where a divergence emerges between the two authors, a difference which shall be examined below.

As mentioned, Thomas uses a wide range of vocabulary when presenting his views on the divine ideas, and it is worth examining these words to understand his thinking in more detail. When explaining what is meant by the place or places of God in *Mystical Theology* 1A, Thomas states:

By 'place' or 'places of God' can be understood here the intelligible and eternal reasons of all creatures which are in the Word, which Plato calls ideas, and which Dionysius calls archetypes and exemplars in his book on the *Divine Names*, chapter 5L: "and the reasons for existing beings", as well as images (*Divine Names*, chapter 7H)³¹.

Thomas' reading of Dionysius and the Platonic tradition has thus enriched his vocabulary with terms such as reasons, arche-

30. *Ibidem*, pp. 3-4.

31. *Ibidem*, p. 27: «Vel per locum uel loca Dei possunt hic accipi intelligibiles rationes eterne omnium creaturarum que sunt in Verbo, quas dicit Plato ideas, Dionysius archetypias et exemplaria (in libro De diuinis nominibus, cap. 5l: "et existentium rationes"), *ibidem* et imagines (eodem libro, cap. 7h)».

types, and exemplars, terms which are not prominent in Richard's lexicon (even though there is evidence to suggest Richard had some knowledge of the Dionysian corpus). Despite this linguistic diversity, Thomas does see these words as synonyms expressing the same eternal ideas or invisible things in the Word of God. In other places, the ideas are called theories, pre-definitions, or spectacles.

The ideas pre-exist in a unified form in the Word. Commenting in his *Explanation on Divine Names* 5E, Thomas writes:

The depth, however, of the following view leads us to understand the principles of existing things as the exemplars or ideas of the eternal Word, or the eternal reasons or archetypes of things (which are dealt with in this chapter at L) which, although they are put in the plural form on account of the multiplicity of their effects and the weakness of our intellect or speech, nevertheless are supremely one in the Word. However, they are named with many different words such as per se goodness, per se essence, per se life, per se likeness, per se wisdom, per se justice, and many others on account of the diversity of their effects, although all of them which are in the more-than-simple Word are nothing other than the Word itself. Therefore, these kinds of archetypes or exemplars are distinguished not in accordance with their more-than-substantial being, but they are distinguished in the Word on account of intellectual contemplations [...]³².

The semantic fluidity is again striking in this passage in which Thomas can interchangeably use many different terms to express the same divine ideas. The divine ideas are multiple for humans who examine their effects in the created order. They are given multiple names: goodness, justice, life, etc. Nevertheless, they enjoy a supersubstantial unity in the pre-existence they have in the eternal Word. Thomas' Dionysian hyperbolic language enables him to differentiate the domain above and beyond being and substance (the unity of the Word and the divine ideas) from the domain of being and substance (the multiplicity of the effects of the ideas in creation).

32. THOMAS GALLUS, *Explanatio in libros Dionysii*, p. 337.

The same treatment of the divine ideas is often merged with Thomas' interpretation of the biblical *Canticle of Canticles*. In this passage, Thomas is commenting on Cant. 3, 1-2, where the bride says that she will seek the spouse throughout the squares and streets of the city:

By 'squares', we understand all the theoretical contemplations, or the divine invisible objects, which can to some extent be apprehended by the investigation of reason or by intellectual speculations, whether they are essential or personal or notional properties [of the Trinity], such as Prior Richard of St. Victor led into consideration and the common intellect. But we say that the streets are the more-than-intellectual unitive experiences which no-one knows about unless he receives them³³.

Here, Richard's ideas on the various kinds of names given to the Trinity, accessed via reason and intellectual speculation, are woven into the commentary on the Canticle. (Interestingly, Thomas goes on to suggest once again that there is another kind of superior knowledge which he thinks is designated by the streets, a knowledge we shall return to below.) Indeed, the bride is said, when contemplating the divine ideas, to repose and sleep with the spouse:

For there are as many theoretical ideas as there are homes, such as eternity and immensity, wisdom, goodness and any other kinds of divine invisible ideas, in each of which the spouse sleeps with the bride when she, united to him, joyfully dwells in these kinds of theoretical ideas³⁴.

The mystical and interpersonal union of the bride/soul with God is here conjoined with the intellectual language of gaining knowledge about the divine ideas. For both Richard and Thomas, such delight and pleasure in knowledge are an important feature of

33. THOMAS GALLUS, *Third Commentary on the Canticle*, in ID., *Commentaires du Cantique des cantiques*, J. Barbet (ed.), Vrin, Paris 1967, p. 167.

34. ID., *Second Commentary on the Canticle*, ID., *Commentaires du Cantique des cantiques*, Cant 1, 15, p. 76.

their views, even though they have different conclusions about how far knowledge and love can be taken in the ascent towards knowing the ideas of God, as we shall now examine.

3. Comparing Richard and Thomas on the divine ideas

Richard and Thomas seem to be largely in agreement in their teaching on the divine ideas³⁵. Thomas by his own admission incorporated Richard's teaching into his own writings. However, what emerges is a major difference in their respective teachings on how to access the highest knowledge about God. For Thomas, this was via the affect and synderesis, whereas for Richard it is always via the intelligence.

Returning to the Prologue of the *Explanation of the Mystical Theology*, where Thomas outlined in a synoptic manner the six grades of contemplation, it will be recalled that Thomas said there was a twofold knowledge of God, the first of which was theoretical or intellectual. Thomas, however, taught that the affect and love gained access to a superior, second kind of knowledge which was higher than the intellect or intelligence:

However, in this book [namely, in Dionysius' *Mystical Theology*], Dionysius has handed down another incomparably deeper way of knowing God, namely a more-than-intellectual and more-than-substantial way which the gentile philosophers have not apprehended, because they did not look for, and did not even think there existed, and did not grasp, the power in accordance with which this way is established in the soul. For they thought that the highest power of knowing was the intellect, when there is another which surpasses the intellect no less than intellect surpasses reason, or reason surpasses the imagination, namely the principal affection. It is a spark of synderesis which alone is able to be united to the divine spirit, just as I touched on in my exposition of that vision in Isaiah 6, 1: *I saw the Lord sitting*, etc.³⁶

35. For a comparison of both authors, see R. JAVELET, *Thomas Gallus et Richard de Saint-Victor mystiques*, «Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales» 29 (1962), pp. 206-233; 30 (1963), pp. 88-121.

36. THOMAS GALLUS, *Explanatio in libros Dionysii*, p. 4.

This is a striking passage which fully enunciates Thomas' revolutionary and affective interpretation of Dionysius' teaching. Having followed Richard's ideas in the first section of this article, we can see and appreciate the enormity of Thomas' move here. Richard taught a rising ascent in levels of contemplation going from the imagination through reason towards the contemplation of the intellect/intelligence: and despite what Richard may at times say about ecstasy of mind, the intelligence is where the schema of Richard's thought terminates. The highest faculty is the intelligence which is superior to discursive reason and the fantasies of the imaginations. Yet Thomas takes the schema to a higher level. Beyond even the intelligence, he asserts, there is the principal or foremost affection which gives fullest access to the divine. It is a spark of *synderesis* which is, in Thomas' terminology³⁷, a faculty of the soul which is open to a unique perception of the divine ideas beyond the operations of the intellect. Whereas for Richard, in his allegorical interpretation of the mystical ark in *Benjamin Major*, the Cherubim are the angels which represent the highest human faculty of knowing, for Thomas it is the Seraphim, equated with the knowledge derived from love, which are superior to the Cherubim. The knowledge gained by the principal affection surpasses intellect and being, and reaches the non-being, so to speak, of God who transcends all being and knowledge. Thomas makes the link between loving affection and the divine spectacles or ideas when he states:

But that wisdom is obtained by a great surge of love for God and by a mighty stretching of the soul towards the eternal spectacles of wisdom³⁸.

37. For a fuller discussion of *synderesis* and Thomas' mystical vocabulary, see D. LAWELL, *Ne de ineffabili penitus taceamus. Aspects of the Specialized Vocabulary of the Writings of Thomas Gallus*, «VIATOR» 40, 1 (2009), pp. 151-184.

38. Preface to *Explanation of the Mystical Theology*, in THOMAS GALLUS, *Explanatio in libros Dionysii*, p. 6: «Ista autem sapientia obtinetur multu estu dilectionis in Deum et forti extensione animi in eterna spectacula sapientie».

Whatever the mind can know about the divine ideas of goodness, beauty, truth and so on, all of this is surpassed by the knowledge derived from the affect in love with God. It is ultimately love which reveals more (experientially) about these ideas than any speculation (in reason) or indeed contemplation (in the intelligence).

Returning, therefore, to the quotation with which this article began: Thomas claims that Richard founded a new science or art form (*novam artem*) on the foundation of the experience of the affect (*super experimentum affectus*), when he uttered his teachings through the Seraph of his mind. Was Thomas right to make this claim about his teacher in Paris? While it is undeniable that Richard spoke of experience and of the affect, the claim that Richard established the doctrines which Thomas teaches is somewhat a stretch of the imagination. Thomas, out of the reverence and respect he bore for Richard, seeks to associate his views with Richard as much as possible, and certainly on the intellectual plane, this is a fair gesture. Nowhere, however, do we find Richard making the strong claim that love or affect can achieve a grade of knowledge which is superior to the intellect. In this way, Thomas, sometimes called the last of the Victorines, makes claims which are distinctly un-Victorine.

Richard certainly can be credited with moving away from traditional interpretations of Rachel and Lia, which focus on action and contemplation, by placing his emphasis on contemplation and experience/affect. This is indeed a new science. For Richard, however, affect and love are always in the service of knowledge, or at least concomitant with knowledge, and never does he subordinate contemplation and knowledge to the affect. The following quote from chapter 13 of *Benjamin Minor* shows Richard's views on how love and affect operate in the contemplative journey:

Therefore, once Judah, that is, a pressing and fervent desire for the good invisible ideas, is born, Rachel begins to burn with a desire for offspring, because she begins to desire to know. Where there is love, there is an eye (*ubi amor, ibi oculus*); we gladly look upon the one we greatly love. Nobody doubts that the one who has been able to love the good invisible ideas wants to gain knowledge

immediately, and to see by means of the intelligence. The more Judah, that is, the affect of loving, increases, the more a desire to give birth burns within Rachel, that is, a desire to know³⁹.

If Rachel represents knowledge in Richard's allegorical interpretation, then she is suffused and entwined with the desire of the affect in an important union. «Where there is love, there is an eye»: it is love which motivates and drives the eye to seek knowledge. Ultimately, love always leads to knowing (*cognoscere*) and to seeing through the intelligence (*per intelligentiam videre*). Again, it is the intelligence which is the peak and climax at the top of the contemplative ladder as Richard teaches, not love per se.

How different is the peak and climax of Thomas' contemplative ascent can be seen in this final text from the *Explanation of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, 5B, a quote which recalls Richard's teaching, only then to signal Thomas' interpretative rupture from the doctrines of Richard. Thomas begins with Richard's definition of contemplation before continuing with his own views:

Contemplation is the free sharp-sightedness of the mind hung poised with admiration over the spectacles of wisdom. Now this is intellectual contemplation. But there is another more-than-intellectual and affective contemplation in which is perfected the portion of Mary after all intellectual operations have been abandoned⁴⁰.

Thomas must have been thinking of his divergence from Richard here, despite claiming that it was Richard who founded the new art of contemplating based on the affect. The adversative conjunction 'but' (*sed*) marks the point where Thomas, after quoting Richard, enunciates his own new science or skill – one indeed which is truly a new science, one based on the affect after the abandonment of intellectual operations⁴¹.

39. RICHARDUS DE SANCTO VICTORE, *Les douze patriarches ou Benjamin minor*, J. Châtillon, M. Duchet-Suchaux (eds.), p. 126; cfr. PL 196, col. 10.

40. THOMAS GALLUS, *Explanatio in libros Dionysii*, p. 907.

41. *Ibidem*, p. 907.

Thomas' affective Dionysian revolution⁴² was bold and must have been noticed even by his contemporaries. Even after Thomas, as seen in the writings of the Pseudo-Thomas Gallus, there was an unwillingness to embrace this revolutionary and radical idea of Thomas Gallus. Pseudo-Thomas takes the teaching and language of Thomas Gallus (sometimes literally quoting Thomas), but re-aligns it with Richard's central teaching on the primacy of the intelligence, or what Pseudo-Thomas characteristically calls the God-formed intelligence or soul (*Deiformis anima*). As the Pseudo-Thomas states:

For the greater and more fervent the extension of our deiform state to the ray becomes, the fuller is the outpouring of that very ray into the Cherub of our mind⁴³.

Yes, love and fervour can assist the intellect in approaching close to a knowledge of God. Yet it is ultimately the Cherub of the mind (the intelligence) which is bathed in the divine ray, not the Seraph (the affect). While Thomas' ideas on the primacy of love went on to influence a host of (anti-intellectualist) movements, what we see in the Pseudo-Thomas is a re-alignment of Thomas Gallus' ideas and language with the Victorine tradition represented by Richard⁴⁴.

42. For this affective turn in Thomas' thought, see D. LAWELL, *The Medieval Assimilation of Dionysian Mysticism*, in D. POIREL (éd.), *Existe-t-il une mystique au Moyen Âge?*, Brepols, Turnhout 2021, and D. LAWELL, *Ecstasy and the Intellectual Dionysianism of Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great*, in J. McEVROY, M. DUNNE, J. HYNES (eds.), *Thomas Aquinas: Ideas, Probings and Questionings*, Four Courts Press, Dublin 2011.

43. PSEUDO-THOMAS GALLUS, *Super librum de Mistica Theologia. Prologus*, Siena, Biblioteca degli intronati, U.V.6, f. 265v.

44. I am currently editing and translating three texts of Pseudo-Thomas (including his *Exposition of the Mystical Theology*, previously unedited) for Brepols Library of Christian Sources. See also J. BARBET, *Un commentaire vercellien du Cantique des cantiques: Deiformis anime gemitus*, Brepols, Turnhout 2005 (Sous la Règle de saint Augustin, 10).

4. Conclusion

The Victorine authors, Richard of St. Victor and Thomas Gallus of Vercelli, have a remarkable affinity of views on the intellectual level. Thomas essentially borrows (openly) Richard's teaching on contemplation. His reflections on the divine ideas and especially the ideas of the persons of the Trinity are clearly indebted to Richard. There is however a wide difference in their ultimate views on the highest medium for accessing knowledge of the divine ideas: for Richard, *intelligentia* is always the peak of contemplation, whereas for Thomas it is the principal affect or *synderesis* which is superior to the intellect. Neither Richard nor Thomas deals with the divine ideas in a systematic way. Richard's ideas emerge in a special way in *De Trinitate* and also as he writes about contemplation in his other works, with a restricted lexical field (mostly concerned with the divine *invisibilia*). On the other hand, Thomas' reading of Eriugena and Dionysius expanded his lexicon, and he talks interchangeably of the divine ideas as exemplars, archetypes, spectacles, images, theories, and so on. The Dionysian treatment of the divine ideas e.g. of being, goodness, etc. means necessarily that Thomas deals with each of the ideas as well, given that he is a commentator on the Areopagite.

Only One Exemplary Form. The *Summa de bono* and Its Sources

MAGDALENA BIENIAK*

1. Introduction

There are many good reasons to look for the sources of the early Franciscan school in the *Summa de bono* (1225–1228). The main work by Philip the Chancellor introduced some important novelties to the Latin West. Inspired by Avicenna's and Avicbron's philosophy, Philip was the forerunner of the theory of the plurality of substantial forms, later characteristic of the Franciscan school¹. Combining elements from Boethius's *De Hebdomadibus*, Avicenna's *Metaphysics*, and Aristotle's *Categories*, he created the first fully developed treatise on the transcendentals (*communissima*), which was then extensively used by the authors of the *Summa Halensis* and other Franciscans². To these examples, I would like to add today an interesting case, where the *Summa de bono* and *Summa Halensis* share the same view, but the direct impact of the Chancellor on the Franciscan authors is difficult to prove because the theory can already be found in earlier authors. Philip discusses the question of whether there are many exemplary forms or just one and con-

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Cfr. R. ZAVALLONI, *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes*, Éditions de l'Institut supérieur de philosophie, Louvain 1951, pp. 397-409; N. WICKI, *Die Philosophie Philipps der Kanzler*, Academic Press Fribourg, Freiburg 2005 (Dokimion, 29), p. 123.

2. Cfr. J. AERTSEN, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez*, Brill, Leiden 2012, pp. 25-48.

cludes that the latter is the case. A very similar formulation of the problem can be found in the *Summa Halensis*. My aim is to highlight some noteworthy aspects of this discussion and trace them back to Philip's sources³.

2. The *Summa de bono* on the Exemplary Form

The section «On the goodness of nature» (*De bono nature*), which is the first major unit of the *Summa de bono* following the famous treatise on the transcendentals, contains a *quaestio* on the exemplary cause⁴. Philip discusses a number of issues: first, whether the formal and the exemplary cause are one and the same thing; second, whether the exemplary cause is eternal and its effect (i.e. the world) is eternal; finally, whether there are many exemplary causes. The answer to the last query is plainly negative. Interestingly, the one who is explicitly accused of sustaining the plurality of the exemplary causes is not Plato but Augustine⁵, despite some clear references to Plato's *Timaeus* in Philip's chapter⁶. Most probably, Philip was aware that the theory of the eternal forms was well rooted in the Christian tradition⁷. Also, there may have been quite

3. Among the most recent and most interesting discussions of this problem, see above all G. TAVOLARO, *Scientia, potentia e voluntas Dei nella "Lectura super primum Sententiarum" di Giacomo da Viterbo*, PhD Dissertation, Università di Salerno – École Pratique des Hautes Études, Salerno-Paris 2016, pp. 109-125.

4. Cfr. PHILIPPUS CANCELLARIUS, *Summa de bono*, N. Wicki (ed.), Editiones Francke, Bern 1985, *pars* «De bono nature», I, q. 5, I, pp. 54-56.

5. Cfr. *Ibidem*, p. 56; AUGUSTINUS HIPONENSIS, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, A. Mutzenbecher (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1975 (CCSL 44A), q. 46, 2, pp. 71-72.

6. *Ibidem*, p. 54.

7. On the medieval theories of exemplary forms before the thirteenth century, see for example M.J. HOENEN, *Propter dicta Augustini. Die metaphysische Bedeutung der mittelalterlichen Ideenlehre*, «Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales» 64 (1997), pp. 245-262: 245-247, and the literature quoted there, in particular M. FATTORI, M. BIANCHI (a cura di), *Idea. VI Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo (Roma, 5-7 gennaio 1989)*, Edizioni dell'Ateneo, Roma 1990, and H. MEINHARDT *et alii*, *Idee*, in J. RITTER, K. GRÜNDER (Hrsg.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Schwabe, Basel 1976, IV, pp. 62-93.

a contingent reason why he refrained from attributing the plurality of the exemplary forms to Plato. As will be shown towards the end of this chapter, Philip's account may have depended on how Peter Lombard referred to the theory of the exemplary forms in his *Sententiae*. Nevertheless, the decisive shift in the conception of the exemplary forms was brought about only after Peter Lombard, through the use of semantic tools that were characteristic of the second half of the twelfth century. Let us examine first the core elements of Philip's position.

To begin with, Philip makes it clear that the exemplary cause is the kind of a formal cause that is separate from the created things (*ex toto est extra*), unlike the substantial forms, such as soul, or the forms that are grasped by reason. Thus, «the exemplary cause» stands for the Platonic idea or form⁸. Philip agrees with Plato that the exemplary form is eternal but, contrary to what he believes to be Plato's stance, he denies that it is separate from God. The eternal idea is identical to God's essence⁹.

From a strictly Platonic perspective, it may be surprising that Philip continuously speaks of the exemplary form instead of forms. Yet his position is a direct consequence of identifying the eternal form with God. God's essence is perfectly simple, so it cannot involve any plurality. However, it remains to be explained why Augustine speaks of multiple eternal forms. As Philip duly notes, Augustine makes a double connection: on the one hand, he situates the eternal forms in God himself; on the other hand, he bears in

8. PHILIPPUS CANCELLARIUS, *Summa de bono*, I, p. 54: «Querendum est de illo principio quod est positum a Platone exemplar, ad quod genus cause reducat. Respondeo quod intentio cause formalis quandoque appropriatur, quandoque communiter accipitur; appropriatur cum dicitur causa formalis que quid est esse, ut anima hominis; communiter accipitur cum in se continet formam que est pars rei et formam secundum rationem et formam exemplarem que simpliciter est extra. Prima vero est intra, media quodam modo intra et quodam modo extra, ultima ex toto est extra».

9. *Ibidem*, p. 55: «Respondeo quod in eandem essentiam incidunt efficiens et exemplaris, quod non accidit in causis posterioribus. Unde non sunt ponende due cause ab eterno. Et in hoc videtur Plato recedere a veritate, cum diceret ydeam non esse idem cum prima».

mind the relationship between the separate forms and things that participate in them. This duality enables Philip to explain the semantic properties of the term *idea*. The noun points primarily to God's essence (*est dictum secundum essentiam*) and is applied especially to the second person of the Trinity, namely to the Son (*appropriatur Filio*). Next, Philip alludes to God's knowledge, which is identical to the divine essence. God's knowledge is absolutely simple. Everything God knows, he knows it through the *Verbum* and in the *Verbum* (the Son), who is the eternal exemplary form¹⁰. He knows all the things – the past, the present, and the future – but does not receive hence any plurality, because the simplicity of God's knowledge depends on the unicity of the essence, not on the multiplicity of the creatures. Nevertheless, since the exemplary form is the model of all the created things, one may use the term in the plural, as did Augustine, who apparently had in mind the fact that the essence of the eternal form somehow contains all the things that participate in it¹¹.

Philip's textual hermeneutics builds on three different semantic functions of the term *idea*. First, he indicates the primary meaning of the term, which is God's essence. Second, he points to the specific application of the term, namely the *appropriatio* (*appropriatur*

10. Cfr. *Ibidem*, p. 84: «Recte autem dico eos dicere quod Primum est ydea eque unius ut multorum, non coartata ad aliquid. Unde Primum intelligendo se intelligit omnia et secundum quandam indifferentiam, secundum quod unum sunt in ipso et in se causa indifferentia, et nichilominus secundum differentiam unius ad alterum in propria natura. [...] Id autem quo cognoscitur in Verbo est ydea que est eadem cum Verbo...».

11. *Ibidem*, p. 56: «De ydeis autem queritur propter quoddam verbum Augustini in XLIII questione libri De LXXXIII questionibus ubi dicit: "Rationes vel ydee que eterne sunt et incommutabiles, quarum participatione fit ut sit quicquid est, quoquo modo est, absit ut ponantur nisi in Deo et ut a rebus ipsis accipiantur". Ex quo videtur quod multe sunt ydee, cum multitudo sit ydeatorum. Quod autem non sit multitudo ydearum, sumitur ex hoc quod omnimoda simplicitas est in ipso secundum essentiam. Esse vero ydeam est dictum secundum essentiam, licet approprietur Filio. Ergo omnimoda simplicitas erit ydee, quod concedendum; se ipso enim omnia cognoscit. Multitudo autem in intentione nominis non est nisi propter multitudinem ydeatorum in suo esse. Et non est simile de exemplaribus que accipiuntur a rebus; illa enim numerantur secundum res».

Filio). In general, this second function was used above all to distinguish the personal notions and the persons of Trinity from the essence. Finally, he speaks of the *intentio nominis – multitudo in intentione nominis*. The reference to plurality is conveyed by the latter semantic function of the term *idea*. The interpretation of Philip's theory of the exemplary form(s) largely depends on the understanding of his use of the *intentio nominis*.

The term *intentio* is omnipresent in Philip's *Summa*. In his studies on the transcendentals, Jan A. Aertsen traced it back to Avicenna¹². Indeed, Philip's dependence on Avicenna is visible in a number of contexts, thus another instance of this kind of inspiration would not be surprising¹³. Now, according to Deborah L. Black, in the Latin version of Ibn Sina's *Metaphysics*, the noun *intentio* is the rendering of the Arabic term *ma'nā*, which «literally means “meaning” or “thought”—as expressed in phrases such as “by x I mean y”», and its main features are «the object-directedness and mental existence»¹⁴. In many passages of the *Summa de bono*, Philip avails himself of the term in a way that fits this description very well. In other cases, however, the situation seems to be more complex. Hence, the origin of Philip's usage of the term is worth re-examining.

The *Summa de bono* contains an explicit definition of *intentio* in a cognitive context, yet the definition does not come from Avicenna but from John of Damascus: «...primus motus [mentalis] dicitur intelligentia; que autem circa aliquid est intelligentia intentio vocatur...»¹⁵. What distinguishes *intentio* from other mental acts is

12. J. AERTSEN, *The Beginning of the Doctrine of the Transcendentals in Philip the Chancellor* (ca. 1230), «*Mediaevalia, Textos e Estudos*» 7-8 (1995), pp. 269-286.

13. Cfr. D.N. HASSE, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy*, Warburg Institute, London 2000, 46-49; M. BIENIAK, *The Soul-Body Problem at Paris, ca. 1200-1250. Hugh of St-Cher and His Contemporaries*, Leuven University Press, Leuven 2010 (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, 42), pp. 16-19; M. LENZI, *Anima, forma e sostanza: filosofia e teologia nel dibattito antropologico del XIII secolo*, CISAM, Spoleto 2011, pp. 115-121.

14. D.L. BLACK, *Intentionality in Medieval Arabic Philosophy*, «*Quaestio. Journal of the History of Metaphysics*» 10 (2010), pp. 65-81: 65-69.

15. PHILIPPUS, *Summa de bono*, I, p. 159; IOHANNES DAMASCENUS, *De fide orthodoxa. Translatio Burgundionis*, cap. 36, E.M. Buytaert (ed.), Franciscan Institute Publications, Louvain-New York 1955, pp. 134-135.

its being *circa aliquid*, thus its “object-directedness”. This feature harmonizes well not only with the Avicennian use of the term, but also with the etymological approach, which was characteristic of the 12th-century understanding of *intentio* as derived from *in aliud tentio*. In that period, the term appears frequently in the moral context, and its meaning can be seen, for instance, from Peter the Chanter’s *Summa de sacramentis*: «Intentio complectitur hec duo, finem et uoluntatem. [...] Intentio dicitur quasi *in aliud tentio*»¹⁶. The same etymology can be found not only in Peter’s followers – e.g. Stephen Langton¹⁷ – but also in Duns Scotus, who explicitly distinguished the etymological understanding of the term from its logical meaning conveyed by the Arabic tradition¹⁸. Thus, it can be safely assumed that, for the Latin early thirteenth-century authors, the quite versatile concept of *intentio* involved above all being directed or pointed at something, independently of the context in which the term was used. This is the general meaning in which Avicenna, John of Damascus, and the Latin tradition could meet.

The variety of ways Philip uses the term *intentio* suggests that it may be difficult to narrow its definition any further, that is, beyond the quite general function of pointing at something. Now, in the analysed passage, the term belongs to the phrase *intentio nominis*, which seems almost like a technical expression. The exact phrase appears in three different contexts in the *Summa*¹⁹. In all of these

16. PETRUS CANTOR, *Summa de sacramentis*, J.A. Dugauquier (ed.), Éditions Nauwelaerts, Leuven 1967, III, cap. 60, par. 364, III.2b, pp. 530–531.

17. Cfr. STEPHANUS LANGTON, *Quaestiones theologiae*, M. Bieniak, W. Wciórka (eds.), Oxford University Press – British Academy, Oxford 2021 (Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi, 36), III, q. 72.1, III.1, p. 277.

18. IOHANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Lectura*, Commissio Scotistica (ed.), Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, Città del Vaticano 1993 (Opera Omnia, 19), II, dist. 38, q. un., pp. 372–373: «De primo (praeter intentionis nomen de quo dictum est supra in isto II prout Avicenna et Averroes loquantur de intentione, et prout etiam dicitur intentio prima et secunda, et praeter hoc etiam quod aliqui ponunt differentiam secundum intentionem), nomen intentionis – ut ad propositum pertinet – est “in aliud tentio”; unde intendere est “in aliud tendere”». Cfr. K. GYEKYE, *The Terms “Prima Intentio” and “Secunda Intentio” in Arabic Logic*, «Speculum» 46, 1 (1971), pp. 32–38.

19. PHILIPPUS, *Summa de bono*, I, p. 172: «Potest autem queri propter quid, si est una potentia omnino simplex sicut ratio aut voluntas, non nominatur una inten-

cases, it refers to something to which the name in question (*nomen*) points, yet the term does not stand for what it means but rather for itself. In particular, Philip uses the expression *intentio nominis* when he explains the rationale behind some grammatical aspect of the term or its etymology. If that is what happens in our passage, then the expression *multitudo in intentione nominis* simply points to the grammatical plural of the term *ideae*; indeed, Philip's aim is to explain the reason why Augustine chooses this particular grammatical form.

Philip's explanation builds thus on semantics and grammar. In this respect, his approach is reminiscent of the theological speculations from the second half of the 12th century. This can also be seen from another short passage in the same question, where Philip hints at the semantics of the term *causa*. God is the eternal cause of the world. Yet the term *causa* involves the created world, which is not eternal. The difficulty is solved by distinguishing the primary meaning of the term, which points to God's essence, from the secondary meaning, that is to say the *connotatio*. If one took the essence of the cause jointly with the *connotatum* (i.e. the effect), then the eternity of the cause would be attributed to the effect as well, and it would be possible to say that the world is eternal²⁰. Obviously, however, such a statement would be largely improper and contrary to the usual way of speaking found in the Christian tradition. By the same token, it seems that Philip considers the use of the plural *ideae* justifiable but divergent from the primary se-

tione nominis simplici, sed multis intentionibus cum dicitur liberum arbitrium»; II, pp. 754-755: «Ad quod dicendum quod cardinales dicuntur triplici ratione. Una sumitur a conditionibus, alia ab intentione nominis, tertia ab actibus. [...] Secunda ab intentione nominis, quod est cardinalis. Cardinales enim dicuntur a cardine, cardo autem per quod volvitur hostium. Duo autem sunt per que fit ingressus ad vitam, operationes et passiones».

20. PHILIPPUS, *Summa de bono*, I, pp. 55-56: «Obiciunt autem sic ad eternitatem mundi ostendendam. Deus ab eterno fuit volens, sciens et patens. Sed velle, scire et posse sunt causa sufficiens et maxime cum ipsi voluntati divine et potestati nichil possit resistere. Erit ergo mundus ab eterno. Respondeo quod hoc verum est, si accipiatur essentia cause cum connotato. Unde si hic dicatur: Deus ab eterno voluit et potuit et scivit facere mundum ab eterno esse, ergo mundus ab eterno fuit, teneret recte; sed quia ab etemo voluit tunc mundum fieri, ideo tunc factus est».

semantic functions of the term, that is, its meaning (God's essence) and *appropriation* (the Son). Properly speaking, there is only one exemplary form (*idea*).

3. The *Summa Halensis* on the Exemplary Form

The distinction between the primary and secondary meaning of the term becomes essential to the discussion on the exemplary form, found in the *Summa Halensis*. The Franciscan authors argue in favour of the unicity of the eternal exemplary form by distinguishing the principal meaning of the term *idea* from the secondary one. According to the direct, primary significate, the noun *idea* means the divine essence, which is perfectly simple and one. Thus, the primary significate of the term does not permit any plurality. By contrast, the secondary meaning (*connotatio*) of the term indicates the relationship between the divine exemplar and the creatures²¹. Hence, Augustine uses the plural *ideae* because he indirectly refers to the multiple images of the unique exemplary form, which is God. Yet just as the plurality within the *connotatum* does not modify the singular of the principal meaning of the term, so from the plurality of the creatures does not follow the plurality of the eternal principles. Hence, there is only one *exemplar* of everything. In the cognitive context, the distinction between the primary and the secondary meaning leads the authors of the *Summa Halensis* to distinguish between the terms *exemplar* and *ideae*. Even though the basic meaning of these terms is the same, they point to different aspects of God's cognition: while the term *exemplar* indicates

21. *Summa Fratris Alexandri (Summa Halensis)*, PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae (edd.), Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Firenze 1924, pars 1, inq. 1, tr. 3, q. 1, 2, cap. 4, n. 80, l. p. 131: «Dicendum quod (1) per ideam dicitur aliquid ut principale significatum in rectitudine: et hoc est divina essentia vel exemplar; (2) item per ideam dicitur aliquid connotatum in obliquitate: et hic est respectus ad creaturas. Nihil aliud ergo est dicere ideas plures quam exemplar plurium. Ex parte ergo (1) principalis significati non ponitur pluralitas, sed (2) ex parte connotati. Et propter hoc non sequitur quod plura ab aeterno, immo ex hoc sequitur quod unum sit exemplar omnium ab aeterno».

the knowing subject, the plural noun *ideae* alludes to the multiple objects known by God²². Nonetheless, the tension between the unicity and the multiplicity in God's causation and knowledge remains difficult to explain²³.

Essentially, Philip in the *Summa de bono* and the *Summa Halensis* sustain the unicity of the exemplary form. Since Philip's *Summa* is probably the direct source of the *Summa Halensis* in many other cases, it is natural to ask whether the Franciscan account of the unique exemplar depends on Philip's exposition. Although it cannot be excluded, the influence would be rather hard to prove because the same theory can be found in other important works written by theologians from earlier generations.

4. Alan of Lille and William of Auxerre

William of Auxerre uses the distinction between the primary and secondary meaning of the term *exemplar* to solve several problems discussed in his *Summa aurea*. The distinction enables him to explain how God knows the creatures²⁴, how multiple effects follow

22. *Summa Halensis*, pars 1, inq. 1, tr. 5, sect. 1, q. un., cap. 1, I, p. 258: «Respondeo quod licet sint idem secundum rem, tamen differentia est inter haec secundum nomen, quia ratio respicit finem, idea formam, exemplar efficientem, sapientia cognitionem, sicut ars operationem [...]. Respondeo quod licet idem sint secundum rem illa; in hoc tamen differunt secundum dictionis modum. Nam sapientia, exemplar et ars se tenent plus ex parte Dei cognoscentis, quod omnino est unum; ideo illa non recipiunt pluralitatem, ut dicantur plura exemplaria, plures sapientiae, plures artes; ratio vero et idea ex parte rei cognitae: et propter hoc, sicut res cognitae plures, ita et *ideae*».

23. The *Summa Halensis* tries to solve this difficulty using some analogies, for example, by comparing the exemplary form to a geometrical point from which many straight lines stem. For a further discussion of this issue, *ibidem*, pars 1, inq. 1, tr. 5, sect. 1, q. un., cap. 1, I, p. 259. Cfr. MEINHARDT *et alii*, *Idee*, p. 86; CH. CULLEN, *Alexander of Hales*, in H. LAGERLUND (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, Springer, Dordrecht 2011, I, p. 63.

24. GUILLELMUS ALTISSIODORENSIS, *Summa aurea*, J. Ribaillier (ed.), Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas Grottaferrata, Roma 1982, I, tr. 9, cap. 1, I, pp. 177-178.

from one simple cause²⁵, and in what sense God – and the Son of God in particular – is the archetypal world. Whatever is said of God, significates God's essence. William considers a number of verbs, adjectives, and nouns: *scit*, *iustus*, *mansuetus*, *ydee*, *mundus architipus*, etc. All these terms mean "God". Yet apart from this basic meaning, the terms have also secondary aspects, such as *connotatio*, *modus significandi*, *tropus loquendi*. These secondary semantic functions make it possible to speak of any kind of relations between God and creatures. So, for example, when one says that God knows the creatures, the term "knows" (*scit*) signifies the divine essence and secondarily signifies (*connotat*) the created images of that essence²⁶. When one says that God is just or clement, the adjectives signify the same thing, namely God's essence, but their *modi significandi* differ because they refer to different effects of God's creating power²⁷. By the same token, according to William, the «exemplary world» refers to the Son of God in the primary sense but secondarily signifies (*connotat*) the effect that the divine essence has in the creatures²⁸. Finally, when one says that «God is diverse forms», the latter expression primarily signifies God's essence but refers to various effects of God's power according to a different *tropus loquendi*²⁹.

The semantic distinctions allow William to justify Augustine's use of the plural regarding the eternal forms. Interestingly, however, he believes that this strategy is insufficient to explain how the plurality of forms exists in the simple essence of God. The secondary

25. *Ibidem*, cap. 3, II, pp. 27-30.

26. *Ibidem*, cap. 1, I, pp. 177-178.

27. *Ibidem*, cap. 3, II, pp. 29-30.

28. *Ibidem*, cap. 2, II, p. 16: «Et dicimus quod iste terminus "mundus architipus" sive "exemplar" connotat preter Filium Dei vel preter divinam essentiam exemplaritatem in creaturis, et hoc est ex modo significandi, nec oportet quod ista exemplaritas ab eterno fuerit, quoniam etiam in creaturis prius naturaliter est exemplar quam exemplum. [...] Filium ergo Dei esse mundum architipum nil aliud est quam ipsum esse ydeam vel ymaginem rerum».

29. *Ibidem*, p. 17: «Deus est diverse ydee sub diverso tropo loquendi, quo dicitur in libro Sapientie, quod Spiritus Sanctus est multiplex [...]; hoc enim dicitur propter diversos effectus, sive propter potentiam qua potens est ex se producere infinitos effectus; in se tamen Deus simplicissimus est et invariabilis. [...] Cum enim dicuntur diverse ydee, diversitas non notatur in exemplari sed in exemplatis».

significate (*connotatio*) says something about the creatures, not about God. No diversity can be predicated of God's essence whether primarily or secondarily³⁰. The secondary meaning of the term *ideae* says something about the effects of God's power but does not say anything about God himself. The problem is then how to explain the generic and specific differences among the creatures given that these differences are supposed to derive from distinct eternal forms. To William's mind, it would be absurd to assume that, in the exemplary world, the idea of a human being is identical to the idea of a donkey. And yet if the archetypal world is God's essence, then there seems to be no room left for any distinction between the ideas. William gives up and offers no solution to this problem. He simply affirms that, in God, the exemplary forms are at the same time one and distinct. In the present state, the human intelligence stands no chance of understanding this³¹.

