

Special Issue:

Position, Saliency and Framing: Party Competition in Multidimensional Settings

From Class to Region: How Regionalist Parties Link (and Subsume) Left-Right into Centre-Periphery Politics¹

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Abstract

The primary dimension of political contestation for regionalist parties is the centre-periphery dimension but they are pressured to adopt positions on the left-right dimension by competition with state-wide parties. We argue that the relative economic position of a region is a key variable for explaining how regionalist parties adopt left-right positions and link them to the centre-periphery dimension. Based on a quantitative analysis on 74 regionalist parties - distributed in 49 regions and 11 countries- along four decades we find strong evidence that regionalist parties acting in relatively rich regions tend to adopt a rightist ideology, while regionalist parties acting in relatively poor regions tend to adopt a leftist ideology. A qualitative illustration of two paradigmatic cases, the *Lega Nord* (LN) and the Scottish National Party (SNP), appears to support our interpretation that left-right orientations are subsumed into centre-periphery politics through the adoption of two ideal types of regionalist discourse: one labelled as 'Bourgeois regionalism' (Harvie, 1994) and one labelled as 'internal colonialism' (Hechter, 1975).

Keywords: regionalist parties, party competition, left-right, centre-periphery, socio-economic region

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Introduction

Regionalist parties can be considered the political manifestation of the existence and relevance of the centre-periphery cleavage in a given political system (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan and Urwin, 1983). Their ideology originates from the defence and promotion of territorially defined identities and interests, and is programmatically centred on self-government claims (De Winter, 1998a: 204-205). A great deal of their political struggle, therefore, consists of trying to push the territorial dimension into the political agenda, thus making it a salient dimension of party competition. However, even when they manage to do so, surely traditional left-right politics does not vanish. As a consequence, like state-wide parties need to come to terms with what for them is a secondary (and perhaps divisive) dimension - i.e. the centre-periphery one - in the same way regionalist parties undergo systemic pressure to take into consideration what for them is a secondary (and perhaps divisive) dimension - i.e. the left-right one. This is particularly the case for competition at regional level, where regionalist parties might have some chances to get in office (Elias and Tronconi, 2011; Tronconi, 2014), and are therefore expected to outline their programmatic platform across a wide range of policy areas. However, they might also be pushed to position themselves in the national arena, where important decisions on socio-economic policies are taken.

This article aims to investigate how regionalist parties position themselves along the left-right dimension and whether this dimension is somehow linked and subsumed with the centre-periphery one. Using a novel cross-sectional and longitudinal dataset -which includes ideology scores for 74 regionalist parties distributed across 49 regions and 11 countries and participating in national and/or regional elections held between 1970 and 2010- we undertake a quantitative analysis which allows us to investigate the main determinants of regionalist parties' positioning on the left-right dimension. In particular, in this analysis we focus on the

role of the relative economic status of the region (vis-à-vis the national average). Since economic issues represent the heart of the left-right divide (Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Wagner, 2011), a correlation between left-right positioning and the relative status of the regional economy would represent a strong clue of the presence of a context-dependent link between the two dimensions. Indeed, we find that regionalist parties in relatively poor regions position themselves overwhelmingly to the left and, *vice versa*, regionalist parties in relatively rich regions position themselves overwhelmingly to the right. We also provide a qualitative illustration regarding two paradigmatic cases – the *Lega Nord* (LN) and the Scottish National Party (SNP) – in support of our interpretation of the quantitative analysis’ results. Although only a wider and more systematic study of ‘framing’ can produce the final evidence, our analysis provides support for the thesis that regionalist parties tend to subsume their left-right ideological orientations into centre-periphery politics. They appear to do so by developing two types of regionalist discourses: a) the ‘bourgeois regionalism’ discourse (Harvie, 1994), which is based on grievances of exploitation by state policies that directly (territorial transfers) or indirectly (welfare) drag resources from the wealthy (and supposedly hard working) region to send them to other poorer (and supposedly self-indulgent) regions; and b) the ‘internal colonialism’ discourse (Hechter, 1975), which is based on the idea of uneven development due to state choices which favour the economic development of certain regions at the expenses of others, without providing enough direct (investments) or indirect (welfare) transfer of resources to close the development gap or to limit the output differential.

In the next section we discuss the state of the art of the literature on regionalist parties ideological positioning and outline our analytical framework and related hypotheses. Then, in section two, we discuss our dataset and coding. Section three presents the descriptive statistics and the results of our multivariate analysis, outlining the main factors of left-right positioning and the links with the centre-periphery dimension. In section four, we present a

qualitative illustration concerning two exemplifying cases to explore the nature and logic of those links. We end with a brief summary and discussion of our main findings.

Analytical framework and main hypothesis

By definition (De Winter et al., 2006a; De Winter, 1998a: 204-205) – and as confirmed by recent empirical studies (Alonso, 2012: 40) - the centre-periphery cleavage represents the origin of regionalist parties and the basis of their core ideology. These parties are ideologically and programmatically focused on both the symbolic/identitarian (i.e. recognition of regional peculiarities, minority ethnic groups or minority nations) and substantive questions (attribution of institutional powers/resources to ‘their’ region) stemming from this originating cleavage. At the same time, the scholarship has widely acknowledged that regionalist parties do not remain (and, often, are not even born as) single-issue ‘prolocutors’ (Lucardie, 2000). Many of them, more or less reluctantly and more or less clearly develop a multi-issue and multi-dimensional ideology (Newman, 1996; De Winter, 1998a; Massetti, 2009). Yet, given the paucity of comparative studies on regionalist parties’ ideology (Gomez-Reino et al. 2006: 252), there are still many moot points on the determinants of their ideological positioning both along their primary (centre-periphery) dimension and, even more, across the primary and secondary (left-right) dimensions.

Some scholars pointed out that the links between the centre-periphery and left-right dimensions can be deeply influenced by the specific national and regional contexts, which shape social characteristics of the regionalist movements and the dynamics of party competition (Coakley, 1992). Others even reject the possibility of generalizations, claiming that whether regionalist movements and parties will take a leftist or rightist colour depends on

idiosyncratic critical junctures, related to past historical events (Erk, 2005; 2009).² Yet, other studies suggest that some context dependent factors are not incompatible with generalization. In particular, Massetti (2009) advances the hypothesis that, due to the dominant position of socio-economic issues in left-right ideologies (Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Wagner, 2011), the relative status of the region (i.e. whether the region is relatively better off or worse off vis-à-vis the whole state) might deeply affect the left-right ‘colour’ of its regionalism. In other words, regionalist parties might ‘read’ left-right politics through the prism of their territory and, in turn, as also suggested by Gourevitch (1979) and Horowitz (1985), this prism can be strongly affected by the relative economic status of the region. Regionalist parties in relatively poor regions are, arguably, more attracted by Marxist/neo-Marxist (e.g. Gramscian) theories of territorial division of labour (Nairn, 1977) or dependency theories recalibrated within the scope of nation-states, such as ‘internal colonialism’ (Hechter, 1975); while regionalist parties in relatively rich regions are, arguably, more attracted by neo-liberal discourses on the need/right of individual regions to compete in world markets, free from the oppression of state taxation aimed (also) at territorial transfers (Harvie, 1994).³ In short, the putative subsuming of the economic left-right dimension into the centre-periphery dimension involves the translation of the idea of economic competition between socio-economic classes into competition between regions. Following this insight, we expect a correlation between the relative economic status of the region and the left-right positioning of regionalist parties. Regionalist parties in relatively poor regions tend to position themselves to the left, while regionalist parties in relatively rich regions tend to position themselves to the right.

²In her comparative study of Belgium, Italy, Spain and the UK, Alonso (2012) follows Erk (2005; 2009) in providing *ad hoc* historical accounts to explain why the link between left/periphery and right/centre applies to Spain and the UK, but not to Belgium and Italy.

³For a small minority of regionalist parties, such as the *Vlaams Belang* (VB), which developed a radical-right ideology, the link between the socio-economic status of the region and their left-right positioning can be more complex and indirect. Besides resenting transfers of resources to relatively poorer regions, these parties strongly oppose the disproportional concentration of non-national immigrants in their (economically more attractive) region (De Winter et al., 2006).

