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## Civic and Political Engagement by Immigrant-Background Minorities in traditional and New Destination European Cities

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A debate has developed in recent scholarship around the distinction between new and traditional immigrant destination cities (Lichter and Johnson 2009; Marrow 2005).

According to such studies, immigrants' social, economic, and political integration is expected to be different depending on whether migrants have settled in new or traditional countries and cities of immigration. In Europe, the focus on how contexts shape migrants' civic and political integration has been centered on how different degrees of openness in immigration policy and legislation affect such integration (Ireland 1994; Koopmans et al. 2005; Morales and Giugni 2011). Less discussion has been devoted to the differential impact of opportunities for civic and political integration associated with new and traditional destinations of migration. This chapter tries to fill in this gap by exploring the patterns of civic and political engagement in nine European cities, including both new and traditional destinations. In order to achieve this goal, the chapter analyzes the factors affecting engagement in ethnic, native, and pan-immigrant organizations as well as immigrants' political engagement in mainstream and immigrant-related activities in Budapest, Barcelona, Geneva, Lyon, London, Madrid, Milan, Stockholm, and Zurich.<sup>1</sup>

To address our main research question, focusing on the impact of the type of destination on immigrants' civic and political involvement, we draw on the literature that has discussed the role of the degree of openness of political contexts on immigrant integration, and on the political behaviorist scholarship with specific reference to studies applied to migration. The latter has

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The literature usually refers to either ethnic or cross-ethnic organizations indistinctly. Yet, because our data enable us to do fine-grained classifications, we distinguish between ethnic, panimmigrant, and native organizations. Note that by ethnic organizations we do not mean only ethnic advocacy organizations or homeland organizations but also all other types of associations—no matter their goals—mainly composed of immigrant-background people of a single ethnic group. The latter includes sport clubs, cultural activities groups, religious associations, and so forth.

offered important insights on the importance for immigrant-background individuals to get organized in order to be better represented and to mobilize in the political sphere.

Since the pioneering work of Sidney Verba and several of his colleagues (Almond and Verba 1963; Nie, Powell, and Prewitt 1969a, b; Verba and Nie 1972), scholarship on political engagement has afforded a central role to associational engagement as a critical resource to mobilize citizens into political attentiveness and action. Associations are also crucial in the political mobilization of immigrant-background minorities. In the late 1990s a few groundbreaking studies led by a group of Dutch scholars suggested that organizational structures played a critical role in shaping the political integration of immigrant-background individuals. These scholars underscored the role of ethnic organizations—that is, organizations mainly composed of people of the same ethnic group—and of membership and engagement in such organizations, claiming that ethnic organizational networks encourage higher levels of political participation. In other words, the larger the "ethnic civic community"—and by that they meant the ethnic organizational network—the higher the levels of political participation among immigrant-background residents (Fennema 2004; Fennema and Tillie 1999).

Other work has emphasized that these positive benefits are not restricted to single-group ethnic associations. When immigrants from multiple ethnic groups organize together in panimmigrant associations, pan-ethnic identities sustain mobilization in the residence country (Okamoto 2003; Okamoto and Ebert 2010). Thus, pan-immigrant organizations also act as vehicles for the political participation of immigrant-background individuals in the settlement country. Finally, findings on the impact of immigrants' engagement in native-based organizations suggest that these organizations foster their political involvement as well (Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004; Lee, Ramakrishnan, and Ramírez 2007; Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2009; Ramakrishnan 2006; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008a; Wong 2006).

Such scholarship has, however, overlooked how contextual aspects may affect engagement in organizations and, therefore, engagement in politics too. The integrative effect of ethnic organizations may, for example, vary depending on whether migrants have settled in traditional or new countries of destination. In fact, in new countries of destination, migrants' organizational structures may be much weaker than in traditional destinations. Or the integrative capacity of new and traditional destinations may vary depending on whether immigrant organizations are afforded a dominant role in the immigrant organizational field and in immigration policies and therefore are differently positioned to provide the resources and political cues that will help immigrants engage in public affairs. This chapter looks at these expectations in some detail.

## **Understanding Immigrants' Civic and Political Engagement**

Political engagement is at the center of the concept of the democratic state as it contributes to the equal protection and representation of groups' interests, it implies the possibility to take part to public affairs, it increases governments' legitimacies, the acceptance of a democratic form of government, and the sense of collective responsibility and civic duty.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For the sake of language economy, we refer to "immigrants" in a general sense to include both first generations (immigrants in a proper sense) and their immediate native-born descendants, who are not immigrants but immigrant-background individuals.

In turn, organizations are important services providers. In addition, the study of organizations as mobilizing structures in the political sphere has been widely acknowledged, particularly within the political-behavioral perspective, by the "civic voluntarism model" (CVM) (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). In this perspective, organizations are conceived, together with workplaces and places of worship, as intermediary structures between the socioeconomic positions of individuals and their political participation. While still emphasizing the importance of the socioeconomic status (SES) model—and of the resources individuals derive from their socioeconomic positions—for citizens' political participation, the CVM underscores the role of organizational resources. According to the CVM, political participation is deeply rooted in social institutions such as the family, the school, the workplace, voluntary associations, and churches. Citizens' affiliations to formal and structured groups—such as associations—as well as their interpersonal connections and embeddedness in informal social groups, are the key to facilitating political recruitment and participation. In particular, they enable the accumulation of resources, such as civic skills, which are the communication and organizational abilities needed in order to employ other kinds of resources—particularly, time and money—efficiently in political life (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995: 271, 304). Involvement in all sorts of formal and informal groups contributes to gaining the knowledge and skills that facilitate access, recruitment, and participation into the political sphere (McClurg 2003). Social connections also create the reciprocal expectations that encourage participation and collective action by facilitating the expression of shared identities (Diani and McAdam 2003).