The exegetical strategy built on semantics is common to all the three works analysed thus far. However, unlike Philip and Alexander after him, William does not focus on denying the plurality of exemplary forms but rather on showing that God is identical to what Augustin and Plato called «the diverse ideas». This put him in a better position when confronting Augustine's text but led him to a metaphysical impasse. Perhaps to avoid the same problem, Philip and Alexander consistently avoid the plural, thus implicitly distancing themselves from Augustine's authority. The dilemma was already perceived by a previous author – Alan of Lille (d. 1202) – whose thought was probably well known to William³².

Among other *auctoritates*, Alan brings up the same quotation from Augustine's *Quaestiones* that was later at the centre of Philip's discussion. Alan finds Augustine's defence of the plurality of ideas

30. GUILLELMUS, *Summa aurea*, II, tr. 1, cap. 3, II, p. 30.

31. *Ibidem*, II, tr. 1, cap. 2, II, pp. 17-18: «Dicimus quod, licet omnia sint unum in Deo, tamen in se omnia sunt diversa et ut distincta; nec valet hec argumentatio: omnia sunt in Deo unum, ergo non sunt in Deo distincta, quoniam ipse secundum idem causa est omnium et secundum commune esse plurimum et secundum discreta esse. Unde non est mirum si in eo sint res et discrete et distincte; hec autem re vera supra intelligentiam humanam sunt quantum ad presentem statum».

32. Cfr. the note below.

so problematic that he doubts whether Augustine truly meant what he said: either he was only quoting someone else's opinion, or he later revoked it in the *Retractationes*. This is the first solution proposed by Alan. As an alternative, he proposes to read the plural of the term *ideae* in the same way as one interprets the plural noun *scientiae*. In Latin, one can say to have various *scientiae* – literally “knowledges” or “skills” – by virtue of diverse objects of knowledge; and yet, properly speaking, there is only one knowledge. By the same token, there is only one eternal exemplary form, that is to say, the divine wisdom, which contains the knowledge of everything since eternity; nevertheless, one may refer to diverse images of the eternal *exemplar* and say that there are diverse exemplary forms³³. In his discussion, Alan does not distinguish the secondary meaning of the term from the primary one. Nevertheless, his text suggests that it is improper to use the plural of the noun *idea* or *exemplar*.

Almost certainly, Alan was not the only theologian from his generation to refuse the plurality of the ideas³⁴. What is interesting,

33. ALANUS AB INSULIS, *Summa “Quoniam homines”*, P. GLORIEUX (ed.), *La somme Quoniam homines d’Alain de Lille*, «Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen-Âge» 20 (1953), q. 5a-b, pp. 127-128: «Vel sicut aliquis dicitur habere tres diversas scientias propter diversitatem scitorum, ita dicere diversas formas fuisse ab eterno propter unum et eternum exemplar quod est sapientia Dei ad quam producta sunt omnia et in qua omnia fuerunt ab eterno per prescientiam; ut pluralitas non referatur ad diversitatem exemplarum sed ad diversitatem exemplarum, non ad diversitatem formarum sed ad diversitatem formatorum». A very similar wording can be later found in one of the passages of William’s *Summa aurea* on the same issue (I, tr. 1, cap. 2, l. 17): «Unde patet quod illa argumentatio non valet: diverse ydee sunt mundus architipus, et in Deo nulla est diversitas; ergo Deus non est mundus architipus. Cum enim dicuntur diverse ydee, diversitas non notatur in exemplari sed in exemplatis».

34. A Victorine theologian from roughly the same period (Richard of St. Victor?) affirmed very clearly that everything in God is God himself, and refused the plurality of the exemplary forms on that basis. Cfr. PS.-HUGO DE SANCTO VICTORE, *Allegoriae in Novum Testamentum* V, pars 7, cap. 2, PL 175, 834D. The work contains portions of Richard of Saint Victor’s *Liber exceptionum* (cfr. <<http://www.mirabileweb.it/title/liber-exceptionum-title/2339>>, in *Mirabile. Archivio digitale della cultura medievale*, accessed: 3/06/2022), but the passage in question was not included in the critical edition; Cfr. RICHARDUS DE SANCTO VICTORE, *Liber exceptionum*, J. Châtillon (ed.), Vrin, Paris 1958 (*Textes philosophiques du Moyen Âge*, 5).

though, is that Alan is commonly associated with the Porretans, and thus with the intellectual heredity of the so-called school of Chartres³⁵. The plurality of ideas was a truism among the Chartrians³⁶, as can be seen from the works of Gilbert of Poitiers³⁷, William of Conches, Bernard³⁸ and Thierry of Chartres³⁹. Thus, Alan's discussion is a clear sign of a paradigm shift. From that moment on, the plurality of exemplary forms will be a foreign ground, regardless of the previous philosophical tradition and the Platonic fascinations of the Church Fathers.

5. Peter Lombard and Calcidius

From *Summa de bono* and the *Summa Halensis*, works written in the first half of the thirteenth century, we have travelled back to the twelfth century authors, namely to Alan of Lille and the school of Chartres. The obvious background behind the whole discussion is Calcidius's Commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*⁴⁰. This is where

35. Cfr. J. MARENBO, *A Note on the Porretani*, in P. DRONKE, *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988, pp. 354-355; L. VALENTE, *Logique et théologie. Les écoles parisiennes entre 1150 et 1220*, Vrin, Paris 2008, pp. 27-28, and the bibliography quoted there.

36. Cfr. MEINHARDT *et alii*, *Idee*, pp. 77-80.

37. Cfr. GILBERTUS PICTAVIENSIS, *Expositio in Boecii De Trinitate*, in N.M. HÄRING (ed.), *The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers*, PIMS, Toronto 1966, I, cap. 2, pp. 99-100.

38. For example, cfr. the texts collected and quoted by I. CAIAZZO, *La materia nei commenti al Timeo del secolo XII*, «Quaestio. Annuario di storia della metafisica» 7 (2007), pp. 245-264: 254-259.

39. Cfr. THEODORICUS CARNOTENSIS, *Lectiones in Boethii librum De Trinitate*, in N.M. HÄRING (ed.), *Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and his School*, PIMS, Toronto 1971 (Studies and Texts, 20), II, 42-44, pp. 168-169: «Dicitur autem prima forma que est diuinitas forma formarum quia est generatiua formarum. Mens etenim diuina generat et concipit intra se formas i.e. naturas rerum que a philosophis uocantur ydee. Unde diuinitas nichil aliud est quam ipsa mens diuina que est generatiua ydearum. Concipit enim et tenet eas intra se [...]».

40. On Calcidius's theory of the exemplary forms, see in particular G. REYDAMS-SCHILS, *Calcidius on Plato's Timaeus Greek Philosophy, Latin Reception, and Christian Contexts*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2020, pp. 91 and 133-134.

such authors as Gilbert of Poitiers or Thierry of Chartres found the Platonic account of the eternal forms. How well was that text known to the later generations of theologians? Whatever the answer to that question may be, they certainly could find quotations from Calcidius in Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*⁴¹. Also, it is Peter Lombard who remarks that Augustine spoke of many primordial causes in God. The Lombard explains that the plural is due to different created effects. At least explicitly, he does not argue against the plurality of the exemplary forms but affirms that the primordial causes in God are subordinated to the principal cause, which is God's power and will⁴². What may be significant to our debate is how Peter quotes Calcidius's *Commentary* on Plato's *Timaeus*. He chooses a well-known passage, where Calcidius affirms that there are three primordial causes: God, matter, and the exemplary form⁴³. Unlike elsewhere in his *Commentary*, Calcidius used here the singular form of the term *exemplar*. As a result, the picture that emerges from Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* is the following: Plato spoke of only one *idea*, while Augustine spoke of many. It would be quite a paradox if this were the reason why Philip the Chancellor attributed the plurality of exemplary forms to Augustine rather than to Plato.

6. Conclusion

To conclude, the discussion on the plurality of the exemplary forms was a mostly exegetical one. At stake were the *auctoritates* of Augustine and, probably, of many other Christian thinkers, who used the noun *ideae* in the plural. At least since Alan of Lille, the theologians agreed that God was the unique, simple exemplary form, through which and by which all the things were created and

41. Cfr. PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas (edd.), Grottaferrata, Roma 1971 (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4), II, d. 1, cap. 1, n. 2, I, p. 330.

42. *Ibidem*, d. 18, cap. 5, I, p. 418.

43. *Ibidem*, d. 1, cap. 1, n. 2, I, p. 330; CALCIDIUS, *Commentarius in Platonis Timaeum*, J.H. Waszink (ed.), Warburg-London, Brill-Leiden 1975 (Plato latinus, 4), pars 2, cap. 307, p. 309: «Sunt igitur initia deus et silua et exemplum».

known. Hence, the patristic use of the plural was an inconvenience that had to be dealt with. The remedy consisted in semantic distinctions, such as *connotatio*, *modus significandi*, and *intentio nominis*: according to the primary sense of the term, “the exemplary form” was only *one*, but pointed to *many* through its collateral meaning. It seems that, at least in the debate on the plurality of the exemplary forms, the twelfth-century way out, which built on semantics and grammar, was still very useful to the thirteenth-century authors: William of Auxerre, Philip the Chancellor, and the Franciscan authors of the *Summa Halensis*.

The Divine Ideas in the Early Franciscan School at Paris (c. 1220-50)

LYDIA SCHUMACHER*

The doctrine of divine ideas, particularly as presented by early Franciscans at Paris, has often been described as one of the hallmarks of the school's Augustinianism. In my paper, I would like to revisit the arguments of some key members of this school. In particular, I will look at the *Gloss* of Alexander of Hales, which was written between 1221-27, the disputed questions he wrote before he became a friar in 1236, and the *Summa Halensis* which he oversaw between 1236-45, but whose section on the divine ideas was probably written by his chief collaborator John of La Rochelle on the basis of Alexander's questions. I will further examine how the *Summa's* account was elaborated in the *Sentences* commentary of Odo Rigaldus who represents a bridge between first and second generation Franciscans like Bonaventure. Odo completed this work before 1245 and produced his own series of disputed questions between 1245-58, in which he advocates a position similar to the one Alexander originally defended in his *Gloss*. In light of the content of the debates and the variety of positions presented, I will reflect at the end of this chapter on the common historiographical notion that the early Franciscan doctrine of divine ideas is fundamentally "Augustinian", calling attention to more likely sources of inspiration behind early Franciscan thought, not least, Francis.

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1. Alexander of Hales and the *Summa Halensis* on Divine Ideas

In an important article on the divine ideas in Alexander, Odo, and Richard Rufus, which has been an important source for this paper, Rega Wood points out that Alexander affirms the existence of many divine ideas in his Gloss on Lombard's *Sentences*¹. To reconcile this claim with the unity of God, he distinguishes between the wisdom of God, the 'rationes' or reasons, and the divine ideas, which correspond to the efficient, final and formal causes of things, respectively. On the grounds that these causes are ultimately one, Alexander concludes that the wisdom, reasons, and ideas in God differ only in name and not in what they are or in that to which they refer². In this regard, Alexander elaborates that the wisdom of God relates to his status as a single knower and thus is entirely one.

However, the divine ideas correlate to the objects which are many, such that the ideas themselves are fundamentally many. As Augustine had argued in his *De ideis*, so Alexander affirms that the idea for a horse cannot be the same as for a man³. Rather «individual things are created in accord with [ideas] unique to them... [which] must be thought to exist nowhere but in the very mind

1. In memory of Professor Mark A. McIntosh (1960-2021), Professor of Christian Spirituality at Loyola University Chicago and author of *The Divine Ideas Tradition in Christian Mystical Theology* (Oxford University Press, 2021).

ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Glossa in I Sententiarum*, PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae (edd.), Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Firenze 1951, d. 36, pp. 356-63. See also R. Wood, *Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solitude: Alexander of Hales, Richard Rufus, and Odo Rigaldus*, «Franciscan Studies» 53 (1993), pp. 7-46: 9.

2. *Ibidem*, d. 36, p. 357: «Differunt autem haec tria secundum nomen, quoniam ratio respicit finem, idea respicit formam, sapientia efficientem cognoscentem. Et quia unum et idem est secundum rem causa exemplaris et finis et causa cognoscens, unum et idem secundum rem est sapientia et idea et ratio».

3. *Ibidem*, p. 358: Alexander cites Augustine's 83 *Quaestionibus* (*De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, A. Mutzenbecher [ed.], Brepols, Turnhout 1975 [CCSL 44A], ch. 46, 2, pp. 71-73) «Non eadem ratione est equus creatus qua homo, sed singula propriis create sunt rationibus. Has autem rationes non est arbitrandum esse nisi in mente Conditoris». He quotes the same passage in *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*, PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas (edd.), 3 vols., Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Firenze 1960, II, q. 46, disp. 1, p. 797.

of the Creator»⁴. Likewise, the reasons or accounts of things are many, because every thing has its own proper end or purpose, which Alexander describes as the medium between a divine idea and its instantiation⁵.

In illustrating how the many divine reasons relate to God without compromising his unity, Alexander invokes an example from Pseudo-Dionysius, which had a long history in the Aristotelian commentary tradition⁶. He observes that a point which serves as the terminus for many lines remains one even though it simultaneously serves as the principle of those lines which it virtually encompasses. In much the same way, he affirms, the wisdom of God is one even though it can be expressed through many reasons⁷.

4. SAINT AUGUSTINE, *On the Ideas*, trans. D.L. Mosher, in ID., *Eighty-Three Different Questions*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington 2002, p. 81; cfr. p. 80: «The ideas are certain original and principal forms of things, i.e., reasons, fixed and unchangeable, which are not themselves formed and, being thus eternal and existing always in the same state, are contained in the Divine Intelligence. And though they themselves neither come into being nor pass away, nevertheless, everything which can come into being and pass away and everything which does come into being and pass away is said to be formed in accord with these ideas».

5. ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Glossa in I Sententiarum*, d. 36, p. 358: «Dicendum quod, licet secundum rem idem sint illa tria, in hoc tamen differunt secundum modum dicendi: nam sapientia nominat plus ex parte Dei cognoscentis, quod est omnino unum; ratio vero medium nominat; idea vero ex parte rei cognitae. Et ideo, sicut res cognitae sunt plures, ita ideae plures; et cum unaquaeque res habeat suum proprium finem, sunt rationes plures secundum quas fines determinantur. Propter respectum ergo ideae ad formam et rationis ad finem, cum sint formae rerum plures et fines plures, dicuntur ideae plures et rationes plures».

6. DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De divinis nominibus*, trans. THOMAS GALLUS, *Explanatio in libros Dionysii*, D. Lawell (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 2011 (CCCM, 223), c. 5, p. 342: «Et in centro (exemplificat de lineis in centro unitis) et omnes lineae circuli coexisterunt secundum unam, id est simplicem, unionem in centro, in quo omnes ille lineae terminantur et uniuntur et a quo omnes fluunt; et signum, id est centrum, in quo omnes lineae diriguntur sicut sagitte in signum, habet omnes lineas circuli dui unitas uniformiter, id est omnino indifferenter, in se ipso in cuius simplicitate omnes terminantur. Unitas dico et ad se invicem et ad unum suum principium, id est ipsum centrum a quo fluunt».

7. ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Glossa in I Sententiarum*, d. 36, p. 359: «Et est exemplum: punctus terminans plures lineas est unus punctus, sed dicitur plura prin-

As Rega Wood has already observed, Alexander changes his position in the *Disputed Questions* dated from before he became a friar⁸. He does this in the context of addressing a question that was earlier posed in distinction 37 of the first book of Lombard's *Sentences*, which considers the being of God in things⁹. This question takes its inspiration from Acts 17:28, which states «in him we live and move and have our being»¹⁰. In treating this question, Alexander cites the distinction which he now draws between reasons which pertain to final causality, ideas which are formal causes, and exemplars, which are that in the likeness of which things are made and therefore serve as the efficient or divine causes of things¹¹.

By contrast to the *Gloss*, Alexander here identifies the ideas rather than the reasons as the media between the divine essence and the creatures that are made. On his account, nothing can be a medium in itself but only in our understanding. On this basis, he claims that the divine ideas have qualities of both the divine being and the creatures that they reflect. On the part of creatures, they are many, but on the part of God, they are one. This interestingly is a claim Alexander had rejected previously in the *Gloss*, where he insists that the multiplicity of the divine ideas must be in God himself rather than derived from creatures, because the temporal cannot be a cause for the eternal¹².

Paradoxically, Alexander avoids contravening this rule in his *Disputed Questions* by denying what he had affirmed in the *Gloss*, namely, that there are many divine ideas which different creatures directly represent. Now, he argues instead that there is just one di-

cipia, cum sit plurium linearum principium. Hoc autem nomen 'ratio' nominat per modum principii; hoc nomen "sapientia" illud idem nominat, sed absolute».

8. WOOD, *Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solitude*, p. 10.

9. The *Sentences* of Lombard treat the being of things in God in book 1, distinction 36, and the being of God in things in distinction 37.

10. ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*, q. 46, pp. 783-811.

11. *Ibidem*, p. 787: «Exemplar, ratio, idea idem sunt in re, sed exemplar in quantum causa efficiens, idea in quantum formalis, ratio in quantum finalis».

12. *Id.*, *Glossa in I Sententiarum*, d. 36, p. 358: «Sed cum temporale non est causa aeterni»; *ibidem*, p. 359: «Plura sint ab aeterno, cum illae rationes, sunt aeternae, quemadmodum in eadem auctoritate habetur: "Rationes rerum sunt stabiles"».

vine idea which diverse beings indirectly signify or con-signify as Alexander puts it. In this case, the temporal is not the cause of the eternal precisely because the divine ideas are multiplied through their relationship with creaturely forms rather than through ideas that might subsist in the one God¹³.

According to Alexander, this is the view that Augustine advocated in *De Trinitate* VI.10.11 when he said that the divine art «is full of all rational living things, and all things are one in it»¹⁴. In affirming this, consequently, Alexander uses Augustine to argue for the opposite position that he had used Augustine's *De ideis* to argue for in his Gloss. Whereas Augustine had been invoked in that context to support a plurality of divine ideas, he is now invoked in the *Disputed Questions* to bolster Alexander's argument that there is just one divine idea which has a plurality of reasons or accounts or manifestations in creatures.

13. Id., *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*, q. 46, resp. 33, pp. 799-800: «Nota quod "ratio" respicit causam finalem: ratio enim est propter quam res est vel fit: "idea" formalem: idea autem est secundum quam inspicitur; "exemplar" vero est ad cuius similitudinem fit vel potest fieri. Dico ergo quod idea media est secundum ratio intelligentiae inter essentiam divinam et creaturam quam facit. Nihil autem est medium secundum rem. Et quia per modum medii est secundum intelligentiam, idea habet aliquem modum ex parte una, et aliquem ex parte altera. Ex parte creaturam habet quod sit "multae"; ex parte autem Dei, quod sit "una". Unde notandum quod non proprie dicitur "multae", ut multitudo quae est in illis exprimatur per dictionem significantem multitudinem, sed per dictionem consignantem multitudinem. Hoc patet ex verbis Augustini (*De Trinitate* VI, 11, 10): singulorum enim rationibus est plena ars illa. Et haec est ratio: quia ex parte Dei idea propinquius se tenet, unde magis ei convenit unitas quam pluralitas; unde, si proprie exprimatur illa pluralitas, debet exprimi per multitudinem "consignantem" et non "significantam". Unde haec est propria "ideae" haec autem minus propria "multae ideae". Dicendum ergo quod rationes sunt plures convertendo ad res, unum sunt convertendo ad Deum; unde, "ars plena est omnium rationum viventium, et omnes sunt unum in ea"».

14. Id., *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*, q. 46, p. 798: «Augustinus: Omnes in ea unum sunt, sicut ipsa unum de uno est, cum quo unum (ars plena est omnium rationum viventium, et omnes sunt unum in ea)». The correct quote from Augustine is «sapientis dei plena omnium rationum uiuentium incommutabilium, et omnes unum in ea sicut ipsa unum de uno cum quo unum»; cfr. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De Trinitate*, VI, 10, 11, W.J. Mountain, Fr. Glorie (edd.), Brepols, Turnhout 1968 (CCSL 50), p. 241, 10-24.

This pattern of using Augustine to argue for opposite positions is one I have found frequently recurring in Alexander's writings and also in the collaboratively authored *Summa Halensis*. As I have shown elsewhere, Alexander sometimes goes so far as to use the exact same passage from a work of Augustine to argue both for and against a particular position¹⁵. At an initial level, this method of citation should lead us to question the standard interpretation according to which the early Franciscan doctrine of divine ideas is basically 'Augustinian.' Later in this chapter, I will come back to this point, but for now I want to move on to another text probably though not certainly by Alexander which discusses the divine ideas.

This is the *De scientia divina*, which Rega Wood identifies as indicative of Alexander's most mature view, even though it cannot be established with certainty as authentic¹⁶. In this question, the author claims that there is not a multitude of divine ideas but only a multiplicity in ways of comprehending the divine idea, which is one¹⁷. This view results from a tendency in this context to stress the unity of the divine ideas with the divine essence which is one¹⁸. Although the author admits that the temporal cannot be the cause of the eternal, he insists that nothing prevents the temporal from being the principle of understanding the eternal.

Notwithstanding the unity of the divine idea, consequently, the author claims that we can understand or rather co-understand many ideas with it¹⁹. A significant upshot of this emphasis on the oneness of God and of his ideas is that God does not know infinite ideas²⁰; nor

15. L. SCHUMACHER, *The Early Franciscan Doctrine of the Knowledge of God: Between Augustine's Authority and Innovation*, «The Mediaeval Journal» 6, 1 (2016), pp. 1-28.

16. WOOD, *Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solitude*, p. 13.

17. ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*, vol. III. Appendix II, q. 2: *De scientia divina*, p. 1463.

18. *Ibidem*, p. 1461.

19. *Ibidem*, p. 1462: «Dicendum quod nihil prohibet temporale esse principium intelligendi aeternum, sed non essendi. Ergo multitudo idearum non est nisi con-significata, non ingrediens earum substantiam. Hoc ideo, quia ex parte ideatorum si ideam intelligimus, cointelligimus multitudinem per ideam».

20. *Ibidem*, p. 1464.

does he know singulars²¹. The reasoning behind this seems to be that it is more perfect to know in terms of a cause than in terms of what is caused, and God knows in terms of himself as the cause and thus only knows himself. According to Rega Wood, the *Summa Halensis* carries on Alexander's mature views and therefore «has nothing to say about... whether God understands infinitely many things, and whether God's understanding of individuals is like knowing many in a universal»²². In a moment, I will show that this is not the case, but first, it is worth explaining briefly the importance of the *Summa Halensis* itself.

As noted above, this massive text was overseen by Alexander of Hales after he entered the Franciscan order in 1236, and the first three volumes were complete by the time he died in 1245. Although much of the material for the *Summa* is drawn from the work of Alexander himself, or from the work of his chief collaborator, John of La Rochelle, it is not clear that Alexander penned any part of the *Summa* personally. Rather, John is likely responsible for the first volume, in which the material on divine ideas appears, and for the third, while another author assembled volume two. Despite the multiple authors, the *Summa* provides a well-coordinated and coherent account of all the major theological issues of the day which are presented from a distinctly Franciscan perspective. Thus, it is oftentimes the best place to look for a mature indication of the “collective mind” of the early Franciscan school at Paris.

In a question on the divine ideas, the Summist, in this case likely John, repeats the standard quotation from Augustine's 83 Questions according to which there are ideas for different things like a man and a horse in God²³. As Alexander had done previously, John affirms that the ideas are the same as the wisdom of God “secundum rem” but differ “secundum nomen”. Here he affirms that the “ratio or rea-

21. *Ibidem*, p. 1465. See also WOOD, *Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solitude*, p. 25.

22. WOOD, *Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solitude*, p. 24.

23. ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Summa Theologica* [*Summa Halensis*], PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas (edd.), Firenze 1924-1948, I, pars 1, inq. 1, tr. 5, sect. 1, q. 1, m. 4, cap. 1, pp. 258-60: «De ideis rerum et rationibus in dei sapientia».

sons concern an end, ideas the form, and exemplars the efficient cause, while wisdom is related to cognition, as art to operation”²⁴. In this way he combines Alexander’s earlier distinctions between ratio-idea-sapientia and ratio-idea-exemplar. As the Summist elaborates, wisdom, exemplars, and art pertain more to God as a knower who is entirely one. They are not therefore subject to plurality so that we can speak of many exemplars, many wisdoms, many arts.

However reasons and ideas concern the things known, which are many thus, the ideas are many. Since each thing has its own proper purpose or end, there are likewise many reasons²⁵. Thus we see that here as in the *Disputed Questions*, the Franciscan author locates the multiplicity of divine ideas in relation to creatures as a way of preserving the unity of God. In this context, John again invokes the standard illustration of a center-point, at which many lines terminate, in order to affirm a sense in which the point is multiple, namely, because it is the principle or origin of many lines²⁶. There is still an emphasis in the *Summa* on the fact that God knows all things through himself as cause²⁷. After all, the Summist reasons, it is more perfect to know many and one through one than many through many or one through one—and here again the line/center analogy is used²⁸.

24. *Summa Halensis*, resp., p. 258: «De ideis rerum et rationibus in dei sapientia quod licet sint idem secundum rem, tamen differentia est inter haec secundum nomen, quia ratio respicit finem; idea formam, exemplar efficientem, sapientia cognitionem, sicut ars operationem. Unde, in quantum efficiens, scit qualiter debeat operari; secundum exemplar dicitur sapiens; in quantum vero potest operari cum vult, dicitur artifex; et quia unum et idem secundum rem est causa exemplaris et finis et causa cognoscens, unum et idem secundum rem est sapientia, idea et ratio».

25. *Ibidem*: «Quod licet idem sint secundum rem illa; in hoc tamen differunt secundum dictionis modum. Nam sapientia, exemplar et ars se tenent plus ex parte Dei cognoscentis, quod omnino est unum; ideo illa non recipiunt pluralitatem, ut dicantur plura exemplaria, plures sapientiae, plures artes, ratio vero et idea ex parte rei cognitae: et propter hoc, sicut res cognitae plures, ita et ideae; et propter hoc quia unaquaeque res habet proprium finem, sunt plures rationes, secundum quas fines determinantur propter respectum ergo ideae ad formam et rationis ad finem, cum sint formae rerum plures et fines, dicuntur rationes et ideae plures».

26. *Ibidem*, resp. IV, p. 259.

27. *Ibidem*, m. 2, cap. 2, p. 248.

28. *Ibidem*, cap. 3, resp., p. 249.

Contrary to the *De scientia dei*, and to Wood's suggestion, however, the Summist explicitly states that the science of God is not just of things that exist – or finite beings – but also of things that could exist as a result of the divine cause. On this basis, the Summist reasons that God does have knowledge of infinite things²⁹. From the fact that God knows the infinity of things that could exist, the Summist draws the further conclusion that he knows necessary or actual as well as contingent things³⁰.

In affirming these things, the Summist paves the way for his ultimate conclusion, which is that God does not merely know the species of things in the general or universal way that Augustine and even Alexander suggested. He also knows individuals. As the Summist puts it, since God is equally the author of things great and small, therefore in his art he must also know both great and small things³¹. While the Summist concedes that knowing singulars is a sign of weakness in humans who derive that knowledge from the senses, in God it is not so because he does not obtain his knowledge from the senses but through a likeness to the thing which exists in himself as cause. Once again, the center/line analogy is used to justify this claim.

2. Odo Rigaldus and Bonaventure on Divine Ideas

A further development of the Franciscan view can be found in the work of Odo Rigaldus, who was possibly a late contributor to the

29. *Ibidem*, m. 2, resp., p. 252: «Cum quaeritur an scientia Dei sit infinitorum, dicendum quod scientia Dei est de rebus, et hoc per se causam. Causa autem potest considerari ut potens operari: et sic scientia Dei, quae est per causam, est infinitorum, quia ipsa potentia causa est infinitorum; sed si consideretur causa ut disponens: sic Dei scientia de rebus per se causam est finitorum, quia dispositio est finitorum».

30. *Ibidem*, m. 3, cap. 4, p. 254.

31. *Ibidem*, m. 3, cap. 6, contra, p. 256: «Ergo ipse Deus aequaliter est artifex magnorum et parvorum; ergo in arte sua aequaliter cognoscit magna et parva. Item, quod potest cognoscere creatura, non potest Deus ignorare. Si ergo creatura potest cognoscere singularia, Deus non potest ignorare singularia».

last volume of the *Summa Halensis* and a successor of John and Alexander as regent master of the Parisian Franciscan School. In his Commentary on Lombard's *Sentences*, which was completed before 1245, he seems to adhere closely to the view of the Halensian Summist. The divine wisdom or art or exemplar is one but the divine ideas are many in comparison to creatures³². In response to the objection that the temporal cannot cause the eternal, Odo argues that while creatures are indeed temporal, God foresees their creation, and in that sense, the temporal is never the cause of the eternal³³.

In elaborating on how the diversity of beings can arise out of one divine idea, Odo denies that matter is the principle of individuation, because it is from nothing. He goes on to observe that if the human soul can understand many things through its cognitive power, then at least the same should be true of God. His knowledge extends to the full range of his power and all that it can achieve³⁴. To illustrate this point, Odo invokes the familiar analogy of a center that comprehends or encompasses all the lines that proceed from it. A further upshot of this example is that God knows not only what he has made but also all that he could make, that is, the infinite³⁵. Furthermore, he possesses knowledge of singulars³⁶. While it is an imperfection in humans to know these on the basis of sense knowledge, Odo echoes the *Summa's* assertion that God knows them in himself as cause and thus knows all things both great and small³⁷.

32. ODO RIGALDUS, *Lectura in I Sententiarum*, L. Sileo (ed.), *De rerum ideis. Dio e le cose nel dibattito universitario del tredicesimo secolo. I. Editio textuum Odonis Rigaldi et aliorum*, Urbaniana University Press, Roma, 2011, d. 35, q. 5, pp. 33-34.

33. *Ibidem*, p. 35: «Dicendum quod licet productio creaturarum sit ex tempore, tamen praevisio quae praevidit Deus se producturum eas in tempore aeterna est. Quia ergo idea dicitur secundum rationem huius praevisionis, non solum secundum rationem actualis productionis, ideo ibi temporale non est causa aeterni».

34. *Ibidem*, p. 36.

35. *Ibidem*, d. 39, q. 5, p. 114: «Multa autem scit Deus quae non disponit facere quae tamen posset si vellet...Item solet dici aliis verbis sic: cum Deus omnia quae scit, sciat in se ipso in causa omnium, potest scire quae scit in se ut in cause potente creare, et sic scit infinita».

36. *Ibidem*, d. 39, q. 5, p. 114.

37. *Ibidem*, d. 39, q. 6, p. 117.

In his *Disputed Questions*, which are dated to around 1245-8, Odo affirms once again that there can be no plurality in a God who is absolutely simple³⁸. Yet there is a marked shift in his position. For he now insists that the reasons or ideas of God can be described as plural, not on the part of God himself who is signified by them but on the part of the mode of signification by which we or indeed he perceives them in relation to himself³⁹. As Odo elaborates, for God to be the exemplar of things is nothing more than to say that he knows what things he is able to produce and how they are produced.

In that sense, his knowledge of himself as the exemplar of all things entails the knowledge of the range of his power⁴⁰. In this regard, Odo reiterates the view of Alexander that God as the efficient cause is entirely one, while the exemplars which are formal causes for things are multiplied with respect to the things for which they serve as patterns. Likewise, he states that the reasons are also plural which concern the ends which are proper to specific things which

38. ODO RIGALDUS, *De ideis*, WOOD (ed.), in EAD., *Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solitude*, pp. 32-46. This includes an edition of questions 3 and 7. The other questions edited by Sileo (in *De rerum ideis. Dio e le cose nel dibattito universitario del tredicesimo secolo*) include 1. Whether we should posit ideas in God or not (p. 174); 2. Whether the ideas are essential or personal (p. 181); 3. Whether there is one idea in God or many; 4. Does God know things better through the ideas existing in himself or in the things themselves (p. 206); 5. Whether every operation of God falls under an idea (p. 211); 6. Does God have ideas of all possible things (p. 216); 7. Whether in God there are reasons for universal and particular things or only for universal things (p. 223); 8. Whether the ideas in God are indifferent to good and evil (p. 231); 9. Whether imperfections like matter have ideas in God (p. 240).

39. ODO RIGALDUS, *De ideis*, solutio, p. 35: «Unde quod “idea” vel “ratio” pluraliter dicuntur, hoc non est ex parte rei significatae quae simplicissima est et simplicissimam unitatem habens, sed ex parte modi significandi qui est ab impositione nostra, scilicet ratione significandi per modum exemplaris. Praeterea, quia, ut dictum est, efficiens respicit res prout ab ipso exeunt; unus est autem modus exeundi; ideo “efficiens” unico modo dicitur et non pluribus. Sed “exemplar” sive ‘forma’ dicitur rationem informationis. Formae autem est distinguere, ideo multipliciter potest dici et multiplicari respectu rerum quas informat. Et differunt “ratio” et “idea” in hoc quod “ratio” cum distinctione quam importat magis respicit finem; “idea” autem formam.

40. *Ibidem*, p. 38: «Sed ipsum esse exemplar rerum non est plus dicere quam ipsi cognoscere res posse ab ipso produci et qualiter sunt producendae...cum enim ipse sibi sit exemplar, tantum extendit se exemplar quantum potentia ipsius».

exhibit form. In this way, Odo claims that he reconciles his opinion with the conflicting views of Augustine, who in his *De ideis* said there were many ideas for different things like man and horse, but also in *De Trinitate* VI.II.10 said that the ideas are one.

The reason the distinction of things in God now seems important in Odo's opinion is that it is necessary to accounting for his ability to create and know many different things as distinct from one another. Odo finds it difficult to see how God could do this if his own idea was simply one⁴¹. As in his earlier Commentary, he disagrees with those who suggest that matter can serve as the principle of individuation, since it is effectively one block of indistinct and confused substance that is not differentiated unless impressed with forms⁴². From this it follows for Odo that God does not simply know all different things in his universal knowledge of himself as the Summist thought.

Rather he knows singulars precisely as such. In order to make a multitude of people, Odo claims, it is necessary for God to have singular reasons for me, for you, and for all individual persons⁴³. Odo goes so far as to insist that God would be ignorant of the things he creates if he did not have an idea for each one of them⁴⁴. Furthermore, Odo claims that in addition to knowing things that do exist, God must know things that do not but could exist and thus must know the infinite, albeit in virtue of his single intuition of himself⁴⁵. While Odo had also affirmed these things in his earlier

41. *Ibidem*, p. 39.

42. *Ibidem*, p. 39: «Quod obicitur de materia (n. 7), dicendum quod secundum quod ipsi philosophi loquuntur de materia prima prout caret omni forma distinguente et disponente ad aliquod ens particulare: dico quod res ibi latent in potentia materiali penitus per indistinctionem, et sic secundum hunc modum falsum supponunt, quia in materia habent res potentes ex ea produci distinctionem».

43. *Ibidem*, p. 42: «Sed ad faciendum populum et multitudinem hominum necesse est singularium habere rationem».

44. ODO RIGALDUS, *Lectura in I Sententiarum*, d. 35, q. 3, p. 22.

45. ODO RIGALDUS, *De ideis*, q. 7, p. 43: «Deus autem aeque cognoscit res non existentes sicut existentes – plura, immo infinita, uno intuitu et scit super quid debet fieri sua operatio; et omnia distinctim ei sunt praesentia; ideo cuiuslibet singularis habet ideam propriam, et non solum in universali, hoc enim esset impotentiae».

Commentary, he nonetheless claimed there that the multiplicity or singularity of God's ideas was on the part of creatures rather than in God himself. The change in viewpoint is that he now locates the multiplicity in God's own knowledge of the creatures he is able to create, not unlike Alexander or Hales had done in his original presentation of the matter in his *Gloss*.

A similar view is taken up by Bonaventure, as Rega Wood briefly suggests in her article⁴⁶. Bonaventure summarizes his view in his *Breviloquium* (1257), a handbook for Franciscan novices which provides a succinct account of many of the key theological issues discussed in his commentary on Lombard's *Sentences* which he completed in 1253. In the *Breviloquium*, Bonaventure distinguishes between the wisdom of God which is the exemplar of all things, and which is one, and the ideas for things and reasons which allow things to achieve their perfection or purpose⁴⁷. As Bonaventure elaborates, these are many because the perfection of God's wisdom requires that he know every thing in the most distinct fashion, namely, as an individual, whether it is a past, present, or future, actual or possible being⁴⁸. Bonaventure reconciles the one and the many by affirming that the ideas or reasons are considered in relation to the objects known, which are likenesses of God.

In his single act of knowing, consequently, God knows in the most specific terms all things which are likenesses of him. The full details of this condensed position become clearer in Bonaventure's *Sentences* commentary. In addressing the question whether there are ideas in God, Bonaventure mentions the view of «some thinkers», evidently the Alexander of Hales of the *Disputed Questions* and the Halensian Summists, who believe that God knows all things in himself as cause rather than through specific reasons. He cites the anal-

46. WOOD, *Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solitude*, p. 27.

47. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *Breviloquium*, in PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas (edd.), *Opera omnia*, V, Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Firenze 1891; BONAVENTURE, *Breviloquium*, trans. D. Monti, Franciscan Institute Publications, Saint Bonaventure 2005.

48. *Ibidem*, I, 8, 7, p. 52: «Wisdom is utterly perfect, it knows each and every thing in the most distinct fashion, conceiving them all most clearly and perfectly. Thus we say that God possesses the principles and ideas of all individual beings».

ogy they use to defend their position of a point that comprehends or includes all the lines leading out from it and its circumference.