In order to properly evaluate the presence and strength of this link we need to include in the analysis other factors, either related to the specific centre-periphery stance adopted by regionalist parties or to structure of the electoral market, which might also affect regionalist parties' left-right positioning. First, we look at regionalist parties' radicalism on their primary (centre-periphery) dimension. Drawing on the empirical findings of previous studies (De Winter, 1998a: 211; Gomez-Reino et al., 2006: 250-251; Massetti, 2009: 517), we expect that leftist positions are linked to radical (secessionist) stances on the territorial dimensions, while rightist positions are linked to moderate (autonomist) claims. Then, we look at the left-right positioning of two types of competitors: the dominant state-wide party in the region and other regionalist parties in the region. The position of the dominant state-wide party in the region is used as a proxy of the regional median voter and, therefore, represents an important indicator of the electoral (left-right) demand. We expect regionalist parties to compete with state-wide parties mainly on the centre-periphery cleavage while adapting to the dominant left-right orientations of the regional electorate. Therefore, we expect them to follow the dominant state-wide party in the region in their left-right positioning. In contrast, we expect that competition with other regionalist parties occur predominantly on the left-right dimension. Therefore, the left-right position of other regionalist parties competing in the same region represents an indicator of the electoral offer and, in particular, of the (left-right) space which is free from direct competitors. Indeed, we expect regionalist parties to occupy free space rather than replicating the same left-right positioning as other regionalist competitors.

Regionalist parties' dataset

We define regionalist parties according to four criteria. First, they are self-contained political organizations that contest elections. Secondly, they are organizationally present and/or field

candidates only in a particular sub-territory (region) of the state. Thirdly, the territorial limitation of their political/electoral activity is a consequence of their explicit objective of defending only the identities and interests of ‘their’ region. Fourthly, as stated by De Winter (1998: 204), regionalist parties’ core mission is to achieve/protect/enhance “some kind of [territorial] self-government” for their homeland. The first criterion excludes regional parties that formally or *de facto* act as regional branches of a state-wide party.⁴ The second criterion excludes state-wide parties that are in favour of decentralization or federalization of the state. The third criterion excludes parties that are momentarily present only in one or few regions (maybe because they are new) but with clear state-wide ambitions. The fourth criterion excludes ethnic parties that are not primarily interested in self-government claims for the region (but, rather, in community rights or restructuring of regional boundaries).⁵

In order to identify regionalist parties and to be able to classify them according to their ideology we proceeded in several steps. First, we collected regional vote shares⁶ for regional and national elections in 19 Western countries⁷ to create an initial dataset. In a second step we looked at the territorial concentration of the vote and we made use of secondary sources, party internet sites and party manifestoes and documents to determine whether a party can be considered as regionalist. We also applied a relevance criterion; we include in our dataset each regionalist party which obtained at least 1% of the vote and/or one seat in one national or regional election.⁸ For a number of parties we were not able to identify their ideology on

⁴ We exclude parties such as the Bavarian CSU, the Northern Irish UUP and the UPN in Navarra because they act *de facto* as regional branches of state-wide parties.

⁵ We exclude ethnic parties, such as the Finnish SFP, because they focus on community rights, not on territorial self-government (Tapio Raunio, 2006). We also exclude parties representing opposing ethnic groups in Navarra and Northern Ireland because the focus of their politics is ethnic competition rather than self-government claims.

⁶ In case of electoral coalitions where the regionalist party is a junior party we used the seat allocation within the coalition to assign vote shares to the different coalition partners. When regionalist parties coalesce for elections and we could not use the seat allocation as a mechanism to allocate vote share (for example in the case when the electoral coalition obtains one seat) we allocated the total vote share to the senior party.

⁷ Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

⁸ Regionalist parties do participate in Greece and Japan but they fail to reach the relevance criterion.

the centre-periphery dimension (i.e. we are not sure they can be considered as regionalist parties), and this led to the exclusion of six countries.⁹

We look at regionalist parties participating in regional and national elections because the population of regionalist parties is different across the electoral arenas. Indeed 54 parties participate in national elections whereas 70 parties participate in regional elections (see appendix A). Four parties participate only in national elections whereas twenty parties participate exclusively in regional elections (fifty parties participate both in national and regional elections).

Party competition and positioning on the left-right and centre-periphery dimensions may be different across electoral arenas. For regionalist parties both the national and regional electoral arenas are usually very important: the national political level because that is where decisions with regard to decentralization are taken; and the regional level because that is where they can also aim to govern, accessing patronage resources and using regional institutions to further ethno-territorial demands. Hence, at the national level regionalist parties may prioritize their position on the centre-periphery dimension whereas at the regional level they may want to emphasize their position on the left-right dimension. Which objective prevails in the end is difficult to deduce *a priori* and we opt to include both type of elections.

The coding scheme for the left-right dimension, which is reported in table 1, is a reformulation of similar taxonomies proposed in earlier works (De Winter, 1998; Tronconi, 2009; Massetti; 2009).

⁹ Australia, Austria, Finland, Norway, Portugal and the United States.

Table 1: Classification of regionalist parties on the left-right dimension.

	Radical right	6	Combining market oriented economic policies with xenophobic, anti-immigrant policies	
Right	1	Mainstream Right	5	Bourgeois (Conservative or Liberal) parties supporting market oriented policies
		Centrist, right leaning	4	‘broad church’ parties with more prominent rightist tendencies
	Centrist, left leaning	3	‘broad church’ parties with more prominent leftist tendencies	
Left	0	Mainstream Left	2	Socialist, social-democratic and green parties supporting state-oriented economic policies
		Radical left	1	Marxist parties, or parties with influential Marxist components

The main difference with previous classifications consists in the possibility of reducing the six-category scale to a dichotomous variable (left and right), which is crucial for testing the main hypothesis presented in this article. This objective was achieved by identifying prevailing left or right tendencies within ‘centrist’ parties, thus dividing the ‘centre’ class into two categories (‘Centrist, right leaning’ and ‘Centrist, left leaning’).¹⁰

The information on which the coding was conducted comes overwhelmingly from recently published secondary sources that provide longitudinal analysis of the individual parties, usually covering almost in full the historical period that we consider: 1970-2010. These sources provide qualitative accounts of the ideological development of regionalist parties and are, therefore, very precious to track their ideological positioning, as well as longitudinal changes. Appendix A provides a list of all coded parties and their average scores (since party position can change over time) for the whole period considered. Appendix B presents a brief discussion of the coding procedure, including examples, and provides a list of references used

¹⁰ Tronconi (2009: 45) and Massetti (2009: 507) identified five categories, while De Winter (1998: 209) opted for a non-symmetric taxonomy consisting of six categories, which included the ‘extreme left’ class but not (perhaps for lack of empirical cases falling into it) the ‘extreme right’ class. All three classifications included a ‘centre’ class.

for the coding. Appendix C validates our scores with the Chapel Hill expert survey (Bakker et al., 2012) and the expert survey conducted by Szöcsik and Zuber (2012) as well as with scores derived from the party Manifesto Project Database (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006).

Results

In table 2 we report the distribution of regionalist parties along the left-right dimension, on the basis of their average scores in the considered timeframe. Three considerations are in order. First, once the left-right space is dichotomized, we find the same exact number of regionalist parties on the two sides of the divide. This empirical finding appears to confirm that regionalism, in general terms, does not have a systematic predisposition to link itself either with a leftist or rightist ideological position.

Table 2: Number (and percentages) of regionalist parties participating in national and regional elections per position on the left-right dimension.

	<i>Left</i>			<i>Right</i>		
	<i>Clearly Left</i>		<i>Centrist</i>	<i>Clearly Right</i>		
	<i>Radical Left</i>	<i>Mainstream Left</i>	<i>Left Leaning</i>	<i>Right Leaning</i>	<i>Mainstream Right</i>	<i>Radical Right</i>
National elections (N = 54)	6 11.11%	12 22.22%	9 16.67%	15 27.78%	9 16.67%	3 5.56%
Regional elections (N = 70)	7 10.00%	16 22.86%	12 17.14%	18 25.71%	14 20.00%	3 4.29%

Secondly, like for state-wide parties, mainstream and centrist positions are remarkably more common than radical (especially radical right) ones. Thirdly, ‘centrist’ positions (summing up left and right leaning ones) are adopted in more than 40% (nearly 45% in the national elections) of cases. In other words, almost half of the parties are not strongly characterized in their left-right ideology. Since, ‘position’ can be seen as determined by various combinations of ‘salience’ and ‘direction’ (Basile, in this special issue), we can say that some of the parties coded as ‘centrist’ might have engaged, to various degrees, into a ‘blurring’ strategy. These data could be, therefore, interpreted as an indication of a prudent approach, adopted by many regionalist parties, in taking a stance on a secondary dimension (in this case the left-right one).