In immigration studies scholarship, the importance of political engagement by immigrants and of the role of organizations for the political incorporation of immigrants has also been widely acknowledged (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009a; Morales and Pilati 2011; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008a). Jennifer L. Hochschild and John H. Mollenkopf argue that highly organized and politicized local communities in the United States help immigrants learn about the political system and that immigrant incorporation turns out to be substantially fostered by networks of nonprofit organizations (Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009c: 19; Mollenkopf and Hochschild 2010: 32). The U.S. scholarship has also repeatedly shown that ethnic organizations are also important means for immigrants to engage in transnational politics and that transnational politics is not a zero-sum game with mainstream politics (Portes, Escobar, and Arana 2008, 2013).

Single-case studies in Europe have further addressed the impact of ethnic and crossethnic organizations on immigrants' political involvement. Dirk Jacobs, Karen Phalet, and Marc Swyngedouw (2004) and Jean Tillie (2004) find a positive effect of ethnic associational involvement on political engagement. Yet, other studies have shown that this relationship is not as clear-cut. A study in Denmark on second-generation immigrants from the former Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Pakistan showed that the impact of involvement in ethnic organizations for political participation depends on the ethnic group (Togeby 2004). In Berlin, immigrants involved in ethnic organizations are more politically active but show no greater interest in German politics than those not involved in ethnic organizations (Berger, Galonska, and Koopmans 2004). The few existing comparative studies suggest that the effect of engagement in ethnic associations on mainstream political engagement across European cities is either negative or nil (Morales and Pilati 2011). Other scholarship shows that, even if immigrants usually occupy a peripheral position in the participatory structure—see, for instance, S. Karthick Ramakrishnan (2006) on Latinos and Asians in the United States—their involvement in civic institutions such as trade unions and other types of voluntary organizations, often mosltly composed of natives,

systematically fosters their political engagement (Lee, Ramakrishnan, and Ramírez 2007; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008a). Maria Berger, Christian Galonska, and Ruud Koopmans (2004) show that engagement in German organizations promotes the political integration of immigrants, and similar research in Milan showed that the effect of engagement in native organizations on political incorporation is greater than engagement in ethnic organizations (Pilati 2010).

The scholarly literature that has analyzed immigrant organizations and the mechanisms of mobilization at work has suggested some reasons why pan-immigrant and native-based organizations should foster immigrants' political engagement more consistently than ethnic organizations do (Pilati and Morales 2016). Sometimes, language barriers affect some ethnic organizational leaders who lack linguistic skills, and this hinders their capacity to mobilize members into local politics and can result in important differences in the impact that ethnic and native organizations have on immigrants' political engagement (Aptekar 2009). Equally, differences in the public visibility of ethnic and mainstream or native organizations may lead to different mobilizing effects because the information cues and shortcuts that they provide to their respective members will differ. In turn, native organizations are likely to sustain many and more structured links to political institutions of the country of residence and play a central role in the associational field. Consistent with this, Ramakrishnan and Irene Bloemraad (2008b) show that mainstream organizations in six Californian cities have considerably higher levels of political presence vis à vis local government officials and policy makers than ethnic organizations. Consequently, the additional resources that immigrants obtain from joining mainstream organizations—and which they do not necessarily obtain from ethnic organizations—are manifold. Native organizations will be more likely to successfully mobilize immigrants into mainstream political engagement because they accumulate more organizational resources and contacts than ethnic organizations. For instance, natives have much greater political knowledge and information, socioeconomic resources, and social capital than immigrants across all European countries (Messina 2007). Therefore, native organizations may more easily provide such resources to immigrants. Native organizations can also offer their immigrant members symbolic resources that legitimize political action. They can, for instance, secure the political recognition that many immigrants lack when they are not national citizens. For all of these reasons, native organizations are regarded as key bridging actors between immigrants and mainstream political institutions, sometimes even crowding-out ethnic and pan-immigrant organizations in providing this linkage function (Caponio 2005).

## **Migrants' organizations in Traditional And New Destinations**

Recent scholarship, mainly in the United States, addresses the impact of contextual conditions in new destination cities on immigrants' integration. This scholarship has explored how migrants settled in new destinations may encounter different conditions of integration compared to migrants settled in traditional destination cities and countries. New destinations tend to be characterized by rapid growth of the foreign-born migrant population, and therefore have overall lower rates of citizenship acquisition. Immigrants in new destinations have lower language proficiency as well as fewer resources—both individual and collective—such as the multiple relationships and social capital immigrants progressively accumulate in the place of settlement. New destinations may be also less prepared for immigration flows, with political elites having less know-how on best practices, policies, and experiences to face immigration-

related challenges, and with extremely different approaches to including or excluding the new arrivals (Hall 2013; Marrow 2005; Okamoto and Ebert 2010).