But he argues against this position, on the grounds that every knower possesses a likeness of the things known and thus does not merely know things in itself as a cause but has a distinct idea for the things that are likenesses⁴⁹. In addressing the further question whether a real plurality of ideas should be posited in God, Bonaventure repeats his predecessors' pattern of citing Augustine's *De ideis* for and his *De Trinitate* against this position⁵⁰. He contests the position that the ideas are plural in reality, on the grounds that this would introduce multiplicity into God, and defends again his own view that the ideas are one in reality but multiple insofar as they are likenesses or rational means of knowing. As he writes:

Just as the rational means of knowing (*ratio cognoscendi*) is one, yet it represents many things that are known in completely distinct ways, according to their proper conditions, so, as regards the mode of knowing (*modum cognoscendi*), divine knowledge is one and simple and without distinction. But in comparison with its object, [divine knowledge] knows things distinctly. Therefore, when it is said "God knows all things distinctly", if the distinction is posited in knowledge in comparison to the knower, the statement is false; but if it is posited in knowledge in comparison to the thing known, the statement holds true⁵¹.

49. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *In I Sententiarum*, in PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas (edd.), *Opera omnia*, I, Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Firenze 1882, d. 35, q. 1, p. 601A: «Et iterum, omne cognoscens, in quantum huiusmodi, simile est cognoscibili: ergo habet eius similitudinem, vel ipsum est similitudo. Et iterum, aliqua cognoscit quae ab ipso non sunt». See also the translation by R.E. Houser and T.B. Noone of BONAVENTURE, *Commentary on the Sentences: Philosophy of God*, Franciscan Institute Publications, Saint Bonaventure 2014, p. 197.

50. *Ibidem*, q. 2, conclusio, p. 605.

51. BONAVENTURE, *Commentary on the Sentences*, p. 204; cfr. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *In I Sententiarum*, d. 35, q. 2, ad 4, p. 607A-B: «Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod cognoscit secundum exigentiam rationum; dicendum, quod sicut ratio cognoscendi est una, et tamen plura cognita distinctissime repraesentat secundum proprias condiciones; sic divina cognitio quantum ad modum cognoscendi, qui est in ipsa, est una et simplex, non distincta; sed in comparatione ad obiectum, distincte cognoscit. Quando ergo dicitur, Deus cognoscit omnia distincte, si di-

The example Bonaventure favours to illustrate his point is that of light, which while numerically one expresses many and varied colours⁵². Like his predecessors, Bonaventure acknowledges the problem that positing ideas for things in God risks suggesting that the temporal is the cause of the eternal. Similar to Odo, however, he gets around this problem by suggesting that things can be connoted both temporally and eternally-temporally when they actually exist from our perspective, and eternally when they only exist in God, as in the case of predestination, which connotes an effect that is not actual⁵³. In this regard, as hinted already, Bonaventure affirms that the likenesses in God are multiplied not only according to the plurality of universals but also according to the plurality of singulars⁵⁴. The corollary of this view for Bonaventure is that even though God only chooses to produce a finite number of things, he is able to produce an infinite number of things, and in order to do that, he must have knowledge of what he produces⁵⁵.

stinctio ponitur in cognitione per comparisonem ad cognoscentem, falsa est; si autem per comparisonem ad cognitum, sic habet veritatem».

52. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *In I Sententiarum*, d. 35, q. 2, ad 2, p. 606A-B.

53. *Ibidem*, q. 3, ad 3, p. 608B: «In quantum sunt, sic sunt solum ex tempore; in quantum autem connotantur, sic possunt connotari et aeternaliter, et temporaliter; aeternaliter, quando respectus importatur in habitu, sic per hoc nomen praedestinatio; ideo praedestinatio est aeterna, quia connotat effectum non in actu, sed in habitu»; BONAVENTURE, *Commentary on the Sentences*, p. 208: «But if we speak about them as they are connoted, they can be connoted both temporally and eternally. They are connoted eternally when a habitual relation is implied, as happens with the term “predestination.” For predestination is eternal, since it connotes an effect that is not actual, but habitual».

54. *Ibidem*, q. 4, conclusio, p. 610A-B: «Et ideo quia similitudo est utrorumque, non solum multiplicatur secundum multitudinem universalium, sed etiam singularium».

55. *Ibidem*, q. 5, ad 3, p. 612B: «Et quia Deus potest facere infinita, quamvis nunquam faciat nisi finita, ideo ideae vel rationes cognoscendi sunt in Deo infinitae, quia non tantum sunt entium vel futurorum, sed omnium Deo possibilium. Nihil enim potest Deus quod non actu cognoscat»; BONAVENTURE, *Commentary on the Sentences*, p. 215: «And since God can make an infinite number of things, even though he always makes only a finite number, it follows that the ideas or the reasons for knowing are infinite in God, because there are ideas not only of things that do exist or will exist, but of all things that are possible for God. For God can do nothing that he does not know in actuality».

3. An 'Augustinian' Doctrine of Divine Ideas?

At this point, it is worth summarising the various shifts in position we have detected in the different texts examined so far. In his *Gloss*, which is the earliest text considered here, Alexander says that God is one but that the reasons or ideas for things are many. They are in God rather than in creatures, lest the temporal be the cause of the eternal, but they do not multiply the essence of God because they differ from him only in name and not in reality. In his *Disputed Questions*, Alexander again affirms the unity of God and the multiplicity of the divine ideas for things, but he now insists that that multiplicity arises from creatures rather than from a nominal distinction within God. To avoid the suggestion that the temporal causes the eternal, he claims that creatures do not signify God directly, which was seemingly an implication of his argument in the *Gloss*.

In his updated position, they only con-signify God and therefore do not introduce multiplicity into him. The *De scientia* avoids the problem by saying that the temporal is merely the principle of understanding rather than the cause of the eternal. The *Summa Halensis* seems to carry on the tradition of the *Disputed Questions* but extrapolates from it the conclusions that the *De scientia* had denied, namely, that the multiplicity of divine ideas that arise from creatures also presuppose God's knowledge of singulars, the infinite, and both necessary and possible beings. Odo furthers these ideas in his *Sentences* commentary but presents a new way of getting around the problem of the temporal causing the eternal. This involves saying that God fore-sees the creation of temporal things which do not therefore cause any multiplicity in him.

In his own *Disputed Questions*, by contrast, Odo turns back to a view more similar to that of Hales in his *Gloss* according to which God's knowledge, despite being one, entails all the forms of multiplicity that Odo mentions which the *Gloss* of Alexander had not—including knowledge of singulars, both those that do and do not exist, and the infinite. For the mature Odo, it is absurd to suggest that there is anything, no matter how small, in God's creation that would not be the subject of his knowledge, lest this be regarded as confused or subject to ignorance. Nevertheless, Odo asserts that

the specificity and plurality of God's ideas does not compromise his unity, because the ideas both for him and for us only multiply the mode by which God is signified and do not diversity him as the object of signification. As we have seen, Bonaventure employs slightly different language in expressing a similar opinion. While the divine ideas are one in his opinion, the likenesses to him are many, such that in the mode of understanding, the divine ideas are multiplied down to the level of singulars and indeed the infinite.

An outside observer might think that there is not such a drastic difference between the views presented by these different authors, and to some extent that is true. Whether the ideas are multiplied in relation to creatures or nominally in God, a delicate balance is struck between the one and the many. The one point the various scholars do have in common is that they use Augustine to defend their differing positions. This raises an interesting question as to whether any of the Franciscan views presented represents an authentic interpretation of Augustine or whether Augustine perhaps simply held contradictory views. On this score, I have argued elsewhere that our early Franciscan authors may have extracted proof texts from the Bishop's thought in order to present different sides of an argument they themselves wanted to consider. This was precisely how the scholastic method was employed at the time: to legitimise novel positions by locating them in relation to an authority of the prior Christian tradition.

In the case under consideration, I would like to suggest now in a next phase of my discussion that the way the early Franciscans interpreted Augustine was heavily informed by the philosophy of the eleventh-century Islamic scholar Avicenna, whose views on metaphysics and psychology strongly influenced early Franciscan readings of both Aristotle and Augustine, who were interpreted in unison during this period, before Aristotle came to fore in his own right as a focus of scholarship in the latter half of the thirteenth century. The influence of Avicenna is something we can discern if we look to some of the other major metaphysical theories that early Franciscans elaborate to underpin the doctrine of divine ideas. These theories include the aforementioned distinction Avicenna drew between beings that do exist actually and those that do not

exist – or necessary and possible beings. This gave rise to the notion that the source of all beings, in this case, God, must be infinite, on the one hand, and to a preoccupation with individual or finite beings on the other.

Although theologically fascinating, such concerns were too different from those of Augustine to simply be projected on to him in the way that Étienne Gilson popularized when he described the early Franciscans' Avicennized Augustinianism as a form of authentic Augustinianism. After all, Augustine saw God as fundamentally simple rather than infinite; he saw the divine ideas as of universals like “man” and “woman” which include particulars like “Peter” and “Mary” and did not posit ideas of particulars themselves. Moreover, he had no metaphysics of necessary and possible being to generate the interest in infinite and finite beings in the first place. Thus, the view of Jan Aertsen seems more accurate in my opinion when he said that Avicenna inaugurated a new form of metaphysics which departed from anything that had been available previously, and which enabled the Franciscans to utterly transform rather than merely “systematise” what it meant to be an Augustinian⁵⁶.

4. The Divine Ideas, the Transcendentals, and Univocity

To illustrate this claim further, it is helpful to look past the doctrine of divine ideas itself to the *Summa Halensis*' explanation of a related doctrine – also treated by Bonaventure – which concerns what John Duns Scotus would only later call the transcendentals or the most common properties of things. Here the *Summa* follows a model that had been introduced by Philip the Chancellor, according to which the first transcendental, namely, being (*ens*), is characterized

56. J. Aertsen has emphasized that Avicenna initiated a ‘second beginning of metaphysics’ in J. AERTSEN, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, Brill, Leiden 2012. J. MCGINNIS, *Avicennian Infinity. A Select History of the Infinite through Avicenna*, «Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale» 21 (2010), pp. 199-222: 212-13. Here McGinnis notes that Avicenna in his *Metaphysics* VI.2 distances himself from the Aristotelian idea that infinity cannot be traversed, promoting a more “positive” idea of infinity which influenced the Franciscan school.

by unity, truth, and goodness, which correspond to the first, second, and third persons of the Trinity – or Father, Son, and Spirit⁵⁷. In a development on Philip's account, clearly inspired by Avicenna, the Summists argue that this Trinity does not merely capture the key qualities of beings, but it is also impressed upon the human mind, with unity, truth, and goodness representing an image of the highest Being, the Triune God⁵⁸.

On account of this image, the Summists argue that human beings are able to know any given thing as one, or indivisible in itself and distinct from other beings⁵⁹; as true, or intelligible in terms of what it is; and good, or fit for a certain purpose⁶⁰; That is not to say that the transcendentals constitute the actual objects of human knowledge. However, they give us the cognitive resources to do as

57. H. POUILLON, *Le premier traité des propriétés transcendentales. La Summa de bono du Chancelier Philippe*, «Revue néoscholastique de philosophie» 42 (1939), pp. 40-77. A. FANI, *Communissima, trascendentali e Trinità: da Filippo il Cancelliere alla prima scuola francescana*, «Il Santo: Rivista Franciscana de storia dottrina arte» 49, 1 (2009), pp. 131-154.

58. *Summa Halensis*, II, 1, inq. 4, tr. 1, sect. 1, q. 3, cap. 5, a. 6, solutio, p. 414; cfr. AUGUSTINUS HIPPOENSIS, *De Trinitate* X.

59. *Ibidem*, I, q. 1, m 1, cap. 1, resp. II, p. 113: «Dicendum quod cum sit ens primum intelligibile eius intentio apud intellectum est nota» (AVICENNA, *Metaphysica* I, 6); cfr. *Ibidem*, II, 1, inq. 1, sect. 1, q. 1, cap. 2, 3; *Ibidem*, I, pars 1, inq. 2, tr. 1, q. 1, cap. 2, a. 2, solutio, p. 522: «Deus sicut efficiens, primum eius nomen est ens».

60. *Ibidem*, pars 1, inq. 1, tr. 3, q. 1, m. 1, cap. 2, resp., pp. 114-15: «Secundum quod ens aliquod consideratur absolutum, ut divisum ab aliis et in se indivisum, determinator per “unum”. Secundum vero quod consideratur aliquod ens comparatum ad aliud secundum distinctionem, determinatur per “verum”: ‘verum’ enim est quo res habet discerni. Secundum vero quod consideratur comparatum ad aliud secundum convenientiam sive ordinem, determinatur per “bonum”: “bonum” enim est ex quo res habet ordinari». Translation by O. Bychkov in L. SCHUMACHER, O. BYCHKOV (eds.), *A Reader in Early Franciscan Theology*, Fordham University Press, New York 2021, pp. 142-43: «Insofar as a being is considered as absolute, undivided in itself, and separated from other [beings], it is delimited by “oneness”. However, insofar as a being is considered in relation to another [being] in terms of its distinctness, it is delimited by “truth”, for “true” stands for the ability of a thing to be detectible. However, insofar as [a being] is considered in relation to another [being] in terms of agreement or order, it is delimited by “goodness”, for “good” stands for the ability of a thing to fit into an order». Cfr. *Summa Halensis*, I, tr. 3, q. 2, m. 1, cap. 2, resp., p. 140.

Avicenna described when he spoke of abstraction as a matter of stripping away all the material dispositions or attributions of a thing in order to lay bare the form that all things of the same kind have in common. To know such a form correctly – in terms of its unity, truth, and goodness – is for the Summist ultimately to know the thing in accordance with the divine idea after which it is modelled.

In other words, the transcendentals make it possible for the mind as God's image to know beings effectively as God knows them. At the same time, the Summists argue that the knowledge of natural beings in terms of their unity, truth, and goodness makes it possible to know the divine being himself as one, true, good, albeit in a limited way that is circumscribed by the creature itself. In short, creatures give us a glimpse into the nature of God. In describing what this glimpse involves, the *Summa* again takes its cue from Avicenna. In this metaphysics the philosopher acknowledges that God is wholly other to all beings he creates, while at the same time insisting that «the fact that God causes creatures establishes an ontological relationship of priority and posteriority between them»⁶¹.

This relationship results in an “agreed meaning” between the cause and the caused, which have whatever qualities or essence they have in the way of a substance and an accident⁶². In other

61. J.W. WOOD, *Kataphasis and Apophasis in Thirteenth Century Theology. The Anthropological Context of the Triplex Via in the Summa fratris Alexandri and Albert the Great*, «The Heythrop Journal» 57 (2016), pp. 293-311: 296.

62. AVICENNA LATINUS, *Liber de philosophia prima sive De scientia divina*, S. Van Riet (ed.), Louvain, E. Peeters-Brill, Leiden 1998, I, 5, p. 40: «Dicemus igitur nunc quod quamvis ens, sicut scisti, non sit genus nec praedicatum aequaliter de his quae sub eo sunt, tamen est intentio in qua convenient secundum prius et posterius; primum autem est quidditati quae est in substantia, deinde ei quod est post ipsam. Postquam autem una intentio est ens secundum hoc quod assignavimus, sequuntur illud accidentalialia quae ei sunt propria, sicut supra diximus. Et ideo eget aliqua scientia in qua tractetur de eo, sicut omni sanativo necessaria est aliqua scientia»; AVICENNA, *The Metaphysics of the Healing*, trans. M.E. Marmura, Brigham Young University Press, Provo 2006, I, ch. 5, 27: «We now say: Although the existent, as you have known, is not a genus and is not predicated equally of what is beneath it, yet it has a meaning agreed on with respect to priority and posteriority. The first thing to which it belongs is the quiddity, which is substance, and then to what comes after it. Since it [has] one meaning, in the manner to which we have alluded, accidental matters adhere to it that are proper to it, as we have shown

words, the substance has the quality as a cause or what is prior to the arrival of the accident, while the accident has it as the effect of the substance or because the substance has it and thus has it in a posterior way. Nevertheless, the substance and accident possess the same quality in the same sense—albeit finitely or infinitely. The *Summa* interestingly adopts precisely this language in speaking of the relationship between God and creatures. There is an agreement between these two extremes in that they are both a type of being. However, God is a being in the prior and proper sense of a term, or in terms of his substance, while a creature is a being in a posterior sense, because it depends upon or participates in God in a way analogous to the manner in which an accident can only exist in a subject. As the *Summa* puts it:

An example of analogical agreement would be substance and accident: they agree in that they are both [a type of] being, which is predicated of them in terms of priority: substance as [a type of] being serves as a substrate to its accidents, and therefore “being” is predicated in a primary sense of substance, which is “being” essentially, and in a secondary sense of accidents, which are “beings” [by virtue of being] in something else. Therefore, one must reply that there is no univocal agreement between God and creatures, but there is an analogical one. For example, if “good” is predicated of God and of creatures, it is predicated of God essentially, and of creatures in terms of participation. This suggests that the predication “good” of God and of creatures is analogical⁶³.

earlier. For this reason, it is taken care of by one science in the same way that anything pertaining to health has one science».

63. SCHUMACHER, BYCHKOV (eds.), *A Reader in Early Franciscan Theology*, trans. by O. Bychkov, pp. 99-100; *Summa Halensis*, I, tract. introd., q. 2, m. 3, cap. 2, resp., p. 32: «Convenientia secundum analogiam: ut substantia et accidens conveniunt in ente, quia dicitur secundum prius et posterius de illis: quia ens substantia est principium accidentis, et ideo per prius dicitur ens de substantia, quae est ens per se; per posterius de accidente, quod est ens in alio. Dicendum ergo quod non est convenientia Dei et creaturae secundum univocationem, sed per analogiam: ut si dicatur bonum de Deo et de creatura, de Deo dicitur per naturam, de creatura per participationem. Similiter omne bonum de Deo et de creatura dicitur secundum analogiam».

Although the *Summa* here describes the relationship between God and creatures as one of analogy, numerous authors have noted that the early Franciscan account involves something more like an analogy of proportionality, which while acknowledging the disparity between the infinite God and finite beings, nonetheless allows for the possibility of referring to them in the same terms with the same meaning. This ultimately marks a dramatic difference from the understanding of analogy that would be advocated by someone like Thomas Aquinas, for whom the most that can be known about God from creatures is what he is not. As recent scholarship has illustrated, the type of analogy that the Summists seems to have in mind here seems much more similar to the way later Franciscans like Duns Scotus would define univocity⁶⁴. As Jacob Wood has observed, the upshot of univocity is that the effects of the divine, namely, creatures, have the power to make something positive, if, again, limited, directly known about the nature of God⁶⁵. Creatures thus reveal rather than conceal the nature of God.

If we look at the early Franciscan doctrine of divine ideas without reference to other relevant passages in the *Summa Halensis* which assess the relationship between God and creatures and how creatures help us to know God, we might miss the subtle way in which that doctrine presupposes and turns on what is already an anticipation of the theory of univocity which draws inspiration from Avicenna. We might overlook the shift from what Jacob Wood describes as an apophatic tradition such as had dominated in Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas, according to which creatures can only tell us what God is not, towards a more cataphatic understanding in which something positive if partial can be known through creatures that exhibit unity, truth, and goodness in a limited way

64. See for example N. LEWIS, *The Problem of the Unicity of Truth in the Early Oxford Franciscan School*, in L. SCHUMACHER (ed.), *Early Thirteenth-Century English Franciscan Thought*, De Gruyter, Berlin 2021, pp. 149-70. See also AERSTEN, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, p. 96.

65. *Summa Halensis*, I, tr. 3, q. 1, m. 1, cap. 1, resp. II, p. 113. J.W. WOOD, *Kataphasis and Apophasis in Thirteenth Century Theology*, pp. 293-311.

about the nature of the God, who is One, True, and Good, in the proper sense of the term⁶⁶.

The inspiration behind this shift was clearly Avicenna's metaphysics of necessary or actual and possible beings which helped early Franciscans to envisage a God who possesses an idea of all things that are and could be – of the infinite – and whose instantiation of some of those individual ideas makes himself directly accessible to the mind in a finite but nonetheless direct way. Such an account can hardly help but bring to mind Francis' emphasis on the value of creatures, great and small, of God's love for them and the way they make God known to us. In that sense, I would argue that the appropriation of Avicenna was instrumental to articulating a specifically Franciscan point of view, with its emphasis on the uniqueness of creatures as objects of God's love and creative design.

Bonaventure of course picked up many aspects of this perspective and elaborated them in some form himself. But given his evident dependence upon the earlier Franciscan tradition – not only in terms of defining the divine ideas, but also the transcendentals and the creature-creator relation – we should be hesitant to accept the common historiographical notion that he and his teachers merely codified what it meant to be an Augustinian at the early University of Paris. This does not do justice to the Avicennian sources of Franciscan thought or indeed to its originality. Above all, it obscures the friars' commitment to elucidating and supporting the Franciscan ethos through the development of their own unique theological and philosophical doctrines, such as the doctrine of divine ideas that has been my focus in this chapter.

66. *Ibidem*: «Dicendum quod cum sit “ens” primum intelligibile, eius intentio apud intellectum est nota primae ergo determinationes entis sunt primae impressiones apud intellectum: eae sunt unum, verum, bonum, sicut patebit; non poterunt ergo habere aliqua priora specialiter ad sui notificationem. Si ergo notificatio fiat eorum, hoc non erit nisi per posteriora, ut per abnegationem vel effectum consequentem. Hinc est quod in notificatione “unius” est una notio per abnegationem, alia vero per effectum consequentem: per abnegationem oppositae intentionis, quae est divisio vel multitudo, cum dicitur “ens indivisum”, per effectum consequentem, qui est distinguere ab aliis: unitas enim distinguit “unum” ab alio et ideo dicitur “divisum ab aliis”».

The Divine Ideas in John of La Rochelle's Theology

RICCARDO SACCENTI*

Among the *rationes contra* which Bonaventure lists in the second *quaestio* of his *De scientia Christi*, there is a quotation from Anselm of Canterbury's *Monologion* concerning the relation between the truth and the essence of the created beings. This quotation is part of Bonaventure's examination of the nature of God's knowledge of things. Discussing the alternative between a knowledge based on similarity among things and another one which derives from their essence, the Franciscan master takes the argument from the *Monologion* as a statement in favour of God's direct knowledge of the essence of each created being¹. As regards the subject of the *quaes-*

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1. On this issue see J.C. BENSON, *Structure and Meaning in St. Bonaventure's «Quaestiones Disputatae de scientia Christi»*, «Franciscan Studies» 62 (2004), pp. 67-90; W. PETERSON BORING, *Revising our Approach to «Augustinian Illumination». A Reconsideration of Bonaventure's «Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi» IV, Aquinas's «Summa theologiae» I^a 84, 1-8, and Henry of Ghent's «Summa quaestionum ordinarium» Q. 2, art. 1, 2*, «Franciscan Studies» 68 (2010), pp. 39-81; O. BOULNOIS, *Ce dont Dieu n'a pas idées. Problèmes de l'idéalisme médiéval (XIII^e-XIV^e siècles)*, in O. BOULNOIS, J. SCHMUTZ, J.-L. SOLÈRE (éds.), *Le contemplateur et les idées. Modèles de la science divine du néoplatonisme au XVIII^e siècle*, Vrin, Paris 2002, pp. 45-78; A. COLLI, *Dalla «natura nobilissima» al «vir desideriorum». Aristotele e la definizione di uomo nel «Commento alle Sentenze» di Bonaventura da Bagnoregio*, in A. PALAZZO (a cura di), *Il desiderio nel Medioevo*, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma 2014, pp. 165-181; M. DAMONTE, *La teoria bonaventuriana dell'illuminazione tra epistemologia e teologia naturale*, «Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica» 109 (2017), pp. 823-834; A. LAMI, «Plato metaphysics» (quando Platone supera Aristotele): alcune riflessioni di Bonaventura storico del pensiero, in M. BORRIELLO, A.M. VITALE (a cura di), «*Princeps philosophorum*». *Platone nell'Occidente tardo-antico, medievale e umanistico*, Città Nuova, Roma 2016, pp. 343-375; S. OPPES, *La «parola» quale «actus absolutus et respectivus» predicata sempre*

tio, Bonaventure argues that God knows created beings through the *rationes aeternae*: created beings are likenesses of them in accordance with a clear exemplarism. The *rationes aeternae* are eternal ideas of the things and thus not their essence: they are exemplary forms and therefore representative of the likeness of things². Starting from this position, the Franciscan master replies to those who understand the argument from the *Monologion* as supporting the divine knowledge of created beings rather than a knowledge through likeness. According to Bonaventure, Anselm's words: «it is clear that in the word in which all the things are created there is no likeness, but their true and simple being», refer not to the way God knows the created beings, but to the likeness caused by the truth of the thing. Therefore, the author of the *Monologion* would use the term *similitudo* to signify not the exemplarity of a notion but rather the way a created thing imitates its creator. Therefore, *similitudo* is not the way in which the creator relates himself to the creatures³.

noZIONalmente in Dio. Un contributo di Bonaventura alla filosofia del linguaggio, «Antoniano» 76 (2006), pp. 687-728; S. PERFETTI, *Paradossi della conoscenza divina nel «De scientia Christi» di Bonaventura da Bagnoregio*, in G. GARFAGNINI, A. RODOLFI (a cura di), «*Scientia humana*» e «*scientia divina*». *Conoscenza del mondo e conoscenza di Dio*, ETS, Pisa 2016, pp. 51-62; P.L. REYNOLDS, *Bonaventure's Theory of Resemblance*, «*Traditio*» 58 (2003), pp. 219-235; D. RISERBATO, *Bonaventura e il fondamento di ogni conoscenza certa*, «*Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica*» 109 (2017), pp. 879-888; T. SCARPELLI CORY, *Bonaventure's Christocentric Epistemology: Christ's Human Knowledge as the Epitome of Illumination in De scientia Christi*, «*Franciscan Studies*» 65 (2007), pp. 63-86.

2. Cfr. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, q. 2, in PP. COLLEGI A S. BONAVENTURAE AD CLARAS AQUAS (edd.), *Opera omnia*, V, Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Firenze 1891, p. 8b: «Hae autem sempiternae rationes non sunt rerum essentiae verae et quidditates, cum non sint aliud a Creatore; creatura autem et Creator necessario habent essentias differentes: et ideo necesse est, quod sint formae exemplares, ac per hoc ipsarum rerum similitudines repraesentativae; et ideo cognoscendi rationes sunt, quia cognitio, hoc ipso quod cognito, assimilationem dicit et expressionem inter cognoscentem et cognoscibile. Et ideo ponendum est, secundum quod Sancti dicunt et rationes ostendunt, Deum cognoscere res per earum similitudines».

3. Cfr. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *De scientia Christi*, q. 2, p. 9a: «Ad illud ergo quod primo obicitur de Anselmo, dicendum quod Anselmus loquitur ibi de similitudine, quae est causata a rei veritate; unde accipit ibi *similitudinem*, secundum quod exprimit sub ratione imitationis postius quam exemplaritatis; et hoc

The *Quaestiones de scientia Christi* date to the early teaching of Bonaventure in Paris, just after his *inceptio* as regent master, and they show how his personal reasoning is deeply rooted in the tradition of his own masters, who taught in Paris during the fifth decade of the thirteenth century and whose doctrines were part of the intellectual education of the young Franciscan friar. Among these *magistri* in Bonaventure's background figures also John of La Rochelle, who served as Parisian regent master in theology for the minor friars between 1238 and 8 February 1245, the date of his death. Scholars have linked the teaching activity of this master to the contents of the major part of the gloss to Peter Lombard's *Sentences* transcribed in the margins of the manuscript Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 691. These notes include a critical discussion of the above mentioned argument from the *Monologion* concerning the relation between the divine word and the existence of beings, which echoes the way Bonaventure considers Anselm's text in the second part of the *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*⁴. Indeed, in the margins of the beginning of book I, distinction 36, the explanation is offered:

One wonders if the things that exist in God are one with the divine essence. And <that this is so> seems to be maintained in the *Monologion* by Anselm, who says: "And in fact in themselves they are a changing essence, created according to an immutable model; in God instead, they are the first essence and the first truth of being". From this authority it emerges that the things that exist in God are the divine nature and God.

Solution. It is one thing to say that creatures are the divine essence and <another thing to say> that creatures are divine essence in God. In fact, in the first statement the creature is meant in the sense that it is in its being, in the second statement it is

modo ponitur in producto respectu *producentes*, et non e converso, sicut subdit; alio vero modo nihil impedit poni in producente respectu *producti*».

4. On the attribution to John of La Rochelle of the preponderance of glosses in the Vatican manuscript see J.-G. BOUGEROL, *La Glose sur les Sentences du Manuscrit Vat. lat. 691, «Antonianum»* 55 (1980), pp. 108-179; ID., *The Fathers and the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard*, in *The Reception of the Church Fathers. From the Carolingians to the Maurists*, I. Backus (ed.), 2 voll., Brill, Leiden-New York-Köln 1997, I, pp. 113-164.

not meant the creature itself in its being but the models of the creatures existing in God, which models are God and the divine essence. And thus, that heresy which says that everything is God does not follow⁵.

The quoted passage, which quite probably reflects John of La Rochelle's teaching, clearly evidences an argument that is echoed in Bonaventure's more articulated discussion. In fact, the gloss states the mutual implication of the issue of God's knowledge of things and of the link between God and the created things, stressing the importance of the distinction between the essence of the multiple *res* and the divine essence, so as to avoid an overlapping that would lead to puzzling theological consequences. Therefore, in John of La Rochelle's reasoning, the divine ideas emerge as an element proper to the divine essence, but it has also the crucial role of clarifying the relation of ontological dependence of the created things on God. Such "exemplarism" allows also to distinguish between *res* and the Creator according to nature.

Considering John's arguments about the divine ideas, it is possible to bring out some of the major aspects of the doctrinal discussion that took place in Paris in the 1240s and that still remain a field of research for scholars to explore⁶. More in detail, the intellectual activity of authors such as John of La Rochelle throws light

5. IOHANNES DE RUPELLA, *Glossa super Sententias*, lib. I, d. 36, ms. Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 691, f. 40vb, marg. inf.: «Queritur utrum res existentes in Deo unica [ms.: uita] sint diuina essentia. Et uidetur per Anselmum in *Monologion*, qui dicit ita ipse: "Et enim in se ipsis sunt essentia mutabilis secundum immutabilem rationem creata. In Deo autem sunt essentia prima et prima existendi ueritas". Ex ista auctoritate uidetur quod res existentes in Deo, sunt natura diuina et Deus. Solutio. Aliud est dicere "creature sunt diuina essentia", et <aliud> "creature sunt in Deo diuina essentia". In prima enim supponitur creatura ut est in esse suo, in secunda non ipsa creatura in suo esse sed rationes creaturarum in Deo existentes que rationes sunt Deus et diuina essentia. Et ita non sequitur illa heresis que dicit omnia esse Deum».

6. A portrait of the interpretation of this decade in the history of theology in Paris is presented in S.E. YOUNG, *Scholarly Community at the Early University of Paris. Theologians, Education and Society, 1215-1248*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014.

on the development of theological and philosophical positions that Bonaventure will reclaim and develop⁷.

The following pages will consider John's position on the divine ideas in some passages of the *Glossa super Sententias* from the Vatican manuscript, but also in a passage taken from the master's *Glossa in Pauli Epistolas*. John's known written production lacks a systematic discussion on the divine ideas; on the contrary, he devoted a series of fragmentary remarks to this question, linked to the interpretation of specific passages from Peter Lombard and Scripture, and thus expressed in writings belonging to different genres of theological literature. This calls for a historical-critical analysis of the sources, which will consider each 'fragment' of John's reflection according to its own specific features. This certainly leads to a partial reconstruction of the *magister's* position, but it also makes it possible to illuminate the unity of the theologian's work and of the discipline he practices, namely *theologia*. This latter, in fact, enquires and makes intelligible the truths of the faith contained in Scripture.

1. Existence of beings and divine essence

In the glosses to book I, distinction 36 of the *Sentences* in ms. Vat. lat. 691, the issue of divine ideas shapes the discussion on the major doctrinal elements that emerge from the reading of the Lombard's text. The first doubt arises from the already mentioned issue of the link between the divine essence and the existence of the created beings. It questions how to understand the notions of idea and model with respect to future existing things. John asks how God's knowledge of the eternal models of the things relates to what will exist in the future. In offering his own solution, the master supports the view that God's knowledge of a created being does not involve the existence of the being in the divine essence but only of its eternal model. Assuming this perspective, John an-

7. See on this L.A. SCHUMACHER, *Early Franciscan Theology. Between Authority and Innovation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2019.

swers the question about God's knowledge of future things underscoring how divine knowledge of beings, including future beings, does not concern the *res* but rather all that could happen.

Therefore, he explains:

In God, there were the ideas of things, not so much of future ones but of all those that can happen. Therefore, in Him there were the ideas of infinite things because infinite is the science of God⁸.

Certainly, God's timelessness makes the question valid only with respect to created beings, that is according to a perspective within which the divine ideas reveal the infinite nature of the *scientia Dei*, which looks not at the existence of beings but at the possibility of their existing.

The distinction between existence of beings and possibility of existing, as a clarification of the nature of the divine ideas in their showing God's knowledge, it is crucial to clarify the exemplarism of the divine ideas themselves as *rationes rerum*. Indeed, if the divine ideas concern what could exist and not what in fact exists, they can act as models in God the Creator's willingness. Thus, the divine ideas are not mere images of the created beings, since the *ymago* – John notes – concerns only past things and therefore already existing beings which are no longer in the realm of possibility. On the contrary, the *rationes aeternae* that God has in his own essence are *exemplares*, that is they are models precisely because of what they can determine in the future.

The distinction between *ymago* and *exemplar* overlaps with that between effect and cause, since the model has the function of a cause: since it determines the possibility of the future existence of a thing, the model becomes the cause of that thing at the moment of the latter's coming to exist. On the contrary, the notion of "im-

8. IOHANNES DE RUPELLA, *Glossa super Sententias*, lib. I, d. 36, f. 41ra marg. inf.: «Dicimus quod in Deo fuerunt ydee rerum non tamen futurarum sed omnium possibilium fieri. Vnde in eo fuerunt ydee rerum infinitarum, quia scientia Dei infinita».

age” describes the effect of the cause, since an image is always the image of a model. As a consequence of this line of thought, John of La Rochelle assumes that the existence of the divine ideas in the divine essence does not require the effective existence of a thing that will be the image of that idea in temporal reality. Rather, it is the existence of the image which requires the previous temporal existence of the model of which it is the image. John explains:

It must be said that imagine and exemplar differ, because there is no image if not of the past, but exemplar is said with respect to a thing that follows in the future. Therefore, exemplar is attributed by reason of the cause, while image is attributed by reason of the effect. And since the effect depends on the cause and not the other way around, then the existence of the exemplar does not require the existence of the copy in the present or in the future, but as a possibility; instead, the existence of the thing of which it is image pre-exists the existence of the image⁹.

The Franciscan master further develops his own argument to underscore the different status of divine ideas and things that are copies of those ideas with respect to existence. The *res*, in fact, as images, require presupposing the existence of the ideas of which they are images, so that their existence depends on the preceding existence of the divine ideas. On the contrary, the existence of a divine idea involves the possible existence of the thing which would be the image of that idea, so that there cannot be any objective or reciprocal relation between the existence of the divine idea and the existence of the created thing. John argues in this way making use of a metaphor taken from university practice, in particular from the activity of producing and reproducing manuscripts which in-

9. *Ibidem*, f. 41ra marg. inf.: «Dicendum quod differunt ymago et exemplar, quia non est ymago nisi rei preteritis, sed exemplar dicitur respectu rei subsequentis. Vnde exemplar se habet in ratione cause, ymago uero in ratione effectus. Et quia effectus dependet a causa, non econtrario, ideo de esse exemplaris non exigitur esse exempli in presenti uel in futuro, sed in possibilitate; sed ad esse ymaginis preexigitur esse rei cuius est ymago».

volved *magistri* and *studentes* in a city, like the thirteenth-century Paris, where a university *studium* was at work. He notes:

You can take the example of the book, written for the purpose of getting others to write a book in the likeness of this one. Even if no one writes, nevertheless <that book> is an exemplar. Hence the term “exemplar” is about possible existence, as the term “cause” is said in potency in relation to effect in potency. From this the solution to the questions appears clear, because the example, that is said of the exemplar, does not concern only the thing that exists or that will exist but that which is potentially possible¹⁰.

The nature of a manuscript realized to work as a model – that is an *exemplar*, according to the technical language of the Parisian *stationarii* – does not depend on its being effectively copied or not, but rather on the fact that it determines the possibility of the existence of copies. In the same way, the exemplary nature of the divine ideas does not involve the necessary existence of their copies in time, in the past or in the future, but it allows potential copies to exist.

This clarification concerning the nature of the divine ideas and the connection between their existence and that of the things which are their images presents the relation between *ydeae* and *res* as univocal with respect to the issue of existence. In fact, the existence of a *res* supposes the necessary existence of the *ydea* which works as an *exemplar*, while the existence of the *ydea* does not involve that of the thing but only its possibility. Thus, the existence of the divine ideas and of the things do not imply each other, since the divine ideas can be the cause of the things, while latter beings are the possible effects of the former. In so doing, the theologian considers the divine will as exclusively responsible for the passage of a thing from the possibility of its existence to its effectiveness. The

10. *Ibidem*: «Exemplum potest poni de libro, quia ad hoc scribitur, ut ad similitudinem eius alii liber scribantur. Etsi nullus scribatur, nihilominus exemplar est. Vnde respectu esse possibilis est terminus ‘exemplar’ sicut causa in potentia dicitur respectu effectus in potentia. Per hoc patet solutio ad quesita, quia exemplum secundum quod dicitur ad exemplar non est solum rei que est uel que est futura, sed que est potentia possibilis».

divine ideas, that is God's knowledge of the created beings, do not bound God to make the *res* existing. Therefore, the conceptual distance between possibility and existence which separates *ydea* and *res* is what distinguishes the divine essence from the created beings.