However, also for centrist ‘broad Church’ parties, such as the rally parties of the ethno-territorial German speaking minorities in Italy (SVP) and Belgium (ProDG), or other inclusive parties that have become the symbol of regional governments (like the CiU in Catalonia, PNV in the Basque Country and, more recently, the SNP in Scotland), the established literature clearly indicates the predominance of left or right leaning components. In addition, a solid majority of cases adopts very clear leftist or rightist positions. Therefore, the third and final consideration is that the general trend amongst regionalist parties is to engage into party competition beyond the original centre-periphery dimension and position themselves on the usually more salient (at a system level) left-right dimension. The analysis that follows aims to investigate whether the adoption of a left-right position can be linked to centre-periphery politics (subsuming strategy), or it is totally independent (two-dimensional strategy).

Multivariate analysis

We now turn to a multivariate analysis in order to explore in how far the economic status of the region can predict a regionalist party position on the left-right dimension. We operationalize the state of the economy of a particular region by calculating the GDP of a region *relative* to the GDP as a country as a whole (Eurostat). Percentages above 100% indicate that a region is doing relative well compared to the country as whole whereas percentages below 100% indicate that a region is economically lagging behind.

We coded regionalist parties on their centre-periphery positioning based on the crucial distinction between moderate/autonomist vs. radical/secessionist stances, where the former do not question the territorial integrity of the state while the latter do (Masseti and Schakel, 2013a; Massetti and Schakel, 2013b). We also introduce three control variables on competition from statewide and other regionalist parties. The state-wide party competition dummy variable measures whether the main (largest) state-wide party can be found on the left (=0) or on the right (=1). To determine the main (largest) state-wide party we look at regional vote shares for a particular election year (Schakel, 2013) and we determine its left-right position via the data from the Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifestos Project for years before 1999 (Budge et al. 2001; Volkens et al., 2013) and from the Chapel Hill expert survey for 1999 and later (Bakker et al., 2012). Two regionalist party competition dummy variables indicate whether there is one (or more) regionalist party on the left or on the right participating in elections within the same region (0=no; 1=yes).

We analyse the left-right ideology of regionalist parties with two variables, a (robust) dichotomous variable and an ordinal/categorical variable with six categories (see table 1). The binary variable is analysed with the help of a logit model whereby we use party clustered standard errors (positions are coded for each national and regional election and positions are clustered in parties). Theoretically speaking, an ordered logit model would be the preferred model for the ordinal/categorical variable. However, Brunt tests reveal that the parallel

regression/ proportional odds assumption is not met. That is, the relationship between each pair of outcome groups is not the same and each comparison requires its own model. We therefore opt for multinomial logit models with party clustered standard errors which do not assume a rank order between the categories. According to Hausman and Small-Hsiao tests these models appear not to violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption. The unit of analysis is a party participating in a particular region-election-year. Only when a regionalist party obtains a regional and/or national election vote share at the regional level it is included and we only look at elections taking place in ‘core-regions’, that is those region(s) for which the regionalist party demands decentralization or seeks to govern in its best interest. Some regionalist parties are multi-regional, in the sense that they participate in more than one ‘institutional’ region (e.g. the LN in ‘*Padania* regions’ in Italy and the PDS in the Eastern *Länder* of Germany). In these cases, each ‘party’s institutional region is analysed separately (therefore the number of ‘parties’ in the tables below are higher than the number of parties reported in tables 1 and 2 and in appendix A). Appendix D provides descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables.

Below we predicted probabilities for a particular ideological position of regionalist party on the left-right dimension. These probabilities are obtained by using the `prvalue` and `prgen` command available in the `SPost` package for Stata developed by Scott Long and Freese (2006). Confidence intervals for the changes in probabilities are obtained by a bootstrap percentile method with 1,000 replications. The bootstrap method is more robust to ‘noisy’ data than, for example, the delta method, and does not require an assumption of normality because bootstrapping resamples from the dataset and treats the sample as the population. The bootstrap method is often not used because although it “frequently provides better estimates of the confidence interval bounds, it is computationally intensive” (Scott Long and Freese, 2006, p.127).

In table 3 we estimate probabilities whether regionalist parties position themselves on the right when a particular independent variable goes from its minimum to its maximum while all other variables are held at their median (dummy variables) or their mean (economic status of the region). Our main hypothesis concerns the impact of the economic status of the region. As reported in table 3, where the regional economy is relatively strong there is a significantly higher probability that a regionalist party adopts a right position on the left-right dimension. For both national and regional elections, the probability that a regionalist party places itself on the right increases by 83 percentage points when relative regional GDP goes from 35 to 162 percent of statewide GDP.

Table 3: Predicting when a regionalist party is on the right.

	National elections				Regional elections			
	min	max	change	sig.	min	max	change	sig.
Economic status of the region	0.12	0.95	0.83	*	0.14	0.97	0.83	*
Centre-periphery position dummy	0.60	0.16	-0.44	*	0.70	0.42	-0.28	*
Main statewide party on the right	0.60	0.73	0.13	*	0.70	0.75	0.05	
Other regionalist party on the left	0.60	0.81	0.22	*	0.70	0.79	0.09	
Other regionalist party on the right	0.60	0.55	-0.05		0.70	0.41	-0.43	*
Number of observations	391				411			
Number of parties	63				81			
Wald chi ²	16*				19*			
Log pseudolikelihood	-204				-230			
McFadden R ²	0.22				0.17			
Adjusted count R ²	0.51				0.40			

Notes: * p < 0.05.

The tables display the results of logit models whereby the dependent variable reflects whether the regionalist party is left (=0) or right (=1). Shown are the probabilities for being a right party when the independent variables go from their minimum to their maximum while all other variables are held at their median (categorical variables; except for main statewide party

which is set at left) or their mean (economic status of the region). Detailed model results are available upon request.

The hypothesized link between centre-periphery radicalism and left-right placement also appears to be substantiated. When a party is moderate on self-government there is a 44 per cent increased probability that the party adopts a position on the right. For regional elections the ‘linkage’ between center-periphery positions and left-right positions is weaker and radical parties have a 28 per cent lower probability to place themselves on the right. Party competition from statewide and other regionalist parties matter too. When the main (largest) statewide party in the region can be found on the right then there is a 13 percentage point higher probability (for national elections) that a regionalist party can also be found on the right. Since in most cases the state-wide parties are the dominant actors, this is a strategic move which follows the electoral demand (i.e. trying to be close to the median voter in terms of left-right positioning) and might heavily overlap with the ‘socio-economic region’ logic discussed above. As an example, the leader of the *Ligue Savoisiennne* (LS) Patrice Abeille plainly stated: “from the political point of view, you know that Savoy, similar to all the mountainous countries, is dominated by the conservative or ultra-conservative tendency. As an example, at the last legislative elections [in 1997] eight RPR-UDF MPs were elected out of eight districts. A left-wing autonomist movement would have no chance of success here” (quoted in Roux, 2006b: 110). On the other hand, regionalist parties also need to look at how the ‘offer side’ of the electoral market is structured. In this case, it makes more sense for them to pay special attention to the positioning of other regionalist parties, in order to identify the ‘free space’. Our analysis shows that when other regionalist parties are present in the region it will affect the left-right position and there is a 22 per cent higher probability (for national elections) to be on the right when the other regionalist party is on the left whereas the probability to be on the right decreases by 43 per cent (for regional elections) when the

other regionalist party can be found on the right. Indeed the occupation of different segments of the left-right continuum by regionalist parties competing in the same region is rather common, e.g. the Basque Country, Catalonia, Aragon, Faroe Islands, Corsica, Sardinia, Val d' Aosta, etc.

In table 4 we provide the results of a multinomial logit analysis which explores in how far the linkage between economic status and left-right ideology holds when using the more fine-grained coding. Table 4 displays change in probability in left-right positioning when the relative state of the economy of the region (% of national average) goes from one/two standard deviation(s) below to one/two standard deviation(s) above the mean ($98\% \pm 24\%$ / 48%).

Table 4: The effects of the relative economic position of a region on the left–right position of regionalist parties.

	National elections		Regional elections	
	1 SD	2 SD	1 SD	2 SD
Radical left	-0.21	-0.41	-0.15	-0.27
Mainstream left	-0.16*	-0.25*	-0.17*	-0.29*
Centrist left leaning	-0.05*	-0.08*	-0.12*	-0.18*
Centrist right leaning	0.23	0.38	0.16	0.20
Mainstream right	0.09*	0.14*	0.09	0.12
Radical right	0.11*	0.21*	0.19*	0.41*
Number of observations	391		411	
Number of parties	63		81	
Wald χ^2	96*		111*	
Log pseudolikelihood	-556		-586	
McFadden R^2	0.12		0.11	
Adjusted count R^2	0.28		0.29	

Notes: * $p < 0.05$.