For these reasons, immigrants settling in new destinations may have more difficulty joining voluntary associations and getting involved in political action than immigrants settling in traditional destination cities where the organizational structure and broader political context is more prepared for immigrant flows. For instance, immigrants' collective rights (cultural, educational, religious, rights related to equal access to media for all ethnic groups, labor, and so on) may be more easily recognized in traditional than in new destinations. The same may be expected for individual rights (access to residence permits and citizenship, family reunion, welfare, antidiscrimination, and so on), leading to more inclusionary approaches toward immigrants in the civic and political spheres. Therefore, following the literature that argues that more open political contexts in terms of individual and collective rights foster migrants' political integration compared to closed political contexts (Cinalli and Giugni 2011; Koopmans et al. 2005), immigrants in traditional destinations are expected to be more likely to engage in civic and political activities than in new destination ones (general hypothesis).

In addition, ethnic and pan-immigrant organizations in new destinations may be less adept than those in traditional destination at *bridging* immigrants and local political institutions, primarily because of the limited size of the migrant population and its recent arrival. Therefore, organizations might provide dissimilar resources across different contexts depending on their position in the immigrant organizational field and their engagement in the policy-making process. Furthermore, previous research suggests that whereas ethnic organizations are afforded a dominant role in the social organization of multicultural policies of diversity accommodation in certain traditional destination countries—such as in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, or Canada (Bloemraad 2006a; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008a)—ethnic organizations are often marginalized in terms of the resources they have at their disposal and in terms of the recognition of their potential contribution to the political process in less accommodating or "closed" political contexts, such as Italy and Spain, which are new destination countries in Europe (Morales and Ramiro 2011; Pilati 2012). In such contexts, ethnic organizations are unlikely to have much leverage in the public arena and will have a difficult time incorporating immigrants into mainstream politics. In contrast, in traditional destination countries such as the Netherlands or Belgium, for example, where the historical and institutional roots of ethnic minority recognition derive from the system of "pillarization" that organized various institutions (newspapers, radios, trade unions, schools, and so forth) along political or religious affiliations (Post 1989), ethnic organizations have a better chance to become powerful mobilizing structures that contribute to the political incorporation of immigrants (Fennema and Tillie 2001; Pieterse 2001). In these contexts, immigrants are encouraged to organize in ethnic associations that are then capable of conveying many political resources to their members because of their wellestablished structure and connections with the local authorities. Consistent with this, some results in these countries suggest that the magnitude and structure of the ethnic civic communities are closely related to the levels of political participation and trust in local political institutions of immigrants (Fennema and Tillie 1999; Vermeulen 2006).

Therefore, there are reasons to expect that there is a partial overlap between the type of destination and the receptivity of the policy approaches, such that traditional destinations are likely to be the most open ones, whereas new destinations—which tend to be characterized by more restrictive integration policies—might be less welcoming and less prepared for the

immigration flows.<sup>3</sup> Thus, drawing on the literature on the impact of the openness of political contexts, we expect that contextual conditions related to new destinations will hinder immigrants' engagement in native, pan-immigrant, and ethnic organizations as well as their involvement in different types of political actions (specific hypothesis).

## **Data and Variables**

The empirical evidence presented in this chapter derives from survey data collected between 2004 and 2008 from representative samples of individuals of immigrant background in nine European cities: Budapest, Barcelona, Geneva, Lyon, London, Madrid, Milan, Stockholm, and Zurich.<sup>4</sup> Whereas Barcelona, Budapest, Madrid, and Milan can be classified as new destination cities, Geneva, Lyon, London, Stockholm, and Zurich are traditional destination cities. Indeed, while postwar immigration characterized the Swiss cities, London, and Lyon, and migration to Stockholm developed a bit later (primarily since the early 1970s), most immigration flows to the Spanish cities, Budapest, and Milan have taken place only since the late 1980s, with considerable peaks happening in the 1990s and 2000s in the three southern European cities.

In each city the survey focused on either two or three different ethnic groups: in Budapest—Chinese, ethnic Hungarian immigrants, and a mixed group of immigrants originating from Muslim countries; in Barcelona and Madrid—Ecuadorians, other Latin American Andeans, and Moroccans; in Geneva—Italians and Kosovars; in Zurich—Turks, Kosovars, and Italians; in Milan—Filipinos, Egyptians, and Ecuadorians; in Lyon—Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians; in London—Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, and Indians; and in Stockholm—Chileans and Turks. The groups were selected according to their size in relation to the overall immigrant population, and they included in each city at least one group of long-standing immigration, one of more recent arrival, as well as one of Muslim religious background.

In most cities, the immigrant population makes up between 10 and 30 percent of the total local population, and the groups surveyed represent the major groups of immigrants present in the cities studied. The total immigrant samples in each city are random samples stratified by ethnic origin composed of at least 250 individuals for each immigrant group. They include immigrants and second generations. All the individuals selected had to have been resident in the cities for at least six months prior to the interview, and to be at least fifteen years of age. The whole sample we employ includes 6,632 individuals of immigrant background.

<sup>3</sup> Of course, traditional destinations vary so that those most open to collective rights—such as the multicultural contexts of Great Britain and the Netherlands—are very different from the more assimilationist France.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The data we employ were collected at the local level, yet we do not have enough variation between cities within single countries. Consequently, differences of contextual indicators across cities match differences across countries with the exception of Zurich and Geneva, and Madrid and Barcelona, and we cannot systematically test the effect of country-level indicators versus the impact of local-level indicators.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Further details on the sampling methods used in the different cities and methodological issues are found in Morales and Giugni (2011), and the technical description of the surveys is available in Palacios and Morales (2013).