2. The idea of evil

According to John of La Rochelle the notion of possible existence defines the metaphysical function of the divine ideas as *rationes* that work as exemplars. Precisely because of this feature, it raises the question of God's knowledge of evil. Since the divine ideas exist in the divine nature, God's knowledge of evil involves the existence of the idea of evil in God. The risk then arises of attributing to God the existence of evil, because if it is true that the existence of the idea of evil in God involves only the possibility of evil, it is also true that the factual existence of evil is the effect of the existence of the idea of evil in God, because it serves as a causal model. Thus, John needs to discuss whether God has to be considered as the cause of evil or not. On the one hand, there are *auctoritates* supporting the argument that connects the existence of evil to God's knowledge of it and therefore to the idea of evil existing in God, while other sources seem to deny that God could have knowledge of evil, raising the further question of whether or not the *scientia Dei* is infinite.

John of La Rochelle suggests that both the philosophical and Augustinian understandings of knowledge can be seen as a deny of God's knowledge of evil. Indeed, according to Algazel's *Metaphysics*, knowledge is defined as the assimilation of the knower to the known thing and such assimilation happens according to the essence or to the species. Since no assimilation of God to evil is possible, it follows that God would not have any knowledge of evil¹¹.

11. Cfr. *Ibidem*, f. 41ra marg. sup: «Dicit philosophus: scientia siue cognitio est assimilatio scientis cum scibili que est uel secundum essenciam aut secundum speciem. Sed nulla est assimilacio Dei ad malum, quia, etc.». La citazione di Algazel si trova in J.T. MUCKLE, *Algazel's Metaphysics*, St. Michael's College, Toronto 1933, p. 61, f. 35.

Augustine seems to agree on this point, as a passage from the *De Trinitate* – the text of the *glossa* erroneously refers to the *Confessions* – suggests: it is not the thing's existence that determines God's knowledge of it, but rather the existence of the thing's idea in God that makes possible the existence of that same thing. The Augustinian argument could be used to affirm that if God's knowledge of things is the cause of the things themselves, so He would be the cause of evil. However, since God cannot be the cause of evil, He cannot have a knowledge of evil. Therefore, the reference to Augustine becomes useful to reframe the notion of *scientia Dei* as the cause of created beings: such causality, as already said, belongs to the field of possibility and the existence of evil does not mean that God is the cause of it but only that He places the evil he knows in the field of possibility¹². John summarizes the argument which denies the presence of the idea of evil in God and explains:

It is said that everything is in God from eternity and so it is in His knowledge; but evil was never in God, because it is not known by God¹³.

John of La Rochelle sees at least two major problems in the thesis of God's "ignorance" of evil, that is of the absence of the idea of evil in God. First of all, the master quotes Gregory the Great to explain that the prophet's knowledge comes from his or her capacity to read in the *liber aeternitatis*, that is to have a knowledge of a thing which derives from its essence or from the divine idea of it. Since the prophet knows the future evils, he acquires such a knowledge through the divine ideas, so that in God the ideas

12. *Ibidem*: «Scientia Dei est causa rerum. Sed Deus modo est causa mali; ergo malum non est scibile a Deo. Vnde Augustinus in libro *Confessionum* [recte: *De Trinitate*]: "non [ms.: nos] quidem quia res sunt scimus res, sed quia Deus nouit res, res sunt"». Il riferimento agostiniano è ad AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De Trinitate*, WJ. Mountain, F. Glorie (edd.), Brepols, Turnhout 1968 (CCSL 50A), XV, 13, p. 495.

13. IOHANNES DE RUPELLA, *Glossa super Sententias*, lib. I, d. 36, f. 41ra: «Item, omnia dicuntur esse ab eterno in Deo et sic in eius cognitione; sed malum nunquam fuit in Deo, quia non cognoscitur a Deo».

of evils have to exist, and God has to know them¹⁴. The second problem is related to the punishment of evil human beings and to the resurrection of good ones. A God who is ignorant of evil, after all, could not act as the supreme judge of human beings' acts, which on the contrary is one of his proper roles¹⁵.

John's *solutio* rests upon the clarification of the kind of knowledge of evil that the ideas of the created things, including evil ones, determine in God. The master here assumes a distinction that Alexander of Hales had already developed: the existence in God of the idea of a created being gives raise to a speculative knowledge, that is to a *ratio*, which is a model according to which the existence of copies does not change the eternal nature of the model itself. Operative knowledge is quite different, since it is defined using the terms *verbum* and *ars* to explain that the knowledge of a thing determines its existence. John explains:

As stated above, science is twofold, that is, speculative and practical. The first does not imply the causal relationship with respect to known things, but the second does. And according to the first type of knowledge, God knows this <affirmation>: "do no evil". And the first is called model by Augustine, while the second <is called> word or art. In fact, they are called model and word because in the word there is the operative power of all the things that happen through the word, while the model, even if nothing is determined through it, is nevertheless called a model¹⁶.

14. *Ibidem*: «Contra. Dicit Gregorius: "prophete ea que cognoscebant et predicabant uidebant in libro eternitatis". Sed prophete dicebant mala futura et peccata populorum; ergo legebant ea in libro eternitatis et illa ibi erant secundum essentiam uel ydeam».

15. *Ibidem*: «Item, Deus est punitor malorum et premiator bonorum, quare necesse est Deum habere cognitionem bonorum et malorum, et ita Deus cognoscit mala».

16. IOHANNES, *Glossa super Sententias*, lib. I, d. 36, f. 4tra mar. sup.: «Ut supra habitum est, duplex est scientia, scilicet speculatiua et practica. Prima non se habet in ratione cause respectu scibilium, sed secunda. Et prima cognitione cognoscit Deus hanc: mala non facere, et uocatur ab Augustino prima ratio, secunda uero uerbum siue ars. Dicuntur enim ratio et uerbum quia in uerbo est potentia operatiua omnium que fiunt per uerbum; ratio uero, etsi nihil fiat per ipsa, nihilominus ratio dicitur».

This double form of knowledge introduces a crucial distinction, according to which God's knowledge of the things is not univocal, but it is related to whether or not God assigns real existence, as well as possible existence, to the things of which he has an idea. The speculative knowledge that leads to the *ratio*, namely to the model which also expresses the definition of a thing, does not cause the existence *in re* of the known idea, while the practical knowledge which happens through the *verbum* has an operative function and determines the existence of a thing which is the image of the idea present in the divine idea.

Against this background, John of La Rochelle is able to explain that God's knowledge of evil does not belong to the field of practical and operative knowledge, but rather it seems to be a knowledge by privation. Following a clearly Augustinian approach, the master explains that by adopting not the knower's point of view – in this case God's – but the known's condition, some things are knowable *per se* through the idea of being and goodness is such a thing. On the other hand, evil belongs to the things that can be known only through privation and not in themselves¹⁷.

3. *Per Filium*

Introducing the knowledge *per verbum*, with an operative nature and characterized in terms of the capability to give form and existence to things, that is an *ars*, requires John of La Rochelle to face a third question, which concerns the exegesis of Rom 11,36. Peter Lombard in his *Sentences* explains that Paul's statement: «by Him, through Him and in Him are all things» signifies the dependence of

17. *Ibidem*: «Ad illud quod obicitur quod omne quod cognoscitur est in cognoscente sic uel sic, dicendum quod quedam sunt per se cognoscibilia et hec habent ydeam, sic bonum cognoscitur et similiter lux; quedam uero non per se, sed per priuationem, sic malum, sicut tenebra non cognoscitur nisi per inuicem sic malum. Aliam speciem alia cognoscitur, sed per priuationem speciei boni cognoscitur. Auctoritates ergo ille intelligende sunt de hiis que habent cognosci per se, non per priuationem».

each thing on God¹⁸. Thus, the text of the Epistle to the Romans explains not only the way the created beings depend on God but also how it is possible to say that everything is made through God and that everything exists in God. Such a triple relation between the Creator and the creatures has a crucial trinitarian value with respect to the *scientia Dei*: it becomes the basis for arguing about the knowledge that the three divine persons have of the created beings and thus on how the divine persons themselves are related to the divine ideas.

The *Gloss* in ms. Vat. lat. 691 presents a short note explaining that each of the three prepositions – *ex*, *per* and *in* – is related to a specific person of the Trinity, since it signifies the relation of the creature with God according to a certain mode. Therefore, John explains:

This preposition “by” means the condition of the creatures with respect to God, insofar as He himself is the architect; this preposition “through” <means the condition of the creature with respect to God>, insofar as He is the art, and since there is no creation by the art but through the art, then it does not say that everything is made by the Son but through the Son; this preposition “in” means the condition of the end and this is appropriate for the Holy Spirit to whom goodness is attributed¹⁹.

The doctrine of the divine ideas assumes a Trinitarian relevance and in particular it becomes essential with respect to the person

18. Cfr. PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas (edd.), Grottaferrata, Roma 1971 (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4), lib. I, d. 36, c. 3, I, pp. 261-262: «Ecce habes quia ex eadem intelligentia Scripture dicit omnia esse *in ipso* et *per ipsum* et *ex ipso* uel *cum ipso*. – Cum ergo ex ea ratione omnia dicuntur esse ex Deo uel per ipsum: non solum quia scit, sed etiam quia auctor est eorum, consequitur ut eadem ratione ea esse in Deo dicantur, scilicet quia scit et eorum est auctor».

19. IOHANNES DE RUPELLA, *Glossa super Sententias*, lib. I, d. 36, f. 41va: «Hec prepositio “ex” notat habitudinem creaturarum ad Deum ut ipse est actor; hec prepositio “per” ut ipse est ars, et quia ex arte non creatur sed per artem, ideo non dicitur omnia ex Filio sed per Filium; hec prepositio “in” notat habitudinem finis et hec conuenit Spiritui Sancto cui attribuitur bonitas».

of the Son and to His relationship with the creation. In discussing the relation between the divine knowledge determined through the ideas and the existence of the created beings, the Franciscan master has already explained how only the knowledge *per verbum*, that is the *ars*, determines the existence. Such a position echoes not just the quoted passage from Rom 11,36, but also the hymn that opens the Gospel of John, where it says (Io 1,3): «through Him all things were made: and without Him nothing was made that has been made»²⁰. Against this background, John of La Rochelle is able to relate the divine ideas more specifically to the person of the Son, that is to the divine *Verbum*, through which everything has been made and that, acting thanks to his capability to do so (*ars*), realizes the operative connection between divine knowledge of the things and their existence *in re*. Thus, the Franciscan master considers the Pauline passage, as well as the Johannine, as two statements about the way the divine ideas act as models for the existence of the created beings through the activity of the second person of the Trinity, who acts as their maker.

John of La Rochelle discusses this same point in another passage of the *Gloss* to the *Sententiae*, commenting on the first distinction of book II of Lombard's text. Here, dealing with the issue of creation, the Franciscan master goes back to the relation between God's existence and the *res creatae*. He questions why the divine ideas are said to be proper to the Son rather than to the Father and to the Holy Spirit. In this case, the text of the *Gloss* presents a double redaction, since a second version is present in the manuscript Todi, Biblioteca Comunale «Lorenzo Leoni», 121, which differs from the Vatican manuscript. Such a double version is coherent with the fact that the *Gloss* collects the materials of a *reportatio* of the *lectura* John gave on Peter Lombard's writing.

The essential question is whether the divine ideas and their exemplarism have to be associated properly to the Son or rather to the *scientia Dei*, given that the proper feature of the *essentia divina* concerns equally the Father and the Holy Spirit. John reaffirms that

20. *Ibidem*: «omnia per ipsum [scil.: verbum] facta sunt: et sine ipso factum est nichil, quod factum est».

knowledge comes through the idea but he notes that, since the idea of a thing is like the image of that same thing, and since being the *ymago* is proper to the person of the Son, the divine ideas are more appropriate to the Son rather than to the other two Trinitarian persons. However, from the point of view of the goddess, the divine ideas in themselves exist in the divine nature and thus they belong to each divine person. In the following scheme we offer the double redaction of the passage²¹:

Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 691, f. 55vb

Todi, Biblioteca Comunale, 121, f. 131va

We say that since knowledge is determined by means of the idea and the wisdom is attributed to the Son, then the idea is also appropriate to the Son. Therefore, wisdom is said to pertain to the <divine> essence but is appropriate for the Son. The same holds for the idea. Furthermore, the cause of the breath is another, because the Son alone is image, while the idea is like the image of the thing by which the thing is distinguished.

Since knowledge is determined by means of the idea, while this wisdom is said in an essential way <of God>, nevertheless it is attributed to the Son and so it is with the idea, although it is proper to the essence and is suitable for every person. And also for another argument, because in the Trinity only the Son is called 'image', and on the other hand the idea is like the image of the thing.

In the relation between God and the created beings, taken from the point of view of the creation of the world, the divine ideas do

21. IOHANNES DE RUPELLA, *Glossa super Sententias*, lib. II, d. 1, Vat. lat. 691, f. 55vb: «Dicimus, quia per ydeam fit cognitio et sapientia Filio attribuitur, ideo et ydea appropriatur Filio. Vnde dicitur quod sapientia est essenziale sed appropriatur Filio. Similiter est de ydea. Item, alia ponitur causa spirationis quia solus Filius est ymago; ydea autem est sicut ymago rei qua res distinguitur»; Todi, Biblioteca Comunale, 121, f. 131va: «Quoniam per ydeam fit cognitio, sapientia autem hec dicitur essentialiter appropriatur tamen Filio, et ideo ydea, quoamuis sit essentie et cuilibet persone, conueniat Filio. Et etiam propter aliud, quoniam in Trinitate solus Filius ymago dicitur; ydea autem sicut imago rei est».

not belong only to the speculative field. They are in God and in the divine essence not only as the *rationes* of everything which has the possibility to exist. Here they are considered as the *divina exemplaria*, whose existence in God is the cause of the existence of the *res*. They are the subject of the *ars* and *verbum* which belong to the practical knowledge identified with the Son.

From this point of view, the Pauline verse where everything is said to have been made «by Him, through Him and in Him» has the value of a statement, in Biblical form, of the principle of efficient cause, according to which the existence of the created beings depends on the divine ideas and the infinite knowledge that God has through them of things. Indeed, as far as through the Son, Who is the *verbum*, the existing things are known to God as existing, they exist. The efficient causality of the Son is different from that of the Father, since this latter is the cause “by which” everything derives because the Father signifies God as first principle, and from that of the Holy Spirit, which signifies the final principle, that is the end to which everything tends.

John of La Rochelle explains all this in more detail in his reading of Rom 11,36, as part of his *Glossa super Pauli Epistolas* which clearly is a sort of diptych with the *Glossa* on Lombard's *Sententiae*²². Here the master explains:

And by reason of the capacity of these three prepositions, “by” “through” “in”, the distinction of the three <divine> persons are highlighted here. “By”, in fact, expresses the efficient cause by reason of the first principle and therefore, by the fact that it says “by him”, it refers to the Father who is the first principle <which does not depend> on anything else. “Through” expresses the efficient cause by reason of the principle but <which depends> on another, and therefore the expression that <Paul> uses, “through him”, belongs to the Son who is the principle <which depends> on the

22. It should be noted that in some manuscripts, such as the Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 94, the *Glossa* by Giovanni de La Rochelle is copied in the margins of the Pauline text accompanied by Peter Lombard's *Magna Glossatura*. This testifies to the centrality of the work of the *Magister Sententiarum* in structuring the *curricula* of the entire Parisian theological and exegetical environment of the first half of the thirteenth century.

Father. Instead, "in" expresses the efficient cause by reason of the final principle or term that <depends> on the other <persons>, and therefore what is said "in him" belongs to the Holy Spirit. And thus, the Trinity is manifested here when it is said "by Him" the Father, "through Him" the Son, "in Him" the Holy Spirit. Subsequently, the unity of the essence is shown when one says in the singular "to Him", and not "to them", "honour and glory", that is "honour" to the Trinity of persons, "glory" to the unity of essence. And this <expression>: "for ever and ever. Amen", is similarly in 1Tim (1,17): "to the king of all ages, immortal and invisible God, honour and glory for ever and ever. Amen"²³.

4. The fragments of a metaphysics of the divine ideas

The study of John of La Rochelle's texts on the divine ideas presents a fragmented doctrinal framework of this specific topic. As already noted, the master didn't devote a specific analysis to this issue and in his known literary production there is no disputed question on the *ydae divinae* nor on the *rationes aeternae* comparable to the systematic analysis in Bonaventure's *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*. John's writings illustrate stances on some aspects of the divine ideas, starting from specific passages from Scripture or Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*. Beside this, the fragmented character

23. IOHANNES DE RUPELLA, *Glossa in beati Pauli Epistolas, ad Rom 11, 36*, mss. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 15602, f. 51vb; Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 94, f. 72vb: «*Quoniam ex ipso*, etc. Et per uirtutem harum trium prepositionum, "ex" "per" "in", notatur hic distinctio trium personarum. "Ex" enim dicit causam efficientem in ratione primi principii, et ideo "ex" dicitur "ex ipso", pertinet ad Patrem qui est principium primum non ab alio. "Per" dicit causam efficientem in ratione principii sed ab alio, et ideo quod dicit "per ipsum" competit Filio qui est principium a Patre. "In" uero dicit causam efficientem in ratione finalis principii siue termini qui ab aliis, et ideo quod dicitur "in ipso" pertinet ad Spiritum Sanctum. Et ita notatur hic Trinitas cum dicitur "ex ipso" Patre, "per ipsum" Filium, "in ipso" Spiritui Sancto. Post modum notatur unitas essencie cum singulariter dicitur: *ipsi*, non "ipsis", *honor et gloria*, id est "honor" Trinitati personarum, "gloria" unitati essencie. Et hoc: *in secula seculorum. Amen*, simile <est n> I Thimoteo 1 [1, 17]: *regi seculorum, immortalis et inuisibili Deo, honor et gloria in secula seculorum. Amen*».

of the master's reasoning depends also on the literary features of his writings, which have the form of glosses in which the contents of his oral teaching are concisely summarized, as is evident from the condensed nature of the notes and from their syntax. This is particularly true of the glosses in the *marginalia* of the manuscript Vat. lat. 691.

Despite such a fragmentary understanding of John of La Rochelle's position on the divine ideas, the texts we have been considering allow us to focus on some crucial doctrinal aspects of the theologian's reasoning. The first crucial question the *magister* discusses is the relation between the *ydeae divinae* as contents of the *scientia Dei infinita* and the existence *in re* of the things that are copies of the ideas. John's exemplarism aims at avoiding every risk of mutual implication between existence of the *res* and existence of the *ydea*. In this way, the relation between God and the created beings is not conditioned by necessity, which would make God's knowledge of things dependent on their existence.

The second doctrinal question that John considers is the distinction between two approaches to the divine ideas. *Ex parte Dei*, that is as existing in the divine essence as *rationes*, the divine ideas are models with an intelligible content, which determine the possibility and not the necessity of the existence of the created beings. On the contrary, *ex parte rei*, the existence of a created being involves the existence of the divine idea that is the model of that being and has a logico-ontological and temporal priority with respect to it. Such a perspective guarantees the freedom of the divine will in conferring effective existence on a *res* making it an image of the corresponding *ratio aeterna*, which exists in the divine essence. In addition, it preserves the infinite nature of the *scientia Dei*, which is not bound by the effective and temporal existence of things but rather concerns the larger field of the possibility of existence.

John of La Rochelle intertwines two distinctions: the one between knowledge of the infinite possible things and knowledge of the existing beings *qua* existing with that between speculative and practical knowledge. If applied to God and His "science", this distinction makes it possible to bring out the difference between the knowledge of the *rationes* and that of the things God realizes *per*

verbum by thinking them as existing. The Franciscan master offers a further development of this point: in referring to the divine word as that on which the existence of things depends, he assumes the doctrine of the divine ideas as the pillar of the theological explanation of the relation that links the creatures to God, and which is summarized in the Pauline formula: «by Him, through Him, in Him are all things». The triple relation which the prepositions “by” “through” and “in” signify concerns the efficient cause considered from three different points of view each corresponding to one of the divine Persons. Within this scheme, the divine ideas are linked mainly to the Son, because it is through the second divine Person that things exist as copies of the *exemplaria divina*, which are in the divine nature.

In short, despite their fragmentary nature, John of La Rochelle's arguments appear as the tesserae of the mosaic of a metaphysical view in which the exemplarism of the divine ideas has a central role. The masters who will follow John will take advantage of his arguing, and their reasoning on the issue of the divine ideas will make use of his inheritance, as it has been seen in the case of Bonaventure of Bagnoregio.

Ejemplaridad y modalidad en la *Quaestio de modo existendi rerum in Deo* de Odón Rigaud. Antecedentes y proyección

CARLOS M. MARTÍNEZ RUIZ*

La cuestión abordada en este trabajo fue planteada en el siglo XII por el autor de la *Summa Sententiarum*, atribuida a Hugo de San Víctor, en estos términos: «¿La presciencia divina es causa de las cosas, o bien las cosas son la causa de la presciencia divina?» Apenas formulada la pregunta, advirtió, con Boecio, que cualquier respuesta que propongamos desemboca en una aporía: Si la ciencia de Dios es causa de las cosas, debemos admitir que Dios es causa del mal; y si las cosas son causa de la presciencia divina, debemos admitir que lo temporal es causa de lo eterno. Absteniéndose de resolver el dilema, finalmente, optó por poner en mayor evidencia su gravedad, mediante una cita del *De natura et origine animae* de Agustín que precisa el contenido de lo que está en juego: «¿Puede decirse que se preconoce el futuro cuando no hay futuro?» De este modo, el anónimo autor fijó las coordenadas del debate al que se ciñe este trabajo, recogidas por Pedro Lombardo en las distinciones 35 y 38 del primer libro de las *Sentencias*¹. Creo

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1. *Summa Sententiarum* I, 12, PL 176, 61C-62D: «De praesentia solet quaeri utrum utrum ipsa sit causa rerum, vel ipsa est causa praesentiae»; AUGUSTINUS HIPONENSIS, *De natura et origine animae* I, 12, 15, K.F. Urba, I. Zycha (edd.), F. Tempisky, G. Freytag, Wien-Leipzig 1913 (CSEL 60), p. 316: «Quid, quod ipsa exinanitur omnino praesentia, si quod praescitur non erit? Quomodo enim recte dicitur praesciri futurum, quod non est futurum?»; PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae*, PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas (edd.), Grottaferrata, Roma 1971 (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 4), 1/2, d. 35, cap. 7, pp. 255-256: «Utrum scientia vel praesentia vel dispositio vel praedestinatio poterit

que la cuestión podría formularse así: *Quia aliquid futurum est, ideo scitur a Deo antequam fiat?*

Los problemas relevados, analizados y discutidos en estas preguntas fueron variando y derivando corolarios sin solución de continuidad hasta el siglo XIV, en el marco curricular y textual de la *secunda pars* del I *Liber Sententiarum* (dist. 35-48), cuya unidad temática fue señalada y justificada por primera vez por Odón Rigaud². En este contexto, la investigación acerca de la ciencia y de la presciencia divina de todas las cosas fue perfilando y consolidando, en sus avances, una visión del conocimiento de Dios estrechamente vinculada a la *productio rerum* (y viceversa), que se vio reflejada paso a paso en una doctrina modal, tanto en el plano lógico como en el plano gnoseológico y en el plano metafísico. Desde las primeras grandes obras del siglo XIII (el *Sapientiale* de Guillermo de Auvergne, la *Summa Aurea* de Guillermo de Auxerre, la *Summa de bono* de Felipe el Canciller, la *Glossa in IV Libros Sententiarum Petri Lom-*

*esse in Deo si nulla fuissent futura, Hic considerari oportet utrum scientia vel praesentia, vel dispositio vel praedestinatio, potuerit esse in Deo, si nulla fuissent futura. Cum enim «praesentia sit futurorum, et dispositio faciendorum, et praedestinatio salvandorum», si nulla essent futura, si nihil esset facturus Deus vel aliquos salvaturus, non videtur potuisse in Deo esse praesentia vel dispositio vel praedestinatio»; *ibidem*, d. 38, cap. 2, p. 277: «Hic oritur quaestio non dissimulanda, utrum scilicet scientia vel praesentia sit causa rerum, an res sint causa scientiae vel praesentiae Dei».*

2. ODO RIGALDUS, *Lectura in I Sententiarum*, L. Sileo (ed.), *De rerum ideis. Dio e le cose nel dibattito universitario del tredicesimo secolo. I. Editio textuum Odonis Rigaldi et aliorum*, Urbaniana University Press, Roma, 2011, d. 35, q. 1, 28, p. 9: «ista appropriata, de quibus hic agitur, “specialiter efflagitant tractatum”, non solum propter sui difficultatem, sed quia alio modo notificant quam ea de quibus dictum est supra. Ponit enim notificari Creator per ea quae dicuntur de ipso absolute, et de iis habitum est supra, et per ea quae de ipso dicuntur per respectum ad creaturas: et de iis agit in hac parte, non quia appropriata sunt, sed quia alio modo notificant Deum quam alia, et etiam quia sunt illa per quae exeunt creaturas in esse, – et non de iis agit immediate ante librum II, in quo agitur de creaturis. Per hoc patet quod non similiter debet repetere de aliis appropriatis de quibus actum est supra, quia non notificant Creatorem nisi secundum se, et ideo solum in parte supra habita de ipsis debet agi». Sobre la concepción de la *scientia divina* en los *Libros de las Sentencias*, cfr. J.-C. BARDOUT, O. BOULNOIS, *Pierre Lombard*, in *Id.* (éd.), *Sur la science divine*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 2002 (Epiméthée. *Essais philosophiques*), pp. 130-134.

bardi de Alejandro de Hales, etc.) se fue afianzando sin pausa una comprensión de la posibilidad en cuanto potencia, y, en tal sentido, referida a la factibilidad. En efecto, los teólogos parisinos de este período abordaron el alcance del conocimiento divino en función de lo que Dios *puede* conocer, y el alcance de lo que Dios puede conocer en función de lo que Dios *puede* realizar. De este modo, favorecieron un isomorfismo más o menos fuerte entre *escibilia* y *future*, determinante del isomorfismo *possibilia* – *factura*, y fueron acordando en que tanto los males como los posibles no futuros no pueden ser conocidos por sí mismos, en cuanto carecen de entidad y, por tanto, de *ideas* en Dios³.

Odón Rigaud, sin embargo, demuestra su agudeza y su originalidad, discutiendo resueltamente una teología que restrinja la *scientia Dei* a lo que Dios puede crear o realizar, y sienta bases bastante sólidas para una comprensión de la posibilidad *a parte rei*, cuyos antecedentes y desarrollo me propongo exponer en estas páginas. Mi objetivo principal es relevar la teoría modal inherente a la doctrina rigaldiana *de scientia dei* en general y *de ideis* en particular, razón por la cual enfocaré mi análisis en la q. 6 de la II Parte de la *Quaestio de existentia rerum in Deo*, en la que Odón se pregunta «si Dios posee en general ideas de todos los posibles». Para ello, me serviré del marco teórico por él establecido en las distinciones 35, 36, 38 y 39 de la *Lectura in I Sententiarum*, así como de las obras de los principales interlocutores que ha tomado en cuenta: Guillermo de Auxerre, Alejandro de Hales y Alberto Magno.

1. La triple división de la ciencia divina según Guillermo de Auxerre

Guillermo de Auxerre dedica uno de los tratados de la *Summa aurea* (redactada antes del 1229 según Ribailier) a la *scientia Dei*. Allí intro-

3. Cfr. ARISTOTELES, *Physica* IV 8, 215a10: «Non entis non sunt species et differentiae»; *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, J. Hamesse (ed.), *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis. Un florilège médiéval*. Étude historique et édition critique, Publications Universitaires, Louvain-Béatrice Nauwelaerts, Paris 1974, n. 132, p. 150.

duce una distinción clave en términos modales para comprender la ciencia y el saber de Dios, cuya recepción fue amplia e inmediata, y se extendió hasta la escolástica barroca, tanto en el ámbito ontológico (*de scientia rerum*) como en el lógico (*de scientia enuntiabilium*). El tratado IX se divide en tres capítulos, el primero de los cuales, tras bosquejar una teoría general del conocimiento (*qualiter Deus scit omnia*), se enfoca en el problema del conocimiento divino del mal; el segundo expone la célebre división de la ciencia divina (*de multiplicitate huius verbi 'scire' secundum quod dicitur de Deo et utrum Deus plura possit scire quam sciat*); y el tercero trata el problema de la predestinación (*de predestinatione*).

Guillermo explica el conocimiento divino a partir del conocimiento humano como *assimilatio*, concepción que los autores del siglo XIII atribuyeron tanto a Aristóteles como a Agustín⁴. En efecto, tanto para Dios como para nosotros, la *scientia* consiste en una asimilación del entendimiento a la cosa entendida, pero de modos diferentes. Mientras el conocimiento humano solo puede producirse a partir de las cosas que existen y, por tanto, la semejanza producida es un *concepto*; Dios es la causa de la cosa conocida y la semejanza producida es una *idea*. Esa es la razón por la que, a diferencia de nosotros, conociendo su propia esencia conoce las cosas pasadas, presentes y futuras contingentes⁵.

4. ID., *De anima* III 8, 431b21; AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De Trinitate*, W. Mountain, F. Glorie (edd.), Brepols, Turnhout 2001 (CCSL 50), IX, 11, 16, pp. 307-308. Cfr. PHILIPPUS CANCELLARIUS, *Summa de bono*, N. Wicki (ed.), Francke, Bern 1982, 2 voll., I, q. 6, p. 275; ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*, PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas (edd.), 3 voll., Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Firenze 1960, II, q. 46, disp. I, m. I, 19, p. 793; ID., *Summa Theologica [Summa Halensis]*, PP. Collegii a S. Bonaventura ad Claras Aquas (edd.), Firenze 1924-1948, I, inq. I, tr. 5, sect. I, q. un., 163, p. 244A; ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *In I Sententiarum*, A. Borgnet (ed.), Paris 1893 (Opera omnia 26), d. 36 A, a. 2, 2, p. 206B: «Ut volunt omnes philosophi, scientia nihil aliud est quam assimilatio scienti ad rem scitam per rationem, sciti et speciem».

5. GUILLELMUS ALTISSIODORENSIS, *Summa aurea in quattuor libros Sententiarum*, J. Ribailier (ed.), Paris-Grottaferrata 1980-1987, 4 voll., (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 16-20), I, 9, 1, p. 177: «dicimus quod scire de Deo dicitur per similitudinem naturalium; in naturalibus autem "scientia est assimilatio intellectus ad rem"; unde hoc verbum "scit" divinam essentiam significat ut exemplar»; 9, 3, q. 5, p.

Con relación al *modo* del conocimiento, Guillermo acepta la distinción propuesta por Pedro Lombardo entre la *aprobación* y el *mero conocimiento*, en virtud de la cual, Dios conoce por aprobación solo los bienes, pero por simple conocimiento no solo los bienes, sino también los males⁶. La novedad de Guillermo consiste en introducir una división en este segundo tipo de conocimiento. A diferencia de la aprobación, que es un conocimiento complejo, la *notitia* es un conocimiento simple, pero de dos maneras distintas, a saber, en cuanto visión y en cuanto intelección. Así pues, el estudio de la ciencia divina exige un triple análisis, toda vez que, para Dios, “saber” puede significar tanto “aprobar”, como “ver” o “entender”, según el punto de vista que se asuma, no solo respecto del objeto del conocimiento, sino del tipo de cognición operado. Según el conocimiento “visivo” Dios solo conoce las cosas futuras y, por tanto, reales, ya que la visión exige presencia del objeto. El conocimiento “intelectivo”, por el contrario es conocimiento en el más amplio sentido posible, según el cual Dios conoce todo lo pensable, ya sea que exista, ya sea que no exista pero que pueda existir, y aún aquello que no existe ni puede existir.

Hoc verbum ‘scire’ dictum de Deo multipliciter accipitur. Quandoque accipitur pro approbare, quandoque pro simplici notitia. Et sic dupliciter: uno modo significat divinam essentiam ut visionem; per hanc scientiam scit Deus tantum ea que fuerunt futura, quia visio exigit rei presentiam et Deo presentia sunt quecumque fuerunt futura; secundo significat divinam essentiam ut intelligentiam sive scientiam largissime sumptam,

195: «Non est simile de scientia hominis et de scientia Dei, quia scientia hominis generatur a rebus que ponunt ymagines suas in anima; unde necessarium est res generasse scientiam sui in anima; sed scientia Dei non formatur a rebus, immo se ipso videt non tantum preterita et presentia, sed futura contingentia. Est ergo certior Dei scientia quam scientia hominis quantum ad infallibilitatem, sed non quantum ad rei fixationem vel determinationem». J.-L. SOLÈRE, *La logique d’un texte médiéval: Guillaume d’Auxerre et la question du possible*, «Revue Philosophique de Louvain» 98/2 (2000), pp. 250-293.

6. PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae*, I, d. 36, c. 4, p. 260: «Cognoscit ergo Deus et bona et mala per scientiam; sed bona cognoscit etiam per approbationem, per beneplacitum, mala vera non».

et secundum hanc scit Deus omne excogitabile, sive sit sive non sit et posse esse, sive nec sit nec possit esse⁷.

No se trata, por cierto, de tres operaciones diferentes, sino de tres significados diferentes de una misma operación (saber) de la esencia divina, esto es, como aprobación, como visión y como inteligencia. Estos tres tipos de conocimiento no se excluyen mutuamente, sino que guardan entre sí una relación de determinación creciente⁸. Esta distinción es muy importante para el presente estudio ya que asienta al menos dos elementos conceptuales claves: 1) la presencia de la cosa como condición determinante de la ciencia visiva de lo real; y 2) la diferenciación de la visión y la intelección a partir del objeto: los entes *futuros*, es decir, los que serán efectivamente creados en el primer caso, y *todo lo pensable*, es decir, todo lo posible, en el segundo.

Tanto Alejandro de Hales como Alberto Magno, cuyas obras analizaré a continuación, refieren la división de Guillermo, pero no la siguen en sus tesis sobre la *scientia Dei*, su modalidad y su alcance, ya que ambos comparten la idea de que Dios no conoce lo que no es futuro. La *Summa Halensis*, por el contrario, no solo la refiere, sino que la incluye en su conclusión, pero sin desarrollar sus aspectos modales⁹. Odón Rigaud es el único que la retoma y la emplea

7. GUILLELMUS ALTISSIODORENSIS, *Summa aurea*, I, tr. 9, 2, p. 180.

8. S.T. BONINO, *Thomas d'Aquin. De la vérité. Question 2 (La science en Dieu). Introduction, traduction et commentaire*, avec une préface de R. Imbach, Éditions Universitaires-Éditions du Cerf, Fribourg-Paris 1996, p. 572.

9. ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Glossa in I Sententiarum*, PP. Collegii a S. Bonaventurae (edd.), *Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae*, Firenze 1951, d. 39, 8, p. 398; ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *In I Sententiarum*, d. 39, A, a. 4, p. 296; *Summa Halensis* I, inq. 1, tr. 5, 1, q. un. (179), resp., 264A: «Scientia Dei tribus modis accipitur. Uno modo pro approbatione, Psalm.: *Novit Deus viam istorum*. Alio modo pro simplici notitia, sed hoc duobus modis: absolute, non connotando existentiam rei scitae, Psalm.: *Scientiae eius non est numerus*; alio modo connotando, secundum quod dicit Eccli.: *A Domino Deo antequam crearentur, cuncta cognita sunt, et post perfectum*, etc., et hoc modo significatur, ut quidam dixerunt, divina scientia ut visio, quasi transiens super rem. Primo modo bona dicuntur subiecta divina scientiae; secundo modo bona et mala, entia et non entia; tertio modo, bona et mala, sed entia tantum secundum aliquod tempus, praesens, praeteritum vel futurum. Et secundum hoc

para sostener la tesis de que Dios no solo conoce los no-entes, sino también los *posibles*. Y de unos y otros posee ideas.

2. Alejandro de Hales: el *exemplar* como semejanza y posibilidad

El texto más importante de Alejandro de Hales a considerar para nuestro propósito es la q. 46 (*de modo essendi rerum in deo*), perteneciente a la colección de cuestiones disputadas antes de su ingreso a la Orden franciscana, entre 1220 y 1236. Esta cuestión se articula con la anterior, en la que trató el modo de existencia de Dios en las criaturas. El último miembro de la q. 46, en efecto, compara y relaciona ambos modos, aunque se centra en el *modus essendi rerum in Deo*¹⁰. La tesis expuesta en dicha cuestión ha sido luego resumida y levemente precisada en la *Glossa* a la distinción 36 del primer *Libro de las Sentencias*, redactada entre 1224 y 1226¹¹.

En la q. 46 Alejandro fija algunos puntos nodales del problema *de ideis*. La pregunta surge del texto del Prólogo al Evangelio

scientia Dei tripliciter dicitur: scientia approbationis, intelligentia, visio. Dicendum ergo ad quaestionem quod scientia Dei non augetur, scita tamen bene possunt augeri». Cfr. M. OZILLOU, *Alexandre d'Halès*, in J.-C. BARDOU, O. BOULNOIS (éds.), *Sur la science divine*, pp. 152-157.

10. ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*, II, q. 46, disp. 1, m. 1, p. 783: «Quaeritur, ratione huius verbi quod dicitur in Evangelio: *Quod factum est, in ipso vita erat*, et ratione illius 11 Rom, 36: *Ex ipso et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia*, utrum creaturae sint in Deo; et si sunt in eo, utrum secundum unum modum sint in eo vel secundum plures, et utrum sint in ipso unum vel plura». Sobre Alejandro de Hales, véase en este volumen el trabajo de Lydia Schumacher.