The table displays the results of a multinomial logit model which estimates the probability that a regionalist party is radical left, mainstream left, left of centre, right of centre,

mainstream right, or radical right. Shown are the changes in probabilities for being a type of party when the relative economic position of a region (% of national average) goes from one/two standard deviation(s) below to one/two standard deviation(s) above the mean (98% ± 24% / 48%) while all other variables are held at their median (categorical variables; except for main statewide party which is set at left). Detailed model results are available upon request.

The results are quite similar for national and regional elections. When the relative economic position of a region improves, there is a higher likelihood of finding ‘mainstream right’ and ‘radical right’ parties whereas the probability of finding ‘mainstream left’ and ‘centrist left leaning’ parties decreases.¹¹

In figure 1 we plot changes in probabilities for positions on the left-right dimension when the relative position of the regional economy goes from its minimum to its maximum. Figure 1A displays the probabilities for national elections and figure 1B for regional elections. We do this to visualize the results of the analysis presented in table 4 and to get a better understanding of how the probabilities change for the values in between the minimum and maximum values of the regional economy variable. The patterns in the figures confirm the previous findings. Overall, the multinomial logit analysis supports the results of the logit models and the relative economic position of the region vis-à-vis the country as a whole is a very strong predictor on the question whether a regionalist party adopts a left or right position.¹²

Figure 1A

¹¹ Ordered logit models reveal that with an improving relative economic position of a region there is a higher likelihood of finding parties on all the positions of the right (with the exception of the centrist right leaning parties in regional elections) and a lower likelihood of finding leftist positions of any sort. Results are provided in appendix E.

¹² The results are highly robust when we change the other variables to non-median values. Detailed results are available upon request.





Figure 1B



Notes: shown are the probabilities of particular positions on the left-right dimension when the relative economic position (% of national average) of a region goes from its minimum (35%) to its maximum (162%). The estimates are based on the model presented in table 4.

We now turn to a qualitative illustration to observe in how regionalist parties do indeed ‘subsume’ their left-right position into a centre-periphery discourse.

A Qualitative illustration of the nature and logic of issue linkage: strategic subsuming?

The most important finding of the analysis presented above is the extremely strong and significant correlation between the relative economic status of the region (relatively ‘rich’ vs. ‘poor’ regions) and the left-right ideological orientations of regionalist parties. Here we present qualitative data on two paradigmatic cases which indicate that this correlation can be interpreted as the result of a systematic process of subsuming left-right orientations into the centre-periphery (regionalist) discourse. Incidentally, the qualitative illustration is also interesting in respect to the link between centre-periphery radicalism and left-right positioning.

As far as the link between economic status and left-right positioning is concerned, the basic logic of the subsuming process is rather straightforward and is informed by electoral strategy: the regionalist party orientates itself towards the left or towards the right depending on which type of economic discourse arguably suits best the construction of coherent regionalist grievances and claims. The regionalist perspective tends to amplify the differences between the region and the rest of the state, while playing down internal (intra-regional) differences. This leads many regionalist parties to identify the whole region as a strongly characterized socio-economic entity on the basis of the prevailing features in the regional socio-economic fabric, thus substituting the concept of socio-economic class with that of socio-economic region. In order to present the main differences between the subsuming of a rightist as opposed to a leftist ideological orientation into a regionalist discourse, as well as the implicit¹³ but clear centrality of the underlying concept of ‘socio-economic region’ in these subsuming processes, we present extracts from electoral manifestos of the *Lega Nord* (LN), a party representing the relatively rich regions of Northern Italy, and of the Scottish National

¹³ The concept of socio-economic region remains implicit in most but not in all cases. One of the exceptions is the reference to ‘class nationalism’ by the *Partido Andalucista* (PA) in the 1980s (Montabes et al., 2006: 218). Another example is the explicit representation of Welsh nationalism as socialist and ‘working class’ in some documents produced by leftist groups gravitating around the Party of Wales - *Plaid Cymru* (Kimber, 1999).

Party (SNP), a party representing a region of the UK (Scotland) that has experience long-term industrial decline and has traditionally lagged behind the national average of economic output.¹⁴

A policy based on extensive public expenditure cannot, by any means, be called as 'social' because it undermines the basis of the economy. It produces: 1) low development; 2) high unemployment; 3) loss of competitiveness for businesses... Mrs Thatcher and Reagan stopped the growth of public spending. Here [i.e. in Italy], public finances are out of control, producing an increase in taxation and public debt... In order to reduce public expenditure you need to eliminate useless expenditures, privileges and the 'nanny state' logic. To do that, you need structural reforms and the most important reform is the federalist one... Like in the U.S.A. and Switzerland, the creation of true fiscal autonomy for local institutions triggers mechanisms of competitiveness and accountability (Lega Nord, 2001 Manifesto, pp. 3-5).

Scotland today is in a state of crisis with our economy decimated by the policies of successive London Governments. Unemployment has soared... Industrial production has fallen far more than in other countries. The UK's Regional Policy has failed to secure long-term jobs for Scotland... The British political system offers Scotland no hope of improvement. A further term of Thatcherism will devastate the Scottish economy, concentrating more wealth and power in the South East of England. The weak and divided Labour Party is powerless to protect Scotland... But there is an alternative – to choose Scotland. Never has the need for an independent Scottish Parliament and a Scottish Government been greater. Only with our own Government will Scotland have the will and the resources to reverse our economic decline and end mass unemployment... Only a Scottish Government will be able to tackle the appalling social conditions in which many of our people have to live. (SNP, 1983 Manifesto, p. 1).

We are working hard for economic recovery and new jobs... However, the London parties' proposed cuts pose a threat to this recovery... At this election, more votes means more Nats [i.e. Nationalists], and more Nats means less cuts. Local services and recovery can and must be protected... Running through this manifesto is the SNP vision of a new future for Scotland, independent, socially just and economically secure. (SNP, 2010 Manifesto, p. 5-6).

As the quotations show, regionalist parties acting in regions that are relatively wealthy (vis-à-vis the state's average) might be pushed to adopt a regionalist discourse which primarily insists on the disadvantages of state intervention in economic matters, and which denounces the loss of regional resources that are transferred to poorer regions via solidaristic and/or developmental state policies. They tend, therefore, to be ideologically oriented towards the right. The LN is by no means an isolated case of that type of regionalism that Christopher

¹⁴ It is worth pointing out that, especially in the early 1970s, the SNP has also insisted on the issue of the North Sea's petroleum, claiming that Scotland benefited only marginally from the discovery of oil fields and that with independence the new business would be at the only advantage of Scots (Lynch, 2001: 123). However, the SNP never developed a stable or predominant 'bourgeois regionalism' discourse.

Harvie labelled as the ‘bourgeois regionalism’ (Harvie, 1994).¹⁵ The overwhelming majority of the main regionalist parties representing relatively rich regions, such as Flanders, Brussels, Catalonia, the Basque Country, South Tyrol, Val d’Aosta, Savoy etc. appear, albeit with their own specificities, to combine an anti-tax, pro-market and pro-business position with their own individual regionalist stance (De Winter et al., 2006b; De Winter, 1998b; Barbera and Barrio, 2006; Buelens and Van Dyck; 1998; Marcet and Argelaguet, 1998; Perez Nuevas, 2006; Roux, 2006b; Pallaver; 2007; Massetti and Sandri, 2012). Symmetrically, regionalist parties acting in relatively poor regions might be pushed to adopt a regionalist discourse that insists on the importance of developmental policies/investments and on welfare provisions, denouncing the dis-interest of the state in creating the conditions for regional development (e.g. infrastructural investments, attention to specific economic sectors. etc.) and the damages inflicted to their regions by right-wing policies aiming at reducing solidarity and welfare. They are, therefore, inclined to incorporate and maybe subsume a leftist ideology, which often translates in the adoption of a regionalist discourse falling within Michael Hechter’s ‘internal colonialism’ (Hechter, 1975). This is not a peculiarity of the SNP. It applies to many other regionalist parties in relatively poor regions, such as Wales, Wallonia, Galicia, Andalusia, Brittany, Corsica, and Sardinia. (Elias, 2009; Van Morgan; 2006; Montabes et al.; 2006; Gomez-Reino, 2006; Buelens and Van Dyck, 1998; Olivesi, 1998; Roux, 2006a; Roux, 2011; Hepburn, 2009).