## Dependent Variables

While the definition of civic engagement is not consistent across studies, we consider civic engagement as engagement in voluntary organizations. In turn, political involvement can be expressed in various forms: in electoral behavior; in extra-electoral activities—such as contacting officials; or in expressing an interest and attachment toward political affairs (Lane 1965; Sigel and Hoskin 1981). In this chapter we focus our attention on several types of civic and political involvement that are key indicators of the degree of civic and political incorporation of immigrant-background individuals in the societies where they live. With regard to civic engagement, we consider engagement in at least one ethnic association, engagement in at least one pan-immigrant organization, and engagement in at least one native organization.

The questionnaire included a detailed battery of questions on associational engagement in relation to a list of eighteen types of organizations (see the appendix reporting the full list of organizations). Respondents were probed about the membership composition of each organization to which they belonged or had participated in in the previous twelve months. One question asked whether half or more members were of immigrant background, and another whether half or more members were of their same ethnicity or country of origin. Thus, each organizational involvement was classified as relating to an ethnic, pan-immigrant, or native organization. Consequently, we employ three dichotomous variables for civic engagement: engagement in ethnic organizations, engagement in pan-immigrant organizations, and engagement in native organizations.

We defined political engagement as consisting ofparticipants' involvement in at least one mainstream extra-electoral activity and at least one immigrant-related extra-electoral activity in the previous twelve months. Political engagement in extra-electoral activities includes actions such as contacting, donating, and lobbying. Following the approach of the American Citizen Participation Study, the surveys asked those respondents who had participated in any form of action: Who is affected by the issue that motivated the action? Whenever a respondent indicated that the issue fundamentally concerned the family or a few other individuals, the city, the country of residence, or the world, we considered this as indicative of mainstream political action. When a respondent indicated that the issue related to immigrants, we considered this indicative of immigrant-related political action. We thus excluded from these indicators actions that the respondents suggested were related to the country of origin of the respondents or of their parents, which are more likely indicators of transnational political action not specifically referring to the country of settlement.

## **Independent Variables**

Traditional versus new destination cities are operationalized by using a dichotomous variable assigned a value of 1 to the new destination cities of Barcelona, Budapest, Madrid, and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> In the few cases where respondents were involved in more than one organization of the same type (e.g., more than one environmental organization, or more than one sports club), the probing was in relation to the organization in which they were more active or to which they devoted more time.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See the Appendix for the detailed coding of the variables.

Milan and a value of 0 to traditional destination cities, namely Geneva, London, Lyon, Stockholm, and Zurich. The impact of factors related to the context of settlement (new versus traditional destination) is contrasted with the effect played by other variables thought to be important in shaping political involvement by classical behavioral perspectives as well as by theories emphasizing the characteristics related to the process of immigration. We thus include as control variables both sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics of immigrants, as well as attitudinal, and immigration-related correlates. The Appendix reports the detailed coding for all independent variables.

#### **Results**

Table 11.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the independent as well as dependent variables analyzed—civic and political engagement. Levels of civic engagement vary across cities. In Barcelona, Stockholm, and Lyon immigrants are active mostly through native organizations. In Milan, Madrid, and Zurich levels of engagement in native organizations are very similar to those in ethnic organizations, and only migrants in London are active mostly through ethnic organizations. Involvement in native organizations is extremely high in Stockholm due to the very high number of affiliations in trade unions—typical of all Scandinavian societies and also, in this case, extended to migrant populations—although engagement in ethnic organizations is also the highest in Stockholm. Concerning political engagement, the table shows that immigrants in Lyon and Stockholm manifest the highest levels of political engagement in mainstream issues, while Barcelona and Geneva show the highest levels of engagement in immigrant-related politics. In contrast, there are cities where immigrants are hardly engaged in any political activity, like Milan and Budapest.

#### Table 11.1 here

Figures 11.1 and 11.2 show, respectively, the rates of civic engagement in at least one ethnic, pan-immigrant, and native organization (Figure 11.1), and political engagement in mainstream and immigrant-related activities (Figure 11.2) by city of settlement, specifically distinguishing between types of destination. If we take a look at Figures 11.1 and 11.2, a few interesting patterns emerge. There are considerable differences between new and traditional destinations with regard to engagement in native organizations as well as engagement in mainstream politics. This is especially clear if we consider the city of Stockholm, one of the European cities with the most open political contexts in terms of migrants' integration among the ones we study (Cinalli and Giugni 2011) and, as we show elsewhere (Morales and Pilati 2011), the degree of openness may have significant effects on the way migrants eventually engage in host country politics. However, other types of civic and political engagement do not seem to manifest a different pattern between new and traditional destination cities. In particular, engagement in ethnic organizations and engagement in immigrant-related political activities seem hardly affected by immigrants' city of settlement.

The multivariate analyses presented in Table 11.2 partially confirm such relationships. While the coefficient testing the impact of the type of destination is always negative—indicating a smaller probability to engage in each type of organization or political activity in new destinations—only models 1 (native organizations), 2 (pan-immigrant organizations), and 4 (mainstream actions) show that the type of place of settlement significantly affects the probability of engaging in the respective form of civic and political engagement studied. Overall, these models show that migrants settled in new destination cities are less likely to engage in some types of organizations and political actions than migrants settled in traditional destination gateways, and that this difference reaches standard statistical significance in the case of engagement in pan-immigrant organizations (model 2).