11. Id., *Glossa in I Sententiarum*, d. 36, 4, p. 357. Rega Wood ha mostrado la evolución del pensamiento de Alejandro con relación a la multiplicidad de ideas en Dios y a su tratamiento, plasmado en la *Glossa* a la distinción 36 y en la q. 46. A pesar de que, como ella misma explica, ambos textos podrían ser contemporáneos, propone un orden redaccional inverso al que estoy siguiendo. Entiendo que no hay elementos suficientes para decidirse por ninguna de las dos alternativas y, en cuanto a la comprensión de la modalidad que nos interesa en este trabajo, tampoco la considero relevante. Cfr. R. Wood, *Distinct Ideas and Perfect Solitude: Alexander of Hales, Richard Rufus, and Odo Rigaldus*, «Franciscan Studies» 53 (1993), pp. 7-46: 9-14.

de Juan y atañe no solamente a la existencia de las cosas en Dios, sino a la temporalidad implicada, a saber la anterioridad de la vida en Dios de las cosas respecto de su efectiva creación. Apoyándose sobre todo en textos de Agustín, Alejandro sostiene que las cosas existen en Dios en tanto sujeto cognoscente, es decir, en cuanto conocidas. En las *Biblia parisiensia*, en uso en la facultad de Teología de París en el siglo XIII, el texto joánico de referencia reza: «*Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil. Quod factum est in ipso vita erat, et vita erat lux hominum*»¹². El sintagma *in ipso vita erat* es predicativo del sujeto *quod factum est*; de modo que la “vida” en cuestión se refiere a la existencia de todo «lo que fue hecho» – es decir, de las criaturas – en Dios. La *Glossa interlinearis* lo subraya claramente:

Omnia] id est omnis creatura visibilis et inuisibilis, omnis forma,
omnis compago, omnis concordia partium.
sine ipso] nulla res subsistens sine ipso est facta.
Quod] et omne
factum est] in tempore
in ipso vita erat] in spirituali factoris ratione semper viuit et vixit¹³.

Esta advertencia es importante para comprender el problema relevado por los autores medievales respecto de la existencia de las cosas en Dios y por Alejandro en particular en torno a las ideas de cosas posibles pero no *hechas* o creadas, al que le dedica la parte central y más extensa de la *quaestio*. En efecto, la cuestión de *modo essendi rerum in deo* comporta, según el halense, cuatro subcuestiones:

12. Io 1,3-4: «Todas las cosas fueron hechas mediante él y sin él no fue hecho nada. Todo lo que fue hecho era vida en él, y la vida era la luz de los hombres». A diferencia del texto griego, que dice: *πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἓν ὃ ὄργονεν. ἐν αὐτῷ ζῶν ἦν, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἦν τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων...* («Todas las cosas fueron hechas mediante él y sin él no fue hecho nada de cuanto existe. En él era la vida, y la vida era la luz de los hombres»).

13. *Bibliorum Sacrorum Tomus Quintus, cum Glossa ordinaria & Nicolai Lyranni expositionibus litterali et morali: Additionibus insuper & replicis*, Lyon 1545, f. 186r. El texto de las *parisiensia* coincide con el de la *Vulgata* y será mantenido igual en la *Sixto-Clementina*.

- I. Si la existencia de las cosas en Dios se realiza de un solo modo o de modos diversos (4);
- II. Si la existencia de las criaturas en Dios es la misma antes y después de existir en el mundo (5);
- III. Si aquello que no es ni será existe en Dios como *vita* (6-9);
- IV. Si las criaturas existen en Dios en razón de su potencia, su sabiduría o su bondad (10-13)¹⁴.

Estas cuatro preguntas forman dos pares complementarios: I-IV y II-III y, en estrecha relación con el Prólogo de Juan, abordan el problema de la existencia de ideas de lo posible en tanto factible, esto es, a partir de su realización.

En cuanto al primer par de preguntas (I y IV) Alejandro apela a las diferencias en el modo en que Juan, Lucas y Pablo se refieren a la existencia de las criaturas en Dios para mostrar que, desde el punto de vista causal, puede ser considerada de tres modos diferentes. En efecto, las cosas existen; (i) en la causa en tanto razón o idea, (ii) en la causa en tanto causa, y (iii) en la causa en cuanto salva y termina el efecto. Por consiguiente, los *modi essendi rerum in deo* son tres. Mientras el primero (i) es eterno, (ii) y (iii) son temporales, considerando la temporalidad en sentido amplio, no estricto, es decir en cuanto medida del cambio o paso del no ser al ser¹⁵.

14. ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*, II, q. 46, disp. I, m. I, 4, p. 784: «utrum diversi sunt modi secundum quos creaturae dicuntur esse in ipso»; 5, pp. 785-786: «utrum aliter sint vita in eo cum iam factae sunt et antequam factae sunt»; 6, p. 786: «Post quaeritur utrum aliquid quod non est et quod non erit possit dici *vita in ipso*»; 10, p. 788: «Post quaeritur, cum omnia dicantur in eo esse vita, utrum dicatur hoc per comparationem ad essentiam, vel ratione potentiae, vel sapientiae, vel bonitatis seu voluntatis». Alejandro responde las preguntas en el siguiente orden I (14), III (15-16), II (17) y IV (18).

15. (i) Io 1,3-4: «Quod factum est, in ipso vita erat»; (ii) Act 17,28: «In ipso sumus, vivimus et movemur» y (iii) Rom 11,36: «Ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia». ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*, II, q. 46, disp. I, m. I, 14, pp. 790-791: «Sunt ergo tres modi essendi in Deo: scilicet in eo quod est causa secundum rationem vel ideam, et hoc est quod dicitur in Evangelio: *Quod factum est, in ipso vita erat*; vel esse in causa ut causa, [et] sic sumitur illud Act 17,28; vel esse in causa salvante et terminante, et huic respondet illud quod dicitur ad Rom 11,36: summa enim bonitas salvat et finit. Unde concedendum est

En estrecha relación semántica con el *esse in*, la expresión *esse vita* no puede referirse sin más ni a la inteligencia ni a la voluntad divina, si tenemos en cuenta tanto los bienes como los males. En efecto, ¿de qué modo se relacionan los males con el conocimiento y la bondad o voluntad de Dios? La respuesta a la que arriba Alejandro es que, de una parte, no podemos decir que los males *existan* en Dios, pero tampoco podemos decir que los ignore. De otra parte, tampoco podemos afirmar que su potencia, su sabiduría y su bondad no los alcance. La potencia divina se extiende a los males no porque Dios *pueda* realizarlos, así como su voluntad tampoco *puede* quererlos, sino porque puede prohibir y castigar su comisión. De modo que solo el conocimiento (y no la voluntad) de Dios se extiende a los males, y de estos se puede decir que son vida y existen *en él* en cuanto a su bondad, no porque puede quererlos sino porque puede impedirlos¹⁶. En conclusión, existiendo en Dios como causa y sujeto cognoscente, las criaturas son vida en él según su inteligencia práctica¹⁷. Ese tipo de cognición de las criaturas – sostiene el halense a través de una cita de Agustín – mira a su realización por parte del sujeto y a la semejanza por parte del objeto. En la relación primordial entre el objeto y su imagen, ser y

quod aliter dicuntur creaturae ‘in ipso’ secundum istos tres modos». Con respecto a la importancia de esos tres pasajes neotestamentarios en el contexto del empeño característico de la primera generación de maestros universitarios parisinos por elaborar una teoría coherente de la *creatio*, véase L. SILEO, *Dalla lectio alla disputatio: Le Questioni De modo essendi Dei in creaturis, De existentia rerum in Deo e De voluntate Dei di Odo Rigaldi*, in A. CACCIOTI, B. FAES DE MOTTONI (a cura di), *Editori di Quaracchi, 100 anni dopo. Bilancio e prospettive. Atti del Colloquio Internazionale. Roma 29-30 Maggio 1995*, PAA-Edizioni Antonianum, Roma 1997, pp. 109-131: 125-127.

16. Cfr. *Summa Halensis*, I, inq. 1, tr. 5, sect. 1, q. un., m. 3, cap. 3, resp., p. 253AB: «Et est exemplum Augustini in arte: Deus enim ita scit malum sicut ars novit vitium. Quaedam enim sunt in arte ut approbanda, quaedam ut reprobanda, sicut in grammatica congruum et incongruum: congruum, ut approbandum; incongruum ut reprobandum. Ita Deus in se ipso arte scit malum ut reprobandum, bonum verum ut approbandum».

17. ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Quaestiones disputatae ‘antequam esset frater’*, II, q. 46, disp. 1, m. 1, 18, p. 793: «Ad aliud, utrum circumscripta per intelligentiam, potentia, sapientia [et bonitate] vel voluntate, dicantur esse in essentia vita, dicendum quod secundum intelligentiam practicam dicuntur esse *vita in ipso*... Patet ergo quod *esse vita in ipso* non est praeter essentiam in se, sed convenit intelligenti essentiae practicae».

vivir se identifican, de modo que en la idea o razón eterna radica la primera intelección de todas las cosas, buenas y malas, «como un verbo perfecto al que no le falta nada»¹⁸.

Con relación al segundo par de cuestiones (II y III), Alejandro opone un texto de Agustín reportado en la *Glossa ordinaria*, con la letra del Prólogo joáneo. Según Agustín, el carpintero fabrica el arca en su mente antes que en la madera, de modo que, al existir en su mente, el arca vive con el artesano antes de ser realizada¹⁹. Dicha afirmación no se compadece con el texto joáneo, según el cual las criaturas viven *ab aeterno* en Dios. Y esta vida de las criaturas, por otra parte, solo puede entenderse según sus razones o ideas existentes en la mente divina. Sin embargo, al ser creadas en el tiempo y existir fuera de la mente divina, las cosas parecen poseer más vida que antes, toda vez que tienen ser no solo en el arquetipo, sino también en la realidad. Según Anselmo (que Alejandro confunde aquí con Agustín), las criaturas ni son de otro modo ni tienen más ser cuando existen fuera de la mente divina que antes, porque no existen en Dios como son en sí mismas, sino como existen en él, es decir, según una razón de suyo inmutable.

Alejandro asume un ejemplarismo más radical y sostiene, por el contrario que, atendiendo a la vida de la criatura como parti-

18. *Ibidem*, disp. I, m. I, 18, p. 793. Cfr. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De Trinitate*, VI, 10, 11, p. 241. En este párrafo, Agustín explica los atributos divinos según Hilario de Poitiers (*De Trinitate* II, 1) y se refiere, explícitamente, al modo en que el Hijo, en cuanto *imago* y *verbum* del Padre recibe de este el ser eternamente. Alejandro, por el contrario, refiere todo el pasaje citado a la existencia de las cosas en Dios en tanto eterna y ejemplarmente conocidas. Sobre este texto de Agustín y otros de gran importancia en el debate de ideis citados en mi trabajo, véase el Dossier presentado por Giovanni Catapano en este volumen.

19. *Glossa ordinaria in Io 1,4*, in *Bibliorum Sacrorum Tomus Qvintus*, f. 186r: «Faber enim arcam prius facit in mente, post in opere. Quod in mente est, viuit cum artifice, quod fit, mutatur cum tempore»; AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *In Iohannis Euangelium Tractatus*, I, 17, R. Williams (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1954 (CCSL 36), p. 10; ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*, II, q. 46, disp. I, m. I, 5, p. 786: «Videtur quod sic, quia arca in mente artificis vivit; sed si viveret extra, secundum quod est res, possem dicere quod plus habet 'vivere' quam ante, quia plus habet 'esse' cum habet esse in specie et in re, quam cum habet 'esse' in specie tantum».

cipación en la vida divina, su vivir es mayor en Dios que fuera de Dios, aunque eso no significa que sean *más vida* en él, ya que la vida se refiere a él según una razón eterna e inmutable²⁰. En la *Glossa* ajusta su posición respecto de la afirmación de Anselmo debido a su proximidad con las tesis panteístas de Amaury de Bène. Decir que las criaturas existen en Dios no significa afirmar que sean Dios, como pretendían los *almariciani*. Antes bien, las criaturas existen en la esencia divina, pero no son la misma esencia divina, porque existen en la sabiduría de Dios. El halense propone un análisis terminista de dos proposiciones para explicar esta diferencia, que será retomado años más tarde por Odón Rigaud:

- (i) 'Todas las cosas son la divina esencia'
- (ii) 'Todas las cosas son en él la divina esencia'

Mientras en (i) el categorema 'cosas' está por las criaturas en cuanto son en el ser divino (*in suo esse*), en (ii) el categorema 'cosas' está por las criaturas mutables pero en sus razones eternas. Existir en las ideas o razones ejemplares, por lo tanto, no es para las cosas existir en la misma divina esencia, sino en cuanto conocidas. Esas razones eternas, en efecto, constituyen la sabiduría de Dios, esto es, lo que Dios sabe y conoce, y en ese sentido son en la esencia divina²¹.

20. Cfr. ANSELMUS CANTUARENSIS, *Monologion*, F. Schmitt (ed.), in *Opera Omnia*, I, Nelson & Sons, Edinburgh 1946, cap. 34, 53: «Nam et antequam fierent et cum iam facta sunt, et cum corrumpuntur seu aliquo modo varientur, semper in ipso sunt, non quod sunt in se ipsis, sed quod est idem ipse»; ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*, II, q. 46, disp. I, m. I, 17, p. 793: «Unde, cum sint in ipso secundum immutabilem rationem, sive sint sive non, dicuntur esse in ipso vita. Dico tamen quod creaturae, cum vitam participant, magis vivunt in ipso quam quando non sunt, quia vivere earum in ipso est; non tamen sunt magis vita in ipso, quia vita refertur ad illum secundum aeternam rationem».

21. Cfr. ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Glossa in I Sententiarum*, d. 36, 1, p. 356: «Dicendum tamen, distinguendo, quod aliud est dicere 'omnia esse divinam essentiam' et 'omnia in ipso sunt divina essentia'. Cum enim dicitur 'omnia sunt divina essentia', supponuntur creaturae prout sunt in suo esse; sed cum dicitur 'omnia sunt in ipso divina essentia', supponuntur rationes aeternae pro rebus mutabilibus; quae rationes sunt Dei essentia, quoniam Dei sapientia. Nec ex hoc sequitur quod sint in Dei essentia, licet sint in eius sapientia: esse enim in Dei sapientia, nihil aliud est

Así pues, existir en la sabiduría de Dios, o en sus razones eternas es ser conocido por Dios.

El ejemplo del carpintero y el arca retorna en la segunda cuestión (III) para reforzar la vinculación entre posibilidad y potencia. La cuestión a definir es si aquello que ni es ni será puede ser considerado *vida en Dios*. La respuesta negativa se basa en que el arca es vida en la mente del carpintero, pero no fuera de esta, es decir, en la materia. Lo mismo sucede con las razones ejemplares de las cosas en la mente divina. Alejandro explica la analogía de Agustín mediante la definición propuesta por Séneca, para quien el ejemplar es «aquello a semejanza de lo cual se realiza algo», de modo tal que de las cosas no futuras y de las imposibles no hay ejemplares porque no hay ejemplados. Este isomorfismo entre ejemplar y ejemplado piensa lo posible a partir de la potencia, limitando la idea a la facticidad y la posibilidad a la realización: *exemplar respicit quod fit*. Así las cosas, Alejandro entiende el no ser ni presente ni futuro (*quod non est et quod non erit*) y el no poder ser (*quae numquam erunt vel non possunt esse*) en el sentido de no ser creado o realizado²².

Esta comprensión factibilista de la posibilidad y de la noción de *exemplar* se refuerza mediante el ejemplo de un retrato de Aquiles, que ni se compara ni se refiere a Aquiles por la mera posibilidad

quam cognosci ab ipso; esse vero in eius essentia est ipsum vere dici de illis: quod de nulla creatura contingit». Texto reproducido *ad litteram* en *Summa Halensis I*, inq. I, tr. 5, sect. I, q. un., m. 4, cap. I, 3, *ibidem*, p. 259B.

22. ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*, II, q. 46, disp. I, m. I, 6, p. 787: «Nihil ergo aliud est, nisi quod ratione exemplaris attribuitur vita creaturae exemplatae. Si ergo sic est de illis quae numquam erunt vel non possunt esse, quod talia non sunt exemplum alicuius exemplaris – exemplar enim est ad cuius similitudinem aliquid fit: ergo exemplar respicit quod fit; si ergo non fit nec fiet aliquid, ratione huiusmodi exemplaris non dicitur illud esse in Deo – relinquitur ergo ea quae non erunt vel non possunt esse, non sunt *in ipso vita*». Cfr. SENECA, *Epistulae morales I. Libri I-XIII*, L. Reynolds (ed.), Clarendon Press, Oxford 1965, ep. 58, 19, p. 157. *Summa Halensis I*, inq. I, tr. 5, sect. I, q. un., m. 3, cap. I, resp., pp. 251B-252A: «Respondeo, secundum Augustinum, *Super Ioannem: Quod factum est in ipso vita erat*, ponens exemplum de arca in mente artificis, quae est vita; et hoc modo *quod factum est, vita est* in Deo. Secundum hoc ergo dicendum quod esse creaturae dicitur dupliciter: in sua natura vel in sua causa; scientia autem Dei non ponit esse vel existentiam rei in sua natura, sed in sua causa, id est in se ipso vel in dispositione sua».

de ser pintado. La posibilidad de realizar un retrato no posee de suyo la *ratio* de Aquiles: solo si se pinta, el retrato tiene razón de ejemplar. Consecuentemente, en Dios solo hay razones ejemplares (presciencia) de las cosas que son, fueron o serán. La misma idea se presenta en la *Glossa*, al sostener, de una parte que las ideas y razones ejemplares son la misma sabiduría divina, conforme a la cual se forma todo lo formable, pero de lo que no es, no hay razón ejemplar alguna en Dios y, por lo tanto, ninguna idea²³. Resulta entonces la siguiente consecuencia:

Sea *a* algo posible en futuro. Luego *a no es vida* en Dios.
Si no es vida en Dios, tampoco lo ha sido, ni lo será.

La razón del consecuente es que todo lo que es o será en Dios lo ha sido eternamente y, por lo tanto, es esencialmente lo mismo *ab aeterno* respecto de lo que será *in tempore*. De aquí se seguiría, finalmente, que las criaturas son *aequaliter* en Dios antes y después de haber sido efectivamente creadas.

Todo este cuadro cambiaría, sin embargo, si se considera la posibilidad en términos de no contradicción, como sugiere Aristóteles en *Analíticos primeros* I. En efecto, si entendemos lo posible como «aquello que, afirmado como existente, no comporta inconveniencia», una vez afirmada la existencia de *a*, la consecuencia sería la siguiente:

Sea *a* algo posible.
a es. Luego *a es vida* en Dios.
Luego *ab aeterno* A tuvo vida en Dios.
Luego todos los posibles, futuros o no futuros, son vida en él²⁴.

23. ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*, II, q. 46, disp. I, m. I, 8-9, pp. 787-788; ID., *Glossa in I Sententiarum*, d. 36, 4, p. 356.

24. *Ibidem*, p. 788. ARISTOTELES, *Analytica priora*, I 13, 32a19-20, Brill, Leiden-New York-Köln 1998 (Aristoteles Latinus III/1-4), p. 26: «Dico autem contingere et contingente quod, cum non sit necessarium, posito autem esse, nihil erit propter hoc impossibile»; *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, n. 12, p. 309: «Possibili posito in esse, nullum sequitur impossibili».

Alejandro entiende que este modo de considerar la posibilidad exige modificar la comprensión senequiano-platónica de ejemplaridad. En primer lugar, porque *ser*, para *a*, es simplemente ser posible, de modo que *a* posee el estatuto de una posibilidad. En efecto, si por posible entendemos aquello cuya afirmación no comporta inconveniencia, entonces un ejemplar no es solamente aquello a semejanza de lo cual se hace algo, sino aquello a semejanza de lo cual *puede* hacerse algo. El halense pone entonces como ejemplo su propio libro. La *peccia* en la que está escribiendo es habitual o disposicionalmente un *ejemplar*, ya que podría ser utilizada para realizar una copia, aunque nunca sea copiada. Es decir que lo posible, en tanto posible, no es ejemplar en acto, pero es disposicionalmente ejemplar (*habitualiter*). Sin embargo, solo puede ser considerado en Dios algo que es *actualmente* ejemplar. Rectificando la afirmación de Agustín, por tanto, Alejandro sostiene que, por el mero hecho de existir en la mente del carpintero, el arca no es vida. En efecto, el vivir depende del alma y el entender del entendimiento; pero no de todas las cosas que existen en el alma y son entendidas se dice que son *vida* en el alma o que *viven* en ella, sino solamente de aquellas que son *primeramente* entendidas por el alma, es decir, de aquellas que poseen en sí mismas y por sí mismas una conveniencia *según la cual* son entendidas:

Sit enim arca in intellectu artificis: non propter hoc dicitur esse vita; quia bona et mala intelliguntur ab anima, scilicet quae habent convenientiam secundum quam intelliguntur. Imperfecta autem et mobilia et mala et diversa, ut diversa, non habent hanc convenientiam; unde mobilia intelliguntur eo quod est sine motu, multa uno et mala bono, imperfecta perfecto, [possibilia] autem hoc quod actu est²⁵.

Así las cosas, la *convenientia* intrínseca que distingue unos objetos inteligibles de otros consiste en que algunos lo son por sí mismos y otros lo son por otro. Los primeros existen en Dios *per*

25. ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*, II, q. 46, disp. I, m. I, 15, p. 791; cfr. ID., *Glossa in I Sententiarum*, d. 6, 4, p. 93.

modum vitae, los segundos *per modum intellectus*. La diferencia radica en el tipo de conocimiento que comportan. De los primeros posee Dios un conocimiento práctico, en el que saber y querer no se distinguen, toda vez que mira a la realización; de los segundos solo un conocimiento especulativo. En consecuencia, *esse vita in*, no es lo mismo que *esse in*. Solo de las cosas existentes o futuras podemos decir que viven en Dios o que son vida en él porque las conoce y quiere (decide) crearlas. Pero de lo posible no futuro no hay idea, porque (solo) es conocido especulativamente, es decir, disposicionalmente, en función de otra cosa a partir de la cual puede ser conocido, así como una potencia no puede ser conocida en sí misma sino a partir de lo que es en acto. El conocimiento práctico de algo por parte de Dios no afirma solamente su ser en el ejemplar o en la inteligencia en tanto tales, sino en un tipo de inteligencia cuyo sujeto puede saber, querer y realizar²⁶.

Alejandro explica el conocimiento de los posibles no futuros de un modo diferente a la *Summa Aurea*, atendiendo a su inherencia en la mente divina. Existen en Dios *per modum intellectus*, es decir, en tanto (simple) conocimiento, pero no en tanto sujeto cognoscente. La existencia de un objeto inteligible en la mente de un sujeto *per modum intellectus* no implica la existencia del objeto en ese sujeto en tanto cognoscente. En el primer caso, el objeto existe cognitivamente, en el segundo causalmente. Ambos tipos de conocimiento establecen en el sujeto dos formas distintas de inherencia. Alejandro entiende que, de ese modo, resuelve no solo el problema del conocimiento divino de los posibles no futuros, sino también el del conocimiento divino de los males. A diferencia del hombre, Dios es *causa* del objeto conocido, de modo que su *scientia* no es efecto del objeto inteligible. En consecuencia, los males no existen en Dios ni son conocidos por él como sujeto cognoscente porque no los causa. Y por la misma razón no poseen ideas en Dios, esto es, no son en él ejemplarmente, porque no es causa ejemplar ni de los males ni de los posibles en tanto posibles no futuros. Allí radica la diferencia entre el conocimiento especulativo y práctico de Dios. Los bienes son conocidos por él de las dos maneras, mien-

26. *Ibidem*, p. 792.

tras que los males (y los posibles) solo son conocidos mediante el conocimiento especulativo²⁷.

Con relación al léxico implicado en esta cuestión, Alejandro sostiene que la diferencia entre *ratio*, *idea* y *exemplar* es intensional, no extensional. La noción de *ratio* dice aquello por lo cual la cosa es o es realizada, es decir, refiere a la causa final. La noción de *idea* dice aquello según lo cual la cosa es mirada u observada (*inspicitur*), es decir, refiere a la causa formal. Y la noción de *exemplar*, finalmente, dice aquello a semejanza de lo cual se hace o se puede hacer algo. Ahora bien, en tanto objeto de la inteligencia (*secundum rationem intelligentiae*), la idea es intermedia entre la esencia del Dios que crea y de la criatura que es creada. Pero esta mediación no es real sino modal, es decir, no se verifica sino *secundum intelligentiam*. En otras palabras, concluye Alejandro: la idea posee un *modo* según se refiere al sujeto cognoscente y otro modo según se refiere al objeto conocido. Por parte de las criaturas, es múltiple; por parte de Dios, una²⁸.

3. Alberto Magno: Las ideas como principio factivo

Alberto retoma varias de las ideas desarrolladas por Alejandro de Hales, precisando algunos puntos importantes con relación a los

27. Cfr. ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Glossa in I Sententiarum*, d. 36, 9, p. 361; *Summa Halensis* I, inq. 1, tr. 5, sect. 1, q. un., m. 4, cap. 2, 2-3, p. 261B. GUILLELMUS ALTISIODORENSIS, *Summa aurea*, I, tr. 9, 1, p. 179: «Dicimus quod malum cognoscitur per exemplar, sed non per proprium exemplar, sed per exemplar sui oppositi: sicut cecitas cognoscitur per suam oppositionem, scilicet per hoc quod visus deficit ubi debet esse».

28. Id., *Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*, II, q. 46, disp. 1, m. 3, 33, pp. 799-800. Parece tratarse de una idea común, al menos en su aspecto general. Cfr. GUILLELMUS ALTISIODORENSIS, *Summa aurea*, II, tr. 2, resp., II, 1, p. 17: «Deus est diverse ydee sub diverso tropo loquendi, quo dicitur in libro *Sapientie*, quod Spiritus Sanctus est multiplex, et in *Evangelio* dicit Filius: *Omnia mea tua sunt*; hoc enim dicitur propter diversos effectus, sive propter potentiam qua potens est ex se producere infinitos effectus; in se tamen Deus simplicissimus est et invariabilis. Unde patet quod illa argumentatio non valet: diverse ydee sunt mundus architipus, et in Deo nulla est diversitas; ergo Deus non est mundus architipus. Cum enim dicuntur diverse ydee, diversitas non notatur in exemplari sed in exemplatis».

posibles no futuros. No solo conoce la *Summa aurea*, las obras de Alejandro de Hales que hemos visto, así como la *Summa Halensis*, redactada entre 1236 y 1245, sino que también tuvo en sus manos la *Lectura* de Rigaud, durante la redacción de su propio *Comentario* a las *Sentencias*²⁹. Voy a considerar principalmente dos obras de Alberto, redactadas en París en 1246, en tiempos de un fluido intercambio y colaboración entre los *studia* de Menores y Predicadores: el comentario a las distinciones 35 y 36 del *I Libro de las Sentencias* y la breve *Quaestio de ideis divinis*³⁰.

La *Quaestio* 22 se divide en dos artículos, el primero de los cuales se refiere explícitamente al problema del conocimiento divino de los no futuros. Alberto opone en ella dos modos de comprender la noción de idea en Dios: referida *solo* a la creación, o bien extendida a lo posible y a lo imposible, es decir a aquellas cosas que no fueron ni serán producidas³¹. En su opinión, la noción de idea se toma como principio factivo y, por tanto, refiere a lo que efectivamente ha sido creado. En tal sentido, solo lo *ideado* es futuro, mientras que lo posible no. Tanto el esquema resolutivo de la cuestión como los núcleos fundamentales de su respuesta ya habían sido presentados sintéticamente en el comentario a la distinción 36³².

La tesis de Alberto se apoya, de una parte, en la autoridad del Ps. Dionisio Areopagita en *De divinis nominibus* V, según el cual, las ideas son ejemplares (*exemplaria / paradigmata*) de las cosas existentes, es decir, razones que producen los seres en Dios y que preexisten en él. Esta referencia se refuerza mediante los ejemplos del número uno y la pluralidad, del centro y el círculo, del sol y lo generable, y del alma y las capacidades del cuerpo que ya habían sido

29. Cfr. F.-M. HENQUINET, *Les manuscrits et l'influence des écrits théologiques d'Eu-des Rigaud O.F.M.*, «Revue de théologie ancienne et médiévale» 11 (1939), pp. 324-350; SILEO, *De rerum ideis*, p. 19*.

30. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Quaestio de ideis divinis*, W. Kübel, H. Anzulewicz (edd.), in Id., *Quaestiones*, Aschendorff, Münster 1993 (Opera Omnia, editio Coloniensis 25, 2), q. 22, pp. 264-266.

31. *Ibidem*, a. 1, p. 264A: «Utrum sit idea operum creationis tantum vel possibilitium et impossibilitium».

32. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *In I Sententiarum*, d. 36, C, a. 8, q. 1, pp. 218-220.

propuestos por Alejandro de Hales³³. Alberto destaca la naturaleza factiva de las ideas en tanto *ejemplares* de las cosas, al explicar la definición dionisiana de estas como *rationes substantifcae* (traducción de οὐσιωποιῦς). Las ideas son razones *ejemplares* porque «otorgan sustancia a las cosas», y preexisten en Dios como la casa en la mente de un arquitecto:

Dicit ergo primo, quod *exemplaria* sunt *rationes rerum substantifcae*, idest donantes substantiam rebus; *praexistentes in deo singulariter* – alia translatio: *uniformiter*; quae enim in rebus essentialiter differunt, in deo uniuntur in unitatem divinae essentiae et differunt tantum rationibus, quae praexistunt in deo sicut universale prae habens rem, ut domus in mente artificis³⁴.

La noción de idea, por lo tanto, solo se refiere a la creación. Ahora bien, la preexistencia de este tipo de razones en la mente divina no puede entenderse sino en acto, ya que constituyen el medio a través del cual el creador conoce lo creado, antes e independientemente de producirlo *ad extra*. Precisamente por tratarse de un principio eminentemente factivo, las ideas median un conocimiento distinto y determinado. Si hubiese ejemplares de cosas posibles

33. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Quaestio de ideis divinis*, a. 1, p. 264A: «Ad primum obicitur per verba Dionysii in libro *De divinis nominibus* capitulo V: “Exemplaria autem esse dicimus in deo existentium rationes substantificas et singulariter existentes; quas theologia praediffinitiones vocat et divinas et bonas voluntates existentium praedeterminativas et effectivas, secundum quas supersubstantialis essentia omnia praediffinit et produxit”. Ex hoc accipitur quod exemplaria sive “paradigmata”, ut dicit alia translatio, non sunt nisi existentium in esse productorum sive producendorum». La traducción reportada por Alberto es la de Juan Sarraceno, mientras que la *alia translatio* es la de Juan Escoto Eriúgena. Cfr. DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De divinis nominibus*, Ph. Chevallier (ed.), *Dionysiaca. Recueil donnant l'ensemble des traductions latines des ouvrages attribués au Denys de l'Aréopage*, I, Desclée de Brouwer, Bruges 1937, V, 6, pp. 360-361; ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Glossa in I Sententiarum*, d. 35, 13 y d. 36, 7, pp. 354 y 359 respectivamente.

34. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, P. Simon (ed.), Aschendorff, Münster 1972 (Opera Omnia, editio Coloniensis 27, 1), V, 6, p. 324AB. Sobre esta cita del Ps. Dionisio, véase en este volumen el trabajo de Tommaso Manzon, pp. 334 y siguientes.

y de cosas imposibles, por el contrario, debería tratarse de ideas *potencialmente* existentes en la mente divina, que, por lo tanto, median un conocimiento indistinto y confuso, inadmisibles en Dios³⁵. La pluralidad de ideas, por último, no compromete en absoluto la simplicidad divina, porque estas refieren ejemplarmente a objetos exteriores a Dios (*quae sunt extra Deum*).

Alberto considera dos tipos de objetos del conocimiento divino: de una parte, los *futura*; de otra parte, los *possibilia / impossibilia*. La diferencia entre ambos es que los primeros serán producidos, pero los segundos no. De manera que el objeto de una idea (*ideatum*) dice por sí mismo la futura producción *ad extra*, excluyendo la alternativa de que el conocimiento divino se extienda a objetos posibles o imposibles, es decir, no futuros.

Tal es el marco teórico en el que Alberto decide inscribir su respuesta. Los dos argumentos a favor de la existencia de ideas de objetos posibles o imposibles (contrarios a su tesis), se refieren tanto a la potencia creadora como a la perfección del conocimiento divino. El primero es particularmente interesante para nuestro estudio: Dios *conoce* todo lo que *puede* hacer. Y puede hacer cosas que no hará, es decir, que nunca existirán (*quae nunquam sunt futura*). Así pues, si el medio a través del cual conoce Dios las cosas son las ideas, entonces también existen ideas de objetos posibles. Negar este tipo de ideas, sostiene el segundo argumento, sería limitar el conocimiento divino, situándolo, además, por debajo del conocimiento de un artífice humano respecto de su obra. Cualquiera carpintero, en efecto, conoce perfectamente el arca que *puede* hacer pero que nunca hará, dice Alberto retomando un ejemplo ya clásico³⁶. Nótese que la formula-

35. Id., *Quaestio de ideis divinis*, a. 1, p. 264AB: «Praeterea, idea in potentia existens non est medium cognoscendi rem distinctam; unde si talia haberent ideam in potentia existentem, sub illa non cognoscerentur distincte; cognitio autem rei indistincta est imperfecta; ergo cognitio dei esset imperfecta, quod est inconveniens».

36. *Ibidem*, a. 1, contra (1-2), p. 264AB. El primer argumento se repite *ad sensum* en *In I Sententiarum*, d. 36, 8, 1, *sed contra*, p. 218B: «Deum plura posse facere quam facit, est verum: ergo scit, quod ipse plura potest facere: sed omnia quae potest facere, cognoscit, quia scit totum infinitum posse suum: ergo plura scit quam facit: et non nisi idea: ergo aliqua habent eam in mente sua quae nunquam fient»; el segundo en ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Enarrationes in Iohannem*, A. Borgnet (ed.), Paris

ción del primer argumento supone que la razón por la que Dios no crea *x*, no radica en la intrínseca imposibilidad de *x*. En otras palabras, Alberto está tratando lo imposible no como algo *no futuro* en razón de sí mismo, sino como algo que Dios no hará (*non facturus*). En su respuesta a este argumento, sin embargo, parece referirse a Guillermo de Auxerre al referir la opinión de “otros”, que admiten el conocimiento divino de cosas posibles e imposibles mediante un «conocimiento de simple visión», claramente distinto del conocimiento práctico, pero que entienden la posibilidad y la imposibilidad no con relación a la potencia divina, sino a la naturaleza misma de la cosa («possibilia et forte impossibilia non sibi, sed naturae»)³⁷.

La importancia de los dos argumentos *contra* considerados en la *Quaestio* 22 radica, de una parte, en que ponen de manifiesto cuál es la principal dificultad que, según Alberto, debe evitar su tesis, a saber, condicionar o restringir el conocimiento divino a la creación³⁸. De otra parte, en que ponen de manifiesto que la noción misma de

1899 (Opera omnia 24), I, 3, pp. 35B-36A: «[...] artifex qui facit arcam, in mente habet formam ad quam perficit formam arcae in lignis, quae licet non vivat prout est in lignis: prout tamen est in mente artificis, movet artificem et dirigit in opere. Et sic vivit in mente, quod non vivit in materia. Quod enim in intellectu agente et operante manet et dirigit, facit opera vitae: et quod facit opera vitae, vivit».

37. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Quaestio de ideis divinis*, a. 1, ad 1, p. 265A: «Ad id ergo quod contra obicitur, dicendum, quod possibilia cognoscuntur a deo secundum quod sunt in arte, cognoscendo, quod ars sufficiens est talia producere, si voluerit artifex, et non sunt idea. Alii dicunt, quod est cognitio simplicis visionis, qua cognoscit possibilia et forte impossibilia non sibi, sed naturae. Et est cognitio practica, quae per ideam est, quae dicit exemplar cognitum et operatum; et hac non cognoscuntur nisi quae sunt futura. Et redit ad idem cum primo». Los Editores identifican esta opinión como la verdadera en *Summa Halensis*, I, inq. 1, tr. 5, sect. 1, q. un., m. 4, cap. 2, 3., p. 261B, pero esta no parece corresponder a la tesis referida por Alberto, ya que solo postula una *cognitio simplicissima* de los males por parte de Dios. Es cierto, sin embargo, que Alberto conoce la distinción de Guillermo de Auxerre y parece referirla según la encuentra en la *Summa Halensis*. Cfr. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *In I Sententiarum*, d. 39, A, a. 4, p. 296A: «Dicunt quidam quod triplex est scientia, scilicet intelligentiae, et visionis, et approbationis: et scientia intelligentiae est, qua intelligitur res simpliciter. Visionis autem scientia est quae transit super res secundum quod sunt vel non sunt sub differentia huius compositionis vel illius. Approbationis autem scientia est, quae est de bonis quorum Deus auctor est»; *Summa Halensis*, I, inq. 1, tr. 5, 1, q. un. (179), resp., 264A: «ut quidam dixerunt, divina scientia ut visio, quasi transiens super rem».

38. Ese será, como veremos, el núcleo de la crítica de Rigaud a la tesis de Alberto.

posibilidad y de imposibilidad que está a la base de su razonamiento no atañe a la naturaleza del objeto sino a la autodeterminación divina de producirlo. El coloniense no aclara qué tipos de objetos *imposibles* está considerando ni la causa de su imposibilidad. Pero resulta claro que se trata de aquellas cosas de las que Dios no puede ser autor, como ya decía Alejandro, no por insuficiencia de poder (*potentia*), sino por su bondad. Esto puede apreciarse en las cuestiones en las que trata el problema del conocimiento divino del mal³⁹.