The two examples reported above can also be illuminating in regard to the second important correlation that we found in descriptive statistics and in the multivariate analysis (see table 3). Rightist regionalist parties acting in relatively rich regions might be satisfied with the protection of regional wealth through fiscal federalism, thus challenging the centralist

¹⁵ Right oriented regionalist parties, and radical right regionalist parties in particular, often accompany criticism of state (cross-regional) solidarity with a rhetoric emphasizing intra-regional solidarity, which can be considered as expression of ‘welfare chauvinism’ (Kitschelt, 1995; Mudde, 2000).

tendencies of the state in terms of welfare and redistributive policies but without necessarily putting into question the very territorial integrity of the state. In contrast, leftist regionalist parties acting in relatively poor regions are presented with a tougher choice: either they construct a radical critique of the state, blaming it for the underdevelopment of their region and demanding secession, or they put themselves into a somehow contradictory position, i.e. accepting their condition of (economic) dependency vis-à-vis the central state while still challenging it from a (moderate) regionalist perspective. The latter option might produce a shift in the focus of the regionalist struggle from demands for the transfer of competences to demands for the transfer of resources. In turn, this shift of focus leaves regionalist parties particularly exposed to competition from state-wide parties (particularly leftist ones). Indeed, while secessionist leftist parties can radically criticize leftist state-wide parties for their failure to draw resources into the region (see the extract from the SNP's 1983 manifesto), autonomist leftist parties have no option but to remain subaltern to leftist state-wide parties, as the latter represent their only chance to see transfers of resources based on redistributive policies adopted by the central state.

Discussion

In the article we set out to explain how regionalist parties position themselves on the left-right dimension and whether and how this dimension of party competition is linked with the centre-periphery one. To start with, our data show that regionalist parties do take a position on left-right politics. However, the fact that they can be found everywhere along the left-right spectrum (from the radical left to the radical right), confirms that this dimension of political contestation is a secondary one, not a primary and characterizing one, for the regionalist party family. In addition, the fact that well more than 40% of regionalist parties adopt centrist

positions, suggests that the left-right dimension could be potentially divisive for them, leading many of these parties to adopt a prudent positioning that avoids strong leftist or rightist stances. In these cases, we cannot exclude that regionalist parties engage in some kind of ‘blurring strategy’. Only in-depth analysis can properly investigate the contours of the four strategies presented in the introduction, exploring and discussing the empirical grey areas between them.

The main challenge of this article was to find linkages, within regionalist parties’ ideological elaboration, between the centre-periphery and left-right dimension. Although we acknowledge the complex and deeply contextual nature of these linkages, we found strong evidence in support of the generalizability of an important link: namely the economic status of the region vis-à-vis the state. Our analysis shows very clearly that regionalist parties in relatively rich regions tend to develop a rightist ideology, while regionalist parties acting in relatively poor regions tend to adopt a leftist ideology. Whether the identified linkage entails a generalized subsuming of left-right orientations into centre-periphery politics can only be proved via a wide and systematic analysis of ‘framing’. In this article, we have provided a qualitative illustration, concerning two paradigmatic cases (the LN and the SNP), which supports our interpretation that the subsuming of left-right orientations into centre-periphery politics manifests itself in the emergence of two ideal-types of regionalist discourse: the ‘bourgeois regionalism’ type (Harvie, 1994) is particularly suitable for parties acting in relatively rich regions; while the ‘internal colonialism’ type (Hechter, 1975) suits parties acting in relatively poor regions. We have used the term ‘subsuming’ here to refer to the framing of issues belonging to the secondary (left-right) dimension in terms of the core (centre/periphery) dimension. Such framing, in our view, induces an almost automatic positioning along the secondary dimension on the basis of considerations that pertain to the

primary dimension. However, we remain agnostic on whether subsuming always entails an attempt by regionalist parties to ‘erase’ the secondary (left-right) dimension, as stated by the editors in the introductory article (p. 8). Finally, the fact that regionalist parties appear to subsume the left-right dimension into the centre-periphery one (rather than *vice versa*) substantiates the hypothesis put forward in the introductory article, precisely in the terms expressed by the editors of this special issue (p. 10), i.e. which dimension is subsumed into which dimension does not depend on the relative salience of the dimensions at a systemic level but, rather, on their relative salience at the party level. However, our analysis also confirmed a general correlation between radical regionalism and leftist positioning (and between moderate regionalism and rightist positioning) which fits into a systemic pattern of positioning that has emerged in some national party systems, such as Spain and the UK (Alonso, 2012). These findings, therefore, call for further comparative research into how the different mechanisms – operated by regionalist and state-wide parties - of linking left-right and centre-periphery politics interact at a systemic level.

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Appendix A

Positioning of regionalist parties

Party	Country	Core region	years	lr	dum_lr	dum_cp	years	lr	dum_lr	dum_cp
Action democratique	Canada	Quebec	—	—	—	—	1994-2008	5.00	1.00	1.00
Alsace d'Abord	France	Alsace	1997-2002	6.00	1.00	0.00	1992-2010	6.00	1.00	0.00
Coalición Agrupaciones Independientes de Canarias	Spain	Canarias	1986-1989	4.00	1.00	0.00	1987-1991	4.00	1.00	0.00
Accolta Naziunale Corsa	France	Corse ¹	1993-2002	1.00	0.00	1.00	—	—	—	—
Aralar	Spain	Pais Vasco ²	2004-2008	1.00	0.00	1.00	2005-2009	1.00	0.00	1.00
Bloque Nacionalista Gallego	Spain	Galicia	1977-2008	1.50	0.00	1.00	1981-2009	1.63	0.00	1.00
Bayernpartei	Germany	Bavaria	1987-2009	5.00	1.00	1.00	1970-2008	5.00	1.00	1.00
Bloc Quebecois	Canada	Quebec	1993-2008	3.00	0.00	1.00	—	—	—	—
Coalición Canaria	Spain	Canarias	1993-2008	4.00	1.00	0.00	1995-2007	4.00	1.00	0.00
Centro Canario	Spain	Canarias	2008	4.00	1.00	0.00	2007	4.00	1.00	0.00
Coalicion Extremena	Spain	Extremadura	1996	3.00	1.00	0.00	1995-1999	3.00	0.00	0.00
Chunta Aragonésista	Spain	Aragon	1989-2008	2.00	0.00	0.00	1987-2007	2.00	0.00	0.00
Corsica Nazione	France	Corse ¹	—	—	—	—	1998-1999	2.00	0.00	1.00
Convergència I Unió	Spain	Cataluna ³	1979-2008	4.00	1.00	0.22	1980-2010	4.00	1.00	0.22
Die Freiheitlichen	Italy	Trento-Alto Adige ⁴	2006-2008	6.00	1.00	1.00	1993-2008	6.00	1.00	1.00
Eusko Alkartasuna	Spain	Pais Vasco ²	1989-2008	2.00	0.00	1.00	1986-2009	2.00	0.00	1.00
Euskadiko Ezkerra	Spain	Pais Vasco ²	1977-1989	1.20	0.00	1.00	1980-1990	1.25	0.00	1.00
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya	Spain	Cataluna ³	1979-2008	2.60	0.00	1.00	1980-2010	2.56	0.00	1.00
Extremadura Unida	Spain	Extremadura	1982-2008	4.00	1.00	0.00	1987-2003	2.00	0.00	0.00
Fédération Autonomiste	Italy	Vallée d'Aosta	—	—	—	—	1998-2008	3.00	0.00	0.00
Front Démocratique des Francophones	Belgium	Bruxelles ⁵	1965-1991	4.00	1.00	0.00	1989	4.00	1.00	0.00
Fólkaflokkurin	Denmark	Faroe Islands ⁶	1971-2007	5.00	1.00	0.20	1970-2008	5.00	1.00	0.25
Fryske Nasjonale Partij	Netherlands	Friesland	—	—	—	—	1970-2007	3.30	0.30	0.00
Herri Batasuna	Spain	Pais Vasco ²	1979-1996	1.00	0.00	1.00	1980-2001	1.00	0.00	1.00
Inuit Ataqatigiit	Denmark	Greenland ⁷	—	2.00	0.00	1.00	1979-2009	2.00	0.00	1.00
Independèntia Repubrica de Sardigna	Italy	Sardegna	—	—	—	—	2004-2009	2.00	0.00	1.00