#### Table 11.2 here

With regard to civic engagement, these results imply that new destinations may be less prepared in terms of providing the means for migrants to join pan-immigrant organizations. The latter is likely to be affected by the policies of integration adopted and, consequently, by whether the places of settlement are new or traditional destinations.

Engagement in political activities is not significantly affected by the context of settlement in terms of new versus traditional destination. Indeed, model 4 suggests that, a significant difference concerns mainstream political activities only. However, this result is not robust (see model 4A in Table 11.A). Our findings suggest that while immigrants settled in new destinations seem to find obstacles to engaging in pan-immigrant organizations, they seem to have similar opportunities to participate in political activities as immigrants settled in traditional destinations. Indeed, such political activities may include all those issues related to migrants' need to contact, for instance, political authorities for questions related to housing, employment opportunities, and health issues which migrants in new destinations also require and on which they have pressing needs.

In contrast to what we expected in our core hypothesis, traditional destinations are not consistently more likely to provide greater opportunities to become politically integrated into mainstream civic and political actions. However, this does not necessarily mean that the political context plays no role. Prior research shows that contextual characteristics linked to different policies of integration in European countries are of utmost importance in shaping migrants' chances to become integrated into the civic and political sphere (González-Ferrer and Morales

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> In order to accurately estimate predictors, given the multistage design employed in the survey, we estimate logit models and specify that the data are clustered by groups within cities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Given that the city of Stockholm may bias the results due to the unusual high levels of involvement in native organizations (model 1) and in mainstream political action (model 4), we also run the same analyzes identifying this city with a dummy variable (see Table 11.A in the Appendix). The results indicate that, as suggested by Figures 11.1 and 11.2, migrants living in Stockholm have significantly higher probabilities to become involved in native organizations and in mainstream political activities, and that once this is taken into account, the difference between traditional and new destination cities ceases to be statistically significant. In any case, with a restricted number of settings, results are bound to be sensitive to individual cases when they are outliers.

2013; Koopmans et al. 2005; Morales and Pilati 2011). What our findings suggest is that the factors related to the relative novelty of immigration waves and the preparedness of recipient societies as well as their reactions to unexpected waves are not the main driving factors.

In addition to the results related to the contextual characteristics in terms of new versus traditional destinations, Table 11.2 further illustrates that there are several key individual characteristics that are highly significant in shaping immigrants' engagement in the different types of civic and political activities. Most standard SES and attitudinal predictors of political engagement for natives apply to civic and political engagement by immigrants as well. However, their effect is not equally significant across the different types of civic and political actions looked at. Being a man tends to positively affect immigrants' chances of civic engagement in pan-immigrant and ethnic organizations, although this relation does not reach standard levels of statistical significance. Having attained a higher education level positively affects political activities of any type, while being employed positively affects civic engagement in both native and pan-immigrant organizations. In contrast, being in paid work decreases immigrants' chances to engage in political nonelectoral activities in general, although this relation does not reach standard levels of statistical significance.

Age shows a curvilinear inverted-U-shaped relationship with civic engagement in native organizations and political engagement, showing that as immigrants become older they show higher probabilities to join civic and political activities, but after a certain age this positive trend is reversed.

Another common correlate of political engagement—being married or in a stable partnership—shows a positive relation to engagement in ethnic organizations. As immigrants are more likely to marry conationals instead of individuals from other ethnic groups, the marital status might not provide the same resources for migrants' political engagement as for the majority population. Having a spouse from the same ethnic group may contribute to sustaining ethnic loyalties and attachments, and therefore it is reasonable that it leads to higher probabilities of joining ethnic organizations.

Across all models, people who are interested in politics are more likely to engage in any type of civic and political activity. Interestingly, the level of social trust is not significant for most types of engagement, but it significantly decreases immigrants' chances of engagement in immigrant-related nonelectoral activities. This result suggests that social trust, that is, higher levels of trust in others, may favor cross-ethnic loyalties to natives, therefore alienating migrants from ethnic and pan-ethnic bonding ties and sustaining engagement in immigrant-related nonelectoral activities.

Turning our attention to the variables relating to the immigration experience, their impact also differs across forms of participation. On the one hand, the native-born descendants of immigrants (second and third generations) show significantly lower probabilities of engaging in native and pan-immigrant organizations, as well as mainstream nonelectoral political activities. Being a Muslim is not significantly or consistently related to either civic or political engagement. On the other hand, language proficiency is highly significant. More specifically, the better migrants speak the language of the country and city of residence, the more they engage in the civic and political activities examined. The only type of activity that is not affected by language skills is engagement in ethnic organizations, and this is a reasonable finding, given that the language of the country of origin is likely to be commonly used within these associations.

On the other hand, the length of time spent in the country has no effect on civic and political engagement, whereas holding the nationality of the country of residence and a permit to

stay considerably increases the chances of involvement in native organizations. This is likely due to the attachments and loyalties toward issues relating to the residence country that holding citizenship may bring with it, as migrants are more likely to feel greater attachments to the national community once they have obtained citizenship. This is consistent with those studies showing that the citizenship regime affects electoral participation in the residence country of immigrants and ethnic minorities (González-Ferrer and Morales 2013). For similar reasons, holding citizenship of the residence country decreases the chances of migrants' engagement in immigrant-related nonelectoral activities as compared to being in an unauthorized situation. In turn, having a permit to stay provides a less consistent result as it increases engagement in native organizations but it decreases the chances of engaging in any type of political activity as well as involvement in pan-immigrant organizations. This may be due to the volatile and unstable situation experienced by migrants who hold a fixed-term permit to stay.