La tesis de Alberto es que las ideas divinas son razones ejemplares de cosas futuras y, en tal sentido, coincide con Alejandro y la *Summa Halensis*. Su posición se basa en la distinción entre *idea* y *ars*. Mientras el término “idea” comporta una relación objetiva, en cuanto dice comparación con lo ideado (*ideatum*), el término “arte” no comporta necesariamente relación alguna. Las ideas ejemplares, en efecto, median eternamente un conocimiento sustantivo de las criaturas, tanto especulativo como práctico y, por tanto, fungen como especies⁴⁰. La forma del arte de un artífice, por su parte, admite una triple consideración: *i*) en cuanto pasa de la mente del artífice a la materia de las distintas figuras que produce; *ii*) en cuanto a la determinación del artífice de plasmarla en tal o cual figura; y *iii*) en cuanto al arte mismo, sin referirla a la producción del arca o al modo en que queda plasmada en la materia, sino en cuanto principio infinito de todas las arcas que el artífice puede construir, independientemente de sus formas individuales.

39. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *In I Sententiarum*, d. 35, B, a. 6, pp. 215-216.

40. *Ibidem*, d. 35, E, a. 12, ad 1, pp. 200B-201A: «[...] idea arcae in mente artificis vita est hoc modo, quia movens et lux ad faciendam arcam: nec est accidens idea, quia in omni intellectu duplex est species, scilicet rei, et speciei. Intellectus enim, ut dicit Philosophus, species et specierum, sicut manus organum organorum: et hoc praecipue verum est de agente cuius lumen species est omnium intelligibilem, quia per ipsum simplicia intelligibilia fiunt: et haec species non est accidens, sed vita movens in practico intellectu et contemplatio in speculativo»; *ibidem*, d. 35, F, a. 14, ad 2, p. 203B: «Species etiam vocantur quandoque secundum quod referuntur ad cognitionem». ARISTOTELES, *De anima* III 7, 432a1-2; THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Sententia libri de anima*, cura et studio fratrum praedicatorum, Editio Leonina-Vrin, Roma-Paris 1984 (Opera omnia 45/1), p. 235A: «Quare anima sicut manus est: manus enim organum organorum et intellectus species specierum et sensus species sensibilium».

Tertio autem modo accipitur ut indistinctum totum, et sic accipitur et vocatur proprie ars et non idea. Ita <fit> secundum rationem in deo; rebus enim creatis respectus idearum per connotata in rebus secundum rationem multiplicatur in deo. Sed “antequam crearentur”, ab aeterno fuit determinatio earum ad res futuras in mente artificis [...] Et ideo non est idea nisi respectu eorum quae erant futura. Sed tertio modo est ars infinitum virtute principium in respectu possibilium, quae numquam erunt futura, et horum proprie non est idea⁴¹.

Considerado en el tercer sentido (iii), el arte es un tipo de conocimiento totalmente indistinto, potencial, e indeterminado respecto de cualquier objeto. De modo que el conocimiento que posee Dios de los posibles que nunca serán futuros, en sentido estricto, es *arte*, no *idea*. A diferencia del arte, en efecto, la idea comporta relación a lo ideado. Este tipo de conocimiento implica una relación causal que, según Alberto, no puede no verificarse. Si algo ha sido ideado, en otras palabras, es porque será producido en un futuro (*facturus*); y si no ha sido ideado, entonces no posee una idea en la mente divina y, por lo mismo, no será futuro. Apartándose de Alejandro, el maestro dominico limita la ejemplaridad a la semejanza, al excluir – o al menos no considerar – la aptitud o la posibilidad de ser ejemplado en sí misma. Para él las ideas son *ejemplares* en tanto el artífice divino o humano las contempla para producir su obra. Pero en tanto que tales, las ideas son la primera forma de las cosas⁴². Por lo tanto, lo posible y lo imposible, que son dos formas de no-futuridad, no pueden constituir idea alguna en Dios. El tipo de conocimiento que posee Dios de

41. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Quaestio de ideis divinis*, a. 1, resp., p. 265A. Cfr. ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Glossa in I Sententiarum*, d. 36, 9, p. 361; *Summa Halensis*, I, inq. 1, tr. 5, sect. 1, q. un., m. 4, cap. 2, 2-3, p. 261B.

42. Id., *In I Sententiarum*, d. 35, F, a. 14, p. 203B: «*Exemplar autem est proprie ad cuius similitudinem aliquid fit per respectum ad ipsum, et non per extensionem super ipsum: unde ideae dicuntur exemplaria secundum quod ad ipsas in se respicit artifex naturae, quando formas naturae producit. Idea vero dicitur ab idos Graece, quod sonat primam formam, sicut hyle sonat primam materiam: et quia illae potentiae sunt et foris manent, ideo ideae per respectum ad formam dicuntur. Ratio autem pertinet ad finem: quia a fine sumitur nomen et ratio rei, ut dicit Philosophus. Et ideo per respectum ad finem operis dicuntur rationes ea quae sunt in mente divina.*»

estos “objetos” – que solo indistinta e indeterminadamente pueden considerarse tales –, es el conocimiento que tiene de sí mismo como principio suficiente de las cosas. Mientras el artífice humano sabe que puede hacer cosas que nunca hará y que hay cosas que nunca haría, el único conocimiento que posee Dios de lo no futuro en sentido estricto es el conocimiento que posee de sí mismo en cuanto *non facturus*, y, en un sentido amplio, el conocimiento indirecto de los males cuya producción repugna a su bondad y a su voluntad⁴³.

En la misma línea, siguiendo a Guillermo de Auxerre y a Alejandro, Alberto sostiene que Dios posee un conocimiento accidental de los males, ya que no los conoce por sí mismos sino por otro, es decir, por sus opuestos⁴⁴. Dicho conocimiento no puede ser práctico, sino solo especulativo, razón por la cual de los males no hay ni puede haber ideas ejemplares ya que la idea media un conocimiento factivo. Los verbos voluntativos o proairéticos – observa – piden infinitivo y denotan una acción, pero no su objeto. Y así, cuando decimos “sé hacer una casa”, lo que decimos saber o conocer no es la casa, sino la acción o el modo de hacerla. Ese tipo de verbos, según Alberto, son los que se relacionan con el conocimiento práctico u operativo. Por eso Dios conoce el mal solo con conocimiento especulativo, ya que conocer el mal no es lo mismo que saber hacerlo, del mismo modo que conocer una casa no es saber cómo construirla⁴⁵.

43. *Ibidem*, d. 36, C, a. 8, q. 1, ad 1, p. 219B: «Deus scit quod numquam est facturus, quia scit seipsum et ipsum nunquam faciet, sed aliquid quod non sit ipse, quod ipse non est facturus, ipse non scit, nisi hoc modo quo dicimus scire mala».

44. GUILLELMUS ALTISSIODORENSIS, *Summa aurea*, I, Appendix XIII, p. 302: «Ad hoc dicimus quod Deus cognoscit mala non per se nec per sui exemplaritatem, sed per accidens. [...] Cognoscitur ergo secundum hoc malum sive malicia, non per exemplaritatem sui, sed per exemplaritatem sui positionis. Secundum autem eos qui dicunt quod non quiddam est, est a Deo, et quod malicia est aliquid, dicimus quod ipsa non cognoscitur per se, sed per accidens, scilicet per bonum, cuius ipsa est adiuncta, sicut quantitas oculo corporali videtur per colorem sibi adiunctum». ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *In I Sententiarum*, d. 36, B, a. 6, ad 1, p. 215B: «Dicendum ergo ad primum, quod cum dicitur, Deus cognoscit malum per accidens, ly *per accidens* refertur ad verbum ex parte materiae actus: et hoc est ex parte cogniti, et non ex parte cognoscentis: et ideo notat defectum in cognito et non in cognoscente».

45. ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *In I Sententiarum*, d. 36, B, a. 6, sol., pp. 215B-216A: «[...] quia (ut dicit Priscianus, verba proharetica desiderant infinitivum, ut scio facere do-

La ciencia de Dios, en otras palabras, no es *simpliciter* causa de las cosas, sino en cuanto se identifica con su esencia y su voluntad. Pero en sí misma, es decir, en cuanto se distingue de la potencia de la voluntad divina, no lo es. Esa es la razón por la que la extensión de la ciencia divina es mayor que la extensión de su voluntad. Solo la ciencia de aprobación, en la que saber y querer son coextensivos, es causa de las cosas, porque allí Dios sabe lo que quiere y resuelve hacer⁴⁶.

4. Odón Rigaud y las ideas de cosas posibles no futuras

El texto más importante de Odón Rigaud sobre las ideas divinas es la extensa *Quaestio disputata de existentia rerum in Deo*, compuesta y disputada *in scholis* entre 1245 y 1247, editada críticamente por Leonardo Sileo junto a las distinciones 35, 36, 39, la q. 1 de la 38 de la *Lectura in I Sententiarum*, y a otros importantes textos inéditos que revelan su contexto vital, su influencia y su impacto. Esta *Quaestio* forma parte de una tríada en la que Rigaud desarrolla la unidad temática comprendida entre las distinciones 35 y 48 del Libro I. La redacción de estas cuestiones (*De modo essendi Dei in creaturis*, *De existentia rerum in Deo* y *de voluntate Dei*), posterior a la *Lectura*, que fue compuesta entre 1240 y 1245, responde al proyecto de elaboración de una teología sistemática de la creación en la que Odón vincula su *lectio* sentenciaría con las disputaciones mantenidas en el *studium* de los Menores y cuya unidad gravita, como ha demostrado Sileo, en una ontología de la creaturalidad⁴⁷.

mum, et non scio domum. Unde si sciret Deus malum scientia operativa, ipse sciret facere malum, et posset facere malum, et faceret malum: quae omnia falsa sunt. Patet ergo, quod cum non possint dicere, scit facere malum, sed tantum quod scit malum, quod haec scientia speculativa est, et non practica, quia verba speculativa non desiderant infinitivum notantem opus, sed potius activum in quem transeat actus verbi»; Cfr. PRISCIANUS, *Institutiones grammaticae*, M. Hertz (ed.), in E. KEIL, *Grammatici latini* III, Olms, Hildesheim 1981, XVIII, 4, pp. 224-225.

46. ODO RIGALDUS, *Lectura in I Sententiarum*, d. 38, q. 1, 12-15, pp. 292-293.

47. SILEO, *Dalla lectio alla disputatio*, p. 109; ID., *De rerum ideis*, 18*-19*; ID., *Teoria della scienza teologica: 'Quaestio de Scientia Theologicae' di Odo Rigaldi e altri te-*

Rigaud divide su *Quaestio* en cuatro partes, cada una de las cuales, a su vez, reúne un número diverso de subcuestiones, resultando la siguiente estructura:

- | | |
|--|-----------------|
| I. <i>De rationibus aeternis creaturarum</i> | (7 cuestiones); |
| II. <i>De ideis</i> | (9 cuestiones); |
| III. <i>De verbo Ioannis: "Quod factum est, in ipso vita erat"</i> | (3 cuestiones); |
| IV. <i>De cognitione activa Dei</i> | (5 cuestiones). |

En el caso de esta obra como en ninguno de los anteriores, podemos y debemos buscar en los textos de la *Lectura* el marco teórico y las líneas maestras de la doctrina vertida en cada una de las 24 cuestiones de las que se compone. Me ocuparé solamente de la q. II, 6 (*Utrum Deus habeat generaliter ideas omnium possibilium*).

4.1. *La ciencia divina de lo posible en la Lectura*

En las distinciones 35, 36 y 39 de la *Lectura* Rigaud integra la triple división de la ciencia de Guillermo de Auxerre, con la distinción propuesta por Alejandro entre ser conocido por Dios y ser en Dios como sujeto cognoscente, al servicio de su propia tesis sobre el conocimiento divino de los no entes y de los posibles.

En primer lugar, Rigaud interpreta la distinción entre noticia visiva y noticia intelectual de Guillermo a partir de la diferencia entre cognición incompleja y cognición compleja. El conocimiento incomplejo (de una rosa, por ejemplo) no afirma ni implica la existencia de la rosa, y, por tanto, corresponde por igual a las cosas que son y a las cosas que no son, de las cuales hay ideas en Dios. Por el contrario, el conocimiento complejo, en virtud del

sti inediti (1230–1250), Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, Roma 1984 (Studia Antoniana, 27), pp. 63-64. Las cuestiones 3 y 7 de la II parte habían sido editadas anteriormente por R. WOOD, *Distinct Ideas*, pp. 7-31. Una traducción al español de la cuestión I de la II Parte fue publicada por J. BARENSTEIN, *Presencia agustiniana en las quaestiones acerca de las ideas. Los casos de Eudes Rigaud y Richard of Middletown*, «Etiam. Revista agustiniana de pensamiento» 7 (2012), pp. 115-136, junto a las traducciones de la *Quaestio 46 de ideis* de Agustín de Hipona y a la *Quaestio disputata de homine et de angelo* de Ricardo de Medievilla.

cual sabemos que la rosa *es*, exige la existencia de la existencia de la rosa, no solo para nosotros, sino también para Dios⁴⁸. A diferencia del hombre, que solo puede conocer lo que existe porque su conocimiento proviene de las cosas y exige su presencia, Dios conoce tanto las cosas existentes como las no existentes. La simple inteligencia – dice Rigaud – es un conocimiento incomplejo, mediante el cual Dios no solo conoce las cosas que son y las que no son (*futura / factura*), sino también las cosas que pueden ser producidas, aunque no las produzca (*possibilia*). Y la simple visión es un conocimiento complejo mediante el cual Dios conoce las cosas que son en tanto son:

Item, scientia simplicis notitiae dupliciter dicitur: scilicet scientia quae est intelligentia, et scientia quae est visio. Scientia quae est “intelligentia” scit Deus et quae sunt et quae fuerunt et quae futura sunt, et etiam quae possibilia sunt fieri, licet non fiant, – haec magis respicit incomplexa quam complexa. Scientia quae est “visio” dicitur qua videt Deus “ea quae sunt” esse sicut sunt, – et haec scientia proprie respicit complexa⁴⁹.

Ahora bien, al oponer las cosas que son posibles de producir aunque no sean producidas a las cosas que son, fueron, o serán

48. ODO RIGALDUS, *Lectura in I Sententiarum*, d. 35, q. 2, 38, p. 15: «Ad aliud dicendum quod est cognitio incomplexorum et est cognitio complexorum. Prima non ponit aliquid esse; et tali cognitione cognoscit Deus ea quae non sunt sicut ea quae sunt, quia tam entium quam non-entium habet Deus ideas. De cognitione autem complexa, qua cognoscitur aliquid esse, sequitur ‘si aliquid cognoscitur, ipsum est’; et hoc forte ita sequitur in Deo sicut in nobis, quia hac cognitione non cognoscit ea quae non sunt, sed solum in cognitione incomplexa, quia habet aequaliter ideas rerum, sive sint sive non sint. In nobis autem non est sic; nec hoc tamen est nobilitatis in nobis, sed magis ignobilitatis, quia in nobis ideae generantur a rebus, et non habemus ideas rerum quae numquam fuerunt. In ipso autem non generantur ideae a rebus, et ideo aequaliter habet ideas existentium et non existentium, et aequaliter cognoscit res sive sint sive non sint».

49. *Ibidem*, d. 39, q. 1, 17, p. 90. No se trata de dos conocimientos distintos, sino de una misma *scientia* en Dios, la diferencia radica en el tipo de connotación: *ibidem*.: «Ad primum dicendum quod non duae sunt scientiae, sed una in Deo, scilicet simplex scientia et scientia approbationis. Tamen aliquid connotatur hic, quod non ibi: cognitio enim simplex non dicit nisi rei notitiam in Deo, – cognitio approbationis autem cum hoc connotat rem cognitam esse vel posse esse a Deo».

producidas, Rigaud está pensando la posibilidad no ya a partir de la potencia y la realización, sino en sí misma, es decir, *a parte rei*. Este giro vuelve a evidenciarse en la distinción 36, al retomar la distinción propuesta por Alejandro en la *Glossa* entre *cognosci a Deo* y *cognosci a Deo cognoscente* a fin de explicar el conocimiento divino de los males en particular y de los no futuros en general. Según Rigaud, decimos que un objeto es conocido por Dios (*cognosci a Deo*) porque no le resulta oculto. En este sentido, males y bienes son conocidos por Dios, aunque los males no provengan de él como causa. Por el contrario, solo aquellas cosas de las que Dios es o puede ser causa existen en él como sujeto cognoscente (*in Deo intelligente*)⁵⁰. La distinción se refiere, como vimos, a dos tipos distintos de inherencia del objeto conocido en el sujeto cognoscente. En el primer caso no implica comparación, es decir, relación real del efecto a la causa, pero en el segundo sí. Precisamente por eso, desde el punto de vista de Dios como sujeto cognoscente, la inherencia del objeto conocido puede considerarse en cuanto al conocimiento especulativo y en cuanto al conocimiento práctico. Dios posee un conocimiento especulativo tanto de las cosas que puede hacer como de las que no puede hacer (no necesariamente de los males); mientras que de las cosas que quiere y decide hacer, posee un conocimiento práctico, razón por la cual estas cosas *son vida en él*⁵¹.

Así pues, el conocimiento práctico se distingue del especulativo porque implica la voluntad y la resolución de Dios de realizar lo que piensa (*cognoscit, vult, et disponit se facturum*). En ese sentido entiende Odón la ordenación a la operación propia de este tipo de conocimiento y, apartándose tanto de Alejandro como de Alberto (que distinguían la idea del arte), sostiene que la misma esencia divina es un *ars plena* que contiene las razones de todas las cosas que viven en él.

50. *Ibidem*, pp. 55-56: «Cognosci enim a Deo' nihil aliud dicit quam non latere ipsum; et sic omnia, tam bona quam mala, cognoscuntur ab ipso, licet mala non sint ab ipso nec in ipso. 'In ipso autem intelligente esse' dicuntur quorum species in ipso sunt, – et haec sunt solum illa quorum est vel potest esse causa; unde 'esse in ipso' dicitur per relationem effectus ad causam».

51. *Ibidem*, d. 36, q. 2, 35, p. 56.

Ad hoc dicendum quod [...] haec solum sunt in Deo vita quae congoscit et vult et disponit se facturum; unde solum illa dicuntur “in ipso vita”, quorum ipse est ars, quia ipse est “ars plena rationum viventium”. Ars autem dicit ordinem ad opus. Ergo ea quae fuerunt in ipso vita, scilicet quae facienda erant ab ipso, fuerunt in ipso vita, intelligente intellectu practico; illa vero quae possibilia sunt fieri et non fient, fuerunt in ipso intelligente intellectu speculativo solum. Et ideo non qua ratione haec dicuntur in ipso fuisse vita, eadem ratione et illa⁵².

Si bien bajo razones distintas, dice el franciscano, tanto las cosas que fueron efectivamente realizadas como aquellas posibles de realizar, aunque no se realicen, son vida en Dios como sujeto cognoscente. Evidentemente, Odón le reconoce al conocimiento especulativo un estatuto mayor que sus predecesores y contemporáneos. Y en estrecha relación con ello, tiende a comprender la posibilidad de las cosas no creadas no solo *a parte dei*, es decir, respecto de la capacidad de Dios para crearlas, sino más bien *a parte rei*, es decir, respecto de la naturaleza misma de las cosas. La *possibilitas*, en otras palabras, no se mide a partir de su futura producción. Dios conoce eternamente tales *possibilia* mediante un conocimiento especulativo. Al conocerse a sí mismo perfectamente, conoce *ab aeterno* la infinidad de su potencia, y conoce muchas cosas que nunca hará, sin perjuicio de que en sí mismas sean posibles. Este conocimiento, según Rigaud, no puede ser sino mediante ideas⁵³.

Consideremos, con Alejandro, la noción de posibilidad de *Ana-líticos primeros*, dice Odón: Sea *a* algo producible por Dios pero que

52. *Ibidem*, d. 36, q. 2, 35, pp. 65-66. Cfr. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De Trinitate*, VI, 10, 11, p. 241: «Ubi est prima et summa vita, cui non est aliud vivere et aliud esse, sed idem est esse et vivere: et primus ac summus intellectus, cui non est aliud vivere et aliud intelligere, sed id quod est intelligere, hoc vivere, hoc esse est, unum omnia: tanquam Verbum perfectum, cui non desit aliquid, et ars quaedam omnipotentis atque sapientis Dei plena omnium rationum viventium inconmutabilium».

53. ODO RIGALDUS, *Lectura in I Sententiarum*, d. 36, q. 2, 35, p. 64: «Deus cognovit ab aeterno infinitatem potentiae suae, ergo cognovit se posse facere multa quae non faciet; et constat quod non cognovit ea nisi per suas ideas; ergo ideae eorum ab aeterno fuerunt in Deo».

Dios no producirá: No podemos negar que *a* sea eternamente conocido por Dios y que, por tanto, sea vida en él, precisamente porque entendemos la posibilidad como aquello cuya afirmación no es inconveniente. El ser vida en Dios no puede depender de la realización presente o futura, ya que eso ofendería la inmutabilidad de la esencia divina. En efecto, si *a* fuese realizado (porque realmente puede serlo), entonces lo que en un momento no fue vida en Dios en otro momento lo sería, provocando un cambio en la esencia divina. Luego, todo lo conocido es vida en Dios en tanto conocido, incluso lo posible en tanto posible. Decir que *a* puede ser hecho, es afirmar que *a* es eternamente vida en Dios. En tal sentido, dice Rigaud, la posibilidad real de *a* vuelve imposibles los enunciados «*a* no habrá sido vida» y «es posible que *a* sea realizado, aunque no será realizado»⁵⁴. Esto resulta tan contradictorio como decir, a la inversa, que la rosa que murió, *fue* vida en Dios eternamente por haber sido futura, pero al cesar de ser, ya no lo es más. De modo que lo que *fue* eterno tendrá o tuvo fin.

Contra: Haec rosa, ex quo futura erat, fuit in ipso vita ab aeterno, et modo non est vita, sicut tu dicis; ergo quod fuit ab aeterno, habet finem, – quod est impossibile. Redit ergo, ut videtur, quod praedicta rosa adhuc sit in Deo vita. Quod concedimus⁵⁵.

Los resultados del análisis rigaldiano de la *scientia divina* impactan decididamente en la ontología. No se trata, en efecto, de la posibilidad extrínseca a la rosa de ser producida por Dios, sino de su poder ser. Precisamente allí funciona la distinción entre el conocimiento práctico y el conocimiento especulativo. Dios no entiende del mismo modo los posibles futuros y los posibles no futuros. Pero entiende perfecta y eternamente unos y otros: los primeros prácti-

54. *Ibidem*, q. 3, 52, p. 65: «Restat ergo, ut videtur, quod quae possibilia sunt a Deo fieri, etsi non fiant, sunt in Deo vita»; cfr. q. 3, 56, pp. 66-67: «[...] dicendum quod rei veritas est quod *a* non fuit in Deo vita, tamen possibile est ipsum fieri. Sed cum dicis “ponatur ergo ipsum fieri”, dico quod cum hoc ponis, eo ipso tu ponis ipsum fuisse in Deo vitam. Unde istae duae non sunt compossibiles: “quod non fuerit *a* in Deo vita”, et “quod possibile *a* fieri, quod tamen non fiet”».

55. *Ibidem*, p. 67.

camente, los segundos solo especulativamente. Unos y otros son vida en Dios bajo dos razones distintas:

Ergo ea quae fuerunt in ipso vita, scilicet quae facienda erant ab ipso, fuerunt in ipso vita, intelligente intellectu practico; illa vero quae possibilia sunt fieri et non fient, fuerunt in ipso intelligente intellectu speculativo solum. Et ideo non qua ratione haec dicuntur in ipso fuisse vita, eadem ratioenem et illa⁵⁶.

Si bien es cierto que la creación está causalmente relacionada con la ciencia divina, esta no puede ser explicada solo en función de aquella. Según Rigaud, no hay analogía entre crear y saber. Si entendemos de modo análogo las acciones de crear y de saber en Dios, terminamos sosteniendo que su conocimiento no es eterno sino temporal. En efecto, la proposición “Dios crea *a*, luego *a* existe” es verdadera, mientras que la proposición “Dios sabe *a*, luego *a* existe” es falsa, al menos en cuanto al conocimiento incomplejo. “Crear” connota un efecto y es una acción transeúnte, pero “saber” no connota un efecto sino una relación, y es una acción inmanente. En consecuencia, los modos de la ciencia divina no son sino dos tipos de relación posibles con un objeto: en la pura inteligencia se refiere a la cosa en tanto potencia; en la visión y en la aprobación en cuanto hábito o disposición, porque en la primera no hay referencia al ser, pero en las otras sí⁵⁷. Dios conoce los males de los que no es causa, los futuros que todavía no ha producido y los posibles

56. *Ibidem*, d. 36, q. 3, 52, p. 66.

57. *Ibidem*, p. 116: «Ad aliud dicendum quod non est simile de creare et scire. Eorum vero quae dicuntur de Deo, quaedam connotat respectum ad res ut potentiam, sicut scire, loquendo de scientia intelligentiae qua scit Deus ea quae potest facere etsi numquam eam faciat; alia connotat respectum ut habitum, sicut scire prout dicit scientiam visionis vel scientiam, approbationis, quae communiter de iis quae sunt vel fuerunt vel futura sunt; alia vero connotat respectum ad actum, sicut hoc quod dico “creare”, – unde sequitur “Deus creat hoc, ergo hoc est”, quod non sequitur de scientia ad minus in incomplexis. Creare ergo connotat effectum, scire autem non effectum sed solum respectum. Quia ergo effectus Dei in creatura temporalis est, respectus autem potest esse aeternus, cum sit habitualis, ideo potest dici Deus aliquid creare de novo vel ex tempore, non autem scire».

que nunca habrá de producir. En este último saber no hay relación alguna con la producción y, por tanto, no puede depender de ella. Es la pura inteligencia de un objeto cuya inteligibilidad depende de su propia naturaleza y no de la capacidad o de la decisión divina de producirlo.

4.2. *Las ideas de todos los posibles en la q. II, 6 de exsistentia rerum in Deo*

En la cuestión II, 6, Rigaud sostiene que «Dios posee generalmente ideas de todos los posibles», entendiendo por *omnia possibilis* tanto las cosas futuras que no serán, como las cosas futuras que serán⁵⁸. La respuesta a la cuestión se articula en dos partes distintas, pero íntimamente vinculadas. La primera se ciñe al aspecto lógico semántico de la noción de idea, es decir, a su *ratio intelligendi*; la segunda consiste en una cita de Agustín sobre el carácter causal de la *scientia* divina. He aquí la primera parte:

Ad hoc dicendum quod qui vellet restringere rationem intelligendi hoc quod est idea, appellando “ideam” secundum quam fit aliquid sive factivum, hoc modo non esset dicendum esse ideas in Deo nisi solum futurorum vel producendorum. Sed quia idea, de suo modo significandi, sive ratio dat intelligere non solum id secundum quod fit alterum, immo secundum quod potest fieri sive sciretur fieri si vellet habens ideam, – hoc modo sumendi ideam in suo modo proprio significandi, dico quod in Deo fuerunt [ideae] ab aeterno non solum futurorum, immo omnium esse possibilium, quod posse potentiae est⁵⁹.

Si bien no puede considerarse excluyente, porque representa una opinión bastante consensuada, la referencia a Alberto es evi-

58. En la tercera parte, relativa al Prólogo de Juan, hallamos una cuestión que replica de alguna manera la II, 6, desde el punto de vista del conocimiento como vida: ODO RIGALDUS, *De exsistentia rerum in Deo*, in L. SILEO (ed.), *De rerum ideis*, III, 2, pp. 253-257: «Utrum in Deo generaliter omnia possibilis debeant dici in ipso vita sicut quod factum est vel quod fiet».

59. ODO RIGALDUS, *Lectura in I Sententiarum*, d. 36, q. 3, 52, p. 220.

dente⁶⁰. Retomando en parte la opinión de Alejandro de Hales sobre la ejemplaridad como posibilidad disposicional, Odón sostiene que la *ratio* de idea no solo dice «aquello según lo cual se *hace* algo», sino también «aquello según lo cual *puede* hacerse algo», o bien, «aquello según lo cual *sabría* hacerlo alguien si quisiera»⁶¹. En sí misma, la noción de idea dice tanto ejemplaridad como posibilidad y, en ese sentido, facticidad; por lo tanto, según su propio modo de significar, designa todos los posibles, y no solo los futuros: la idea divina, en efecto, designa de suyo un poder de potencia irrestricto⁶². Odón explica desde el punto de vista lógico el carácter irrestricto de la noción de idea, corrigiendo la interpretación albertina de *De divinis nominibus* V, 8, reportada como primer argumento en contra de su tesis:

Quod obicitur primo de auctoritate Dionysii, potest sic responderi: cum dicit quod secundum istas “omnia praedefinivit et produxit”, non loquitur secundum praecisionem quin et alia secundum

60. Los cuatro argumentos contrarios a la respuesta de Rigaud a la cuestión desarrollan diversos aspectos de la tesis de Alberto Magno acerca del carácter factivo de las ideas divinas expuesta en los textos analizados en el párrafo, aunque también sean referibles a otros autores. El aparato crítico de la q. II, 6 demuestra que Tomás de Aquino conoce y, por lo general, rechaza punto por punto la crítica de Odón a la tesis de Alberto. Tanto en este caso preciso, como en el aparato crítico de toda la *Quaestio de existentia rerum in Deo* y de las distinciones de la *Lectura* editadas en el mismo volumen, se pone claramente en evidencia que Tomás fue un lector de Odón tan atento como crítico, a pesar de que este no figure nunca entre sus fuentes. Lo mismo debe decirse, ciertamente con signo contrario, de Buenaventura. He relevado este aspecto con relación al análisis rigaldiano del *dominium* en C. MARTÍNEZ RUIZ, *Odón Rigaud y la cuestión del poder: Lectura super II Librum Sententiarum, d. 44*, «Archivum Franciscanum Historicum» 103 (2010), pp. 339-358, pero el minucioso trabajo de Leonardo Sileo no deja ningún lugar a dudas al respecto.

61. ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Quaestiones disputatae ‘antequam esset frater’*, II, q. 46, disp. I, m. I, 15, p. 791; cfr. ID., *Glossa in I Sententiarum*, d. 6, 4, p. 93.

62. Cfr. *Summa Halensis*, I, inq. I, tr. 4, I, q. 3, 3. (155), p. 236: «Ad hoc, nihil temere asserendo, cum omni modestia respondendum quod, si potentia Dei concipiatur ab anima absolute, non poterit anima determinare nec capere infinitum pelagus suae potestatis. Sed cum anima speculatur divinam potentiam ut ordinatam secundum conditionem potestatis, veritatis, bonitatis, dico quod possibile Deo est quod posse potentiae est et non potest quod est impotentiae».

illas posset producere. Unde vult dicere quod omnia producta secundum illas produxit, non tamen propter hoc excludit quin et alia secundum illas posset producere. Unde loquitur secundum causalitatem⁶³.

La definición en cuestión, reportada por Odón, reza como sigue:

Exemplaria autem esse dicimus in Deo existentium rationes substantificas secundum quas supersubstantialis existentia, id est Deus, omnia praediffinivit et produxit (103).

Según los terministas, la restricción consiste en una coartación del término común de una suposición mayor a una menor. En opinión de Rigaud, Alberto interpreta el predicado de la definición como una restricción *per praecisionem vel disparationem* del término categoremático sujeto (*exemplaria*). Rigaud sostiene que Alberto restringe por exclusión el categorema *exemplaria* a las ideas de aquellas cosas cuya producción ha sido predefinida por Dios; cuando, en realidad, está por *todas* las ideas que existen en Dios, no solamente por aquellas de las cosas que existen o van a existir; de manera que la conclusión que deduce es falsa. Se trata, por el contrario, de un término común no restringido; de modo que, al decir que todas las cosas fueron producidas según las ideas como “ejemplares”, no se excluye otras cosas que podrían ser producidas según las ideas⁶⁴.

63. ODO RIGALDUS, *De existentia rerum in Deo*, II, 6, 110, p. 221; cfr. *ibidem*, II, 6, 103, p. 219; «Ergo solum sunt rationes vel ideae praedefinitorum productio, et sic non omnium possibilium»; ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Quaestio de ideis divinis*, p. 264A; ID., *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus*, V, 6, p. 324AB.

64. Los categoremata pueden estar tanto por cosas que existen como por cosas que no existen. Pero lo apelado es siempre algo que existe; de manera que a veces lo supuesto y lo apelado son lo mismo, pero otra veces no. Rigaud estaría entendiendo la restricción *secundum praecisionem vel disparationem* a partir de la regla para establecer cuándo los apelados y los supuestos son lo mismo y cuándo no; cfr. GUILLELMUS DE SHERWOOD, *Introductiones in Logicam*, C.H. Lohr, P. Kunze, B. Musler (edd.), *William of Sherwood, Introductiones in Logicam. Critical Text*, «Traditio» 39, (1983), 5.3.2-4, p. 272: «Terminus communis, non-restrictus, habens sufficientiam appellatorum, supponens verbo de praesenti, non habenti vim ampliandi,

Para sufragar su opinión, Odón lleva a la segunda parte de la *solutio* una cita de la *Ciudad de Dios* recurrente en la *Lectura* y en la *Quaestio de existentia rerum in Deo* junto a otras equivalentes, que otro podría hacer valer para sufragar la tesis contraria:

Augustinus dicit, et omnibus notum est, quod cognitio Dei ex rebus non dependet, immo aequaliter se habet ad omnia, ergo aequaliter cognoscit futura et non futura; sed quidquid quod non est ipse, per ideam cognoscit; ergo omnium, tam futurorum quam aliorum habet ideas⁶⁵.

Agustín sostiene que, a diferencia de un artífice humano, Dios no hace absolutamente nada sin conocimiento. De manera que, si todo lo hace sabiendo, hizo las cosas que había conocido. «Este mundo no podría ser conocido por nosotros si no existiera» – dice –, «mas, si no hubiese sido conocido por Dios, no podría existir». Tanto Alejandro de Hales como Alberto Magno y la *Summa Halensis* (por referirme

supponit tantum pro his, quae sunt». Un ejemplo claro de la interpretación rigaldiana de la definición lo hallamos en ODO RIGALDUS, *De existentia rerum in Deo*, II, 3, 30, p. 186: «Item, Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, in plurali definit dicens: “Exemplaria autem dicimus esse in Deo existentium rationes substantificas et singulariter praexistentes, quas theologia praedefinitiones vocat, et divinas et bonas voluntates, existentium determinativas vel effectivas, secundum quas supersubstantialis (scilicet Deus) existentia omnia praedefinivit et produxit”. Cfr. T. PARSONS, *The Development of Supposition Theory in the Later 12th through 14th Centuries*, in D.M. GABBAY, J. WOODS (eds.), *Handbook on the History of Logic 2. Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic*, Elsevier, Amsterdam 2008, pp. 202-215. En III, 2 Odón aplica la misma estrategia resolutive para probar que el conocimiento de lo posible no futuro «es vida en Dios», ya que la expresión *esse vita in Deo*, tal como está formulada (absolutamente), no cosignifica nada y, por tanto, no se puede restringir su alcance: ODO RIGALDUS, *De existentia rerum in Deo*, III, 2, 26, p. 256: «Sumendo autem ‘esse vita in Deo’ simpliciter sine omni connotato, quia nihil de modo significandi videtur connotare, sic possent dici esse vita in eo omnia possibilis».

65. ODO RIGALDUS, *De existentia rerum in Deo*, II, 6, 92, p. 216; AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De civitate Dei*, B. Dombart, A. Kalb (edd.), Brepols, Turnhout 1955 (CCSL 48), XI, 11, p. 332; Id., *De Genesi ad litteram*, J. Zycha (ed.), Tempsky, Praha-Wien/Freytag, Leipzig 1894 (CSEL 28/1), V, 18, 36, p. 160. La misma cita se halla en ODO RIGALDUS, *Lectura in I Sententiarum*, d. 35, q. 5, 60; Id., *De existentia rerum in Deo*, II, 6, 93; III, 2, 26; 3, 32 y 5, 65, pp. 30, 216, 256, 257, y 279 respectivamente.

solamente a los autores estudiados aquí) interpretaban la doctrina de Agustín en sentido excluyente, es decir, referida a las cosas futuras. Pero según Rigaud la *scientia Dei*, por no depender de las cosas sino ser causa de estas, es inmutable y se refiere a todas las cosas por igual, es decir, tanto a las futuras como a las no futuras.

Así pues, Odón da por verdadera la proposición:

«si *a* no hubiese sido conocido por Dios, no podría existir».

Pero, atento a la *ratio intelligendi* propia de la noción de idea, entiende que de allí no se sigue que

«Dios solo conoce aquello que existe o existirá».

La noción de idea, en efecto, dice *prioridad* respecto de lo ideado, pero no futura existencia de lo ideado⁶⁶. En tal sentido, Rigaud entiende que restringir la noción de idea a un principio factivo, es decir, aquello conforme a lo cual se efectúa algo, excluyendo por ello que haya ideas de posibles no existentes, equivale a afirmar que Dios conoce algo *porque* es futuro; y, de este modo, a hacer depender la *scientia divina* de la creación, cuando el conocimiento divino es causa y no efecto de las cosas⁶⁷. Estaríamos así confundiendo la mera *intelligentia*, que es un conocimiento incomplejo y especulativo, con la *approbatio*, que es un conocimiento complejo, especulativo y práctico. En efecto, cuando decimos que las cosas son *porque* Dios las conoció, el conocimiento referido no es de simple noticia intelectual, sino de aprobación, es decir, el que suma a la intelección la voluntad y la resolución de producir lo ideado. De manera que, como decía en la *Lectura*, la proposición «si Dios sabe *a*, existirá *a*» es verdadera inferencialmente, pero no causalmente,

66. ODO RIGALDUS, *De existentia rerum in Deo*, II, 6, 92, p. 214: «Et quod idea dicat rationem prioritatis respectu ideati, dicit Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus* (...) Ibi plane habetur quod idea dicit rationem prioritatis respectu ideati».