Lega Nord	Italy	'Padania' regions ⁸	1983-2008	5.00	1.00	0.13	1980-2010	5.29	1.00	0.00
Ligue Savoisiennne	France	Rhone-Alpes	—	—	—	—	1998	5.00	1.00	1.00
Lega dei Ticinesi	Switzerland	Ticino	1991-2007	5.00	1.00	0.00	1991-2007	5.00	1.00	0.00
Movimento per le Autonomie	Italy	Sicilia	2008	4.00	1.00	0.00	2006-2008	4.00	1.00	0.00
Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie	Belgium	Vlaams Gewest	2003-2010	5.00	1.00	1.00	2004-2009	5.00	1.00	1.00
Partido Andalucista	Spain	Andalucia	1979-2008	2.00	0.00	0.00	1982-2008	2.00	0.00	0.00
Partido Aragonés	Spain	Aragon	1979-2008	4.67	1.00	0.00	1983-2007	4.57	1.00	0.00
Partiu Asturianista	Spain	Asturias	1989-2004	3.00	0.00	0.00	1987-2003	3.00	0.00	0.00
Partito Autonomista Trentino Tirolese	Italy	Trento-Alto Adige ⁴	—	—	—	—	1988-2008	4.00	1.00	0.00
Plaid Cymru	United Kingdom	Wales ⁹	1970-2010	2.36	0.00	0.82	1999-2007	2.67	0.00	1.00
Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas	Spain	Pais Vasco ²	—	—	—	—	2005	1.00	0.00	1.00
Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus	Germany	East German Länder ¹⁰	1990-2005	1.00	0.00	0.00	1990-2006	1.00	0.00	0.00
Parti Nationaliste du Quebec	Canada	Quebec	1984	3.00	0.00	1.00	—	—	—	—
Partido Nacionalista Vasco	Spain	Pais Vasco ²	1977-2008	4.50	1.00	0.40	1980-2009	4.33	1.00	0.33
Partito Popolare Trentino Tirolese	Italy	Trento-Alto Adige ⁴	—	—	—	—	1973-1978	4.00	1.00	0.00
Parti Québécois	Canada	Quebec	—	—	—	—	1970-2008	2.00	0.00	1.00
Partido Riojano	Spain	La Rioja	1993-2008	4.00	1.00	0.00	1983-2007	4.00	1.00	0.00
Partido Regionalista de Cantabria	Spain	Cantabria	1993	4.00	1.00	0.00	1983-2007	4.00	1.00	0.00
Partido Regionalista Extremeño	Spain	Extremadura	1993	3.00	0.00	0.00	1991	3.00	0.00	0.00
Partit Socialista de Menorca	Spain	Islas Baleares	1979-2004	2.00	0.00	0.00	1983-2007	2.00	0.00	0.00
Partit Socialista de Mallorca (-EN)	Spain	Islas Baleares	—	—	—	—	1983-1995	2.00	0.00	0.00
Partito Sardo D'Azione	Italy	Sardegna	1979-2008	3.00	0.17	0.83	1974-2009	2.88	0.13	0.75
Pro deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft	Belgium	Deutsche Gemeinschaft	1974-1999	4.00	1.00	0.00	1974-2009	4.00	1.00	0.00
Quebec Solidaire	Canada	Quebec	—	—	—	—	2003-2008	1.00	0.00	1.00
Rassemblement Valdôtaine	Italy	Vallée d'Aosta	—	—	—	—	1973	5.00	1.00	0.00
Rassemblement Wallon	Belgium	Communautaire française	1971-1991	2.00	0.00	0.00	—	—	—	—
Scottish Greens	United Kingdom	Scotland	1992-2010	2.00	0.00	1.00	1999-2007	2.00	0.00	1.00
Sardegna Nazione	Italy	Sardegna	1996-2008	2.00	0.00	1.00	1994-2009	2.00	0.00	1.00
Scottish National Party	United Kingdom	Scotland	1970-2010	2.64	0.00	1.00	1999-2007	2.67	0.00	1.00
Skånepartiet	Sweden	Skåne	—	—	—	—	2002	5.00	1.00	0.00

Sjálvstýrisflokkurinn	Denmark	Faroe Islands ⁶	1971-2007	4.00	1.00	0.21	1970-2008	4.00	1.00	0.25
Scottish Socialist Party	United Kingdom	Scotland	2001-2010	1.00	0.00	1.00	1999-2007	1.00	0.00	1.00
Südtiroler Freiheit	Italy	Trento-Alto Adige ⁴	—	—	—	—	2008	4.00	1.00	1.00
Südtiroler Volkspartei	Italy	Trento-Alto Adige ⁴	1972-2008	4.27	1.00	0.00	1973-2008	4.25	1.00	0.00
Tjóðveldi	Denmark	Faroe Islands ⁶	1973-2007	2.00	0.00	1.00	1970-2008	2.00	0.00	1.00
Union Democratique Bretonne	France	Bretagne	1981-2007	2.00	0.00	0.00	1986-2010	2.00	0.00	0.00
Unió Mallorca	Spain	Islas Baleares	1993-2008	4.00	1.00	0.00	1983-2007	4.00	1.00	0.00
Union Nationale	Canada	Quebec	—	—	—	—	1970-1985	5.00	1.00	0.00
Unione di u Populu Corsu	France	Corse ¹	1986-1997	3.50	0.50	0.00	1982-1999	3.00	0.00	0.00
Unión Renovadora Asturiana	Spain	Asturias	—	—	—	—	1983-2003	4.00	1.00	0.00
Unió Valencia	Spain	Valencia	1986-2000	5.00	1.00	0.00	1987-2007	5.00	1.00	0.00
Union Valdôtaine	Italy	Vallée d'Aosta	1972-2008	4.18	1.00	0.00	1973-2008	4.13	1.00	0.00
Union Valdôtaine Progressiste	Italy	Vallée d'Aosta	—	—	—	—	1973-2008	3.00	0.00	0.00
Union für Südtirol	Italy	Trento-Alto Adige ⁴	1996-2008	5.00	1.00	1.00	1993-2008	4.75	1.00	1.00
Vallée d'Aoste Vive	Italy	Vallée d'Aosta	—	—	—	—	2008	3.00	0.00	0.00
Vlaams Belang	Belgium	Vlaams Gewest	1978-2010	6.00	1.00	1.00	1995-2009	6.00	1.00	1.00
Volksunie	Belgium	Vlaams Gewest	1971-1999	3.00	0.30	0.60	1995-1999	2.00	0.00	1.00
Western Canada Concept	Canada	'Western Canada' ¹¹	—	—	—	—	1981-2009	5.00	1.00	1.00

1 the Corsican name for Corse is Corsica.

2 the Basque name for Pais Vasco is Euskadi.

3 the Catalan name for Catalonia is Catalunya.

4 the German name for Alto-Adige is Südtirol.

5 the Dutch name for Bruxelles is Brussel.

6 the Faroes name for Faroe Islands is Føroyar.

7 the Inuit name for Greenland is Kalaallit Nunaat.

8 the 'Padania' regions include Emilia Romagna, Liguria, Lombardia, Piemonte, and Veneto.

9 the Welsh name for Wales is Cymru.

10 the East German Länder include Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt and Thüringen. The Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus is considered to be a regionalist party until 2007 when it reformed itself into Die Linke.

11 'Western Canada' includes Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan.

Notes: shown are average scores across region*election years.

lr = position left-right dimension; 1 = extreme left to 6 = extreme right.

dlr = dummy centre-periphery dimension; 0 = left; 1 = right.

dcp = dummy centre-periphery dimension; 0 = autonomist; 1 = separationist.

See table 1 for the coding of the positions of regionalist parties on the left-right dimension.

Appendix B Coding Left-Right Positions

The most widely used datasets for the comparative analysis of political parties' ideological positioning – the Manifesto Project Database (MRG/CMP) and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) – only include a very small group of regionalist parties (see appendix C). In order to place parties on the left/right dimension, we resorted to our own coding, primarily based on secondary sources (see bibliography below). We code regionalist parties on a scale with six classes, which can be reduced both to a dichotomous (left (1-3) vs. right (4-6)) or to a three-classes categorization (clearly left (1-2); centrist (3-4); clearly right (5-6)). Below we illustrate how specific case-studies as well as comparative classifications by De Winter (1998), Massetti (2009) and Tronconi (2009) have guided our coding. We will present a couple of examples falling into each category and then we will give examples of cases with longitudinal changes across categories:

Examples of coding

Radical left (1) parties are Marxist parties, or parties with influential Marxist components. *Herri Batasuna* (HB) and the *Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus* (PDS) can be considered typical examples of parties with an ideology dominated or strongly influence by Marxism, and both are consensually described to be extreme or radical left (Izquierdo, 2011: 232-234; Hough and Koss, 2009). Tronconi (2009: 45) coded HB as extreme left and Massetti (2009: 507) coded both HB and PDS as radical left.