## Conclusion

In this chapter we analyzed the impact of specific characteristics of the context of settlement, namely settlement in a new or in an traditional destination city, on various types of civic and political engagement of immigrant-background individuals in nine European cities. In particular, we analyzed how settling in a new or in an traditional destination city may affect the involvement of immigrant-origin individuals in ethnic, pan-immigrant, and native organizations as well as their engagement in mainstream and immigrant-related activities (cf. Pilati and Morales 2016). Our core hypothesis is that traditional and new cities of destination are likely to implement different integration policies and have different legislations concerning individual and collective rights granted to migrants and their descendants. Therefore, these characteristics are expected to affect civic and political engagement. In particular, traditional gateways are expected to provide more "open" political opportunity structures for immigrants' integration and participation whereas new ones are expected to be more restrictive because of a slower

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Most of these findings, with a few exceptions, are confirmed by the separate analyses provided in Table 11.A.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> We recognize the possibility that different immigrant groups' participation might be influenced by cultural factors specific to their countries of origin. We have maximized the variation in those origins by choosing groups for each city that have been in the country for a longer period of time, recent arrivals, and one group of Muslim religious background. While the number of countries of origin is too large to include a control variable for each, the variable that may make the largest difference in this regard—Muslim origin—is included. The small effect of this variable lends confidence to the conclusion that characteristics of particular national origin groups do not unduly influence our results. Moreover, it is unlikely that our findings are accounted for by the possibility that the mix of immigrants in traditional destination cities is systematically different from the mix of immigrants in new destination cities. In traditional destination cities we have Italians (two cities), Kosovars (two cities), Turks (two cities), Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, Indians, and Chileans. In new destination cities we have Chinese, Hungarians, mixed Muslim nationality groups, Ecuadorans (two cities), other Latin Americans, Moroccans, Filipinos, and Egyptians. Thus, the nationality groups differ more across individual cities than between traditional versus new destination cities.

implementation of political integration policies, less know-how by political elites, less preparedness, and less experience with immigration flows.

Our first contribution is conceptual. We use a more fine-grained distinction among types of organizations depending on the ethnic composition of the membership and among types of political engagement. Thus, we distinguish between native, pan-immigrant, and ethnic organizations with regard to civic engagement, and between mainstream and immigrant-related activities concerning political engagement. This distinction has proved very insightful, as our results show that the contextual effect of new and traditional destinations changes depending on the type of civic and political engagement studied. In particular, the type of destination mainly significantly affects engagement in pan-immigrant organizations. This is of utmost importance. On the one hand, this is likely to have negative effects on the mobilizing impact of organizations on political engagement of migrants, as migrants are eventually going to have fewer resources for mobilization derived from pan-immigrant organizations. On the other hand, it shows that migrants, with the exclusion of pan-immigrant organizational engagement, have equally important organizational and political resources at their disposal in new and traditional destinations. However, as mentioned, this does not mean that other contextual characteristics may not be significant in shaping migrants' opportunities to participate in the civic and political sphere, in line with prior research arguing that the context of policies and legislation that afford migrants varying individual and group rights actually matters for their political inclusion (Bloemraad 2006a, b; Koopmans et al. 2005; Morales and Giugni 2011; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008a). Future research may specifically look at how other contextual conditions affect migrants' civic engagement, as this has been less studied when compared to their political engagement. Indeed, the context is not only relevant to understanding to what extent migrants engage in politics, but it also determines how useful certain resources—in our case, the multiple skills and social capital provided by associational involvement—are for political engagement. Given that involvement in associations is quite low for immigrant-background individuals across most European societies (see, e.g., Strömblad, Myrberg, and Bengtsson 2011: fig. 6.3), lack of access to these organizational resources might prove to be a considerable source of political inequality.

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Figure 11.1 **Associational Engagement by City and Type of Destination** 




Figure 11.2 **Political Engagement by City and Type of Destination** 




Table 11.1 **Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables by city** (mean)