67. Cfr. ID., *Lectura in I Sententiarum*, d. 38, q. 1, 3 y 17, pp. 288 y 296; ID., *De existentia rerum in Deo*, II, 1, 1 y 16, pp. 174 y 179; II, 4, 65 y 68, pp. 207 y 209 respectivamente.

ya que «saber *a*» cosignifica el efecto en la criatura y lo que es efectuado en la criatura. Si lo entendiésemos en sentido causal, entonces Dios sería la causa de todo lo que conoce. Así pues, el enunciado «Dios sabe que ese hombre fornicia» cosignifica un efecto o algo que *el hombre* efectúa, pero es imposible que eso sea efectuado por Dios como causa⁶⁸. Retomando un aspecto de la doctrina de Alejandro acerca del carácter intermedio de la idea en tanto objeto inteligido analizado en la segunda sección, Rigaud plantea como objeción un eventual corolario: la pluralidad de las ideas responde a la pluralidad de criaturas futuras, no a la simplicidad de la esencia divina. Pero la pluralidad o la diversidad de ideas no futuras, cuya no existencia se prevé, no puede responder ni a esas mismas ideas ni a Dios. Por lo tanto, de las cosas no futuras no hay ideas⁶⁹. En virtud de su propia *ratio intelligendi*, la idea no se refiere a lo que existe sino a lo que puede existir. Más aún, las ideas son enumerables en función de su posibilidad y no de su existencia, toda vez que son posibilidades distintas. Del hecho de que haya ideas de dos posibles *a* y *b* no se sigue necesariamente que existan dos entes *a* y *b*. Un carpintero puede tener dos ideas distintas de una mesa y de una silla que sabría hacer, pero que nunca hará:

idea de ratione sua non respicit quod est, sed quod potest esse, et tunc secundum quod numerantur illa quae possunt quorum sunt, sic et ideae eorum et illa numerantur non in esse, sed in possibile

68. ID., *Lectura in I Sententiarum*, q. 1, 16, p. 294 y 20, pp. 298-299: «Ad aliud dicendum quod, cum dicitur “Deus scit hoc”, ibi connotatur effectus in creatura, sive quod efficitur in creatura; sed non necesse est quod illud efficiatur a Deo, – vel si efficiatur ab ipso, non tamen oportet quod efficiatur secundum rationem causae. Et quod ita sit, patet, quia si dicitur “Deus scit istum hominem fornicari”, ibi connotatur aliquis effectus sive aliquid quod efficitur in creatura, et tamen impossibile est illud – cum sit malum – effici a Deo, unde bene verum est, [quod] si connotatur effectus aliquis, aliquid respondet ei pro causa, sed non oportet quod illud sit ipse Deus vel eius scientia».

69. ID., *De existentia rerum in Deo*, II, 6, 104, p. 219; ID., *Lectura in I Sententiarum*, d. 35, 66, p. 33: «Ad primum dicendum quod ideae in Deo unum sunt et sunt ipse Deus, tamen per comparisonem ad creaturas plures dicuntur ideae». ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Quaestiones disputatae ‘antequam esset frater’*, II, q. 46, disp. 1, m. 3, 33, pp. 799-800.

esse. Unde duorum possibilium fere duae sunt ideae, nec sequitur propter hoc quod illa sint duo entia: possum enim habere duas ideas duarum rerum, quas scirem facere, licet etiam numquam faciam⁷⁰.

Esta respuesta es muy importante con relación a la comprensión rigaldiana de la modalidad. Odón no podría sostener la pluralidad de ideas de objetos posibles no existentes ni futuros si no considerase la posibilidad en sentido intensional. En tal sentido, su planteo está muy cerca de la tesis aviceniana de la esencia en general y, en este caso de modo particular, de las tres acepciones de universal, sobre todo la segunda. Según esta acepción, como es bien sabido, una intención es universal en tanto puede ser predicada de muchos, aunque no exista ninguno. Esta posibilidad es intrínseca a la intención, es decir, radica en su *quiditas*. Y así, la intención “casa heptagonal” es susceptible de ser predicada de muchas casas, aunque no haya ninguna de ese tipo⁷¹. Análogamente, la idea de una tal casa es formable por sí misma, aunque nunca sea construida. Lo mismo podría decirse de una casa de planta circular y de otra de planta pentagonal. Estas intenciones son *tres* intenciones distintas y se distinguen entre sí solo intensionalmente, ya que carecen de extensión. Por la misma razón, son tres ideas distintas y enumerables *in possibile esse*. Digamos que, así como la universalidad no puede ser explicada en términos exclusivamente extensionales, la posibilidad no puede ser explicada en términos exclusivamente fácticos. Al igual que sus contemporáneos, Odón leyó esta doctrina de la modalidad (*in se possibile*) en el IV libro de la *Philosophia prima* de Avicena, y aflora sutilmente en esta cuestión, como en el resto de los textos analizados. Si las cosas son posibles o imposibles según su propia naturaleza y no por

70. *Ibidem*, p. 222.

71. AVICENNA LATINUS, *Liber de philosophia prima sive De scientia divina*, S. Van Riet (ed.), E. Peeters, Louvain-Brill, Leiden 1998, V, 1, p. 276: «Dico igitur quod universale dicitur tribus modis: dicitur enim universale secundum hoc quod praedicatur in actu de multis, sicut homo; et dicitur universale intentio quam possibile est praedicari de multis, etsi nullum eorum habeat esse in effectu, sicut intentio domus heptangulae, quae universalis est eo quod natura eius est posse praedicari de multis, sed non est necesse esse illa multa; immo nec etiam aliquod illorum».

su factibilidad, el alcance de lo posible o lo imposible no radica en la potencia divina ni depende de ella. Todo lo que empieza a existir en el mundo, antes de ser, debe ser posible; y si no fuera en sí mismo posible, no existiría de ningún modo⁷².

Sin perjuicio de lo expresado hasta aquí, en el último argumento contrario, Rigaud considera una noción factiva de imposibilidad con la que podrían estar de acuerdo cualquiera de sus adversarios y que se refiere, más bien, a la omnipotencia divina. El argumento sostiene que si Dios pudiera hacer cosas imposibles, deberíamos afirmar que de esas cosas hay ideas en Dios, pero, como esto es inconveniente, Dios no puede hacer cosas imposibles⁷³. No deja de sorprender el hecho de que en ningún momento se puso en discusión la omnipotencia divina, pero Odón aclara que la noción de imposibilidad (y de posibilidad) admite dos sentidos viables, ambos dependientes de la noción de potencia: respecto de Dios (*quoad Deum*) y respecto de la naturaleza (*quoad naturam solum*). Así pues nada que sea imposible para Dios puede tener idea en su mente ni existencia fuera de ella, ya que Dios solo posee ideas de aquellas cosas que son posibles para él (*quae sibi sunt possibilis*). Pero puede haber ideas en Dios de cosas imposibles para la naturaleza, ya que él sabe lo que puede hacer y sabe que lo puede hacer. Sería contradictorio afirmar, por el contrario, que haya en Dios ideas de lo que

72. AVICENNA, *Liber de philosophia prima sive De scientia divina*, S. Van Riet (ed), E. Peeters, Louvain-Brill, Leiden 1977, IV, 2, p. 208: «Omne enim quod incipit esse, antequam sit, necesse est ut sit possibile in se. Si enim fuerit non possibile in se, illud non erit ullo modo; non est autem possibilitas sui esse eo quod agens sit potens super illud, quia agens non est potens super illud, cum ipsum non fuerit in se possibile. Nonne enim vides quia possumus dicere quod super impossibile non est posse, sed posse est super id quod possibile est esse?». A falta de estudios específicos sobre la recepción de Avicena por parte de Odón Rigaud, resulta muy orientador el valioso estudio de A. BERTOLACCI, *Reading Aristotle with Avicenna. On the Reception of the Philosophia Prima in the Summa Halensis*, in L. SCHUMACHER (ed.), *The Summa Halensis. Sources and Context (Veröffentlichungen des Grabmann-Institutes zur Erforschung der mittelalterlichen Theologie und Philosophie 65)*, De Gruyter, Berlin-Boston 2020, pp. 135-154.

73. ODO RIGALDUS, *De existentia rerum in Deo*, II, 6, 106, p. 220: «Item, cum Deus possit facere impossibilia, tunc dicerentur rationes impossibilium esse in Deo, hoc autem inconueniens; ergo, etc.».

no puede hacer, ya que entonces sabría que puede algo que ignora (ya que sabe lo que puede)⁷⁴. Tanto el argumento como la respuesta funcionan solamente si se toma la imposibilidad *quoad naturam* en sentido físico y no metafísico, es decir, como alteración o suspensión de una ley natural (abrir las aguas del mar o transubstanciar el pan y el vino). Un sentido, por cierto, del todo excepcional respecto del enfoque desarrollado hasta aquí, y, por lo tanto, menos relevante⁷⁵.

Aún haciendo valer la excepcionalidad de este argumento, resulta evidente, a partir de todo lo visto, que Rigaud desarrolla una comprensión intensional de la modalidad y que, al sostener que en Dios hay ideas de todos los posibles y no solamente de los futuros, defiende una *possibilitas ut possibilitas*, o *possibilitas in se*, opuesta a una *possibilitas ut potentia*, o posibilidad de realización, pero no contradictoria. En efecto, él no impugna en ningún momento el carácter factivo de las ideas divinas ni la comprensión de la posibilidad en términos de potencia. Lo que impugna, tanto desde el punto de vista lógico como desde el punto de vista ontológico, es la reducción de las ideas a principios factivos y de la posibilidad a la factibilidad. Todo lo que Dios produce, lo produce mediante una idea. Pero eso no implica en absoluto que Dios solo tenga ideas de aquello que produce o va a producir.

74. *Ibidem*, pp. 222-223: «Quod obicitur, quod essent tunc ideae impossibilium, dicendum quod si tu appellas impossibile quoad Deum, dico quod tale nullo modo potest habere ideam nec potest esse, quia Deus non habet ideam nisi eorum quae sibi sunt possibilium. Si loquaris de impossibili quoad naturam solum, de talibus bene concedo quod sunt ideae in Deo: cognoscit enim se posse facere talia, et constat quod cognoscit illud quod scit se posse, – vel aliter sciret se posse quod non cognosceret, quod absurdum est dicere».

75. Cfr. *Summa Halensis*, I, p. 1, inq. 1, tr. 4, q. 3, cap. 1 (151), p. 232: «Dicendum quod possibile secundum naturam dicitur duobus modis. Uno modo, cuius principium est natura sive cuius principium est in natura; alio modo, quod non est a potentia naturae, sed tamen est consuetum ut fiat in natura a causa superiori, secundum quod dicitur “consuetudo est altera natura” ut creatio et iustificatio et huiusmodi»; *ibidem*, I, p. 1, inq. 1, tr. 5, sect. 2, q. 4, tit. 1, m. 4, cap. 3 (233), p. 327: «quia in dictis vel factis hominum impossibilitas refertur ad naturam rei, in praesentia et praedestinatione refertur possibilitas vel impossibilitas ad potentiam Dei, quae eadem semper fuit et erit: praedestinatio enim et potentia in Deo idem sunt».

5. Consideraciones finales

El análisis de la *Quaestio de modo existendi rerum in Deo* demuestra la importancia fundamental de la modalidad en la doctrina rigaldiana de las ideas. La noción de *possibilitas*, en efecto, emerge como uno de los pilares en los que se asienta la crítica de Odón Rigaud al modelo ejemplarista de las relaciones de Dios con el mundo y del mundo con Dios de mayor aceptación entre sus contemporáneos. La noción de *possibilitas in se* y, sobre todo, su rol explicativo, divide la posición de Rigaud de la de sus contemporáneos (Alejandro de Hales y Alberto Magno, por lo menos) y de sus fuentes. Al oponer dos modos de comprender la noción de idea en Dios referida solo a la creación, extendida a lo posible y a lo imposible, Alberto no hacía sino refrendar un consenso en torno a la comprensión de la posibilidad como potencia y a la función factiva de las ideas ejemplares, sobre la base de un isomorfismo *idea* – *ideatum* que terminó identificando la noción de *ideatum* con la de *futurum*.

Odón Rigaud, por el contrario, entiende que el carácter causal de la idea no excluye objetos meramente posibles y no futuros. Antes bien, trata su comprensión de la posibilidad *in se* como compatible y no contradictoria con una comprensión de la posibilidad *in Deo* de la cosa, que, por otra parte, nunca negó. El punto de inflexión de su tesis, sin embargo, consiste en que no se puede restringir ni lógicamente ni ontológicamente la posibilidad a la realización. Y, en tal sentido debe afirmarse, ya en un plano teológico, que la extensión de la ciencia divina es mayor que la de su voluntad. Allí radica la relevancia de la q. II, 6 al interior del tratado *de modo existendi rerum in Deo*.

Esta comprensión de la posibilidad, desde luego, se halla muy lejos de una teoría de la contingencia *a parte rei* como las que se debatirán después de la censura de 1277, pero abre un camino diferente al de sus colegas, que algunos discípulos de Rigaud transitarán, como Buenaventura, y otros no, como el anónimo autor de las *Veritates quaestionum* editadas por Sileo⁷⁶. Este desarrollo de la

76. ANONYMUS, *Veritates quaestionum*, q. 9, 21, Sileo (ed.), *De rerum ideis*, p. 305: «Sed cum duplex sit intellectus, speculativus et practicus, 'esse in ipso intelligente'»

modalidad, por otra parte, se verifica en el marco preciso de una *inquisitio* acerca de las ideas y, por tanto, se halla condicionado y hasta limitado por sus objetivos. Mi trabajo se ha ceñido a la *Quaestio de existentia rerum in Deo* y a su relación con las distinciones de la *Lectura* editadas críticamente. Para completar un análisis de la teoría modal de Rigaud resulta imprescindible consultar toda la *pars secunda* del primer libro, de modo particular la distinción 43. De Odón Rigaud todavía queda casi todo por estudiar y conocer, aunque no sea ni poco ni relevante lo que vamos conociendo, gracias a la edición de su obra, lamentablemente fragmentaria. Pero lo cierto es que, dondequiera que se lo aborde, se revela como un autor extraordinario, cuyas teorías se proyectan fácilmente más allá de sus interlocutores inmediatos, aunque la presencia de Rigaud en sus obras no se tenga en cuenta, como en el caso de Alberto Magno y de Tomás de Aquino. Una de las cuestiones capitales que deja en agenda el estudio de la tesis rigaldiana sobre la ciencia divina, es la recepción de Avicena: específicamente, su posición respecto de la tesis de la indiferencia de la esencia y, por supuesto, la teoría modal en su conjunto, cuyos conceptos de *possibile* e *impossibile* vemos aflorar en la doctrina propuesta por Eudes Rigaud acerca de la *scientia Dei*.

etiam dupliciter: vel 'esse in intellectu eius speculativo', et sic sunt in eo quae cognoscit se posse facere quae tamen non faciet; vel 'esse in intellectu eius practico', et sic sunt in eo quae cognoscit et disponit facere. Et haec sunt in ipso vita. Et sic patet quomodo haec differunt»; ANONYMUS, *Quaestiones super Sententias*, q. 15, 34 (*Utrum scientia Dei sit contingentium*), Sileo (ed.), *De rerum ideis*, pp. 329-330: «Dicendum quod Deus habet cognitionem vel scientiam de contingentibus futuris quantumcumque contingentia sint, quia omnia sunt praesentia Deo, – sive sint praeterita sive futura – per cognitionem, quia, ut dictum est, uno simplici intuitu omnia novit. Nec tamen de necessitate omnia evenient quae sunt contingentia futura, nisi solum ea quae a Deo sunt praescita futura; nisi enim illa evenirent, scientia Dei esse fallibilis, – quod non est dare. Quia tamen possibile est aliqua contingentia non fuisse futura, ideo non omnia contingentia futura de necessitate eveniet».

According to the Blessed Dionysius: the Areopagitic Character of Bonaventure's Exemplarism, with Particular Reference to the *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*

TOMMASO MANZON*

1. Introduction

It is a common trope to describe Bonaventure's thought as being fundamentally indebted to the Augustinian tradition¹. In this respect, the *Doctor Seraphicus* has been widely considered to be «the ultimate Medieval champion of the longstanding Augustinian intellectual tradition»². While this perspective has been offered with different nuances³, one can find in Bonaventuran scholarship an enduring and widespread persuasion that the deep structure of his thought is best understood with reference to Augustine and his successors⁴.

In spite of this common perception, the presence of other major influences within Bonaventure's *oeuvre* has been routinely acknowledged. One such major influence is that of the texts that go under the name of Dionysius the Areopagite. Indeed, Dionysius'

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1. See L. SCHUMACHER, *Bonaventure's Journey of the Mind into God: A Traditional Augustinian Ascent?*, «Medioevo» 37 (2012), pp. 201-230: 201, n. 2-3; for an early account of the limits of Bonaventure's Augustinianism, see L. MEIER, *Bonaventuras Selbstzeugnis über seine Augustinismus*, «Franz Studien» 17 (1930), pp. 342-355.

2. SCHUMACHER, *Bonaventure's Journey of the Mind into God*, p. 201.

3. Cfr. L. SCHUMACHER, *New Directions in Franciscan Studies*, «Theology» 120 (2017), pp. 253-261: 256.

4. Cfr. C. CULLEN, *Bonaventure*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006; S.P. MARRONE, *The Light of Thy Countenance: Science and the Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century*, Brill, Leiden 2001.

influence on Bonaventure is so vast that it has prompted attempts to define what is exactly the relationship between the Areopagite's and Augustine's influence on the Franciscan.

Joseph Ratzinger provided one such attempt of tracing the contours of this intertwining of *auctoritates*. In the closing pages of his classic study of Bonaventure's theology of history, the future Benedict XVI summarizes his findings claiming that in the *Collationes in Hexaemeron* the Franciscan was intent in establishing «a sort of short salvation-history of theology in which he related Augustine to *doctrina* and Gregory the Great to the preachers; but Dionysius he saw as the patron of the *ecclesia contemplativa*, the Church of the final Age»⁵. In other words, Ratzinger is arguing that, while Bonaventure's spirituality and mysticism look to Dionysius as their main source of inspiration, this should be understood within a doctrinal framework provided by the bishop of Hippo. This perspective resonates with the classical understanding of Bonaventure as an inveterate Augustinian. Nonetheless, Ratzinger proceeds to argue that, while Augustine plays a fundamental role within Bonaventure's intellectual project, he does so only in a «subordinate and ministerial position»⁶. Rather, it is the vision of a contemplative church that has the Areopagite as its patron saint that takes prece-

5. J. RATZINGER, *The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure*, trans. by Z. Hayes, Franciscan Herald Press, Chicago 1989, pp. 157-158; here, Ratzinger is drawing on Bonaventure's *De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam* 5, in PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas (edd.), *Opera omnia*, V, Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Firenze 1891, p. 321: «Tota sacra Scriptura haec tria docet, scilicet Christi aeternam generationem et incarnationem, vivendi ordinem et Dei et animae unionem. Primum respicit fidem, secundum mores, tertium finem utriusque. Circa primum insudare debet stadium doctorum, circa secundum stadium praedicatorum circa tertium studium contemplativorum. Primum maxime docet Augustinus, secundum maxime docet Gregorius, tertium vero docet Dionysius».

6. RATZINGER, *The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure*, p. 158: «Bonaventure had never set out to be an "Augustinian". His intention had been merely to give that place to Augustine which he deserved just as he wished to give to Aristotle the place he deserved. In the great hierarchical structure of Christian wisdom, it is not only Aristotle who has a subordinate and ministerial position, but Augustine as well. Certainly, Augustine stands above Aristotle; but he must be satisfied with the second place. He stands far too close to the philosophers to succeed in arriving at the first place».

dence as a wider framework within which Augustine must be understood. Therefore, Ratzinger's eventual judgement proves to be a remarkable development on the understanding of Bonaventure as a straightforward synthesizer of Augustine's thought. However, it is important to notice how he still understands the Franciscan's *doctrina* as being primarily founded on Augustine⁷.

In the light of recent studies concerning Bonaventure and Early Franciscanism⁸ there seems to be enough ground for discussing and complicating this view⁹. In particular, there seems to be a mounting case that some of the positions ascribed to Augustine by Bonaventure and his fellow Franciscans (one thinks in particular of his direct teachers such as Alexander of Hales and John De La Rochelle) were in fact retrieved from other sources that were

7. In this, Ratzinger seems to be simply taking Bonaventure at his own words as he places Augustine as the first among the doctors (see above, n. 339), this, in spite of the fact that Ratzinger himself notices how Bonaventure could be critical of Augustine when the latter seemed to be too close to the philosophers (*The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure*, p. 158): «Certainly Augustine stands above Aristotle; but he must be satisfied with the second place. He stands far too close to the philosophers to succeed in arriving at the first place. Already in his *Commentary on the Sentences* [...] we find that Bonaventure is quite capable of very critical observations about Augustine». Cfr. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *In II Sententiarum*, in PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas (edd.), *Opera omnia*, II, Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Firenze 1885, d. 13, a. 1, q. 1, p. 312; d. 33, a. 3, q. 1, p. 793; ID., *In IV Sententiarum*, in *Opera omnia*, IV, Firenze 1889, d. 8, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, p. 211.

8. L. SCHUMACHER (ed.), *The Legacy of Early Franciscan Thought*, De Gruyter, Berlin 2021; EAD., *Early Franciscan Theology. Between Authority and Innovation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2019.

9. It should be noticed that the diagnosis concerning Bonaventure's Augustinianism was itself a by-product of a wider judgement cast on the whole of the Franciscan tradition, cfr. F. EHRLE, *Grundsätzliches zur Charakteristik der neueren und neuesten Scholastik*, Herder, Fribourg 1918; É. GILSON, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, Random House, New York 1955; SCHUMACHER, *New directions in Franciscan studies*, p. 261: «Since modern research on medieval thought first began to gather momentum in the late nineteenth century, scholars have held fast to a number of key assumptions about the Franciscan intellectual tradition [...] in particular, they have arrived at the consensus that Franciscans before John Duns Scotus [...] were relatively unoriginal systematizers of the long-standing medieval intellectual tradition inaugurated by Augustine».

subsequently hidden under the name of the great Latin doctor¹⁰. On a close look, in their Bonaventurean instantiation even classic Augustinian themes such as the doctrine of illumination would in fact have a material dependence on authors such as Avicenna or Dionysius¹¹. If this were true, it would follow that Bonaventure's *doctrina* is much less Augustinian than he himself seems to imply in some of his writings¹².

In the light of this thesis, this paper is concerned with proposing a re-examination of Dionysius' influence over Bonaventure, and in particular on the latter's doctrine of divine ideas¹³. This will be done by making reference to the *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, being this the text where Bonaventure's exemplarism is drawn out most systematically. Furthermore, the *Quaestiones de scientia Christi* offer a convenient proof-text for assessing Bonaventure's relationship to Dionysius, insofar as they are a work that bear the undisputable mark of the Areopagite. In fact, they have been long identified as a

10. These covert attributions might have been driven, at least in part, by the desire to underline the continuity between the burgeoning school of Franciscan thought and the earlier Latin-speaking tradition of thought. For instance, with respect to the *Summa's* treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity, Schumacher (*Early Franciscan Theology*, p. 163) comments that «in addition to Pseudo-Dionysius, John of Damascus remains a key authority throughout the *Summa's* discussion of the Trinity, along with Augustine and Richard of St. Victor. Nevertheless, the references to Augustine primarily serve to confirm the conformity of the *Summa's* doctrine to Western orthodoxy, particularly as regards the *filioque* and the psychological model. In its actual contours, this doctrine departs significantly from Augustine and exhibits commonalities with the model outlined by Damascus and, above all, Richard of St. Victor».

11. L. SCHUMACHER, *Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine's Theory of Knowledge*, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford 2011, pp. 110-154.

12. Cfr. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *Epistola de tribus quaestionibus*, in PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas (edd.), *Opera omnia*, VIII, Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Firenze 1898, n. 12, p. 335; ID., *In III Sententiarum*, in *Opera omnia*, III, Firenze 1887, d. 3, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, p. 86.; ID., *Unus est magister*, in *Opera omnia*, V, n. 19, p. 572.

13. I use this expression for convenience of use; nowhere in the *Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi* Bonaventure use the term *idea* preferring instead synonyms like *similitudo*, *specie*, *ratio*, or *exemplar*; cfr. Z. HAYES, *Introduction*, in BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ*, Franciscan Institute Publications, New York 1992, p. 50.

text where Bonaventure's engagement with Dionysius reaches new levels of systematic relevance, even going beyond his Franciscan teachers in his drawing from the works of the Greek Father¹⁴. At the same time, quotes and expressions extracted from Augustine's works abound in the *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*. In this respect, as I shall endeavour to show in the following pages, Bonaventure consistently grafts Augustine onto Dionysius, and this not only with respect to what concerns contemplation and mystical theology. In other words, it is also with respect to the ambit of *doctrine* that Dionysius seems to provide Bonaventure with the wider metaphysical and doctrinal framework within which Augustine (alongside other *auctoritates*) is to be understood.

As a concluding note to this introduction, it should be recalled how Bonaventure's exemplarism sits at the very core of his thought¹⁵; accordingly, a renewed understanding of his doctrine of divine ideas, that is, a crucial part of his exemplarism, bears implications for our global understanding of his work. I will offer some considerations concerning this point towards the end of my argument.

14. RATZINGER, *The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure*, p. 90: «In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, it seems that Bonaventure knew Dionysius only from the perspective of the School-theology [...] but this begins to change from about the time of the *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*. Here to an increasing degree the dominating force is found in the idea of a knowledge of God in that area which is characterized in the following words: "Sola affective vigilat et silentium omnibus aliis potentiis imponit" [...] there is not a change in context; but there is a change of emphasis within the whole. It is this new emphasis which gives a new meaning to the entire structure of Bonaventurian theology». Zachary Hayes (*Introduction*, pp. 42-43) points out how, with respect to Bonaventure's earlier treatment of the subject of the knowledge of Christ's soul in d. 14 of *In III Sententiarum*, there seems to be a moving beyond the influence of Alexander of Hales (which was deeply felt in the *Commentary*) and towards a deeper grasp of Dionysius' thought.

15. E.H. COUSINS, *Response to Zachary Hayes*, «The Journal of Religion» 58 (1978), pp. 97-104: 101: «Exemplarity through the Word is the center of Bonaventure's system and the basis for the intimate interpenetration of God and the world».

2. On the presence of the *Corpus Dionysiacum* in the *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*

In order to prove my thesis, I will focus my discussion on the explicit quotes from the *Corpus Dionysiacum* or explicit references to Dionysius authority in the *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*. In each case, I will discuss the import of every single quotation within its immediate context, with an eye to its proximate relationship with quotes from Augustine, as well as to its contribution towards defining Bonaventure's doctrine of divine ideas. Before doing so, I will quickly rehearse the topic and the argumentative outlines of the *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*.

The *Quaestiones de scientia Christi* deal with the dilemma generated on the one hand by the dogmatic assertion that Jesus possesses a genuine human nature, and on the other hand by the mystery of the hypostatic union that recognizes how the humanity of Jesus existed in an unprecedented, unparalleled, and unrepeatable intimacy with the Godhead. This combination of dogmatic assertions raised a crucial question concerning the nature of Jesus' knowledge: did he possess the same degree of knowledge of a normal human being, or his divine nature, hypostatically united to his humanity, privileged him with exceptional cognitive powers¹⁶? Bonaventure develops this theme over 7 *quaestiones*, divided in three blocks. The *Quaestiones* 1-3 discuss the nature and extent of God's knowledge; by doing so, Bonaventure is also dealing with Christ's knowledge according to his divinity. In turn, q. from 5 to 7 directly address the main topic of the *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, taking the opposite perspective of the first three questions, and dealing with Christ's knowledge according to his humanity. Q. 4, by far the lengthier one, deals with the doctrine of divine illumination, hence forming a bridge between the first and the third set of questions by describing how human souls come to participate in the divine knowledge.

Explicit quotes from the *Corpus Dionysiacum* appear in q. 2, 3 and 7. Accordingly, my analysis will focus on these questions; nonetheless, I will make reference to the other questions when necessary.

16. HAYES, *Introduction*, pp. 30-31.

1) Dicendum, quod secundum beatum Dionysium et secundum beatum Agustinum in pluribus locis, Deus cognoscit res per rationes aeternas¹⁷.

The readers of the *Quaestiones de scientia Christi* first come across the name of Dionysius right at the beginning of the *respondeo* of q. 2. The topic with which this *quaestio* is concerned is whether God knows things through the eternal reasons or whether he does so through his essence. Bonaventure finds a way of squaring both options claiming that while God knows through the eternal reasons these can be identified with the divine essence. As he puts it, «Deus cognoscit res per rationes aeternas, quae sunt rerum similitudines exemplares et perfectissime repraesentativae ac expressivae atque idem essentialiter, quod est ipse Deus»¹⁸. As it is evident in 1) the argument by which the Franciscan supports his conclusion is set under the joint authority of Dionysius and Augustine. Crucially, Bonaventure refers both their doctrines concerning this *quaestio* to the concept of “rationes aeternas”. As we shall see in the next paragraph, this choice depends on that made by the translator of the *Corpus Dionysiacum* (in this case, John Sarrazin) and ends up establishing a lexical homology between Augustine’s and Dionysius’ way of discussing the divine ideas. Eventually, this shall clear the ground for Bonaventure to read Augustine through the lenses provided by Dionysius.

2) Ait enim beatus Dionysius in libro de Divinis Nominibus, capitulo quinto: “Exemplaria dicimus esse in Deo existentium rationes substantificatas et singulariter praeexistentes, quas theologia praedefinitiones vocat, et divinas bonas voluntates existentium determinativas et effectivas, secundum quas supersubstantialis existentia omnia praedefinivit et produxit”¹⁹.

17. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, in *Opera omnia*, V, q. 2, p. 8.

18. *Ibidem*.

19. *Ibidem*. DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De divinis nominibus (translatio secundum Iohannem Sarracenum)*, in Ph. CHEVALLIER et alii, *Dionysiaca. Recueil donnant l'ensemble des traductions latines des ouvrages attribués au Denys de l'Aréopage*, 2 vols,

Quote number 2) flows directly from 1) and presents many elements of interest. Given the goals of my argument, it is noteworthy how the τῶν ὄντων οὐσιωποιοῦς λόγους of the Greek original are translated into Latin as *existentium rationes substantificas*. In particular, we should take notice of the way in which λόγος is rendered as *ratio*. This is by no means an unjustifiable translation. At least, it was not so within Bonaventure's *milieu*. Indeed, the choice of language made by Dionysius' translator John Sarrazin harkens back to the equivalences drawn by Augustine in his famous *Quaestio de ideis*, where he observes how «rationes enim graece λόγοι appellantur non ideae»²⁰. The import of this translation was that of suggesting a linguistic and conceptual connection between Dionysius' *exemplaria* and Augustine's *rationes/ideae*.

Before the *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, this parallel was consciously drawn (although with no explicit mention of Augustine's authority) by Thomas Gallus in his *Explanatio in libros Dionysii*: «per locum vel loca Dei possunt hic accipi intelligibiles rationes aeternae omnium creaturarum quae sunt in Verbo, quas dicit Plato ideas, Dionysius archetypias et exemplaria ibidem et imagines»²¹. These parallels can also be found in the *Summa Halensis*. There, the Summists write of a «mundus archetypus» which is full with the «rationibus aeternis, quae sufficient ad rationem creaturarum»²². In the same *quaestio*, we also find that the «mundus archetypus [est] sufficiens exemplar rerum conditarum et habeat in se ideas sive rationes aeternas, idea vero vel ratio dicatur ad illud cuius est ratio, non tamen mundus cum suiis contentis est ab aeterno, quia idea et ideatum et exemplar et exemplatum et ratio et illud cuius est

Desclée de Brouwer et Cie, Bruges 1937-1951, II, p. 360. ID., *De divinis nominibus*, in B.R. SUCHLA (ed.), *Corpus Dionysiacum I*, De Gruyter, Berlin 1990 (Patristische Texte und Studien, 33), p. 188.

20. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, A. Mutzenbecher (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 1975 (CCSL 44A), q. 46, 2.

21. THOMAS GALLUS, *Explanatio in libros Dionysii*, D. Lawell (ed.), Brepols, Turnhout 2011 (CCCM, 223), p. 27.

22. ALEXANDER HALENSIS, *Summa Theologica [Summa Halensis]*, PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas (edd.), Firenze 1924-1948, II, 1, p. 1, inq. 1, tr. 2, q. 2, p. 85.

ratio non sic dicuntur ad invicem relativa quae simul sunt»²³. Clearly, in this passage the editors of the *Summa* employ *ratio*, *idea* and *exemplar* as interchangeable terms, and identify the world of the archetypes as that of the eternal reasons. Arguably, this is a sign of the close acquaintance between Alexander of Hales and the school of St. Victor²⁴. In any case, by the time that Bonaventure composed the *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, it seems that a measure of equivalence between Augustine's and Dionysius' language for the doctrine of divine ideas had been absorbed by the Franciscan world in Paris.

Turning back to 2), we can observe how this is the only authoritative definition of the eternal reasons proposed by Bonaventure in order to support his own definition in the *respondeo* of q. 2 («Deus cognoscit res per rationes aeternas, quae sunt rerum similitudines exemplares et perfectissime repraesentativae ac expressivae atque idem essentialiter, quod est ipse Deus»). While 2) is followed seamlessly by two quotes from Augustine (respectively, from the *Confessions* and from the *City of God*), neither of these bring forth a direct definition of what the eternal reasons are; in fact, they seem to satisfy the function of further articulating the implications of 2)²⁵. It follows that, within the context of this *quaestio* and apparently of the whole of the *Quaestiones de scientia Christi* Bonaventure is operating with a definition of the eternal reasons that at its roots does not depend on Augustine but rather on Dionysius. At the same time, this Dionysian understanding of the *rationes/exemplaria* is at

23. *Ibidem*, p. 87.

24. The *Summa Halensis* abounds with quotes from Hugh and Richard of St. Victor, cfr. B.T. COOLMAN, *Hugh's of St. Victor's Influence on the Summa Halensis*, in L. SCHUMACHER (ed.), *The Summa Halensis. Sources and Context*, De Gruyter, Berlin 2020, pp. 201-215: 202-203. We also know that it was Thomas Gallus who taught the work of Dionysius to Antonio of Padua (V. GAMBOSO, *Antonio di Padova: Vita e spiritualità*, Edizioni Messaggero, Padova 2011, p. 175), and J.G. Bougerol has even hypothesized that Alexander might have been one of Thomas' disciples before the latter's move to Vercelli (J.G. BOUGEROL, *Introduction a Saint Bonaventure*, Vrin, Paris 1988, p. 94); cfr. also B.T. COOLMAN, *Knowledge, Love and Ecstasy in the Theology of Thomas Gallus*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2017, p. 9.

25. Cfr. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, q. 2, p. 8.

least partially presented in an Augustinian language as well as being deeply intertwined with texts taken from Augustine. This provides the ground for the inclusion of Augustine's intuitions and doctrines within a Dionysian framework.

With regard to the latter point, it is noteworthy how the eternal reasons come to be defined as the «divinas bonas voluntates existentium determinativas et effectivas», according to which (*secundum quas*) the «supersubstantialis existentia omnia praedefinivit et produxit». Accordingly, the eternal reasons now come to be understood within a voluntaristic framework where they represent as many reflections of the divine will; at the same time, they are connected to the Dionysian notion of a divine *supersubstantialis existentia*. Famously, the adjective *supersubstantialis* has a long history in Latin Christian thought, that stretches back at least to Hieronymous' translation of the Lord's Prayer²⁶. Unsurprisingly, this expression is attested in Augustine. At the same time, the notion of a *supersubstantialis existentia* seems to emerge in Latin thought only in concomitance with the translation of Dionysius. Indeed, this is direct consequence of one of the most characteristic features of the language of the *Corpus Dionysiacum*, that is, its abundance of adjectives introduced by the prefix *ὑπερ-*. Hence, we find in the Latin *Corpus Dionysiacum* a host of related notions such as *supersubstantialis deitatis*, *supersubstantialis substantia*, *supersubstantialis essentia*, and *supersubstantialis trinitatis* (It should be noticed that all these verbal forms appear in John Sarrazin's translation of the *Corpus*, while Eriugena seems to prefer the rendering *superessentialis*). Accordingly, not only the eternal reasons are given a strong voluntaristic nuance, but they are also represented as the productive the productive expressions of the divine *supersubstantialis existentia* *supersubstantialis existentia*, the latter being notion that at the time represented a still relatively recent introduction within the Latin Christian tradition.

Such a framework, developed in conversation with the *Corpus Dionysiacum*, helps understanding Bonaventure's further elabora-

26. Cfr. P. DI LUCCIO, *Il pane «quotidiano» e l'escatologia del Regno: Le parole del «Padre Nostro» come interpretazione dello «Shemà»*, «Gregorianum» 93 (2012), pp. 261-291: 262, n. 5.

tion on the nature of the divine exemplars in q. 2 as well as in the rest of the *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*. For instance, let us take into consideration the following passage:

sempiternae rationes non sunt rerum essentiae verae et quidditates, cum non sint aliud a Creatore; creatura autem et Creator necessario habent essentias differentes: et ideo necesse est, quod sint formae exemplares, ac per hoc ipsarum rerum similitudines representativae; et ideo cognoscendi rationes sunt, quia cognitio, hoc ipso quod cognitio, assimilationem dicit et expressionem inter cognoscentem et cognoscibile²⁷.

Arguably, this passage can be read in the light of the previous reflections, to the effect that the *sempiternae rationes* are not other (*aliud*) from the creator. This follows insofar as they are his good wills and the predeterminations of creatures eternally existing in him. Subsequently, creatures have to be different from their own eternal reasons, insofar as (among many other reasons) creatures are the product of the divine will but not the divine will itself. However, they are created and persevere in their existence in the divine will. Therefore, their exemplars are the creature's existence insofar as they are the product of and exist in the divine will.