Mainstream left (2) parties are socialist, social-democratic or green parties which (actively) support state-oriented economic policies. We coded *Rassemblement Wallon* (RW) as a mainstream left party since it 'strongly believed in an active state' (Buelens and Van Dyck, 1998: 53) but is not dominated by Marxist components. Similarly we coded the *Chunta Aragonesista* (CHA) as mainstream left as this party stresses both its regionalist and leftist (non-Marxist) ideology (Baras et al., 2012: 4). Tronconi and De Winter coded RW respectively as left and centre-left/left (Tronconi, 2009: 45; De Winter, 1998: 209); Massetti coded CHA and RW as mainstream left (2009: 507).

Centrist, left leaning (3) parties are 'broad churches' which are inclusive but which show a predominant leaning towards the left. The *Partiu Asturianista* (PA) was coded as centrist for its explicit ambition to draw 'Asturianistas' from all ideological orientations. For European elections it has joined both left-oriented regionalist (1989) and right-oriented regionalist (2004) coalitions. In 2007 it has entered a coalition with the centrist (but right leaning) *Unión Renovadora Asturiana* (URAS). Another indication of PA's centrist positioning came in 1995, when the PA could have been decisive for the birth of a PSOE-led regional government but preferred to abstain, thus giving way to the PP. The leaning towards the left was identified because the PA was founded by a group of old members of the PSOE which have maintained control of the party throughout and have always restated its progressive character (Baras et al., 2012: 6). The *Bloc Québécois* (BQ) is another example of centrist regionalist party which features a leftist leaning. The party was founded by former members of both the progressive-conservative and the liberal party, and aimed to unite pro-independence *Québécois* from all ideological orientations. However, leftist (social-democratic) components are predominant in the party (Bickerton and Gagnon, 2013: 179). The BQ and PA were not previously coded in comparative analyses.

Centrist, right leaning (4) parties are ‘broad churches’ which are inclusive but which show a predominant leaning towards the right. *Unió Mallorquina* (UM) was coded as centrist because, like many other regionalist parties in Spain, originated from the disintegration of the centrist state-wide UCD. Its centrist vocation is testified further by its brief affiliation with the (short-lived) centrist state-wide party PRD and by its capacity of entering regional government coalitions with both right and left parties. Yet, the UM inherited the right leaning orientations of the UCD and its electorate has been much closer to the PP’s than to the PSOE’s (Baras et al., 2012: 6-9). The *Pro deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft* (ProDG) was also coded a centrist because it aims to be a rally party for the whole German speaking population of Belgium. However, its origin as a splinter from the Christian democratic party and its competition for votes with the Christian democratic and liberal party testify to a rightward leaning (Van Ingelgom, 2008: 5-8). The ProDG was not coded in previous comparative works, while the UM was coded as centre party by Massetti (2009: 511).

Mainstream right (5) parties are bourgeois (Conservative or Liberal) parties which support market oriented policies. The *Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie* (NVA) is described by De Winter (2006: 36) as a party with a clear pro-market (pro-entrepreneurs) ideology which places itself in between the Liberals, Christian Democrats and the *Vlaams Blok*. The *Fólkaflokkurin* (FF) is considered a liberal conservative party that “developed a conservative social and economic program and was mainly representing private business and the fishing industry” (Ackren, 2006: 225). No comparative work coded the FF, while Massetti coded the N-VA as mainstream right (2009: 507).

Radical right (6) parties support market oriented economic policies but in contrast to mainstream right parties combine it with xenophobic, anti-immigrant policies. As a result, these parties are widely considered to be radical right by referring to this combination of policies. The *Vlaams Belang* (VB) is widely recognized a radical-right party (Buelens, 2011: 283). Like most radical right parties, the VB has a mixed profile on the socio-economic left-right dimension: it displays ‘welfare chauvinism’, while it clearly supports “liberal measures, like privatization, reduction of taxes for small and medium enterprises, etc.” (De Winter et al., 2006: 63). The *Alsace d’Abord* (AA) boasts a very similar ideology in which regionalism and radical right themes are combined: “*le parti Alsace d’abord combine une doublé identité: régionaliste dans la promotion des intérêts de l’Alsace, et de droite extrême.*” (Delwit, 2005: 78). Tronconi coded the VB as extreme right (2009: 45). Massetti coded both the VB and AA as radical right (2009: 511).

Longitudinal changes

We were able to detect changes in left-right ideological positioning for 17 out of 74 parties (about 23% percent). Most changes occurred within the leftist (1-3) or rightist (4-6) positions, while five parties leapfrogged across the left-right divide. Amongst these five parties, only two parties (*Volksunie* (VU) and *Partito Sardo D’Azione* (PSdAz)) moved between clear stances on the left and on the right while three parties (*Fryske Nasjonale Partij* (FNP), *Partido Regionalista de Cantabria* (PRC) and *Unione di u Populu Corsu* (UPC)) are centrist parties which have moved from centrist left leaning (3) to centrist right leaning (4) or *vice versa*.

Longitudinal changes within the left (1-3): The Scottish National Party (SNP) has been, most of the time, a ‘broad church’ for Scottish nationalists of all ideological orientations. It stressed its leftist (non-Marxist) stance (2) only in the period from 1984 to 2001. However, even before 1984 (at least starting from the election of Billy Wolfe as leader in 1969) and after 2001, it featured a leftward leaning (3) (Lynch, 1998; 2002; 2006; 2009). The *Union Democratique Bretonne* (UDB) was born with an ideology strongly influenced by Marxism (1). “From the 1960s to the mid 1980s, UDB’s program was influence by Marxism and third world ideology” (Pasquier, 2006: 90). However, it has subsequently softened its ideology adopting a mainstream left position consisting of a mix of social-democratic and green stances (2) (Pasquier, 2006: 91).

Longitudinal changes within the right (4-6): The *Südtiroler Volkspartei* (SVP) was born as a conservative party (5) dominated by the urban (Bozen’s) bourgeois until 1957. With the rise of the rural (agrarian section) the party became more centrist (4) and more concerned with regionalist claims. In the period considered in this article the party has changed its position again. In the 1970s it moved again to the right (5), undergoing leftist splits and styling itself as a tough anti-Communist party, while from the 1980s it has re-acquired its role of rally party, representing the German speaking people of all social classes and all ideological orientations (4) (Holzer, 1998: 165-166; Pallaver, 2006: 167). The *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (PNV) re-emerged from Franco’s dictatorial regime as a regionalist party with a classic Christian-democratic ideology (5). However, since the 1990s the PNV has started a process of radicalization of the centre-periphery issue and has gone back to a more centrist position (4) (Acha Ugarte and Perez-Nievas, 1998: 93-96; Perez-Nievas, 2006: 50-51).

Longitudinal changes across the left-right (leapfrogging): The VU represents an exception as it is one of the two parties that leapfrogged across the left-right divide adopting both clearly rightist and leftist positions. De Winter classifies it as right in the 1950s, centre-right in the 1960s, centre-left in the 1970s, centre in the 1980s and left in the 1990s (1998: 209). Tronconi coded it as centre in the early 1980s and early 1990s, and as right in the mid 1980s and in the mid 1990s. In the period considered in this article (since 1970), we code the party as centrist in the 1970s and 1980s, with leftist leaning in the 1970s and rightist leaning in the 1980s. The leftist leaning in the 1970s is justified by the massive intake of leftist members after the 1968 social movements and the increasing tensions with the right wing section of the party which eventually walked out in 1978. The right leaning in the 1980s is justified by the rightward re-positioning in socio-economic policies, while adopting leftist positions on environmental and other ‘new politics’ issues (De Winter, 1998b: 33-34). We code the VU as mainstream left (2) in the 1990s because the then party leader “radicalized the party program towards the left and green spectrum..., locating the VU somewhere between the Ecologists and Socialists.” (De Winter, 1998b: 34).