	BAR	BUD	GEN	LON	LYO	MAD	MIL	STO	ZUR	Total
Dependent variables										
Engagement in at least one native organization	0.228	0.060	0.200	0.090	0.346	0.112	0.112	0.783	0.167	0.203
Engagement in at least one pan-immigrant organization	0.099	0.006	0.190	0.043	0.206	0.069	0.027	0.197	0.079	0.092
Engagement in at least one ethnic organization	0.139	0.035	0.148	0.131	0.087	0.126	0.113	0.193	0.171	0.124
Engagement in at least one mainstream extra-electoral activity	0.200	0.064	0.205	0.046	0.332	0.075	0.037	0.581	0.086	0.155
Engagement in at least one immigrant-related extra-electoral	0.126	0.030	0.111	0.046	0.183	0.065	0.036	0.057	0.057	0.076
activity										
Independent variables										
Gender	0.557	0.611	0.539	0.523	0.444	0.493	0.524	0.486	0.665	0.543
Age	38.970	33.846	43.985	33.750	36.366	34.998	35.398	38.006	44.625	37.712
Married	0.611	0.510	0.701	0.483	0.535	0.543	0.628	0.598	0.773	0.597
In paid work	0.789	0.561	0.535	0.599	0.535	0.776	0.731	0.665	0.559	0.641
Educational level attained	0.566	0.747	0.571	0.722	0.592	0.485	0.636	0.630	0.495	0.604
Interest in residence country politics	0.539	0.611	0.600	0.423	0.719	0.439	0.374	0.619	0.569	0.533
Proportion of life living in the country	0.232	0.279	0.589	0.756	0.797	0.203	0.272	0.604	0.554	0.458
Social trust	0.484	0.596	0.508	0.492	0.337	0.523	0.472	0.450	0.494	0.488
Second and third generations	0.008	0.019	0.134	0.502	0.484	0.003	0.022	0.173	0.111	0.155
Has no country of residence citizenship nor permit	0.109	0.079	0.200	0.021	0.057	0.157	0.207	0.000	0.176	0.117
Has country of residence citizenship	0.201	0.180	0.156	0.764	0.799	0.161	0.057	0.800	0.118	0.336
Has country of residence permit to stay	0.690	0.741	0.644	0.215	0.145	0.682	0.737	0.200	0.706	0.547
Language	0.874	0.538	0.708	0.825	0.930	0.743	0.165	0.886	0.381	0.648
Muslim	0.285	0.314	0.440	0.439	0.703	0.342	0.288	0.292	0.513	0.402
New destination city	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	
N	741	823	649	886	705	866	900	508	902	6,980

*Note*: All dependent variables are measured on a 0–1 scale and, hence, represent the proportion of all respondents engaged in the given type of association or political activity.

Table 11.2 Correlates of civic participation (models 1 to 3) and of political participation (models 4 and 5). Logit models (data clustered by group-city)

	Mod	Model 1 Mod		Model 2		lel 3				del 5
	engagement in		Engagement in		Engagement in		Engagement in		Engagement in	
	nat		pan-imi	_	eth		mains			nt-related
	organiz	zations	organiz	zations	organiz	zations	nonele			ectoral
							activ	ities	activ	vities
	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
Male	-0.03	(0.08)	$0.17^{+}$	(0.10)	$0.20^{+}$	(0.10)	0.09	(0.07)	0.08	(0.10)
Age	$0.05^{*}$	(0.02)	0.02	(0.04)	0.02	(0.02)	0.09***	(0.02)	$0.05^{**}$	(0.02)
Age squared	-0.00*	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.00)	-0.00	(0.00)	-0.00***	(0.00)	-0.00*	(0.00)
Married	-0.08	(0.12)	-0.18	(0.13)	$0.30^{**}$	(0.09)	-0.10	(0.09)	-0.06	(0.13)
Education	0.50	(0.32)	0.13	(0.28)	0.14	(0.23)	0.85***	(0.26)	$0.62^{*}$	(0.24)
In paid work	$0.22^{**}$	(0.08)	$0.27^{**}$	(0.10)	0.12	(0.13)	$-0.16^{+}$	(0.09)	-0.12	(0.10)
Interest residence country politics	$0.59^{***}$	(0.10)	$0.72^{***}$	(0.14)	$0.23^{*}$	(0.10)	1.14***	(0.12)	0.91***	(0.16)
Social trust	-0.20	(0.15)	-0.13	(0.24)	-0.25	(0.21)	0.11	(0.20)	-0.42*	(0.20)
Proportion of life living in the country	0.34	(0.49)	0.27	(0.39)	-0.13	(0.31)	0.20	(0.39)	0.32	(0.32)
Second and third generation	-0.83***	(0.23)	$-0.32^{+}$	(0.19)	-0.16	(0.15)	-0.77**	(0.25)	-0.05	(0.18)
Home country language proficiency	0.74***	(0.15)	0.84***	(0.21)	0.18	(0.23)	1.30***	(0.15)	0.63**	(0.21)
Muslim	$-0.62^{+}$	(0.36)	-0.10	(0.22)	-0.22	(0.22)	-0.65 <sup>+</sup>	(0.36)	0.04	(0.18)
Legal status: Has no country of residence citizenship nor permit (REF)										
Has country of residence citizenship	$1.17^{**}$	(0.36)	-0.40	(0.30)	-0.07	(0.30)	0.23	(0.33)	-0.43 <sup>+</sup>	(0.24)
Has country of residence permit to stay	0.45**	(0.17)	-0.47*	(0.20)	-0.17	(0.26)	-0.42*	(0.18)	-0.42*	(0.18)
New destination city	-0.93 <sup>+</sup>	(0.49)	-0.96**	(0.31)	-0.40	(0.24)	-1.02*	(0.43)	-0.08	(0.25)
Constant	-3.60***	(0.62)	-3.20***	(0.54)	-2.68***	(0.58)	-4.80***	(0.59)	-4.31***	(0.37)
11	_	( - )	-	( - )	-	( )	-	( )	-	( /
	2834.99		1840.43		2389.19		2275.78		1650.65	
chi2	450.60		228.29		190.46		662.51		190.75	
N	6,350		6,350		6,350		6,350		6,350	

p < .10 p < .05 p < .01 p < .01 p < .001

# Appendix Coding of Variables

#### **OUTCOME VARIABLES**

Engaged in at least one political activity: Participation in at least one of the following extra-electoral political activities in the previous twelve months: contacted a politician; contacted a government or local government official; worked in a political party; worked in a political action group; wore or displayed a badge, sticker, or poster; boycotted certain products; deliberately bought certain products for political reasons; donated money to a political organization or group; contacted the media; contacted a lawyer or a judicial body for nonpersonal reasons.<sup>12</sup>

Whenever a respondent indicated that the issue fundamentally concerned the family or a few other individuals, the city, the country of residence, or the world, we considered this as indicative of *mainstream political action*. When a respondent indicated that the issue related to immigrants, we considered this indicative of *immigrant-related political action*.