Finally, as a corollary we should notice how Bonaventure describes *cognitio* via the eternal reasons as «assimilationem [...] et expressionem inter cognoscentem et cognoscibile». For reasons that will become evident over the course of the following pages, this should be understood as an expression of the creatures on the part of the creator, and an assimilation with the creator on creatures' part. In other words, God's will to express himself as creator takes the shape of the eternal reasons in which he knows and creates his creatures²⁸; at the same time, creatures know God in and through (their own existence as) the eternal reasons, thereby coming to know and being assimilated to God's essence, all the while enjoying an increasing conformity to their archetypes. Hence, it could

27. Cf. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, q. 2, p. 8.

28. Concerning how God's knowledge causes things and is to be distinguished from creaturely knowledge that is caused by things, see *ibidem*, q. 1, p. 5.

be said that the exemplars represent how God sees and wishes his creatures to be.

3) Item, Dionysius, de Divinis Nominibus, capitulo quinto: “Exemplaria in Deo esse dicimus existentium rationes substantificas et singularites praeexistentes, quas theologia praedefinitiones vocat”; sed diversarum rerum diversae sunt rationes substantificae: ergo cum res creatae realiter sint diversae, necesse est, rationes illas substantificas esse realiter distinctas²⁹.

4) Sed contra: 1. Dionysius capitulo quinto de Divinis Nominibus, loquens de Deo dicit sic: “omnia quidem in se praehabet secundum unam simplicitatis excellentiam, omnem duplicitatem renuens”. Si ergo Deus praehabet in se res per rerum rationes; et illae refugiant omnem duplicitatem: ergo nullam habent realem diversitatem³⁰.

5) Item, hoc ipsum ostendit Dionysius, de Divinis Nominibus, quinto capitulo, tali ratione: omnes lineae originaliter sunt in puncto, et omnes numeri in unitate; et tamen ex hoc non ponitur in puncto et in unitate realis diversitas in creatura: ergo nec in causa suprema³¹.

All these quotes appear within the discussion of q. 3, «Utrum Deus res cognoscat per similitudines realiter differentes»³². With respect to their context within Bonaventure’s argument, they represent a classic example of the Scholastics’ habit of harmonizing of authorities. According to this custom, superficial dissonances

29. *Ibidem*, q. 3, p. 11. Cfr. n. 19.

30. *Ibidem*, p. 12. Here, Bonaventure merges and modifies Sarazzin’s and Eriugena’s translations. DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De divinis nominibus (translatio secundum Iohannem Sarracenum)*, p. 363: «Omnia quidem in seipsa praehabet, secundum unum simplicitatis excessum omnem duplicitatem refutans»; ID., *De divinis nominibus (translatio secundum Iohannem Scotum seu Eriugenam)*, in CHEVALLIER et alii, *Dionysiaca*, p. 363: «Omnia quidem in seipsa superat, secundum primam simplicitatis excellentiam omnem duplicitatem respuentem». ID., *De divinis nominibus*, in B.R. SUCHLA (ed.), *Corpus Dionysiacum I*, De Gruyter, Berlin 1990 (Patristische Texte und Studien, 33), pp. 188-189.

31. *Ibidem*. Cfr. DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De divinis nominibus (translatio secundum Iohannem Sarracenum)*, p. 86. ID., *De divinis nominibus*, p. 129.

32. *Ibidem*, p. 10.

appearing within the received tradition are played against one another by a *magister* over the range of a particular *quaestio*, and finally find a reconciliation in the *respondeo*³³. In this case, Bonaventure even comes to the point of quoting Dionysius against Dionysius himself, insofar as quotes 4) and 5) supports the position that the Franciscan chooses to refute.

Q. 3 is a sequel to q. 2, being devoted to discussing a problem which is implicitly provoked by the results of the previous *quaestio*. This is the issue of the seeming contradiction between God's oneness and the apparent multiplicity of the eternal reasons. The matter is immediately raised by the Dionysian definition of the *exemplaria*: there are many *rationes substantificas*, and yet they are proper to God's *supersubstantialis existentia*. But how can there be real multiplicity in the existence of a substance-beyond-substance that as such seems to lie beyond the very dichotomy between the one and the many? One should notice that this dilemma does not emerge exclusively as a result of Dionysius' definition of the divine exemplars, but potentially might also be provoked by the second of the two quotes from Augustine employed by Bonaventure in q. 2. In this passage, taken from chapter 11 of Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*, the Bishop of Hippo claims that «non multae, sed una sapientia est, in qua sunt infinita quaedam ei que finite thesauri rerum intelligibilium, in quibus sunt omnes invisibiles atque incommutabiles rationes rerum, quae per ipsam factae sunt, quoniam Deus non aliquid nesciens fecit»³⁴. In this case, one could ask how God's absolute oneness is compatible with the claim that his one *sapientia* contains a multiple number of *incommutabiles rationes*. This is to say, that the issue is bound to arise also within an environment determined primarily by Augustinian doctrines. However, it seems likely that, just like in q. 2 Augustine's views are made by Bonaventure dependant on a Dionysian understanding of the divine archetypes, so too the problem at stake in q.

33. Cfr. P.W. ROSEMANN, *The Future of Scholastic Thought*, in J. McEvoy, M. Dunne (eds.), *The Irish Contribution to European Scholastic Thought*, Four Courts Press, Dublin 2009, pp. 254-273.

34. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, q. 2, p. 8.

3 should find a solution inspired by the Areopagite. As it will emerge in the following discussion of quote 6), this seems indeed to be the case.

6) Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius septimo capitulo de Divinis Nominibus: "Non ex entibus entia dicens novit divinus intellectus, sed ex se ipso et in ipso secundum omnium causam, notitiam et scientiam et substantiam praehabet et praeconcepit, non secundum ideam singulis se immitens; hoc est, non secundum ideas realiter differentes, sed secundum unam causae excellentiam omnia noscens et continens, sicut et lux secundum causam in se notitiam tenebrarum praecepit et non aliunde cognoscens tenebras quam a lucis defectu. Sese igitur divina sapientia agnoscens, cognoscit omnia materialia immaterialiter, et indivisim divisibilia, et singulariter multa, ipso uno omnia cognoscens et producens"³⁵.

Bonaventure answers to q. 3 arguing that «Deus res cognoscit se ipso ut similitudine expressive omnium, ita ut rationes ideales non plurificentur in Deo secundum rem, sed tantum secundum rationem»³⁶. Accordingly, the eternal reasons in God do enjoy some kind of multiplicity; however, this multiplicity is not determined so much by a distinction between the eternal reasons. Instead, this distinction is determined by an intellectual operation by which it is possible to differentiate between distinct aspects of God's unique creative act. As Zachary Hayes puts it, according to Bonaventure «God's knowledge is one simple act intrinsic to the divine essence, in which all of reality, real and potential is known»; hence, «there can be but one idea because that idea is identical with the divine essence precisely in its act of self-expression»³⁷. At the same time, «it is necessary to distinguish between what an idea is in itself and what an idea is in relation to creation [...] the ideas are many [...] in relation to the things known by

35. *Ibidem*, q. 3, p. 14; cfr. DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De divinis nominibus (translatio secundum Iohannem Sarracenum)*, p. 397. ID., *De divinis nominibus*, pp. 196-197.

36. *Ibidem*, p. 13.

37. HAYES, *Introduction*, p. 54.

God through the ideas, namely, the ideata [...] the plurality of ideas in God, therefore, is not real but only logical or mental»³⁸.

The Dionysian character of this conclusion is manifest in 4) and 5). Where the former seems to contain within itself all the elements necessary to Bonaventure's conclusion, the latter relates to the *respondeo* of q. 3 as a graphic and expository analogy. On top of this, Bonaventure employs 6) to conclude his exposition of the *respondeo*, that is, right before dealing with the arguments in favour of the refuted position. In particular, 6) serves Bonaventure as a further clarification and summary of his *respondeo*. Bonaventure introduces the words of the Areopagite in the following way:

Sic et in proposito intelligendum est, quia ipsa divina veritas est lux, et ipsius expressiones respectu rerum sunt quasi luminosae irradiationes, licet intrinsecae, quae determinate ducunt et dirigunt in id quod exprimitur. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius septimo capitulo de Divinis Nominibus [...]»³⁹.

In this passage the exemplars/eternal reasons find a new connotation as «luminosae irradiationes»; at the same time, the link with Dionysius' definition reported in 2) by the presence of the adverb «determinate» that recall the pre-determinative nature of the «divinas bonas voluntates». Accordingly, we are sent back to the voluntaristic framework within which God's self-irradiation is to be understood. Subsequently, while the deity is described in terms that resemble those of natural processes, there is nothing compulsory in his expressing forth himself; all is due to his intention.

The passage just mentioned lead directly into 6), where the link between God, his luminous irradiations and the creatures expressed by the latter is then further articulated. Eventually, the combined

38. *Ibidem*, pp. 50-51: «Language about the divine ideas is simply a way of highlighting the expressive character of divine truth. And if divine truth is essentially identical with the full self-knowledge of divine being, then the divine ideas are not something distinct from the divine essence. They are identical with that essence. They are nothing other than the divine essence viewed precisely from the perspective of its expressive character».

39. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, q. 3, p. 14.

result of 6) and Bonaventure's own words is that of presenting God as the one all-comprehensive cause; as such, he is the one exemplar of everything that actually is, as well as of that which might potentially be. Having said that, the one exemplar can also be contemplated as a multiplicity of *exemplaria* as rational souls can meditate on the single light of the all-comprehensive cause according to its different connections to its many irradiations/effects⁴⁰. Summing up, we can see how the entire problematic of q. 3 emerges from a Dionysian definition of the eternal reasons and is dealt with by Bonaventure making reference once again to the *Corpus Dionysiacum*. All of this contributes to the strengthening of the Areopagitic hue of Bonaventure's doctrine of divine ideas⁴¹.

Noteworthy, there is more to the *respondeo* of q. 3 than the untangling of the dilemma intrinsic to the presence of multiple eternal reasons within the uniqueness of God's super-substance. By identifying the *exemplaria* with God, while at the same time claiming through Dionysius that God does not know *ex entibus entia*, Bonaventure is

40. As Bonaventure explains elsewhere in the *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, epistemic certainty is possible only on the ground of a *cointuitio*, or, on our capacity of *contuendum Deum*, that is the act of glimpsing together both the creature's *ratio creata* or intelligible species and its *ratio increata* or eternal species. Where the former offers the concrete data that offers a springboard for elevating to the eternal truth, the latter offers the archetypal or regulative certitude that constitute the reality in God of the created essence (T. SCARPELLI, *Bonaventure's Christocentric Epistemology: Christ's Human Knowledge as the Epitome of Illumination in De scientia Christi*, «Franciscan Studies» 65 [2007], pp. 66-67; subsequently, G. GIRGENTI, *I due platonismi di Bonaventura*, «B@Belonline Print» 9 [2011], pp. 60-73: 65 calls Bonaventure epistemology an «intuitionist empiricism», distinguishing it from the Platonic *ἀνάμνησις*, according to which sensual experience is just an occasion for remembering innately known ideas). The living and actual connection of the *Verbum factivum* offers, together with primal intuition of God's being present in our memory (cfr. É. GILSON, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, trans. by I. Trethowan, St. Anthony Guild Press, New York 1965, p. 362) the basis of the *cointuitio*. Concerning the concept of *cointuitio* see also K. FEDORYKA, *Certitude and Cointuition. St. Bonaventure's Contribution to the theory of Knowledge*, «Aletheia» 6 (1993-1994), pp. 163-197.

41. Once again, on this point Bonaventure receive the influence of Thomas Gallus; cfr. COOLMAN, *Knowledge, Love, and Ecstasy in the Theology of Thomas Gallus*, p. 72.

able to maintain a clear distinction between creaturely existence as it is in itself and as it is in God. This follows insofar as creatures exist as the fruits of God's irradiation and because of this they live eternally in God's self; nonetheless, being there via their exemplars, they never come to be confused with the Godhead and maintain their creaturely identity. At the same time, these two aspects of creaturely existence should not be set apart dualistically and statically. In turn, they should be kept together without being confused, they should be distinguished without being separated from one another. This follows insofar as Bonaventure's doctrine of divine ideas makes it so that creaturely existence is neither totally separated from God nor just a bad copy of the eternal reasons. In turn, creaturely existence in all its manifestations (that which Bonaventure calls *natura*⁴²) is the outworking of all the aspects of the divine will unfolded in its creative operation. Accordingly, the *exemplaria* or *rationes substantificatas* or *divinas et bonas voluntates* are only revealed to the rational soul in their concrete connection to an actual or possible creature. Therefore, while qualitatively different, ideas and ideata can never be truly separated, and they are the product of two different ways of looking at the same being. In this respect, the eternal reasons represent the life of *natura* in God, something that becomes fully manifest in all its forms once creatures are contemplated with reference to what exists above and beyond them.

As we shall see towards the end of this paper, the eternal reasons do not only represent the origin and permanence of creaturely existence in God: they also constitute the latter's destiny.

7) Excessivum autem modum cognoscendi dico, non quo cognoscens excedat cognitum, sed quo cognoscens fertur in obiectum excedens excessivo quodam modo, erigendo se supra se ipsum. De quo cognoscendi modo Dionysius loquitur in libro de Mystica Theologia, et septimo capitulo de Divinis Nominibus dicit sic: "Oportet agnoscere, nostrum intellectum quandam habere

42. Cfr. A. DI MAIO, *Piccolo glossario bonaventuriano: Introduzione al pensiero e al lessico di Bonaventura da Bagnoregio*, Aracne, Roma 2008, p. 76: «Sometimes *natura* is employed [by Bonaventure] in an absolute way, that is, as making reference to the whole of creation [...] the totality of created finitude» [my translation].

potentiam ad intelligendum, per quam videt intelligibilia, unionem vero excedentem intellectus naturam, per quam coniungitur ad ea quae sunt ultra se. Secundum hanc igitur divina intelligendo, non secundum nos, sed nos totos a nobis totis extra factos et totos deificatos; melius est enim Dei esse et non esse sui; sic enim erunt omnia credibilia iis qui sunt cum Deo⁴³.

This quote belongs to the conclusion of the *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, and specifically to the *respondeo* of q. 7, which is concerned with whether or not «anima Christi comprehendat omnia, quae comprehendit sapientia increata»⁴⁴. In other words, in q. 7 Bonaventure is expressing himself on the main topic of the *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*; accordingly, it is not surprising that the *respondeo* to this question is longer and more articulated than the preceding ones.

Anima Christi in Verbo non comprehendit proprie infinita; quatenus tamen verbum est exemplar factivum, fertur in illud comprehendendo; sed quatenus est exemplar expressivum, in idem fertur non comprehendendo, sed excedendo⁴⁵.

Crucially, Bonaventure's answer to q. 7 revolves around a distinction between two possible ways of looking at the divine *Verbum*. On the one hand, the *sapientia increata* can be understood «secundum quod est exemplar *factivum et dispositivum*»; on the other hand, the same can be contemplated «secundum quod est exemplar *expressivum sive repraesentativum*»⁴⁶. In the first instance, the *sapientia increata* is considered in its actual creating activity of what there is, so that «relucent in arte divinae sapientiae ea quae sunt, fuerunt et erunt»⁴⁷. What is relevant in order to understand the *respondeo* is that, according to Bonaventure, all that was, is, and

43. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, q. 7, p. 40; cfr. DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De divinis nominibus (translatio secundum Iohannem Sarracenum)*, p. 385. Id., *De divinis nominibus*, p. 194.

44. *Ibidem*, p. 37.

45. *Ibidem*, p. 39.

46. *Ibidem*; emphasis mine.

47. *Ibidem*, p. 40.

will be is a finite set⁴⁸. Accordingly, thanks to its union with God the soul of Christ can comprehend (read: circumscribe) this set of beings insofar as it contains a finite, if immense, number of elements⁴⁹. However, if we choose the second way of looking at the eternal Word, the perspective changes radically. This follows insofar as «secundo modo relucet omnia, quae Deus potest facere et intelligere; et haec quidem sunt infinita»⁵⁰. The soul of Christ cannot comprehend an infinite set⁵¹, insofar as it is a «substantia finita», that «quantumcumque sit unita Verbo, infinita non comprehendit, quia nec illis aequatur nec illa excedit»⁵². Hence, Christ understands an immense but finite number of eternal reasons that correspond to those creatures that have been actually created by God. However, he cannot comprehend the infinity of exemplars that God understands. Nonetheless, even if Christ's soul cannot grasp (Latin *capere*) the Word as the *exemplar expressivum sive repraesentativum*, it can be grasped by the latter; in other words, it can be drawn into it and in its infinity, as the «cognitive power is drawn as by a magnet to an object that it will never completely comprehend, but which captivates and grasps the intellect and the will and constantly draws the finite human spirit beyond itself into the infinite abyss»⁵³: «ac per hoc in illa [the uncreated Word] non fertur per modum comprehensionis, sed potius per modum excessus»⁵⁴.

As it emerges from 7), Bonaventure is indebted to Dionysius for this notion of being taken into the Word *per modum excessus*, concerning which, he claims that *excessus* «est ultimus modus cogno-

48. *Ibidem*: «Cognitio animae Christi [...] comprehensiva non est nisi respectu finitorum. Unde si secundum illam dicatur anima Christi cognoscere quaecumque Verbum cognoscit, hoc intelligitur de praeteritis, praesentibus et futuris, quae aliquo modo faciunt ad integritatem ipsius universi, quod plene et totaliter fuit ab instanti conceptionis descriptum in anima Christi Iesu».

49. *Ibidem*.

50. *Ibidem*.

51. *Ibidem*: «Cognitio animae Christi per modum excessus quodam modo dici possit respectu infinitorum».

52. *Ibidem*.

53. HAYES, *Introduction*, p. 66.

54. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, q. 7, p. 40.

scendi et nobilissimus, quem in omnibus libris suis laudat Dionysius, et maxime in libro de Mystica Theologia»⁵⁵. Hence, Bonaventure sees the *Mystica Theologia* as representing the apex of Dionysius' treatment of a subject that runs through the whole of *Corpus Dionysiacum*; in turn, the *Mystica theologia* is especially concerned with this particular mode of knowing. In this, Dionysius is only echoing the Bible, most of which is mystically concerned with this topic (Bonaventure makes particular reference to *Revelations* 2,17)⁵⁶. In spite of this concentration on the *Mystica theologia* in 7) the definition of the *Excessivus modus cognoscendi* is developed once again drawing on the *Divinis Nominibus*. In fact, his definition seems to be a summary and paraphrase of Dionysius' own words: «quo cognoscens excedat cognitum, sed quo cognoscens fertur in obiectum excedens excessivo quodam modo, erigendo se supra se ipsum»⁵⁷.

At least two comments can be made concerning 7) and the way in which Bonaventure is implicitly interacting with this text. First, it is crucial to briefly discuss the connection between the theme of *excessus* and that of the *unio mystica*. In this respect, we should notice how Dionysius' claim that «unionem vero excedentem intellectus naturam, per quam coniungitur ad ea quae sunt ultra se»⁵⁸ would have had an "affective" undertone for Bonaventure. In other words, once again being under the influence of Thomas Gallus' exegesis of the *Corpus Dionysiacum*, Bonaventure held that the *unio mystica* is achieved by an *excessus* accomplished by the *affectus*' progress beyond the *intellectus* and into God⁵⁹. It is important to un-

55. *Ibidem*, p. 43; cfr. DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De mystica theologia (translatio secundum Iohannem Sarracenum)*, in Ph. CHEVALLIER et alii, *Dionysiaca*, I, pp. 565-597. ID., *De mystica theologia*, in A.M. RITTER (ed.), *Corpus Dionysiacum* II, De Gruyter, Berlin-New York 1991 (Patristische Texte und Studien, 36), pp. 139-151.

56. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, q. 7, p. 43: «De quo etiam mystice quasi est tota Scriptura divina, et de quo Apocalypsis secundo: Dabo ei calculum, et in calculo nomen novum scriptum, quod nemo scit, nisi qui accipit».

57. *Ibidem*, p. 40.

58. Cfr. *supra*, n. 43.

59. For Gallus' reading of Dionysius, cfr. B.T. COOLMAN, *The Medieval Affective Dionysian Tradition*, «Modern Theology» 24, 4 (2008), pp. 615-632: 619. Cfr. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, q. 6, pp. 36-37: in the

derline how this is an interpolation, insofar as neither in this quote nor anywhere else in the *Corpus Dionysiacum* do we find Dionysius making this point explicitly. All he gives us is his claim that the *unio* is not accomplished by the *intellectus*⁶⁰. Furthermore, it should be noticed that for Thomas as well as for Bonaventure this idea of going beyond the *intellectus* does not imply that the *unio mystica* is something in itself irrational, but rather supra-rational. After all, the *excessus* is still a *modus cognoscendi* that as such is not opposed to the *intellectus* but simply lies beyond it⁶¹. Accordingly, *affectus* and *intellectus* are not in tension with one another but rather the *affectus* is that which surpasses the *intellectus* and finally unites the human soul to its creator⁶².

The second point that needs to be underlined, is that in its original context the words by Dionysius in 7) do not make reference specifically to Christ's human nature, but rather to the human condition in general⁶³. By taking this point and applying it specifically

first passage, Bonaventure claims that the *summum bonum* attracts per *aspectum et affectum*; in the second one, he adds that the creature exceeds itself and transits into God: «anima non est contenta aliquo bono, quod capiat et comprehendat, quia nihil tale est summum; sed bono tali et tanto, quod capiat et apprehendat per aspectum et affectum, et a quo capiatur per superexcedentiam et excessum»; «et quod dicitur, quod modus diligendi Deum est sine modo diligere; hoc non est, quia amor ille careat finitate et mensura, cum illa sit coequalis omni creaturae, sed quod affectus in amando non debet sibi figere limitem et terminum coarctantem, sed potius excessivo modo toto conatu mentis ferri in illam infinitissimam bonitatem».

60. COOLMAN, *The Medieval Affective Dionysian Tradition*, p. 616.

61. ID., *Knowledge, Love, and Ecstasy*, p. 247; on the concept of *excessus*, see B. FAES DE MOTTONI, *Excessus mentis, alienatio mentis, estasi, raptus nel Medioevo*, in E. CANONE (a cura di), *Per una storia del concetto di mente*, Olschki, Firenze 2005, I, pp. 167-184.

62. The following words, used by Declan A. Lawell in order to describe the thought of Thomas Gallus, are apt to be applied also to Bonaventure's thought, cfr. D.A. LAWELL, *Thomas Gallus, Jean-Luc Marion and the Reception of Dionysian Neoplatonism*, Ph.D. dissertation, Queen's University of Belfast, 2008, pp. 232-233: «love grows out of intellect. In the early stages of the soul's ascent, affect and mind work in tandem until finally love alone takes over in the passage to the Other».

63. DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, *De Divinis nominibus (translatio secundum Iohannem Sarracenum)*, II, p. 385: «Sed, quod in aliis dixi, iuxta proprietatem nostram ea quae sunt super nos accipientes, et rationi connutritae sensibus infixi, et nostris diuina

to the soul of Christ and to the way in which his humanity is drawn into the depth of his divinity, Bonaventure transforms this text so as to make it a description of the dynamics internal to the hypostatic union. In itself, this does not go against the grain of Dionysius' reasoning. Nonetheless, this constitutes a re-reading on Bonaventure's part, which is consistent with the Christo-centric (and cross-centric) emphasis typical of his approach to Dionysius' mystical theology⁶⁴. Moreover, by describing in such a way the relationship between Christ's soul and the eternal Word, Bonaventure is describing the paradigm according to which other human souls relate to the divine exemplar⁶⁵. In this respect, while Christ's union with the Word is qualitatively different from that of any other human being (to the extent that his grace is described not simply as sufficient but as superexcellent⁶⁶), his human soul is still nonetheless a regular human soul. Accordingly, also the souls of human beings other than Christ are able to know God via excess⁶⁷.

comparantes, decipimur, secundum apprens diuinam et ineffabilem rationem exsequentes. Oportet autem uidere mentem nostram habere quidem uirtutem ad intelligendum, per quam intelligibilia inspicit, unionem autem excedentem mentis naturam, per quam coniungitur ad ea quae sunt supra ipsam. Secundum hanc igitur oportet diuina intelligere, non secundum nos, sed nos ipsos totos extra nos ipsos statutos et totos deificatos. Melius est enim esse dei et non nostri ipsorum, ita enim erunt diuina data cum deo factis».

64. Cfr. P. ROEM, *Negative Theologies and the Cross*, «The Harvard Theological Review» 101 (2008), pp. 451-464: 460-461.

65. Bonaventure adds a *corollarium* in which he acknowledges this point, tracing the difference between Christ's and anybody else's experience of the excess, BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, q. 7, p. 40: «Hic autem modus cognoscendi per excessum est in via et in patria; sed in via ex parte, in patria vero est perfecte in Christo et in aliis comprehensoribus; sed in aliis est *coarctate* tum ex parte mensurae propriae gratiae, tum ex parte voluntatis diuinae, quae non se cuiuslibet offert in omnimoda familiaritate; sed in anima Christi est *liberalissime*, tum quia ab ipsa habet gratiam implentem omnimode capacitatem suam, tum quia speculum aeternum praebet se ei manifestabile secundum familiaritatem omnimodam».

66. HAYES, *Introduction*, p. 63.

67. *Ibidem*: «Its willing of [him]self is God's ecstatic willing of his own goodness within it. The divine will is expressed precisely in the ontological freedom out of which the creature possesses and fulfils itself by implicitly striving toward God and so confessing his generosity. God's wise and benevolent election of the world

Finally, q. 7 presents us with another instance of Bonaventure enveloping Augustine's doctrine within Dionysius'. In this respect, just like Bonaventure takes the language of *excessus* from the latter, he appears to borrow that of *comprehensio* from the former. This is visible in q. 6, that deals with the issue «Utrum anima Christi comprehendat ipsam sapientiam increatam»⁶⁸. We already know from q. 7 that the answer to this question cannot be positive; indeed, Bonaventure comes to the conclusion that «anima Christi non potest proprie comprehendere sapientiam increatam»⁶⁹. In order to develop this point, Bonaventure goes on to provide a definition of *comprehendere*, writing that «sapientia increata comprehendi non potest ab anima sibi unita nec ab alia quacumque creatura, secundum quod *comprehendi* dicitur aliquid, quod comprehendens totum et totaliter secundum omnem modum capit in se ipso»⁷⁰. In turn, this definition is based on the *auctoritas* of Augustine, and specifically on his epistle *De videndo Deo*:

Plenitudinem Dei nullus non solum oculis corporis, sed nec ipsa mente aliquando comprehendit; aliud est enim *videre*, aliud videndo *totum comprehendere*, quandoquidem id *videtur*, quod praesens utcumque sentitur; totum autem *comprehenditur*, ita videtur, ut nihil eius lateat videntem, aut cuius fines circumspici possunt⁷¹.

appears as the [creature's] prospering»; cfr. E. VAN VERSENDAAL, *Plenitudo Fontalis: Love's Groundless Yes and the Grateful Originality of Nature*, «Communio International Catholic Review» 46 (2019), pp. 134-81: 169.

68. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, q. 6, p. 32.

69. *Ibidem*, p. 34.

70. *Ibidem*.

71. *Ibidem*, q. 6, p. 34; cfr. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De videndo deo* (= *Epistula 147, ad Paulinam*) in ID., *Epistulae CXXIV-CLXXXIV*, A.A. Goldbacher (ed.), Tempisky-Freytag, Wien-Leipzig 1904 (CSEL 44), pp. 294-295, 11: «[...] dei plenitudinem quisquam non solum oculis corporis sed vel ipsa mente aliquando comprehendit. Aliud enim videre, aliud est totum videndo comprehendere, quandoquidem id videtur, quod praesens utcumque sentitur, totum autem comprehenditur videndo, quod ita videtur, ut nihil eius lateat videntem, aut cuius circumspici possunt, sicut te nihil latet praesentis voluntatis tuae, circumspicere autem potes finis anuli tui».

This quote, together with Bonaventure's answer to q. 6 allows us to better understand his use of the language of *excessus* as well as the way in which Dionysius and Augustine connect around it. In the passage above, Augustine claims that our *comprehensio* of God is inexhaustible, insofar as no finite creature can ever hope to comprehend the infinite creator; as we find in another passage also quoted by Bonaventure in q. 6, but this time from the *De Trinitate Dei*, this point is also correlated to God's unsurpassable and inimitable degree of self-knowledge: «in quantum Deum novimus, similes ei sumus, sed non ad aequalitatem similes, quia non tantum eum novimus, quantum ipse sese»⁷². Both these quotes open the room for articulating something analogous to Dionysius' *excessus*, that is, some mode of knowledge that goes beyond *comprehendere*. Accordingly, they form the basis for the Bonaventuran synthesis of q. 7. Nonetheless, in neither quotes employed by Bonaventure there is any hint that Augustine thinks that the creature's incapacity to fully comprehend God is the prelude to its *excessus*. Even less so, there are no suggestions that this further move should be operated by the creature's *affectus*.

Nonetheless, we should notice that Bonaventure's reading of Augustine in the light of Dionysius does not seem to be wholly arbitrary. A third text by Augustine quoted in the *respondeo* to q. 6 – this too excerpted from the *De Trinitate Dei* – offers Bonaventure a hook for complementing the bishop's discussion of the *visio Dei* not just with a generic form of Dionysianism, but more specifically with the affective variety espoused by the Franciscan. So writes Augustine:

Cum Deum novimus, quamvis meliores efficiamur, quam eramus, antequam nossemus, maxime cum eadem notitia placita digneque amata verbum est; fit aliqua Dei similitudo illa notitia, tamen inferior est, quia in inferiore natura est; creatura quippe animus, Creator autem Deus⁷³.

72. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, q. 6, p. 34; cf. AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De Trinitate*, W.J. Mountain, F. Glorie (edd.), Brepols, Turnhout 1968 (CCSL 50), lib. 9, cap. 11, 2: «in quantum deum novimus similes sumus, sed non ad aequalitatem similes quia nec tantum eum novimus quantum ipse se».

73. *Ibidem*, q. 6., p. 35; AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De Trinitate*, lib. 9, cap. 11, 5: «cum deum novimus, quamvis meliores efficiamur quam eramus antequam nos-

Here, Augustine is claiming that the creature's love for the knowledge of God is that which prompts the creature to know its creator more. On the ground of this premise Bonaventure can claim in q. 7 that «in comprehensivo terminatur intelligentiae aspectus, in excessivo vero intelligentiae appetitus»⁷⁴. In other words, the soul's appetite for knowing and becoming more like God cannot find rest in anything that can be circumscribed by its intellectual faculty; rather, it needs to be fully taken into God's infinity: only then, its *appetitus* will be extinguished⁷⁵. Hence, while the apex of comprehension is the vision of God, the excess brings about the soul's ascension above itself and into God, and this event represents the satisfaction of the same *appetitus* that brought about the soul's contemplation of the deity.

3. Conclusion

It may seem as if in the last few pages the argument has somewhat strayed from the main topic of this paper. However, as I shall now discuss, Bonaventure's rereading of Augustine through the lenses of the Victorine Dionysius in q. 6 and 7 has a direct effect on his doctrine of the eternal reasons.

In this respect, it should be noted that the excess of the soul above itself and into God is done as it were via the eternal reasons. As we know, the soul can comprehend through its *intellectus* the *sapientia increata* when contemplating it as the *Verbum factivum* and by discerning the eternal reasons of that which in fact exists. However, as the soul unites with God by reaching above itself and into the

semus maxime quae cum eadem notitia etiam placita digneque amata verbum est fit quae aliqua dei similitudine illa notitia, tamen inferior est quia in inferior natura est; creatura quippe animus, creator autem deus».

74. *Ibidem*, q. 7, p. 40.

75. *Ibidem*, p. 36: «Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod animam nihil minus Deo implere potest; dicendum, quod illud verum est, sicut tactum est, quia anima non est contenta aliquo bono, quod capiat et comprehendat, quia nihil tale est summum; sed bono tali et tanto, quod capiat et apprehendat per aspectum et affectum, et a quo capiatur, per superexcedentiam et excessum».

Verbum expressivum, it does so by being drawn into the very infinity of the eternal reasons that is God's life itself. In other words, what happens is not just that the rational soul simply comes to know more eternal reasons than before; in fact, when the soul turns to the *Verbum expressivum*, the magnitude of the exemplarity that emerges is such that it can only be experienced as it is touched by the self-exceeding soul. This means coming into close contact with the divine super-substantial essence, without there ever being a confusion between the creature and the creator insofar as the latter is always infinitely and qualitatively exceeding the former.

As Hayes puts it, this means that «the divine archetypes operate like a springboard or a magnetic force that propels or draws the human spirit out of itself and toward the mystery of the eternal», insofar as through them God is active as a motive power that elicits in human souls a desire for moving out of themselves «in search of that truth and goodness which constitute the mystery of the divine»⁷⁶. In particular, this magnetic power is prominently identified in the Word itself, that which is «ipsam divinam virtutem operativam vel expressivam»⁷⁷. However, the claim that the divine archetypes operate like a springboard for the rational soul should not be understood to mean that the contemplative ever comes to the point of leaving them behind. Just like the *affectus* moves beyond but does not eliminate or break ties the *intellectus*, so the *excessus* does not eliminate *comprehensio* but rather represents the entrance into that same infinity which has been already partially intuited. Arguably, we could say that just like the eternal reasons can be seen as the forms of God's creative excess outside of himself, they also stand for the forms through which the creatures exceed themselves and move into God.

Eventually, all of this is connected to the way in which Bonaventure interprets the classic Christian and Neo-Platonic theme of the

76. HAYES, *Introduction*, pp. 58-59.

77. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, q. 3, p. 16; in this respect, it should also be noticed how in q. 5 Bonaventure quotes approvingly from John Damascene the principle that «quod in Christo propter duas naturas necesse est ponere, in eo duas fuisse voluntates: ergo pari ratione et duas cognitions, ergo et duas scientias, ergo et duas sapientias»; *ibidem*, q. 5, p. 29. Therefore, to an uncreated Word corresponds an uncreated will.

exitus/reditus from/to God⁷⁸. In both directions, from God and towards God, the *sapientia increata* is the gateway to God's life. As creatures are created and maintained by God's will in and through the Word, so it is to that Word that they return in contemplation, and it is by being taken up into that Word that they finally come to rest in their creator⁷⁹. Accordingly, the *Quaestiones de scientia Christi* present a circular argument, that starts in q. 1 with «the affirmation of the infinity of God's nature, power, and knowledge» and which «comes to an end with the analysis of this same infinite mystery as the ultimate goal of the human spiritual journey»⁸⁰. As I have showed in the previous pages, this argument is centred around some core ideas drawn from the *Corpus Dionysiacum* such as Dionysius' understanding of the divine exemplars, as well as on a peculiar reading of the *Corpus Dionysiacum* originally provided by the School of St. Victor. Through these lenses, Bonaventure re-interprets creatively the terms and ideas that flow to him from other sources and in particular those provided by Augustine.

As a way of concluding this paper, I would like to quote Boyd Taylor Coolman, who, discussing the «medieval interpolation of love over knowledge» in the Victorine reading of Dionysius' *Theologia Mystica*, claims that such development was produced

by the convergence of two theological traditions flowing through the Western Middle Ages: the (Augustinian) assumption that God is fully known and loved in a beatific *visio Dei*, which is the goal of

78. As Ratzinger notices (RATZINGER, *The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure*, pp. 144-145), this circularity is actually deeply rooted in Bonaventure's imagining of God as a circle. Drawing on Alan of Lille *Regulae Theologiae* and the Pseudo-Hermetic *Book of the 24 Masters*, the Franciscan calls God a «sphaera intelligibilis, cuius centrum est ubique et circumferentia nusquam»; drawing instead from Pseudo-Dionysius, Bonaventure calls the divine love a «cyclus aeternus, ex optimo, per optimum et in optimum», cfr. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *In I Sent.*, d. 45, a. 2, q. 1, concl., p. 804.

79. BONAVENTURA DE BALNEOREGIO, *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, q. 2, p. 7: «Deus est exemplar vere et proprie, sicut vere et proprie est efficiens et finis; sed exemplar vere et proprie non est, nisi quod habet similitudines rerum exemplatarum, per quas illas cognoscit et facit».

80. HAYES, *Introduction*, pp. 66-67.

human existence, and the (Dionysian) insistence that God is radically transcendentally unknowable. The affective reading of Dionysius is one of several medieval attempts to resolve this contradiction⁸¹.

In the *Quaestiones de scientia Christi*, and more broadly in Bonaventure's work, it is possible to observe one of the most precious fruits of such synthesis between the legacy of Augustine and this specific variant of Dionysianism.

81. COOLMAN, *The Medieval Affective Dionysian Tradition*, p. 615; cfr. L. SCHUMACHER, O. BYCHKOV (eds.), *A Reader in Early Franciscan Theology*, Fordham University Press, New York 2021, p. 16.

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Theories of Divine Ideas: From the Church Fathers to the Early Franciscan Masters

This volume studies the origins of Franciscan exemplarism, focusing on the main theories of divine ideas formulated in Christian circles from the Church Fathers to Bonaventure and the Franciscans active in Paris in the first half of the Thirteenth century. The texts here contained discuss the exemplarism of Augustine of Hippo, Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor, John of Damascus, John Scotus Eriugena, Anselm of Canterbury, the canons of Saint Victor (Hugh, Achard, Richard and Thomas Gallus), Philipp the Chancellor, and the Franciscan Alexander of Hales, John de la Rochelle, Odo Rigaldus and Bonaventure. Together with the volume *Divine Ideas in Franciscan Thought (XIIIth-XIVth century)* [2018], this work contributes to the reconstruction of the history of the Christian theories of divine ideas in the Middle Age.

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