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Parties' websites:

<i>Party name</i>	<i>Party website address</i>
Action democratique	http://www.adq.qc.ca/
Alsace d'Abord	http://www.alsacedabord.org/
Ålands Framtid	http://www.alandsframtid.ax/
Accolta Naziunale Corsa	http://www.anc-corsica.com/
Aralar	http://www.aralar.net/eu
Bloc Nacionalista Valencià	http://bloc.compromis.ws/
Bayernpartei	http://landesverband.bayernpartei.de/
Bloc Quebecois	http://www.blocquebeois.org/horizon2015/accueil.php
Coalición Canaria	http://www.coalicioncanaria.org/web_2010/index.php
Centro Canario	http://www.centrocanario.org/
Chunta Aragonesista	http://www.chunta.com/
Corsica Nazione	http://www.corsica-nazione.com/
Convergencia i Unió	http://www.ciu.cat/
Die Freiheitlichen	http://www.die-freiheitlichen.com/
Eusko Alkartasuna	http://www.euskoalkartasuna.org/es/?l=es&l=es
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya	http://www.esquerra.cat/
Extremadura Unida	http://extremaduraunida.es/eu/
Fédération Autonomiste	http://www.federationautonomiste.org/
Front Democratique des Francophones	http://fdf.be/
Fólkaflokkurin	http://folkaflokkurin.fo/xa.asp
Fryske Nasjonale Partij	http://www.fnp.nl/
Inuit Ataqatigiit	http://www.ia.gl/da/
Independentia Republica de Sardigna	IRS: http://www.irsonline.net/
Lega Nord	http://www.leganord.org/
Ligue Savoisiene	http://notre.savoie.free.fr/
Lega dei Ticinesi	http://www.legaticinesi.ch/
Movimento per le Autonomie	http://www.mpa-sicilia.it/home.php
Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie	http://www.n-va.be/
Parti Quebecois	http://pq.org/
Partido Andalucista	http://partidoandalucista.org/
Partido Aragonés	http://www.partidoaragones.es/proyectos/Autogobierno.htm
Partiu Asturianista	http://www.asturianista.as/
Progetto Nordest	http://www.progettonordest.org/
Partido Nacionalista Canario	http://www.pnc-canarias.eu/
Partido Nacionalista Vasco	http://eaj-pnv.eu/esp/index.php
Partito Autonomista Trentino Tirolese	http://www.patt.tn.it/
Partito Sardo d'Azione	http://www.psdaz.net/
Partido Riojano	http://www.partidoriojano.es/
Partido Regionalista de Cantabria	http://www.prc.es/
Partido/Coalicion Regionalista Extremeño/a	http://prex-crex.blogspot.com/2006/09/el-hueco-regionalista-extremeo-i-los.html
Pro duetschsprachige Gemeinschaft	http://www.prodg.be/de/aktuelles
Partit Socialista de Menorca	http://eleccions.psm-menorca.org/
Plaid Cymru	http://www.partyofwales.org/?force=1
Partit Socialista de Mallorca (-EN)	http://www.pensadiferent.cat/

Quebec Solidaire	http://www.quebecsolidaire.net/
Scottish Greens	http://www.scottishgreens.org.uk/uploaded/Holyrood2007.pdf
Sardegna Nazione	http://www.sardignanazione.it/
Scottish National Party	http://www.snp.org/
Skånepartiet	http://www.skanepartiet.org/
Sjálvstýrisflokkurin	http://www.sjalvstyri.fo/sjalvstyrisflokkurinfo/
Scottish Socialist Party	http://www.scottishsocialistparty.org/
Südtiroler Freiheit	http://www.suedtiroler-freiheit.com/
Südtiroler Volkspartei	http://www.svp.eu/de/
Tjóðveldi	http://www.tjodveldi.fo/
Union Democratique Bretonne	http://www.udb-bzh.net/
Unió Mallorquina	http://www.uniomallorquina.info/
Unione di u Populu Corsu	http://www.p-n-c.eu/
Union für Südtirol	http://www.buergerunion.st/
Unión Renovadora Asturiana	http://www.uras.es/
Unió Valencia	http://www.uniovalenciana.org/
Union Valdôtaine	http://www.unionvaldotaine.org/homepage.asp
Vallée d'Aoste Vive	http://www.aostaviva.it/
Vlaams Belang	http://www.vlaamsbelang.be/
Western Canada Concept	http://www.westcan.org/

Appendix C

Validation of left-right positions of regionalist parties

To validate our position scores of regionalist parties on the left-right dimension we calculate Pearson correlations between two expert surveys and scores derived from the Manifesto Project Database (see table below). From the table below we may observe that the Pearson correlations reach satisfactory levels of statistical significance and indicate that the left-right position scores from various sources are highly correlated with our scores.

Table C1: validation left-right scores.

Our scores	EPAC	CHES	MRG/CMP
Six categories	0.85*	0.82*	0.74*
Dummy	0.75*	0.77*	0.51*
N parties	26	14	18

* $p < 0.01$

Notes: shown are Pearson correlation coefficients between our position scores and two expert surveys and positions derived from party manifestoes. For the comparison with EPAC and CHES we calculated averages of our scores for the 2000s and for MRG/CMP we took averages since the 1970s.

Sources

EPAC = Ethnonationalism in Party Competition.

Szöcsik, Edina and Christina Isabel Zuber (2012) EPAC – a new dataset on ethnonationalism in party competition in 22 European democracies, *Party Politics*, published online 1 November 2012.

EPAC Left-Right question (eco): “Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties at one end of the spectrum, want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties at the other end of the spectrum, emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state.” Scores may range between 0 (left) and 10 (right).

CHES = Chapel Hill Expert Survey.

Bakker, Ryan, Catherine de Vries, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Anna Vachudova (2012) Measuring party positions in Europe: the Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, 1999-2010, *Party Politics*, first published online November 29, 2012.

CHES Left-Right question: “LRECON = position of the party in YEAR in terms of its ideological stance on economic issues. Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the

economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a less welfare state. 0 = extreme left ... 5 = center ... 10 = extreme right.”

MRG/CMP = Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifestos Project.

Volgens, Andrea, Pola Lehmann, Nicolas Merz, Sven Regel, Annika Werner with Onawa Promise Lacewell and Henrike Schultze (2013) The manifesto data collection. Manifesto project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).

MRG/CMP Left-Right: we took the scores of the variable ‘Rile: Right-left position of a party a given in Michael Laver/Ian Budge (eds.): Party Policy and Government Coalitions, Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: The MacMillan Press 1992.’

Appendix D
Descriptive statistics

Table D1: national elections

	Mean	Median	St.dev.	Min	Max
Ideology left-right	3.32	4	1.51	1	6
Ideology left-right dummy	0.52	1	0.50	0	1
Economic status of the region	97.97	97.39	23.73	35.04	162.26
Ideology centre-periphery dummy	0.39	0	0.49	0	1
Main state-wide party on the right	0.43	0	0.50	0	1
Other regionalist party on the left	0.36	0	0.48	0	1
Other regionalist party on the right	0.34	0	0.47	0	1

Table D2: regional elections

	Mean	Median	St.dev.	Min	Max
Ideology left-right	3.40	4	1.51	1	6
Ideology left-right dummy	0.54	1	0.50	0	1
Economic status of the region	97.13	95.59	22.89	35.04	158.10
Ideology centre-periphery dummy	0.38	0	0.49	0	1
Main state-wide party on the right	0.54	1	0.50	0	1
Other regionalist party on the left	0.34	0	0.48	0	1
Other regionalist party on the right	0.40	0	0.49	0	1

Notes: the number of observations is 311 for national elections and 411 for regional elections.

Appendix E

Results ordered logit models

Table E1: The effects of the relative economic position of a region on the left–right position of regionalist parties.

	National elections		Regional elections	
	1 SD	2 SD	1 SD	2 SD
Radical left	–0.10*	–0.22*	–0.09*	–0.22*
Mainstream Left	–0.16*	–0.27*	–0.19*	–0.31*
Left of centre	–0.03*	–0.05*	–0.06*	–0.07*
Right of centre	0.07*	0.11*	0.01	0.01
Mainstream Right	0.13*	0.24*	0.22*	0.34*
Radical right	0.08*	0.18*	0.11*	0.26*
Number of observations	391		411	
Number of parties	63		81	
Wald chi ²	18*		15*	
Log pseudolikelihood	–627		–653	
McFadden R ²	0.04		0.04	
Adjusted count R ²	0.10		0.13	

Notes: * $p < 0.05$.

The table displays the results of an *ordered* logit model which estimates the probability that a regionalist party is radical left, mainstream left, left of centre, right of centre, mainstream right, or radical right. Shown are the changes in probabilities for being a type of party when the relative economic position of a region (% of national average) goes from one/two standard deviation(s) below to one/two standard deviation(s) above the mean (98% \pm 24% / 48%) while all other variables are held at their median (categorical variables; except for main statewide party which is set at left). Detailed model results are available upon request.