<u>Engagement in ethnic organizations</u>: Engagement in at least one organization for which the respondent was currently/in the past a member of, or participated in, during the prior twelve months and in which half or more of members are of the respondent's ethnic/national origin.

<u>Engagement in pan-immigrant organizations</u>: Same as above but half or more of members are of multiple immigrant origins.

<u>Engagement in native or mainstream organizations</u>: Same as above but half or more of members are of the majority native group in the country.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> We follow the classification proposed by Teorell, Torcal, and Montero (2007) and exclude the more contentious forms of protest, namely signing petitions, participating in demonstrations, and joining strikes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> List of types of organizations: A. Sports club or club for outdoor activities; B. Organization for cultural activities, tradition preserving or any hobby activities (musical, dancing, breeding, etc.); C. Political Party; D. Trade union; E. Business, employers, professional or farmers' organization; F. Organization for humanitarian

#### **PREDICTORS**

<u>Political context</u>: 1 = new destination cities (Barcelona, Budapest, Madrid, Milan); 0 = old destination cities (Geneva, London, Lyon, Stockholm, Zurich).

*Gender:* Dichotomous in which 1 = male.

Age: Continuous variable, range 15–94.

<u>Education</u>: The highest level of education achieved; an ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 1 (0 = not completed primary education to 1 = first and second stage of tertiary education).

*In paid work:* A dichotomous variable distinguishing between those in paid work, assigned a score of 1, from others.

<u>Married</u>: A dichotomous variable for which 1 is assigned to people who are married or live in partnership.

Social trust: An ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 10 (0 = "you can't be too careful in dealing with people"; 10 = "most people can be trusted") recoded into a 0–1 range. Given the high number of missing values, these were imputed with the mean value.

<u>Proportion of life spent in country</u>: The number of years since arrival is divided by the age of the respondent, and a value of 1 is assigned to all those who were born in the country.

<u>Second and third generation</u>: A dichotomous variable for which 1 is assigned to people born in the country identifying second and third generations.

*Legal status*: Categorical variable for which 1 is assigned to all respondents who have the citizenship of the country of residence 2 to those respondents who have a permit to stay and 0 otherwise.

aid, charity, or social welfare; G. Organization for environmental protection or animal rights; H. Human rights or peace organization; I. Religious or church organization; J. Immigrants organization (e.g. organization for the support or promotion of immigrants' interests, broadly defined); K. Ethnic organization (e.g., organization primarily for the advancement of the ethnic group); L. Antiracism organization; M. Educational organization, teachers', parents, and so on; N. Youth organization (e.g., scouts, youth clubs, etc.); O. Organization for the retired/elderly; P. Women's organization; Q. Residents, housing, or neighborhood organization; R. Other org.

<u>Muslim</u>: Dichotomous variable for which 1 is assigned to people declaring to be of Muslim religion.

<u>Language</u>: A dichotomous variable for which 1 is assigned to people who speak fluently the host country language.

Table 11.A Correlates of civic participation (model 1) and of political participation (model 4). Logit models with cluster option (data clustered by group-city) controlling for the city of Stockholm

	Model 1A eng	gagement in	Model 4A engagement in mainstream nonelectoral activities			
	native orga	nizations				
	b	se	b	se		
Male	-0.01	(0.09)	0.11	(0.08)		
Age	$0.05^{*}$	(0.02)	$0.08^{***}$	(0.02)		
Age squared	-0.00*	(0.00)	-0.00***	(0.00)		
Married	-0.05	(0.11)	-0.07	(0.06)		
Education	0.69***	(0.19)	1.02***	(0.20)		
In paid work	$0.20^*$	(0.09)	-0.21*	(0.09)		
Interest residence country politics	0.63***	(0.09)	1.21***	(0.12)		
Social trust	-0.19	(0.18)	0.11	(0.23)		
Proportion of life living in the country	1.10***	(0.29)	0.86**	(0.33)		
Second and third generation	-0.63***	(0.14)	-0.59***	(0.16)		
Home country language proficiency	0.67***	(0.15)	1.23***	(0.17)		
Muslim	-0.38+	(0.22)	-0.43 <sup>+</sup>	(0.23)		
Legal status: Has no country of residence citizenship						
nor permit (REF)						
Has country of residence citizenship	0.53**	(0.18)	-0.33	(0.24)		
Has country of residence permit to stay	$0.29^{+}$	(0.15)	-0.55***	(0.16)		
New destination city	-0.17	(0.28)	-0.33	(0.31)		
Stockholm	2.54***	(0.20)	1.94***	(0.27)		
Constant	-4.52***	(0.53)	-5.64***	(0.56)		
11	-2616.43		-2155.07			
chi2	4509.61		777.33			
N	6,350		6,350			

<sup>+</sup> p < .10 \* p < .05 \*\* p < .01 \*\*\* p < .001